THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993

IRENEO G. GERONIMO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO

ESMAN, Respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for the petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library

Alfredo G. Ablaza for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33850 1 which affirmed the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Pasig, Metro Manila in Special Proceeding No.
10036 declaring valid the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A.
Esman and appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased
Graciana Geronimo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of
Appeals, are as follows:

This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of the estate
of Graciana Geronimo-Esman.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the heirs
oppositor Antonio A. Esman and describing the latter as "husband of the deceased".
On April 4, 1988, an amended petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the
surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now describing the latter as the "live-in
partner of the deceased" after finding out that the marriage between oppositor and
the decedent was a "nullity for want of a marriage license".

It is undisputed that the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no
descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her two brothers Tomas and
Ireneo, her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A. Esman. . . .
However, the husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the
decedent is now being questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the
marriage between oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage
license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The principal issue now which has to be resolved by this Court before it can appoint
a judicial administrator is whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo
and Antonio A. Esman was valid.
Petitioner contends that the marriage between her (sic) deceased sister and
oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no marriage license
issued to the parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner
contends that a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows
that the marriage license number was not stated in the marriage contract (Exh.
"I"); and that the marriage contract itself does now (sic) show the number of the
marriage license issued (Exh. "J"). Moreover, marriage license number 5038770
which was issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of
Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated
but to Pasig in October 1959.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by petitioner are
mere concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned documents (Exh. "I"
and "J") would show that except for the phrases "not stated" and "not recorded" the
two certified copies of the marriage contract issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros,
Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque were the same as the
certified copy of the marriage contract which was attached to the original petition
which named the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply
asked that these phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the
omission of the marriage license number on the Registry of Marriages in the Local
Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no marriage
license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio
A. Esman; and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros
are printed by the Bureau of Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to
various provinces or municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial numbers
even if already used in the printing of the marriage license forms in the past years
are used again in the printing of the same forms in the succeeding
years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Various witnesses were presented by oppositor to prove that indeed the deceased
and oppositor were married. David Montenegro, an employee of the National
Archives & Records Section, testified that a copy of the marriage contract between
Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo celebrated on January 7, 1955, is on file
with their office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Msgr. Moises Andrade, parish priest of Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan, testified that he
was asked to come over to teach in Guadalupe seminary and stayed in Pasig as
assistant priest of the parish of Immaculate Concepcion from 1975 to 1983. Here,
he came to know the spouses Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman whom he
attended to spirituality, conducted mass for, gave communion, and visited them
socially. He had occasions to go to the couple's garment business, Gragero Lingerie,
and observed that the couple were quite close with each other and with the people
working in their business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Marciana Cuevas, assistant supervisor of the couple's garment business testified

that she was aware of the marriage which took place between Graciana Geronimo
and Antonio A. Esman; that they lived together as husband and wife in Bambang,
Pasig, after the wedding; and that is the oppositor who has been successfully
supervising the lingerie business after the death of Graciana
Geronimo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Julie Reyes, supply officer of the governor's office testified that she is in charge of
all accountable forms being taken in the fourteen (14) municipalities of the province
of Rizal which include marriage licenses; and pad no. 83 covering marriage licenses
nos. 5038751 to 5038800 was taken by the Municipality of Pateros way back in
October 9, 1953.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Florenciana Santos, assistant local civil registrar of Pateros, Metro Manila, testified
that in the entry of marriage book of Pateros, particularly page no. 23 of book no. 2
and reg. no. 51, there is no column for the marriage license; that they started
putting the marriage license only in 1980; that they have a copy of the questioned
marriage contract in which the marriage license number is recorded; and that the
records of 1959 were lost during a typhoon, but they sent a copy of the marriage
contract to the archives section.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Oppositor Antonio A. Esman testified that he was married to Graciana Geronimo on

January 7, 1955 in Pateros and were (sic) issued marriage license no. 5038770;
and that he was introduced by the deceased to the public as her lawful husband.
(Decision, pp. 1-3)2chanrobles virtual law library

In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the public respondent stated:

It may be conceded that [Exhibits "I" and "J"] of the petitioner-appellant do not
bear the number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of Graciana
Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such non-indication of the
number could only serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It could not
be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license.
On the other hand, the marriage license number (No. 5038776, [sic] dated January
7, 1955) does appear in the certified archives copy of the marriage contract (Exhibit
7 and sub-markings). The non-indication of the license number in the certified
copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-
vis the issue of the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in
the law which requires that the marriage license number would (sic) be indicated in
the marriage contract itself. 3chanrobles virtual law library
Unfazed by his successive defeats, and maintaining his adamantine stand that the
marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio Esman is void, and, perforce,
the latter had no right to be appointed as the administrator of the estate of the
former, the petitioner artfully seeks to avoid any factual issue by now posing the
following question in this petition: "Can there be a valid marriage where one of the
essential requisites - license - is absent?" Doubtless, the query has been framed so
as to apparently present a question of law. In reality, however, the question
assumes that there was no marriage license, which is, of course, a factual
contention. Both the trial court and the public respondent found and ruled
otherwise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 4 which collated representative cases
on the rule of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the
exceptions thereto, we stated:

Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising
errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the
function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed
by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of
are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous
as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, they must
stand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of endings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) When the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record.

Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls under any of the above
exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail. However, if only to disabuse
the mind of the petitioner, we shall proceed to discuss the issue regarding the
alleged absence of a marriage license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses
Esman because the copies of the marriage contract he presented (Exhibits "I" and
"J") did not state the marriage license number. The flaw in such reasoning is all too
obvious. Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent when he presented a copy of
the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section
(Exhibit "7") where the marriage license number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January
1955) does appear. Petitioner tried to assail this piece of evidence by presenting
Exhibit "V," a certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City that
Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued on 1 October 1976 in favor of Edwin G.
Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. This was sufficiently explained by the Court of
Appeals thus:

It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of
the Government like the Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A) come from the
National Printing Office and are printed with serial numbers. These forms are
distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal treasurers concerned. But
the serial numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used
in the succeeding years when the same forms are again printed for distribution.
However, the distribution of the serially-numbered forms do not follow the same
pattern.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the appellant
refused to acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage License No. 5038770
was requisitioned and received by the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953
thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes
and borne out by Exhibits "1" and "2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman and
Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 07, 1955, another, marriage
license bearing the same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality
of Pasig in October, 1959 (Exhibit "L-1"). Subsequently, still another marriage
license bearing No. 503877() was also issued to the Treasurer of Pasay City on June
29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that was used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and
Evangelina Guadiz (Exhibit "V"). (Appellee's Brief, pp. 31-32) 5chanrobles virtual
law library

At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the non-
recording of the marriage license number but certainly not the non-issuance of the
license itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Costs against the petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 Entitled "Ireneo Geronimo vs. Antonio Esman." Per Associate Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona,
concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Jaime M. Lantin; Rollo, 24-35. chanrobles virtual law library

2 Rollo, 25-27. chanrobles virtual law library

3 Id., 30. chanrobles virtual law library

4 204 SCRA 601, 608-609 [1991].

Endnotes: citing cases are omitted. chanrobles virtual law library

5 Rollo, 32-33.
 EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.

VILLAMORA, complainants, vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge,
and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Respondents.

Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.chanrobles virtual law library

Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora,
are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and
Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the
same court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5,
1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of
filing fees from exempted entities. 1chanrobles virtual law library

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective

Comments. 2A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3The case was
thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City,
for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to First
Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the
reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4chanrobles virtual law
library

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this
administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular
charge against respondents.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a
marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence,
their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly
had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the
local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called
the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages
involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said
marriages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the
employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo
who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only
lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of
Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract
and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these
marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo,
however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy,
but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the
contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do
so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano
and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the
marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to
furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five
marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because
the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place
of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the
absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to
avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage
contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages
solemnized and the number of documents notarized.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages
in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were
null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six
(6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one
hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that
respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they
collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages
celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of
complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the
entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made
as solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that
it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held
accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable
only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she
collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly
to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the
general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were
manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the
preparation of the monthly report.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated
was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized
should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages
paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6)
documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued
by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted
payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that
this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed
as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one
supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to
sign the same.

3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court

Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge
forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and
Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as
clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one
appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent
judge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-
conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac
and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to
respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the
consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of
court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that
he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-
conditioning unit was bought from his

co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been
appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public
as item which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.

4. Cash bond issued without a receipt

It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al.,
"bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property
bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt
therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite
the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has
not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of
Tinambac.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court,
then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding
receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman
desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure
therefor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the
bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has
nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.

5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his
house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the
former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was
archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6,
1992.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention
prisoners and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case
archived because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein
remained at large.

6. Unlawful collection of docket fees

Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of
said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to
remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her
personal account.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because

respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees
from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by
the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the
same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account;
and that after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the
other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Tr e a s u r e r of
Tinambac.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona
prepared and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994,
together with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we
are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the
facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and
perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the
evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at
length the material portions thereof.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge
Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B),
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh.
D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
(Exh. G).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show
the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code
were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage
contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except
that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he
claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage
certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo
Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs
taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently
show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was
solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already
started living together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites of marriage
were complied with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because
the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign
the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local
Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage
certificate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the
marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This
happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he
consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was
told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already
invited and the place of the parties where the reception would be held was more than
twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not
sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and
the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by
themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others,
that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days
with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been
impeached.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b,
K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,

K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a
simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the
explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those
pictures.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself
to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person
whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and
unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it
appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not
solemnize their marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted
that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family
Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was
stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old.
If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve)
been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and
this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he
solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting
parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married
again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation
given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the
second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of
the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his
instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he
solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the
second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first
time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already
signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require
the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second
time?chanrobles virtual law library

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not
a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was
solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37
and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no
one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones
vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function
and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a)
copy of their marriage contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio
executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A
and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On
cross-examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their
affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a
certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits
there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage
contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and
respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by
respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga
allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first
denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign
the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was already
solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the
marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted
to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was solemnized by
Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to
believe.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of
Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the
marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the
affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14).
Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative
value.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the
contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he
already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the
marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage
contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others.
His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate
of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;

2-1-94).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer
and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in
the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage
contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and
procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during
the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of
respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to
let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge
Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;

10-28-93).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing
three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for
July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of
cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during
the whole month (Exh. 7).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon
has presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons,
affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-
H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides,
the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is
not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the
marriages he solemnized were all illegal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of
cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual
number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees,
have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for
July and September, 1992 are concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both
signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b).
The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that there
were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the
said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for
July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as
shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official
receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the
monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be
based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of
documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the
correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk
of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely
signs the monthly report when it is already signed by respondent
Baroy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close
supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions
(The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174
SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."chanrobles virtual law library

On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly
report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the
monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to complainant
Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to
check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a
month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to
Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report
based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether the
report is correct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable
not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other properties of the court (p.
32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was
already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11;
11-23-93).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however,
also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees
received for those documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992. The
evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits
and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only
issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge
Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred
thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only
five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial register
show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each
document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and
Sambo declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy
declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme
Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal
Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering
that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own
discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages
were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were not
returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when solemnization fee was
returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage
license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the
notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied
it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January
20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she was
taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees
(Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those
documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any
demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession.
Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she
has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V,
W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-
S).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a
certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her
after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh.
Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just
kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the
cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993,
after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book,
however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on
March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs.
8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the
cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally
deposited it because of the filing of this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without
any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three
(3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6;
1-4-94).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy
received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo
Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only
an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank
or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No.
5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or
almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash
bond (Exh. 7).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she
used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and
collections she received. She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she
issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X
(TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official
receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already
filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court,
Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with
respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for
the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The
same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was
brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still
placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used
yet.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand
(P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29,
1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as
witness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a
time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was
eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on
August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet.
The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May
29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this
case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these
circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action
as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA
27).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara
executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt
for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no
probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the
hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been
discussed earlier.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his
house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this
fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The
evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647
entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and
Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex
Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was
confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial,
particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of
Tinambac.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have
presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from
the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused escaped while
in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047
archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on
April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the
accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued
against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact there
was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano
and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No.
5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be
accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge
Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail,
but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did
not take custody of Alano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he
heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He
should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should
have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the
explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest.
It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered
archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped
is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped
while in his custody only that the complainants could not present records or other
documentary evidence to prove the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases
filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in
paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was deposited by
respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on
February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against
farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing
fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts
Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed
against farmers on loans they obtained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the
Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on
February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid
voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter
to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not
pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent
Baroy).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really
exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead
of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have them
dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12,
1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable
officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages,
particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that
it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of
court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme
Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven
that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect to the number of
documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or similar offenses will be
more severely dealt with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those
marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy
of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the
irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article
4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of
closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions,
particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA
16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of
court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to
check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not
contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
158).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of
court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have
falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with
respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial
fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees
were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were
issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the
amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993,
or after one year and five months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for
withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without
any court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash
bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180,
MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt
(Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until
it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to
pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount
of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer
only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court
Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall
issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn.
Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of
Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A
circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the
municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper
receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for
Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also
provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall
be deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City,
Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any
of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction
over the subject matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her
callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk
of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s)
a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P.
Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414;
August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/
her custody; monies received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt
thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated
November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit
the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her
misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found
guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.

xxx xxx xxx

We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above
all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. 5Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. 6It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least
of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality
imposed upon a Court of justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. 7Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. 8chanrobles virtual law library

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished
in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on

respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of
illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but
actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects
flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged
as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of
gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher
penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in
the future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Cruz, J., took no part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Bidin, J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1 Original Record, 1. chanrobles virtual law library

2 Ibid., 9 and 23. chanrobles virtual law library

3 Ibid., 86. chanrobles virtual law library

4 Ibid., 134. chanrobles virtual law library

5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 635. chanrobles virtual law library

6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, July 20, 1994. chanrobles virtual law library

7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as amended. chanrobles virtual law library

8 Article 4, id. chanrobles virtual law library

9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 39, Act No. 3613.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., Petitioners, v.
NORMA BAYADOG, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.chanrobles.com :
law library

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father’s death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father’s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action
for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a
pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioner’s averment that the allegations in the petition are ‘true and correct’." It was thus
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of
the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution" 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11
This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"
12 and case law considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement.chanrobles.com.ph:red

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating
that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-
year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be
a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must
be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Article 63: ". . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 17 provides in part: ". . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof . . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Article 18 reads in part: ". . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon
in the application for a marriage license. . . ." chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature
of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with Respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito
had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage
even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife" .

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father’s marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file
an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of
rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and Respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from
a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It
should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral,
in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like
a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The said case is ordered REINSTATED.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Endnotes:

1. The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE,
premises considered, defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case
is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).

2. Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

3. Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

4. Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.

5. Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

6. Now Article 3. Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the
requisites are complied with:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties, their consent, freely given;

(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

7. Now Article 4. Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character

x x x
8. Art 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title
but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.

9. Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

10. Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 126010, December
8, 1999; See also Tuazon v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

11. Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

12. Article 1. Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal or family life . . .

13. Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).

14. Now Article 34. Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a
man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

15. Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

16. Rollo, p. 29.

17. Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Articles 17 and 18, Family Code.

18. Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

19. Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

20. Art. 17. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons
and within the periods indicated herein:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian
did not give his or her consent within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by
the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such
party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no
knowledge of the other’s insanity, or by any relative or guardian or person having legal
charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45 by the injured party, within five years
after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45 by the injured party, within five years
from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years after the marriage.

21. Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board, 272 III,
App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.

22. In re Conza’s Estate, 176 III. 192, Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac 394 cited in I
Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.

23. Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.

24. Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986);
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100
Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.

25. 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

26. 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am. Jur. 221.

27. Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge
Brilliantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).

28. Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

29. Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended
by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000

FILIPINA Y. SY, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI,
and FERNANDO SY, Respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision 1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44144, which affirmed the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
denying the petition 3 for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina
Sy and Fernando Sy.

Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on

November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then
22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who
were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively. 5

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware
business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. 6

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son
Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,
1988, and from then on, lived with his father. 7

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case
No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of
petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the
grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. 8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. 9 The trial court also granted custody
of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina
testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and
bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored
her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer
away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina
away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also
claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her
only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on
different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a
Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time
Fernando maltreated her. 11

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.

Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed
as Civil Case No. 8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual
infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.

On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the
final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on
her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological
incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on
her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her,
performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such
psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their
marriage and became manifest thereafter. 15

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9,
1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage
to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not
constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In
the decision 17 of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of
petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the
quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and
essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the
couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the
celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living
together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court
which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. 18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution dated November 21, 1996. 20

Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE

FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON
NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO
MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;

2 . W H E T H E R O R N O T T H E H O N O R A B L E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S C O M M I TT E D
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];

3 . W H E T H E R O R N O T T H E H O N O R A B L E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S C O M M I TT E D
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT
THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE
IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH
RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS
APPLICABLE HERETO. 22

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate
and marriage license are different and incongruous.

Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of
instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not
ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said
that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very
reason for their existence would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be
subject to cavil. 25 In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the
validity of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a
deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the
pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects
according to existing law.

Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and
the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to
Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were
contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the
marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their
marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in
the course of the trial. 26 The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes,
Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993,
during her direct examination, 28 as follows:

ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15, 1973?

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's
and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on
record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona. 30

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed
petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was
incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the
issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license
was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on
record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim
of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private
respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil
Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are
the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that
these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been
made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore,
that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object
thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. 33

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer
detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May
21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R.
No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between
petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 CA Records, at 51-59.

2 Records, at 136-143.

3 Id. at 1-5.

4 Exh. A; Id. at 6.

5 Exhs. B & C; Id. at 7-8.

6 Id. at 136.

7 Ibid.

8 Id. at 10-11.

9 Exh. E, Id. at 10-18.

10 Id. at 18.

11 Id. at 23-24.

12 Exh. G; Id. at 23-26.

13 Exh, H; Id. at 27-46.

14 Id. at 1-5.

15 Id. at 3.

16 Id. at 136-143.

17 Supra, note 1.

18 Id. at 59.

19 Id. at 60-64.

20 Id. at 76.

21 Rollo, pp. 10-55.

22 Id. at 31.

23 Sumbad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106060, June 21, 1999, p. 23; Modina vs. CA, G.R. No.
109355, October 29, 1999, p. 13; citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 269
SCRA 145 (1997).

24 Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187, 198 (1997); Mauna
vs. Civil Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398 (1994).

25 GSIS vs. CA, at 198, citing Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 371 (1995).

26 Exhibit A, Records, p. 6; Rollo, p. 72.

27 Records, at 1 and 53.

28 TSN, 22 January 1993, p. 4.

29 Records pp. 7 & 8; Exh. A, Rollo, p. 72.

30 Rollo, at 20.

31 Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character:

xxx xxx xxx

32 Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts
which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party; may
apply to the court for relief.

Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without
the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not.

(1) The objection is proper, and

(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse
who has not obtained consent.

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

Art. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:

(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and

(3) By the local customs.

Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute
community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this Code shall govern.

Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made
before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.

Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the
parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons
unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as
in the proper registries of property.

Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also enter into marriage
settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the
marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.

Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon whom a sentence of
civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be
indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto.
33 See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997); Quebral vs. CA,
252 SCRA 353 (1996).
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.]

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, Petitioner, v. JUDGE SALVADOR M.

OCCIANO, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law
via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without
the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the "vast
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office
of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete,
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located
almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent
judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined
the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested
its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that
same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the
latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to
his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage
is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially
refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the
same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after
reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is
now bothered by her conscience.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that
the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor
Orobia claimed it.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has
no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated
7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it
has no record of their marriage.

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal,
informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the
failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a
duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.

We agree.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro v. Domagtoy, 1 respondent judge held
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos. We held that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability." 2 (Emphasis supplied.)

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act
of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
further held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. . . . While magistrates
may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons." 3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People v. Lara, 4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance
of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law,
it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by

petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. 5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do
not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the
will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We
cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the
Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to
naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity
of this Court as a disciplining authority. 6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. 259 SCRA 129 (1996).

2. Id., pp. 135-136.

3. Id., p. 136.

4. C.A. O.G. 4079.

5. Farrales v. Camarista, 327 SCRA 84 (2000).

6. Sandoval v. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 (1996).

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 167684 : July 31, 2006]

JAIME O.SEVILLA, Petitioner, v. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January
2002.

In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed
that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On
the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract
before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage
license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage
license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime
were married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May
19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered
with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The trial court made the following findings:

In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and
defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the
Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil
rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father
accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil
wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on
May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never
applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March
11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he
and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed
another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and
indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly
shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided
in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his
parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time,
for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became
difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in
1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity
plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United
States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.

Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service
was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his
marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the
supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated
March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March
11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in
reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994
(Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was
ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a
certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate
of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious
ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under
Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."

Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model,
she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff
who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved
plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they
came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where
plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they
learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of
everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he
may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family,
more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she
was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went
home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family
alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family
did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no
sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they
finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding
sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p.
15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless
pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which
she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8
months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior
which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A
compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums.
Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him
from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried
very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They
had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half
years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on
and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be
studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally
abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff
married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of
his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after
they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His
grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his
daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").

Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was
plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church
wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites
some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still
civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.

As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to
divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United
States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant
who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21).
During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000
(Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no.
2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is
inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties,
the trial court made the following justifications:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or
absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various
certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh.
"EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the
marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19,
1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys
probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, x x x.

xxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May
19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan
B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601
(e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.

Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004,
the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:

In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court
explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired."With
said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local
civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to
the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book
were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry
on marriage license no. 2720792.

xxx

Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential
requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with
facts on record.8

Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals
denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from
the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage
license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as
appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their
marriage as null and void ab initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage
of the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the
validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that
is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v.
Cariño13 :

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of
their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.

The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,14 where it was held that:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry
of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued
and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that
the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the
register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence
of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. - a written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of
a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.

We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing
requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was
dated 11 March 1994. It reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards
(sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.


: Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office
with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find
the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

 (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

: Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application
was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by
this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.

This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal
intent it may serve.

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.


: Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our
loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily
implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its
best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to
its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty
whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate
the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already
retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that
his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the
logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of
the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969.
Did you bring with you those records?cralawlibrary

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?cralawlibrary

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?cralawlibrary

A No, sir.

Q Why not?cralawlibrary

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
cralawlibrary

COURT

May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxx

COURT

Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number
issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about
no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you
could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which
now, was this issued or not?

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered,
the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar
in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted
and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands,
or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable
presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be

overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been
effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the
logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the
said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence
or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity
of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.24

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several
years producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before
he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual
sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.28

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social
and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.
29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
`that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always presume
marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima faciepresumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate
Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31.
2 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
3 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.
4 Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 232.
6 Rollo, pp. 47-50.
7 Id. at 50-52.
8 Id. at 29-31.
9 Id. at 80-81.
10 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

11 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not
those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
12 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional charater.
13 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.
14 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
15 Records, Vol. I, p. 103.
16 Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the trial court that in his letter
requesting for the issuance of a certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, he
mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp.
725-726.)
17 Id. at 228.
18 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.
19 Id. at 735-737.
20 Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

xxxx

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence;

xxxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

21 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 798-799.
22 Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).
23 Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655 (2000).
24 Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77.
25 Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740.
26 Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN, 11 April 1996.
27 Id. at p. 414.
28 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663 (2000).
29Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No.
145370, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.
30 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709 (1999).
31 Id.
32 G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 167746 : August 28, 2007]

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT

OF APPEALS,Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66724 denying petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000,
dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged
their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC
BR Chapel.4 They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and
respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church
in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar
of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann
Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil
Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6

Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of
their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's
representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14
October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October
1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.8Petitioner only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact,
has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing
as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month;
andcralawlibrary

3. To pay the costs.11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner's
appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be
regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage contract being a public document is a prima
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the
Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that
there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered
as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face
of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the
ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy v. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No.
127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party
litigants.14

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the
Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them.15 The wedding
took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino
Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona,
Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite,
was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight
because the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor
of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but their marriage contract bears the
number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation
to Article 58 of the same Code.19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the
parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; andcralawlibrary

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.21

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a
ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a
certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage
License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due
search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on
said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would
render the marriage void ab initio.

In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost
one year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this
case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage
license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita
Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario
on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever
legal purpose or intents it may serve.26

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and
the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.
27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is

overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made
in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these,
petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona,
Cavite.29

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims
that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold
that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do
not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to
the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license
number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is
not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny
of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract
from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the
parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,32 petitioner
cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he
now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the
civil marriage took place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a
mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City
Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot
benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his
mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle.
We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of
marriage betrays his bad faith.34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than
one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the
second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was
executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υ
αl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San
Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding
ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's testimony as follows'

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the
wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San
Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I don't remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?cralaw library

WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I
don't know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you
already a Marriage Contract?cralaw library

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the
Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that
took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner - - that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel - - will not strengthen his posture.
The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony
will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that
the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of
the marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage
bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:
1Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios
and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, p. 25-32.

2 Penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos; CA rollo, pp. 257-258.

3 Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1325.

4 Crusade of the Divine Church of Christ.

5 Annex A, Records, p. 5; Annexes B to C, Records, pp. 6-7.

6 Rollo, pp. 33-36.

7 Id. at 185.

8 TSN, 14 October 1999, p. 34.

9 Rollo, p. 39.

10 Id. at 46.

11 Id. at 68-69.

12 Id. at 21.

13 Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

14 Rollo, p. 206.

15 Id. at 209.

16 Records p. 1.

17 Id. at 15-a.

18 (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.

19 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.

20 Now Article 3 of the Family Code.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
andcralawlibrary
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35.

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.

21 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667-668 (2000).

22 G.R. No.103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

23 G.R. No.132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133.

24 386 Phil. 760, 769 (2000).

25 Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25 Family Code, provides:

The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with
him in a register book strictly in the order in which the same shall be received. He shall
enter in said register the names of the applicants, the dates on which the marriage license
was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.

26 Records, p. 15-a.

27 Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - x x x

xxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed. (Rule 131, Rules of Court.)

28 Magsucang v. Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224-225 (2003).

29 TSN. 23 November 1999, p. 4.

30 Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, p. 125.

31Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, p. 8; Moreno v. Bernabe, 316 Phil. 161, 168
(1995).

32Abacus Securities Corporation v. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006, 483 SCRA
315, 337.

33 TSN, 1 October 1998, p. 96.

34 Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, Jr., 312 Phil. 939, 944 (1995).

35 TSN, 1 October 1998, pp. 33-35.

36 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 662 2003).

37 Goshen v. New Orleans, 18 US 950.

38 People v. Janssen, 54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929).

39Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 436;
Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, 31 July 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated
July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged
the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a
ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing
officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.
4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock

in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St.,
Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the
Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:cralawlibrary

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.7?r?l1

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001
and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8?r?l1

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License
No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9?r?l1

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003,
was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,
Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license
of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11?r?l1

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.
12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the

residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been
solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev.
Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the
actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the
solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and
Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.
17?r?l1

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas
and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a
certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured
the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did
not know where the marriage license was obtained.20He attended the wedding ceremony on
January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the
marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann
Ceriola.21?r?l1

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-
law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her
house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in
securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a
male person went to their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days
later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before
returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that
she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that
a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26?r?l1

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is
one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b)
she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said
photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage
contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain
Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she
and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty.
Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed
were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28?r?l1

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29?r?l1

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30?r?l1

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but
that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the
one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
Chinese.31?r?l1

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan,
and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party
was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void
ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:cralawlibrary

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9,
1993 in Manila. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

SO ORDERED.34?r?l1

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the
same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:cralawlibrary

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE,

THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE
WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING
OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL
AGE.

III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON
THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35?r?l1 ???
ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search
for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37?r?l1

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract.
The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife,
and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38?r?l1

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October
2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.39?r?l1

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41?r?l1

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING

ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42?r?
l1

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order
No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as
follows:cralawlibrary

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:cralawlibrary

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. ???ñr?bl?š ??
r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:cralawlibrary

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the
formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage
ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage
license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges
on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held
that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage
license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied
on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence
of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was
there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic
v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:cralawlibrary

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:cralawlibrary

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names
of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44?
r?l1

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license
for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained
to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and
indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did
not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have
been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be
given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth
noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court
that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar
of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration
absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court.
She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she
is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of
them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even
testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The
task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified
as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy
of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of
the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the
court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there
was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that
the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became
the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and
that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that
burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was
issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that
would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based
on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and
Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:cralawlibrary

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant
and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity
was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave
their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage
contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before
the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during
the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
 xxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring,
Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten
(10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears
to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10
January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with
one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him
to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50?r?l1

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the
same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the
same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly
absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is
hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate

Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

2 Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.

3 Rollo, p. 13.
4 Id. at 47.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 12.

7 Id. at 10.

8 Id. at 48.

9 Id. at 49, "January 19, 1993" in some parts of the records.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 49-50.

12 Id. at 50.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 51.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id. at 52.

21 Id.

22 Id. at 53.

23 Id. at 54.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Id. at 55.

28 Id.

29 Id. at 56.

30 Id. at 57.
31 Id.

32 Id. at 58.

33 Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no
license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.

34 Rollo, pp. 58-59.

35 Id. at 122.

36 Id. at 128.

37 Id. at 129.

38 Id. at 130.

39 Id. at 131.

40 Id. at 135-146.

41 Id. at 173-174.

42 Id. at 31.

43 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.

44 Id. at 262.

45 Supra note 43.

46 Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.

47 403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).

48 Supra note 43.

49 Supra note 47, at 870.

50 Rollo, pp. 129-130.

51Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the
marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid
even if the ailing party subsequently survives.

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the
marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.

Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall
state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally
authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that
the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no
means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil
registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship
of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a
legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage
to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of
thirty days after the performance of the marriage.

Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be
solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the
plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.

Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of
military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.

Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities
may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc
solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016

RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B.

KHO, Respondents.


DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14,
2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set
aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2,
in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of
nullity of his marriage with private respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.



The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by
herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition
allege as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said
clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended
marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of
June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony

which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account
that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the
church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00
o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage
license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the
procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's
office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required
for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was
celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been
validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for
want of the most essential requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated
was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning
and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such
marriage license;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court

that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1,
1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;

x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to
petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of
cause of action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their
marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary,
both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and
secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC
of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective
pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted
between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The
foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar for proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.

SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite
marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As
such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA
promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2
of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and
subsisting for all intents and purposes.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties,
there is a presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that
petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any
indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in
the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated
January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-
CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED
LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING

AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING
TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER

DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF
LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED
PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR

REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA
to give due credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of
marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence
but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well
as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a
procedural question by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present
petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these issues in a
petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and
prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the
existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which is not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed
a marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but
proper for this Court to review these findings.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly,
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of
exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace
or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital
cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall
under any of these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.
15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is

that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.16Stated differently,
the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.17

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a
marriage license which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was
performed.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court
is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which protects and
strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is
sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly
in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification
of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It was further held that the presumed
validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured.20

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has
no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner]
and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1,
1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to
prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC,
respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof
to the court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does
not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained
a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where
information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could
be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the
RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the statements of the witnesses for
respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony
was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor
of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and
petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove
such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached
is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it
cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of
the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that
respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear
that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and
void.

As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of
this Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar,
which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license, must categorically state
that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability
to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the absence of a categorical
statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite diligent search." The
Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by
the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification,
the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage
void ab initio.

Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court
considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case
of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling
in Republic v. CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license
was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in
their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this
Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not require a categorical
statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. x x
x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of
the subject marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of
a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of
exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated,
petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be
that his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize
his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up
for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Brion,*J., on leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Endnotes:

*Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Francis II. Jardeleza, per Raffle dated
May 23, 2016.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Arsenio J. Magapale and Vicente L. Yap, concurring; Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp.
28-40.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-
Javier and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 41-43.

3 Annex "C" to Petition, id. at 44-59.

4Rollo, pp. 60-61.

5 See RTC Decision, id. at 56.

6Rollo, p. 64.

7Id. at 59.

8Id. at 39.

9Id. at 72.

10Id. at 15.
11Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 494, 498-499.
(Emphasis supplied)

12 The Family Code of the Philippines took effect on August 3, 1988.

13 Emphasis supplied.

14 Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and
vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a
judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be
performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.

15Republic of the Phils. v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 568-569 (2008).

16Id. at 569.

17Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 202 (2007).

18 403 Phil. 861 (2001).

19Id. at 869.

20Id. at 870.

21 See RTC Decision, rollo, p. 56.

22Rollo, p. 133.

23Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575 (2007).

24 529 Phil. 419, 429 (2006).cralawred

25 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

26 Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. - A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of
a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.cralawred

27Supra note 18.

28 G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013.

29 702 Phil. 578, 590-592 (2013).

30Supra note 25.

31Abbas v. Abbas, supra note 29, at 592.

32Alcantara v. Alcantara, supra note 17, at 203-204.

33Abbas v. Abbas, supra note 29, at 594.

 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C.

SALGADO, Petitioners, v. LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent.


DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the Decision4 dated
July 23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No.
69611.




The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No.
69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses
Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses
Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002
and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated
October 25, 2002.7chanrobleslaw

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-
Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to
the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on
December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.
8chanrobleslaw

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San
Juan, Metro Manila, covered by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/
s):ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),
2. TCT No. 60069/T-301 (now TCT No. 11106-R),
3. TCT No. 5109/T-26 (now TCT No. 11107),
4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),
5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and
6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina,
the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge
and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23,
2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-
Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died on
September 21, 2002,11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir.
She secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and
8003.12chanrobleslaw

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.13chanrobleslaw

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14 which the trial court considered as the
Answer of her husband, Gerard,15 Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage
contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had
a common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through
a Partition Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented through
another Partition Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the
properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject
of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering
Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as
single without reference to any husband.18chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer,
19 stating that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is

cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife
- a relationship which was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the
Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they acknowledged
that they were living together as common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the
partition of the properties they owned in common. Hence, Luis already received his share in
the properties20 and is estopped from denying the same.21 After the termination of their
cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita
Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and
custody of Severina.22 It was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25,
2002. The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of
Marriage23 (between Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office.24chanrobleslaw

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence
which included a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina,25cralawred the
Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.26 The
Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack
of marriage license as borne out by the marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis
himself disclosed on cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to
the alleged marriage.27 Luis had also admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity
of the Partition Agreement.28 The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed
in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties,
which she had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of Luis.29chanrobleslaw

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency
of evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by
evidence to the contrary.30The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their separate
motions for reconsideration,31 which the trial court denied.32 Consequently, both the
Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.
33 Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado were deemed to have waived their presentation of

evidence when they failed to attend the scheduled hearings before the trial court.
34chanrobleslaw

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses
Salgado, the CA Second Division directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate
dispatch the demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the
Spouses Salgado's] proffered evidence[,]"35 whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the
petition of the Spouses Maya and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate
dispatch.36chanrobleslaw

In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to
resolve the demurrer to evidence in more specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to
evidence for lack of merit and held that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has
sufficiently established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision38 in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage
between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public
document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the
fact of marriage.39 The trial court also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA40 where the
validity of marriage was upheld despite the absence of the marriage license number on the
marriage contract.41 The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the
Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina
without the consent of her husband, Luis.42chanrobleslaw

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and
against [the Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF

NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated January 23, 2002
executed by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of

the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all
issued in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;
3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R
(formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively) to the conjugal community of
properties between [Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision44 which ordered the
"ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis executed by
[Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 x x x."45 The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new
TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds.46chanrobleslaw

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for
reconsideration on September 11, 200747 and August 28, 2007,48 respectively, which the
RTC denied in the Omnibus Order49 dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted
the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the
CAon December 13, 200750 and April 24, 2009,51respectively.

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement52 which was
approved by the CA in its Decision53 dated October 26, 2011. This resulted in the
termination of the Spouses Maya's appeal.54chanrobleslaw

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,55 dismissing the appeal of the Spouses
Salgado. The fallo reads as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did
not present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the
evidence presented by Luis.57 The CA further explained that "the best evidence to establish
the absence of a marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the
parties to the Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a
certification from the said office that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a
marriage license was issued on or before December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina.
Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said
certification and present evidence during the trial."58chanrobleslaw

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration59 which the CA
denied through its Resolution60 dated November 26, 2012.

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether
the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage
between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for
want of marriage license based on the Marriage Contract61 presented by Luis which has
adequately established its absence.62chanrobleslaw

Luis, in his Comment,63 opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises
a question of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. He also
countered that the Spouses Salgado did not present any evidence to support their theory.
64 If the existence of the marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses

Salgado to show the lack of marriage license by clear and convincing evidence.
65chanrobleslaw

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first
tackle the procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the filing of this
petition for review on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether
the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which
states that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the
marriage being of an exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate
court is, as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are
exceptions66 recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.67chanrobleslaw

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at
the time of its celebration68 on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and
the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character,70 renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3). It sets forth:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)
"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title
III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3)
consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil
marriage, (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."71 To reiterate,
in any of the aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid
marriage license is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no
marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil
Code) being cited as the reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is
quoted as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in
favor of, said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me, this
marriage being of an exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x.
72chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible.
Being a public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage,
but is also a prima facieevidence of the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section 44,
Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract me prima
facie proof that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of
ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage
already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious
practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of
marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this
exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious
ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil
marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to
each other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of
marriage appearing on the records. This was also consistently affirmed by Luis in open
court:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Atty. Francisco:

Q You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A

- certifying that you were married to the late [Severina].

A Yes, sir.
-
Q Do you recall when this marriage took place?
-

A As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my

- daughter get (sic) one (1) year old. That was 1966 December
something like 28, because she was born December 30, the death of
Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1)
year old two (2) days before we got married here in San Juan.

Q So, when was she born if you can recall?

-

A Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

-

Q If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

-

A Yes, sir.
-

Q If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

-

A It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73

-

x
x
x
x

[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you
were married to [Severina]?
 A Yes sir.
:

Q When do you say you marrfied] her?

:

A Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is
: December 28, 1966.74 (Emphasis ours)
Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony
between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite,
practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall
under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of
the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious
ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage
is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's
marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-
existence of the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77
of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the
burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time
of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This
presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which
on its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing
officer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the
marriage contract was not explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage
license was presented. No other witness also testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is
not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for
one, and is uncertain about the documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall.
As he revealed in his testimony:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place
between you and [Severina]?
ATTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a

wedding that took place, Your Honor.

C O U Answer.
RT:

What preparations were done?

A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of

the Mayor during that time and the Mayor is a close friend of
ours. So, when he knew that we are traveling, we are going
to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with him
in Thailand, he told us you better get married first before
you travel because your daughter will be illegitimate.75

x x x
x

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A- We did not.

Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A- No.

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-] There was no marriage license?

A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:

Not necessarily.

A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the

license because it was at the house of the Mayor.

COURT:

But in this particular case before you went to the house of

the Mayor for the solemnization of your marriage, did you
apply for a marriage license?

A- No.76

x x x
x

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF [LUIS]:

Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you

were asked by counsel as well as a question was raised by
the Honorable Court whether or not you applied for a
marriage license when you got married on December 28,
1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell the Court what
you meant by that?
COU
RT:

By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COU
RT:

Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization

of the marriage, you answered no.

WITNESS:

I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something
affidavit or application before we went to the house of the
Mayor to get marry (sic) but that was about - - I cannot
recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:
 Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you
used we, whom are you referring to?

A- [Severina].

Q- And, yourself?

A- Yes.

Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with

[Severina] before the solemnization of the marriage?

A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was

the Registrar, Office of the [M]ayor or Office of the Chief of
Police. I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San Juan.

Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?

A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our
marriage. They let us signed (sic) an application or affidavit. I
cannot recall what it is.77 (Emphasis ours)
In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider
the glaring statements in the marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to
the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77
of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact
of marriage based on the marriage contract but simply glossed over the part stating that
the marriage is of an exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case
of mere non-recording of the marriage license number on the marriage contract, as was
in Geronimo.78chanrobleslaw

The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence,
inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the absence of the marriage license number on the
marriage contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no
statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also
testified that the deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the
husband of the deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with
the National Archives and Records Section where the marriage license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage license was issued to the parties."79 Considering that the absence of the
marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein
that the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was
presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis
and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80 the Court similarly declared that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character,
is void. In lieu of a marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false
affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the
notion that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with. The Court
held that to permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an
abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the
parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal
requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under
a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at
least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to
an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as
if there was no affidavit at all.81chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because
these refer to the absence of a formal requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should
be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception."82 "The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic 'autonomous social institution."83chanrobleslaw

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and
Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement84 in November 1980, which divided their
properties between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such agreement
on the ground that "the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the
contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It,
therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is
void."85chanrobleslaw

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86 the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case
may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x
x."87 It provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.88 (Emphasis ours)
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the
time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for
lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of
the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license."90 "Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.'"91chanrobleslaw
Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition
of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil
Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value."
As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that
"partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x
x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even
without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution
of the Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition
Agreement.92 It also remains uncontroverted that he already received his share as
stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said
agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which
renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage
license or certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the
local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license,93 such certification
is not the only proof that could validate the absence of a marriage license.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment
therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code,
are circumstances which cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that
Luis' failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left
for the USA in 1981, and until Severina's death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled
with her.94 All those years, he never presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not
even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented any
other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and
subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to
prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one
as well."95chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the
Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 11-72.

2Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Elihu A. Ybañez
and Florito S. Macalino concurring; CA rollo, pp. 569-597.

3 Id. at 698-699.

4 Rendered by Judge Luis R. Tongco; records, Volume IV, pp. 142-152.

5 Records, Vol. I, pp. 3-14.

6 Id. at 16, 18 and 20.

7 Id. at 22-23.

8 Id. at 4.

9 Id. at 5-8.

10 Id. at 9.

11 Id. at 272.

12 Id. at 10.

13 Id. at 11.

14 Id. at 38-47.

15See RTC Order dated May 3, 2004; id. at 88.

16 Id. at 112-114.

17 Id. at 49-50.

18 Id. at 40-41.

19 Id. at 100-111.

20 Id. at 102.

21 Id. at 107.

22 Id. at 103.

23 Id. at 201.

24 Id. at 104.
25cralawred Id. at 146-152.

26 Records, Vol. II, pp. 20-38, 55-83.

27 Id. at 23.

28 Id. at 31.

29 Id. at 34.

30 Id. at 356.

31 Id. at 357-369, 371-392.

32 Id. at 433.

33 Records, Vol. III, pp. 1-32, 169-220.

34See RTC Order dated April 23, 2007; records, Vol. IV, p. 44.

35See CA Decision dated April 30, 2007; id. at 53.

36See CA Decision dated May 16, 2007; id. at 64.

37 Issued by Judge Luis R. Tongco; id. at 140-141.

38 Id. at 142-152.

39 Id. at 150.

40 G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 494.

41 Records, Vol. IV, p. 150.

42 Id. at 151-152.

43 Id. at 152.

44 Id. at 313-325.

45 Id. at 325.

46 Id.

47 Id. at 167-188.

48 Id. at 154-164.
49 Id. at 216-217.

50 Id. at 228-229.

51 Id. at 360-361.

52 CA rollo, pp. 517-522.

53 Id. at 524-533.

54See CA Decision dated August 6, 2012; id. at 583.

55 Id. at 569-597.

56 Id. at 596.

57 Id. at 585.

58 Id. at 592-593.

59 Id. at 607-650.

60 Id. at 698-699.

61Rollo, p. 159.

62 Id. at 36.

63 Id. at 596-603.

64 Id. at 598.

65 Id. at 600.

66(1) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. New City
Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 213 (2005), citing The Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 401 SCRA 79, 86.
67SuperlinesTransportation Co., Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company, 548 Phil.
354, 362 (2007).

68Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667 (2000).

69 Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and cralawlawlibrary

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

70 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.

71Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 569 (2008).

72Rollo, p. 159.

73 TSN, June 6, 2005, pp. 15-16.

74 TSN, June 7, 2005, p. 30.

75 TSN, June 14, 2005, pp. 15-16.

76 Id. at 17-18.

77 Id. at 46-48.

78 Supra note 40, at 500.

79Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 203-204 (2007). (Emphasis ours)

80 573 Phil. 553 (2008).

81 Id. at 573-575.

82Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 68, at 670.

83 Id. at 667-668.

84 Records, Vol. I, pp. 112-114.

85See Consolidated Appellee's Brief; id. at 519.

86 328 Phil. 1289 (1996).

87 Id. at 1295. (Italics in the original)

88 Id. at 1295-1296.

89Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.

90Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861, 872 (2001).

91Valdez v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, supra note 86, at 1297. (Emphasis ours and
italics in the original)

92 TSN, June 17, 2005, pp. 30, 36.

93Abbasv. Abbas, 702 Phil. 578, 593 (2013); Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, supra note 90, at
869; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257,
262.

94Rollo, p. 502.

95Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, supra note 80, at 574.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997

NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

HERMOGENES ONG and JANE C. ONG, Respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

No less than the Constitution commands us to protect marriage as an inviolable social

institution and the foundation of the family. 1 In our society, the importance of a wedding
ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the matrix of the family and, therefore, an
occasion worth reliving in the succeeding years.

It is in this light that we narrate the following undisputed facts:

Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in
Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a
contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video
tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States
where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was
apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon
private respondents' return.

When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that
the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered.

Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding,
private respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint for specific performance and
damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch 33,
Dumaguete City. After a protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby granted:

1. Ordering the rescission of the agreement entered into between plaintiff Hermogenes Ong
and defendant Nancy Go;

2. Declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs
Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong for the following sums:
a) P450.00 , the down payment made at contract time;

b) P75,000.00, as moral damages;

c) P20,000.00, as exemplary damages;

d) P5,000.00, as attorney's fees; and

e) P2,000.00, as litigation expenses;

Defendants are also ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which,
on September 14, 1993, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence they
presented to prove that they acted only as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and, as such,
should not have been held liable. In addition, they aver that there is no evidence to show
that the erasure of the tape was done in bad faith so as to justify the award of damages. 2

The petition is not meritorious.

Petitioners claim that for the video coverage, the cameraman was employed by Pablo Lim
who also owned the video equipment used. They further assert that they merely get a
commission for all customers solicited for their principal. 3

This contention is primarily premised on Article 1883 of the Civil Code which states thus:

Art. 1883. If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action against the
persons with whom the agent has contracted; neither have such persons against the
principal.

In such case the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has
contracted, as if the transaction were his own, except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners' argument that since the video equipment used belonged to Lim and thus the
contract was actually entered into between private respondents and Lim is not deserving of
any serious consideration. In the instant case, the contract entered into is one of service,
that is, for the video coverage of the wedding. Consequently, it can hardly be said that the
object of the contract was the video equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video
equipment of another person is of no consequence.

It must also be noted that in the course of the protracted trial below, petitioners did not
even present Lim to corroborate their contention that they were mere agents of the latter. It
would not be unwarranted to assume that their failure to present such a vital witness would
have had an adverse result on the case. 4

As regards the award of damages, petitioners would impress upon this Court their lack of
malice or fraudulent intent in the erasure of the tape. They insist that since private
respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse of thirty days, as agreed upon in their
contract, the erasure was done in consonance with consistent business practice to minimize
losses. 5

We are not persuaded.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to human nature for any
newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that
private respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners
are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering that
private respondents were about to leave for the United States, they took care to inform
petitioners that they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the
erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified.

In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of
their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages."

In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for
a fee, the former undertook to cover the latter's wedding and deliver to them a video copy
of said event. For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with
their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private
respondents and are thus liable for damages.

The grant of actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P450.00 is justified, as

reimbursement of the downpayment paid by private respondents to petitioners. 6

Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because
this case is not among those enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. However, it is
also accepted in this jurisdiction that liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations, that is, the act which violates the contract may also
constitute a quasi-delict. 7Consequently, moral damages are recoverable for the breach of
contract

which was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. 8
Petitioners' act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage of private respondents'
wedding was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo.

As the appellate court aptly observed:

Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded
- a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered
- could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding
the appellees moral damages albeit in the amount of P75,000.00, which was a great
reduction from plaintiffs' demand in the complaint in compensation for the mental anguish,
tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the appellees suffered and which
under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the
Civil Code. 9

Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the case at bar,
the award of exemplary damages by the trial court is justified 10to serve as a warning to all
entities engaged in the same business to observe due diligence in the conduct of their
affairs.

The award of attorney' s fees and litigation expenses are likewise proper, consistent with
Article 2208 11 of the Civil Code.

Finally, petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate courts holding him
jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed.
He argues that when his wife entered into the contract with private respondent, she was
acting alone for her sole interest. 12

We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the
Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business
without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that it was only
petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. Consequently,
we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below,
pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who
execute them. 13

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 14, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents
and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the judgment
award. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1 Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.

2 Rollo, pp. 15-23.

3 Ibid., p. 7.

4 Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states, "(t)hat evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced,".

5 Rollo, p. 19.

6 Article 2200, Civil Code of the Philippines.

7 PARAS, Civil Code of the Philippines, V, 1990, pp. 995-996, Singson v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,
23 SCRA 1117 (1968).

8 TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V,

1995, p. 656.

9 Rollo, p. 37.

10 Article 2232, Civil Code of the Philippines.

11 Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

xxx xxx xxx

12 Rollo, p. 23.

13 Article 1311, Civil Code of the Philippines.

 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated
August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No.
8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25,
2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as

follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore.
The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take
effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4at the Virgen
sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6 ςrνll

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688,
as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccionalas minimum
to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7 ςrνll

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals ,8 the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.Gmur,9 which
held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which
one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no
jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted
by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good
faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his
act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.11 ςrνll

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not
acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had
been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of
the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by
a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However,
the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN
HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
 B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17 ςrνll

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The
petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are
allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow
that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit
bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis ,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the
petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know
the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he
relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No.
6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella -
Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil
Case No. 6020, to wit:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment

of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23,
1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.21 ςrνll

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married.24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan .25 In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein
that:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one

can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.26 ςrνll

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio .

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the
appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and TINGA, JJ.,concur.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by
Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.

2 Records, pp. 114-119.

3 Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia and Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
dissenting.
4 Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. B, the copy of
their marriage contract. Records, p. 10.

5 The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1,

reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously
united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and
prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

6 Rollo, pp. 38-40.

7 Records, p. 119.

8 G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

9 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).

10 58 Phil. 817 (1933).

11 Rollo, p. 43.

12 ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

13Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

14Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
15 G.R. NOS. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.

16 Rollo, p. 51.

17 Id. at 20-21.

18 G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.

19Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

20 Supra.

21 CA Rollo, p. 38.

22 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
andcralawlibrary

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

23Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio,except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

24 Rollo, p. 54.

25 G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

26 Id. at 124.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.


DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No.
31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac,
Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong, and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter
agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal
and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte
for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of “not guilty” to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the
wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the
couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they
went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also
identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife. 8 Days after the wedding, she
went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R.
Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the
couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing
the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled
that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the
petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No.
3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which
pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or
of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of
the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of
the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
P200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the
act of the petitioner in “blessing” the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony
had transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses
deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled
that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides
minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.:
(1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2)
they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at
least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these
requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a
marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under
Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44
of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds:

First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes “an
illegal marriage ceremony.” Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes
those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these
provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and
wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by
the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise
maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife.18

Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in
ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the “blessing” into a “marriage ceremony.”19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the “blessing” in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the
RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present
case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found
violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime

punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as
follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal
marriage ceremony.

In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged “blessing” by the
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an “illegal marriage ceremony” which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a “marriage
ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family
Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New
Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no
substantial amendments.

Article 625 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting
parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other
as husband and wife.”26

Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a
marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second,their declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him
and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that,
contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of
Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida
fails to persuade us. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may
seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against
him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its
failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had
indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife.
The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome
these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the
prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church “blessing” into a marriage ceremony.
Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of
the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the
requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation
of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations,
such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting
in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the
petitioner may view this merely as a “blessing,” the presence of the requirements of the law
constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this “blessing” into a “marriage ceremony” as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of their
relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that
the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The
marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of
these requirements negates his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony
has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal
liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an
element of the crime.

The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this
provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which
provide as follows:

Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do
so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and
practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage
in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage
that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing
marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one
month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more
than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the
MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and
not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As
correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the
Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the
penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this
point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which
provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law,
is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00 pursuant to Section
44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 3-26.

2Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose
C. Reyes, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.; id. at 28-55.

3From the testimonies of Joseph Yere, id. at 89-90; Mary Anne Yere, id. at 182-183; the
petitioner, id. at 118-123, 129 and 133-136; Joey Umadac, id. at 145-153; and Dominador
Umadac, id. at 166-167.

4 Id. at 30.

5 Id. at 29.

6 Id. at 35.

7 Id. at 36-37.

8 Id. at 85-86 (TSN dated August 5, 2004 of Florida Umadac, p. 14).

9 Id. at 31.

10 Id. at 49-50.

11 Id. at 60-61.

12 Id. at 62-63.

13 Id. at 68.

14 Id. at 46.

15 Id. at 51.

16 Ibid.

17 Id. at 12-14.

18 Id. at 15.
19 Id. at 15-16.

20 Id. at 18.

21 Ibid.

22 Id. at 19.

23 Art. 55. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with
legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and
wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or
mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage.

24 Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the
parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by
signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the
person solemnizing the marriage.

25 Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained
in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their
witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

26 This provision was taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which was, in turn, a
reproduction of Section 3 of the Marriage Law.

27 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

28People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 115 (2000).

29 Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 84464. June 21, 1991.]

SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I. SANCHEZ, Respondents.

Franco L. Loyola for petitioners.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The Regional Trial Court of Cavite dismissed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of
sale, holding that it was not spurious. It was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which found
that the vendor’s signature on the questioned document had indeed been forged. The
petitioners are now before us and urge that the decision of the trial court be reinstated.

In her complaint below, herein private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the
widow of Roberto Sanchez, averred that her husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter
parcel of land located at Rosario, Cavite, which was registered without her knowledge in the
name of the herein petitioners on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their
favor by her late husband on February 7, 1968. Involving the report of a handwriting expert
from the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, who found that the
signature on the document was written by another person, she prayed that the deed of sale
be annulled, that the registration of the lot in the name of the petitioners be canceled, and
that the lot be reconveyed to her. 1

In their answer, the petitioners questioned the personality of the private respondent to file
the complaint, contending that the late Roberto Sanchez was never married but had a
common-law wife by whom he had two children. On the merits, they claimed that Roberto
Sanchez had deeded over the lot to them in 1968 for the sum of P500.00 in partial
settlement of a judgment they had obtained against him. They had sued him after he had
failed to pay a P1,300.00 loan they had secured for him and which they had been forced to
settle themselves to prevent foreclosure of the mortgage on their property. 2

On the petitioner’s motion, the trial court required the examination of the deed of sale by
the National Bureau of Investigation to determine if it was a forgery. Trial proceeded in due
time, with the presentation by the parties of their testimonial and documentary evidence.
On June 25, 1986, Judge Alejandro C. Silapan rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.

In his decision, 3 the trial judge rejected the testimony of the handwriting experts from the
PC and the NBI, who had both testified that the standard signature of the late Roberto
Sanchez and the one written on the alleged deed of sale "were written by two different
people." He cited Go Fay v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 4 in support of his action.
Explaining the supposed differences between the signatures, he said that Roberto Sanchez
was "under serious emotional stress and intensely angry" when he reluctantly signed the
document after he had lost the case to them, "with the added fact that they only wanted to
accept his lot for P500.00 and not for the settlement of the entire obligation of P1,300.00."
At that, he said there were really no fundamental differences between the signatures
compared. Moreover, the signatures examined were from 1970 to 1982 and did not include
those written by Roberto Sanchez in 1968.

The decision also noted that Roberto Sanchez did not take any step to annul the deed of
sale although he had knowledge thereof as early as 1968. He thus allowed his action to
prescribe under Article 1431 of the Civil Code. As for the contract of a marriage submitted
by the private respondent, this should also be rejected because although the document was
dated September 21, 1964, the Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the
subject land on August 25, 1966, described his civil status as "single." It was also doubtful if
she could bring the action for reconveyance alone, even assuming she was the surviving
spouse of Roberto Sanchez, considering that he left illegitimate children and collateral
relatives who were also entitled to share in his estate.

As earlier stated, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 5 which held that the
trial court did err, as contended by the appellant, in holding that the deed of sale was not
spurious; that the action to annul it had already prescribed; that Catalina Sanchez was not
the widow of Roberto Sanchez; and that she had no capacity to institute the complaint.

Before us now, the petitioners fault the respondent court for a) upholding the testimony of
the expert witnesses against the findings of fact of the trial court; b) annulling the deed of
sale; c) declaring that the action to annul the deed of sale had not yet prescribed; d) not
declaring the private respondent guilty of estoppel; and e) not sustaining the decision of the
trial court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

We see no reason to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is consonant with the
evidence of record and the applicable law and jurisprudence.

The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the widow of
Roberto Sanchez with her submission of the marriage contract denominated as Exhibit "A."
6 That evidence rendered unnecessary the presumption that "a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" and may
also explain why Roberto Sanchez could not marry the woman by whom he supposedly had
two illegitimate children, assuming these persons did exist. It is strange that the trial court
should reject Exhibit "A" in favor of the Transfer Certificate of Title describing Roberto
Sanchez as "single," 7 disregarding the elementary principle that the best documentary
evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. A Torrens certificate is the best
evidence of ownership of registered land, not of the civil status of the owner.
As the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, the private respondent could validly file the
complaint for the recovery of her late husband’s property, without prejudice to the
successional rights of his other heirs. Parenthetically, (and curiously), although the
supposed common-law wife and her illegitimate children were never presented at the trial,
their existence was readily accepted by the trial court on the basis alone of the petitioner’s
unsupported statements.

Coming now to the questioned signature, we find it significant that the examination by the
NBI was requested by the petitioners themselves but in the end it was the private
respondent who presented the NBI handwriting expert as her own witness. 8 The
explanation is obvious. The petitioners hoped to refute the findings of the PC handwriting
expert with the findings of the NBI handwriting expert, but as it turned out the findings of
the two witnesses coincided. Both PC Examiner Corazon Salvador and NBI Examiner
Zenaida J. Torres expressed the informed view that the signature on the deed of sale was
not written by Roberto Sanchez. 9

They did not conjure this conclusion out of thin air but supported it with knowledgeable
testimony extensively given on direct and cross-examination on the various characteristics
and differences of the signatures they had examined and compared. 10 The trial judge said
the testimony of PC Examiner Salvador was not reliable because her examination of the
document was "done under circumstance not so trustworthy before the action was
instituted." But he did not consider the fact that her findings were corroborated by NBI
Examiner Torres, who conducted her own examination at the instance of the petitioners
themselves and after the action was instituted. It is worth noting that the competence of
the two expert witnesses was never assailed by the petitioners nor was it questioned by the
trial judge. The petitioners also did not present their own handwriting expert to refute the
findings of the government handwriting experts.

The Court has itself examined the signatures of Roberto Sanchez in the several instruments
among the records of this case, including those dating back to before 1968 11 and is
inclined to accept the findings of the handwriting experts. The case invoked by the
petitioners is not applicable because the differences in the signatures compared in the case
at bar were, as the trial judge found, caused not by time but by the tension gripping
Roberto Sanchez when he signed the deed of sale.chanrobles law library : red

Incidentally, the petitioners have not sufficiently established the reason for such tension,
which appears to be a mere conjecture of the trial judge. No proof was submitted about
their filing of the complaint against Roberto Sanchez. Petitioner Jaime Villanueva himself
admitted under oath that he did not read the decision in the case nor did he ask his lawyer
how much had been awarded against the defendant. 12 Nobody testified about Roberto’s
state of mind when he allegedly signed the document, and in Manila at that although the
persons were residing in Cavite. Even the witnesses to the Bilihan were not presented nor
was any explanation for their absence offered.

The explanation given by the petitioners for their delay in registering the deed of sale is not
convincing. That delay lasted for all of thirteen years. The petitioners suggest they are
simple peasants and did not appreciate the need for the immediate transfer of the property
in their name. They also say that they forgot. The evidence shows, however, that they
understood the need for registering their property for purposes of using it as collateral in
case they wanted to borrow money. It would appear that they thought of simulating the sale
registering the subject lot when their own lands were insufficient to secure a P100,000.00
loan their daughter wanted to borrow.

Concerning the question of prescription, we find that the applicable rule is not Article 1391
of the Civil Code but Article 1410. Article 1391 provides that the action for annulment of a
contract prescribes in four years in cases where the vice consists of intimidation, violence,
undue influence, mistake, fraud or lack capacity. The deed of sale in question does not
suffer from any of these defects. The supposed vendee’s signature having been proved to be
a forgery, the instrument is totally void or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious"
under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. According to Article 1410, "the action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."cralaw virtua1aw library

Finally, petitioners invoke Article 1431 of the Civil Code and contend that the respondent
court erred in not declaring the private respondent and her late husband estopped from
questioning the deed of sale until after fourteen years from its execution. The inference that
Roberto Sanchez and the private respondent knew about the instrument from that date has
not been proved by the evidence of record. Moreover, we fail to see the applicability of
Article 1431, which provides that "through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon." Neither the private respondent nor her late husband
has made any admission or representation to the petitioners regarding the subject land that
they are supposed to have relied upon.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Our own finding is that the petitioners have not proved the validity and authenticity of the
deed of sale or even the circumstances that supposedly led to its execution by the late
Roberto Sanchez. On the contrary, we are convinced from the testimonies of the
handwriting experts that his signature had been forged on the questioned document and
that he had not conveyed the subject land to the petitioners. The deed of sale being a
forgery, it was totally void or inexistent and so could be challenged at any time, the action
for its nullification being imprescriptible. The private respondent, as the widow of Roberto
Sanchez, has the capacity to sue for the recovery of the land in question and is not
estopped from doing so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1. Rollo, pp. 23-26.

2. Ibid., pp. 32-35.

3. Id., pp. 36-43.

4. 46 Phil. 968.

5. Aldecoa, Jr., J. ponente; Tensuan and Victor, JJ., concurring.

6. Exhibits for the Plaintiff, p. 1.

7. Ibid., Exhibit B, p. 2.

8. TSN, February 17, 1986, pp. 24-25.

9. TSN, February 25, 1985, pp. 32-33; TSN, February 17, 1986, p. 50.

10. TSN, February 25, 1985, pp. 33-39; TSN, February 17, 1986, pp. 39-50; TSN, April 30,
1986, pp. 21-30.

11. Exhibit "A," Exhibits for the Plaintiff, p. 1; Exhibit 7, Exhibits for the Defendants, p. 167.

12. TSN, May 30, 1985, p. 43.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-9005. June 20, 1958.]

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, Petitioner, v. FELIPE APELAN

FELIX, Respondent.

Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz, for Petitioners.

Nicodemus L. Dasig for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. MARRIAGE IN ARTICULO MORTIS; LACK OF AFFIDAVIT AND NON-REGISTRATION OF

MARRIAGE. — In the celebration of the marriage in articulo mortis, where all the requisites
for its validity were present, the marriage is not voided by the of the failure priest to make
and file the affidavit required in sections 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law and to register said
marriage in the local civil registry.

2. ID.; FAILURE TO SIGN MARRIAGE CONTRACT; EFFECT OF. — Signing of the marriage
contract is a formal requirement of evidentiary value, the omission of which does not render
the marriage a nullity.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of the
marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.

It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived
together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but
had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea
became seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated
to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vicarra 1 visited and persuaded
her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of
Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix
without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of
his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old
woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and
then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis, 2 Carmen Ordiales
and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.

After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied,
and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial
ceremonies.

On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel
defendant to render an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They
are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving
forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the
Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.

Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal
question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief - whether the events
which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding
marriage.

According to the Court of Appeals:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the
marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29
and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the reverend’s testimony in court. Fr.
Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no reason to side one or the
other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive evidence on the celebration or performance of the
marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not in articulo mortis,
because Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified,
however, that her condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and according to his
observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about her
condition that he decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after
hearing her confession. . . . . The greatest objection of the Appellees and the trial court
against the validity of the marriage under consideration, is the admitted fact that it was not
registered.’

The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.

There is no question about the officiating priest’s authority to solemnize marriage. There is
also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both
declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each
other as husband and wife."cralaw virtua1aw library

The appellants’ contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

library
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the
priest, as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and

(b) The priest filed no affidavit nor recorded the marriage with local civil registry.

The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing — may seriously be doubted. The
Court of Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held
such marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis
was a fact", and the only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr, Bautista to send
copies of the certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register
the said marriage in the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the
said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue tendered in the court of first instance.
(See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)

However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage
certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?

Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law
which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required but
the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate,
signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested
by the person solemnizing the marriage . . . (Emphasis ours).

In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes
for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.

In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being
manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife" - which in this case actually occurred. 3 We think the signing of the marriage contract
or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the act. 4 No
statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite — not the
formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one
thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.

"Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually provide
for the issuance of a certificate of marriage . . . and for the registration or recording of
marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is not essential
to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials issuing the license, certifying the
marriage, and making the proper return and registration or recording." (Sec. 27 American
Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)

"Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct that a
license must be issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform the ceremony,
that a certain number of witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of the marriage shall
be signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the conditions shall be guilty
of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority to secure publicity and to
require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do not void common-
law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where such marriage are entered into
without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of these statutes to
discourage deception, prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve
from doubt the status of parties who live together as man and wife, by providing competent
evidence of the marriage. . . ." (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp.
188-189.) Emphasis ours. (See also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)

And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or
several formal requirements of this Act . . ." (Section 27.)

In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of
such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41)
implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would
not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista’s
omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the
liberation of Manila and its environs.

Identical remarks apply to the priest’s failure to make and file the affidavit required by
sections 20 and 21. It was the priest’s obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no
serious consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by
the emergency.

"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff’s natural father and mother,
while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the
celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites." (Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.)
See also Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the
priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for
the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a
marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613), 5 this marriage
should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.

In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who
have lived publicly in a state of concubinage 6 , section 22), we must hold this marriage to
be valid.

The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the
plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or
sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased." (Art 952, Civil Code.)

Wherefore, the Court of Appeals’ decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia
and Felix, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Now a nun at Sta. Escolastica College.

2. In his presence, Matea and Felipe expressed mutual consent to be thenceforward

husband and wife.

3. p. 49 Record on Appeal.

4. And to prevent fraud, as petitioners contend. p. 30 brief. See Corpuz Juris Secundum,
Vol. 55 p. 899.

5. Because it is a formal requisite" (Section 7 as amended. See American Jurisprudence,

supra. However, the New Civil Code seemingly rules otherwise. (Art. 80 (3)).

6. Section 22 Act 3613; Article 76 New Civil Code.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-16925. March 31, 1962.]

FABIAN PUGEDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD

TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez, CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her
husband Victoriano Salvanera, GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA,
GLORIA VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem,
Rafael Trias, TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband
Ramon Portugal, Defendants-Appellants.

Placido Ramos for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cajulis, Trias & Viniegra for defendants-appellants Trias, Et. Al.

Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.

SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; MARRIAGES, REQUISITES OF; EVIDENCE COMPETENT TO PROVE FACT OF

MARRIAGE; FAILURE OF REGISTRY NOT BAR TO FACT OF MARRIAGE. — When the question
as to whether or not a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may
be improved by evidence of any kind. Testimony by one of the parties or witnesses to the
marriage, or by the person who solemnized the same, is admissible. Public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged marriage, birth and baptismal certificates
of children borne by the alleged spouses, and a statement of such marriage in subsequent
documents, are competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage. The mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage,
as long as in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding
of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.

2. FRIAR LANDS; DISTINGUISHED FROM PUBLIC LAND; ACQUISITION NOT GOVERNED BY

PUBLIC LAND LAW. — The Friar Lands Act (Act No. 112) expressly declares that friar lands
are not public land in the sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act, and their
acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the Public Land Act.

3. ID.; CERTIFICATE OF SALE A CONVEYANCE OF OWNERSHIP; RESOLUTORY CONDITION

ATTACHED TO THE SALE. — Under Act No. 1120 the conveyance executed in favor of a
buyer or purchaser, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be canceled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in
full.

4. CIVIL PROCEDURE; CASE AT BAR; PRESCRIPTION OF CLAIMS. — In the case at bar,

plaintiff’s failure to intervene and assert any claim to the properties which were the subject
which were the subject of intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the first
husband of his (plaintiff’s) wife (which proceedings covered a period from 1915 to 1929)
now bars him from asserting any claim, usufructuary or otherwise, in said properties by the
filing of an action in 1948. The value of plaintiff’s claims for useful improvements on the
land of his wife having been proved in court, to the effect that useful expenditures for the
benefit of the separate properties of one of the spouse are partnership properties, can not
be applied. But even if such useful improvements had been proved, plaintiff may no longer
recover his share in the value of the improvements in the paraphernal properties of his wife
as he instituted the present action only after 14 years from the death of his wife in 1934. In
1935 defendant children of plaintiff’s wife presented a project of partition to plaintiffs, which
partition made no mention whatsoever of any participation of plaintiff therein. This express
omission in said deed of partition, though not assigned by plaintiff, was enough notice to
plaintiff that defendants intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the
properties left by his deceased wife, even of the usufruct by him until 1948, thirteen years
later, plaintiff’s rights, if any, have prescribed.

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First Instance of Cavite, is
certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225,
226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282, 2284, 2378, 2412, 2682,
2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate
located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn (camarin) also of strong
materials, and a store also of strong materials in General Trias, Cavite and sets of household
furniture. The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the
same were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff
contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934.

The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias
are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while
the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said
deceased Maria C. Ferrer.

The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273,
2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following
interest therein: 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot
No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-
half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer
in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties and defendants
managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties
above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C.
Ferrer, be partitioned and one-half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff.

The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the
properties described in the complaint, or that said properties had been administered by the
defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way of special and affirmative
defense they alleged that the properties subject of the complaint had been inherited by the
defendants from their deceased father Mariano Trias and deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer
and had been in possession and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully,
uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a claim of ownership to the exclusion of all
others, and that plaintiff is estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation in
the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for lack of knowledge and belief the claim
of plaintiff in his complaint that he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage
continued up to the death of the latter in 1934. They further presented a counterclaim
against the plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what was contributed by
them in support of the candidacies of plaintiff when running for the office of provincial
governor of Cavite. They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and
P5,000 in cash amounting in value to the total sum of P50,000 and a counterclaim for
P100,000 which is the value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which
the plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.

The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter’s claim that the properties
mentioned in plaintiff’s complaint were joint properties of the plaintiff and the defendants.
They also allege that the properties had gone to the management and control of the
defendants Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof during
the administration by them of said properties. As cross-claim against their co-defendants,
they allege that they are each entitled to one-eighth of the properties left by their mother
as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as well as a share of one-eighth each
in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in
Lingad, Litlit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.

Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias, answering
the cross-claim of their co-defendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations contained in the
answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that the cross-claim is improper as
the same should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the defendants Pugeda are
estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any further right to the properties left by
their deceased mother.

There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is the alleged
existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the
plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate under certificates of sale
issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in
part during the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the claim
for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have been bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer during the
marriage, which plaintiff claims is in the possession of the defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente
testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings,
plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the Peace, who
was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of whom
was Santiago Salazar and another Amado Prudente, deceased; that after the usual
ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after
the witnesses had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and
another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time the keeper
of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no celebration of
the marriage was held in spite of the prominence of the contracting parties because plaintiff
was then busy campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board and Maria C.
Ferrer was already on the family way.

The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy of
the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January 1916,
which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein; but this absence was
explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the register forgot
to make an entry of the marriage in the registry.

Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived in the
house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue was baptized on August 26,
1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The
baptismal certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of the spouses
Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of said birth was also submitted and it
states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.

It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife, as
husband and wife, until the death of the latter, publicly and openly as husband and wife.
Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by the parties
defendants themselves. The document contains the following significant statement or
admission.

"WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the said deceased:
Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the
children of her first marriage with Mariano Trias, now deceased: and Teofilo and Virginia,
both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer, are the children of her second marriage with Fabian
Pugeda.

". . . That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that Lots Nos. 3177 and
3178 known as the Buenavista property will be administered by one of the parties to be
agreed upon and for said purpose they appoint Miguel F. Trias, and all earnings, rentals and
income or profits shall be expended for the improvement and welfare of the said property
and for the payment of all claims and accounts of our deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer, and
for the maintenance and education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of the testimonial and documental
evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria
C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not only by the chain of
circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the
marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that plaintiff and deceased
Maria C Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there
is a strong presumption that they were actually married.

On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite the
following authority:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 53. — As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of

the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept,
or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be
proved by evidence of any kind." (p. 27, Civil Code)

"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff’s natural father and mother,
while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the
celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding of a
copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites." (Madridejo v. De Leon, 55
Phil., 1)

"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage." (55 C. J. S., p. 900).

In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was
in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the
death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial court to that effect.

On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the
action were formerly Friar Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, province
of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale in the name of Mariano Trias in the
year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The different
lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to said Maria C. Ferrer, widow, are set
forth in a table appended to this decision as Annex "A."

On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero declared that
the lots in question, were conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and
consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the
latter’s share in the conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the rate of
1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal properties, to
be assigned to her children by both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the balance of 1/9
to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment the case was appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants presented
a motion for new trial on the ground that they discovered copies of four documents namely
- Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp. 108-117, (The last document is
a copy of a court order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the project of partition
in Case No. 860, Intestate of Mariano Trias) which if admitted might alter decision. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance
of Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.

Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales who
then presided the court, rendered a new decision. Judge Gonzales found that the total
amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the lots in question amount to only
P8,911.84, while the installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and 3178 were paid
for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer in the total sum of P16,557.32. Judge
Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages should participate in the ownership of the
lands, according to the actual contributions made by each marriage in the installments in
payment of the lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now subject of the appeal is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders

judgment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284,
2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680, 2718, 2764, (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of percentage and indicated in each individual lot;

2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same were fully paid during
the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the couple
Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the installments for these two lots were paid after
death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not lose the character of conjugal property for payments
were made from the crops thereof;

3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the
payment for the installments of these 21 lots amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must
be reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid from the mass of
the hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be distributed among
all the children of heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage to be deducted
from the mass of her estate;

4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments for these six
(6) lots were fully paid during marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are
hereby declared to be conjugal between them — one half of which must go to the children
or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or heirs of Maria C.
Ferrer in her first and second marriage;

5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which commenced after the death
of his mother who died on February 11, 1934, must render an accounting of his
administration within three (3) months time from the date this judgment has become final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action." (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156)

Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants claim that
Judge Gonzales had no power or authority to change the decision of Judge Lucero, as it was
not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence. They have also assigned
before Us a set of errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues set forth
above. As the issue of marriage has already been considered we will now pass to the second
and more important question as to whether the lands subject of the action may be
considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or of the second or of both.

A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots is
necessary that the issues in the action may be justly determined.

A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the friar lands
were purchased by the government for sale to actual occupants (actual settlers and
occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government). (Paragraph 3 of
Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the lands are not
public lands in the sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act, and their
acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of
Purposes, Id.)

The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 12. — . . . When the costs thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set
forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the
amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the
office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United States or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant
the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and
become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the
Land Registration Act. . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

"SEC. 13. — The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate shall be
considered as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the
installments and at the interest specified in the certificate, and he shall by such acceptance
become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all accrued interest. . . .
Provided, however, That every settler and occupant who desires to purchase his holding
must enter into the agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the said certificate
and executing the said receipt whenever called on so to do by the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands, and a failure on the part of the settler and occupant to comply with this
requirement shall be considered as a refusal to purchase, and he shall be ousted as above
provided and thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case of unoccupied lands: . .
. ."cralaw virtua1aw library

"SEC. 15. — The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold
under the provisions of this Act until the full payment of all installments of purchase money
and interest by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or encumbrance made by him
shall be invalid as against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in all
respects subordinate to its prior claim."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Sec. 16. — In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is
provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the Government to
any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the
certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the
purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed
and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend
and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have
taken had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate, upon
proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the certificate.
In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land before having
complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate
shall be entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon presenting his
assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration." (Vol. III, Public
Laws, pp 315-316).

A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance executed in
favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the
ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be
cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale
certificates were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were assigned in
accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the law provides that when the buyer does not
leave a widow, the rights and interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are left to the
buyer’s heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the Director of Lands,
Et Al., v. Ricardo Rizal, Et Al., G.R. No. L- 2925 prom. December 29, 1950, this court thru
Mr. Justice Montemayor held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the purchaser, even before
the payment of the full price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is
considered by the law as the actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in
full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere lien
holder or mortgagee.

". . . In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act
1120, pending payment in full of the purchase price, although the Government reserves title
thereto, merely for its protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser, and
that any accretion received by the lot even before payment of the last installment belongs
to the purchaser thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different from a sale
of public lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a
person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel of land desired. Thereafter the
land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant or to a qualified bidder the
successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land and cultivate and improve it,
(Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after satisfying the requirements of
cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a sales patent.
(Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate
of sale in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not
paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies and his widow remarries both she
and the second husband are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as his
wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder
of a certificate dies before the payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to
the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a widow, the right to the friar land is transmitted
to his heirs at law.

It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the
action none was paid for in full during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and
that payments in installments continued to be made even after the marriage of Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the
certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said
marriage continued in the name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as installments
for the lots were taken from the fruits of the properties themselves, according to the
admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Mr. Viniegra:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q De los productos de esos terrenos, durante la administracion por los demandados, recibia
Vd. su participacion?

A No, señor.

Q Nunca?

A Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have been
informed that the obligations have been paid annually from the products of the land.

Q Therefore, from the products of these lands - the proceeds — the obligations to the
Bureau of Lands are being discounted from the said proceeds and after the remainder, as in
palay, are equally divided, is that what you mean to say?

A Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of the lands the
obligations to the Bureau of Lands would be paid.

Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna participacion?

A No señor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the obligations to the
Bureau of Lands were being paid from the products of the lands.

Mr. Viniegra:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after paying the
Bureau of Lands?
A How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to the Bureau of Lands
— that was until the Japanese time, and I knew some obligations were not paid, as a result
of which the sales certificates of some big lots were cancelled.

Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Como se mantenia Vd?

A Mi Madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me.
(Session of November 20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp. 259-261, Matro.) (Brief for
Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49- 51).

There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar, and
that is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the inventory of the estate left by said
deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the
project of partition in said especial proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias
adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the
other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.

The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the
friar lands purchased as above described and paid for, had the character of conjugal
properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling legal
reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said nature
of the lands in question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C.
Ferrer took place, the latter was appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased
husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1"
Trias). An inventory of the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15,
1929, was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of partition of the properties
was submitted. The project includes the friar lands subject of the action, and in accordance
with it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was adjudicated to the deceased
Mariano Trias as his share and the other half adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her
share. The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This project
of partition was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated February 11, 1929,
submitted to the Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.

The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano
Trias must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It does not appear,
and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever appeared in said proceedings to claim
participation in the properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the
proceedings to claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife
Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that the said friar lands actually belonged to
the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that he had no interest therein. The
project of partition was approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and defendant had
already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiffs failure to assert any claim to the
properties in the said intestate proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely
from asserting the claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.

We will now proceed to consider plaintiff’s claim that the lands in question had, through the
joint effort of himself and his wife, increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400
cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of improvements such as a system of
irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments remaining
unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield of the said lands and if it be taken into
account that one-half of said lands already belonged to the children of the first marriage, to
whom the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of the estate of their father, the
deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only portion of the products or produce of the lands in which
plaintiff could claim any participation is the one-half share therein produced from the
paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce belonging to Maria C.
Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the lands is not shown, but the fact that
plaintiff was engaged in continuous political campaigns, ever since his marriage in 1916 (he
had devoted most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the
products of the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer must have been used in these
political campaigns as well as in meeting the expenses of the conjugal partnership. The
value of the useful improvements introduced on the lands, joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer
and her children, was not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of
the old Civil Code, to the effect that useful expenditures for the benefit of the separate
properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be applied. But even if
such useful improvements had been proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s action
to recover his share therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present
action was instituted by plaintiff only in the year 1948. After the death of Maria C. Ferrer,
plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard from for 14 years, that is,
until he instituted this action in 1948. His claims for the improvements, if any, is therefore
also barred.

The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the improvements in
the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is also applicable to the claim of the
plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have been made and the furniture supposedly
bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character of conjugal
partnership property of said spouses. In the year 1935, defendant herein presented a
project of partition to plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition is dated March, 1935
and is marked Exhibit "5" -Trias). In this project of partition of the properties of the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff’s children with
the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of any participation that
plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or otherwise, or in any building or improvement. This
deed of partition was shown to plaintiff but the latter did not sign it.

The express omission of the name of plaintiff herein in the above deed of partition as one of
the heirs of the deceased Maria C, Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that defendants had
intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the properties left by the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. But in spite of his
knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him until February, 1948 when plaintiff
demanded his share in the properties and later brought this action.

The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted this action.
Consequently, whatever rights he may have had to any portion of the estate left by the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be deemed to have
prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the
plaintiff herein one-ninth share in the estate of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct
should be set aside and the objection to the grant of such share to plaintiff on the ground of
prescription is sustained.

Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to consider
the cross-claim of his children, namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge Lucero
decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Pugeda be divided among her
children, including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda, and decreed
one-ninth of the properties of the said deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two
children of hers with the plaintiff and assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth share in the
said estate left by her in usufruct.

In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his wife
Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of limitations, the decree entered by Judge
Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into nine parts, one part belonging to each
heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the share in usufruct
of the plaintiff therein and increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed,
and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio G. Lucero,
presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among
her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be
divided among her eight children at the rate of one- eighth per child. As thus modified, the
judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, C.J. and Padilla, J., took no part.

 EN BANC

G. R. No. 150758 - February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner 


vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of
the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity,
on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the
City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united
in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with
whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married
to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He
alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from
his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested
his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all
between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS

CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE
NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged
indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to
the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13Hence, petitioner argues that all
four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and
Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at
the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to
Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued
by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that
the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court
provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage
contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of
a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis
ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract
plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National

Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on
February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that
there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices
have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is
quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity
of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence
presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony
that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own
conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his
second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal
laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the
permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by
the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally
declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least
two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and
3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied
by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr.
of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in
this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes
of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity
of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special
contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a
deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States
criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be
entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence,
the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced
petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.

Vitug, J., see separate opinion.

Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.

Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.

Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.

Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.

Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.

Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION>

VITUG, J.:

Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to
Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro
argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab
initio on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the
crime of bigamy.

The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage,
contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were it
not for its being bigamous.

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial
declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?

I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a
party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter
explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the
very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity.2 As early as the
case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code
itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of
nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case
for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to
that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the
courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a
voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense
in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of
annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void
ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.

It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted
of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the
second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior
marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:

"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of
the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the
Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a
subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent
marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the court
in Yap vs. Court of Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel
rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage
shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code
has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8

A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has
been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil
law with those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential
marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which
are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal
capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a
marriage license, or the like.

The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties

thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage,
remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the
Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial
declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is
expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses rights and obligations,
property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable
marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons:
First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the
Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages;
10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of

the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of
relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may
not so readily be as evident.11 It would have been logical for the Family Code to consider
such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to
make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.

Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a
voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or
prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the
Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36,
celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the
effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription
seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36
are truly meant to be inexistent.

Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due
to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and
efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been
declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy.
Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial
issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being
valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal
offense for bigamy.

In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first
marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.
12 The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it

needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid
marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the
second marriage has been contracted without the necessary license and thus void,13 or that
the accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal
liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses
refers to the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites
for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to
be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity
in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the
declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground,
without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The
judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact
of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the
relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of
the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had
entered into it.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

Endnotes:

1 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 4-11.

2 Record, p. 78.
3 Record, p. 84.
4 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 11-12; TSN, 13 September 1995, pp. 6-9.
5 Record, pp. 1-2.
6 Id., p. 66.
7 TSN, 11 December 1996, p. 6.
8 Id., pp. 6-7.
9 Id., pp. 7-8.
10 Penned by Judge Rumoldo F. Fernandez, Rollo, pp. 156-162.
11 Rollo, p. 7.
12 Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE. Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907.
13 Rollo, pp. 7-16.
14 Id., pp. 16-18.
15 Record, p. 85.
16 Record, p. 84.
17 Record, p. 148.
18 Record, p. 149.
19 Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992, 205 SCRA 337, 343, citing People
v. Borromeo, 218 Phil. 122, 126.
20Decision dated November 20, 1995, penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional Trial Court of
Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. AV-885 (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 43).
21 Record, pp. 16-18.
22 Family Code, Art. 41.
23 Family Code, Art. 2.
24Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, pp. 119-120, citing the Family
Code, Articles 2 and 3.
25 Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

26 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;

(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse
or his or her own spouse.
27 Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996.
28 Family Code, Art. 54.

VITUG,
1 Article 349, Revised Penal Code.
2 Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338; see also People vs Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033.
3 100 Phil 1033.
4 See People vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767.
5 Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122; Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327.
6 143 SCRA 499.
7 145 SCRA 229.
8 I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
even for purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that the marriage, at
least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be
required when either or both parties have not at all given consent thereto that verily results in a "no"
marriage situation or when the prior "marriage" is between persons of the same sex.
9 Deliberations of the family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996.
10 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
11One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological incapacity merely renders
a marriage voidable, not void.
12 De la cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs. Hon.
Diez, et. Al., 109 Phil 155; Zapanta vs. hon. Montessa, et. al., 144 Phil. 1227; People vs. Mora Dumpo,
62 Phil 246; People vs. Lara, 51 O. G. 4079.
13 People vs. Lara, supra.
14 De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 155733 - January 27, 2006]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO

AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other
HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS
OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA
DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO,
BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF
GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely,
GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA
CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL,
AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR.,
namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA,
JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,
2 Respondents.3

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668,
which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24,
2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several
collateral issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into
two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half - and full-blood
siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs
of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,
9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to
Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa
Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado's life. Before him
was Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship
with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal
status of Ramon Osorio's and Felisa Delgado's union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the
ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only
child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latter's intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle
of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the
couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado's intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support
thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much
as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that
Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on,
when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of
the name and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily
mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo
Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June
15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self -

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17but whether a

marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners
point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a
baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Señorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived
together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this
period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and
friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the
following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in
the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States - Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form
526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo
J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado
in Manila on 3 June 1919;18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to
Josefa Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own,
they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These
children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect
as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.
According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and
blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in
1920 until her father's demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado's obituary which was prepared by
Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report
card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.
20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate
child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when
Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the
documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.
21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia
filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunanGuillermina Rustia. He stated
under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28,
1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia
Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the
original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was
opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia's late brother,
Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition
was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were
barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa
Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings,

claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state
that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were nevermarried but had merely lived together
as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition
in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied
on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue
and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix
of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of
the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision,
are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in
the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among
themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the
said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and
effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela
Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court
hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent
JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner

CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to
render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a
period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the
r e c o r d o n a p p e a l w a s n o t f i l e d o n t i m e .29 T h e y t h e n f i l e d a p e t i t i o n
for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31However, on
motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, the Court of
Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors' appeal in the interest of
substantial justice.32

In a Petition for Review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that oppositors' failure to file the record on appeal within the
reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10,
1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
decision33 read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under

exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice.

xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court's pronouncements as to certain
matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the
party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal,
but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground
of late filing.

xxx

In this instance, private respondents' intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent
and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration
proceedings.

xxx

A review of the trial court's decision is needed.

xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
the APPROVAL of the private respondents' Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of
the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court's May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court's decision.
Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The
dispositive portion of the amended decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have
been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-
Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among
themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the
proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants
upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed
administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates
in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to
the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the
requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual
administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of
the administrator's qualification and posting of the bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia
on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the
extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado
(Campo) affected by the said adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are

permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions
of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or
disputable.37

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage;

xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50
years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed
status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a
record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not
married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or
unmarried woman.39

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its

absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40Once the presumption of
marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need
not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen
the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as
Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration
under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the
titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more
than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which
are prima facieevidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners' own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to
Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This
again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by
the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil
status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of
law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive

presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no
matter how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one
of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient
evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio.
The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of
marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa
and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado's and
Caridad Concepcion's Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all
the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the
decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y
would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each
other reciprocally?cralawlibrary

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children
of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It
seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate
child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the
illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we
submit that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of
the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between
legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That
prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate
relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the
same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing
before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that
the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to
them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-
blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they
shall share equally.53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except
Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may
inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code,
the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces.54Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado
who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their
children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a
vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it
is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their
children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they
are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa's estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent's entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no

will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial
or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo

Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission
or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974
at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the
new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on
condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is

compulsory in any of the following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more
or less with that of the conception;

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition

through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and
second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from
her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not
constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma's right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma's second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor's report
card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado's obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not.
The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The
fact that his name appears there as intervenor's parent/guardian holds no weight since he
had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was
Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was
published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the
authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic
writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia
himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to
present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor's claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter's death. We affirm the
ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the
deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be
strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are
not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo
Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If no executor is named in

the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the

estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia.
They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia,
respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia's June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado
who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado's full - or half-siblings who
may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado's
grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial
court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who
are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia's estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado's estate) shall be
inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective
shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived
Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from
among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and
filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1 Oppositors in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch 55.
2 Intervenor in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch 55.
3 In the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners, the oppositors were identified as
"oppositors-respondents," while intervenor was identified as "intervenor-respondent." For clarity, we
shall refer to them collectively as "respondents" in this decision. The Court of Appeals was also
impleaded as public respondent but this was not necessary since this is a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
4 Judge Hermogenes Liwag, Rollo, pp. 92-106.
5Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pestaño of the former 15th Division, Rollo, pp. 75-90.
6The original action was a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado, Rollo, p. 92.
7 Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz, both deceased and now substituted by
their respective heirs.
8 The children of Guillermo Rustia's deceased brother Roman Rustia, Sr.
9 Intervenor Guillerma Rustia.
10 Oppositor Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
11 In some pleadings, this was spelled as "Feliza."
12 In some pleadings, this was spelled as "Osario" and in others, "Oscorro."
13Art. 992, new Civil Code. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
14 Rollo, p. 1262.
15 Id., pp. 1200-1201.
16 In relation, the Civil Code of Spain (the old Civil Code) provided that when the acknowledgment was
made separately by either parent, the name of the other parent shall not be revealed. Nor shall any
circumstance be mentioned by which such person might be recognized (Article 132). This showed the
intent of the said Code to protect the identity of the non-acknowledging parent.
17 One of the children of Felisa Delgado with Lucio Campo.
18 CA decision, Rollo, pp. 77-78.
19Under the old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of Guillerma Rustia's birth in 1920, she was
an illegitimate child, not a natural child, since she was born of parents who at the time of conception
were disqualified to marry each other.
20 Rollo, p. 920.
21 Law in effect at the time of the death of Guillermo Rustia.
22 Filed before the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
23 Rollo, p. 1149.
24 Most of the respondents herein.
25 Filed on behalf of the surviving brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces
of Josefa Delgado.
26 Now represented by their heirs as respondents.
27 Id.
28 Rollo, pp. 105-106.
29 Dated September 25, 1990.
30 This petition was initially filed with the Supreme Court but was referred to the Court of Appeals, the
latter having concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over the petition.
31Penned by Associate Justice Artemon Luna, and concurred in by Associate Justices Serafin Camilon
and Celso Magsino of the Seventh Division, dated March 20, 1991, Rollo, pp. 627-644.
32 Resolution dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 656-671.
33 De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 678 (1997).
34Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices
Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pesta o of the 15th Division, dated January 31, 2002, Rollo, pp.
46-63.
35Both the petitioner and the oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 31, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals.
36 Dated October 24, 2002.
37 II Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 672 (9th rev. ed. 2001).
38 Elisa vda. de Anson.
39 Rollo, p. 1266.
40 Balogbog v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 252 (1997).
41 Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos
P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
42 Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947.
43Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active
Military or Naval Forces of the United States - Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia himself stated under oath to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on June 3,
1919.
44 Rule 132, Section 23, Rules of Court.
45 Josefa Delgado stood as sponsor in the baptism of Luisa Delgado on September 14, 1919, Rollo, p.
1266. In 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao filed a petition for letters of administration for the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado; supra, note 25.
46 Acebedo v. Arquero, 447 Phil. 76 (2003).
47Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693 (1999), citing Perido v. Perido, No. L-28248, 12
March 1975, 63 SCRA 97.
48 Ricardo Francisco, Evidence 400 (3rd ed. 1996).
49 Rollo, p. 1262.
50 Id., pp. 1200-1201.
51 Old Civil Code, art. 134. An acknowledged natural child is entitled:

1. To bear the surname of the person acknowledging it.

2. To receive support from such person, in accordance with article 143.
3. To receive the hereditary portion, if available, determined by this Code.
52 The records do not indicate the dates of birth of Felisa Delgado's children. The dates when Felisa

Delgado cohabited with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo were likewise not stated. From the limited
facts of the case on this issue, it is safe to assume that they were all born during the effectivity of the
old Civil Code. Under the said Code, children born out of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception, could have married, were natural children.
53III Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines
493-494 (1979 ed.) citing 7 Manresa 139.
54 Desiderio P. Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession 391 (8th ed. 1991).
55 In case the surviving collateral relatives are already deceased at the time of execution of this
judgment, their shares in the inheritance of Josefa Delgado shall accrue to their respective estates.
56 Then surviving spouse, now represented by his intestate estate.
57 Law in effect at the time of the death of Josefa Delgado.
58Under the old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of Guillerma Rustia's birth in 1920, she is
an illegitimate child, not a natural child, since she was born of parents who, at the time of conception,
were disqualified to marry each other.
59 Paterno v. Paterno, No. L - 23060, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 585.
60I Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 577
(1985 ed.).
61Art. 284 of the new Civil Code provided that the mother is obliged to recognize her natural child in
any of the cases referred to in Art. 283.
62 New Civil Code, Art. 283.
63 New Civil Code, Art. 278.
64 Supra, note 60, at 283.
65This was provided in Article 285 of the new Civil Code and carried over to Article 175 of the Family
Code. While there are exceptions to this rule, Guillerma's case does not fall within the exceptions.
66 Subject to exceptions provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 285 of the new Civil Code.
67 I Tolentino, supra note 60, at 585-586.
68 RTC decision, Rollo, p. 104.
69 Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz, represented by their heirs in this
petition.
70 Children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia, Sr.
71 II Regalado, supra note 37, at 39.
72 Gabriel et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 413.