The Seven (7) Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and

Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations

The United Nation's "Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations",
adopted by the UN General Assembly, thru Resolution No. 2625 (XXV) on October 24, 1970,
after ten (10) years of work and study, contain the following seven (7) basic principles of
international law:

"1. The principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

"2. The principle that states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

"3. The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in
accordance with the Charter;

"4. The duty of states to cooperate with one another in accordance with the Charter;

"5. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

"6. The principle of sovereign equality of states; and

"7. The principle that states shall fulfill in good faith the obligation assumed by them in
accordance with the Charter."(cf. fifth (5th) Introductory Clauses of the "Declaration" in
Merlin M. Magallona, 96).

The Declaration enumerated the elements of "sovereign equality" of a state, thus:

"The principle of sovereign equality of states.

"All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of
the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other
nature.
"In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:

"(a) States are juridically equal;

"(b) Each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
"(c) Each state has the duty to respect the personality of other states;
"(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the state are inviolable;
"(e) Each state has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and
cultural systems;
"(f) Each state has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international
obligations and to live in peace with other states." (cf. Principle No. 6 of the main body of
the "Declaration" in Magallona, 104).

The Subjects and Objects of International Law

A subject of international law is an entity with capacity of possessing international rights and duties
and of bringing international claims. This entity is said to be an international person or one having
an international personality, on the basis of customary or general international law.(Magallona,
18-19).

A subject of Public International Law is an entity directly possessed of rights and obligations in
the international legal order, e.g. a sovereign state, such as the Philippines. (Paras, 43).

An object of Public International Law, on the other hand, is merely indirectly vested with rights
and obligations in the international sphere, e.g. a Filipino private citizen is generally regarded not
as a subject but an object of Public International Law because, while he is entitled to certain rights
which other states ought to respect, he usually has no recourse except to course his grievances
through the Republic of the Philippines and its diplomatic officers. (id.).
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Kinds of Subjects in International Law

A. The STATE

Magallona distinguishes between (a) general or objective international personality and (b)
particular or special international personality, as follows:

"x x x As to the first (general or objective international personality), rights and obligations are
conferred by general international law and such personality is binding erga omnes; and as to the
second (particular or special international personality), personality binds only those which give
consent (express or tacit).

"The distinction is implied in the Reparation for Injuries Case, in which on the question as to the
legal personality of the United Nations to claim reparation for injury to its agents committed by
nationals of a non-Member State, the (International Court of Justice or ICJ) states: "xxx fifty
States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had the
power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective
international personality and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with
capacity to bring international claims xxx [ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 185]."(Magallona, 19).

B. STATES: Single/Simple and Composite

Paras categorizes "subjects in international law" into two (2) categories: (a) the complete or perfect
international personality, and (b) the incomplete or imperfect, or qualified or quasi-international
personality. (Paras, 47).

He classifies states into the following species: (a) single or simple state (e.g., Philippines), and (b)
composite state.

The 1933 Monteviedo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides for the legal
characteristics of a State, thus:

"The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a)a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; (d) and capacity to enter into
relations with other States." (cf. Magallona, 20).

The "capacity to enter into relations with other States" refers to independence, which many highly
qualified publicists consider as the decisive criterion of statehood. (Magallona, 20-21).

RECOGNITION is considered as "the act by which another State acknowledges that the political
entity recognized possesses the attributes of statehood." (Magallona, 21, citing Jessup, Modern
Law of Nations: An Introduction, 1949, p. 4).

There are two theories on the nature and effect of recognition, as discussed by Magallona (at pp.
22-22):

xxx The constitutive school maintains that it is the act of recognition which constitutes or creates
the status of a State as a subject of law and thus gives it a legal personality. The international status
of any entity as a State is to be determined by the will and consent of already existing States.

xxx The declaratory theory asserts that recognition merely confirms the acceptance by States of
the status of an entity as a State. A new State acquires legal personality by its own creative act in
bringing about the objective criteria of statehood, rather than by the subjective act of other States.

xxx The declaratory school is the preferred approach, the prevailing view being that recognition is
not an element of statehood.

Paras, Coquia and Defensor-Santiago classify the different kinds of composite states as follows:

"(1) The Federation or Federal State (such as the United States and the United States of
Switzerland);
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"(2) The Confederation (such as the original Confederation of the American States, which
eventually became the nucleus of the present United States).

"(NOTE: The principal difference between a federal union and a confederation is that a federal
union of states exists when the central or federal government exercises authority over both the
various states in the union and the citizens thereof; while the confederation has some sort of power
over its individual states, but not over the individual citizens of the member states. The federal
union, as such, is an International Person, thus the United States is represented in the United
Nations as one juridical or international entity; on the other hand, the confederation as such
is not an International Person, each of the member-states being represented by its own
delegate. However, there is at present no confederation of confederated states).

"(3) The Real Union (such as the former United Arab Republic which was formed by two
sovereign states [Egypt and Syria] linked by a common government in external affairs and by a
common chief of state. The union then possessed a single international personality [the separate
personalities of the states having been merged into a unified whole]. xxx.

"(4) The Personal Union (this is the merger of two separate sovereign states in the sense that both
have the same individual as the accidental or temporary head of state. However, the union as such
has no separate international personality since each of the member-states has its own government
and its own separate international personality. It would seem that today, there is no Personal Union
in existence. xxx.

"(5) The Incorporate Union (one where the internal and external organs of government of two
states are merged into one, resulting in a single international personality. An example is the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland xxx. While in a Real Union there is a merger only of foreign
affairs or external relations, in the Incorporate Union the merger is actually complete and concerns
internal as well as external affairs and relations).
"NOTE: The British Commonwealth of Nations xxx apparently does not fall under any of the
preceding classifications xxx."
(Paras, 49-50; Coquia & Defensor-Santiago, 64-100).

c. The INCOMPLETE, IMPERFECT, QUALIFIED OR QUASI-INTERNATIONAL

PERSONALITIES

Paras lists the incomplete, imperfect, qualified or quasi-international personalities as follows:

"xxx among them are the dependent states (protectorate and suzerainties); belligerent
communities (and in a very, very modified way, insurgent communities, subject to certain
conditions); colonies; dependencies and possessions; mandates and trust territories; certain public
and political corporations or companies; and international administrative bodies." (Paras, 52;
underscoring supplied).

It is noteworthy to state that "international Organizations such as the former League of Nations
and the present United Nations are of course in their own way International Persons." (Paras, 60).

The United Nations, being possessed of juridical personality, has the following capacities: to
contract; to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; and to institute legal
proceedings. (Paras, 63, citing Art. 1, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly on Feb. 13, 1946, in 1 UN Treaty Series 15).

Paras classifies the three (3) groups of International Organizations, aside from the United Nations,
as follows:

(1) Inter-governmental bodies, including specialized agencies of the UN, e.g., Food and
Agricultural Organization, International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund, United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization;

(2) Other Inter-Governmental Bodies, e.g., Permanent Court of Arbitration, International Criminal
Police Commission, Bank of International Settlements;
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(3) Non-Governmental International Bodies, e.g. International Commission of Jurists, Christian

Family Movement Moral Re-Armament, International Chamber of Commerce, Rotary
International. (cf. Paras, 60-61).

Private Individuals: Developing New Status in International Law

Paras discusses that while traditional writers insist that private individuals are merely objects and
not subjects of international law, some recognized writers in recent years have accorded to the
individual a new status in international law: they say, and with good reason, that private
individuals should now be regarded as subjects in the international order, in view of the importance
laid on them by the following:

"(1) the Charter of the United Nations Organization, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; x x x;
"(2) the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Tribunals for War Crimes xxx;
"(3) the norm of general international law which prohibits piracy x x x:
"(4) espionage rules; conventions punishing acts of illegitimate warfare; rules of general
international law punishing private individuals for breach of blockade and carriage of
contraband;
"(5) the practice of certain courts of permitting foreigners to appear and prosecute claims;
"(6) the Genocide Convention of 1948 which directly holds liable not only states, but also
private individuals, for the mass extermination of a racial group;
"(7) the existence of rules safeguarding the rights of aliens and minorities;
"(8) punishment for the illegal use of the flag (Reporter's Note: this refers to vessels using
the flag of s state with which such vessel is not registered);
"(9) the procedure in admiralty and maritime matters;
"(10) the special status accorded to refugees, and to displaced persons, such as those fleeing
from South Vietnam, from Cambodia, and, more recently, from Cuba x x x. (cf. Paras, 44-
46).

BELLIGERENT AND INSURGENT COMMUNITIES

A status of belligerency recognized under international law may arise if (1) there exists within the
State an armed conflict of a general character;(2) the insurgents occupy a substantial portion of the
national territory; and (3) they conduct the hostilities in accordance with the rules of war thru
organized groups acting under a responsible authority. (Coquia/Defensor-Santiago, 85).

Recognition of a status of belligerency on the part of other States is necessary for the legal creation
of the status of "belligerent community." (id.).

A fourth requirement that has been suggested for the recognition of belligerency is that there must
exist a circumstance which makes it "necessary" for the recognizing State to define its attitude to
the conflict. Coquia and Defensor-Santiago explains the matter, thus:

The reason for this final requirement is that if the parties to the struggle propose to exercise
belligerent rights on the high seas in such a manner as to affect the recognizing State's maritime
interests, the need for it to define its attitude to the struggle has arisen. If, on the other hand, a
distant inland state with no maritime interests, and in no way affected by the conflict were to
recognize the rebels as belligerents, it could open itself to the charge of encouraging
rebellion. (id., 86).

Recognition of belligerency before the four conditions are fulfilled is considered as contrary to
international law (id., 86, citing Sorensen, 286).

Recognition of belligerency by a State not a party to the contest is frequently announced in a formal
proclamation of neutrality between the two contending parties. Recognition may be express or
implied. (id., 87).

If the foreign government gives aid to the de facto (belligerent) government recognized by it, and
that de facto government is defeated in the war, then the lawful government may hold the foreign
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State responsible for an act of unjustifiable aggression and of premature recognition. (id., citing
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, 13).

The recognized belligerent community lacks the right to send or receive diplomatic agents to join
international organizations, and to benefit in a normal manner from multilateral conventions
concerned with peacetime international relations and activities of States. (id., 86).
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago cite the legal implications of recognition of a belligerent
community, thus:

The granting of recognition of belligerency to rebels is only provisional. While conferring an equal
status to warring groups, it does so only for the purposes and for the duration of the war. For the
purposes and for the duration of the war, the insurgents recognized as a belligerent power possess
for the most part, the duties and rights of States when engaged in war. (id., citing Kelsen, 413).

A state of insurgency is not equivalent to a state of belligerency. The former is "a rebellion which
has not yet achieved the standing of a belligerent community xxx, a condition described as
intermediate between internal tranquility and civil war." (Coquia, 88).

The conditions for a state of insurgency are: (1) the insurgents must have a government and a
military organization of their own; (2) the insurrection must be conducted in the technical forms
of war, that is, it must be more than a petty revolt and must assume the true characteristics of a
war; and (3) the government of the insurgents must in fact control a certain part of the territory of
the State in which the civil war takes place. (id., citing Kelsen, 412).

A related matter is the "government in exile". It has two classes, according to Coquia and
Defensor-Santiago:

The first category consists of governments whose heads and cabinets move from the national
territory temporarily during the moments of crisis. xxx. In such cases, no formal act of recognition
(is) necessary xxx because it (is) deemed that there (is) no break in legal continuity.

A second category consist of governments formed abroad, in which case there can be no legal
connection between the government in exile and the government operating on the national territory
at the time. xxx. A formal act of recognition (is) necessary. xxx.

The governments under the second category do not have any international status. While there may
be groups assuming governmental powers for their national territory for political or other reasons,
the fact is that they are merely hoping to form a legitimate government or State at some time in
the future.

xxx A recognition accorded during the effective continuance of the lawful (de jure) government
over the greater part of the national territory may be considered as an act of interference in the
national affairs of another State. (id., 97, citing the recognition of the Franco regime in Spain by
Germany and Italy only five months after the Spanish civil war broke out at the time when the
republican government was still in control of the greater part of Spain).