Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the
Citizenship
1. LEE vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael Dinglasan et al.
sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land
designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated in Roxas City.
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the
CFI Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong
for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The
plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of
the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring
ownership of private agricultural land, including
residential, commercial or industrial land. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals ruled against
plaintiffs; hence, they appealed to the Supreme
Court. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled
thus:
“… granting the sale to be null and void and cannot
give title to the vendee, it does not necessarily follow
therefrom that the title remained in the vendor, who
had also violated the constitutional prohibition, or
that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of
which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring
the prohibition. In such contingency another
principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty
vendor from recovering the title which he had
voluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that of pari
delicto.”
On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A.
Dinglasan, filed with the CFI Capiz an action for
recovery of the same parcel of land, submitting that
the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being
violative of the Constitution. The heirs of Lee Liong
filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the case
on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied
the motion. The Supreme Court annulled the orders
of the trial court and directed it to dismiss the case,
holding that the suit was barred by res judicata.
On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and
Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot
No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Register
of Deeds of Roxas City. Petitioners alleged that they
were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and
owner of the lot.
Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of
Deeds, Capiz, issued a certification that a transfer
certificate of title over the property was issued in the
name of Lee Liong. However, the records of the
Register of Deeds were burned during the
war. Thus, as heretofore stated, on September 7,
1968, petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of
title.
In 1994, the RTC Roxas City ordered the
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of
title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an
approved plan and technical description.
On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of
judgment in Reconstitution Case, alleging that the
RTC Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the case.
The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners
were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of
title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong
did not acquire title to the lot because he was a
Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified
to own the subject land.
In 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision declaring the judgment of reconstitution
void. Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed
with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. The Court of
Appeals denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reconstitution based on the plan
and technical description approved by the Land
Registration Authority is valid.
HELD:
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes
restoration in the original form and condition of a lost
or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person
to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution
of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the
same way it has been when the loss or destruction
occurred.
In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of
title in the name of Lee Liong, alleging that the
transfer certificate of title issued to him was lost or
destroyed during World War II. All the documents
recorded and issued by the Register of Deeds,
Capiz, which include the transfer certificate of title
issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all destroyed
during the war. The fact that the original of the
transfer certificate of title was not in the files of the
Office of the Register of Deeds did not imply that a
transfer certificate of title had not been issued. In the
trial court proceedings, petitioners presented
evidence proving the sale of the land from the
Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the latter’s subsequent
possession of the property in the concept of
owner. Thus, the trial court, after examining all the
evidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of title
in the name of Lee Liong.
However, there is a question as to whether Lee
Liong has the qualification to own land in the
Philippines.
The sale of the land in question was consummated
sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,
aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands,
save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee
Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire
the land in question.
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the
land to an alien did not validate the transaction, for it
was still contrary to the constitutional proscription
against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private
domain. However, the proper party to assail the
illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the
transaction. “In sales of real estate to aliens
incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the
provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and
the vendee are deemed to have committed the
constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto
the courts will not afford protection to either party.”
The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor
General. This was what was done in this case when
the Solicitor General initiated an action for
annulment of judgment of reconstitution of
title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years
to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such
action. Prescription never lies against the State.
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the
original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari
delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action
for reversion or escheat of the land to the State,
subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate
against escheat proceedings because the land is
now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee,
Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been
inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs,
petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a
fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of
lands of the public or private domain was intended
to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-
Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no
more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such
land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.” Thus, the subsequent transfer of the
property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be
impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial
transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision
to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution
of the original certificate of title must be based on an
owner’s duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or
other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted. In
this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and
technical description approved by the Land
Registration Authority. This renders the order of
reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A
judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the
re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. It does
not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title. Any change in the
ownership of the property must be the subject of a
separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in
possession of the land, a separate proceeding is
necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the
land.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets
aside the order of reconstitution of title in
Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition,
without prejudice.
2. Republic vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February
15, 2012

Facts: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of
Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on
August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting
married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said
document was notarized but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City.
In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport.
Her application was denied due to the citizenship of
her father and there being no annotation on her birth
certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of
her election of Philippine citizenship averring that
she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered
voter in Baguio City and had voted in local and
national elections as shown in the Voter
Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her
positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her
record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of
a Philippine passport.
After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and
declaring Sagun a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition
for review on certiorari, pointing out that
while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance before a
notary public, there was no affidavit of her election
of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of
allegiance which was not registered with the nearest
local civil registry was executed when she was
already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached
the age of majority.
Issues:
1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration
of Philippine citizenship procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible?
2. Has Norma complied with the procedural
requirements in the election of Philippine
citizenship?
Held:
1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or
the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. There is no specific
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare that a given person is part of
our citizenry. Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial
court to make a specific declaration of respondents
Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not
within the courts competence.
2. When respondent was born on August 8, 1959,
the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution,
which declares as citizens of the Philippines those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution
reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. Being a legitimate child, respondents
citizenship followed that of her father who is
Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority,
she elects Philippine citizenship. For respondent to
be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have
validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted
pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1,
Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest
civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of
electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
(3) registration of the statement of election and of the
oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship
shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625
unless the party exercising the right of election has
complied with the requirements of the Alien
Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should
first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently,
the person electing Philippine citizenship is required
to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
based on his aforesaid election of Philippine
citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based
on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of
said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final
determination and review.
It should be stressed that there is no specific
statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the
direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special
proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any
interested party to file an action for cancellation or
correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election,
loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the
relief prayed for by the respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural
infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is
erroneous since the records undisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal
requirements for a valid election. Specifically,
respondent had not executed a sworn statement of
her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in
support of her claim of alleged election was her oath
of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached
the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly
pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming
arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance
suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable
time after respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest civil registry
as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The
phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made generally
within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory
explanation proffered by respondent for the delay
and the failure to register with the nearest local civil
registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent
clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of
Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert
that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship since the law
specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere
exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted
stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts
showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot
take the place of election of Philippine citizenship.
Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek
the intervention of the court to confer upon her
Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in
Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector
is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements, respondents petition before
the trial court must be denied.
4. REPUBLIC vs. CHULE Y. LIM
G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004
FACTS:
Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She claimed
that she was born on 29 October 1954 in Buru-an,
Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan
City. the Court finding the petition sufficient in form
and substance ordered the publication of the hearing
of the petition.
During the hearing, Lim testifies that:
1. Her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has
been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her
marriage certificate.She presented a clearance from
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to further
show the consistency in her use of the surname
"Yu".
2. She claims that her father’s name in her birth record
was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should
have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
3. Her nationality was entered as Chinese when it
should have been Filipino considering that her father
and mother never got married. Only her deceased
father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She
claims that her being a registered voter attests to the
fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
4. It was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that
she was a legitimate child when she should have
been described as illegitimate considering that her
parents were never married. She also presented a
certification attested by officials of the local civil
registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte that there is no record of marriage between
Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the
present.
The RTC granted the petition and directed the civil
register of Iligan City to make the following
corrections in the birth records of Lim:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)"
to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by
changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question
"LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
Petitioner Republic appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Petitioner claims that Lim never complied
with the legal requirement in electing her citizenship.
Petitioner also assails the Court of Appeals’ decision
in allowing respondent to use her father’s surname
despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lim complied with the legal
requirement in electing her citizenship
2. Whether the CA erred in allowing Lim to to use her
father’s surname despite its finding that she is
illegitimate.
HELD:
1. The Republic avers that respondent did not
comply with the constitutional requirement of
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the
age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship
of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
“in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest
civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.”
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply
only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
case of respondent who was concededly an
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father
and Filipino mother were never married. As such,
she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a
Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a
Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a
voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
2. The Republic’s submission is misleading. The
Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
father’s surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her father’s misspelled surname which
she has been using ever since she can
remember. In this regard, respondent does not need
a court pronouncement for her to use her father’s
surname.
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To
bar her at this time from using her father’s surname
which she has used for four decades without any
known objection from anybody, would only sow
confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed
for changing one’s name or surname is to avoid
confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person
is allowed to use a name “by which he has been
known since childhood.”
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed
the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils., we
held: Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142,
which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person
to use a name “by which he has been known since
childhood” (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil.
795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v.
Tañada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot
enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from
using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84
Phil. 222).
While judicial authority is required for a change of
name or surname, there is no such requirement for
the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as
would give the false impression of family relationship
remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed
change of name would in great probability cause
prejudice or future mischief to the family whose
surname it is that is involved or to the community in
general. In this case, the Republic has not shown
that the Yu family in China would probably be
prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In
respondent’s case, the change in the surname that
she has been using for 40 years would even avoid
confusion to her community in general.
5. G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.
DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s
disqualification in the presidential elections for
having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his
(Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is
a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,
holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners
assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had
jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on
questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in
connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President"
or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the
Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before
the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in
holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing
fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen.
His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any
other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon
his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s
son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The
1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and
the allegation that respondent was born only before
the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondent’s citizenship in view of the established
paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents
presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
6. Valles vs Comelec G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9,
2000
 Principle of jus sanguinis
 How Philippine citizenship is acquired
 Effect of filing certificate of candidacy:
express renunciation of other citizenship
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934
in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where
she later married a Filipino and has since then
participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a
petition for her disqualification as candidate on the
ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian
or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed
to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the
1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time,
what served as the Constitution of the Philippines
were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on
Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having
been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
7. IN RE: VICENTE CHING
BAR MATTER No. 914
October 1, 1999
FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses
Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay,
a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La
Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has
resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching
finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University
in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he
was advised that he needs to show proof that he is
a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his
oath.
Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but
his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were
married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935
Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is
a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the
foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always
considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified
public accountant – a profession reserved for
Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a
municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by
saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a
Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching
did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when
he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after
reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the OSG
points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by
present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar
circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase "reasonable period"
and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to
taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath.
HELD:
No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-
five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after
he had reached the age of majority. The age of
majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21)
years. The Supreme Court noted that the period is
originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It
seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s
special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not
enough that he considered all his life that he is a
Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer
(was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship
are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any
explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino
citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never
thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the
bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
DECISION:
The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
8. BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at
issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that “no person shall be a Member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In
1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA.
As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in
Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection
with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In,
the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He
won over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition
for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered
a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of
the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided
in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may 9. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
however reacquire the same in the manner provided Representative
by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
former citizen: REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR.,
respondents.
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
3. by direct act of Congress.
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.
**
Facts:
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to:
 The petitioners come to this Court asking for
the setting aside and reversal of a decision of
1. desertion of the armed forces;
the House of Representatives Electoral
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in
Tribunal (HRET).
World War II;
 The HRET declared that respondent Jose
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States
Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and
at any other time,
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
voting purposes.
5. political economic necessity
 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election
for the second district of Northern Samar was
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original held.
nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino  Among the candidates who vied for the
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior position of representative in the second
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other legislative district of Northern Samar are the
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
restored to his former status as a natural-born  Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
Filipino. elected representative of the second district
of Northern Samar.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
  The petitioners filed election protests against
the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
o 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines; and
o 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of
the second district of Northern
Samar.
 The HRET in its decision dated November 6,
1989, found for the private respondent.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
 WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen
of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
Ratio:
o The records show that in the year
1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits
of hard work.
o As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was
able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.
o The father of the private respondent,
Jose Ong Chuan was born in China
in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te
to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong
Chuan spent his childhood in the
province of Samar.
o As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the
rural and seaside community of
Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the
years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met
a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao.
The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to
Catholic faith and practice.
o The couple bore eight children, one of
whom is the Jose Ong who was born
in 1948.
o Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated
from this country. He decided to put
up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in
Samar.
o The business prospered. Expansion
became inevitable. As a result, a
branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong
Chuan, unsure of his legal status and
in an unequivocal affirmation of
where he cast his life and family, filed
with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954.
o On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar,
after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan
a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957,
the Court of First Instance of Samar
issued an order declaring the
decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan
may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
o Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong
Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
During this time, Jose Ong (private
respondent) was 9 years old,
finishing his elementary education in
the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him
from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned.
o After completing his elementary
education, the private respondent, in
search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education.
o Jose Ong graduated from college,
and thereafter took and passed the
CPA Board Examinations. Since
employment opportunities were
better in Manila, the respondent
looked for work here. He found a job
in the Central Bank of the Philippines
as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of
his family in Manila.
 o In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. His status
as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal
treatment given to derived citizenship
on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino.
The Constitutional Convention had to
be aware of the meaning of natural
born citizenship since it was precisely
amending the article on this subject.
o The pertinent portions of the
Constitution found in Article IV read:
 SECTION 1, the following are
citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
 SECTION 2, Natural-born
Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
o The Court interprets Section 1,
Paragraph 3 above as applying not
only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but
also to those who, having been born
of Filipino mothers, elected
 Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was
citizenship before that date. The
not validly a naturalized citizen because of
provision in question was enacted to
correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was
not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born
o Election becomes material because
Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
 To expect the respondent to
have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary.
He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had
been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9)
years old.
 He could not have divined
when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be
amended to require him to
have filed a sworn statement
in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having
been a citizen since 1957.
 In 1969, election through a
sworn statement would have
been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for
one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old
o In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court
held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship
o The private respondent did more than
merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
 his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship.
o SC: The Court cannot go into the
collateral procedure of stripping
respondent’s father of his citizenship
after his death. An attack on a
person’s citizenship may only be
done through a direct action for its
nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to
declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to respondent’s father as
null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he
has already been laid to rest
10. Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration
GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter
the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February
1961.
In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to
visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on
13 March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was
allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February
1962.
On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with
Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation,
after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought an action for injunction.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years
after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write and speak either English or
Tagalog, except for a few words.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a
Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know
the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila
denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya
Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became
a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision to Section 16.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization
as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings,
in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof,
it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot
be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely
 no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat
them differently.
As the laws of our country, both substantive and
procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure
(a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable
the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the
matter of her own citizenship settled and established
so that she may not have to be called upon to prove
it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved
only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the
citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage
or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the
case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains
even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
11. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DELA
ROSA
Facts:
Ø Juan G. Frivaldo had earned majority of the votes as
public servant ( Governor) in Sorsogon.
Ø There was a conspicuous doubt whether the
respondent Frivaldo acquired Filipino citizenship
before he ran as governor in the said city.
Ø Respondent judge Dela Rosa set the petition for
hearing and directed the publication of order in
official gazette for 3 consecutive weeks and last
said publication which would be 6 months before its
hearing, it was held months after the respondent
Frivaldo filed a petition for Naturalization.
Ø There was a motion to set hearing ahead of schedule
it was granted by the court and manifested the public
office running intention for filing certificate
candidacy.
Ø The respondent brought all his requirements and 6
days later respondent judge assailed his decision in
RTC allowing respondent Frivaldo to reacquire
Filipino citizenship by virtue of his rights and
privileges of being a natural born Filipino citizen;
However, Quiterio alleged that there was
jurisdictional defect about granting naturalization
process.
Ø Several days after the proclamation of the court,
Election was done and Frivaldo was declared winner
in the casting of votes.
Ø Republic petitioner filed the petition with COMELEC
to annul proclamation of private respondents
winning state they allege that respondent Frivaldo
didn’t reacquire his citizenship and had pending
political status as of the moment.
Ø COMELEC had issued enbanc resolution which was
dismissed because there was a late filing of the said
resolution, meanwhile petition for mandamus under
Rule 65 of Sec 5(2) Article VIII of the constitution,
regarded the revise or modification on appeal or
certiorari in GR No. 105735 and was filed with prayer
for temporary restraining order.
Ø There was a failure to reacquire due to time that lapse
and the failure to publicize the naturalization of the
respondent in the official gazette inorder to become
a Filipino citizen again. The Revised Naturalization
law is a procedural law that must be followed.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Frivaldo shall claim the
qualification as newly elected Governor in
Sorsogon by properly reacquiring his Natural
citizenship.
RULING:
Ø GR No. 105715 and GR No. 104654 assailed that the
respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen when he runs
as a governor in Sorsogon.
Ø GR No. 105735 was a petition for mandamus and the
issuance of proclamation which makes it moot and
academic.
Ø Respondent claim that the only remedy for him to
reacquire his Filipino citizenship was through
running in public service as governor, that was a
repatriation which is limited or not permitted to his
cause of action.
Ø Our constitutional law implicates that only Filipno
citizens are required to run and be elected as public
officers.
Ø Petition in GR No. 105715 and 104654 was both
GRANTED, while GR No. 105735 petition was
DISMISSED. He was declared a non-Filipino citizen
and therefore disqualified for the position as
incumbent governor of the said municipality, He
must vacate his office and surrender his position to
Vice Governor of Sorsogon, No proclamation as to
cost.

12. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, movant-
appellee, vs.WILLIAM LI YAO, petitioner-appellant.
G.R. No. L-35947, October 20, 1992
(Cancellation of Philippine Citizenship)
Keywords:
· William Li Yao was naturalized in 1949 but RP
now wants to cancel the certificate of naturalization
on ground that it was fraudulently obtained. He died
after the filing of brief.
· Lower court sustained the government's motion
for cancellation on the ground that he committed
underdeclaration of income and underpayment of
income tax.
· to strip him of his citizenship without going into the
Settlement of tax liability under amnesty is not
sufficient for reversing denaturalization
FACTS: William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a
petition for naturalization in 1949. After hearing, the
Court granted the petition and declared Li Yao a
naturalized Filipino citizen. Li Yao subsequently took
his oath of allegiance. About fifteen years later, the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's
certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was
fraudulently and illegally obtained. Relying solely on
the ground that William Li Yao evaded the payment
of lawful taxes due the government by under-
declaration of income as reflected in his income tax
returns for the years 1946-1951, the lower court
granted the petition and cancelled the Certificate of
Naturalization of Li Yao. Li Yao appealed. After the
parties had filed their respective briefs, Li Yao died.
ISSUE: WON the cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization made by the government through the
Office of the Solicitor General is valid.
RULING: Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known
as the Revised Naturalization Act provides that a
naturalization certificate may be cancelled "[i]f it is
shown that said naturalization certificate was
obtained fraudelently and illegally." In ordering the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate
previously issued to appellant, the lower court
sustained the government's motion for cancellation
on the sole finding that Li Yao had committed
underdeclaration of income and underpayment
of income tax.
Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has
fully paid or settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68
which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a
sufficient ground for lifting the order of the lower
court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of
naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the
decree is merely the removal of any civil, criminal or
administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer,
only insofar as his tax case is concerned. In other
words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect
of obliterating his lack of good moral character
and irreproachable conduct which are grounds
for denaturalization.
The lower court based its order of cancellation of
citizenship on the finding of evasion of payment of
lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2
of the Revised Naturalization Law requiring,
among others, that applicant conduct himself "in
a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines
in his relation with constituted government as
well as with the community in which he is living,"
other grounds for cancellation presented by the
Solicitor General.
Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which
should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once
acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not
stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute
ample ground for divesting one of said citizenship.
Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the
law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court
and legislation by Congress.
13. LABO vs. COMELEC
176 SCRA 1
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of
Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He
was married in the Philippines to an Australian
citizen. The marriage was declared void in the
Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground
that the marriage had been bigamous. According to
Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of
the Philippines.
Held: The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to
an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically
divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant.
There is no claim or finding that he automatically
ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was
naturalized as such through a formal and positive
process, simplified in his case because he was
married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for
such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of
Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner
claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.

14.Coquilla vs COMELEC RULING:

G.R. No. 151914,
31 July 2002
[Citizenship; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of ky. In 1998, he came
to the Philippines and took out a residence
certificate, although he continued making several
trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under
R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November
10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed
such certificate is not true. The question is whether
the COMELEC was justified in ordering the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this
reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a
material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus
rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In
the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office
for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This
is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration 15.Frivaldo vs. Comelec

GR No. 120295
as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which
June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he
filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had FACTS:
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re- and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship.
election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the
two year residency in Oras was a material
He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential
misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6
Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of
months after his oath as a citizen.
allegiance as a Philippine citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision,

elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed
the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted
Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the
Court had already ruled based on his previous
attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship,
and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest
ISSUE:
number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Sorsogon.
Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections
held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his
COC. ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal
and because of the curative nature of Presidential
Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the
date of the filing of his application to run for governor.
The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are:
(1) filing the application;
(2) action by the committee; and
(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application
is approved.
It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the
applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship.
If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact
to the date of the filing of the application, then it
should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor
of Sorsogon.
16.Angat vs Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 132244
14 September 1999
[Naturalization; Reacquisition; RA No. 8171]
FACTS:
Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked
to regain his status as a Philippine citizen before the
RTC Marikina. RTC allowed him to take his Oath of
Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day,
the RTC declared him as citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March
1997, asserting that the petition should have been
dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding
over repatriation case.
RULING:
No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization and not with
the RTC which has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the
court's order was null and void.
RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October
23 1995, is an act providing for repatriation of Filipino
women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who
have lost the Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity.
Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially
invoked RA 965 and RA 2630, since these laws
could only apply to persons who had lost their
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the armed forces of an
allied country or the armed forces of the US, a factual
matter not alleged in his petition. Parenthetically,
under these statutes, the person desiring to
reacquire his Philippine citizenship would not even
required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is
to take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register the said oath with the
proper civil registry.
17. CICERON P. ALTAREJOS vs. COMELEC,
JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA
G.R. No. 163256
November 10, 2004
AZCUNA, J.:
Private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon
Versoza filed to the COMELEC a petition to
disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground
that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy
that he was not a permanent resident of or immigrant
to a foreign country.
Petitioner object that he did not commit false
representation in his application for candidacy as
mayor because he was already issued a Certificate
of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required
to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private
respondents filed their Memorandum, while
petitioner did not file one within the required period.
Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum
subsequently.
Atty. Zaragoza, Jr hearing officer of this case
recommended that petitioner Altarejos be
disqualified from being a candidate for the position
of mayor.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was
even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate
during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there
was delay in the registration of his Certificate of
Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with
the proper civil registry, the same was brought about
by the inaction on the part of said offices since the
records of the Special Committee on Naturalization
show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of
Allegiance have long been transmitted to said
offices.
ISSUE: When does the citizenship qualification of a
candidate for an elective office apply?
RULING:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court
ruled that the citizenship qualification must be
construed as applying to the time of proclamation of
the elected official and at the start of his term. The
Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n
elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
* In addition, candidates for the position of governor
x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not
specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one year’s
residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least twenty-three years of age on
election day).
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of
his application. In said case, the repatriation of
Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court
therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725
was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature.
The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date
of filing of his application was justified by the Court,
thus:
xxx
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it
was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to past events i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into
being in order to benefit the greatest number of
former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to
enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is
to be given the fullest effect and expression, then
there is all the more reason to have the law apply in
a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage
of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential
Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of
as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the
would show a contrary intention on the part of the
Court had already ruled based on his previous
legislative authority; and there is no showing that
attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship,
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust
and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest
or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to
number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of
his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there
Sorsogon.
will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach
of some constitutional guaranty.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.

Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he
filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was,
therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in HELD:
the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.

The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office, and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none
other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
and because of the curative nature of Presidential
Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the
date of the filing of his application to run for governor.
The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are:

(1) filing the application;

(2) action by the committee; and

(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application

is approved.
16.LEE VS. COMELEC and FRIVALDO
GR No. 120295
June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the
FACTS: applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship.

Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again

and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact
to the date of the filing of the application, then it
should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor
of Sorsogon.
20.REPUBLIC v. TEODULO C. TANDAYAG,
GR No. L-32999
1982-10-15
Facts:
Petitioner’s prayer was from an order from the lower
court "1 - authorizing petitioner's son, Edgardo Sy
Tiongsa, to take his oath of allegiance to... the
Republic of the Philippines, at such time and place
as may be set forth in the judgment; and thereafter
2 - an order issue directing the Commissioner,
Bureau of Immigration, Manila or his representative,
to revoke, cancel or void the Alien Certificate of
Registration and Immigration Certificate of
Residence of petitioner, Consolatrix Kho Sy and her
minor child, Edgardo Sy Tiongsa,... prayer was...
granted.
Motion for reconsideration based on alleged
procedural deficiencies arising from lack of
conformity to the then applicable rules and
regulations promulgated by the Department of
Justice... no sufficient basis for the imputation of
such procedural flaws... it was alleged that the lower
court erred in ruling that the... mother was
repatriated and that the minor son by virtue thereof
was entitled to acquire Filipino citizenship.
In the well-reasoned order denying the motion for
reconsideration by respondent Judge Teodulo C.
Tandayag, the argument that there was "no
satisfactory evidence" presented by the mother to
support her claim for citizenship was... rejected.
Appeal lacks merit.
Issues:
Whether or not the repatriation of a mother,
Consolatrix Kho Sy, entitles her minor son, Edgardo
Sy Tiongsa, to a declaration that... he is entitled to
Philippine citizenship.
Whether or not the repatriation of a mother,
Consolatrix Kho Sy, entitles her minor son, Edgardo
Sy Tiongsa, to a declaration that... he is entitled to
Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
The son is entitled to Philippine citizenship.
The contention could not be sustained because
Consolatrix Kho Sy has proven in open Court that
she was born in Iligan City on September 7, 1921 of
a Filipino father who is already dead and a
Filipino mother who is still alive so that she is a
natural born citizen of the Philip-pines... order
appealed from must be affirmed, declaring
Consolatrix Kho Sy repatriated and Edgardo Sy
Tiongsa, her son, entitled to Philippine citizenship.
22. Mercado v. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083
May 26, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano
were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano
garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado
on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano
is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained
the age of majority and registered himself as a voter
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold
public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in
R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must
be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at
the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by
naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of
candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of
allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he
will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the
ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national.
A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
23.CALILUNG VS DATUMANONG
Dual citizenship
FACTS:
Petitioner herein prays for the prohibition to stop the
respondent from implementing RA 9225 (An Act
Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending
for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes.” Petitioner avers
the constitutionality of RA 9225, specifically its
Section 3 and 3:
Section 2: Declaration of Policy: It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all Philippine Citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
condition of this Act.
Section 3: Retention of Philippine Citizenship: Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, together allow
dual allegiance and not dual citizenship.
HELD:
During the deliberation of the Congress, it was
clarified that the purpose of these contended
sections is to recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and his loyalty to the
Republic.
Further, Rep. Locsin averred that doing what section
2 and 3 say, the problem of dual citizenship is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country because the latest oath that will be taken by
the former Filipino is one of the allegiance to the
Philippines and to the United States, as the case
may be. And by swearing to the supreme authority
of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship.
Further it was held that the bill recognizes the
Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the
other citizenship.

Wherefore the petition is denied.
24.
25. GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176947
February 19, 2009
FACTS : In his complaint affidavit filed before the
COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that
Tambunting made false assertions. Cordora stated
that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the
required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-
born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed
that he is an American: upon arrival in the
Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon
departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001.
According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed
that Tambunting acquired American citizenship
through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2
December 2000. Cordora concluded:
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the
dismissal of Cordora’s complaint against
Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate
his charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance
on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that
Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not
sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American
citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and
the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department.
The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that
Cordora failed to support his accusation against
Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which
raised the same grounds and the same arguments
in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20
February 2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed
Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
ISSUE : WON Tambunting Committed an Election
Offense by making false enties in his COC
HELD
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a
Filipino mother and an American father. Neither
does he deny that he underwent the process
involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting
claims that because of his parents’ differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by
birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s
observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his
birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS
Form I-130 only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
However, the same certification showed nine other
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino.
Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship
prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before
the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had
dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running
for public office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact
a national by the said states. For instance, such a of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return
situation may arise when a person whose parents there permanently,16 and is not dependent upon
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle citizenship.
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to
establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made false
entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
innocence of the charge filed against him.
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and
is the result of an individual’s volition.
residency requirements prescribed by law.
26. Eugenio Eusebio Lopez vs. COMELEC
in Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers (DIGEST)
were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain 23 July 2008
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization.12 Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 GR No. 182701
states that naturalized citizens who reacquire
Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective TOPIC:
public office in the Philippines shall "meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as Loss and Re-Acquisition of Citizenship
required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all FACTS:
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath
of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for
9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San
of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007. He
Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our was eventually declared the winner.
recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13
Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v.
COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a
Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of
another country and thereafter ran for elective office the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification
in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, of Lopez because he was ineligible from running for
a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become any public office.
a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the
twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to
him.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by
virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
the residency requirement because of Tambunting’s
naturalization as an American. Cordora’s reasoning
fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized
American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the
Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of
Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman.
COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate
in the elections, Lopez should have made a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
Lopez resorted to petition for certiorari, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and
assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying
petitioner.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman
in the Barangay elections of 2007.
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought
American citizenship and renounced his Filipino
citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-
acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions
before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship
may run for a public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. –
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by
virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his
oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los
Angeles, California; the same is not enough to allow
him to run for a public office.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship
as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will
prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe
that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of
law.
27. NESTOR A. JACOT V. ROGEN T. DAL and
COMELEC (CASE DIGEST)
27 November 2008
GR No. 179848
TOPIC:
Loss and Re-Acquisition of Citizenship
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution
dated 28 September 2007 of the , affirming the
Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC
Second Division, disqualifying him from running for
the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in
the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on
HELD:
the ground that he failed to make a personal
renouncement of his US citizenship.

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his

oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the
made before the Los Angeles PCG and his
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the
Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially
US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner sought to
comply with the requirement of a personal and
reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship, because
Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
these are distinct requirements to be complied with
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.
for different purposes.

He filed a request for the administration of his Oath

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are
the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country,
Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued
must take the following oath of allegiance to the
on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s
Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain
request, and on the same day, petitioner took his
their Philippine citizenship.
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27
September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
and Identification Certificate, recognizing petitioner By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision,
as a citizen of the Philippines. the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but
there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign
citizenship.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. The law categorically requires persons seeking
elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and
all foreign citizenship before a public officer
Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with
highest number of votes for the position of Vice
or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Mayor.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division
compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
finally issued its Resolution11 disqualifying the
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who
petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor
reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the
requisite renunciation of his US citizenship

(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of

Republic Act No. 9225, and
ISSUE/S:

(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the

Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the
Philippines,
citizenship requirement as required by law for
persons seeking public office.
to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify
as candidates in Philippine elections.
28. JAPSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Ø Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and
private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were
candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local
elections held on 14 May 2007.
Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before
the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his
Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino,
having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was
then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter
Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and
Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of
America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had
been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When
Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March
2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a
resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14
May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as
required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991
Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine
citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA,
the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006
lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport
himself as an American citizen as proven by his
travel records. He had also failed to renounce his
foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the
COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of the
latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ø Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino
who went to the USA to work and subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed,
however, that prior to filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March
2007, he already performed the following acts: (1)
with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225,
granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty
filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los
Angeles, California, USA, an application for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2
October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz,
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in
Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a
Philippine passport indicating in his application that
his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St.,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was
issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4)
on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed
his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the
Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he
stated that his address was at Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5)
thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a
voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured
another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating
therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally,
Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Ø He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his American citizenship, and he had
been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year
prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty
sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No.
07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was
declared Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
Ø The COMELEC First Division found that Ty
complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5
of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office, and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none
other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Ø Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of
Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19,
2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover,
neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public
office nor is in active service as commissioned or
non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the
country of which he was naturalized citizen
Ø Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in
stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year
before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned
that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the]
Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen
in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has
been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year
before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he
represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ø The petition was denied and COMELEC was in
favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable
resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded
to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the
COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion
and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
Ø Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside
the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28
September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and
en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution
denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate
of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly
elected Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition.
According to Ty, the COMELEC already found
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very
same pieces of evidence without violating the well-
entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court.
Ø The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet
the one-year residency requirement set by law to
qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14
May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in
the Petition at bar.
Ø . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March
2007, he had already effectively renounced his
American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine
citizenship.
Ø The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed
orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals
and annulled the election of the respondent as
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the
ground that respondent's immigration to the United
States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a
green card holder, which was proof that he was a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status
as such before he ran for election on January 18,
1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under
§68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the
residency requirement for elective positions.
RULING:

Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency
requirements for elective position.
Ø It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225
governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino
may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship
despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides
for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would
reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of
residence of the natural-born Filipino taking
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225
imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship;
nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition
or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow
for dual citizenship.
Ø There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to
stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-
year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections
so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To
the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that
absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected, does not
constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also
notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty
was actually present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least
nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007
local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place
is not necessarily determinative of the fact of
residence therein, it does strongly support and is
only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant
case to establish residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this
Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to
comply with the one-year residency requirement, so
Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May
2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the
Court did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective
post, for as long as he is able to prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a change
of residence for election law purposes for the period
required by law. As this Court already found in the
present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence
that he had established residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate
for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered
the most number of votes.
Ø To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification,
Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws
so zealously protect and promote. In this case,
Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is
ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant
Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.
29. DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 180048
JUNE 19, 2009
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the
First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying
ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-
mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on
January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship
under RA
9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine
citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and
political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-
mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running
for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his
American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.
HELD:
We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for
public office in view of his failure to renounce his
American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow
reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
for:
Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country;
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the
effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a foreign
country.
The law provides that they are not deemed to have
reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner’s oath of allegiance and certificate of
candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA
9225 which further requires those seeking elective
public office in the Philippines to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Petitioner failed to renounce his American
citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running
for vice mayor.
30. : B.M. No. 1678PETITION FOR LEAVE TO
RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW
B.M. No. 1678
December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE
OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in
March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention
for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free
medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed
never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although
he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right
to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he)
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice.
31. Cabiling vs. Commissioner
G.R. No. 183133
July 26, 2010
FACTS:
The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized
Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother.
They were all raised, have resided and lived their
whole lives in this country. During their age of
minority, they secured from the Bureau of
Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration
(ACRs).Immediately upon reaching the age of
twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine
citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry
as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 625.
ISSUE:
Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino
citizenship in the Civil Registry encumbers persons
to become naturalized citizens of the Philippines.
RULING:
No. Petitioners complied with the first and second
requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It
was only the registration of the documents of
election with the civil registry that was belatedly
done. The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to
the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine
citizenship has not been lost and they should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for
such election.The actual exercise of Philippine
citizenship, for over half a century by the herein
petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public
which is equivalent to formal registration of the
election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE.
32 .In the matter of the Petition of MARTIN NG to
be Admitted a Filipino Citizen.
[G.R. No. L-24054. March 7, 1988.]
Facts:
Martin Ng filed with the then Court of First Instance
of Cebu an application for naturalization as a citizen
of the Philippines, in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 473.
At the scheduled hearing of the petition no one
appeared to register any opposition other than the
Assistant City Fiscal in representation of the Solicitor
General. He entered a general opposition without
specifying any grounds therefor. The Court
thereafter proceeded to receive the petitioner’s
evidence, after which the Fiscal declared that the
proceedings had failed to disclose any ground for
opposing the petition.
The Lower Court then rendered judgment finding the
petition to be well founded and adequately
supported by competent evidence, and declaring the
petitioner entitled to naturalization as a Filipino
citizen subject to subsequent compliance with the
other requisites provided for in Republic Act No. 530.
On the final hearing, unexpectedly, the City Fiscal of
Cebu, in representation of the Solicitor General, filed
an opposition on the ground of lack on petitioner’s
part of a lucrative business, trade or profession.The
court a quo however overruled the opposition and
declared the petitioner "entitled to a grant of
Philippine citizenship by naturalization as soon as
the same shall be in order and as soon as he shall
be disposed to do so.The Court pointed out that the
matter of petitioner’s lucrative income should have
been ventilated during the original hearing; it could
no longer be raised at the final hearing which is
limited only to a determination of compliance with the
four requirements of R.A. No. 530.
From this Order the Solicitor General, in behalf of the
Republic, has appealed and seeks to persuade this
Court to reverse the aforesaid judgment and order of
the Lower Court, postulating several serious defects
in the proceeding:
that the Court a quo never acquired jurisdiction of
the subject matter on account of the petitioner’s
omission to state that he was, during World War II, a
resident of Loboc, Bohol; his failure to comply with
the statutory requirement for posting the petition and
notice of hearing; and his failure to file a declaration
of intention one year prior to the filing of the petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled for naturalization.
The omission of the petitioner to state in his
application the circumstance that he had for a brief
period during the last War stayed in Loboc, Bohol, is
not a fatal one. It was so ruled by this Court in Tan
v. Republic. Moreover the evidence shows that the
petitioner was brought by his parents to Loboc at a
time when he was only two (2) years of age, and
stayed there only for four (4) years. And that he had
no intention whatever to hide the fact of his sojourn
at Loboc, or make it difficult for the Government
authorities to check up on his activities, is
satisfactorily demonstrated by his having testified
freely and openly about it in the proceedings below.
The actuality of the posting of the petition and the
notice of hearing in a public and conspicuous place
in accordance with law, was attested to by the
Court’s Clerk-in-Charge whose certification to this
effect was duly submitted in evidence.
Finally, that he was exempt from filing a declaration
of intention, has also been satisfactorily established
by the unrebutted proof, testimonial and
documentary, that he was born in the Philippines
and completed his elementary and secondary
education in schools recognized by the Government
and where Philippine History, Government and
Civics were taught without limitation as regards
nationality or race.
This Court is also satisfied that the evidence
adduced adequately established petitioner’s
"lucrative income." It is also satisfied that the
petitioner’s character witnesses — Messrs.
Bartolome Avanceña and Vicente Fernan — are
persons not merely of good standing but of no title
prominence in the community, competent to speak
of the petitioner’s person and reputation.
Finally, as to the petitioner’s asserted failure to prove
that the laws of his country, Nationalist China, grant
reciprocal rights to Filipinos to become citizens of
that country, this Court has more than once ruled it
to be of judicial notice that reciprocity does exist.
33. REPUBLIC v. KAMRAN F. KARBASI
GR No. 210412
Jul 29, 2015
Facts:
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi (Karbasi) filed
a petition for naturalization with the RTC, where he
alleged the following:
His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly issued by
the UNHCR;
He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos
Street, Dipolog City, since early part of June 2000
and more so has resided continuously in the
Philippines for not less than 11 years immediately
preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11
July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1)
year;
His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and
his other places of residence, prior to his present
residence, were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon
City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol
Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte;

He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran,
as shown in his identity card which also serves as
his birth certificate;
He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22
years old and born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City,
whom he married on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog
City, as shown in their certificate of marriage;
His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, 1-year old , was born
on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and presently
residing with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City;
He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed
name (Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11 July
1990 specifically at the Manila International Airport
on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731, per
UNHCR certification containing reference to his
Pakistani passport issued under said assumed
name;
Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, which
reduced to five years the ten year requirement of
continuous residence;
He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in
which he has been engaged since 1998 and, as
such, he derives an average annual income of Php
80,000.00 more or less;
He has all the qualifications required under Section
2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4,
of the Commonwealth Act No. 473;
He has complied with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473)
regarding the filing with the Office of the Solicitor
General of his bona fide intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration
of Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;
It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of
the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is a
citizen or subject; that he will reside continuously in
the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
for naturalization filed by KAMRAN F. KARBASI to
be admitted as citizen of the Philippines is hereby
GRANTED.
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
interposed an appeal to the CA, based mainly on the
ground that the RTC erred in granting Karbasi's
petition as he failed to comply with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on
character, income and reciprocity. Specifically, the
OSG pointed out that Karbasi failed to establish that:
1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization to
Filipino citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income as
required under the law; and 3] he is of good moral
character as shown by his disregard of Philippine tax
laws when he had underdeclared his income in his
income tax returns (ITRs) and overstated the same
in his petition for naturalization.
CA denies the appeal of the OSG and affirmed the
grant of naturalization.
The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in
Karbasi's ITRs was prepared in good faith because
he was of the belief that he no longer needed to
include the income he received as payment of his
services to Daewoo Electronics Electronics
Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins Philippines
International, Inc. (Kolins), because the same were
already withheld at source. The CA likewise affirmed
the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a refugee, need not
prove reciprocity between Philippine and Iranian
laws.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not the CA had correctly affirmed
the RTC decision granting Karbasi's application for
naturalization despite the opposition posed by the
OSG.
Ruling:
Citizenship is personal and, more or less a
permanent membership in a political community. It
denotes possession within that particular political
community of full civil and political rights subject to
special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the
duty of allegiance to the political community.The
core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political
rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold
public office and the right to petition the government
for redress of grievance.
No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who
are Filipino citizens.[13] Among those listed are
citizens by naturalization. Naturalization refers to the
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the
present laws, the process of naturalization can be
judicial or administrative. Judicially, the
Naturalization Law provides that after hearing the
petition for citizenship and the receipt of evidence
showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications required by law, the
competent court may order the issuance of the
proper naturalization certificate and its registration in
the proper civil registry. On the other hand, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9139 provides that aliens born and
residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine
citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a
petition for citizenship with the Special Committee,
which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the
petition and issue a certificate of naturalization.[14]
In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.
It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship
should not easily be given away.All those seeking to
acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court,
that they have complied with all the requirements of
the law. The reason for this requirement is simple.
Citizenship involves political status; hence, every
person must be proud of his citizenship and should
cherish it. Naturalization is not a right, but one of
privilege of the most discriminating, as well as
delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does,
public interest of the highest order, and which may
be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor.
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization,
the application must show substantial and formal
compliance with the law. In other words, an applicant
must comply with the jurisdictional requirements;
establish his or her possession of the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications enumerated under
the law; and present at least two (2) character
witnesses to support his allegations.[17] Section 2 of
the Naturalization Law clearly sets forth the
qualifications that must be possessed by any
applicant, viz:
Section 2. Qualifications. - Subject to section four of
this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for
a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or
Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages;
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine
history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during
the entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
The contention in this case revolves around the
following points:
1.the sufficiency of Karbasi's income for purposes of
naturalization;
2.the effect of the alleged discrepancy in the
amounts of his gross income as declared in his ITRs,
on one hand, and in his petition for naturalization on
the other; and
3.the necessity of proving reciprocity between
Iranian and Philippine laws on naturalization.
The Court resolves these issues in seriatim.
First. A reading of the OSG's pleadings discloses
that its position arose out of a comparison made
between Karbasi's declared income and the
amounts reflected in the Data on Annual Income and
Expenditure in Western Mindanao issued by the
NSCB. The OSG also invokes the past rulings of the
Court where the concept of "lucrative trade, trade,
profession or lawful occupation" was explained in
this wise:
It means not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities
in life. It must be shown that the employment gives
one an income such that there is an appreciable
margin of his income over his expenses as to be able
to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and
thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or a
public charge. His income should permit him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard
of living, and consistently with the demands of
human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.[18]
A long line of cases reveals that the Court did not
hesitate in reversing grants of citizenship upon a
showing that the applicant had no lucrative income
and would, most likely, become a public charge. A
summary of some of these notable cases is in order:
In the Matter of the Petition for Admission to
Philippine Citizenship of Engracio Chan also known
as Nicasio Lim.[19] - The Court found that the
petitioner, who was a salesman at the Caniogan
Sari-Sari and Grocery Store, then located in Pasig,
Rizal, from which he received a monthly salary of
P200.00, with free board and lodging, had no
lucrative income. Even if the petitioner was then an
unmarried man without dependents, a monthly
income of P200.00 with free board and lodging, was
not considered gainful employment. Further, there
was no proof that he was legally authorized to use
an alias and his use thereof, being in violation of the
Anti-Alias Law, was indicative of a reproachable
conduct.
In the Matter of the Petition of Antonio Po to be
admitted a Citizen of the Philippines.[20] - The Court
found Antonio Po, then single and employed as
collector of the Surigao Chamber of Commerce as
without lucrative income on the ground that his
employment had so long depended upon the
selection of the succeeding presidents of the
chamber and that he then got free board and lodging
by living with his widowed mother. Simply put, there
was not enough stability in his claimed salary. His
additional income gained from helping his mother to
run a store was also insufficient to satisfy the law, in
the amount and in its steadiness. His free board and
lodging pretense was also discerned as indicative of
dependence upon his mother for support.
In the Matter of the Petition ofTanpa Ong Alias Pedro
Tan to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines.[21] -
The income of the applicant as contemplated in the
naturalization law was only P3,000.00 a year.
Considering that he had a wife and seven children to
support, this income was held as insufficient to meet
the high cost of living at that time.
Keng Giok v. Republic.[22] - The Court held that an
income of P9,074.50 per annum was not sufficient
for a married applicant with a wife and five children
to support.
Sy Ang Hoc vs. Republic.[23] - The Court held that
his income, derived from employment in a business
enterprise of the petitioner's father, was not sufficient
to establish compliance with the statutory
requirement of lucrative occupation or calling.
In the Matter of the Petition to be admitted a Citizen
of the Philippines by Pantaleon Sia alias Alfredo
Sia.[24] - The Court ruled that the determination of
lucrative income or occupation should be reckoned
as of the time of the filing of the petition. The Court
decided against the petitioner as his regular salary
was not ample enough to defray his family's
expenses. The excess amounts representing his
bonuses and commissions should not be considered
in determining whether or not petitioner had a
lucrative income or occupation.
With the pronouncements in these cases in mind,
the comparison made by the OSG now begets
another question: can the possession of an
applicant's lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation, for purposes of naturalization, be fairly
determined through a simplistic read-through on
government data?
The Court answers in the negative.
While it is true that a naturalization case is not an
ordinary judicial contest to be decided in favor of the
party whose claim is supported by the
preponderance of the evidence, this does not accord
infallibility on any and all of the OSG's assertions. If
this were the case, the rules of evidence might as
well be brushed aside in order to accord
conclusiveness to every opposition by the Republic.
Needless to state, the Court still has the final
authority and duty to evaluate the records of
proceedings a quo and decide on the issues with fair
and sound judgment.
Here, it is clear that the circumstances prevailing in
the above-cited cases are not at all attendant in
Karbasi's situation. There was neither a showing that
Karbasi was dependent on another person for
support nor proof that his family's extraordinary
expenses that would render his income as
inadequate. As in any other business venture, the
risk of losses is a possibility for his repair shop but,
still, this risk was not clearly established to render his
livelihood as unstable and volatile. In fact, the OSG
does not belie the fact that Karbasi has been
engaged by reputable companies for his services.
Conversely, the findings of the RTC would indicate
that Karbasi had indeed exhibited industry and hard
work in putting up his repair shop business and that
his wife considered him as a good provider, not to
mention a vocational and college degree holder.
Admittedly, testimonies in favor of an applicant for
naturalization are expected to be self-serving.
Nevertheless, the Court finds it difficult to agree with
the OSG's meager use of government data to prove
that Karbasi would become a burden to the
Philippine society in the future. Except for its own
citation of government data, nothing else was
presented to establish that Karbasi had indeed no
lucrative income or trade to support himself and his
family.
To accept the OSG's logic is a dangerous precedent
that would peg the compliance to this requirement in
the law to a comparison with the results of research,
the purpose of which is unclear. This is not to say
that the data produced by government research are
inappropriate, or much less irrelevant in judicial
proceedings. The plain reliance on this research
information, however, may not be expected to
produce the force of logic which the OSG wants to
attain in this case. Besides, had the law intended for
government data on livelihood and income research
to be used as a gauge for the "lucrative income"
requirement, it must have stated the same and
foreclosed the Court's power to assess existing facts
in any given case. Here, the Court opts to exercise
this power and delve into a judicious review of the
findings of the RTC and the CA and, as explained,
to rule that Karbasi, possesses a lucrative income
and a lawful occupation, as required by the
Naturalization Law.
At this point, it is worthy to note the Court's ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Chua[25] (Chua),
where the Court assessed the prevailing
circumstances of an applicant for naturalization who
was a medical student at the time of the filing of her
petition. In Chua, the Court rejected the Republic's
argument that the applicant's status as a subsequent
passer of the Board Examinations of 1985 for
Doctors of Medicine could not by itself be equated
with "gainful employment or tangible receipts." The
Court held that this interpretation of the income
requirement in the law is "too literal and restrictive."
It then cited Uy v. Republic,[26] where the Court laid
down the public policy underlying the lucrative
income requirement as follows:
[T]he Court must be satisfied that there is
reasonable assurance not only that the applicant will
not be a social burden or liability but that he is a
potential asset to the country he seeks to adopt for
himself and quite literally, for his children and his
children's children.
The Court, in Chua, continued:
The economic qualification for naturalization may be
seen to embody the objective of ensuring that the
petitioner would not become a public charge or an
economic burden upon society. The requirement
relates, in other words, not simply to the time of
execution of the petition for naturalization but also to
the probable future of the applicant for naturalization.
In the case at bar, the Solicitor General does not
dispute that respondent applicant, then a student,
was earning P2,000.00 a month, with free board and
lodging, at the time she filed her Petition in August
1984. While this amount was not, even in 1984,
exactly a princely sum, she was not then a public
charge and the respondent applicant having passed
the qualifying medical board examinations, can
scarcely be regarded as likely to become a public
charge in the future should she be admitted as a
citizen of this Republic. Respondent is certainly in a
position to earn substantial income if allowed to
exercise her profession. Being a Doctor of Medicine,
she is also clearly a "potential asset to the
country."[27]
As in Chua's case, it does not at all seem likely that
Karbasi, in his current circumstances, will ever
become a public charge. It bears emphasis to note
that from a refugee who had nothing when he came
to the Philippines, Karbasi had indeed refused to be
the object of charity by working hard to graduate
from college and to eventually engage in business to
give his family support and comfort. The CA could
not have explained this in better terms—
Thus, Karbasi went from being a refugee - who was
dependent on the UNCHR for support - to a self-
made entrepreneur who can ably support himself
and his family. As such, there is no showing that
Karbasi may turn out to be a public charge and a
burden to our country's resources. The fact
moreover that he overcame this adversity through
his education and skills shows that he is a potential
asset of the country.
Second. The OSG raised the issue of Karbasi's
alleged underdeclaration of income in his ITRs. It
contended that even if Karbasi had, indeed, a
lucrative means of earning, his failure to declare the
income which he had earned from service contracts
and to present any proof of the withholding of the
taxes thereon, would reflect adversely on his
conduct, which under the statute must be "proper
and irreproachable." The OSG cited Lim Eng Yu v.
Republic[28] (Lim Eng Yu), where the applicant later
refuted the amounts reflected in his ITRs in order to
prove that he had lucrative trade or occupation. The
Court rebuffed this "eleventh hour explanation" and
concluded that the applicant had to conceal his true
income for the purpose of evading payment of lawful
taxes. The Court found that Lim Eng Yu, at that time,
had a wife and two children, so, at most, his total tax
exemption then, was P5,000.00. Had he stated the
net incomes he claimed in his ITRs, he would have
been required to pay income taxes, it appearing that
the same exceeded his exemption under the law.
Such conduct showed that Lim Eng Yu's moral
character was not irreproachable, or as good as it
should be, thus, disqualifying him for naturalization.
Like the CA, the Court is inclined not to apply the
rigidity of the ruling in Lim Eng Yu to the present
case. Unlike Lim Eng Yu, Karbasi did not deny the
charge of the OSG and instead admitted a
procedural lapse on his part. Here, there is no
showing that the income earned by Karbasi was
undeclared in order to benefit from statutory tax
exemptions. To clarify, this does not intend to
downplay the requirement of good moral character
in naturalization cases. It bears stressing that the
granting of applications for naturalization still
necessitates that only those who are deserving may
be admitted as Filipino citizens. The character of the
applicant remains to be one of the significant
measures to determine entitlement to Filipino
citizenship. Nonetheless, the tenor of the ground
used for the denial of the application in Lim Eng Yu
is not akin to what happened in this case.
Clearly, in Lim Eng Yu, the petitioner altogether
intended to evade the payment of taxes by abusing
the benefits granted by tax exemptions. In this case,
Karbasi did not deny that he gained income through
his transactions with Daewoo and Kolin. He even
presented, as evidence, the contracts of service he
had entered into with the companies including a
Summary of Accounts paid to his repair shop. He did
not disclaim that he had rendered services to these
companies and that he had earned a considerable
sum therefrom. Instead, he explained the cause of
his lapse and acknowledged his mistaken belief that
his earnings from these transactions need not be
declared in his ITRs as these were withheld already.
Again, it is not the objective of the Court to justify
irregularities in ITRs by reason of a "mistaken belief."
The Court, however, finds it difficult to equate
Karbasi's lapse with a moral depravity that is fatal to
his application for Filipino citizenship. This mistaken
understanding of the proper way to declare income
is actually so common to individual taxpayers,
including lawyers and other professionals. While this
is not to be taken as an excuse for every irregularity
in ITR.S, the Court is not prepared to consider this
as an outright reflection of one's immoral
inclinations. With due consideration to his character
as established by witnesses, and as observed by the
RTC during the hearings, Karbasi should be deemed
to have sufficiently explained his mistake.
In the case of Chua, the Court had even disregarded
the OSG's argument that the applicant's failure to
execute her ITR "reflects adversely on her conduct."
Her explanation of non-filing as an "honest mistake"
was accepted by the Court with due regard to the
other circumstances of her case. Like the CA, the
Court also finds the same degree of sincerity in
Karbasi's case, for he was candid enough to elicit
this conclusion. Besides, there was no suggestion in
the records that Karbasi habitually excluded
particular income in his ITRs. Echoing the findings in
Chua, the Court does not believe that this one lapse
should be regarded as having so blackened
Karbasi's character as to disqualify him from
naturalization as a Philippine citizen.
Third. Considering the above disquisitions, the Court
does not need to belabor the last issue on reciprocity
between Iranian and Philippine laws on
naturalization. True, the Naturalization Law
disqualifies citizens or subjects of a foreign country
whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of
Karbasi's petition, both with the RTC and the CA,
together with his supplemental pleadings filed with
the Court, however, reveals that he has successfully
established his refugee status upon arrival in the
Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations under
its various international commitments come into
operation. Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in this
case, to wit:
Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the
same circumstances" implies that any requirements
(including requirements as to length and conditions
of sojourn or residence) which the particular
individual would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of
the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must
be fulfilled by him, with the exception of
requirements which by their nature a refugee is
incapable of fulfilling.
Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees. They shall in particular make every effort
to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce
as far as possible the charges and costs of such
proceedings.
In the same vein, Article 7[29] of the said Convention
expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity,
while Article 34 states the earnest obligation of
contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As
applied to this case, Karbasi's status as a refugee
has to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship,
in consonance with Philippine statutory
requirements and international obligations. Indeed,
the Naturalization Law must be read in light of the
developments in international human rights law
specifically the granting of nationality to refugees
and stateless persons.
34.MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE-
LLAMANZARES vs.
COMELEC,et al.
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700
March 8,2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016
elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence
up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn
infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS
SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the
US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American
citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines
due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005.
She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to
the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter
and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes
Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or
cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural born Filipino citizen since she was a
FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot
be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in
want of citizenship and residence requirements and
that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed
the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified
as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a
natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year
residency requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born
Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos
may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that
she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that
residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial
evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of
the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a
class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention,
wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with
the natural-born citizenship as to the country where
they are being found, as covered and supported by
the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the
10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to
remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines,
Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under
RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.
35. : Go vs. LUIS T. RAMOS
July 2. 2014
Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-
affidavit[9] for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go
alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable
alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents
himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal
circumstances and other records indicate that he is
not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the
birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s
citizenship as “FChinese.” Luis argued that although
it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his
parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the
citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while
all the other entries were typewritten. He also
averred that in September 1989 or thereabout,
Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming
managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with
the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, was able to procure a Philippine
passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-
affidavit,verring that the complaint for deportation
initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case
designed to oust him of his rightful share in their
business dealings.
Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the
allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is
a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father
Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and
Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm.
Linda L. Malinab Hornilla dismissed the complaint for
deportation against Jimmy.
On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner
reversed the decision. Their contention is that Carlos
election of citizenship was made out of time.
The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for
apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go to
China.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC
but was denied by the said court.
They questioned the said decision and filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of appeals. The
petition was granted.
Their motion for reconsideration was denied at
Bureu of immigration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed.
RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is
to determine whether the confinement or detention
is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if
the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be
no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application.[99]
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he
may no longer question his detention through a
petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His
remedy would be to quash the information and/or the
warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought
to be released had been charged before any court.
The term “court” in this context includes quasi-
judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized
to order the person’s confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.[100] Likewise, the cancellation of his
bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas
corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of
Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional
Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on
bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because
there is no law authorizing it.[101]
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the
Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his
deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement
that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to
continue with the deportation proceedings, the
petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and
academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to
touch on the other arguments advanced by
respondents regarding the same subject.
36. BALGAMELO CABILING MA v.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ
GR No. 183133,
Jul 26, 2010
639 Phil. 577
The Facts
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling
Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma
(Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma
(Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro)
are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,[1] a
Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a
Filipina.[2]
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo
and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935
Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and
1957, respectively.[3]
They were all raised in the Philippines and have
resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years;
they spent their whole lives, studied and received
their primary and secondary education in the
country; they do not speak nor understand the
Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and
do not know any relative of their father; they have not
even traveled abroad; and they have already raised
their respective families in the Philippines.[4]
During their age of minority, they secured from the
Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs). [5]
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one,
they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance
with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that "(t)hose whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship" are
citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969,
Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance
before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal
Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte.[6] On 14
January 1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty.
Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City,
Surigao del Norte.[7] In 1978, Valeriano took his
oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C.
Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of which
the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March
2005.[8]
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine
citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry
as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than
thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine
citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.[9]
On the other hand, there is no showing that
Valeriano complied with the registration
requirement.
Individual certifications[10] all dated 3 January 2005
issued by the Office of the City Election Officer,
Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all
of them are registered voters of Barangay
Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997,
and that records on previous registrations are no
longer available because of the mandatory general
registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside
from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is
one of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads in
Barangay Washington, Surigao City.[11]
Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli
were born also in Surigao City in 1953[12] and
1959,[13] respectively. The Office of the City Civil
Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that the
documents showing that Arceli elected Philippine
citizenship on 27 January 1986 were registered in its
Office on 4 February 1986. However, no other
supporting documents appear to show that Lechi
Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she
subsequently elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no document
exists that will provide information on the citizenship
of Nicolas and Isidro.
The Complaint
On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration
received the Complaint-Affidavit[14] of a certain Mat
G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and
overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral, however, did not
participate in the proceedings, and the Ma family
could not but believe that the complaint against them
was politically motivated because they strongly
supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004
National and Local Elections.[15]
On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the
Bureau of Immigration charged them for violation of
Sections 37(a)(7)[16] and 45(e)[17] of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
The Charge Sheet[18] docketed as BSI-D.C. No.
AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416) reads, in
part:
That Respondents x x x, all Chinese nationals, failed
and continuously failed to present any valid
document to show their respective status in the
Philippines. They likewise failed to produce
documents to show their election of Philippines (sic)
citizenship, hence, undocumented and overstaying
foreign nationals in the country.
That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent
themselves as Philippine citizens in order to evade
the requirements of the immigration laws.
Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of
Immigration
After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were
afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations, the
Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), composed of the public
respondents, rendered a Judgment dated 2
February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children
violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections
37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum
Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6
and 22 August 2001, respectively.[19]
The Board ruled that since they elected Philippine
citizenship after the enactment of Commonwealth
Act No. 625, which was approved on 7 June 1941,
they were governed by the following rules and
regulations:
1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625,
providing that the election of Philippine citizenship
embodied in a statement sworn before any officer
authorized to administer oaths and the oath of
allegiance shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry;[20] and Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration [BI])
Circular dated 12 April 1954,[21] detailing the
procedural requirements in the registration of the
election of Philippine citizenship.
2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 1956[22] of
the CID, requiring the filing of a petition for the
cancellation of their alien certificate of registration
with the CID, in view of their election of Philippine
citizenship;
3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19
August 1982; and DOJ Guidelines, 27 March 1985,
requiring that the records of the proceedings be
forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of
Justice for final determination and review.[23]
As regards the documentation of aliens in the
Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the
Bureau of Immigration[24] requires that ACR, E-
series, be issued to foreign nationals who apply for
initial registration, finger printing and issuance of an
ACR in accordance with the Alien Registration Act of
1950.[25] According to public respondents, any
foreign national found in possession of an ACR other
than the E-series shall be considered improperly
documented aliens and may be proceeded against
in accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or
the Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended.[26]
Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure
to prove a valid claim to Philippine citizenship via
election proceedings, public respondents concluded
that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi
Ann are undocumented and/or improperly
documented aliens.[27]
Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not submit
any document to support their claim that they are
Philippine citizens. Neither did they present any
evidence to show that they are properly documented
aliens. For these reasons, public respondents
likewise deemed them undocumented and/or
improperly documented aliens.[28]
The dispositive portion[29] of the Judgment of 2
February 2005 reads:
Subject to the submission of appropriate clearances,
summary deportation of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix
Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma,
Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma, Taiwanese
[Chinese], under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7),
45(e) and 38 in relation to BI M.O. Nos. ADD-01-031
and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001,
respectively;
Issuance of a warrant of deportation against Felix
(Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma,
Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma
and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 37(a);
Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix
Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma,
Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma in the
Immigration Blacklist; and
Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma,
Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma
under C.A. No. 613, Section 29(a)(15).
In its Resolution[30] of 8 April 2005, public
respondents partially reconsidered their Judgment
of 2 February 2005. They were convinced that Arceli
is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613,
Section 13(g).[31] However, they denied the Motion
for Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma and the
rest of his children.[32]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and
Valeriano filed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the
Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 89532. They sought the nullification of the
issuances of the public respondents, to wit: (1) the
Judgment dated 2 February 2005, ordering the
summary deportation of the petitioners, issuance of
a warrant of deportation against them, inclusion of
their names in the Immigration Blacklist, and
exclusion of the petitioners from the Philippines; and
(2) the Resolution dated 8 April 2005, denying the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition[33] after finding that the petitioners
"failed to comply with the exacting standards of the
law providing for the procedure and conditions for
their continued stay in the Philippines either as
aliens or as its nationals."[34]
On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution[35] denying
the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration dated 20
September 2007.
To reiterate, a person's continued and uninterrupted
stay in the Philippines, his being a registered voter
or an elected public official cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. The constitutional
mandate concerning citizenship must be adhered to
strictly. Philippine citizenship can never be treated
like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude.
Our Ruling
The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the
Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. The mandate states:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) xxx;
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.[37]
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted.
It laid down the manner of electing Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article
IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest
civil registry. The said party shall accompany the adverted to above, which period may be extended
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the under certain circumstances, as when the person
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the
extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine
is not indefinite.
citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under
oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
of the statement of election and of the oath with the
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February
nearest civil registry.
16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on
May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28)
years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar,
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said
Vicente D. Ching,[38] we determined the meaning of
election has not been made "upon reaching the age
the period of election described by phrase "upon
of majority.[44]
reaching the age of majority." Our references were
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice, and the case of Cueco v.
We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v.
Secretary of Justice.[39] We pronounced:
Ramos,[45] a case in which we adopted the findings
of the appellate court that the father of the petitioner,
whose citizenship was in question, failed to elect
x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did
Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of
not prescribe a time period within which the election
three (3) years upon reaching the age of majority;
of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935
and that "the belated submission to the local civil
Charter only provides that the election should be
registry of the affidavit of election and oath of
made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age
allegiance x x x was defective because the affidavit
of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-
of election was executed after the oath of allegiance,
one (21) years.[40] In the opinions of the Secretary
and the delay of several years before their filing with
of Justice on cases involving the validity of election
the proper office was not satisfactorily
of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved
explained."[46]
by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
In these decisions, the proper period for electing
In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners
Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
because they belatedly complied with all the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the
requirements. The acts of election and their
United States Government to the effect that the
registration with the nearest civil registry were all
election should be made within a reasonable time
done beyond the reasonable period of three years
after attaining the age of majority.[41] The phrase
upon reaching the age of majority.
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that
the elections should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.[42] However, we
held in Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice,[43] that the The instant case presents a different factual setting.
three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We Petitioners complied with the first and second
said: requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It
was only the registration of the documents of
election with the civil registry that was belatedly
done.
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean
a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority,
and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three
(3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine We rule that under the facts peculiar to the
citizenship under the constitutional provision petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship
has not been lost and they should be allowed to
complete the statutory requirements for such
election.
Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court
of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In
Re:Florencio Mallare,[47] Co v. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives,[48] and
Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar,
Vicente D. Ching.[49]
In Mallare, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age was deemed to be a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship.[50] The
Court of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot
support herein petitioners' cause, pointing out that,
unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a
Filipina, hence, no other act would be necessary to
confer on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino
citizen,[51] and that Esteban was born in 1929[52]
prior to the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625.[53]
In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise
his right of suffrage, as he established his life here in
the Philippines.[54] Again, such circumstance, while
similar to that of herein petitioners', was not
appreciated because it was ruled that any election of
Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would have
resulted in absurdity, because the law itself had
already elected Philippine citizenship for him[55] as,
apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to his father.[56]
In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his
application for admission to the Philippine Bar
because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit: (1)
a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry
were complied with only fourteen (14) years after he
reached the age of majority. Ching offered no
reason for the late election of Philippine
citizenship.[57]
In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners'
argument of good faith and "informal election"
unacceptable and held:
Their reliance in the ruling contained in
Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar,
Vicente D. Ching, [which was decided on 1 October
1999], is obviously flawed. It bears emphasis that
the Supreme Court, in said case, did not adopt the
doctrine laid down in In Re: Florencio Mallare. On
the contrary, the Supreme Court was emphatic in
pronouncing that "the special circumstances invoked
by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected
public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by election.[58]
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise
of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
citizenship can take the place of election of
citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in
petitioners' case, the election of citizenship has in
fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the
registration of the documents of election beyond the
frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive
acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and
continuously been done. The actual exercise of
Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the
herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine
public which is equivalent to formal registration of the
election of Philippine citizenship.
For what purpose is registration?
In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,[59] we elucidated the
principles of civil law on registration:
To register is to record or annotate. American and
Spanish authorities are unanimous on the meaning
of the term "to register" as "to enter in a register; to
record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a
list."[60] In general, registration refers to any entry
made in the books of the registry, including both
registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and
cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal
notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry
made in the registry which records solemnly and
permanently the right of ownership and other real
rights.[61] Simply stated, registration is made for the
purpose of notification.[62]
Actual knowledge may even have the effect of
registration as to the person who has knowledge
thereof. Thus, "[i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof
to all persons (and it) operates as a notice of the
deed, contract, or instrument to others."[63] As
pertinent is the holding that registration "neither adds
to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into
a valid one between the parties."[64] It lays
emphasis on the validity of an unregistered
document.
Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.
In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose
of registration is to give notice to third parties; that
failure to register the contract does not affect the
liability of the partnership and of the partners to third
persons; and that neither does such failure affect the
partnership's juridical personality.[65] An
unregistered contract of partnership is valid as
among the partners, so long as it has the essential
requisites, because the main purpose of registration
is to give notice to third parties, and it can be
assumed that the members themselves knew of the
contents of their contract.[66] The non-registration of
a deed of donation does not also affect its validity.
Registration is not a requirement for the validity of
the contract as between the parties, for the effect of
registration serves chiefly to bind third persons.[67]
Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that
registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an
analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of
sale, we reiterated the settled rule that registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a
mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the
world at large.[68]
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the
existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is
the confirmation of election as such election. It is not
the registration of the act of election, although a valid
requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It
is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship
has been claimed.
Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact
of birth and of marriage.[69] Thus, has it been
admitted through existing rules that the late
registration of the fact of birth of a child does not
erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact of marriage
cannot be declared void solely because of the failure
to have the marriage certificate registered with the
designated government agency.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of
allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious
undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the
state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This
was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a
Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other
nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the
Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status having
been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer
have any national identity except that which they
chose upon reaching the age of reason.
Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view
of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR
presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on
account of the new requirement to present an E-
series ACR, they are deemed not properly
documented.[70] On the contrary, petitioners should
not be expected to secure E-series ACR because it
would be inconsistent with the election of citizenship
and its constructive registration through their acts
made public, among others, their exercise of
suffrage, election as public official, and continued
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since birth.
The failure to register as aliens is, obviously,
consistent with petitioners' election of Philippine
citizenship.
The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship
of children of Filipino mothers have been indicated
not alone by the jurisprudence that liberalized the
requirement on time of election, and recognized
positive acts of Philippine citizenship.
The favor that is given to such children is likewise
evident in the evolution of the constitutional provision
on Philippine citizenship.
Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that
children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching their age of majority,[71]
upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they
automatically become Filipinos[72] and need not
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. The 1973 provision reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) xxx.
(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of
the Philippines.[73]
Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the
1987 Constitution now classifies them as natural-
born citizens upon election of Philippine citizenship.
Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof[74] shall be deemed natural-born
citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)
The constitutional bias is reflected in the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.
MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.
xxxx
x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers,
the 1935 Constitution merely gave them the option
to choose Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, even, apparently, if the father were
an alien or unknown. Upon the other hand, under
the 1973 Constitution, children of mixed marriages
involving an alien father and a Filipino mother are
Filipino citizens, thus liberalizing the counterpart
provision in the 1935 Constitution by dispensing with
the need to make a declaration of intention upon
reaching the age of majority. I understand that the
committee would further liberalize this provision of
the 1935 Constitution. The Committee seemingly
proposes to further liberalize the policy of the 1935
Constitution by making those who became citizens
of the Philippines through a declaration of intention
to choose their mother's citizenship upon reaching
the majority age by declaring that such children are
natural-born citizens of the Philippines.[75]
xxxx
xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the
provision of the 1973 Constitution and not that of the
1935? [76]
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind the
modification of the 1935 rule on citizenship was a
recognition of the fact that it reflected a certain male
chauvinism, and it was for the purpose of remedying
that this proposed provision was put in. The idea was
that we should not penalize the mother of a child
simply because she fell in love with a foreigner. Now,
the question on what citizenship the child would
prefer arises. We really have no way of guessing the
preference of the infant. But if we recognize the right
of the child to choose, then let him choose when he
reaches the age of majority. I think dual citizenship
is just a reality imposed on us because we have no
control of the laws on citizenship of other countries.
We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But
whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control.
But certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the
Philippine government to require that [at] a certain
point, a child be made to choose. But I do not think
we should penalize the child before he is even able
to choose. I would, therefore, support the retention
of the modification made in 1973 of the male
chauvinistic rule of the 1935 Constitution.[77]
xxxx
MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who
became a Filipino citizen by election, which the
Committee is now planning to consider a natural-
born citizen, he will be so the moment he opts for
Philippine citizenship. Did the Committee take into
account the fact that at the time of birth, all he had
was just an inchoate right to choose Philippine
citizenship, and yet, by subsequently choosing
Philippine citizenship, it would appear that his choice
retroacted to the date of his birth so much so that
under the Gentleman's proposed amendment, he
would be a natural-born citizen?[78]
FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and
the natural-born who lost his status is that the
natural-born who lost his status, lost it voluntarily;
whereas, this individual in the situation contemplated
in Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to
choose.[79]
xxxx
[on the period within which to elect Philippine
citizenship]
MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very
important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but
a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him to run for
Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme Court x x
x.[80]
We are guided by this evolvement from election of
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the election requirement under the
1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification
of these children as natural-born citizens under the
1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the
omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of
registration of the documents of election should not
result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine
citizenship.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis
of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship
in form and substance. The failure to register the
election in the civil registry should not defeat the
election and resultingly negate the permanent fact
that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking
requirements may still be complied with subject to
the imposition of appropriate administrative
penalties, if any. The documents they submitted
supporting their allegations that they have already
registered with the civil registry, although belatedly,
should be examined for validation purposes by the
appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of
Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the
administrative orders and other issuances of the
Bureau of Immigration and the Department of
Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable
time.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007,
and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the
Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the
Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the Bureau of
Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-
04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with respect
to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling
Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are
given ninety (90) days from notice within which to
COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of
Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February
2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE
that all requirements, including the payment of their
financial obligations to the state, if any, have been
complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the
documents submitted by the petitioners; and ACT
thereon in accordance with the decision of this
Court.
[16] Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or any other officer designated by him
for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination
by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien:
(1) xxx
xxxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in
violation of any limitation or condition under which he
was admitted as a non-immigrant.
[17] Sec. 45. Any individual who:
(a) xxx
xxxx
(e) Being an alien shall, for any fraudulent purpose,
represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order
to evade any requirement of the immigration laws.
37. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO
ONG (DIGEST)
18 June 2012
GR No. 175430
TOPIC:
Burden of Proof, Naturalization, Citizenship
FACTS:
The respondent, Kerry Lao Ong, filed for a petition
for naturalization in 1996.
Ong was born in Cebu City to Chinese parents. He
was raised and educated in the Philippines, having
studied in the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu,
and the Ateneo de Manila University. In 1981, he
married Grezilda Yap, also a Chinese citizen, and
fathered four children, which upon filing of petition
were all of school age, and were enrolled in
exclusive schools in Cebu.
In his petition, he alleged that he is a
“businessman/business manager,” and has been
since 1989. However, when he testified, he alleged
that he has been a businessman since after he
graduated from college in 1978. He made no
mention of the nature of his “business.” He also
alleged that he earns an average annual income of
P150,000.00, and presented four tax returns as
“proof” of said income (amounting to P60,000.00,
P118,000.00, P118,000.00 and P128,000.00).
In 2001, the trial court granted his petition, and was
admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines.
In 2003, The Republic, through the Solicitor General
appealed the decision to the CA, which was then
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong has proved that he has some
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in
accordance with Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of
the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong is
DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth
paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended.

The Court held that Naturalization laws should be

rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. The burden
of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.
38. Republic v. Li Ching Chung

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some

known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation” means “not only that the person having
the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is
an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the
object of charity or a public charge. It has been held
that in determining the existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the
applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income
should not be included in the assessment.
G.R. No. 197450
TOPIC: Naturalization Proceedings
DOCTRINE: The only right that a foreigner has, to
be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is
that which the statute confers upon him; and to
acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all
the statutory conditions and requirements. The
absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to
the petition as this necessarily results in the
dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.

FACTS:
The applicant provided no documentary evidence,
On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known
like business permits, registration, official receipts,
as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese
or other business records to demonstrate his
national, filed his Declaration of Intention to Become
proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead,
a Citizen of the Philippines before the OSG. Almost
Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his
seven months after filing his declaration of intention,
possession of “some known lucrative trade,
respondent filed his Petition for Naturalization before
profession or lawful occupation.” Bare, general
the RTC.
assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that
is required of an applicant for naturalization.

On April 5, 2008, respondent filed his Amended

Petition for Naturalization, wherein he alleged that
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove
he was born in China, which granted the same
that he possesses the qualification of a known
privilege of naturalization to Filipinos; that he came
lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth
to the Philippines on March 15, 1988; that on
paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law.
November 19, 1989, he married Cindy Sze Mei
Ngar, a British national, with whom he had 4
children, all born in Manila; that he had been
continuously and permanently residing in the country
since his arrival and is currently a resident of Manila
with prior residence in Malabon; that he could speak
and write in English and Tagalog; that he was
entitled to the benefit of Sec 3 of Commonwealth Act
(CA) No. 473 reducing to 5 years the requirement
under Sec 2 of ten years of continuous residence,
because he knew English and Filipino having
obtained his education in Manila; and that he had
successfully established a trading general
merchandise business. He attached several
documentary evidence in support of his application.
The petition was set for initial hearing on April 3,
2009 and its notice was posted in a conspicuous
place at the Manila City Hall and was published in
the Official Gazette and in the Manila Times.
Thereafter, respondent filed the Motion for Early
Setting praying that the hearing be moved from April
3, 2009 to July 31, 2008 so he could acquire real
estate properties.
The OSG filed its Opposition, arguing that the said
motion for early setting was a "clear violation of Sec
1, RA 530, which provides that hearing on the
petition should be held not earlier than 6 months
from the date of last publication of the notice." The
last publication in the newspaper of general
circulation was on June 13, 2008, the earliest setting
could only be scheduled 6 months later or on
December 15, 2008.
The RTC granted respondent’s application for
naturalization as a Filipino citizen. And CA affirmed.
The CA held that although the petition for
naturalization was filed less than 1 year from the
time of the declaration of intent before the OSG, this
defect was not fatal.
The OSG argues that "the petition for naturalization
should not be granted in view of its patent
jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because: 1) it
was filed within the one (1) year proscribed period
from the filing of declaration of intention; 2) no
certificate of arrival, which is indispensable to the
validity of the Declaration of Intention, was attached
to the petition; and 3) respondent’s failure to comply
with the publication and posting requirements set
under CA 473." In particular, the OSG points out that
the publication and posting requirements were not
strictly followed, specifically citing that: "(a) the
hearing of the petition on 15 December 2008 was set
ahead of the scheduled date of hearing on 3 April
2009; (b) the order moving the date of hearing
(Order dated 31 July 2008) was not published; and,
(c) the petition was heard within six (6) months (15
December 2008) from the last publication (on 14 July
2008).
ISSUE/S: Whether the respondent should be
admitted as a Filipino citizen despite his undisputed
failure to comply with the requirements provided for
in CA No. 473, as amended – which are mandatory
and jurisdictional in character – particularly: (i) the
filing of his petition for naturalization within the one
(1) year proscribed period from the date he filed his
declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen;
(ii) the failure to attach to the petition his certificate
of arrival; and (iii) the failure to comply with the
publication and posting requirements prescribed by
CA No. 473.
HELD: No
Section 5 of CA No. 473,47 as amended,48
expressly states:
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior
to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine
citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship
shall file with the Bureau of Justice (now Office of the
Solicitor General) a declaration under oath that it is
bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name,
age, occupation, personal description, place of birth,
last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of
arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in
which he came to the Philippines, and the place of
residence in the Philippines at the time of making the
declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful
entry for permanent residence has been established
and a certificate showing the date, place, and
manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant
must also state that he has enrolled his minor
children, if any, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education of the Philippines, where Philippine
history, government, and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during
the entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant
must furnish two photographs of himself. (Emphasis
supplied)
As held in Tan v. Republic, "the period of one year
required therein is the time fixed for the State to
make inquiries as to the qualifications of the
applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the
State will have no sufficient opportunity to
investigate the qualifications of the applicants and
gather evidence thereon. An applicant may then
impose upon the courts, as the State would have no
opportunity to gather evidence that it may present to
contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may
adduce on behalf of his petition." The period is
designed to give the government ample time to
screen and examine the qualifications of an
applicant and to measure the latter’s good intention
and sincerity of purpose. Stated otherwise, the
waiting period will unmask the true intentions of
those who seek Philippine citizenship for selfish
reasons alone, such as, but not limited to, those who
are merely interested in protecting their wealth, as
distinguished from those who have truly come to
love the Philippines and its culture and who wish to
become genuine partners in nation building.
The only exception to the mandatory filing of a
declaration of intention is specifically stated in
Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit:
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to
make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in
the Philippines and have received their primary and
secondary education in public schools or those
recognized by the Government and not limited to any
race or nationality, and those who have resided
continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty
years or more before filing their application, may be
naturalized without having to make a declaration of
intention upon complying with the other
requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall
be added that which establishes that the applicant
has given primary and secondary education to all his
children in the public schools or in private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any
race or nationality. The same shall be understood
applicable with respect to the widow and minor
children of an alien who has declared his intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before
he is actually naturalized.
Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the
category of such exempt individuals that would
excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one
year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization.
Contrary to the CA finding, respondent’s premature
filing of his petition for naturalization before the
expiration of the one-year period is fatal.
In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is
upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of the law. The
opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by
naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or
privilege extended to him by the State; the applicant
does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or
vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship.
The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the
chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the
statute confers upon him; and to acquire such right,
he must strictly comply with all the statutory
conditions and requirements. The absence of one
jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as
this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance
of the naturalization process.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93374 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
naturalization of respondent Li Ching Chung,
otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen
Lee Keng, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-118905
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila,
is DISMISSED, without prejudice.
39. EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is
a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528
Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an
employee, he derives an average annual income of
around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and
other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write
English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from
the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8
setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of
December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons
concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why
the petition should not be granted. The entire petition
and its annexes, including the order, were ordered
published once a week for three consecutive weeks
in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC
likewise ordered that copies of the petition and
notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in
the Manila City Hall Building.9
During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa,
Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in
1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So
family’s business. He would usually attend parties
and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s
family. He knew petitioner to be obedient,
hardworking, and possessed of good moral
character, including all the qualifications mandated
by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo,
testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He
and petitioner were classmates at the University of
Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy.
Petitioner was a member of some school
organizations and mingled well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
decision to the CA on the following grounds:
Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed
to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a
foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44
Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization
pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted
by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an
alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate
and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-
born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along
thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and
affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate,
the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No.
9139 was to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and
more encouraging which is administrative rather
than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature
believes that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing
from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No.
9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely
to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born
aliens. The only implication is that, a native born
alien has the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the
applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of
his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56
Within the purview of the naturalization law, a
"credible person" is not only an individual who has
not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not
a police character and has no police record; who has
not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or
testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is
not the declaration made but the person making it.
This implies that such person must have a good
standing in the community; that he is known to be
honest and upright; that he is reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be
taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the
applicant’s worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that
respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition.
A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered
therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate
of naturalization may be cancelled if it is
subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained
it by misleading the court upon any material fact.
Law and jurisprudence even authorize the
cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon
grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the
granting of the certificate.59 If the government can
challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more
reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within
the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose
the petition before the lower court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit.
40. DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 202809,
2014-07-02
Facts:
On October 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for
naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
473, the Revised Naturalization Law,... Petitioner
made the following allegations in his petition: 1] that
he was born on May 7, 1982 in Manila to spouses
Felix and Emma Go, both Chinese nationals; 2] that
he was of legal age, Chinese national, single, with
residence address at No. 1308-1310 Oroquieta
Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, where he had been residing since
birth; 3] that he spoke English and Tagalog and has
spent his elementary, secondary and tertiary
education in Philippine schools where subjects on
Philippine history, government and civics were
taught as part of the school... curriculum; 4] that he
believed in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, was of good moral character and had
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relations with the... constituted
government as well as with the community; 5] that
he is not opposed to organized government or is
affiliated with any association or group of persons
that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments; 6] that he did not defend or
teach the necessity... or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the success
and predominance of men's ideas; 7] that he was
neither a polygamist nor a believer in polygamy; 8]
that he had never been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude and was not suffering
from... mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases; 9] that he was not a citizen or subject of a
nation at war with the Philippines; 10] that it was his
intention in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever
all allegiance and... fidelity to any foreign state or
sovereignty, particularly to China of which he was a
citizen; 11] that he would reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship; and 12] that he was... exempt from the
filing of the Declaration of Intention with the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) under C.A. No. 473,
Section 5, as he was born in the Philippines and
received his primary, secondary and tertiary
education in the country.
The OSG, however, later moved for the reopening of
trial for the admission of its documentary
evidence.[8] It informed the RTC that it had received
a report, dated November 23, 2006, issued by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),[9] tending to
prove petitioner's non-compliance with the
requirements of the law on naturalization.
April 3, 2007, petitioner manifested to the RTC that
he had a clearance issued by the NBI as proof of his
lack of criminal record, and that he was not the same
Dennis Go who was the subject of the NBI
Investigation Report being offered in evidence by the
OSG.

RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for
naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed
the qualifications set forth by law.
Issues:
findings of facts by the RTC are fully supported by
the evidence extant in the records of the case,
rendering its reversal by the CA, as unwarranted and
erroneous.
OSG mainly harps on the petitioner's failure to prove
that his witnesses are credible.
Ruling:
The Court agrees.
The records of the case show that the joint affidavits
executed by petitioner's witnesses did not establish
their own qualification to stand as such in a
naturalization proceeding.
petitioner did not present evidence proving that the
persons he presented were... credible.
While there is no showing that petitioner's witnesses
were of doubtful moral inclinations, there was
likewise no indication that they were persons whose
qualifications were at par with the requirements of
the law on naturalization
This lack of "credibility"... on the part of the
witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or renders futile
petitioner's claim of worthiness.
Further, petitioner's witnesses only averred general
statements without specifying acts or events that
would exhibit petitioner's traits worthy of the grant of
Philippine citizenship.
It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding
that the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses only
proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos.
To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to
embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals. This
leads to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner
failed to prove that he has all the qualifications
entitling him to the grant of Philippine citizenship.
Filipino... citizenship is predicated upon oneness
with the Filipino people. It is indispensable that an
applicant for naturalization shows his identification
with the Philippines as a country deserving of his
wholehearted allegiance.
petitioner's failure to state his former residence in the
petition was fatal to his application for naturalization.
the inclusion of present and former places of
residence in the petition is a jurisdictional
requirement, without which the petition suffers from
a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured
by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial.[25]
In effect, there was an unpardonable lapse
committed in the course of petitioner's compliance to
the jurisdictional requirements set be law, rendering
the trial court's decision, not only as erroneous, but
void.
Principles:
Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent
membership in a political community. It denotes
possession within that particular political community
of full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications.
it imposes the duty of allegiance to... the political
community.[

It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship
should not easily be given away. All those seeking
to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the
Court, that they have complied with all the
requirements of the law.
Citizenship involves political status; hence, every
person must be proud of his citizenship and should
cherish it. Verily, a naturalization case is not an
ordinary judicial contest, to be decided in favor of the
party whose claim is supported by the...
preponderance of the evidence. Naturalization is not
a right, but one of privilege of the most
discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting
nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the
highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under
the precise conditions... prescribed by law therefor
41. [ GR No. 144742, Nov 11, 2004 ]
REPUBLIC v. HAMILTON TAN KEH +
DECISION
484 Phil. 810
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed the
present petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated
February 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 55339 which affirmed the orders
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 125, granting respondent
Hamilton Tan Keh's petition for naturalization and his
motion to present evidence of compliance with
Republic Act No. 530. Likewise sought to be set
aside is the appellate court's Resolution dated
August 31, 2000, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The case arose from the following undisputed factual
antecedents:
On August 10, 1993, respondent Tan Keh filed with
the court a quo a petition for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473), otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. He alleged in his petition that, inter alia,
he is a resident of San Jose, Caloocan City and
previously resided in Binondo, Manila, Sta. Cruz,
Manila and Carmona, Cavite; he was born in the
Philippines on May 22, 1959 and is a citizen of
China; he is married to Lily Chu Ko, also a Chinese
citizen, with whom he has three (3) children, all born
in the Philippines; he has continuously resided in the
Philippines except for brief visits abroad in
connection with his business; he received primary,
secondary and tertiary education in Philippine
schools and is able to speak and write English and
Tagalog; he is employed as company manager of
KB Trading and earns therefrom an annual income
of P100,000, more or less; he believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution and
he has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner; he possesses all the
qualifications under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4 of CA 473; and he
desires to become a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines. The petition was docketed as
Naturalization Case No. C-24.
On July 4, 1994, the court a quo issued a Notice of
Hearing stating in part:
WHEREFORE, notice is hereby given that said
petition will be heard by this court, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 125, Caloocan City, located at the 2nd
Floor Genato Bldg., 12th Ave., Grace Park,
Caloocan City, Metro Manila on April 27, 1995 at
8:30 in the morning.
Let a copy of this notice as well as the petition and
its annexes be published, at the expense of the
petitioner, in a newspaper of general circulation once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and in the
Official Gazette and to be posted in a public and
conspicuous place and in the Office of the Clerk of
Court.[2]
A copy of the said notice, as well as respondent Tan
Keh's petition for naturalization, were published in
the September 5, 12 and 19, 1994 issues of the
Official Gazette. They were, likewise, published in
the July 7-13, 1994, July 14-20, 1994 and July 21-
27, 1994 issues of the "Newsline."
At the initial hearing on April 27, 1995, the OSG
manifested in open court that the notice of hearing
and the consequent publication suffered from a fatal
defect in that they violated Section 10[3] of CA 473.
The said provision proscribes the hearing of a
petition for naturalization within thirty (30) days
preceding any election. The hearing on April 27,
1995 was less than thirty (30) days preceding the
May 8, 1995 senatorial, congressional and local
elections. Accordingly, on the same day, the court a
quo issued an Order canceling the April 27, 1995
hearing and resetting the same to June 9, 1995.
However, it no longer ordered the republication of
the notice of hearing and the petition.
A Motion to Dismiss respondent Tan Keh's petition
for naturalization dated June 16, 1995 was filed by
the OSG on the ground that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the action since the notice
of hearing and the consequent publication were
fatally defective. The court a quo, however, denied
the motion to dismiss, as well as the subsequent
motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG.
In the Order dated December 18, 1995, the court a
quo granted respondent Tan Keh's petition for
naturalization. The dispositive portion thereof
stated:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
believes and so holds that the petitioner has
complied with all the requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. He has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. Upon the expiration of
the two-year period provided for by Section 1,
Republic Act No. 530, petitioner be allowed (sic) to
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines, after
submission of satisfactory proof that he has
complied with the other requirements of the
aforementioned law.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On February 16, 1996, a few months after his
petition for naturalization was granted, respondent
Tan Keh filed with the court a quo a Motion for Leave
of Court to Travel Abroad. The said motion was
granted.
On July 7, 1997, respondent Tan Keh filed a Motion
to Defer Oath-taking praying that since he left the
country several times, he should be allowed to defer
his oath-taking until such time that the two-year
probationary period under Section 1 of Rep. Act No.
530 had been completed. The said motion was
granted by the court a quo.
On February 22, 1999, respondent Tan Keh filed
with the court a quo a Motion to Present Evidence of
Compliance with the Requirements of Rep. Act No.
530. The OSG filed an Opposition thereto on the
ground that respondent Tan Keh did not comply with
the requirements under Section 1 of Rep. Act No.
530, particularly that proscribing an applicant from
leaving the country during the two-year probationary
period.
In the Order dated May 4, 1999, the court a quo
granted respondent Tan Keh's motion to present
evidence of compliance with the requirements of
Rep. Act No. 530. The OSG sought reconsideration
thereof but the court a quo, in the Order dated July
30, 1999, denied the motion.
The OSG then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari alleging that the court a quo did
not acquire jurisdiction over the action because the
notice of hearing and the consequent publication
violated Section 10 of CA 473; hence, the same
were void and without legal effect. In denying the
OSG's motion to dismiss and granting respondent
Tan Keh's petition for naturalization, Judge
Geronimo Mangay (now retired) allegedly acted with
grave abuse of discretion. The OSG likewise
imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (who
replaced Judge Mangay) in granting respondent Tan
Keh's motion to present evidence of compliance with
the requirements of Rep. Act No. 530 despite the
fact that, in violation thereof, he left the country
within the two-year probationary period.
After the parties had filed their respective pleadings,
the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision
dated February 11, 2000, dismissing the OSG's
petition for certiorari as it ruled that the court a quo
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
the OSG's motion to dismiss and granting
respondent Tan Keh's petition for naturalization, as
well as in subsequently granting his motion to
present evidence of compliance with the
requirements of Rep. Act No. 530.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision but the appellate court, in the
assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2000, denied
the same.
THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW, IS NOT A
RESTRICTION IN THE PUBLICATION OF THE
NOTICE OF HEARING.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE
SECTION 1 OR (sic) R.A. NO. 530 EVEN THOUGH
HE LEFT THE COUNTRY SEVERAL TIMES
DURING THE TWO-YEAR PROBATIONARY
PERIOD.
IV

Hence, the recourse to this Court.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT RESPONDENT'S TRAVEL ABROAD CAN
In support of its petition, the OSG advances the BE CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO
following arguments: SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO 530.[5]
I The first two grounds shall be resolved jointly as they
are interrelated. Sections 9 and 10 of CA 473 read:
Sec. 9. Notification and appearance. - Immediately
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED
clerk of court to publish the same at the petitioner's
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE THE
expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks,
FACT THAT THERE WAS A DEFECTIVE
in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers
PUBLICATION. THE NOTICE OF HEARING TOOK
of general circulation in the province where the
PLACE WITHIN THE PROHIBITED PERIOD
petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition
UNDER SECTION 10 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public
NO. 473, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
and conspicuous place in his office or in the building
THE "REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW." THE
where said office is located, setting forth in such
TRIAL COURT'S RESETTING OF THE HEARING
notice the name, birthplace, and residence of the
ON A DATE OTHER THAN THAT STATED IN THE
petitioner, the date and the residence of the
PUBLISHED NOTICE OF HEARING DID NOT
petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the
CURE THE DEFECT. A VALID AND NOT FATALLY
Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the
DEFECTIVE PUBLICATION IS A
petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT. HENCE, THE
petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition,
TRIAL COURT NEVER ACQUIRED
which hearing shall not be held until after six months
JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION.
from the date of the last publication of the notice.
The clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies
of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization
II
certificate, and other pertinent data to the
Department of the Interior,[6] the Bureau of
Justice,[7] the Provincial Inspector[8] of the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING Philippine Constabulary of the province and the
THAT SECTION 10 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NO. 473, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
Justice of the Peace[9] of the municipality wherein
the petitioner resides.
A plain reading of Section 9 of CA 473 shows that
for there to be a valid publication, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the petition and notice of
Sec. 10. Hearing of the petition. - No petition shall be
hearing must be published; (2) the publication must
heard within thirty days preceding any election. The
be once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks;
hearing shall be public, and the Solicitor General,
and, (3) the publication must be in the Official
either himself or through his delegate or the
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in
provincial fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of
the province where the applicant resides. The said
the Commonwealth of the Philippines at all the
provision also requires that copies of the petition and
proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing,
notice of hearing must be posted in the office of the
the court believes, in view of the evidence taken, that
clerk of court or in the building where the office is
the petitioner has all the qualifications required by,
located. Further, the petition shall not be heard
and none of the disqualifications specified in this Act
within six (6) months from the date of last publication
and has complied with all requisites herein
of the notice.
established, it shall order the proper naturalization
certificate to be issued and the registration of the
said naturalization certificate in the proper civil
Publication is a jurisdictional requirement and non-
registry as required in Section 10 of Act No. 3753.
compliance therewith affects the jurisdiction of the
It is not disputed that there was publication of the court.[10] The rationale for the publication was
notice of hearing and respondent Tan Keh's petition enunciated in the early case of Cui v. Republic of the
for naturalization in the Official Gazette and Philippines,[11] thus:
Newsline once a week for three consecutive weeks.
The publication required by law in the Official
The OSG, however, contends that the said
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
publication was defective because the initial hearing
a means of screening aliens applying for Filipino
on April 27, 1995 took place within the prohibited
citizenship by giving the public a chance to come
period under Section 10 of CA 473, i.e., within thirty
forward and protest the grant of such citizenship if
(30) days preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The
they possess any information derogatory to the
fact that the said hearing was reset to June 9, 1995
applicant….[12]
did not allegedly cure the defect since the court a
quo did not order a republication of the notice of Significantly, the Solicitor General, personally or
hearing of the latter date. through his delegate, and the provincial fiscals, are
the only officers or persons authorized by law to
appear on behalf of the government and oppose an
The OSG maintains that Section 10 of CA 473 also application for naturalization or move for the
operates as a restriction on the requirement of cancellation of a naturalization certificate already
publication such that the date indicated in the issued.[13] The government as an agency of the
published notice of hearing must not be within thirty people represents the public, and therefore the
(30) days preceding any election. When the hearing Solicitor General who appears on behalf of the
was reset to and conducted on June 9, 1995, there government represents the public.[14]
was no publication of the notice thereof.
Accordingly, the RTC did not allegedly acquire
jurisdiction over respondent Tan Keh's petition for On the other hand, Section 10 requires, in part, that
naturalization because publication is one of the "no petition shall be heard within thirty days
jurisdictional requirements therefor. Citing preceding any election."
jurisprudence, the OSG insists that naturalization
laws must be construed strictly and doubts resolved
against the applicant. The fact that, in this case, the initial hearing was
originally set during the prohibited period in Section
10, but well beyond the six (6) months prohibited
The Court is not persuaded. period in Section 9, did not render the publication of
the notice and the petition invalid. Respondent Tan
Keh had strictly complied with all the requirements
under Section 9. His petition and the notice of
hearing were duly published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette during the
month of September 1994 and in a newspaper of
general circulation in July 1994. Moreover, the
original date of hearing, April 27, 1995, was not
within six (6) months from the last publication of the
notice thereof.
On April 27, 1995, when it was pointed out by the
OSG that the said hearing was within the prohibited
period in Section 10, the court a quo forthwith
cancelled the same and reset it to June 9, 1995. The
OSG, as the representative of the Republic, the only
other party apart from respondent Tan Keh who
possessed an interest in the naturalization
proceedings, was fully apprised of the new date of
the hearing. There was, thus, no need for the
republication of the notice of hearing and the petition
for, clearly, the avowed purpose of Section 9 had
already been accomplished.
There are two prohibited periods that must be
reckoned with under Sections 9 and 10 of CA 473.
Section 9 provides that the notice must set forth,
inter alia, "the date of the hearing of the petition,
which hearing shall not be held within six months
from the date of last publication of the notice."
Section 10, on the other hand, provides that "no
petition shall be heard within thirty days preceding
any election." The hearing on June 9, 1995 on
respondent Tan Keh's petition was not within any of
these two prohibited periods.
The case of Te Tay Seng v. Republic[15] cited by
respondent Tan Keh is instructive. In that case, the
hearing on the petition for naturalization was set on
May 5, 1959. The notice thereof was duly published
in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, the last day of publication being October 13,
1958. Thereafter, the applicant moved that the
testimony of one of his character witnesses be taken
on April 23, 1959 instead of on May 5, 1959, the date
set for the hearing of the petition as indicated in the
notice. The trial court therein granted the said
motion and allowed the taking of the testimony on
April 23, 1959. On appeal, among the arguments
raised by the Republic was that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction to take the testimony of the
character witness before the publication of the date
of hearing in the newspaper and the Official Gazette.
The Court ruled against the Republic on this point,
holding that "as from October 13, 1958, the last
publication of the notice of hearing, to April 23, 1959,
the date when the testimony of the character witness
Francisco R. Lopez was taken or heard, the six
months already had passed, and as it does not
appear that an election was to be held within 30 days
from April 23, 1959, the testimony of the character
witness Francisco R. Lopez taken or heard on April
23, 1959 does not come under the prohibition above
quoted."[16]
As discussed earlier, all the requisites for a valid
publication under Section 9 had been complied with
in respect of respondent Tan Keh's petition for
naturalization. Further, the hearing thereon on June
9, 1995 was not within any of the prohibited periods
under Sections 9 and 10. Contrary to the contention
of the OSG, therefore, the court a quo acquired
jurisdiction over respondent Tan Keh's petition for
naturalization.
Anent the third and fourth arguments proffered by
the OSG, which relate to the issue on whether
respondent Tan Keh violated Section 1 of Rep. Act
No. 530 because he left the country during the two-
year period, albeit with leave of the court a quo, the
Court believes that it is premature, at this point, to
resolve this issue.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rep. Act No. 530 read:
Sec. 1. The provisions of existing laws
notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship
shall be heard by the courts until after six months
from the publication of the application required by
law, nor shall any decision granting the application
become executory until after two years from its
promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing,
with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his
representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during
the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously
to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to
any Government announced policies.
Sec. 2. After the finding mentioned in section one,
the order of the court granting citizenship shall be
registered and the oath provided by existing laws
shall be taken by the applicant, whereupon, and not
before, he will be entitled to the privileges of a
Filipino citizen.
The assailed Order dated May 4, 1999 of respondent
Judge Angeles merely granted respondent Tan
Keh's motion to present evidence of compliance with
the requirements of Rep. Act No. 530. It did not, as
yet, make any finding with respect to whether
respondent Tan Keh had fully complied with the
above provision. Neither did it make a categorical
ruling that respondent Tan Keh is already entitled to
the issuance of a certificate of naturalization and
allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. The
dispositive portion of the May 4, 1999 Order merely
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Motion to Present Evidence of Compliance with the
Requirements of RA 530 is hereby GRANTED.
Let the presentation of evidence be held on May 27,
1990 (sic) at 8:30 AM.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The said Order is, in fact, in accord with Section 1 of
Rep. Act No. 530, which provides that a decision in
a naturalization case becomes final only after two
years from its promulgation and after another
hearing is conducted to determine whether or not
there was such compliance. As the Court of Appeals
correctly ratiocinated:
At any rate, it would be precipitate for respondent
judge to deny private respondent's motion to present
evidence to show his compliance with the
requirements of R.A. No. 530. If a hearing is held,
petitioner would have the opportunity to show the
perceived violations by private respondent of the law
as to prevent him from embracing Philippine
citizenship. In other words, whether or not private
respondent has faithfully complied with the legal
requirements to warrant his naturalization as a
Filipino citizen would be better determined in the
course of private respondent's presentation of
evidence. At that point, private respondent has the
burden of showing compliance.[18]
Indeed, the hearing on respondent Tan Keh's motion
to present evidence of compliance with the
requirements of Rep. Act No. 530 would be the
proper venue where the OSG could fully ventilate its
perceived violations by respondent Tan Keh of the
said law. If the court a quo, after the said hearing
and notwithstanding the OSG's opposition, issues to
respondent Tan Keh the certificate of naturalization
and allows him to take his oath, the OSG, if it is still
so minded, may appeal the court a quo's order in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of CA
473.[19]
In fine, the appellate court committed no reversible
error in holding that respondent Judge Angeles did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting
respondent Tan Keh's motion to present evidence of
compliance with the requirements of Rep. Act No.
530.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
42. [ GR No. 144742, Nov 11, 2004 ]
REPUBLIC v. HAMILTON TAN KEH +
DECISION
484 Phil. 810
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed the
present petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated
February 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 55339 which affirmed the orders
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 125, granting respondent
Hamilton Tan Keh's petition for naturalization and his Let a copy of this notice as well as the petition and
motion to present evidence of compliance with its annexes be published, at the expense of the
Republic Act No. 530. Likewise sought to be set petitioner, in a newspaper of general circulation once
aside is the appellate court's Resolution dated a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and in the
August 31, 2000, denying the petitioner's motion for Official Gazette and to be posted in a public and
reconsideration. conspicuous place and in the Office of the Clerk of
Court.[2]
A copy of the said notice, as well as respondent Tan
The case arose from the following undisputed factual
Keh's petition for naturalization, were published in
antecedents:
the September 5, 12 and 19, 1994 issues of the
Official Gazette. They were, likewise, published in
the July 7-13, 1994, July 14-20, 1994 and July 21-
On August 10, 1993, respondent Tan Keh filed with 27, 1994 issues of the "Newsline."
the court a quo a petition for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473), otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
At the initial hearing on April 27, 1995, the OSG
amended. He alleged in his petition that, inter alia,
manifested in open court that the notice of hearing
he is a resident of San Jose, Caloocan City and
and the consequent publication suffered from a fatal
previously resided in Binondo, Manila, Sta. Cruz,
defect in that they violated Section 10[3] of CA 473.
Manila and Carmona, Cavite; he was born in the
The said provision proscribes the hearing of a
Philippines on May 22, 1959 and is a citizen of
petition for naturalization within thirty (30) days
China; he is married to Lily Chu Ko, also a Chinese
preceding any election. The hearing on April 27,
citizen, with whom he has three (3) children, all born
1995 was less than thirty (30) days preceding the
in the Philippines; he has continuously resided in the
May 8, 1995 senatorial, congressional and local
Philippines except for brief visits abroad in
elections. Accordingly, on the same day, the court a
connection with his business; he received primary,
quo issued an Order canceling the April 27, 1995
secondary and tertiary education in Philippine
hearing and resetting the same to June 9, 1995.
schools and is able to speak and write English and
However, it no longer ordered the republication of
Tagalog; he is employed as company manager of
the notice of hearing and the petition.
KB Trading and earns therefrom an annual income
of P100,000, more or less; he believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution and
A Motion to Dismiss respondent Tan Keh's petition
he has conducted himself in a proper and
for naturalization dated June 16, 1995 was filed by
irreproachable manner; he possesses all the
the OSG on the ground that the court a quo did not
qualifications under Section 2 and none of the
acquire jurisdiction over the action since the notice
disqualifications under Section 4 of CA 473; and he
of hearing and the consequent publication were
desires to become a citizen of the Republic of the
fatally defective. The court a quo, however, denied
Philippines. The petition was docketed as
the motion to dismiss, as well as the subsequent
Naturalization Case No. C-24.
motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG.

On July 4, 1994, the court a quo issued a Notice of

Hearing stating in part:
WHEREFORE, notice is hereby given that said
petition will be heard by this court, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 125, Caloocan City, located at the 2nd
Floor Genato Bldg., 12th Ave., Grace Park,
Caloocan City, Metro Manila on April 27, 1995 at
8:30 in the morning.
In the Order dated December 18, 1995, the court a
quo granted respondent Tan Keh's petition for
naturalization. The dispositive portion thereof
stated:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
believes and so holds that the petitioner has
complied with all the requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. He has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. Upon the expiration of
the two-year period provided for by Section 1,
Republic Act No. 530, petitioner be allowed (sic) to
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines, after
submission of satisfactory proof that he has
complied with the other requirements of the
aforementioned law.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On February 16, 1996, a few months after his
petition for naturalization was granted, respondent
Tan Keh filed with the court a quo a Motion for Leave
of Court to Travel Abroad. The said motion was
granted.
On July 7, 1997, respondent Tan Keh filed a Motion
to Defer Oath-taking praying that since he left the
country several times, he should be allowed to defer
his oath-taking until such time that the two-year
probationary period under Section 1 of Rep. Act No.
530 had been completed. The said motion was
granted by the court a quo.
On February 22, 1999, respondent Tan Keh filed
with the court a quo a Motion to Present Evidence of
Compliance with the Requirements of Rep. Act No.
530. The OSG filed an Opposition thereto on the
ground that respondent Tan Keh did not comply with
the requirements under Section 1 of Rep. Act No.
530, particularly that proscribing an applicant from
leaving the country during the two-year probationary
period.
In the Order dated May 4, 1999, the court a quo
granted respondent Tan Keh's motion to present
evidence of compliance with the requirements of
Rep. Act No. 530. The OSG sought reconsideration
thereof but the court a quo, in the Order dated July
30, 1999, denied the motion.
The OSG then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari alleging that the court a quo did
not acquire jurisdiction over the action because the
notice of hearing and the consequent publication
violated Section 10 of CA 473; hence, the same
were void and without legal effect. In denying the
OSG's motion to dismiss and granting respondent
Tan Keh's petition for naturalization, Judge
Geronimo Mangay (now retired) allegedly acted with
grave abuse of discretion. The OSG likewise
imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (who
replaced Judge Mangay) in granting respondent Tan
Keh's motion to present evidence of compliance with
the requirements of Rep. Act No. 530 despite the
fact that, in violation thereof, he left the country
within the two-year probationary period.
After the parties had filed their respective pleadings,
the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision
dated February 11, 2000, dismissing the OSG's
petition for certiorari as it ruled that the court a quo
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
the OSG's motion to dismiss and granting
respondent Tan Keh's petition for naturalization, as
well as in subsequently granting his motion to
present evidence of compliance with the
requirements of Rep. Act No. 530.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision but the appellate court, in the
assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2000, denied
the same.
Hence, the recourse to this Court.
In support of its petition, the OSG advances the
following arguments:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THERE WAS A DEFECTIVE
PUBLICATION. THE NOTICE OF HEARING TOOK
PLACE WITHIN THE PROHIBITED PERIOD
UNDER SECTION 10 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NO. 473, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE "REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW." THE
TRIAL COURT'S RESETTING OF THE HEARING
ON A DATE OTHER THAN THAT STATED IN THE
PUBLISHED NOTICE OF HEARING DID NOT
CURE THE DEFECT. A VALID AND NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE PUBLICATION IS A
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT. HENCE, THE
TRIAL COURT NEVER ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT SECTION 10 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NO. 473, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW, IS NOT A
RESTRICTION IN THE PUBLICATION OF THE
NOTICE OF HEARING.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE
SECTION 1 OR (sic) R.A. NO. 530 EVEN THOUGH
HE LEFT THE COUNTRY SEVERAL TIMES
DURING THE TWO-YEAR PROBATIONARY
PERIOD.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT RESPONDENT'S TRAVEL ABROAD CAN
BE CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO
SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO 530.[5]
The first two grounds shall be resolved jointly as they
are interrelated. Sections 9 and 10 of CA 473 read:
Sec. 9. Notification and appearance. - Immediately
upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the
clerk of court to publish the same at the petitioner's
expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks,
in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers
of general circulation in the province where the
petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition
and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public
and conspicuous place in his office or in the building
where said office is located, setting forth in such
notice the name, birthplace, and residence of the
petitioner, the date and the residence of the
petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the
Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the
petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his
petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition,
which hearing shall not be held until after six months
from the date of the last publication of the notice.
The clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies
of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization
certificate, and other pertinent data to the
Department of the Interior,[6] the Bureau of
Justice,[7] the Provincial Inspector[8] of the
Philippine Constabulary of the province and the
Justice of the Peace[9] of the municipality wherein
the petitioner resides.
Sec. 10. Hearing of the petition. - No petition shall be
heard within thirty days preceding any election. The
hearing shall be public, and the Solicitor General,
either himself or through his delegate or the
provincial fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines at all the
proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing,
the court believes, in view of the evidence taken, that
the petitioner has all the qualifications required by,
and none of the disqualifications specified in this Act
and has complied with all requisites herein
established, it shall order the proper naturalization
certificate to be issued and the registration of the
said naturalization certificate in the proper civil
registry as required in Section 10 of Act No. 3753.
It is not disputed that there was publication of the
notice of hearing and respondent Tan Keh's petition
for naturalization in the Official Gazette and
Newsline once a week for three consecutive weeks.
The OSG, however, contends that the said
publication was defective because the initial hearing
on April 27, 1995 took place within the prohibited
period under Section 10 of CA 473, i.e., within thirty
(30) days preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The
fact that the said hearing was reset to June 9, 1995
did not allegedly cure the defect since the court a
quo did not order a republication of the notice of
hearing of the latter date.
The OSG maintains that Section 10 of CA 473 also
operates as a restriction on the requirement of
publication such that the date indicated in the
published notice of hearing must not be within thirty
(30) days preceding any election. When the hearing
was reset to and conducted on June 9, 1995, there
was no publication of the notice thereof.
Accordingly, the RTC did not allegedly acquire
jurisdiction over respondent Tan Keh's petition for
On the other hand, Section 10 requires, in part, that
naturalization because publication is one of the
"no petition shall be heard within thirty days
jurisdictional requirements therefor. Citing
preceding any election."
jurisprudence, the OSG insists that naturalization
laws must be construed strictly and doubts resolved
against the applicant.
The fact that, in this case, the initial hearing was
originally set during the prohibited period in Section
10, but well beyond the six (6) months prohibited
The Court is not persuaded.
period in Section 9, did not render the publication of
the notice and the petition invalid. Respondent Tan
Keh had strictly complied with all the requirements
A plain reading of Section 9 of CA 473 shows that
under Section 9. His petition and the notice of
for there to be a valid publication, the following
hearing were duly published once a week for three
requisites must concur: (1) the petition and notice of
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette during the
hearing must be published; (2) the publication must
month of September 1994 and in a newspaper of
be once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks;
general circulation in July 1994. Moreover, the
and, (3) the publication must be in the Official
original date of hearing, April 27, 1995, was not
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in
within six (6) months from the last publication of the
the province where the applicant resides. The said
notice thereof.
provision also requires that copies of the petition and
notice of hearing must be posted in the office of the
clerk of court or in the building where the office is
On April 27, 1995, when it was pointed out by the
located. Further, the petition shall not be heard
OSG that the said hearing was within the prohibited
within six (6) months from the date of last publication
period in Section 10, the court a quo forthwith
of the notice.
cancelled the same and reset it to June 9, 1995. The
OSG, as the representative of the Republic, the only
other party apart from respondent Tan Keh who
Publication is a jurisdictional requirement and non-
possessed an interest in the naturalization
compliance therewith affects the jurisdiction of the
proceedings, was fully apprised of the new date of
court.[10] The rationale for the publication was
the hearing. There was, thus, no need for the
enunciated in the early case of Cui v. Republic of the
republication of the notice of hearing and the petition
Philippines,[11] thus:
for, clearly, the avowed purpose of Section 9 had
The publication required by law in the Official already been accomplished.
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
a means of screening aliens applying for Filipino
citizenship by giving the public a chance to come There are two prohibited periods that must be
forward and protest the grant of such citizenship if reckoned with under Sections 9 and 10 of CA 473.
they possess any information derogatory to the Section 9 provides that the notice must set forth,
applicant….[12] inter alia, "the date of the hearing of the petition,
which hearing shall not be held within six months
Significantly, the Solicitor General, personally or
from the date of last publication of the notice."
through his delegate, and the provincial fiscals, are
Section 10, on the other hand, provides that "no
the only officers or persons authorized by law to
petition shall be heard within thirty days preceding
appear on behalf of the government and oppose an
any election." The hearing on June 9, 1995 on
application for naturalization or move for the
respondent Tan Keh's petition was not within any of
cancellation of a naturalization certificate already
these two prohibited periods.
issued.[13] The government as an agency of the
people represents the public, and therefore the
Solicitor General who appears on behalf of the
The case of Te Tay Seng v. Republic[15] cited by
government represents the public.[14]
respondent Tan Keh is instructive. In that case, the
hearing on the petition for naturalization was set on
May 5, 1959. The notice thereof was duly published
in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, the last day of publication being October 13,
1958. Thereafter, the applicant moved that the
testimony of one of his character witnesses be taken
on April 23, 1959 instead of on May 5, 1959, the date
set for the hearing of the petition as indicated in the
notice. The trial court therein granted the said
motion and allowed the taking of the testimony on
April 23, 1959. On appeal, among the arguments
raised by the Republic was that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction to take the testimony of the
character witness before the publication of the date
of hearing in the newspaper and the Official Gazette.
The Court ruled against the Republic on this point,
holding that "as from October 13, 1958, the last
publication of the notice of hearing, to April 23, 1959,
the date when the testimony of the character witness
Francisco R. Lopez was taken or heard, the six
months already had passed, and as it does not
appear that an election was to be held within 30 days
from April 23, 1959, the testimony of the character
witness Francisco R. Lopez taken or heard on April
23, 1959 does not come under the prohibition above
quoted."[16]
As discussed earlier, all the requisites for a valid
publication under Section 9 had been complied with
in respect of respondent Tan Keh's petition for
naturalization. Further, the hearing thereon on June
9, 1995 was not within any of the prohibited periods
under Sections 9 and 10. Contrary to the contention
of the OSG, therefore, the court a quo acquired
jurisdiction over respondent Tan Keh's petition for
naturalization.
Anent the third and fourth arguments proffered by
the OSG, which relate to the issue on whether
respondent Tan Keh violated Section 1 of Rep. Act
No. 530 because he left the country during the two-
year period, albeit with leave of the court a quo, the
Court believes that it is premature, at this point, to
resolve this issue.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rep. Act No. 530 read:
Sec. 1. The provisions of existing laws
notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship
shall be heard by the courts until after six months
from the publication of the application required by
law, nor shall any decision granting the application
become executory until after two years from its
promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing,
with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his
representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during
the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously
to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to
any Government announced policies.
Sec. 2. After the finding mentioned in section one,
the order of the court granting citizenship shall be
registered and the oath provided by existing laws
shall be taken by the applicant, whereupon, and not
before, he will be entitled to the privileges of a
Filipino citizen.
The assailed Order dated May 4, 1999 of respondent
Judge Angeles merely granted respondent Tan
Keh's motion to present evidence of compliance with
the requirements of Rep. Act No. 530. It did not, as
yet, make any finding with respect to whether
respondent Tan Keh had fully complied with the
above provision. Neither did it make a categorical
ruling that respondent Tan Keh is already entitled to
the issuance of a certificate of naturalization and
allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. The
dispositive portion of the May 4, 1999 Order merely
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Motion to Present Evidence of Compliance with the
Requirements of RA 530 is hereby GRANTED.
Let the presentation of evidence be held on May 27,
1990 (sic) at 8:30 AM.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The said Order is, in fact, in accord with Section 1 of
Rep. Act No. 530, which provides that a decision in
a naturalization case becomes final only after two
years from its promulgation and after another
hearing is conducted to determine whether or not
there was such compliance. As the Court of Appeals
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
correctly ratiocinated:
vs.
At any rate, it would be precipitate for respondent
judge to deny private respondent's motion to present REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
evidence to show his compliance with the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
requirements of R.A. No. 530. If a hearing is held,
petitioner would have the opportunity to show the
perceived violations by private respondent of the law Ponente: MENDOZA
as to prevent him from embracing Philippine
citizenship. In other words, whether or not private
respondent has faithfully complied with the legal
FACTS:
requirements to warrant his naturalization as a
Filipino citizen would be better determined in the
course of private respondent's presentation of
evidence. At that point, private respondent has the The trial court granted the petition and admitted
burden of showing compliance.[18] petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State,
however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
Indeed, the hearing on respondent Tan Keh's motion among others for having failed to state all his former
to present evidence of compliance with the placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7
requirements of Rep. Act No. 530 would be the and to support his petition with the appropriate
proper venue where the OSG could fully ventilate its documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he
perceived violations by respondent Tan Keh of the failed to mention said address in his petition, but
said law. If the court a quo, after the said hearing argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
and notwithstanding the OSG's opposition, issues to Residence containing it had been fully published,
respondent Tan Keh the certificate of naturalization with the petition and the other annexes, such
and allows him to take his oath, the OSG, if it is still publication constitutes substantial compliance with
so minded, may appeal the court a quo's order in §7.
accordance with the pertinent provisions of CA
473.[19]
ISSUE:

In fine, the appellate court committed no reversible

error in holding that respondent Judge Angeles did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting
respondent Tan Keh's motion to present evidence of
compliance with the requirements of Rep. Act No.
530.
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State
to its appelant’s brief without having been presented
and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132,
Section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
justified the reversal of of the Trial Court’s decision.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is HELD:

DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

43. Ong Chia vs. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. Petition was denied.
No. 127240. March, 27, 2000)
Jhez
RATIO:
6 years ago
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It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of
strict application of the law in naturalization cases
defeat petitioner’s argument of “substantial
compliance” with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of
evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
the documents submitted to the appellate court by
the State.
44. Republic of the Philippines vs. Azucena
Saavedra Batu(i)gas (DIGEST)
GR No. 183110
7 October 2013
TOPIC:
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife, Naturalization,
Citizenship
FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the
CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that
granted the Petition for Naturalization of respondent
Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del
Sur. She stated that she intends in good faith to
become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty,
and particularly to China; and that she will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
filing of her Petition up to the time of her
naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena
failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The
OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under
the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the
retail trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s
claim that she owns real property because aliens are
precluded from owning lands in the country. Finding
the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be
evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on
September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena
has never departed the Philippines since birth.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and
Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary
education were taken in Philippine schools. After
earning a degree in education, she then practiced
her teaching profession in several different schools
in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago
Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen.
They have five children, all of whom studied in
Philippine public and private schools and are all
professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her
husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
business of and later on in milling/distributing rice,
corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena
submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance
sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During
their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought
parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the
citizenship requirement as required by law to
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under
Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called
derivative naturalization, which is available to alien
women married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are
married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary
for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their
marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February 1980,
Azucena applied before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration
by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The
CID granted her application. However, the Ministry
of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found
no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a
Filipino citizen, as only their marriage certificate was
presented to establish his citizenship. As the records
before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven. Under
judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth
certificate indicating therein that he and his parents
are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration,
land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of
which are public records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main
objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among
family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that
the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial
scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of
making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, that granted the Petition
for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to
compliance with the period and the requirements
under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the
Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of
Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien
Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.
45. RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY, GR
No. 199113, 2015-03-18
Facts:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he
became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon
their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to
the Philippines... they purchased a 600-square
meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria,
Oriental Mindoro... where they constructed a
residential house... in the year 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is
public land and part of the salvage zone.
filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application[3] (MLA)
over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said... application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own
land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents... petitioner re-
acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 9225... petitioner averred that at
the time he filed his application, he had intended to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had
been assured by a CENRO officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that
he bought the property from the
Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject
property was titled land and they have the right and
authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact
led to the institution of civil and criminal suits
between him and private respondent's family.
finding probable cause to indict petitioner for
violation of Article 172 of the RPC and
recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in... court.
CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner's MLA.
It ruled that petitioner's subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA which was void ab initio... the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public
document suffices to warrant indictment of the
petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any...
proof that he gained or intended to injure a third
person in committing the act of falsification... filed
before the MTC... a warrant of arrest was issued...
against the petitioner.
petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a
petition[15] for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He
asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a... pre-condition for the re-
determination of probable cause by the court that
issues a warrant of arrest
RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition
for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court
Issues:
in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when
he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of
Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have
submitted his person to the... said court's jurisdiction
by his voluntary appearance... the MTC... properly
denied petitioner's motion for re-determination of
probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused (petitioner).
Ruling:
contentions have no merit... petitioner was
naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first
category of natural-born Filipinos under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country.
As... the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking
the required oath of allegiance
Section 2 declaring the policy that considers
Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have
lost... their Philippine citizenship, should be read
together with Section 3, the second paragraph of
which clarifies that such policy governs all cases
after the new law's effectivity.
Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the
accused following the time-honored principle that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the
State and liberally in... favor of the accused.[23] R.A.
9225, however, is not a penal law.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the Citizenship before the Department of Immigration
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006
governing law at the time he was naturalized as certifying that she has... ceased to be an Australian
Canadian... citizen, naturalization in a foreign citizen.
country was among those ways by which a natural-
born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 petitioner ran for Mayor in
six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having... no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship Caba, La Union... in the 2007 elections. She lost
status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err
in finding probable cause for falsification of public
document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
She again sought elective office during the May 10,
2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor.
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking
an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
and was proclaimed as... the winning candidate.
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person

private respondents... filed separate petitions for quo

Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief
in filing his motion for re-determination of probable
cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked
jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such
erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the
RTC correctly... ruled that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the
said motion... petition is DENIED
45. TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON v.
COMELEC, GR No. 198742, 2012-08-10
warranto questioning the... petitioner's eligibility
The petitions similarly sought the petitioner's
disqualification from holding her elective post on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed
to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign... citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by

R.A. No. 9225.

Facts:

trial court held that the petitioner's failure to comply

petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen... she with
became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold
public office.
she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship... pursuant to
the personal... declaration of renunciation she filed
in Australia was not under oath.
The application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines... the petitioner filed an unsworn
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the
appeal was dismissed
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the COMELEC en banc.
Issues:
For purposes of determining the petitioner's eligibility
to run for public office, whether the "sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship"... in Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.
Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective
office for failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition
of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship... by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of... any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath... she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly,
however, the same was not under oath contrary to
the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of... foreign citizenship must be sworn
before an officer authorized to administer oath.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
compels natural- born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who
reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1)
to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225,... and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of... candidacy, to qualify
as candidates in Philippine elections.
[T]he intent of the legislators was not only for
Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
but also to explicitly renounce their foreign...
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the
Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine
elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship,
namely, Philippine citizenship.
it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their
citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the
operative act that restores their right to run for public
office. The petitioner's failure to... comply therewith
in accordance with the exact tenor of the law,
rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship she executed
As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek
elective office. Unless she... executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is
ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines.
Principles:
47. G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL
ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA.
RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10,
2013 and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the
local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has
already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore,
has successfully finished his term of office. While the
relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the
motion for reconsideration is important as it will
either affirm the validity of Arnado’s election or affirm
that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to
support his plea for the reversal of this Court’s
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented
his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the
Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It
must be stressed, however, that the relevant
question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his
foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither
do his accomplishments as mayor affect the
question before this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act of the United States as having
the effect of expatriation when he executed his
Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on
April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested
of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent
was divested of all the rights of an American citizen,
the fact that he was still able to use his US passport
after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation
repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws,1 which must be presented as public
documents2 of a foreign country and must be
"evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not
suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed
to cite any law of the United States "providing that a
person who is divested of American citizenship thru
an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such
American citizenship by using a US Passport issued
prior to expatriation."4
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction.
Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code calls for application in the case before us,
given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his
certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino
citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American
citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any
foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnado’s
disqualification to run for any local elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared
policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act."5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires those
who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who
seek elective public office, to renounce any and all
foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship, when read together with Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code7 which
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running
for any elective local position, indicates a policy that
anyone who seeks to run for public office must be
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a
former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship
to continue using a foreign passport – which
indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the
individual as its national – even after the Filipino has
renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a
complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority
decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport
is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the
country which issued the passport, or that a passport
proves that the country which issued it recognizes
the person named therein as its national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born
Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that
he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his
Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he
renounced his American citizenship. It is also
indubitable that after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least
six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the
efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of his American
citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S.
passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement
that the renunciation must be made through an oath
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the
oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has
sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign
passport because it is convenient for the person to
do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues
the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left
Arnado "a man without a country".1âwphi1 On the
contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to
have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does
it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the
decision merely points out is that he also possessed
another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of
administrative bodies will not be interfered with by
the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.8 They are accorded not only
great respect but even finality, and are binding upon
this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative
body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended
evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion had such evidence been
properly appreciated.9
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that
COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his
U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced
his American citizenship. This was debunked by the
COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only
used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed
with Arnado’s claim that he only used his U.S.
passport on those occasions because his Philippine
passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En
Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he
used his Philippine passport for his travels on the
following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010,
31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4
June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other
dates indicated in the certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January
2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the
Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700
which also indicated therein that his nationality is
USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the
travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration
showing that Arnado also presented his U.S.
passport four times (upon departure on 14 April
2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure
on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November
2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of
the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his
use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported
by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine
passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records
show that he continued to use his U.S. passport
even after he already received his Philippine
passport. Arnado’s travel records show that he
presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009,
on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These
facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based
on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the
U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado
obtained his Philippine passport. Arnado’s continued
use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as
isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us
to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the
principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos
are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual
citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce
their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue
using their foreign passports, we are creating a
special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby
effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
hereby DENIED with finality.
48. IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE
PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner.
IN RE EPIFANIO MUNESES
(Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship)
B.M. No. 2112
Keywords:
· Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses became a
lawyer in 1966 but acquired American citizenship in
1981
· Restored citizenship in 2006 by virtue of RA
9225
· A Filipino lawyer who re-acquires citizenship
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar but
must apply for a license or permit to engage in law
practice.
On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses
with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying
that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.
Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but
lost his privilege to practice law when he became a
American citizen in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or the
“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003” by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate in
Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of
law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact,
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The
loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s
membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.
R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to
practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.
qualifications, the OBC recommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B.
Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on
a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by

the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required,
and incompliance thereof, petitioner submitted the
following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine

Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of
Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-
Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well
as his updated payment of annual membership
dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the
2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty.
Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE
Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his
compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his

compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and
finding that the petitioner has met all the