THIRD DIVISION

DIGNA A. NAJERA, G.R. No. 164817

Petitioner, Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
EDUARDO J. NAJERA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 3, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found
petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 The facts are as follows:

On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains.[1]

Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in
the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint
Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.[2] They are childless.

Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage as
shown by the following facts:

(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division of the
Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was
dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able
to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.

(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to
rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.

(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he
came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with another
man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered
unprintable words against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.

(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every year, he
quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, hearrived home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994,
while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her
with a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her
body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.

(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother at
Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.

Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in
accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent
pursuant to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of petitioner and
respondent and the forfeiture in
favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and
(4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.

On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by publication as
provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer[3] wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and averred
that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the
subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award
of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled
hearing.

On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[4] terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally
their conjugal properties.
 On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting
an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties.[5] The initial hearing of the case was held on
November 23, 1998.

Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist
Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a government
agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage contract.[6] At the time of
their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the
Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of P5,000.00. It was petitioners brother who helped respondent
find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a
seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then
returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of
having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of
the house and returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved
in drugs.[7]

In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house
on the lot.[8]

On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioners sister. Respondent,
however, did not allow petitioner to go with him.When respondent arrived home at around midnight, petitioner asked him
about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he did not answer her.Instead, respondent
went to the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that
she was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When she opened
her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry his attack with her
left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got
nervous and went out.After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone
out and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to
Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or
hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her
wounds. After a few hours, she went home.[9]

When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about 300 meters
away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She found that their
personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.[10]

Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.[11]

Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner
learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment from him.[12]

Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondents parents were separated. Respondents
brothers were also separated from their respective wives.[13]

Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.[14]

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She
confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:

It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the
kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated from Respondents
father. This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana
habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.

His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-
seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and
anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.
 Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality
Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-
destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najeras psychological impairment as traced to his
parents separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage
to Petitioner Digna Aldana.

Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable
damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his
impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage be
annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his
marital duties and responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.[15]

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with
borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.[16]

Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he
received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner
without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.[17]

On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and
respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo

Najera;

2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and

respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint
Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.[18]
 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[19] dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[20]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case ofRepublic v. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.

2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo
Najera.

3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same set
of facts established by petitioners evidence submitted before the trial court and therefore the same
conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in
Psychology.[21]

The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent which is
his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
 The Court is not persuaded.

Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
 (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church --
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
 The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."[24] The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. [25] In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party'spsychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[27]

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to
satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation
of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28] Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed
to prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from
Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality disorder. [D]id you find
any organic cause?
A No, sir.

Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents family] background, there was strong basis that
respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.

Q Did you interview the respondents family?

A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).

xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
 Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly affected, is this
curable?
A The chances are nil.

Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.

Q What is this organic damage?

A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.

Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline personality
disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-
destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.

Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?

A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.[29]

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence
or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable
cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation[30] only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004, twelve days before the
decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7
in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
 The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

Petitioners argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered
the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for
reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this
Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to
this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a
sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed)
corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and
conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of
due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family
was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his
own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother
with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his
friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he
 could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was
aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman;
Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home
very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final
separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the
Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of
the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the
Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon
1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-
appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants
mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates
(psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the
respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the
Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented
before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue.

True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
 Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of
evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.

Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the
court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample
reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]

Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted
the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his
right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with
moral certainty required by law and conclude thatthe husband-respondent upon contacting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital
contract x x x.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on thepsychological
incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding
the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated
February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005]

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
 [G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005]

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12,
1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.[1]
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos
with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits
received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount
of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.

SO ORDERED. [2]
 Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed
a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly supportpendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument. [3]
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.[4] Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.[5]
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto
the trial courts decision.[6] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the son. [7] Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question
these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] and the Petition for Certiorari[9] were ordered consolidated by this Court.[10]
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and
jurisprudence, thus:

1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY
LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;

2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;

3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89

OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST
THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE
GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-
HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND

4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS
TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON. [11]
 In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENTS MOTION
FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING. [12]

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00
BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES. [13]

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS
OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN
SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL. [14]

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS
PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT. [15]

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:

On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties particularly
the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love
instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-
appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was
unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make
the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and their son; that he
had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their
separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless
nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts,
damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the
Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not
follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million
pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally
prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.
[16]

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:

ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219[17] of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be
recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully
cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based
were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to
psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. . . .
[18]

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said
courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering
into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one
must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely
deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner.
Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[19]
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:

Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of
litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. (par. 11) [20]

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of attorneys fees and costs of
litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.
[21]

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both
are grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to
comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since
the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without
basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park
and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:

The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration
of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572
573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.

The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are
conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following:

1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;

3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .

Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the parties conjugal properties
and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who
worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package
from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount
of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations other
than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such
share as provided in this Code. In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had
there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous
cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of
the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July
12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of
any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband,
for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has
chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she
will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.

Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just,
lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being
part of their conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said
defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of
the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies. [22]

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:

On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement
benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal partnership.

On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties. In
the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps
were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received
from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued
from plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the
trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee,
the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial
court.
[23]

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case
may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared voidab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,[24] this Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage on the
property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of
gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law
now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of
the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation
and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51
and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages
(in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates
only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any
continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to
have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the
other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-
ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it
may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. [25]

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of
one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn
twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005[26] and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the
son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are
contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner
from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
Companies issustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and
November 13, 1996 which increased the supportpendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and
ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, G.R. No. 166738
Petitioner,
Present:
*
CARPIO-
MORALES, J.,
- versus - Acting Chairperson,
**
CARPIO,
***
CHICO-
NAZARIO,
****
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and
EDWARD RUMBAUA, BRION, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:

August 14, 2009

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,[1] the decision
dated June 25, 2004[2] and the resolution dated January 18, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
The challenged decision reversed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage of the petitioner and
respondent Edward Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The assailed
resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
 The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage against the
respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged
on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for
his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he
was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.

Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as personal service proved futile.[5] The RTC
ordered the provincial prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no fabrication or
suppression of evidence would take place.[6] Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated the presence of collusion between
the parties.[7]

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition.[8] The
OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings of the case. [9]

The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate her charges.

The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva
Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but the respondent’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a job.
The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent
proposed to the petitioner that they first have a “secret marriage” in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed;
they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never lived together; the
petitioner stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his parents in Novaliches.
 The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six months of their marriage. At that point, the
respondent refused to live with the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application for a
PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s daily meetings became occasional visits to the petitioner’s
house in Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent enrolled at FEATI University after
he lost his employment with PAL.[10]

In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to convince him
to go to the United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately from the petitioner. The
respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special
occasions. The respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.

In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed the petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the
pain that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s action, the petitioner severed her relationship
with the respondent. They eventually reconciled through the help of the petitioner’s father, although they still lived separately.

In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her
mother went to the respondent’s house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia). When
she confronted the respondent about it, he denied having an affair with Cynthia.[11] The petitioner apparently did not believe the
respondents and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery brought.[12]

The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication between her and respondent had
ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract; [13] and the
testimony, curriculum vitae,[14] and psychological report[15] of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
 Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta
Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence
Completion Test; and MMPI.[16] She thereafter prepared a psychological report with the following findings:

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual level. Logic and reasoning remained
intact. She is seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into most situations especially if it is within her interests.
She is pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had reservations from negative criticisms such that she normally adheres
to social norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity, both intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her
compliant attitude which makes her a subject for manipulation and deception such that of respondent. In all the years of their
relationship, she opted to endure his irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that someday things will be much better
for them. But upon the advent of her husband’s infidelity, she gradually lost hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that she
has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of being aggressive and very cautious at times – so as to fight with the
frustration and insecurity she had especially regarding her failed marriage.

Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he believes that the world
revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an
extreme air of confidence and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards others
especially to that of petitioner.

REMARKS

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In
love, “age does matter.” People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life with another and that he/she will not
die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face when love is
not the love he/she expected.

In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really happened for her towards the young respondent –
who used “love” as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she extended towards him. He made her believe
that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful – only to reveal himself contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the
commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that he was able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner look like
an innocent fool. His character traits reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be grave, severe and
incurable.[17] [Emphasis supplied.]
 The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of
the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:
xxxx

Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent imposed limited or block [sic] out
communication with his wife, forgetting special occasions, like petitioner’s birthdays and Valentine’s Day; going out only on
occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel to have sexual intercourse.

It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case which show the psychological incapacity of
respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital
responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is “declared grave, severe and incurable.”

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin
Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The CA Decision

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.[19] The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed
and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.[20]

In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called
“narcissistic personality disorder;” it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give the court an insight into
the respondent’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the
respondent’s incapacity was “deep-seated” and “incurable.”
 The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be psychological, although its manifestations
may be physical. Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so that
he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed them. In other words,
the illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. In the present case, the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly refused to live with her
because of his parents’ objection to their marriage.

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005. [21]

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that –

1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina[22] (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed with because
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;

2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the
defects in her testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and

3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.

The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and the RTC’s
decision be reinstated.
 The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect after the
promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not
proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. [23]

The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.

THE COURT’S RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel
for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly published -- is geared towards
the relaxation of the OSG certification that Molinarequired. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:

SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated.
It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other
 pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered
despite the absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early
as February 13, 1997.

The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or
remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is
that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,[25] as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[26]
Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in
rules of procedure.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be
applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the
certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since confirmed and
clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48
mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is
important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective,
the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.

A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper

 The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of
evidence are procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of her former counsel,
Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in
this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.

We do not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this
stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final
order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed
only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by
ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would
probably alter the result if presented.

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a
remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima
facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Grantingarguendo that the petitioner’s
counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First
Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:[29]

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases,
there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by
counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested remand.

Petitioner failed to establish the

respondent’s psychological incapacity

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on

Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should
refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.”

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do's.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
 (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity
must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] These requisites must be strictly
complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define “psychological incapacity,” fleshing out its
terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized this approach in the recent case
of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33] when we explained:

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
 attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence
insufficient to prove that the respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.

a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondent’s condition

The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b)
visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during special
occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he
was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity” that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.

In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it
was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to
cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family.
The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts
of blaming petitioner for his mother’s death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best
amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the
respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady
and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.

To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these imperfections,
however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered
him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[35]

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty,”
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.

b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. [36] For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to
be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who “believes that the world revolves around him”; and who “used love
as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.” Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own
idea of “love”; made a generalization that respondent was a person who “lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse,” and
who engaged “in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool”; and finally concluded that the respondent’s
character traits reveal “him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to
be grave and incurable.”

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It
failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception
of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered “Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable” – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary
inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the
petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made
with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof
of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent testimony in court cured whatever deficiencies attended her
psychological report.

We do not share this view.

A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were
married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential
duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s
condition was grave and incurable. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:

Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as Exh. “E-7”, there is a statement to the effect that his
character traits begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial personality disorder. What do
you mean? Can you please explain in layman’s word, Madam Witness?

DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:

A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality disorder cannot accept that there is something wrong with his own
behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are eccentric; they are exemplary,
demanding financial and emotional support, and this is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent abused and used
petitioner’s love. Along the line, a narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply because they love
themselves more than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person cannot support his own personal need and
gratification without the help of others and this is where the petitioner set in.

Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?

A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral manifestation under personality disorder [sic] this is
already considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of developmental
disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years and brought about by one familiar relationship the way
he was reared and cared by the family. Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child disorder. [sic]

Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?

A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long before he entered marriage. [Un]fortunately, on the part
of the petitioner, she never realized that such behavioral manifestation of the respondent connotes pathology. [sic]

xxxx

Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is now lying [sic] with somebody else, how will you
describe the character of this respondent who is living with somebody else?

A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is one who indulge in
philandering activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of another person, and this [is] again a buy-
product of deep seated psychological incapacity.
Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep seated [sic], how would you describe the psychological
incapacity? [sic]

A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would say incurable in nature and at this time and again
[sic] the psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not being able to give meaning to a
relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.

Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the respondent and the petitioner, Madam Witness?

A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative years and so if it takes enough that such
psychological incapacity of respondent already existed long before he entered marriage, because if you analyze how he
was reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is already an unhealthy symbiosis developed between the
two, and this creates a major emotional havoc when he reached adult age.

Q: How about the gravity?

A: This is already grave simply because from the very start respondent never had an inkling that his behavioral
manifestation connotes pathology and second ground [sic], respondent will never admit again that such behavior of his
connotes again pathology simply because the disorder of the respondent is not detrimental to himself but, more often
than not, it is detrimental to other party involved.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:

Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the respondent never appeared at my clinic.

Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning wife to annul their marriage with her husband in
general, what can you say about the respondent?

A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to give meaning to their relationship. If you analyze their
marital relationship they never lived under one room. From the very start of the [marriage], the respondent to have
petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their family knew of their marriage [sic]. Respondent completely
refused, completely relinquished his marital obligation to the petitioner.
 xxxx

COURT:

Q: Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the petitioner, can you really enumerate the specific traits of the
respondent?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the dependent attitude of the respondent.

Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?

A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply because he never had a set of
responsibility. I think that he finished his education but he never had a stable job because he completely relied on the
support of his mother.

Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific?

A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the part of the mother merely because respondent
happened to be the only son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic] developed between the son and
the mother simply because the mother always pampered completely, pampered to the point that respondent failed to
develop his own sense of assertion or responsibility particularly during that stage and there is also presence of the
simple lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested by
the fact that respondent refused to build a home together with the petitioner when in fact they are legally married.
Thirdly, respondent never felt or completely ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty hurting the
petitioner because on the part of the petitioner, knowing that respondent indulge with another woman it is very, very
traumatic on her part yet respondent never had the guts to feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their
relationship, and clinically this falls under antisocial personality. [37]

In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:
xxxx

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO

Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?

 DR. NEDY TAYAG

A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up to this very moment, no scientific could be upheld
to alleviate their kind of personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other person suffering from any kind of
disorder particularly narcissistic personality will never admit that they are suffering from this kind of disorder, and then
again curability will always be a question. [sic][38]

This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general characteristics of a person suffering from a
narcissistic personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these traits. She
mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely, gravity, incurability, existence at
the time of the marriage, psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own limited way, related these to the
medical condition she generally described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general
way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the
respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and
incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of
the petitioner’s case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner
related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner. Neither
the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[39] If a
psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted
and given credit.[40] No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly
about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately
thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and
meager facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the
nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given
focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his
determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among
others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example,
why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of
his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not
because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital
developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared
to have been factored in. Not a few married couples have likewise permanently separated simply because they have “fallen out
of love,” or have outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their younger years.

Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the
introduction of additional evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the
conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the ground of the respondent’s psychological
incapacity.

The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge
his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled inMolina, it is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown
to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.[41]

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 andJanuary 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.

SO ORDERED.
The petitioner, petition to declare for the nullification of marriage against the respondent for the ground of psychological
incapacitated to exercise essential obligations as shown by the following circumstances, the respondent was reneged on the promise
to live in one roof after finding a job, failed to extend financial support to the petitioner, blaming the petitioner for the death of the
mother’s respondent, and presented himself single for all his transaction and pretended working in Davao although he was
cohabiting with other woman in Novaliches City