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IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION


1. Introduction
2. Sequence
a. PART I. Economic Foundations of Military Power.
b. PART II. Impact of Industrial Revolution on
c. PART III. Impact of Industrial Revolution on Conduct of War
d. PART IV. Salient conclusions.
PART I - ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY POWER
3. Industrial Revolution
4. Adam Smith
Britain in Eighteenth Century
a. Monetary Theory
b. Importance of Military Power
c. Navigation Act
5. Alexander Hamilton
Post American Civil War Scenario.
a. National Economy.
i Manufacturers are protected by the government to enhance the productive
capacity of the country.
ii Public debts be taken as a binding force for the investors.
iii Hamilton believed in a national bank to lend maximum support to the
government.
iv Manufacturers of munitions of war be encouraged and controlled by
government.
v A strong military policy/attainment of naval safeguard for external
commerce.
b. Infant Industry Argument
i Import duties on finished products.
ii Restraints on export of raw material whereas export of finished goods be
encouraged.
iii Exemption of duties on import of certain necessary raw material.
iv Monetary rewards and bounties.
v An annual purchase of firearms and military weapons from local
manufacturers.
c. Inter-Weaving of Secondary Economy
d. National Security.
i National unity against factionalism and sectionalism.
ii Colonies on the continent be only transferred to America. Professional army
should be the basis of national defence.
iii Take a sizeable share in the occupation of the ocean and right of
transportation of commodities, fishing and use of other seas.
iv If necessary, a counter navigation law.
6. Friedrich List-“The customs union of member states to promote internal free trade but to shield
member states from foreign competition (England). It requires progressive destruction of internal tariffs
between the member states”.
a. Relationship of Politics, Economics and Power.
b. National Security
(i) Protection of Productive Power
(aa) To guard commerce by a navy, because the merchants cannot
protect themselves.
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(ab) To protect the carrying trade by navigation laws, because


carrying trade supports naval power and naval power protects carrying trade.
(ac) To support agriculture and other industry by turnpikes, bridges, canals
and railroads.
(ad) Protect new inventions by patent laws.
(ii) Ability to Wage War
(iii) Protectionist Policy
(iv) Influence of Railways
c. State Power Vs Economy.
(i) Economy should be used as tool to achieve national aims and objectives.
(ii) Development of industries is necessary to strengthen the economy of a country.
(iii) Abolish internal tariff and adopt a uniform commercial policy within the
country as well as with other nations.
(iv) Object of national economy is not to make individuals rich but to increase the
national wealth, which will ultimately increase national power.
(v) Wage war by a nation depends upon its productivity.
(vi) The greater the productive power, the greater the strength of a nation in its
foreign relations and greater it’s independence in time of war.
PART II- IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION ON STRATEGY
(MOLTKE AND RISE OF GERMAN GENERAL STAFF)
7. Impact on Strategy
8. Strategy
9. Development of Strategy
a. Strategy of Envelopment.
b. Strategy of Defensive Offensive.
c. Strategy of Mobilization.
d. Strategy of Concentration.
e. Operations on Interior and Exterior Lines.
f. Strategy of Expedients.
g. Blitzkrieg.
10. Validity of Concepts Today and Tomorrow.
nd
a. German Blitzkrieg was surprise to the armies of Europe during 2 World War.
b. Strategy of Defensive-offensive can prove successful, if based on strong foreign policy to
reach to a diplomatic solution in earlier time frame.
11. Emergence of the Prussian Army in Europe
a. Its organization.
b. Peacetime training.
c. Theoretical study of war.
th
12. Prussian Army of 19 Century owes its elevation to zenith to four great men, most of them
non-Prussian by descent
a. Fredrick the Great.
b. Napoleon.
c. Scharnhorst.
d. Gneisenau.
13. Origin and Rise of General Staff
14. Moltke’s Philosophy on Conduct of Military Affairs
a. Decentralization.
b. Initiative
c. Logistics.
d. Railways
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e. Roads
f. Mobilization
g. Envelopment
h. Inner Lines.
15. These wars were rapidly decided in 7 weeks only due to
a. Limited nature of both wars.
b. Superiority of Prussian General Staff.
c. Speed of Prussian mobilization.
d. Superior Prussian tactics.
PART III - IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION ON CONDUCT OF WAR
(SCHLIEFFEN AND STRATEGIC ENVELOPMENT)
16. American Civil War (1861-1865)
17. Austro-Prussian War (1866
18. Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871)
19. Von Schlieffen
a. Parallelism.
b. Implications.
(i) Location of Switzerland and Belgium
(ii) Terrain
(iii) Intervention of Britain
20. Schlieffen Plan
a. Considerations
(i) Russian mobilization will be slow initially so France is to be taken on first.
(ii) France would have strong fortresses along their frontiers, which may result
in loss of valuable time.
(iii) Wide manoeuvres through Belgium was possible.
(iv) Military advantage, out weighed violation of Belgium’s neutrality and
dangers of British hostility was imminent.
b. Plan
(i) Eastern Front (Russia)
(ii) Southern Front (Serbia)
(iii) Western Front
(iv) Execution
c. Criticism on the Plan
(i) General von Bulow and General Bernhardi preferred frontal attacks instead of
flanking ones.
(ii) General von Schlicting advocated smaller groups instead of huge armies.
(iii) Schlieffen was blamed for doing nothing for the training of senior
commanders.
d. Modification in Plan
e. Reasons of Failure
(i) Moltke (the younger) only copied the ideas of Moltke (the elder) slavishly and
could not visualize the situation correctly at Verdun.
(ii) Plan was to advance west of Paris but actually it was conducted east of Paris,
leaving French capital and railways hub uninvested.
(iii) Weak and incompetent generalship.
(iv) Incorrect passage of information to Moltke’s Headquarters.
(v) Exposed flank of General Kluck.
21. Impact on Conduct of War
a. Adoption of Strategy of Annihilation
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b. Concept of Depth in Defence.


c. Faster Mobilization.
d. Enhanced Offensive Capability.
e. Importance of Attrition not Lost
f. Aerial Reconnaissance.
g. Unification of Command
h. Tactics as a Prelude
PART IV - SALIENT CONCLUSIONS
22. Salient Features
a. Mobilization
b. Concentration
c. Command and Control
d. Strategy
e. Power Potential
f. War Waging Capacity
g. Strategy of Envelopment
h. Efficient Staff Procedures
i. Protection to Industrial Sector
23. In nutshell the industrial revolution, transformed a fundamental change in the concept and
modes of making war. The revolution had following facets
a. An economic revolution that provided the means to feed, arm, and transport mass
armies.
b. The mobilization of mass armies.
c. A revolution in weapons technology involving a phenomenal increase in
firepower.
d. A revolution in the technique of management and organization.
24. Conclusion

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