Pena vs GSIS

Immutability of judgement

Facts: petitioner Felisa Peña acquired three subdivision lots with a right to repurchase However,
petitioner alleged that Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. failed to repurchase said lots and refused to
deliver the corresponding titles of the said subdivision lots because the same were mortgaged to herein
respondent GSIS, hus, on 21 January 1994, petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance,
Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages4 before the HLURB Regional Office against Queen’s Row
Subdivision, Inc., sking for the cancellation of the mortgage to respondent and the consolidation of
ownership to her, alleging that the mortgage of the subject lots to the respondent was null and void
because it had no written approval of the HLURB

Queen’s Row Subdivision did not file any responsive pleading. Respondent, on the other hand, filed its
Answer asserting that the subject properties had been mortgaged, foreclosed, and transferred to its
name even before the petitioner purchased the same

HLURBrendered a Decision5 dated 20 December 1995 in favor of petitioner

respondent filed a Notice of Appeal ,HLURB Arbiter Manuel issued an Order8 denying the said appeal

Petitioner then claimed that for failure of respondent to file the proper mode of appeal within the
reglementary period before the HLURB, its Decision dated 20 December 1995 already became final and
executory

Respondent appealed the foregoing Order of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President. On 12 May 1999, the Office of the President issued the assailed Decision,

etitioner filed a Petition for Review17 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court
of Appeals

The Court of Appeals subsequently rendered its Decision on 24 April 2003 denying the Petition for
Review filed by petitioner and affirming the Decision of the Office of the President

Issue: Whether the Office of the President can set aside and reverse a judgment of the HLURB Regional
Office that has long become final and executory for failure of the respondent to interpose the proper
mode of appeal within the reglementary period

Held: No, petitioner is correct, right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it
should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, appeal is a right
of statutory and not of constitutional origin.

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional22 and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render
the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, nal and executory judgments can no longer
be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the
land. Decision of the HLURB Regional Office had become final and executory as early as March 1996,
even the Office of the President had no more jurisdiction to revive, review, change or alter the same.
Such final resolution or decision of an administrative agency also binds the Office of the President even
if such agency is under the administrative supervision and control of the latter

It is already well settled in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect
of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

Here, after the HLURB Regional Office rendered its 20 December 1995 Decision, respondent, instead of
filing a Petition for Review within 30 days from receipt of the said Decision which was the proper mode
of appeal, opted to file a mere Notice of Appeal which was denied in the Order of HLURB because it was
prohibited by the Rules of HLURB.

Doctrine of Judicial stability

Panilllio vs salongga

Facts: because of cruelty, moral depravity and gross neglect of private respondent, the grandparents
felt obliged to exercise substitute parental authority over the minor which apprehension led to securing
their appointment as guardians ad litem of the ward .

The judge on RTC Cavite issued an order and appointed the grand parents as guardian ad litem pending
determination of the merits of this case.

a petition for habeas corpus was submitted by private respondent and later assigned to Branch 149 of
the Regional Trial Court in Makati. Which was granted by respondent judge

petitioners moved to dismiss the habeas corpus petition on the basis of litis pendentia as well as lack of
cause of action private respondent filed her own motion to dismiss in the Cavite custody case anchored
on improper venue and the existence of a prejudicial question

Issue: WON the petition for habeus corpus is proper?

Held: No, The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-
equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to
the competencia of the Makati court to entertain the habeas corpus case on account of the previous
assumption of jurisdiction by the Cavite court, and the designation of petitioners as guardians ad
litem of the ward.

Thus, in the case of Parco vs. Ca, 111 SCRA 262, this Court held that the various branches of the Court of
First Instance being co-equal cannot interfere with the respective cases of each branch, much less a
branch's order or judgment. it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate
authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate
authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal
prosecutions, and to courts-martial.

Fallo vs Body of decision

Gonzales vs solid cement corp

Facts: The resolution of the court in a given issue – embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a decision
or order – is the controlling factor in resolving the issues in a case. The fallo embodies the court’s
decisive action on the issue/s posed, and is thus the part of the decision that must be enforced during
execution. The other parts of the decision only contain, and are aptly called, the ratio decidendi (or
reason for the decision) and, in this sense, assume a lesser role in carrying into effect the tribunal’s
disposition of the case.

When a conflict exists between the dispositive portion and the opinion of the court in the text or body
of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter under the rule that the dispositive portion is the
definitive order, while the opinion is merely an explanatory statement without the effect of a directive.
Hence, the execution must conform with what the fallo or dispositive portion of the decision ordains or
decrees.

Significantly, no claim or issue has arisen regarding the fallo of the labor tribunals and the CA’s ruling on
the merits of the original case. We quote below the fallo of these rulings, which this Court ultimately
sustained.

Àrmovit vs CA

Facts: BCBI obtained load from GSIS. BCBI defaulted in payment,GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction. BCBI filed an action to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure which was granted by RTC. Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision with modification.

Held: GR is that a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the opinion of the
court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter.

An exception would be where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to
show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail

t is clear that the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision (that "we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim
for ‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be unreasonable"30) is not an order which can be the subject of
execution. Neither can we ascertain from the body of the Decision an inevitable conclusion clearly
showing a mistake in the dispositive portion. On the contrary, the context in which the statement was
used shows that it is premised on the interpretation that Atty. Armovit’s valid claim is only for an
additional ₱252,000.00 in attorney’s fees:.