Dela Cruz, Airiz M.

2016-166623

Conde vs. Abaya

G.R. No. 4275 March 23, 1909

Facts:

Paula Conde, as the mother of Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she had by
Casiano Abaya, moved the settlement of the intestate succession of the latter. Roman
Abaya, Casiano’s brother, was declared to be the sole heir of the deceased, to the
exclusion of the Condes, and therefore entitled to take possession of all the property
of his estate.

Paula Conde contended that her right was superior to that of Roman and
moved for a hearing of the matter. Hence, trial ensued.

The trial court ruled that the administrator of the estate of the deceased should
recognize Jose and Teopista as natural children of the deceased; Paula Conde should
succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their
deceased natural father; and that Paula is the only heir to the exclusion of Roman.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the mother, as the heir, of the presumed natural child may
bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child

Ruling:

No. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not
transmissible to his ascendants or descendants. The action to claim its legitimacy
may be brought by the child at any time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its
heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs
shall be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action. The action
already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not
lapsed before then.

Further, the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the
child, that is, it can always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs
by the child itself, while the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child
does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it cannot be instituted against
the heirs of the presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the
life of the presumed parents.

An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be

exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event
of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the
discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by
the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
 Ledesma vs. Mclachlin, et al.
G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938

Facts:

Plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, of which

relation was born a daughter, Ana Quitco Ledesma. The relation between Socorro
Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a deed
acknowledging Ana as his natural daughter and issued in favor Socorro a promissory
note.

Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin with whom he

had four children. In 1930, Lorenzo died and on 1932 his father died leaving real and
personal properties upon his death.

Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, plaintiff
Socorro filed before committee on claims and appraisal, the promissory note for
payment. The commissioners, upon receipt of said promissory note, instead of passing
upon it, elevated the same to the Supreme Court en consulta. However, the court
refrained from giving his opinion thereon.

The court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased
Eusebio Quitco, which Ana was not included. No appeal was taken, and in lieu thereof
there was filed the complaint which gives rise to this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the action to recover the amount of the last installment of the
promissory note issued by Lorenzo M. Quitco can be filed against the estate of Eusebio
Quitco

Ruling

No. The claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note
should not have been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased
not being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco,
which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section
642 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, more than ten years having thus elapsed
from the expiration of the period for the payment, the action for its recovery has
prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Moreover, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the
properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not
make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father
or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their
predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of
their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said
father from whom they did not inherit anything.
 Pamplona vs. Moreto
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980

Facts:

Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, during their marriage, acquired

adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 1496 and 4545 which are covered by certificates of title issued
in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega.”

In 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate. In 1952, Flaviano, without the

consent of the heirs of his deceased wife, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona,
married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495.
Pamplona constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano pointed
to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano. Shortly thereafter, the son of Geminiano
also built his house within lot 1496.

In 1956, Flaviano died intestate. The plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to

vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the ground that
Flaviano had no right to sell the lot. Geminiano refused to vacate the premises hence,
this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of
the nullity of the deed of sale.

The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano in their favor is valid as
the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano and they are purchasers believing
in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.

It was found out that while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No.
1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square
meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale transaction.

The trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs and declared that the deed of absolute
sale null and void but the sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half of
Lot 1496 which defendants are declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of Flaviano to Geminiano is valid

Ruling:

Yes. The sale is valid.

There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property, the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano and Monica had already been dissolved
and the necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were
not instituted by the heirs. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a
community between the surviving husband, Flaviano, and his children in the concept
of a co-ownership. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the
fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment.
 The SC rejected respondent Court’s ruling that the sale was valid as to one-
half and invalid as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano had the
legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he could
dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners.

The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as
vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the
fences were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-
owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation
and possession, a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership was created
and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano, but also his heirs, from asserting as against
the Pamplonas any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale. In fact, the heirs
lived as neighbors to the Pamplonas for nine years, yet lifted no finger to question the
occupation, possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, hence
they are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the property in dispute as null and void.
 Jayme vs Gamboa
G.R. No. L-47820 November 28, 1942

Facts:

Antonio Jayme brought Efigenia Enriquez, whom he had an intimate

relationship, to his home town, Bacolod. In 1883, Efigenia gave birth to Petitioner
Fortunato Jayme. However, Antonio, in 1884, married defendant Genoveva Gamboa,
by whom he had four children.

Fortunato came to know Antonio as his father as the latter used to visit him
two or three times a week in the house where he lived with his mother, provide them
support and arrange things for his education. Fortunato was continued to be
recognized and treated as a son not only by Antonio but also by the latter's legitimate
children until Anotonio’s death in 1937.

Fortunato claims the right to inherit from the deceased Antonio Jayme as the
latter's legally acknowledged natural son. However, his claim is contested by the
widow and the legitimate children and grandchildren of the deceased, who deny the
status of acknowledged natural child asserted by him.

The trial court declared Fortunato Jayme an acknowledged natural son of the
deceased Antonio Jayme, with the right to inherit from him. But upon motion for new
trial filed by the defendants, the same judge modified the said order by holding that
although Fortunato is a legally acknowledged natural son of the deceased Antonio
Jayme, he is not entitled to inherit from the latter because "his rights as a natural
acknowledged son of the decedent cannot be enforced." From that order both parties
appealed.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Fortunato Jayme is a natural child and acquired the status of
such
2. Whether or not Fortunato Jayme is entitled to inherit from the estate of his
natural father

Ruling

1. Yes. Fortunato Jayme is a natural child and acquired the status of such.

Under Law 11 of the Laws of Toro, which was the law in force at the time
Fortunato Jayme was born, natural children were those at the time of their birth or
conception were of fathers who could have married their mothers justly without
dispensation.

The fact that Antonio Jayme lawfully contracted marriage with Genoveva on
January 16, 1884, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it may be presumed
that he was an unmarried man on April 17, 1883, when Fortunato Jayme was born.
Once it has been proved that the father, Antonio Jayme, could legally marry without
dispensation at the time Fortunato was born, there is no need to prove that Efigenia,
with whom he had the child, could also legally marry without dispensation, for such
capacity is presumed by law in default of evidence to the contrary. Therefore,
Fortunato Jayme is a natural son of Antonio Jayme.
 Further, the tacit acknowledgment of a natural child on the part of his father
was in itself sufficient to give him the status of an acknowledged natural child and
that Antonio performed acts tending to show tacit acknowledgment of Fortunato as
his natural child. No form of acknowledgment was prescribed. The SC ruled that
those pre-Civil Code acts of Antonio Jayme, taken together, are sufficient to establish
tacit recognition by him of Fortunato as his natural child.

2. The then Civil Code provides that an acknowledged natural child is entitled to
receive the hereditary portion determined by such Code. It further provides that
when the testator leaves legitimate children or descendants, and also legally
acknowledged natural children, each of the latter shall be entitled to one half of the
portion pertaining to each of the legitimate children.

Rule 12 of the transitory provisions of the then Civil Code expressly ordains
that the inheritance of those who die after the Civil Code was in force "shall be
allotted and divided in accordance with this code"; even if a decedent made a will
under the prior legislation and the testamentary dispositions should conflict with the
provisions of the Code, the former should be harmonized with the latter; "the
legitimes, betterments, and legacies shall be respected, but their amounts shall be
reduced when it is not possible in any other manner to give to each participant in the
inheritance the share pertaining to him.
 Quion vs. Claridad
G.R. No. L-48541 January 30, 1943

Facts:

This is an action by the heirs of the deceased by his second marriage whose
dominion over their share in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of
law vested in them upon the death of said deceased, subject only to the lien of the
latter's creditors, for the purpose of obtaining relief on the ground of fraud, which
action may be brought within four years after the discovery of the fraud, in accordance
with section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In the intestate proceedings of a deceased, prosecuted by appellants who

knowingly concealed the fact that said deceased left a second wife with whom he had
two children, herein appellees. The trial court, in a subsequent action brought by
appellees to recover their legal participations in the deceased's estate, correctly
declared said appellees co-owners of the estate in question to the to the extent of one-
half thereof, with right to its possession.

The appellant's claim that the intestate proceedings could no longer be

reopened after the expiration of the two-year period fixed in section 597 and 598 of
the Code of Civil Procedure shall fail.
 Neri vs. Akutin
G.R. No. L-47799 May 21, 1943

Facts:

The testator, Agripino Neri, left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage with preterition of the children by his first marriage
as they had already received their share during the lifetime of the deceased, which
the court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy.

A motion for reconsideration has been filed by the respondents on the ground
that there is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage and that even
assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of
the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of the inheritance made to them.

The trial court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ruled that since
all the parcels that corresponded to Agripino Neri are now in the administrator's
possession, as appears in the inventory filed in court, it is clear that the property of
the deceased has remained intact and that no portion thereof has been given to the
children of the first marriage.

Issue:

1. Whether or not there is preterition

2. Whether or not there should be nullity of the institution of heirs and the
opening of a total intestacy.

Ruling:

1. Yes. There is preterition. Since, however, this is an issue of fact tried by the
Court of First Instance, and the Supreme Court are reviewing the decision upon a
question of law regarding the issue, the Court can rely only upon the findings of fact
made by the latter Court.

When the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage,
he left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, he
left nothing to them or, at least, some of them. This is, accordingly, a case of
preterition governed by Article 814 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open
but the legacies and betterments shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious.

2. Yes. There should be nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of a
total intestacy.

Although the annulment of the institution of heirs in cases of preterition does

not always carry with it the ineffectiveness of the whole will because if, aside from
the institution of heirs, there are in the will provisions leaving to the heirs so
instituted or to other persons some specific properties in the form of legacies
or mejoras, such testamentary provisions shall be effective and the legacies
and mejoras shall be respected in so far as they are not inofficious or excessive. In
this case, however, no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will, the whole property
of the deceased having been left by universal title to the children of the second
marriage. The effect, therefore, of annulling the institution of heirs will be necessarily
the opening of a total intestacy.

In the instant case, the testator omitted the children by his first marriage upon
the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than
those given to the children by his second marriage. It was, therefore, the thought of
the testator that the children by his first marriage should not receive less than the
children by his second marriage.
 Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc
G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956

Facts:

The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate of Hemady based on
twenty different indemnity agreements or counterbonds, each subscribed by a
distinct principal and by the deceased Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor.

The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value
of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further
asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the
bond.

The administratrix contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a
guarantor was terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or
damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent.

The trial court dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on the ground that
whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate,
because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of Hemady extinguished his liability as guarantor

Ruling:

No. Under the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession, are
subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased and cannot be regarded
as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party. They
take such inheritance subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of
him from whom they derive their rights.

The nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the
conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal
inducement for the contract. A person who enters into a contract is deemed to have
contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly
stipulate to that effect. His failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to
terminate upon his death.

Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not require bondsman Hemady to
execute a mortgage indicates nothing more than the company’s faith and confidence
in the financial stability of the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly
personal.

The contracts of suretyship entered into by the decedent in favor of Luzon

Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking,
nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his
eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The
contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate.
 Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

Facts:

First Countryside Credit Corporation and Efraim M. Santibañez entered into

two loan agreements dated May 31 and December 31, 2019 respectively. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the
FCCC.

In February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in

March 1981, testate proceedings commenced. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors. Each of them
was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the
tractor respectively taken by them.

On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was

executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand
letters for the settlement of his account were sent by Petitioner to Edmund, but the
latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay.

The petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was
no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Accordingly,
the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

On the other hand, Florence alleged that the loan documents did not bind her
since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her
and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that the claim
should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the
decedent was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred
by the said decedent. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was
null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been
probated. The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid

2. Whether or not petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased

Ruling:

1. No. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory.

In the present case, the deceased left a holographic will which provides that all
his properties, real or personal shall be distributed in favor of Edmund and Florence.
Said provision is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by
the decedent including the three (3) subject tractors. Hence, any partition involving
the said tractors among the heirs is not valid.

It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired

jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction
which the Court cannot allow. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears
to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval
is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that
part of the estate.

2. No. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the
estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent
Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with
the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent.
 Santos vs. Lumbao
G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007

Facts:

Rita Santos, during her lifetime, sold the subject property, through a document
denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa” to respondents Spouses Lumbao, who in turn, took
actual possession thereof and erected their house thereon.

Lumbao alleged that prior to the death of Rita, the latter informed her that she
could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited
by her and her co-heirs had not yet been partitioned.

Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter to petitioners

but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to
reconvey the subject property. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages.

Petitioner, in turn, prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause
of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

Spouses Lumbao amended their Complaint because they discovered that

petitioners executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana
and that the Complaint was filed directly in court in order that prescription or the
Statute of Limitations may not set in.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. However, on appeal,
said decision was reversed by the CA.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages is dismissible

for their failure to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law

2. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and
enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of the Spouses Lumbao’s action for
reconveyance with damages.

Ruling:

1. No. Spouses Lumbao’s non-compliance with the condition precedent of

undergoing conciliation, cannot be considered fatal. Although petitioners alleged in
their answer that the complaint filed by Spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for
their failure to comply with the condition precedent, which in effect, made the
complaint prematurely instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear
the case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint. It is also well-
settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation, when so required
under the law, is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if
not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.

2. Yes. The fact that the “Bilihan ng Lupa” was a duly notarized document, it
enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the
facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution.
In addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where one’s signature
appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act.
Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners’ denials without clear and convincing
evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow
the above-mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the
truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.

Further, law and jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an
estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective
undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The sale is
valid, but only with respect to the share of the selling co-owner. In this case, the lot
already sold to Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because
the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during the
lifetime of their mother.

The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. the heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because
they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common
ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased
mother.
 In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa
Marcelino Casas
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918

Facts:

On April 17, 1917, Jose Riosa died. He left a will made in January, 1908 which
was duly executed in accordance with section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
law then in force. The will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and
subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other.

Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribe certain additional
formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916.
The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the
death of the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements.

Issue:

Whether or not the will executed by Riosa is valid

Ruling:

Yes. The validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in
force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no
retrospective effect.

Statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the necessary
formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made
and, when they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of their making.

It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said,
that "all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless
the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.
 Bugnao vs. Ubag
G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909

Facts:

Francisco Ubag, appellants, contend that the last will and testament of their
deceased brother, Domingo Ubag, is not in the manner and form prescribed in section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and alleged that when the will was executed,
Domingo was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally
incapable of making a will.

The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of
the will and swore that the testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind
and memory, and in their presence attached his signature thereto. Despite the
searching and exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel
for appellants could point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction
as to a single incident which occurred at or about the time when the will was executed
a contradiction.

Ubag, on the other hand contended that the fact that the alleged will leaves all
the property of the testator to his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for
his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence
because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and
unreasonable a will.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid

Ruling:

Yes. The evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the

execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the
deceased; that it was made in strict conformity with the requisites prescribed by law;
and that, at the time of its execution, the deceased was of sound mind and memory,
and executed the instrument of his own free will and accord.

Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the

transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.

It is true that the testimony of the witnesses disclose the fact that he was at
that time extremely ill, that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the
paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence
of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of
testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the
aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of
the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein,
taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will
clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his
property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
 Bagtas vs. Paguio
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912

Facts:

Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, died on September 28, 1909 and the will was
propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent.

Isidro Paguio contend that the will was not executed according to the
formalities and requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the testator
was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the
mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will. He alleged that the decedent
suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body, his hearing became impaired,
and that he lost the power of speech. He retained the use of his right hand, however,
and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate
his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.

On the other hand, testamentary witnesses testified that the decedent wrote
out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his property, and
these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put
them in form. The attorney read them to the decedent asking if they were his
testamentary dispositions and that the decedent assented each time with an
affirmative movement of his head. The decedent then, after looking over it, signed
the will in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed
it in the presence of the decedent and each other.

Issue

Whether or not the will is valid

Ruling:

Yes. The will is valid.

The presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and
the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary
capacity. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established
the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a
testamentary document of this character.

The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the
last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to
entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the
statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct
of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity
and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it
does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have
comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was engaged.
The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several
hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in
all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its
dispositions are those of a rational person.
 Comparative Study of the following cases:
Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc (1956)
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez (2005)
Santos vs. Lumbao (2007)

As to the facts involved:

In the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co. Inc. (Estate of Hemady),
the decedent was a solidary guarantor of indemnity agreements; In Union Bank of
the Philippines vs. Santibañez (Union Bank), the decedent obtained a loan and
executed a promissory note; and In Santos vs. Lumabo (Santos), the decedent
executed a Deed of Sale of the property subject to partition.

As to the person against whom the claims were made

In Hemady, the case was filed against the estate of the decedent; In Union
Bank and in Santos, the case was filed against the heirs of the decedent.

As to the issue raised

In Hemady, the issue is whether or not death of the decedent extinguished his
liability as guarantor; in Union Bank the issue is whether or not the heir may be
made personally accountable for the debts incurred by the decedent; and in Santos,
the issue is whether or not the heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
decedent.

As to the ruling of the Supreme Court

In Hemady, it has been ruled that the heirs, by virtue of the rights of
succession, are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased and cannot
be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a
party. The contracts of suretyship entered into by the decedent not being rendered
intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the
contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder
necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs.

In Union Bank, the heirs cannot be held personally accountable for any
liability incurred by her decedent. If the petitioner failed to file its money claim with
the probate court, at most, it may only go after the co-maker of the decedent.

In Santos, the lot already sold by the decedent can no longer be inherited by
the petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was
already sold during the lifetime of their mother. The heirs are bound by contracts
entered into by their decedent. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them
and their deceased mother.