1. Lucia Europa v Hunter Garments manufacturing - G.R. No. 72827. 18 July 1989. Held: No.
Held: No. In support of the conclusion of the Attorney-General, he cites the case of
Facts: In 1973, petitioner’s daughter, Lucrecia Europa, was employed as sample maker by
the private respondent (Hunter). Sometime in the course of her employment, Lucrecia got
electrocuted by the high speed sewing machine which was assigned to her by Hunter.
On 18 July 1980, petitioner filed an action for damages against Hunter based on quasi-
delict. The Lower Court (LC) found for petitioner.
Issue: WON there was gross negligence on the part of private respondent as expressed in
the judgment of the LC.
Ruling: Yes. Indemnity for death increased to P30,000.
The SC held that in actions based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, all damages for natural
and probable consequences of the act/omission complained of are recoverable (Art. 2202)
As found by the LC, there were at least two incidents where high speed sewing machines
of defendant corporation were grounded. These were brought to the attention of the
management of Hunter but nothing was done. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Salvador
confirmed that Lucrecia died from “shock probably secondary to electrocution.” The SC
reiterated the LC and held that if the machines were frequently and regularly checked or
properly maintained, the death of Lucrecia could not have come to pass.
2. US vs. TAN PIACO G.R. No. L-15122 March 10, 1920
Facts: Piaco rented two automobile trucks and was using them upon the highways of the
Province of Leyte for the purpose of carrying some passengers and freight. He carried
passengers and freight under a special contract in each case. He had not held himself out
to carry all passengers and all freight for all persons who might offer passengers and
freight. Said defendants were charged with a violation of the Public Utility Law (Act No.
2307 as amended by Acts Nos. 2362 and 2694), in that they were operating a public utility
without permission from the Public Utility Commissioner.
Issue: Whether the appellant was a public utility under the foregoing definitions, and was
therefore subject to the control and regulation of the Public Utility Commission.
Terminal Taxicab Co. vs. Kutz (241 U. S.. 252).
Section 14 of Act No. 2307, as amended by section 9 of Act No. 2694, provides that: "The
Public Utility Commission or Commissioners shall have general supervision and regulation
of, jurisdiction and control over, all public utilities. . . . The term 'public utility' is hereby
defined to include every individual, copartnership, association, corporation or joint stock
company, etc., etc., that now or hereafter may own, operate, managed, or control any
common carrier, railroad, street railway, etc., etc., engaged in the transportation of
passengers, cargo, etc., etc., for public use."
Under the provisions of said section, two things are necessary: (a) The individual,
copartnership, etc., etc., must be a public utility; and (b) the business in which such
individual, copartnership, etc. etc., is engaged must be for public use. So long as the
individual or copartnership, etc., etc., is engaged in a purely private enterprise, without
attempting to render service to all who may apply, he can in no sense be considered a
public utility, for public use.
"Public use" means the same as "use by the public." The essential feature of the public use
is that it is not confined to privilege individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is
this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives it its public character. In determining
whether a use is public, we must look not only the character of the business to be done,
but also to the proposed mode of doing it. If the use is merely optional with the owners,
or the public benefit is merely incidental, it is not a public use, authorizing the exercise of
the jurisdiction of the public utility commission. There must be, in general, a right which
the law compels the power to give to the general public. It is not enough that the general
prosperity of the public is promoted. Public use is not synonymous with public interest.
The true criterion by which to judge of the character of the use is whether the public may
enjoy it by right or only by permission.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the appellant was not operating a public utility, for public
use, and was not, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commission.
3. Air France vs. Carrascoso
Fact: The plaintiff, Rafael Carrascoso, paid for and was issued a “First class” ticket by Air
France from Manila to Rome. During a stopover in Bangkok, the manager of Air France
asked the plaintiff to vacate his seat because a white man has a “better right” than him. At
first, the plaintiff protested, but, as things got heated up, he was asked by the other Filipinos
on board to give up his seat and transfer in the tourist class. After the trip, Carrascoso sued
Air France for the embarrassment and inconvenience he suffered.
The trail court awarded damages to the plaintiff which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Air France assailed the decision. According to them, the issuance of a first class
ticket does not guarantee Carrascoso a seat in the first Class.
Issue: Whether or not Air France is liable for the damages to Carrascoso and on what basis
Decision:Yes. Air France is liable based on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana. Culpa
Contractual There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso.
There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said
contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, t h a t t h e r e w a s b a d f a i t h w h e n A i r
F r a n c e ’ s e m p l o y e e c o m p e l l e d Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth “ after he was already, seated” a n d to ta k e a s e at i n
t h e t o u r i st c l a s s , by r e a so n o f w h i c h h e s u f f e r e d inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The
Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first
class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat.
Such claim is simply incredible. Culpa Aquiliana Here, the SC ruled, even though there
is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous
act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air
France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
4. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT G.R. No. L-7664
FACTS: Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara
filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee is
charged . 14 year old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in one of those pools.
Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was drowned in one of its swimming pools
but avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident.
Defendant also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and
supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law
under the circumstances.
After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed
the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal
directly to this Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.
ISSUE:
1. WON the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of
defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.
2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance could be used against the respondent
HELD: decision is affirmed
The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil
Code. The first article provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done.” Such
fault or negligence is called quasi-delict. Under the second article, this obligation is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle
to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the
damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is
claimed, or of one of his employees.
NO. There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions
to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their
death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a
ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The
bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on
display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the
use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a
course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. …There is a male nurse
and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are
security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of
the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life, from
manual resuscitation to calling for a doctor. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has
done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and
for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.
2. We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not show
how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is
that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink
a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his
lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant
where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, “As the
doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the
negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.”
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being
apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations
of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded
to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after
retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to
bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine
now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at
hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court, which we
find supported by the evidence: “There is (also) a strong suggestion coming from the
expert evidence presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where
the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his
forehead against the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and
which to his drowning.
5. LASAM VS. SMITH - 45 PHIL 657
FACTS: The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San Fernando, La
Union, and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from one point to
another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. Defendant undertook
to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford
automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by a licensed
chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur allowed his
assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver’s license, but had some experience
in driving. The car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin,
when, according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in
the steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a
distance of about half kilometer, the car left the road and went down a steep
embankment. The automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it.
Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a dislocated rib, but his wife, Joaquina,
received serious injuries, among which was a compound fracture of one of the bones in
her left wrist. She also suffered nervous breakdown from which she has not fully
recovered at the time of trial.
The complaint was filed about a year and a half after and alleges that the accident was
due to defects in the automobile as well as to the incompetence and negligence of the
chauffeur. The trial court held, however, that the cause of action rests on the defendant’s
breach of the contract of carriage and that, consequently, articles 1101-1107 of the Civil
Code, and not article 1903, are applicable. The court further found that the breach of
contact was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore the defendant was liable in
damages
ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in its findings that the breach of contract was not due to a
fortuitous event?
RULING: Yes. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability is
the contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the
plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so he is
liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to
causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads: “No one shall be liable for
events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the
exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which
the obligation itself imposes such liability.”

As will be seen, some extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of the obligor,
or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. In the present case, this
element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of
God or to adverse road conditions which could have been foreseen. As far as the record
shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the
negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.