Presumption of the existence of Marriage Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
urt, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves
Balogbog v Balogbog
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older
brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition
and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino
by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the
estate of their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that
their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan,
Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold
to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.
Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality
of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband
and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he
knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as
"balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of
Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and
Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private
respondents, who testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina.
According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church
of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding and was in fact
asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in
Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died
in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This
contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at
Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the
coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was
six.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4 She testified that after
the wedding, she was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-
as, but it was burned during the war.
Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 6
Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina
lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they
were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina had children by a man she had married
before the war, although he did not know the names of the children. On crossexamination,
Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman
in a criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.
Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.
Issue:
Is the marriage of Gavino and Catalina valid?
Ruling:
as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent
proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private
respondents (to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during
the war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal
treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to
the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents.
Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, 15 the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove
marriage.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the
preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional
concern.
Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the
balance in favor of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating Committee
of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of inquiring into a
complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso
testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his nephew.
Calimag v Heirs of Macapaz
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this
case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia)
(respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.)
and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273
Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the
names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5 In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an
annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the
said property measuring 49.5 sq m.6
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was
cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the name of the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly
sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the documents
submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005
purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the
affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of
Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of
falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against
the petitioner. However, said criminal charges were eventually dismissed.
Issue:
whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra?
RULING:
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate
of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running
afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the
Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the
fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven
by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the
facts of birth) inpublic records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer (Civil Registrar)." Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live
birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.
REQUISITES: SEX
REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at
age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing
and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed
that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has
female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels
of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks
and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1
Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by
Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
Issue:
Is there any provision of law that allows the change of name and sex in the civil registrar by
virtue of sex reassignment through surgery?
Ruling:
None. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was
but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage,
one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship
in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
REQUISITES: MARRIAGE LICENSE
Carino v Carino
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
“MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return
to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to
file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
Issue:
Who is entitled to the claim of the death benefits of SP02 Carino?
Ruling:
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage. Thus, Santiago and Susan Yee’s 2nd marriage is also void.Article 147 of FC
will govern Susan Nicdao while article 148 of FC will govern Susan Yee
Alcantara v Alcantara
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person
who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR
Chapel. They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went
through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on
26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to
Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October
1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and
lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring
their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage
contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the
validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced
by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to
petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara
on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October
1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Respondent, in fact, has
filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage
be denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
Do the irregularities in the issuance of the marriage license render the marriage void?
1. Marriage License obtained through a fixer;
2. Issued from Carmona, Cavite but the couple were not resident of the same.
Ruling:
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must
be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case,
the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom
the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Bangayan v Bangayan
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go Bangayan (Sally)
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In
December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin
and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship.
On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
 Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During
the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition
before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition,
Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
Issue:
Is the marriage of Benjamin and Sally Go bigamous?
Ruling:
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between
Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting. Thus, Benjamin’s marriage to Sally is void.
Second, Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982.
Kho v Republic
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said
clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended
marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of
June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which
actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there
was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas
the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early
morning of June 1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage
license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the
procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's
office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for
the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated
before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued,
thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most
essential requisite;
Issue:
Is the CA correct is concluding that the absence of the marriage license is a mere defect that
will not make the marriage null and void ab initio?
Ruling:
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or
of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA,
it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of
the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent
failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage
which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.
Republic v CA
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a
civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas
personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract
itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage
was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered
she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted
only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro
gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of
Pasig, Metro Manila.
Issue:
Is the marriage of Castro and Cardenas valid?
Ruling:
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due
search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license
no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
Servilla v Cardenas
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any
marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose
M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E")
was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license
no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again
wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract
(Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and
expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's
parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until
their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually,
their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being
a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's
second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their
conjugal partnership in 1983.
Issue:
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing
in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as
null and void ab initio
Ruling:
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be
overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively
defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of
Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that
the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for
the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence
or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption
is of great weight
Sy v CA
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22
years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were
born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware
business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the
spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However,
their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May
15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father.7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil
Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion
of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the
grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership
of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to
Filipina.
Ruling:
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed
petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity
between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of
their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued
on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November
15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record.
Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an
exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent
could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We
thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginnin
REQUISITES: MARRIAGE CEREMONY
MORIGO V PEOPLE
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in
Ontario Canada, which was granted.
In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago and subsequently filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony.
Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment
since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.
Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
Issue:
Is Lucio Morigo guilty of bigamy?
Ruling:
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
3-FOLD LIABILITY
MORENO V BERNABE
Facts:
Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complainant against Judge C. Bernabe of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleges that on October 4, 1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were married
before respondent Judge Bernabe. She avers that respondent Judge assured her that the
marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then
visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could
not get the marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a
marriage license. She claims that respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo
Moreno to deceive her.
In his comment, Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo
Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant but also
admitted that he solemnized the marriage without the actual marriage license.
In his Memorandum of October 11, 1994, Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Respondent for failure of complainant to appear on any of
the scheduled hearings and on the basis of a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed on behalf of
complainant who has left for Singapore by her elder sister Sherlita N. Bendanillo expressly
withdrawing her complaint against Respondent. Judge Villarama, however, also recommended
that the respondent be issued a stern warning "in view of the fact on record that he indeed
solemnized a marriage without the requisites marriage license
On November 7, 1994, we referred the aforementioned Memorandum to the Office of
the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. The Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a
marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be
imposed against him.
Issue:
Is Judge Bernabe be held administratively liable even after the withdrawal of the complaint
against him?
Ruling:
Yes. The Family Code declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in
the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The fact that complaint has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against
herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have
been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and certain
the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. The Court has an interest in the conduct of
members of the judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts
in that direction may not be detailed by the complainant’s desistance from further prosecuting
the case he or she initiated.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the
illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability
of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility.
The Revised Penal Code provides that “priests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of
course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
Van Dorn v Romillo
Facts:
The basic background facts are that Alice Reyes Van Dorn petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while Richard Upton private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they
were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence
in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business
in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located
in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Is the foreign divorce issued in Nevada valid and binding in the jurisdiction of the Philippine
court, the same being contrary to local law and public policy?
Ruling:
Yes. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
WHO CAN FILE AND OBTAIN?
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577
Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church,
Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr.,
Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages.
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all
of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus.
Sometime in 1985, after securing divorce from Crasus, Fely got married to an
American named Stephen Micklus, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1988, she acquired
American citizenship.
Crasus filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC on 25
March 1997 on the grounds of psychological incapacity.
Both RTC and CA granted the petition and declared the marriage between Crasus and
Fely void ab initio. CA, however, cited Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family code in declaring
the marriage void ab initio.
Issue:
Did the CA err in applying Article 26, paragraph 2 in declaring the marriage between Crasus
and Fely void ab initio?
Ruling:
Yes. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to
the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of
the couples getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been
an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not
have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
Therefore, the Court ruled that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely
Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
Juego-Sakai v. Republic
Facts:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11,
2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by
agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, on
April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014,
the RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and
effective under Philippine Laws. On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
In an Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings
and recalled and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second
of the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing:
(a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
(b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
This is because the divorce herein was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement
of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained
the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the CA
ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was
fatal to her cause.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in its interpretation of the 2nd requisite under Article 26 of the Family
Code?
Ruling:
In the Landmark case of Republic v Manalo, the Court held that the fact that it was
the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should
not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the
divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true
intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of an alien-initiated proceeding.
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules
that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even
if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the
exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to
Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in
Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law
REPUBLIC V MANALO
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a
case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011,
was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from
the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce
instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the
former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as
to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse.
Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the
divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such
interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law. In the issue
of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo
should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it
will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights
are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal
protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial,
arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case
is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had
initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction
between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue
favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino
family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all
forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The
State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited
to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces:
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that
the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven.
Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
 However, RTC denied the petition citing ratiocinating that paragraph 2 of Article 26
does not apply to the present case because Marlyn herself is an initiator or active participant
REPUBLIC V CIPRIANO in the procurement of the divorce?

FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Did the RTC err in its application of par 2 Art 26 of the Family Code?
Ruling:
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC warrants the
Court's reversal. The dismissal of Marlyn's petition based on the trial court's interpretation of
Article 26 of the Family Code is erroneous in light of the Court's disposition in Manalo. The fact
that the divorce was by the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Akira was not sufficient ground
to reject the decree in this jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE

RULING:
Yes, the SC is unanimous in holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry.
At the outset, the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court provides:
However, note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former
wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

NULLADA V CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA

Facts:
Marlyn Nullada claimed that on July 29, 1997, she and Akira Ito got married in
Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of Marriage that was issued by the
Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The document was registered with both the Office of the
Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division.
The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their
relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by
mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan.
She subsequently filed a Petition for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce
decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, by Marlyn in 2014 with the RTC of Manila.