POLITICAL LAW PART V

ARTICLE VI – THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.

a. Define legislative power

– Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:

1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws

2. principle of separation of powers

3. non-delegability of legislative powers

– reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable laws

– Separation of Powers

Read:

a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139

b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62
c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178
d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106

e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991

f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106

b. Nature of legislative power

c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the legislature?

d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.

e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.

1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President in case of war or other national
emergency, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
Resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the government.
– Other exceptions: traditional

3. Delegation to local governments

The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to know better the needs of
the people therein.

a. See Section 5 of Article X

b. Read:

aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660

bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56

A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of probation officers in their
area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where there is a probation
officer because the local government unit appropriated an amount for his salaries, convicts may avail of
probation while in places where no funds were set aside for probation officers, convicts therein could not
apply for probation.

a. Reason for the delegation

4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and Section 32, Article VI—The
Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject
any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress of local legislative body after the registration
of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.

f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies.

1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test?

Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124
and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions
of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of
an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds
of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its
population is less than five hundred persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may “not be created
or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected” and the “recommendation
of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.” Petitioner
argues, accordingly: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are
based, provides:

The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or
boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be
required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created,
and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines
shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President
of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction
of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines,
with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer,
shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so
formed.

Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not
amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case
involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing
municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to
said transfer (See Gov’t of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan [34
Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common
boundaries of two municipalities.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative
nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law:

(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate and

(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but,
also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained
by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid
the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause
of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

… may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed
that the phrase “as the public welfare may require,” in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It
is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had
upheld “public welfare” and “public interest,” respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of
the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial
pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of
which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. The law construed in the Calalang case
conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and
streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act
No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases
involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions,
calling for the determination of questions of fact.
2 TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)
1. US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled “An Act penalizing
the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose,” the material provisions of which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting
in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the
Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of
rice at an excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General
of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of
Act No. 2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang
Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General
of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary
to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive
Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged,
and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919;
that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first
published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of
August, 1919.

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the
Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or
define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but
says that it may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion
of the Governor-General. The Act also says: “For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define what is “an extraordinary
rise.” That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-
General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to issue and promulgate “temporary rules
and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify or define what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall
remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any
manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of
the Governor-General to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or what is not “an extraordinary
rise in the price of rice,” and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out
the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a
proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice,
sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have
been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the
existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a
crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested
in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive
to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power
to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within
its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not
constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which
rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act
No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic
Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate
the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into
effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains
to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act
is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without
the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act
in conformity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions,
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all
its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment
of any prescribed fact or event.
4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (Affecting National interest)
6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that
some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed
the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned,
respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the
delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is
that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.

It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner
required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine
and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include
the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of
Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public
interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in
communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the
creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over
respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or
components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.

II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because
it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner
laments that said order was based merely on an “initial evaluation,” which is a unilateral evaluation, but
had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the
confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have
been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-
power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are
necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process.

Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative
bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency
is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in the
instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining
the order in question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent
NTC’s legislative function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the
ongoing proceedings on petitioner’s application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner
is not the only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing
review of the rates charged.

We find merit in petitioner’s contention.

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical classification as
to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:

Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates
are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to
petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by
the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital,
which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report,
and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well
as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of
fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which
demands previous notice and hearing.

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel,
et al. to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice
of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185,
204, supra, where it is said: ‘If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the
requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a
group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules
which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) … It is said in 73 C.J.S.
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: ‘Aside from statute, the necessity
of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the
circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or
legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and
its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property
may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-
judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other.
Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction
of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner’s financial statements-without
affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial
statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%)
rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its
rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and
detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such
nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner’s ratiocination that
an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the
public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial
outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector
who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.

At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order
was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not
necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary
in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.

g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative bodies/agencies have the force of law? penal
law? In order to be considered as one with the force and effect of a penal law, what conditions must concur?
See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) or the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION – a reviewer –
Primer by FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, 1987 edition.
5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328
 6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327
7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270

h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII.

i. Classify the membership of the legislative department. Differentiate their qualifications,

elections/selections and as to the participation of the Commission on Appointments in order to validate
their membership.

j. Manner of election and selection

1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108

2. Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at
large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided for by law.
3. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
and, on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
4. Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of the House of Representatives.

2. Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three (3) consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, ½ of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women
youth, and such other sectors, as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least one hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
 [4] Within 3 years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on standards provided in this section
Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read and
write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of
the election.

Read:

1. ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545

Rep. Act No. 2630

“Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine Citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United states, acquired US citizenship, MAY REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY TAKING
AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING THE
SAME WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR LAST
RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES. The said Oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.”

2. Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution

“Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine Citizenship in
accordance with par. 3* , Section 1 shall be deemed natural born citizens.”
OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIO CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK
JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004

Who takes the place of the winning candidate as a Member of the House of Representatives who was
disqualified after he was proclaimed as such?

Facts:
The petitioner and Mark Jimenez were candidates for Congressman of the 6th District of manila for the May
14, 2001 elections. Mark Jimenez won over the petitioner with 32,097 votes as against petitioner’s 31,329
votes.

3. Petitioner filed an electoral protest before the HRET based on the following grounds: 1]
misreading of ballots; 2] falsification of election returns; 3]substitution of election returns; 4] use of marked,
spurious fake and stray ballots; and 5] presence of ballots written by one or two persons.
4. On March 6, 2003, the HRET issued its Decision in the case of ABANTE, ET AL. VS. MARI
CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, et al., declaring Mark Jimenez “ ineligible for the Office of
Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in the District. Mark Jimenez filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied.

As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner claimed that all the votes cast for the former
should not be counted and since he garnered the second highest number of votes, he should be declared
winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6 th District
of manila.
Issues:

Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not be counted?

Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed winner since the winner was disqualified?

Held:

1. There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate in order that the votes of a disqualified
candidate can be considered “stray”. This final judgment must be rendered BEFORE THE ELECTION.
This was the ruling in the case of CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA. Hence, when a candidate has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day he was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot
be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
The reason behind this is that the people voted for him bona fide and in the honest belief that the candidate
was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

2. The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not
entitle the second placer to be declared the winner. The said principle was laid down as early as 1912 and
reiterated in the cases of LABO VS. COMELEC, ABELLA VS. COMELEC and DOMINO VS.
COMELEC.

Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of 3 years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their
election.
No member of the House of Representative shall serve for a period of more than 3 consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of
the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of Sectoral representatives to the Hose

of Representatives.

Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987

2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, September
4, 1989

b. On gerrymandering

Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763

4. Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may
be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
representatives thus elected shall serve only the unexpired term.
Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337
COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislative districts whose Congressmen resigned
or died while in office) without a law passed by Congress appropriating funds for the said purpose.
2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December 28, 1987

5. Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined
by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving such increase.

a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress? P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per month] as
per Section 17, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. The President’s salary is P300,000.00 per annum, while the
VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice is P240,000.00 per annum. The Chairman of the
Constitutional Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members, P180,000.00 per annum.

b. Read:

1. Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President; P240,000.00 for VP, Senate President;
Speaker; Chief Justice; P204,000.00 for Senators, Representatives, Chairmen of CC; P180,000.00 for
members of the Constitutional Commissions)
2. PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;
3. LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823

6. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.

a. Privilege from arrest

Read: Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22

b. Freedom of Speech and debate

Read:
1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
7. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption
of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of
which they are authors.
8. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned and controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Read:

1) ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431

After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) , he is deemed to have resigned
his position as Governor of Negros Oriental because as a legislator, he is not allowed to hold any other
office in the government.
2) PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153
A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa as “appointed member”
for being a member of the Cabinet is allowed to return to his former position as Governor if he resigns
from the Batasan. This is so because he was just an “appointed” member as distinguished from the Adaza
Case. (Note: It appears that an appointed member of the Batasan is placed in a better position than the
elected members)

3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution

9. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies and
other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Read:

1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39

2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31

What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a member of Congress who is a
stockholder of the corporation involved in a case is not allowed to appear under the guise that he is
appearing as such, not as counsel for the corporation.

10. Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the 4th Monday of July for its
regular season, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until 30 days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any
time.
Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
[2] A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
[3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly
behavior, and with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty
of suspension, when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty days.

NOTE: In the cases of:

1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN; and

2. REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be suspended by the Sandiganbayan in
accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019. This preventive suspension applies to all public officials, including
members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will be considered class legislation if Senators and
Congressmen who commit the same is exempt from the preventive suspension imposed therein.

Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended by the Congress itself.

[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting
such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at
the request of one fifth of the members present, be entered in the journal.
Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings.
[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without the consent of the other, adjourn for more
than three days, nor to any place than that which the 2 Houses shall be sitting.

Read:

1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for reconsideration dated March 14, 1949
2) Disciplinary measures on erring members

Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal

4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the other?

Read:

U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729

The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper journalists and reporters as to
what the proceedings all about.
b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1
CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347

The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that it is urea formaldehyde is the
one exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde which appears in the journal which was really
approved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME,
NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.

d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131

e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714
(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters required to be entered in the journals, like
yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present.
)
5) Differentiate a “regular” from a “special” session.
11. Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all election contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of 9 members, 3 of whom shall
be justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief justice, and the remaining six shall
be members of the Senate or House of Representatives as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last par. Sec. 4, Art. VII

Read:

1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988

2) FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,October 27, 1988
 3)ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC & RAZUL AND SANCHEZ VS.
COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
4. BONDOC VS. HRET, supra
11. Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the Senate President,
as ex-oficio chairman, 12 senators and 12 members of the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of
the commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority of all the members.

Read:

1. RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989

If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is substantial so as to
dramatically decrease the membership of one party while reducing the other, the number of representatives
of the different parties in the Commission on Appointments may also be changed in proportion to their
actual memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the Senators was only “temporary”
so as not to result in the change of membership in the Commission on Appointments)
2. GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992
Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in addition to the Senate President as
the head thereof, every two (2) Senators are entitled to one (1) representative in the Commission. Parties,
however, are not allowed to “round off” their members, I.e., 7 Senators are entitled to 3 representatives in
the Commission on Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5.
Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires that there must be 24 members of the
Commission. If the different parties do not coalesce, then the possibility that the total number of Senators
in the CA is less than 12 is indeed a reality. (Example: Lakas—13 Senators; LDP—11 Senators. In this
case, Lakas is entitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP would have 5 members (11/2= 5.5)
3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the
October 20, 1992 Decision)

To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.

12-a. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within 30 days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while
the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members, to discharge
such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
13. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the
public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which
shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member.
14. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Read: 1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29

“A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to
due process of law.”

Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation; question hour