Carrefour, S.A.

In mid-1972 the top management of Carrefour, S. A. faced several important policy

decisions . They concerned the speed and direction of future growth and how that
growth ought to be financed .

Company Background
Carrefour began operations with a single 650-sq m supermarket in Annecy, France,
in the summer of 1960. This store tested the response of retail-food customers to
the idea of one-stop, 1 self-service shopping with discount prices. The store proved
to be popular; after considerable study, the firm's founders decided to test their
retailing formula with additional products such as clothing, sporting equipment,
auto accessories, and consumer electronics. In 1963, Carrefour thus opened the
first hypermarket2 in France at a location just outside of Paris. The store covered
2,500 sq m, sold both food and nonfood products at discount prices, and provided
parking for 450 cars.

Copyright © 1973 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

Harvard Business School case 273- 099.
I. In France, as in most of Europe, retail distribution in 1960 was a highly fragmented activity.
Small shopkeepers accounted for almost all sales of both food and nonfood products, and product
lines in individual stores were very narrow. Food shopping was essentially a daily activity, and visits
to four entirely separate shops were required in order to purchase baked goods, dairy products, meat
products, and vegetables.
2 _ A hypennarket was defined as a store with a selling area of 2,500 sq m or more. (One square
meter equals approximately JO sq ft .)

111
112 .•hmaging Sh t
or,. tr," Assets and Liabilitits

and ~c Carrefour hypermarket was accepted enthusiastically by French consu

e c?mpany began to grow rapidly. Between 1965 and 197 l corporate mcrs,
grew_ ~ptdly (Exhibit l ), keeping pace with a sales growth i~ excess 0
(Exh1b1t 2). Nonfood items accounted for about 40% of total volume. %
t~~ts
. As the company's revenues increased, so did the size of its stores. Stanin
m 1970 new stores, called commercial centers, were opened with selling areas a!
large as 25,000 sq m.
By the end of 1971, Carrefour had built and was operating 16 wholly owned
stores; had an equity interest in 5 stores operated as joint ventures; and had franchise
agreements with 7 additional stores. Plans were under way to open 15 new stores
under one of these three operating arrangements in 1972 (Exhibit 3).
Carrefour's strategy was to build its stores outside of towns in locations where
highways provided easy access and land could be acquired very inexpensively.3
The company favored inexpensive construction in combination with low-cost land,
which gave Carrefour a total investment per square meter of selling space in a
fully equipped store equal to about one third that of traditional supermarkets and
department stores.
Carrefour also followed a strategy of decentralized management. Each store
manager was a profit center with almost complete freedom in decision making.
One Carrefour store manager (paid F 12,000 per month versus F 2,500 two years
earlier when he was a store manager in a smaller competing supermarket chain)
made the following comments:
My previous job was demoralizing. It took a month to get authorization to buy something
for the store which cost 14 francs . Now I am free to make all of my own decisions.
I can hire ten people, buy a new refrigeration unit, or hire a band for a parking lot
festival. 4

Factors Favoring Growth

The high degree of consumer acceptance which _fueled C~four's gro:,vth at 50%
per year stemmed in large measure from factors hke convemence and pnce. Almost
roduct purchased more than once a year could be bought at a Carrefour
any PTh pany even operated discount gasoline outlets at many stores. Indeed,
store. e com r · · F
Carrefour operated five of the ten largest-volume ga;o me ~tat;ns ~n ~ance. h
While convenience was undoubtedly a strong .actor 1~ arre our s growt ,
• G · on food and nonfood items differed somewhat, but
so was pnce · ross margms ge gross margin of about 1501. -10
(Exh'b'
1 1t 2) . The
Carrefour operated on ~ a~~rati n the prices) of retailers in traditional outlets
gross margins (and, by imp ica o • fi '
averaged 5 to 10 percentage points more than Carre ours.

t available for purchase within a market area.

I plots of land were no
3 . In a few situations where arge
Carrefour leased land•
4. Les Informations, January 11 , 1971. p. 25.
 Carrefour, S.A . 113

Obstacles to Growth
Convenience and price favored the growth of discount retail stores in France.
Nonetheless, these finns suffered from obstacles not met by most rapidly growing
businesses . First, for many years the nation 's distribution system had lagged behind
mos~ other sectors of the economy in adopting modem techniques. When an eco-
nomic rationalization of this sector started to occur, its results were especially
severe for many small shopkeepers. As shown in Table A, 40% or almost 80,000
of the 203,600 small retail shops in operation in 1961 had disappeared by 1971.
These small shopkeepers represented a significant political force in France, and
their problems could not be easily ignored. 5
One way of addressing the problem of the small merchant was to slow down
the growth of hypennarkets; another was to ease the financial burden . of those
merchants forced out of business. Each of these solutions was used to some extent
to reduce the size of the problem caused by the growth of hypermarkets in France .
In an effort to slow the growth of hypermarkets, national and local governments
in almost every country in Europe made it difficult to obtain construction permits
to build large new retail stores .6 Local merchants would generally lobby vigorously
against the issuance of new construction permits in their market areas . This prompted
some discount retailers to offer plans for large commercial centers in which space
could be leased to as many as 40 independent shopkeepers. This type of plan
allowed small merchants to set up specialty stores and boutiques, and usually
generated some measure of local merchant support for the issuance of permits .
While specialty stores in commercial centers eliminated financial hardships
for a few small merchants, this idea hardly represented a complete solution . In
an attempt to attack the problem more broadly , the French National Assembly

TABLE A
Number of Retail Stores in Operation, 1961-1971

1961 1967 1969 1971

Grocery and dairy stores
(selling area less than 400 sq m) 149,100 111 ,900 96,480 85,090
Chain stores and cooperatives
(selling area less than 400 sq m) 35,000 31 ,980 29,295 26,050
Drug stores 19,500 14,280 14,280 13,710
Totals . . . . . . . . 203,600 158,160 140,055 124,850

Source: Points de Vente, March 1972, p. 125.

5 . Groups of shopkeepers often staged protest demonstrations at public appearances of high government
officials and at new hypermarkets . In May 1970, Carrefour' s largest store was totally destroyed b
fire which did not appear to be accidental. Ya
6. Permits were usually issued for a store of a specific size to be built in a specific loc f 1:
. d' 'd I O . . d . a ion ,or a
specific firm or 10 1v1 ua . nee a permit was issue , 1t could not be sold , but the build' .
once constructed , could be sold to another firm or individual. mg itself,
114 Managing Short-Term Assets and Liabilities

passed legislation in mid-1972 to tax retail stores in order to provide pensions

for small shopkeepers who were unable to continue in business . The tax was to
be paid by all retail merchants; the heaviest burden was to be borne by operators
of large stores built after 1962. For Carrefour, the tax (based on 1971 operations)
would have amounted to roughly F 3 million. 7

Joint Ventures and Franchises

The ability to get construction permits had a major impact on corporate growth
potential for a retail discount chain. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Carrefour's rapid growth was made possible by the fact that the firm had been
able to get two new construction permits each year. As more firms entered the
discount retail field, however, the competition for permits became more difficult
as many firms and individuals vied for authorization to build in attractive locations.
In the late 1960s, to achieve a more rapid pace of expansion than the firm could
achieve if it were limited to two new stores per year, Carrefour offered to share
its retailing know-how, trademark, and consumer goodwill with potential partners
both in France and elsewhere in Europe. Carrefour offered its expertise in exchange
for either an ownership interest in stores under construction or franchise fees. In
joint ventures Carrefour purchased an ownership interest of 10-50% (Exhibit 3).
Under franchising, Carrefour received a fee of .2% of total store sales, and Carre-
four's central buying office for nonfood products (SAMOD) received a fee equal
to 1% of the store's sales of nonfood items.8
Between 1969 and 1971, Carrefour was quite successful in adding selling
area under the Carrefour name by means of joint ventures and franchises (Exhibit
4). Success in the area of joint ventures was evidenced by Carrefour's investments
and advances to affiliates, which had grown to almost F 19 million (Exhibit 1).
Joint venture stores that had been in operation long enough to permit evaluation
of their profitability (e.g., SOGARA) were as profitable as wholly owned Carrefour
stores (Exhibit 5).9 However, they seemed to take a little longer than wholly
owned stores to reach that position.

Competition
Carrefour's early success in discount retail distribution naturally attracted consider-
able competition. While Carrefour was by far the hypermarket leader in France
in terms of selling space, other firms were becoming important factors in the

7 . An equivalent volume of sales generated in small shops built prior to 1962 would have generated
a tax liability of about F 500,000.
8. SAMOD ·received a similar fee from the firm' s wholly owned stores as well for performing the
purchasing function on nonfood products. . .
9 . Carrefour did not consolidate the results of joint ventures and other affiliates for finafroncial d~~drtmdg
. I d d . E h"bit 2 for example arose m 1v1 en s
purposes. The only income from these ventures me u e m x 1 , '
as shown in Exhibit 5.
 Carrefour, S.A . 115

TABLE B
Leading French Hypennarket Chains, June 30, 1972

Number of Stores Total Selling Area

Owner Operated under of Stores
Trade Name Group Trade Name (000 sq m)

Carrefour Carrefour 28 250

Mammoth Paridoc 28 153
Escale8 Au Printemps 13 83 1
Radar Docks Remois 9 ~~
Rond-Point 8 27
Euromarche8 G.S.R.P. 7 132
Auchan 5 47
Record 5 23
Geant Casino Casino 4 36
Delta 4 24

Source: Enterprise, July 1972, p. 63; September 15, 1972, p. 78.

a. In mid-1972, Au Printemps and Euromarche concluded an agreement according to which all Au Printemps
stores would be operated under the Euromarche trade name. This consolidation was believed to represent
an effort by Au Printemps to compete more effectively in the future with Carrefour.

business (see Table B). By 1970 the combined building activity of all hypermarket
operators was adding about 250,000 sq m per year of new selling space (Exhibit
6) . Some industry analysts 10 suggested that consumer needs for stores of this size
in France would be satisfied when total hypermarket selling area reached 2 .2
million sq m. About one half this amount was in place by June 30, 1972.
Outside of France, Carrefour' s management saw a need for hypermarkets as
great as the need in France . However, existing large retailers outside of France
appeared to be somewhat stronger financially than the competition that Carrefour
had faced in France (Exhibit 7).

10. Enterprise, September 15, 1972, p. 75.

 r
116 Managing Short-Term Assets and l iabilities

< EXHIBIT I
. . f F ench francs)
Carrefour, S.A . Balance Sheet Data, 1965-1971 (rrulhons o r
---
--
1969
)' 1966
1965
1967 1968
F 4
1970
F
1971
1 F 1
1. Intangible assets
8 F 14 20 25
2. Land F 5 F 8 F 28
3. Buildings and 50 82 136
11 22 26 202
equipment 21 38 52
14
4. Other fixed assets 6 9
---"as 140 213 ~
39 48 279

'
5. Total fixed assets 22 10 22 35
12
6. Less: Depreciation 5 8
~ ~
7. Net fixed assets 17 31 °36 118 178 216
►· 8. Investments and
4 5 10 12
advances to affiliates 2 3 19
17 30 65 72 107
9. Inventory 6 14
1 2 2 3 4
10. Accounts receivable 50 75
9 19 58 124
11 . Other current assets 1 51
18 116
12. Cash 9 5 8 ~
~
28 45 108 168 266 386
13. Current assets 16
~
14. Total assets F 35 F 62 F 85 F 188 F300
--
F457
-- F622
. .. -- -- --
15. Shareholders' equity F 11 F 14 F 17 F 39 F 89 F 98 F 112
16. Special provisions 1 1
17. Long-term debt 3 9 14 26 25 64 64
18. Accounts payable 48 61 77
19. Trade notes (non-
39 100 79 147 244
. interest bearing)
20. Other current
liabilities
16

5 6
33

15 23 59 86
-124
-
21. Current liabilities 21 39 54 123 186 294 445
,, 22. Total liabilities F 35 F 62 F 85
--
F 188
--
F300 F457 F622
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
23. Current ratio .76 .72 .83 .88 .90 .90 .87
24. Total debt/share-
holders' equity 2.2 3.4 4.0 3.8 2.4 3.7 4.6
,, 25. Net working capital
(millions of francs) (5) (11) (9) (15) (18) (28) (59)
26. Number of shares
' outstanding (000s) 8 347 347 347 462 588 588 588

a. Over the course of its growth, Carrefour sold equity for the company's own account to groups outside the families of the foun~ers
on only two occasions. In early 1968 the firm sold approximately 75,000 shares at F 145 per share to 40 employees at all levels in
the firm (including store floorwalkers) . In late 1969, the firm sold privately approximately 120,000 shares at F 342 per share. About
50,000 of these shares were sold to the Banque Pour L'expansion lndustrielle, which later offered them to the public (along with
about 70,000 shares supplied by the founders), when Carrefour's stock was first introduced for trading on the Paris Bourse in J~ne
1970. At 12/31/71 the company had granted employee stock options covering 4,880 shares to 244 employees. All case data adJUSted
for stock splits and stock dividends.
 - - -- - - --

Carrefour, S.A . 117

EXHIBIT 2
Carrefour, S.A. Income Statement oata, 1965-1971 ( ·ir
- m1 ions of French francs except per share data)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
1. Revenues (all
taxes included)
F 156 F220
2. Less: Value F339 F524 F 1,025 F 1,445 F2,234
added tax
3. Revenues (net of
value added tax)
- 153
3
- 5 7 11 147 195 298

215 332 513 878 1,250 1,936

4. Starting inventory
6 6 14 17
5. Plus: Purchases 34 65 72
133 194 291 454 782 1,670
6. Less: Ending 1,063
inventory
7. Cost of goods sold
8. Gross margin
- 6
133 186
14 17
288
30
441
65
751
72
1,056
107
1,635
20 29 44 72 127 194 301
9. Salaries
8 11 16 26 56 82 119
10. Depreciation and
amortization
2 5 4 8 15 19 32
11 . Other expenses 3 7 11 17 26 41 61
12. Operating profit 7 6
--
13 21 30 52
13. Nonoperating 89
gains (losses) (1) 0 1 4 (5)
14. Investment
provision
(4) (7) (10)
15. Profit before tax 6 6 14 22 30 40 80
16. Income tax 3 3 7 12 14 17 36
17. Profit after tax F 3 F 3 F 7 F 10 F 16 F 23 F 44

Allocation of Profit after Tax

18. To: Shareholders' equity (}-/ S) F 3 F 2 F 5 F 3 F 3 F 3 F 4
19. To: Employee profit
sharing 8 4 7 10 20
20. To: Dividends 1 2 3 6 10 20
•
Selected Financial Statistics
21 . Gross profit margin 13.1% 13.5% 13.3% 14.0% 14.4% 15.5% 15.5%
22. Profit/sales (net
of VAD 2.0% 1.4% 2.1% 2.0% 1.8% 1.8% 2.3%
23. Profit/equity 27.0% 22.0% 43.0% 26.0% 18.0% 23.0% 39.0%
24. Earnings per
share (francs) 8.6 8.6 20 22 27 39 75
25. Dividends per
share (francs) 2 4 7 11 18 34
26. Book value per
share (francs) 33 40 48 84 151 168 191
27. Market value per
share (francs) . . 1,040 1,980
28. Price-earnings ratio 27 27
29. Dividend yield . . 1.7% 1.7%
30. Dividend payout ratio 0% 33.0% 29.0% 30.0% 38.0% 43.0% 45.0%

a. According to French law, large firms must share_with employees a portion of P:ofils after tax in exc~ss _of 5% of net worth. The
~m_ount shared is earned by employees in 1 year (hne 19), ~eco~es a t~-deduct,ble expen_ s e to t_he f,rm ,_n the second year (included
!" hne 9), and becomes the basis for a duplicate tax deduction (line 14) in the second year 1f the firm continues to make fixed asset
investments equal to the charge. This legislation makes it_possi~le for a firm to share profits with _employees, yet incur no real after-
tax cost (except for a potential one-year lag between profit-sharing payments and tax recovery) since the burden falls entirely on the
government via a reduction in corporate income taxes.
 'Ci
EXHIBIT 3

----
Carrefour New Store Opening Data, 1960-1972
Carrefour
ownership Selling
Interest Opening Surface Pa11c1ng
Aff/1/ate
Country and City Name (%) Date (000 sq m)
~
---!__
Wholly Owned Stores
100 6160 .7
France: Annecy .1
100 5/63 .8
Annecy 6/63 .1
100 5.5
Paris (region) 3/64 2.5 1.0
100
Lyon ... 5/65 1.0 .2
100
Chalon-sur-SaOne 10/66 11.5
.2
100 2.0
Lyon 10/67 5.5
100 .7
Chartres 4/68 4.3
Annecy 100 .7
100 9/68 9.0
Dijon 1.5
100 10/68 9.1 2.4
Paris (region) 5/69 4.6
Chambery 100 .8
100 8/69 7.1 1.5
Grenoble 7.6
100 3/70 1.8
Paris (region)
100 9/70 21.3 4.0
Marseille
100 4/71 14.0 1.5
Orleans
100 6/71 15.0 3.6
Melun
100 10/72 11.3 3.0
Meaux
100 11/72 6.0 1.9
Lyon
136.8 27.0

Joint Venture Stores

SOGARA 49.9 3/67 3.2 .9
France: Bayonne
SOGARA 49.9 10/69 16.2 1.8
Bordeaux
Toulouse SOGARA 49.9 3/72 25.0 4.0
SOGRAMO na 6/72 7.5 1.0
LeMans
SOGRAMO na 6/72 8.2 1.1
Angers
SOGRAMO na 11/72 13.8 1.4
Nantes
Ardennais 14.6 3/70 7.7 1.2
Charleville
Ditrimas 49.9 11/69 7.6 1.0
Belgium : Mons
Ditrimas 49.9 9/72 17.3 2.0
Liege
Switzerland: Lausanne Hypermarche
e S.A. 30 4/70 6.3 1.0
Berne Hypermarche
S.A. 30 3/72 9.2 1.1
U.K. : Cardiff Hypermarket
Ltd. 10 9/72 5.5
127.5
- 1.0
17.5
Franchise Stores
Bouriez 1.3
France: Paris (region) 0 9/69 7.5
Bouriez 1.5
Strasbourg 0 11/70 12.7
1.3
Lille Bouriez 0 5/71 9.4
1.5
Nancy Bouriez 0 10/71 8.7
1.2
Bethune Bouriez 0 5/72 8.4
2.0
Lens Bouriez 0 9/72 8.2 1.0
Colmar Bouriez 0 12/72 6.6 3.0
Caen Promodes 0 2/70 9.4 .9
Alen~on Promodes 0 8/72 3.8 1.6
Paris (region) Promodes 0 11/72 8.7 1.4
Valenciennes Promodes 0 10/72 8.6 1.1
Bourges Dock de Nevers 0 7.5
Nevers Dock de Nevers 0
3/69
10/69 7.1
106.6
---
1.2
19.0

na = not available.

~
 Carrefour , S.A . 119

EXHIBIT 4
Store Selling Area Operated under the c 1: N
arreiour ame , 1960-1972
1960-
1963 1964 1965 1971 1972
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
New Selling Area Opened Each Year (000 sq m)
Wholly owned stores 6.9 2.5
Joint venture stores 1.0 11 .5 5.5 22.4 11 .7 28.9 29.0 17.3
Franchise stores 3.2 23.8 14.0 86.5
22.1 22.1 18.1 44.3
Total 6.9 2.5 1.0 11 .5 8.7 22.4 57.6 65.0 47.1 148.1
Cumulative Selling Area Operating under Carrefour Name (000 sq m)
Wholly owned stores 6.9 9.4 10.4 21 .9 27.4 49.8 61.5 90.4 119.4 136.7
Joint venture stores
3.2 3.2 27.0 41 .0 41 .0 127.5
Franchise stores
22.1 44.2 62.3 106.6
Total 6.9 9.4 10.4 21.9 30.6 53.0 110.6 175.6 222.7 370.8
Percent of Cumulative Selling Area under Each Form of Operation
Wholly owned stores 100 100 100 37
100 . 90 94 56 52 54
Joint venture stores
10 6 24 23 18 34
Franchise stores 29
20 25 28
Total 100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100 100 100

EXHIBIT 5
Ownership, Profitability , and Investment Data for Carrefour Affiliates, 1969-1971

Profit after Dividends to Investments

Carrefour Revenues Tax Carrefour and Advances
Aff/1/ate Name Year Ownership (%) (m/11/on F) (000 F) (000 F) (million Ff
SAMOD 1969 92 F 5 F 417 F 174
1970 92 13 607 221
1971 90 17 1,089 221 F 1.8
SOGARA 1969 49.9 97 219 0
1970 49.9 257 3,930 150
1971 49.9 304 7,710 500 5.0
Ardennais 1969
1970
1971 14.6 58 175 0 .8
Ditrimas 1970 49.9 42 8 0
1971 49.9 45 19 0 2.6
Hypermarche S.A. 1969 30 na na 0
1970 30 na na 0
1971 30 na na 0 4.8
ltalmare 50 2.2
Hypermarket Ltd. 10 1.3
Pelaza 68
Other affiliates .2
F 18.7

na = not available.
a. At cost; does not include equity in earnings retained in affiliate.
120 Managing Short-Term Assets and liabilities

EXHIBIT 6 k ts Constructed in France, 1963-1972

-~St~o~re~Ty,~pe~_ _
1963-1966 1967 -----
l'N~u~m~be~r~an~d~S~iz~e~o~f'._H:_:.:y::pe:nn.:::ar=e_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

-
:.=:_:_=-----~~===-:-----~
1968 1969 1970 1971 6 mos.

Number of Hypermarkets Constructed

3 3 6 16 11 7
Independent . . • • 2 8 19 21 8
1 10
Chain . • · · 2 7 5 14
4
Department stores . s
Cooperatives and others
Total for year 4 8
12
1
16
28
2
45
73
3
42
115
5
-29
144
8
~
32
Cumulative total 4 176
Hypermarket Selling Space Constructed (000 sq m)
Selling space con-
19 42 77 270 258 155
structed in year 207
Cumulative selling
19 61 138 408 666 821 1,028
space constructed
Carrefour Hypermarket Selling Space Constructed (000 sq m)
Wholly owned 17 8 22 12 29 29 0
Joint venture 3 0 16 8 0 41
Franchise 22 22 18
~
Total for year 17 11 22 50 59 47 49
Cumulative total 17 28 50 100 159 206 255
(Carrefour/industry)
cumulative .87 .46 .37 .25 .24 .24 .24

Sources: Enterprise, March 6, 1971, p. 1O; September 15, 1972, p. 75; and Carrefour Annual Report,
1971 , p. 21.
Note: Data in Exhibit 6 differ somewhat from data in Exhibit 4 because ( 1) not all stores operating under
the Carrefour name were located in France, and (2) Carrefour constructed three stores prior to 1966 which
were not large enough to be classified as hypermarkets.
~ _ :_~ .k,.41 , ~, ..•. "' ,,_~_,,,_,,, .-~ -~, """'--· . . ... _ .. e - ~ - "" _., .•. *= ,.,-,- .• . ~

EXHIBIT 7
Financial Data for Large Retail Firms in Europe , 1967-1971

Sales (million F) Net Worth (million F) Net Profit/Net Worth (percent)

Country Firm 1967--68 1968-69 1969-70 197~71 1967--68 1968-69 1969-70 197~71 1967--68 1968-69 1969-70 197~71
France Au Printemps F 5,151a F 5,480a F 6,1208 F 6,719a F 372 F 373 F 378 F 372 4.7% 4.9% 1.9% .5%
Carrefour 524 1,025 1,445 2,234 39 89 98 112 26 18 23 39
Casino 1,245 1,380 1,589 1,868 79 110 118 141 21 14 14 16
Docks Remois 586 627 683 732 85 89 92 95 5.3 5.3 5.9 6.9
Galeries Lafayette 556 484 545 582 275 267 243 160 (1 .9) (1 .5) (9.9) (52)
Belgium G. B. Enterprises 664 812 1,343 1,719 138 145 225 247 9.9 11 11 15
S. A. Innovation 419 381 853 971 145 152 262 260 6.8 4.5 6.0 4.8
Germany Karstadt 4,888 5,281 5,745 6,644 1,029 1,102 1,190 1,272 13 13 13 13
Kaufhof 4,459 4,929 5,218 5,928 759 816 858 931 13 14 15 14
Nechermann 2,048 2,190. 2,348 2,697 210 216 209 222 10 11 5 7
U.K. Great Universal 4,084 4,370 4,856 5,079 1,971 2,002 2,154 2,364 15 15 15 15
Marks and Spencer . 3,226 3,626 4,129 4,766 1,328 1,371 1,424 1,858 18 18 20 24
Italy La Rinascente 1,366 1,426 1,564 1,744 298 306 324 314 8.2 8.1 7.8 8.3

Current Ratio Total Debt/Shareholders' Equity

France Au Printemps 1.0 1.0 1.2 .9 .9 1.1 1.2 1.4

Carrefour .9 .9 .9 .9 3.8 2.4 3.7 4.6
Casino 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 3.5 2.8 3.6 4.0
Docks Remois 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.1
Galeries Lafayette 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 .8 1.0 1.2 1.6
Belgium G. 8. Enterprises 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.9
S. A. Innovation 2.6 3.1 1.5 1.1 .8 .8 1.3 1.4
Germany Karstadt 4.1 3.4 2.6 2.0 .8 .8 .9 .9
Kaufhof 1.7 1.9 2.7 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6
Nechermann 1.6 2.0 2.0 1.6 2.2 2.6 2.8 3.3
U.K. Great Universal 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.8 .5 .7 .7 .7
Marks and Spencer . 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 .6 .7 .8 .8
La Rinascente .9 .8 .8 .7 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0
Italy

a. Includes sales of affiliated stores .

.....
N
.....