HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY G.R. No.
L- The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be
27873. November 29, 1983
public domain, public forest land, Revised Administrative Code
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:
These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the
decision of the CA which declared the disputed property as forest
land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons. These petitions
have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title
and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The
parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.
Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application
for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the
same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of
Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director
of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition
to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his
opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold
whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel
Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled
to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956
square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing
527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share
to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the
possession of private persons for over 30 years and therefore in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the
subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a
private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by
Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint
against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for
the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed
by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was
dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the disputed lot is part
of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of
the CA in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the
disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part
of the public domain classified as forest land.
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
“mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable
of registration in the names of the private applicants.
RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers
may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be
on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into private ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest
and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such
land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the
public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must
have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness
Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a
thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of
the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s
finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done
because it was classified as “public forest.”
Menguito vs. Republic Case Digest (G.R. No. 134308. December 14,
2000)
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC of Pasig City, granting
the application for registration of the lands in question to the
petitioners.
FACTS:
On November 10, 1987, an application for Registration of Title was
filed with the RTC of Pasig City by herein petitioners who were
successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo Froilan
Menguito and Generoso Menguito.The petitioners sought to have
parcels of land, situated in Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila, be brought under the operation of Land Registration
Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to
have their title thereto registered, conformed and be declared as
owners in fee simple of said parcels of land. The petitioners also asked
the Court to declare that they acquired the said parcels of land
through inheritance and that said lands were occupied by applicants
and their predecessors-in-interest in actual, open, peaceful,
continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners for
more than 30 years. Petitioners, in their application, opted to apply
for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended, should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable
in the instant case.
Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a notice of
hearing addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director of Land
Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the
owners of adjacent properties as mentioned in the application. The
hearing was scheduled on April 25, 1989.The addressees were then
ordered ‘to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any
portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and
unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your
default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated
and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the
Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said
application or any decree entered thereon.'
The Solicitor General filed its opposition to the application for
registration contending that neither the applicant nor his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The muniments of title and tax
payment receipts of applicant, according to the Solicitor General, do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition of the lands applied for and the said muniments of title do
not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession of
applicant to be of recent vintage. The Solicitor General further
contends that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who
has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the
period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the
instant application was filed on July 31, 1990. The Solicitor General
claimed that the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation
and thus, prayed for the the denial of the application for registration
and for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
On April 25, 1989, at the initial hearing, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr.
appeared and registered a verbal opposition to the application.
The lower court then issued an Order of General Default against the
whole world, except as against the oppositors Republic of the
Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written
opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their ‘Formal Offer of Evidence,’
together with documentary exhibits.
On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation
and Opposition to applicants’ formal offer of evidence. In the
manifestation, it objected to the extrajudicial settlement and
partition dated December 12, 1985 for being self serving and the tax
declarations for being incompetent and insufficient proof of
possession of the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-
in interest. the oppositor Republic also objected to the tax receipts
submitted by the applicants, the same being incompetent and
insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It also objected
to the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo
Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito submitted by the applicants as
being self-serving and a mere photocopy. The first page of the Deed
of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by the applicants was
also claimed by the oppositors as self-serving and mere photocopy.
The second page of said deed was also attacked as referring
to different parcels of land other than those being applied
for. Oppositor respectfully prayed that the application for registration
be denied and that the land applied for be declared as part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and that
there is no need for it to submit evidence in support of its opposition.
On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision affirming the
order of general default against the whole world and confirming the
registerable title of the applicants.
On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor
General, moved for a reconsideration of the lower court decision, to
which a written opposition was interposed by the applicants.
On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals where the
decision was reversed due to the failure of the lower court to consider
the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles. The Court
of Appeals was not convinced that the land in question had been
classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since June 12,
1945.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts
of the trial court.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, the petitioners were duty-bound to
prove two legal requirements: : (1) the land applied for was alienable
and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. The records show that
petitioners failed to establish this two requisites.
Petitioners relied on a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in
Exhibit “E” indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. This proof is insufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution provides that "All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State." The petitioners
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of public domain.

If the land was indeed alienable, petitioners still needs to establish
possession of the lots in question in an open, continuous, exclusive
and adverse in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June
12, 1945. Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land
from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of their
predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even
before the Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof,
however, to support such claim. Petitioners presented evidence that
they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974. Their
predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes
on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had
declared the land for tax purposes in 1943. However, they did not
present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to
substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and
cannot suffice.
Cirilo’s children were the best witnesses because they could have
substantiated petitioners’ claim that indeed the lots in question had
been donated to Pedro Menguito and they may even have in their
possession documents that can adequately support their supposed
claim. However, they were not presented as witnesses. Instead,
petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of
Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their
houses thereon. Tax declarations, tax receipts and the Municipal
Treasurer’s certifications of tax payments presented in evidence by
the petitioners were incompetent and insufficient because they are
of recent vintage.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Petitioner now appeals citing three issues:
Issues:
Whether or not the land is already alienable and disposable
Whether or not respondent is qualified to acquire the property in
view of the constitutional prohibition under Art. XII Sec 3 of the 1987
Constitution
Held:
No. The certifications from DENR are not sufficient there being no
authority from the part of CENRO to classify the land (1st certification)
and the certification issued by the RTD (2nd certification).
The given evidences of conversion were 2 certifications from the
DENR by the CENRO, which under its Project 30 (Land classification),
the land falls within the Alienable and Disposable Zone. However,
under DAO No. 20, only the PENRO can classify lands greater than 50
ha. Hence, there was no authority to classify the land which is
evidently greater than 50 ha.
There was also no probative value for the certificate issued by the RTD
as it is outside his function
Both also are without a certification from the Secretary of DENR which
is required.

No. There is an absolute prohibition by the Constitution under Art. XII

REPUBLIC V TAN PROPERTIES INC
AUGUST 6, 2017LIGHT
CASE INVOLVES AN APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF
TITLE BY RESPONDENT OF A LOT IN STO. TOMAS, BATANGAS.
Sec 3. The only disposition that can be made to private corporations
was through a lease not exceeding 25 years, renewable by 25 years.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is
to transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the
public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent
the constitutional intent is removed.

Facts:
The requirements of publication and notice being confirmed, the trial
ensued on 11 November 1999. There was no oppositor other than the
Republic.
The exception in Acme cannot be availed here as the land therein was
already private property when it was acquired. In the case at bar, the
land not being alienable and disposable without ownership for more
than 30 years, is not yet private property when purchase from
Porting.

The witnesses presented by the respondent were 1) Primitivo

Evangelista and 2) Anthony Dimayuga Torres, father of the vendor of
the land (Porting) to respondent, who got the land from his father,
Prospero Dimayuga, who was in possession of the land (open,
continuous, adverse and peaceful) since 1942. This land was
previously given to Fortunato as a donation but was revoked. The trial
court rendered in favor of the respondent wherein:

“The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could

apply for registration of land provided such entity and its
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or
more.”

This ruling was affirmed by the CA in toto.