Lorenzo v. Posadas, G.R. No.

L-43082 (64 PHIL 353) June 18, 1937

Facts: Herein petitioner Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate of a certain Thomas
Hanley, deceased, brought an action against respondent Posadas, Collector of Internal
Revenue. Petitioner alleges the respondent to have exceeded in its tax collection, which, as
assessed by the former, should only be in the amount of PhP1,434.24 instead of
PhP2,052.74. Disregarding the allegation, respondent filed a motion in the CFI of Zamboanga
praying that the trustee be made to pay such tax. The motion was granted. Petitioner paid the
amount in protest, however notified the respondent that until a refund is prompted, suit would
be bought for its recovery. Respondent overruled the protest. Hence, the case at bar.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the provisions of Act No. 3606 (Tax Law) which is favorable to the taxpayer
be given retroactive effect?

Held and Reasoning: No. The respondent levied and assessed the inheritance tax collected
from the petitioner under the provisions of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code
as amended by Act No. 3606. However, the latter only enacted in 1930 - not the law in force
when the testator died in 1922. Laws cannot be applied retroactively. The Court states that it
is a well-settled principle that inheritance taxation is governed by the statue in force at
the time of the death of the decendent. The Court also emphasized that "a statute should
be considered as prospective in its operation, unless the language of the statute clearly
demands or expresses that it shall have retroactive effect...” Act No. 3606 does not contain
any provisions indicating a legislative intent to give it a retroactive effect. Therefore, the
provisions of Act No. 3606 cannot be applied to the case at bar.

[RELATED to Article 4, Civil Code of the Philippines]

 Lichauco v. Apostol, G.R. No. L-19628 (44 PHIL 138), December 4, 1922

Facts:
Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under the Phil. laws, engaged for several years in the
business of importing carabao and other draft animals, and was desirous of importing, from
Pnom-Pehn, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum.
However, respondent Director of Agriculture refused to admit said cattle except upon
condition that drafts be immunized. Petitioner however contends that the respondent has no
authority over the matter, invoking section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3052. On the other hand, relying upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code,
Admin. Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, and Dept. Order No. 6 of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondent maintained its decision. Hence, the issue.

Issue: Whether or not section 1770 (and other similar acts) has been repealed by implication
by Act 3052 and hence cannot be applied with the case at bar?

Held and Reasoning: No. The Court ruled that the contention of the petitioner is untenable
for the reason that the invoked section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature
while 1770 is a particular one. Section 1770 is therefore not inconsistent with section 1762
and instead be considered a special qualification of the latter provision. Moreover, the court
emphasized that "specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law
upon a same subject unless it clearly appears that the provision of the two laws are so
repugnant..xxx...The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law
of the particular subject and the other as the general law of the land." Therefore, Section 1770
of the Administrative Code remains in effect and serves as a supplementary provision to
section 1762, as amended.

[Related provision: Article 7, C.C]

 Ferrazini v. Gsell, 34 Phil 693, August 10, 1916

Facts:
The issue started when defendant was alleged to wrongfully discharge the plaintiff who had
been employed by the defendant for an indefinite time, admitting that he discharged the
plaintiff without written advice, however, asserting that such discharge is lawful on account of
absence and disobedience of the plaintiff. The previous judgment was in favor of the plaintiff,
hence, the defendant now seeks an appeal. The defendant asserts that in their contract, the
petitioner cannot enter into an employment within five years after the termination of their
agreement. However, it is discovered that the plaintiff has contracted another employment,
hence, violating their agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the right of the plaintiff to enter into contract can be restrained and
such agreement is against public policy?

Held and Reasoning: No. The Court ruled that it is the policy of the law that the freedom
of persons to enter into contracts shall not be lightly interfered with, as long as it does
not conflict with the morals of the times or contravenes the interest of the society.
Defining public policy, is the law of persons the public, of social and legal interest, that which
is permanent and essential of the institutions, cannot be left to his own will. The doctrine that
a contract in restraint of trade is void as against public policy is based on two principal
grounds: 1.) the injury to the public by being deprived of the restricted party’s industry; and 2.)
the injury to the party himself by being precluded from pursuing his occupation, preventing
him from supporting his family and/or himself. Moreover, stressing a rule in Gibbs v. CGCB,
the court held that public welfare is first considered. Therefore, the contract between the
plaintiff and defendant is clearly one that is against public policy because it deprives the
former in obtaining a livelihood.

[Art. 6, C.C.]
 US v. Palacio, G.R. No. 11002, January 17, 1916

Facts:
Herein respondent Palacio, then being a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte, was
charged with the duty of assessing real property, upon revising and reassessing the real
property of a certain Francisco Madlonito, omitting such from the tax list knowing that the
properties omitted were lawfully taxable – thus, charged with the violation of section 87 of Act
82 (Municipal Code). Defendant’s counsel alleged in the complaint did not constitute a crime
provided in sec. 87 of Act. No. 82, however, such defense was overrules and respondent was
sentenced a penalty for such crime. Then, defendant appealed. Hence, the issue.

Issue: Whether or not the acts committed by the accused constitute the infraction provided
for and punished by section 87, Act. No. 82?

Held and Reasoning:

Yes. The Court stated that the enacting of a new law, Act No. 2238 which created the
position of provincial assessor for each province, was the same as that of Act No. 82.
Moreover, another statue - Act No. 1930 which provides for the proper acts by municipal
board of assessors re taxes is also of the same nature. Thus, all three acts are intimately the
same, in so far as the declaration of assessment of taxable properties are concerned.
Furthermore, the Court stressed that one of the rules of interpretation is that “when
there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different dates, and it appears
evidently by the form and essence of the later law that it was the intention of the
legislator to cover therein the whole of the subject, xxx, the latest law should be
considered as a legal declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in
force and not be rejected and repealed.” Repeals by implications are not favored, and will
not be decreed, unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. Passing a statute was
not intended to abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless repugnancy between
the two is irreconcilable, the Court said.
Therefore, although Act 2238 does not penalize assessors in revising tax lists, it should
be considered that sec. 87 of Act No. 82 is still in force and is still applicable to the acts done
by the respondent.
[Art. 7, C.C]
 Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. 30642, April 30, 1985

Facts:
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation who, while
working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a
result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that
Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground.
A motion to dismiss was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on
an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as
amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners opposed the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the
established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original
jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or
employees.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioners can avail both remedies – that is to avail benefits pursuant to
Worker’s Compensation Act and sue for higher damages pursuant to the Civil Code – in case
of doubt?

Held and Reasoning:

No. The Court states that “once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no
longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action
for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa”.
Moreover, it is clearly stated in Article 10 of the New Civil Code that "In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right
and justice to prevail.” More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In
case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living of the laborer."
[Article 10, C.C.]