ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.
HOUSE the said foreign country, he shall be
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents
 The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C.
Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen."
FACTS
1. Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of
the Phil., was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
Arpil 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.
2. On Nov. 5, 1985 (until October 1993), Cruz
enlisted in the US Marine Corps, without the
consent of the Republic of the Phils, he took an
oath of allegiance to the US. He lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No.
63, Section 1 (4) – a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship by, among others, “rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country, and taking of an oath
of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of
the Rep. of the Phils, shall not divest a Filipino of
the Phil. Citizenship if either of the ff
circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a
defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with
said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed
forces on Philippine territory with the consent of
the Republic of the Phils: Provided, that the
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, enjoyment of his civil
and political rights as a Filipino citizen finally ,
That any Filipino citizen who is rendering
service to, or is commissioned in, the armed
forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b), shall not be permitted to participate nor
vote in any election of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said
country. Upon his discharge from the service of
automatically entitled to the full
3. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss
of Philippine citizenship was by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990,
in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
4. On March 17, 1994, Cruz reacquired his loss of
Phil citizenship thru repatriation under Rep.
Act 2630 – ran and elected as the
Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections;
gathered 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio
Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.
5. Petitioner then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the House of Reps since
he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
6. On March 2, 2000, the HRET dismissed the
petition, for quo warranto, and declaring
respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative
of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections. Also, denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the decision in its
resolution on April 27, 2000.
7. Petitioner thus filed the present petition for
certiorari assailing the HRET’s decision on the
following grounds:
a. The HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled the PR is
a natural-bron citizen of the Phils despite the
fact that he had ceased being such in view of
the loss and renunciation of such citizenship
on his part.
b. …… despite the fact that he did not validly
acquire his Phil citizenship
c. ….. despite the fact that such reacquisition
could not legally and constitutionally
restore his natural-born status (assuming
the PR’s acquisition of Phil citizenship was
invalid)
Petitioner’s argument:
1. Respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a
natural-born Filipino since he lost his Phil
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the US in
1995 and had to reacquire the same by
repatriation.
2. He insisted that Article IV, section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens from birth w/o
to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
citizenship.
Respondent’s argument
1. Contends that he reacquired his status as a
natural-born citizen when he was repatriated
since the phrase “from birth” in Article IV,
Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristics of being a natural-born
citizen.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born
Filipino who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Phil.
Citizenship.
RULING
1. Petition is without merit.
2. Accdg. to the 1987 Constitution, the ff are the
considered Filipino citizens:
a. Those who are citizens of the Phils at the time
of the adoption of this constitution
b. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Phils
c. Those born before January 17, 1973 of the
Filipino mothers, who elect Phil citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority and
d. Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law
3. 2 ways of acquiring citizenship
a. By birth
b. By naturalization
2 kinds of citizens
a. Natural-born citizens- citizens of the Phils
from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his Phil citizenship
b. Naturalized citizens- those who have become
Filipino citizens thru naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act no. 473
(Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed
the former Naturalization Law Act No. 2927
and by Republic Act no. 530.
4. To be a naturalized, applicant must possess all
the qualifications. The decision granting Phil
citizenship becomes executory only after 2 years
from is promulgation when the court is satisfied
that during the intervening period, the applicant
has
a. Not left the Phils
b. Has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession
c. Has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules
or
d. Committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any government
announced policies.
5. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship
may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act NO. 63
enumerates the 3 modes of w/c Phil citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen:
naturalization, repatriation and direct act of
Congress
6. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition
and reacquisition of Phil citizenship. As a mode
of initially acquiring citizenship, naturalization
is governed by CA no 473. Naturalization as a
mode for reacquiring is govern by CA 63
Repatriation may had under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to:
a. Desertion of the armed forces
b. Service in the armed forces of the allied
forces in the WW 2
c. Service in the armed forces of the US at any
time
d. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien
e. Political and economic necessity
In Angara vs Republic, under RA no 965 and
2630, the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Rep of the Phils and registering said oath in the
LCR of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. Repatriation results in the
recovery of the original nationality.
7. In Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
when he rendered service in the AF of the US.
However he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under RA NO 2630, Section 1:
SECTION 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of
the United States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in
the place where he resides or last resided in the
 Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
8. Having taken the required oath of allegiance and
having registered the same in the LCR of
Magantarem, Pangasinan, then respondent Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as
a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
The act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his
Phil citizenship
Art 3, sec 4 of the 1973 Constitution
- A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of
the Phil from birth w/o having to perform any act
to reacquire or perfect his Phil citizenship
Under 1973 Consti
- 2 categories of Fil citizens – naturalized and those
born before Jan 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who
upon reaching the age of majority elected
citizenship.
- Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered
natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
were likewise not considered natural-born because
they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution
- now considers those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born.
9. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceedings in order
to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
10. A final point. The HRET has been empowered by
the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House. The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power and annul
the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgment for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of
the assailed decision. There is no such showing
of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner vs
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZAO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents
FACTS
1. Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vie mayor of the City of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections. The results of the
election were as follows: Manzano, 103,583;
Mercado, 100,894; Daza III, 54,275.
2. Proclamation of respondent was suspended in
view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a Certain Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Phils
but of the US
3. On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the
Comelec granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is
an American citizen based on the record of the
BOI and misrepresented himself as a natural-
born citizen.
4. On April 27, 1998, Manzano files an answer to
the petition admitting that he is registered as a
foreigner with the BOI under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino parents. He was born in the San
Francisco, California, US on Sept. 14, 1955, and
is considered an American under US laws. But he
did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
5. Under section 40 of the Local Government Code,
persons with the dual citizenship are disqualifies
from running for any elective position.
Therefore, the commission declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for Vice-Mayor of
Makati City.
6. On May 8, 1998, PR filed a motion for
reconsideration which was remained pending
even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044,
dated May 10, 1998, of the Comelec, the board of
canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice
mayor of Makati but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
7. On May 19, 1998, petitioner Mercado intervened
the case for disqualification and was opposed by
PR Manzano.
8. On August 31, 1998, the Comelec en banc
reversed the ruling of the 2nd Division, with
voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining,
and declared PR Manzano qualified to run for
vice mayor of Makati in the May 1, 1998
elections. Considering that Manzano was also a
natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the
1935 Philippine Constitution, as his parents were
Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of 6,
his parents brought him to the Phils using an
American passport and registered him as an
alien. However, this did not result in the loss of
his Phil citizenship. When Manzano attained the
age of majority, he registered himself as a voter
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, which effectively renounced his citizenship
under American Law. Therefore, Comelec
proclaim the respondent Manzano as the
winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
9. On the evening of Aug. 31, 1998, the board of
canvassers proclaimed Manzano as vice-mayor
of Makati.
Petitioner’s arhument
Mercado, seeking to set aside the resolution and
declaration of Manzanoas vice-mayor, contends that
the Comelec en banc erred n holding that
a. Under Phil law, Manzano was no longer a US
citizen when he renounced his US citizenship
when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 y.o. ; and he renounced his US
citizenship when he registered himself as
avoter and voted in the elections of 1992,
1995 and 1998.
b. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold
the elective office of vice-mayor
c. During the May 11, 1998 elections, the
resolution of the 2nd Division adopted on
May 7, 1998 was not yet final so petitioner
may not be declared winner even assuming
that Manzano is disqualified to hold office
Private respondent’s argument
1. Claims that petitioner has no righto
intervene and therefore cannot bring this
suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion
for intervention cites Sec 1 and 3 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Comelec
2. Argues that petitioner has neither legal
interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a “defeated
candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of
Makati City who cannot be proclaimed as the
Vice-mayor of Makati even if Manzazno be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment”
ISSUE
1. Whether petitioner Mercado has
personality to bring the suit considering
that he was not an original party in the
case for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mamaril nor was petitioner’s motion for
leave to intervene granted.
2. Whether under our laws, Manzano is
disqualified from the position for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he
eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected?
RULING
1. For the first issue, at the time petitioner sought
to intervene in the proceedings before the
Comelec, there had already been a proclamation
of the results of the election wherein petitioner
came out only second to the private respondent.
However, the fact is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner
had and still has an interest in ousting PR from
the race at the time he sought to intervene.
According to Sec. 6 of RA No 6646, Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
2. The failure of the Comelec en banc to resolve the
petitioner’s motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, hudtifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari.
3. For the second issue, the disqualification of
private respondent Manzano is being sought
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code
 of 1991 (RA NO 7160 which disqualifies the
candidacy of a person who has a dual citizenship
(this provision is incorporated in the Charter of
Makati City).
4. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For
instance such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states
Article 4 of the Consti, it is possible for the ff
classes of citizens of the Phils to possess dual
citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers' country such children are citizens of that
country;
(3) those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latter's country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
Dual allegiance on the other hand refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individual’s volition. Sec 5 of Art 4
provides : dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law
5. Clearly, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain
allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Finally, much is made of the
fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation and that he
holds an American passport which he used in his
last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997.
There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his
certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he
had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him
can be considered simply as the assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of
his American citizenship.
6. Private respondent's oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that
he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship. His declarations will be
taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings.
7. The petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of
merit.
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioners, vs ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE ONG, JR,
respondents. GR NOS. 92191-92. JULY 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, petitioner, JR vs
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE ONG, JR,
repondents. GR Nos. 92202-03. JULY 30, 1991
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices
for respondent Ong, Jr.
FACTS
1. The petitioners come to this Court asking for
the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET)
2. HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong Jr.
is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laong, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
3. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election
for the 2nd District of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong Jr.
4. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar.
5. The petitioners filed election protests against
the PR premised on the ff grounds:
a. Jose Ong Jr., is not a natural born citizen of
the Phils
b. Ong is not a resident of the 2nd district of
Northern Samar
6. On November 6, 1989, HRET found for the
private respondent.
7. On Nov. 12, 1989, petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration and was denied by the HRET in
its resolution dated on Feb. 22, 1989.
ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making
that determination, the HRET acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
RULING
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
1. The Constitution explicitly provides that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17,
Constitution). The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete.
2. In the case of Lazatin vs HRET, it stated that
under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive. The use
of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
3. In the case of Robles vs HRET (181 SCRA
780, 1990), the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its
power as constitutes a denial of due process of law,
or upon a demonstration of a very clearunmitigated
ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a
remedy for such abuse.”
4. In the leading case of Morrero vs Bocar (66
Phil. 429, 1938), the Court ruled that the power of
the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial
interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
power as will constitute a denial of due process." The
Court does not venture into the perilous area of
trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government. It comes in only when
it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct
an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less
than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
5. Art. 8, Section 1, Constitution, the SC has
been expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review
the decisions of the other branches and agencies of
the government to determine whether or not they
have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. In
the absence of a showing that the HRET has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court
to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a
matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to
decide.
6. The Electoral Tribunals, although not powers
in the
7. tripartite scheme of the government, are, in
the exercise of their functions independent organs —
independent of Congress and the Supreme Court.
The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]).
8. In the case at bar, the Court finds no
improvement use of power, no denial of due process
on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the
exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
1. The records show that in the year 1895, the
PR’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Phils from
China. Ong te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hardwork.
2. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to
obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration. The father of the
PR, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He
was brought by Ong Te to Samare in the year 1915.
3. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the
province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his
neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the
community. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the
rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose
Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipina, Agripina
Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married
in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The
couple bore eight children, one of whom is the
private respondent who was born in 1948. The
private respondent's father never emigrated from
this country. He decided to put up a hardware store
and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in
Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became
inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the
private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in
an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life
and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar of application for naturalization on February
15, 1954.
4. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after
trial, declared Josoe Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
5. On May 15, 1957, the CFI of Samar issued an
order declaring the decision of April 28, 1995 as final
and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already
take his Oath of Allegiance. Jose Ong Chuan took his
Oath of Allegiance, then a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
6. At the time when Jose Ong Chuan took his
oath, PR then a minor of 9 years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him
from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned. Their
house got burn for 2 times but they constructed
again their house in the same place. PR went to
Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
The respondent continued to stay in Manila in order
to work in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
examiner. Later, he worked in the hardwate business
of his family in Manila. Om 1971, his elder brother,
Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 ConCon.
His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
7. The PR frequently went home to Laoang,
Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood
days. In 1984, he married a Filipina named Desiree
Lim. For the 1984 and 1986 elections, Jose Ong JR.
registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
After several years, he ran for public office in 1987
elections as a representative in the 2nd district of
Northern Samar. PR gathered higher votes.
8. The provision in question was enacted to
correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born
citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under
earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino
fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were
both considered as natural-born citizens.
9. Hence, the bestowment of the status of
"natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the
fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of
citizens made up of essentially the same similarly
situated members. It is for this reason that the
amendments were enacted, that is, in order to
remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore,
treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
either before or after the effectivity of that
Constitution.
10. The Constitutional provision in question is,
therefore curative in nature. The enactment was
meant to correct the inequitable and absurd
situation which then prevailed, and thus, render
those acts valid which would have been nil at the
time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980]). There is no dispute
that the respondent's mother was a natural born
Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this
case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or choose to be a Filipino citizen.
11. To expect the respondent to have formally or
in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is
to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason
is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came
of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would
be amended to require him to have 􀁆led a sworn
statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been
an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who
had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
12. In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59
SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the present case, the PR
did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the Phils. The
respondent traces his natural born citizenship
through his mother, not through the citizenship of
his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant
only to determine whether or not the respondent
"chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that
time and up to the present, both mother and father
were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have
elected any other citizenship unless he first formally
renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a
foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with
a problem of election, there was no foreign
nationality of his father which he could possibly have
chosen.
13. There is another reason why we cannot
declare the HRET as having committed manifest
grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-
born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the
Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong,
full blood brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by both
bodies.
14. What was the basis for the Constitutional
Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born
citizen? Under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then
residing in said islands and their children born
subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a
Filipino citizen.
15. Was the grandfather of the private
respondent a Spanish subject? Article 17 of the Civil
Code of Spain enumerates those who were
considered Spanish Subjects, viz: "ARTICLE 17. The
following are Spaniards: 1. Persons born in Spanish
territory. 2. Children born of a Spanish father or
mother, even though they were born out of Spain. 3.
Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization
papers. 4. Those without such papers, who may have
acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy."
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his
habitual residence. This domicile, once established
is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC;
Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic,
83 Phil. 768 [1949]) As earlier stated, Ong Te
became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar
around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of
residence was then issued to him by virtue of his
being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September
7,1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established m 1895
continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond
the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place
were Ong Te setup his business and acquired his real
property. As concluded by the Constitutional
Convention Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-
paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he,
nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines.
The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits
in said country, was of no moment. This will not
change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed
in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of
Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
16. If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue
of having established his domicile in a town under
the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also
an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has
been de􀁆ned as one who has actual fixed residence
in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. A priori,
there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe
that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in
concluding that the private respondent was a
natural-born Filipino. The petitioners' sole ground
in disputing this fact is that the documents
presented to prove it were not in compliance with the
best evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the
private respondent failed to present the original of
the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and
of the transcript of the proceedings of the body
which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated.
17. On the contrary, the documents presented by
the private respondent fall under the exceptions to
the best evidence rule. It was established in the
proceedings before the HRET that the originals of
the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the
plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention
held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found. This
was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty
Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief
Librarian of the U.P. Law Center, in their respective
testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that
there is no governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.
18. The Constitutional Convention was the sole
judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a
member of that body. The HRET, by explicit
mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the
qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of
Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the
controversies over which they were sole judges.
Decisions were arrived at only after a full
presentation of all relevant factors which the parties
wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree
with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts
as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We
have to keep clear the line between error and grave
abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
1. The petitioners question the residence
qualification of respondent Ong. The petitioners lose
sight of the meaning of "residence" under the
Constitution. The term "residence" has been
understood a synonymous with domicile not only
under the previous Constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution.
2. The domicile of origin of the private
respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is
fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners'
imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the
present.
3. Even assuming that the private respondent
does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme
Court in the case of De los Reyes D. Solidum (61 Phil.
893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his
residence and domicile. It is enough that he should
live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that
of a friend or relative. To require the private
respondent to own property in order to be eligible to
run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and
residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by
the Constitution that the candidate should also own
property in order to be quali􀁆ed to run. (see
Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965]). It has also
been settled that absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence.
4. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the house
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED.
Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar.
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO
and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants, vs
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,
respondent-appellee.
FACTS
1. In the instant case, petitioners seek the
issuance of a writ of injunction against the
Commissioner of Immigration, 'restraining the
latter and/or his authorized representative from
ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the
Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation
and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to
do so.
2. On Feb 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for
a passport visa to enter the Phils as a non-
immigrant. She stated in the interrogation that she
was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and
that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Phils to
visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ping for a period of
1 month which would expire on April 13, 1961.
3. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng
filed a bond in the amount of P1,000 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yueng would
actually depart from the Phils on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or w/in the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow.
4. Petitioner Lau Yeung was allowed to stay in
the Phils after repeated extensions up to Feb 13,
1962.
5. On Jan 25, 1962, she contracted marriage
with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her
bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not
write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor,
with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-
law.'
6. The Court is of the considered opinion, and
so holds, that the instant petition for injunction
cannot be sustained for the same reasons set forth in
the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the
pertinent portions of which read: 'First, Section 15 of
the Revised Naturalization Law provides: "'Effect of
the naturalization on wife and children. — any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines." Indeed, plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung,
Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully
naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being
disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a
Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January
25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias
EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
7. Petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming
not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege
that she possesses all the qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been
admitted as a temporary visitor only on March 13,
1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the
requisite length of residence in the Philippines. Lau
Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor,
whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after
repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last
February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff
only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one
month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident
that said marriage was effected merely for
convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending
compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This
cannot be permitted. The Solicitor General has well
stated: "That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having
been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only for a
period of one month and thereby secured a visa,
cannot go back on her representation to stay
permanently without first departing from the
Philippines as she had promised.
ISSUE
Whether an alien female who marries a male citizen
of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political
status
RULING
1. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473,
an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to
undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15
is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the
widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino,
who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to
be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege. This is plain common
sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
2. As the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such
procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine
citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship
settled and established so that she may not have to
be called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter into a transaction or business
or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but
such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as
of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition
of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that
the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case.
3. But with the approval of Revised
Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on
June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or
racial consideration from the qualifications of
applicants for naturalization (according to its
proponent, the purpose in eliminating this
consideration was, first, to remove the features of the
existing naturalization act which discriminated in
favor of the Caucasian} and against Asiatics who are
our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity
and, second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco,
Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained
in Section 15 the phrase in question.
4. In order for an alien woman marrying a
Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is
not enough that she possesses the qualifications
prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over
and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole
process of judicial naturalization, apparently from
declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can
become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a
Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her
nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband;
she remains to be the national of the country to
which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and
if she desires to be of one nationality with her
husband, she has to wait for the same time that any
other applicant for naturalization needs to complete,
the required period of ten year residence, gain the
knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the
principal local languages, make her children study in
Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in
some lawful occupation of her own independently of
her husband, file her declaration of intention and
after one year her application for naturalization,
with the a􀁆davits of two credible witnesses of her
good moral character and other qualifications, etc.,
etc., until a decision is rendered in her favor, after
which, she has to undergo the two years of
probation, and only then, but not before she takes
her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered
and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly;
she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial
declaration.
5. Whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al
as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON.
ROSALIO G. DELA ROSA GR NO 104654.
JUNE 6, 1994
RAUL LEE VS COMELEC AND JUAN G.
FRIVALDO GR NO 105715. JUNE 6, 1994
RAUL LEE VS COMELEC AND JUAN
FRIVALDO GR NO 105735. JUNE 6, 1994
The Solicitor General for petitioner in GR No 14654
Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent
- A petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court in relation to RA No 5440
and Section 25 of the Interim Rules
I.
GR NO 104654
1. On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a
petition for naturalization captioned” In the
Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-
admitted as a Citizen of the Philippinesunder
Commonwealth Act No. 63”
2. On October 7, 1991, in an order, respondent
Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16,
1992, and directed the publication of the said
order and petition in the OG and a newspaper of
general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the
last publication of which should be at least 6
months before the said date of hearing. It also
required the posting of a copy thereof and the
petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Manila.
3. On Jan. 14, 1992, PR filed a “Motion to Set
Hearing Ahead of Schedule”, where he
manifested his intention to run for public office
in the May 1992 elections. And alleged that the
deadline for filing of certificate of candidacy was
March 15, 1992, one day before the hearing and
asked to reset the March 16 hearing on Jan 24.
4. The motion was granted in an order dated Jan
24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was
moved to February 21, 1992. That said order was
not published nor a copy thereof posted.
5. On Feb 21, the hearing proceeded with the PR as
the sole witness. He submitted the following
documentary evidence;
a. Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated
Oct 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of the
Philippine Star
b. Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office
c. Notice of Hearing of Petition
d. Photocopy of a Citation issued by the
National Press Club with PR’s picture
e. Certificate of Appreciation issued by the
Rotary Club of Davao
f. Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued
by the Republican College, QC
g. Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued
by the Davao-Bicol Association
h. Certification issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office that the
record of birth of private respondent was not
on file
i. Certificate of Naturalization issued by the
United States District Court
6. On Feb 27, respondent Judge rendered the
assailed decision – granting the petition of JUAN
G. FRIVALO and was re-admitted as a citizen of
the Rep of the Phils by naturalization and vesting
upon him the rights and privileges of a natural
born Filipino citizen.
7. On the same day, PR was allowed to take his oath
of allegiance before the respondent Judge
8. On March 16, a “Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and to Admit Motion for
 Reconsideration” was filed by Quiterio H.
Hermo alleging that the procedings were tainted
with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new
trial to conform with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law.
9. On March 19, 1992, the SolGen interposed a
timely appeal directly with the SC
GR NO 105715
1. Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the
position of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private
respondent was the official candidate of the
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats
(Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
2. Private respondent was proclaimed winner on
May 22, 1992.
3. On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the
Comelec to annul the proclamation of PR as
Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on
the grounds that:
a. That the proceedings and composition of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in
accordance with law
b. That private respondent is an alien, whose
grant of Philippine citizenship is being
questioned by the state in GR No. 104654
c. That private respondent is not a duly
registered voter.
4. Petitioner further played that the votes cast in
favor of PR be considered as stray votes and that
he, on the basis of the remaining valid vote. Be
proclaimed winner.
5. On June 10, the Comelec issued the questioned
en banc resolution which dismissed the petition
for having been filed out of time, citing Section
19 of RA No 7166 which provides that the period
to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on
question affecting its composition or
proceedings was 3 days.
6. Petitioners argues that the Comelec acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the
fundamental issue of the PR’s disqualification in
the guise of technicality. He further claims that
the inclusion of PR’s name in the list of
registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon
was invalid because at the time he registered as a
voter in 1987, he was still an American citizen
and the grant of Filipino citizenship to PR is not
yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal
before us.
7. Petitioner prays for
a. The annulment of PR’s proclamation as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon
b. The deletion of Private respondent’s name
from the list of candidates for the position of
governor
c. The proclamation of the governor-elect
based on the remaining votes, after the
exclusion of the votes for PR
d. The issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin PR from taking his oath and
assuming office
e. The issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel the Comelec to resolve the pending
disqualification case docketed as SPA Case
No. 92-016, against PR
GR NO. 105375
1. This a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section
5(2) of the Art 8 of the Constitution, with prayer
for temporary restraining order (parties herein
are identical with the parties in GR NO 105715
2. Petitioner for cancellation alleged that
a. The PR is an American citizen and therefore
ineligible to run as candidate for the position
of governor of the Province of Sorsogon
b. That the trial court’s decision re-admitting
PR as a Filipino citizen was fraught with
legal infirmities rendering it null and void
c. That assuming the decision to be valid, PR’s
oath of allegiance, w/c was taken on the
same day the questioned decision was
promulgated, violated RA NO 530, which
provides for a 2-yeat waiting period before
the oath of allegiance can be taken by the
applicant
d. That the hearing of the petition on Feb 27,
1992, was held less than 4 months from the
date of the last publication of the order and
petition
3. PR denied the allegations therein and averred
and averred:
a. That Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a
candidate for the same office for w/c PR was
aspiring, had no standing to file the petition
b. That the decision re-admitting him to Phil
citizenship was presumed to be valid
c. That no case had been filed to exclude his
name as a registered voter
4. Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for
cancellation of Pr’s certificate of candidacy
5. On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the
Comelec to decide the petition for cancellation,
citing Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which provides that all petitions on matters
involving the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy must be decided “not later than 15
days before election”
6. The Comelec contends that the preparation for
the elections occupied much of its time, thus its
failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No 92-
0166. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure, it is excused
from deciding a disqualification case within the
period provided by law for reasons beyond its
control and it also assumed that the same action
was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when
he filed before it a petition for quo warranto.
II
GR NO 104564
PR’s citizenship
1. PR alleges that the precarious political
atmosphere in the country during the Martial
Law compelled him to seek political asylum in
the US and eventually to renounce his Phil
citizenship.
2. He claims that his petition for naturalization was
his only available remedy for his reacquisition of
the Phil citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Phil
citizenship thru repatriation and direct act of
Congress but was later informed that
repatriation proceedings were limited to army
deserters or Filipino women who had lost their
citizenship by reason of their marriage to
foreigners and his request to Congress failed to
materialize. He also claims that the re-
scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an
earlier date w/o publication, was made without
the objection from the OSG.
3. Accdg to the PR, there was substantial
compliance with the law and that the public was
well-informed of his petition for naturalization
due to the publicity given by the media.
4. Private respondent theorizes that the rationale of
the law imposing the waiting period is to grant
the public an opportunity to investigate the
background of the applicant and to oppose the
grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to
do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that
such requirement may be dispensed with,
claiming that his life, both private and public,
was well-known. Private respondent cites his
achievements as a freedom fighter and a former
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six
terms.
5. The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious.
The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No.
91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering
the decision an anomaly.
6. PR, to reacquire Phil citizenship, is duty bound
to follow the procedure prescribed by the law on
Revised Naturalization Law. It is not for an
applicant to decide for himself and to select the
requirements w/c he believes are inconvenient
or merely of nuisance value. The law does not
distinguish between an applicant who was
formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was
never such a citizen.
7. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to
hear the petition for naturalization of private
respondent. The proceedings conducted, the
decision rendered and the oath of allegiance
taken therein, are null and void for failure to
comply with the publication and posting
requirements under the Revised Naturalization
Law.
Under Sec 9 of said law, both the petition for
naturalization and the order setting it for hearing
must be published once a week for 3 consecutive
weeks in the OG and a newspaper of general
circulation. Compliance therewith is
jurisdictional.
8. The petition for naturalization lacks several
allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1)
that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2)
that he resided continuously in the Philippines
for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak
and write English and any one of the principal
dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in
the Philippines from the date of the 􀁆ling of the
petition until his admission to Philippine
citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration
of intention or if he is excused from said filing,
the justification therefor. Likewise the petition is
not supported by the affidavit of at least 2
credible persons who vouched for the good moral
of private respondent as required by Sec 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law and also the PR
failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival
to the petition.
9. Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no
decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two
 years from its promulgation in order to be able The petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No.
to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R.
country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is
continously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and
the applicant has not been convicted of any therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve
offense or violation of government promulgated as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is
rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER
act prejudicial to the interest of the country or the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of
contrary to government announced policies. Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
GR NO 105715
1. We have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715
after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead
of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails
the en banc resolution of the COMELEC,
dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn
is a petition to annul private respondent's
proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the
proceedings and composition of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with
law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose
grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned
by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that
private respondent is not a duly registered voter.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the
grounds that it was filed outside the three-day
period for questioning the proceedings and
composition of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
2. Petitioner's argument, that to unseat him will
frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable.
Both the Local Government Code and the
Constitution require that only Filipino citizens
can run and be elected to public office. We can
only surmise that the electorate, at the time they
voted for private respondent, was of the
mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired
Filipino citizenship.
3. Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the
votes cast in favor of private respondent be
considered stray and that he, being the candidate
obtaining the second highest number of votes, be
declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC , 176
SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the
candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold
the office to which he was elected, the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of
votes is not entitled to be declared winner.

GR NO 105735