TERRITORIALITY

JESUS MIQUIABAS VS COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED

STATES ARMY
G.R. No. L-1988
February 24, 1948

Short Version:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines.
Therefore, the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner
for the offense allegedly committed by him

Facts:
1. Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines.
He has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the United
States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States.
2. He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried
and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.
3. This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review. Thus, a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was filed by petitioner against the Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus
Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under custody and to have
appointed a General Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an offense over which the
said court has no jurisdiction.

Issue:
1. Whether the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has jurisdiction to try petitioner for
the offense allegedly committed by the petitioner? (NO)

Ruling:
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any
criminal action which may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.

Ratio:
1. The offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within a base that would bring the case
within the jurisdiction of the general court-martial.
 It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all
offenses committed within its territory.
 But it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign
nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions of
said territory.
 On March 11, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America, entered into an agreement concerning military bases.
 Under paragraph 1 (a) thereof, the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over the criminal
case against petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base.
 Paragraph 2, of Article XXI of the agreement, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation, which
will be available for use to the United States armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and
installations, its temporariness not being for a definite period of time, but "until such time as
 other arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two
Governments."
 There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed as placing the Port of
Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent base.
 Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the temporary quarters
and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be
considered as offenses within the bases
 Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but without, a
base, since it has been committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the bases
mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located
within the present limits of the City of Manila.
2. The offender is not a member of the armed forces of the United States
 Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still the General Court-
Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a "member of the armed
forces of the United States" there being no question that the offended party in this case is the
United States.
 Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines.
 Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a member of the
armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of
civilian employees separately from members of the armed forces of the United States, which is a
conclusive indication that under said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian employees.

U.S. V. Bull (1910)

U.S. v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7 G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
FACTS:
• accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into
the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head of cattle
and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing the animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering. • animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses,
and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without
being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding • neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were
cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and
cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
• All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission. Section 1 of Act
No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that — The owners or masters of steam, sailing,
or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall
carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for
the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage
from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with
adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the
animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
• Bull (Norweigan): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof, so it is not within the jurisdiction of the Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character when the neglect and omission
which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the
United States

HELD: The defendant was found guilty

YES.
• No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high
seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line
drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters,
and a new set of principles became applicable. Note: when it comes in our territory it has the discretion
to prosecute or not. If it chooses to prosecute must be justified.
• 2 well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them 1. French theory and
practice-matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquility
of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the
vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. 2. The United
States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence
or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.
• The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and
a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the
port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
• The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that
the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according
to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of
the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a
failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."

People v. Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573

G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910. ARELLANO, C. J.

Laws Applicable: Revised Penal Code Art. 2 and Opium Law (Crimes Relative to Opium & Other
Prohibitive Drugs Art. 190 - 194)

Facts: A steamship named Erroll, from Hong Kong bound for Mexico, was searched and inspected at the
port of Cebu where sacks of opium were found. A large sack of opium was discovered in the hold and a
smaller one in the cabin. Soon after, more cans of opium were identified around the firemen's sleeping
area.

The defendant, Look Chaw, acknowledged his ownership and control over the sacks of opium found in
the search of the vessel. Also, he sold prepared opium the day the vessel arrived at Cebu. The defendant
is charged for unlawful possession of opium and unlawful sale of opium at the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.
The court ruled that it has jurisdiction because the crime was committed on the wharf of Cebu; which is
within its district. The court sentenced the defendant to five years imprisonment, a fine of 10,000 pesos,
with further imprisonment in case of bankruptcy. The defendant filed an appeal.

Issues: Whether or not the Philippine Court has jurisdiction over a foreign vessel and crimes committed
within it.

Held: YES. Mere possession of things prohibited by the Philippines, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in
any port, does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country. But when the said prohibited
items, such as opium, are set on or brought into Philippine soil, it becomes a violation of the penal code
and the Philippine Court has appropriate jurisdiction over it, taking into account absence of international
treaties.
Imprisonment was reduced to six months and the fine to 1,000 pesos.

G.R. No. L-13005 | October 10, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Objective: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of
a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law)
Facts:
 The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun
Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage
direct from the port of Saigon.
 The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship, and
had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the
port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium
hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine.
 The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in
Saigon. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands.
 No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import
illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has
been proven

Ruling: Yes, the crime of illegal importation of opium is proven. There was illegal importation of
opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands.
Rationale:
 Section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts
of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk,
is prima facie evidence of importation.
 As applied to the Opium Law, [the Court] expressly holds that any person unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this
person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands.
  The Court accordingly finds that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country
into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these
statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.

Pp vs Wong Cheng G.R. No. L-18924

October 19, 1922
FACTS:
The Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
sustaining the demurer presented by Wong Cheng who was accused of having illegally smoked opium,
aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay
two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the lower court, which so held and dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
WoN the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard a foreign vessel
anchored in our jurisdiction waters?
RULING:
Yes, the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction.
There are two fundamental rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard merchant vessels
while in territorial waters of another country; the French Rule; and the English Rule. Of these two rules
we observe the English Rule wherein crimes in merchant vessels are generally triable in that country
where it was perpetrated, unless if they merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the
internal management thereof.
Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by the court as not triable since it
is not considered a disturbance of the public order. But to smoke opium within our territorial limits,
even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is certainly a breach of public order because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Therefore, the order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law without special finding as to costs.
People v. Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922. MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in
the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned
by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves
all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on
the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea
that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were
able to escape.
• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy
• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility.
• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."

ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found
guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.

YES. Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary
for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. At
least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of
superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the
act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.

PROSPECTIVITY
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons
G.R. No. L-30026 / January 30, 1971 / En Banc / Petition for Habeas Corpus
Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, Gaudencio Agapito, Epifanio Padua and Paterno Palmares –
Petitioners
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons – Respondent
Decision by J. Fernando, Digest by Jason Jimenez

Short Version: Petitioners sought release from imprisonment through this petition for habeas corpus.
They were meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes. They
invoked the doctrine in People v. Hernandez which negated the existence of such an offense, a ruling
that was not handed down until after their convictions had become final. Their petition was granted.
Since judicial decisions form part of the legal system of the Philippines, the conclusion is that the
Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the
RPC as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application a final sentence has
been rendered "and the convict is serving the same."

Facts: Petitioner Gumabon was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Other petitioners were similarly
made to suffer the same penalty. Each of them has served more than 13 years. Subsequently, in People
v. Hernandez, SC ruled that the information against the accused was not warranted under Article 134 of
the RPC, there being no such complex offense. SC reaffirmed the ruling in People v. Lava.

Petitioners asserted the deprivation of the constitutional right of equal protection. According to them,
they were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were
convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were
convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law,
petitioners were allowed to suffer life imprisonment, while others suffered only prision mayor.

Petitioners likewise relied on Article 22 of the RPC which requires that penal judgment be given a
retroactive effect. Petitioner Gumabon contended that he has served more than the maximum penalty
that could have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being
illegal. Hence, this petition for habeas corpus.

Issues:
1. Should the Hernandez ruling be given retroactive effect? YES
2. Is the habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? YES

Ruling: Petition granted

Ratio:
1. The Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate
of the RPC (Article 22) as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application
a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the same." The Hernandez case
negated the existence of the complex offense for which the petitioners were convicted.
2. Where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such
sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but
the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess
imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his
discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was
valid." The only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ...
is the writ of habeas corpus."

Voting: Dizon, Zaldivar, Concepcion, concur. Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and
rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and
asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who
was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the
defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense
of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of the walls of the house of the defendant was
indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first
issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts
referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership
into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
 Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's
property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before
time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code
also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539
provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
 Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was
disproportionate to the attack.
 Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also,
assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was
also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due
to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the
provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages.
Appellant has already been detained 14 years, so his immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on
person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to
prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.

People vs. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering People’s Restaurant. A
witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, and
poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun,
entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind and shot him six
times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession was an
unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed
firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove
Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced
to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a
sentence of 17 to 20 years.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime occurred in 1994) is
applicable

No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an
aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the
accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.

2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.

Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can
be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under PD No. 1866. t is simply
considered as an aggravating circumstance, no longer as a separate offence.
According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is favorable to the
accused.

3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of murder

No. For self-defense to prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said
aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case, defendant
failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim approached him with a bolo was
inconsistent to the witness’ statement of the victim being in a prone position in the table. This does not
constitute the requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing,
the last two requisites have no basis.

4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder which was not proven and that the
alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the offense is reclusion
perpetua due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance.

Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a crime of murder as described by art
248 of RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed in according to article 63(2) of RPC

People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

FACTS: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5,
1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion
to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile
v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of
appeals.

ISSUE: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous
charge under RA 1700.

Ratio: No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to
occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was
not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession
of firearms.

However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the
accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue. PD 1866
should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of subversion

Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release
Tujan.

LIBERALITY IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL GR. No. L2873
Facts: Eugenio Garcia Madrigal was found guilty of the crime robbery. He was 17 yrs old at that time of
the commission of the crime. The lower court ignoring defendant’s minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of from 4 yrs to 2 months and 1 days of prision correctional to 8 yrs of prison
mayor. He was also sentenced to pay the offended party, jointly and severally with the other accused,
the sum of P85 as indemnity.
Republic Act No. 47 which amended article 80 of the RPC by reducing 18 – 16 the age below which
accused to be committed to the custody or care of the public or private benevolent or charitable
institution, instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison has given rise to the controversy.

Issue: Whether Eugenio, being 17 yrs of age at the time of the commission of the crime was entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of article 88, paragraph 2 of the RPC.

Ruling: All parts are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each amd every part
thereof and that conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded
unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language.

Spanish text of the RPC prevails over its English translation

Aristotle Valenzuela v. People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then
manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing
an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a pushcart with cases of
detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space,
where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5)
minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same
area in the open parking space. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner
and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards
of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated
theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen.

ISSUE:
Is the crime committed frustrated or consummated theft?

HELD:
The crime is consummated. The following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent
of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. There was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the
owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking.
So long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi
and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of
another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. Insofar as we
consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is
the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could
only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated.
People of the Philippines v. Manaba
Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933)

FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. After trial,
Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the
court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by
the offended party. Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape.
Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denied and he was
convicted.

ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy.

HELD: No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was
tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended
party to file the complaint. As the first complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid
complaint in accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction over
subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish equivalentof the word filedis not
bound in the Spanish text which is controlling, because it was the Spanish text approved by the
legislature.
Prescribed but undeserved penalties
PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950 Parricide, Feeblemindedness, Imbecility,
Article 12 of the RPC
NOVEMBER 20, 2017
FACTS:
Late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any
previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his
wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting
in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house,
laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by
the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, who witnessed
and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. Defendant admitted that he killed, motive was
admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the
reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias.
He appealed based on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Is the appellant imbecile and covered by Article 12 of the RPC?
RULING:
Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The Supreme Court of Spain
held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that
there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time
of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will,
because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or
insanity.The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law
are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence
of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to
the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in
anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated
his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of
school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could
feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is
that he believed her faithless.
Appellant was found guilty of parricide.
Effects of repeal amendment of penal law
PRESCILLA TUATES v. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, GR No. 138962, 2002-10-04

Facts:
Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772
or the Anti-Squatting Law, petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz, appealed to the RTC of
Quezon City (Branch 96).
Pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration, however, Republic Act No. 8368, "An Act
Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled 'Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts'" was
enacted.
In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners' criminal convictions were
extinguished by R.A. 8368, and the civil aspect, i.e., the removal of petitioners' illegally constructed
house and improvements, shall remain executory against... them
Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with it the extinction of both the
criminal and civil aspects of the crime.
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondents, agrees with petitioners that both the
criminal and civil liability were rendered extinct with the repeal of P.D. 772, and recommended that the
assailed issuances be reversed and set... aside.
Issues:
That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, the express repeal of said
decree absolves the petitioners of any criminal or civil liability;
Ruling:
In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to
punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified
repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering... legal what had been previously declared
as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so.
Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability under P.D. 772 has been rendered
nugatory with the passage of R.A. 8368, both criminal and civil aspects of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-
70428 and Q-97-70429 in the RTC as well as Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and
38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be dismissed.
Principles:
Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known as the "Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997," provides:
"SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as the 'Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997.'
"SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled 'Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts' is
hereby repealed.
"SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772
shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.
"SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. -- Nothing herein shall be construed to nullify, eliminate or
diminish in any way Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279 or any of its provisions relative to sanctions
against professional squatters and squatting... syndicates.
"SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers
of national circulation.
"Approved, October 27, 1997."

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO v. CA, GR No. 125359, 2001-09-04

Facts:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for
violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960[1] in relation to Section 34[2] of the Central Bank Act
(Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five
Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the same
offense, but involving different accounts,... l
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense,
again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same court
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the Central Bank issued
Circular No. 1318[5] which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. It took
effect on January 20, 1992.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to the
Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against them, including
the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the
charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a similar plea during
her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration. The
trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners' motion and set the consolidated cases
for trial on January 5, 1995.
The assailed
September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is
hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993...on the condition that he face the
criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-petitioner
Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by... posting bail in the above-
mentioned cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary investigation because
of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked their right to
due process thru motions for preliminary investigation
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justice...respondent Judge
set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access to the records of the
prosecution.
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353
retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade
foreign exchange transactions.[26]
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353
retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade
foreign exchange transactions.[26] Second, even the... most cursory glance at the repealing circulars,
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal
of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular.
Issues:
the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from
abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960.
On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They aver that the dollar-
salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act No. 3019, and
the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive... jurisdiction over their cases.
first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for violations of Circular No. 960 before
the RTC of Manila constitutes forum shopping.
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No. 960 in relation to
Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the Central Bank. The act to be penalized
here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the foreign... exchange accounts to the proper
authority.
on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice
was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process.
5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto and Rivera
moved for the quashing of the informations/cases...
On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts punishable under laws
that have already been repealed.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly Section 34,[29] by
Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any penal sanction for violations of any non-trade
foreign exchange transactions previously penalized... by Circular No. 960.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting Section 34 of the
old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary
Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Republic
Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.[
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject of the criminal
cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on various dates between 1983 to 1987.
The fourth issue involves petitioners' claim that they incurred no criminal liability for violations of
Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[53] Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be
alleged and proved.
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute immunity under the
Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government on November 3, 1990.
Ruling:
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to punish a
person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused.[39]
Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in... particular Section 36, is there any indication that the
increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex
post facto law in this case.
The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 "by a
fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more than five
years."
During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S. Benedicto gave formal notice to
the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000. The death of an accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability as well as the... civil liability based solely thereon.
Principles:
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentral's charter repealing the former
show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law and the new law "to maintain internal
and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve the... international value of the peso
In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at the words
employed to project their intention.
FELONIES & CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PEOPLE v. ROMANA SILVESTRE, GR No. 35748, 1931-12-14
Facts:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her codefendant
Martin Atienza
On May 16, 1930,... Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a sworn
complaint for adultery... the two defendants begged... the municipal president of Paombong... to speak
to the complainant... urging him to withdraw the complaint
Domingo Joaquin acceded to it... and... the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the adultery
case commenced against the accused
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas
de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Nino, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were...
gathered together
Martin Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire
to it.
Upon being asked... why he wanted to set fire to the house, he... answered that that was the only way
he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery
against him and his codefendant
Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the
barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania,... as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but they
had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw
their home in flames
The fire destroyed ... about forty-eight houses.
Tomas Santiago... and Tomas Gonzalez,... saw Martin Atienza... going away from the house where the
fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record against her are:...
that Romana Silvestre listened to her co-defendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not give
the alarm when the latter... set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court below
found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Issues:
which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson committed by
her co-defendant Martin Atienza?
Ruling:
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be
one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to
commit it, nor cooperates in the... commission of the act by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions
In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or... material
cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence
while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that
they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the... crime of arson; and as for her failure to give
the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do... not constitute the cooperation required by article
14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard
to which one has kept silent.

People v Talingdan 84 SCRA 19, July 8, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA
DOMOGMA,
accused-appellants.

Facts: Bernardo Bagabag was murdered in his own house in Abra on June 24, 1967 by Talingdan, Tobias,
Berras, Bides and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife [whom cannot be charged with parricide because
no certificate or proof of marriage could be presented by the prosecution]. The murder was witnessed
by Corazon, the eldest child of Bernardo and Teresa. She testified to the crime committed by the
accused-appellants.

Crime Committed: Murder and the sentence of life imprisonment with indemnity to the offended party,
the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000.

Contention of the Accused: According to Teresa, there was no illicit affair between her and Talingdan.
She loved her husband. Contrary to the testimony of Corazon, they never quarreled nor did the former
maltreat her. She never left home for so long. And she was cooking for supper, and not Corazon, on the
night of the murder. She contends that her in-laws used her daughter to testify against her because they
don’t want Teresa from the start. She even added that Bernardo had some enemies during his lifetime.
Talingdan said that he escorted the Mayor as a bodyguard, while the other three accused also claimed
that they were at a certain Mrs. Bayongan’s house during the night of the murder.
Contention of the People: The sworn statement of the 13-year old Corazon was true. She
knew the accused because they live nearby their place. Besides, the accused-appellants
testimonies are indefensible and futile. Moreover, her mother claimed to have no suspect in mind
during the investigation in their house although she was in conspiracy with the other four accused.

Issue: Whether or not the appelants are guilty of the crime murder of killing Bernardo Bagabag?

Ruling: The court affirmed the decision held by the trial court with costs. There are two aggravating
circumstances present, treachery and evident premeditation, with no mitigating circumstances to offset
the accused-appellants. Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, and Bides are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and are sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Teresa Domogma is guilty
as accessory to the same murder, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years
prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties
of the law. What about Teresa’s conviction? Teresa was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her. After Bernardo was killed, she became
active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory --- paragraph
3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE Vs GONZALES ET. AL. G.R. No.: 80762 Date: March 19, 1990
FACTS:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus
would like to surrender to the authorities.
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before
trial, however, Jose Huntoria who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented
himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the
prosecution. He stated that he clearly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing
and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform as the place was then
awash in moonlight. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of
Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional
accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant) Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and
Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor
as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime.
In the decision dated October 31, 1984 on the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo found all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The case then was brought to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the evidence are sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime of murder beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
No, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged. Huntoria testified that
he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd
Peñacerrada. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was
then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But
on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did
the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them. Thus this principal
witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact,
Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in
which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence
on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused.
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

OTHER EXCULPATORY CAUSES – INSTIGATION

PEOPLE VS LUA CHU G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931
Facts: Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng were convicted of the illegal importation of opium. On November, 1929,
Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium. Tieng went to Juan
Samson's house and told him that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins for P2 a tin, and that
opium is in the vessel Kolambugan, awaiting shipment direct to Cebu. When the vessel arrived, Tieng
was told that he must pay over the Php6000 before the opium be taken out. The next day, Samson
informed of what had taken place to Colonel Francisco, who then instructed the Captain Buenconsejo,
to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Samson also went to the office of the
provincial fiscal, reported the same, and asked for a stenographer to note his conversation with Tieng
that night and in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. On December 17, 1929, Buenconsejo, Fernando,
and the stenographer went to Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of
strips of wood.
Samson asked Tieng where the opium was, and the latter answered that it was in the cases numbered 11
to 18 – a total of 3,252 tins. Tieng returned later that night with Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole
owner of the opium.Samson then interrogated Chu on when the former was going to get the opium, on
whether Chu had brought the money, on how he had come to bring in the opium; Chu would answer
them, while Buenconsejo listened in. As Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay;
Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two men. After the two to the
Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Buenconsejo and Samson went to Chu's home to
search it and arrest him, and took him to the Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the
customhouse to examine the cases marked.
Contention of the accused: The accused principal defense was that they were induced by Samson to
import the opium in question. Contention of the state: The state contends that the defendants do not
deny their participation in the act in question. Samson denied his connection with the offense for
purposes of gain; further contending that he smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited
drug, but he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, rather to assure the seizure
of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.

Issue: Whether or not the Samson instigated the accused to import opium

Ruling: Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein accused to import the opium in question, but
pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Natividad; not to gain the Php2000
intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited
drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the
public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this
is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it
simply a trap set to catch a criminal. The mere fact that the Samson pretended to agree a plan for
smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of
said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
Decision against the accused is affirmed.

US v. PHELPS 16 Phil 440 August 11, 1910

FACTS:
While in international saloon in Jolo, Homer G. Smith (the lone prosecution witness) heard
James O. Phelps (the accused) smokes opium in some occasions. Smith asked the accused if Phelps
smoke opium. Phelps answered yes. Smith said that he wanted to smoke opium. On the first
invitation by the accused Phelps, he was not able to prepare a room for smoking. They made
another agreement and went together at a certain house in Tulay. A Chinaman prepared the room
and the pipe for smoking. Smith gave the Chinaman P2.00. The Chinaman gave the pipe to Smith.
Smith then left, with the pipe, and reported the accused to the Justice of peace. Phelps was later
arrested. The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused that Smith visits him (Phelps)
seeking where he (Smith) can smoke opium. Also, the attending doctor testified that Phelps was
a strong, robust man and presents no appearance of an opium smoker. The Court of First Instance
convicted Phelps of violating Act. No. 1761. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Phelps liable?

RULING:
No, because the commission of the crime was intended by Smith and Phelps was only
induced in its commission. Phelps is only charged with having smoked opium this one time in the
house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the
witness Smith, who was an employee of Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that
capacity in Jolo. Smith stated to the accused that he (Smith) was desirous of smoking. He urged
the accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. If he had, by
those means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium or
any of the prohibited paraphernalia, Smith’s testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere
possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law itself. It is
not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. Smith only suggested
the commission of this crime but he (Smith) stated that he desired to commit the same offense
and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. When
an employee of the government, as in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages
or induces the persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is
reprehensible. Appellant Phelps is found not guilty. Lower court judgment reversed and the
appellant acquitted.

AGE (UNDER 18 or OVER 70)

People vs. Doquena G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939

Facts:
Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of
their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a
Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped
Doquena on the nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to
resume playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he
got his cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for
a fight and resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter.
The court held that in committing the act, the accused acted with discernment and was conscious of the
nature and consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable (given that
the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT
program), and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to the
Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that
to determine whether or not there was discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken
into consideration:
a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed.
b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed
c) The time he had at his disposal
d) The degree of reasoning of the minor
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment
Ruling:
Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment for
premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT
that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over
nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance,
the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.
LLAVE V PEOPLE G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006

Facts:
Neil Llave, 12 years old, raped Debbielyn. The victim was pulled from a vacant lot. The accused ordered
her to lie down on the cement. He removed her shorts and underwear and his own. He penetrated his
penis into the victim’s vagina and had a push and pull movement. Teofisto, the witness, saw the incident
and shouted. The accused fled the scence. During trial the accused argued that being a minor, he is
presumed that he acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
thus exempt from criminal liability.

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

Ruling:
Yes, the accused acted with discernment. The factual circumstance which bolstered the he acted with
discernment is when the accused stated that he was an outstanding student. This allegation proves that
he acted with discernment with full knowledge and intelligence. He was possessed of intelligence well
beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish which conduct is right or wrong. Hence, the accused is
not exempt from criminal liability.
LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG
PEOPLE VS URAL G.R. NO. L-30801 MARCH 27 1974
FACTS:
- Alberio went to the municipal building and saw Ural, a policeman inside the jail where he was
boxing prisoner Napola (who was imprisoned for being drunk). When Napola fell to the ground
he U kicked him and poured some liquid on N and then ignited N’s body.
- Dr. Luzonia Bakil who treated the victim, said that he sustained 2nd degree burns on the arms,
neck, left side of the face and one half of the body including the back. She also testified that
without any medical intervention, the burns would have caused death
- Napola died on Aug 25 1966. Death certificate indicated burn as the cause of death.
- During the trial, the prosecutors failed to present the detention prisoners who saw the burning
of Napola as witnesses as well as the wife of the deceased
- Nevertheless, Ural was convicted of murder, was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was
ordered to pay for costs
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
TC did not err in convicting Ural for murder.
- Ural had his own version of the story. According to him he heard a scream for help from Napola
whose shirt was in flames when found by him, he removed the shirt, but did not summon the
doctor because he thought that the burns were not serious.
 SC: this statement cannot prevail over the testimony of Alberio
 This statement does not prove that he was not the one who burned Napola, at most this
could only mean that he was alarmed by the consequences of his evil act
- Ural assailed the credibility of Alberio as a witness, saying that he was not listed as a prosecution
witness and that he was convicted of murder in the past
 Wouldn’t preclude him from being a credible witness.
 Since there was no police investigation (accused a police officer), the investigation that
ensued was done by a special counsel of the fiscal’s office. A possible explanation of
alberio not being listed at first.
 The statements of the witnesses for the defense were not inconsistent with that of
Alberio’s.

Therefore, there is no reason to not believe in Alberio’s testimony.

- The present case is covered by article 4 (par.1-result greater than what was intended).
 Aggravating circumstance: art 14(1).
 TC erred in not appreciating the Mitigating circumstance “that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed”
 No intent to kill but only to maltreat the drunk napola who might have been
making a nuisance of himself
 He realized the fearful consequence of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to
secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary
- Since the mitigating circumstance offset the aggravating circumstance, TC correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder. Trial Court
decision AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE vs. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ, JR. G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001
FACTS: After their vehicles almost collided with each other, Andres and Appellant had an altercation.
Thereafter, Andres went back inside to his car when he was blocked by the appellant’s son who said,
"Anong problema mo sa erpat ko." Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded
his vehicle, sat at the driver’s seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough
to talk back to appellant’s son, Dino. In the meantime, appellant, thinking that Andres was going to get
something from his car, took a gun. However, he was pushed by his daughter-in-law which made him lost
his balance and accidentally fired the gun hitting Andres’ wife, and two sons.Appellant was charged and
convicted of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder in the RTC.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting him from criminal and
civil liabilities contending that he had no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his wife nor the
children. He lost his balance when his daughter Trisha approached and pushed him backwards to stop him
from joining Dino and Noel Andres but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it
accidentally fired.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was treachery attendant in the crime.

RULING: No. Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate
employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly
and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the
employment of means of execution that would ensure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of
the intended victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means
employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. I affirm the recommendation of the
Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed
for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.

SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
PEOPLE VS PAGAL G.R. No. L-32040 October 25, 1977

FACTS: The accused, Pedro Pagal and Jose Torcelino were charged with the robbery with homicide, with
generic aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation, in disregard of the respect due
the offended party, and with abuse of confidence. When the case was called for arraignment, the accused
entered a plea of guilty but they were allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act, and that
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation.

RTC: After considering the 4 aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstance of only plea of guilt,
found them guilty of the crime charged, sentencing them with the penalty of death.

The case was elevated to the SC by virtue of the mandatory review on account of the penalty of death
imposed on the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in not appreciating in favor of the accused the mitigating
circumstances of (1) sufficient provocation and (2) passion or obfuscation.

RULING: No. As a rule, two or more mitigating circumstances arising from the same act cannot be
considered as separate and distinct circumstances but should be treated as one. In this case, the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered because the alleged provocation
which caused the obfuscation arose from the same incident, which is the alleged maltreatment and/or ill-
treatment caused by the victims towards the accused-appellants.

As to the circumstance of passion and obfuscation, it cannot be treated as mitigating if the crime involved
was planned and calmly meditated before its execution, such as in this case of robbery where the
appellants are expected to have carefully planned its execution. The maltreatment that appellants claim
the victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the
crime. Provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding
the act.
People v Leonor GR. No. 125053 March 25, 1999

Facts:
 Dr. Tarlengco (the victim) was in her clinic when Leonor entered and inquired the cost of tooth
extraction; after answering, Leonor left and said that he would come back
 Leonor came back a few minutes later and while Dr. Tarlengco was preparing the materials for
tooth extraction, Leoner barged in and asked for money, stabbed the victim, grabbed her watch
and ran away
 Reynato Baquilod (security guard, one of the witnesses) heard the victim asking for help. After
knowing what happened through the brief statement of Dr. Tarlengco, Baquilod left and chased
Leonor. Upon catching up on Leonor he asked him why he did what he did; Leonor answered “Sir,
hindi ko naman po gusto to. Ginawa ko lang dahil kailangan ng pamilya ko”
 Mr. Tarlengco (father of the victim, one of the witnesses) got a chance to talk to his daughter
while she was still struggling in the hospital; she briefly shared what happened to her father

Defense version:
o Leonor went inside the clinic and asked for the price of tooth extraction. Dr. Tarlengco
answered that its 150 per tooth; Leonor negotiated that it be 100 per tooth but Dr.
Tarlegco allegedly declined
o Leonor said that he will just look for another clinic but thereafter, the victim agreed to
charge the extraction 100 per tooth. Leonor was made to sit on the dental chair and
before injecting anesthesia, Dr. Tarlengco changed her mind and decided that the price
should still become 150 pe tooth/
o Leonor pushed away the dentist’s hand and that angered her. As Leonor was making his
way out, Dr. Tarlengco cursed and pushed him and thereafter, the victim blacked out and
stabbed the victim
 Leonor contends that the crime should only be homicide for he did not rob the victim and that he
be granted the mitigating circumstance that there was sufficient provocation by the offended
party immediately preceding the offense
 However, the court affirmed that there was robbery for he was found in possession of the
properties of the victim; both the watch and the amount of money was recovered from him

Issue: Whether or not Leonor should be granted the mitigating circumstance he prayed for.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque in Criminal Case
No. 95-212 is hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000
as indemnity for death; P44,318 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as attorneys
fees, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
No. The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of the
retaliatory act. Following the statement of the accused, he claims that a push and bad words justify the
retaliation with a knife. Such claim is underserving of belief and does not entitle him the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance.
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A WRONG

People vs. Benito G.R. No. L- 32042 December 17, 1976

FACTS:
 Benito was a former employee of the Civil Service Commission at its main office and was
assigned as Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up to Nov. 1965
when he was suspended for "DISHONESTY"

 After two months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED THEFT,
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and
administratively charged for "DISHONESTY" culminating in his dismissal from the Civil Service on
February 1966.

 October 21, 1965 the victim Moncayo, as an administrative officer, reported to the
Commissioner of Civil Service that Benito admitted having malversed an amount between
P4,000 and P5,000 from his sales of examination fee stamps.

 At eleven o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1969 Moncayo, allegedly made upon seeing
Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission near the canteen: "Nagiistambay pala
dito and magnanakaw."; or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said: "Hindi ko alam na itong Civil
Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw."

 At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect shot the victim eight (8) times
on the head and different parts of the body at closer range which consequently caused the
latter's death on the spot inside his car.

 Benito contends that there’s mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense since
Moncayo insulted him when he remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Civil
Service Commission.
NOTE: Benito was later on acquitted of the crime that Moncayo alleged he had committed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defamatory remark by the victim may give rise to the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a wrong?

RULING:
No. Office of the Solicitor General said that the defamatory remark was not specifically directed at
Benito. SC said that even assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, Benito "had more
than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it.” The six-hour
interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the assassination
was more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to
regain his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally
ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He acted with treachery and
evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder. Also, SC said that the facts of the case
strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was not the latter's alleged
defamatory remark but the refusal of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not
act primarily to vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having
exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately refusing to
change his report. Because according also to Benito’s testimony, he saw Moncayo three hours later after
the remark or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him about his case and Moncayo said
that he had already submitted his report and he could not do anything more about Benito's case. SC
denied his petition.

UNITED STATES VS AMPAR G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917

FACTS: A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Mababoy municipality in San Carlos, province of Negros
Occidental. Clemente Ampar went to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some delicacy.
Patobo’s answer was “there is no more come here and I will roast a pig out of you.” Because of this, It
provoked Mr. Ampar, which later led to the assault. Ampar struck Patobo on the head win an AX,
causing the latter’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not Patobo’s remarks constitutes as a grave offense?

RULING: The Court penalized the defendant (AMPAR) correctly by giving him the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance due to his old age and also what Patobo did on insulting Ampar in front of many people is
a serious matter to the defendant being of old age.

Mitigating circumstances; Immediate vindication of a grave offense

G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
 This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch VIII, Manila dated
October 25, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85-40579 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leandro
Pajares y Florentino" convicting herein appellant Pajares of the crime of Murder.
 Appellant was charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated homicide in two separate
informations:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579: CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580
MURDER FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
That on or about the 11th day of October, That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at
1985, at night time, purposely sought to night time, purposely sought to insure and better
insure and better accomplish his criminal accomplish his criminal design, in the City of Manila,
design, in the City of Manila. Philippines, the Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
said accused, conspiring and confederating confederating together with five (5) others whose
 together with five (5) others whose true
names, real Identities, and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, evident premeditation, and treachery,
attack, assault. and use personal violence
upon one DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN, by
then and there mauling him and hitting him
with a baseball bat at the back of the head,
a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting
upon the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y
SABAYAN a club wound on the head which
was the direct and immediate cause of his
death.
true names, real identities, and present whereabouts
are still unknown, and helping one another, with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one RENATO PEREZ Y RUIDERA, by
mauling and hitting him with a baseball bat at the
back, a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting upon
him a club wound at the back which is necessarily
mortal and fatal, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of
homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the accused, that is, because of the timely
and able medical attendance rendered upon the said
RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA which prevented his death.

 Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges. Upon the petition of herein appellant that the
two (2) cases be consolidated, a joint trial ensued.
 The prosecution presented several witnesses, but their main arguments were taken from the
testimony of Renato Perez, who is the same victim in the Frustrated Homicide case:
 He testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and the deceased Diosdado Viojan
were on their way to a store located at Gomez St., Paco, Manila to buy something.
 They were walking abreast with each other, the deceased was at his right side and was a bit ahead
of him, when appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at
the back of his head.
 The latter ran a short distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to
help Viojan he, too, was attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat hitting him at the back below the
left shoulder.
 He then grappled with the appellant for the possession of the baseball bat but the latter's
companions, namely: Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost
consciousness. He was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by Eugene Panibit and Joselito
Perez where he was treated for the injuries he sustained
 He identified in court the baseball bat used by Pajares
 Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the prosecution.
 He asserts that he knew the deceased Diosdado Viojan by the name Dado, having met him once at
the store, and Renato Perez by the name Balat. At the time of the incident, he was inside the store
of Alex Blas with about eight (8) other People watching television.
 Hence, he did not see who hit Diosdado Viojan and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the
advise of Alex Blas, he went home and slept.
 At about 3:30 in the morning of October 12, 1985, he was arrested inside their house. Without
asking any question, he went with the arresting officers to the police station (TSN, Hearing of August
1, 1988, pp. 72-76).
 RTC JUDGMENT: found accused appellant guilty of the crimes charged against him:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized by Art. 248, par, 1, Rev. Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider,
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of
the law; to pay Arlene Viojan and her child the sum of: P30,000,00; P12,000.00 as funeral expenses;
P15,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees; and finally the
costs of the suit.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Physical Injuries as
defined in par. 1, Art. 266 and penalized by Art. 27, both of the Rev. Penal Code, hereby sentencing him
to an imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH; and to pay the cost of suit.
 Hence this appeal.
 APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:
 Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua upon him. He avers that such a penalty is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment which is prohibited by the Constitution.
 Appellant points out that hours before the clubbing incident, Roberto Pajares, appellant's younger
brother, was mauled by the group of Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower court referring to the
entry in the Police Blotter and the sworn statement of Roberto Pajares.
 The mauling of the latter is a big insult and truly offending to the appellant and his family. Hence,
the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by herein appellant was a vindication of the grave offense
committed against his family. a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
 Considering further that the appellant was just nineteen (19) years old at the time he committed the
offense the penalty imposed by the court a quo should have been seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day (Brief for the Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-58).

ISSUE: WON the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication can be applied in favor of the
appellant
HELD: NO.
 Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside the store of Alex Blas, watching
television, when the incident occurred, Alex Blas even advised him to go home so as not to be
involved in the incident. However, the latter was not presented to corroborate appellant's
testimony.
 Alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as
to preclude any doubt that the accused could have been physically present at the place of the crime
or its vicinity at the time of the commission (People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 94320, September 4. 1991
(201 SCRA 317]).
 In the case at bar, appellant was within the vicinity of the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
 Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez as the perpetrator of the crime. In
the face of the clear and positive testimony of the prosecution witness regarding the participation of
the accused in the crime, the accused's alibi dwindles into nothingness.
 The Positive identification of the accused by the witness as the perpetrator of the crime cannot be
overcome by the mere denial of the accused. Such positive identification of the accused that he
killed the victim establishes the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty (People v
Arroyo, supra).
 The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery. There is treachery, the law
says, when the offender adopts means, methods or forms in the execution of the felony which
ensure its commission without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make (People v. Cuyo, G.R. No. 76211, April 30, 1991 [196 SCRA 447]).
 As found by the trial court, appellant Pajares hit Diosdado Viojan with a baseball bat from behind
without any warning thereby precluding any possible retaliation from the victim.
RE IMMEDIATE VINDICATION
 Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is whether or not the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be appreciated in his favor. While it
may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the
deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter (Exhibits
"A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother
himself (Exhibits "G", "Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that there is a
lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado Viojan.
 Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People
v. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.
 DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
modification that the indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy of this
Court on the matter.

PASSION OR OBFUSCATION

G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909

THE UNITED STATES vs. AUGUSTUS HICKS
FACTS:
CFI- Moro Province convicted Augustus Hicks of murder and sentenced him to the penalty of death, to
be executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs. The case has been submitted to SC for review.
 From September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola,
a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro
Province. Trouble arose between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907. Agustina left Hick's
house and went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted new
relations with another negro (LOL) named Corporal Wallace Current.

 December 21, 1907 at about 7:30 p. m., - Augustus Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd
Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room
with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked
the corporal to come out of said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of
the room, and after a short conversation, Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when
Hicks asked him the following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which
Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any longer, but
if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I
have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a
revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand
roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself
behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in
the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and
died in a little more than an hour later.
 Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and
wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. Hicks immediately fled from the house and
gave himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail;
and, when a few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had fired a
shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail,
threw eight revolver cartridges out of the window; these were picked up by a policeman who
reported the occurrence and delivered the cartridges to his chief.
HICKS’ VERSION:
 When he (Hicks) withdrew his hand from that of Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but
managed to support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again Current threatened him
with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as Edward Robinson
caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet striking Augustina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment of should be affirmed (?)
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute the
crime of murder, with two aggravating circumstances: treachery and premeditation (plus the
fact that srime was committed in the home of the deceased).
Treachery. Augustina was suddenly and roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber
revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while the injured woman was unarmed and unprepared. It is
logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were employed in the attack directly and specially
insured the consummation of the crime without such risk to Hicks as might have been offered by the
Augustina who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the place
where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
Premeditation.
1. According to the testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave from the
former to be absent from the canteen where he was working on the morning of the day when the affray
occurred, alleging that his mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble.
2. It is also shown by the fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's
invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of the crime, was
lying on the table on which were also several loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say,
referring to the deceased, that her time had come, adding that he would rather see her dead than in the
arms of another man.
3. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in the cuprit's house several loaded cartridges,
a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
No mitigating circumstances present, not even loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as
alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the
loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious,
unworthy, and immoral passions.
Judgment affirmed. with costs, provided, however, that the death penalty shall be executed according
to the law in force, and that in the event of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory
penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the pardon.

U.S. V. DELA CRUZ March 29, 1912 G.R. No. L-7094

The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his former lover upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance. The accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance
because in this case, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion
and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him but the sudden
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.
SUMMARY:
Defendant, in the heat of passion, killed his querida (concubine or lover) upon catching her red-handed
in the arms of another. Trial court convicted defendant of homicide and sentenced him to 14 years 8
months 1 day of reclusion temporal. Supreme Court found extenuating/mitigating circumstances in the
commission of the act of homicide therefore reducing defendant’s sentence to 12 years 1 day of
reclusion temporal.
FACTS
Defendant (De la Cruz), in the heat of passion, killed his querida when he caught her red-handed in
carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
2. Trial court found defendant guilty of homicide without any extenuating circumstances present.
Defendant was sentenced to 14 years 8 months 1 day of reclusion temporal (medium degree of penalty
prescribed by the code).

ISSUES: 1. WoN there is an extenuating/mitigating circumstance present - YES

RULING: 1. YES. There is an extenuating circumstance present in the case. The Court is of the opinion
that the defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation when he caught his querida in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
The Court mentioned the view taken by the Supreme Court of Spain regarding a case with similar state
of facts: A man who kills a woman (his lover) for having caught her in her underclothes with another
man and afterwards shoots himself inflicting a serious wound should be responsible for the act but with
extenuating circumstance considered because he acted as such due to strong emotion which impelled
him to perform the criminal act. The situation presents a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary
course to produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for
extenuation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO GELAVER, G.R. No. 95357 June 9, 1993
Facts:
The prosecution presented Randy Mamon, who testified that at 7:00 a.m. of March 24,
1988, he heard shouts coming from the house of Tessie Lampedario in Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. He saw the appellant and a woman having a heated
argument. Thereafter, appellant held the neck of the victim, dragged her and with a knife on his
right hand, stabbed the latter three times on the breast. Appellant then went out of the gate
and fled in the direction of the public market of Sto Niño. (TSN, June 27, 1988, pp. 7-10)
Appellant Eduardo Gelaver admitted killing his wife but claimed that he did so after
catching her having carnal act with her paramour. Appellants version of the killing was that
when his wife saw him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her paramour immediately stood up,
took a knife placed on top of the bedside table and attacked appellant. The latter was able to
wrest possession of the knife and then used it against the paramour, who evaded the thrusts of
the appellant by hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received the stab
intended for the paramour.
As to why he continued to stab his wife, appellant said that his mind had been
"dimmed" or overpowered by passion and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act
with her paramour.
Issue: Whether or not the accused guilty of the crime parricide?
Held:
Yes. Appellant's claim that on the day prior to his killing of the victim, his daughter
Sheryl had confided to him that her mother was living with a paramour at the house in front of
the Sto. Niño Catholic Church was belied by Sheryl herself. In her testimony, she stated that she
did not know the house where the crime was committed and she had not gone to that place.
She further testified that she had not seen her mother in any other house except that of her
grandfather's. (TSN, January 17, 1989, p. 5)
If there was a naked man with the victim, he would have had no time to get dressed
because he was then under attack by appellant. There would then have been the spectacle of a
man in the nude running in the streets.
People of the Philippines vs. Gonzales, Jr.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Inocencio Gonzales, Jr., accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001

FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accused-appellant were
both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were
driving almost collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked
from his car and went over to Gonzales’. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of
Inocencio, entered the scene in defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took
out the gun which was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalez’s daughter,
Trisha, hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free
his hand and with Trisha’s substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance
and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noel’s wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth
and nephew Kevin were wounded.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to
the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and the parents of Kevin Valdez.
Hence, an automatic review or this case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was present in the
commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate voluntary
surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong be considered as mitigating circumstances.

RULINGS:
1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not
attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode
of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victim’s
provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses
and insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive
behavior of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of
reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the
accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of
a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly
proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness
contradicts the appellant’s pretense of voluntary surrender.

The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining.

Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the
provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation
varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres
towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient
provocation to shoot at the complainant’s vehicle.

The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a
relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant
and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez.

Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining
when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a
wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed
and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun, although not deliberately
sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of
the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting
crimes committed.

People v. Bates (G.R. No. 139907)

Facts:
Around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 1995, Edgar Fuentes, Simon Fuentes and Jose Boholst
left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green
Valley, Ormoc City. After delivering copra around 5:00 in the afternoon, the three men headed back to
Barangay Esperanza. While they were along a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter
suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose
Boholst who was then walking ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed Carlito’s right hand and elbow
and tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While the two were grappling for possession,
the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his
son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the banana
plantation each brandishing a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking him several times. Jose fell
to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Marcelo, then, turned to Simon
and Edgar and shouted “huwes de kutsilyo”. Upon hearing the same, Simon and Edgar ran. Upholding
the prosecution evidence, the trial court rendered its Judgment, finding Marcelo Bates guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

Issue:
Whether or not Marcelo could validly invoke the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation?
Decision:
Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of appellant. To be
considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful
sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the
present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing is brother, Carlito, shot by Jose.
However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the
second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the
latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything else after that, he could
have validly invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon
seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate
on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of
anger in the spirit of revenge.

Voluntary surrender or plea of guilt

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANCISCO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-45284 December 29, 1936
AVANCEÑA, C.J.

FACTS:
1. Francisco de la Cruz, Fernando Legaspi and three other persons whose identities are still unknown,
confederating together and helping one another and with intent of gain, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Yu Wan and afterwards took, stole and carried away with him twenty-
six (P26) pesos in cash.

2. That the said accused Francisco de la Cruz is a habitual delinquent under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, he having been previously convicted once of the crime of theft and twice of
the crime of estafa, by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent courts, having been last
convicted on July 24, 1933.

3. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.

4. During the trial and after two witnesses for the prosecution had testified, the accused withdrew
their plea of not guilty, substituting it by that of guilty.

5. The facts charged constitute the crime of robbery defined in article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code and punished by the penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor in its medium
period.

6. The court sentenced Francisco de la Cruz to six months and one day of prision correccional and,
considering him a habitual delinquent, sentenced him furthermore to the additional penalty of six
years and one day of prision mayor. Francisco de la Cruz appealed for this sentence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dela Cruz may avail of plea of guilt as a mitigating circumstance? No.
 RULING: AFFIRMED.
Wherefore, eliminating the additional penalty by reason of habitual delinquency, considering the
presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime without any mitigating
circumstance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is sentenced to the
penalty of from six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six years, ten months and one day
of prision mayor, as maximum, affirming the appealed sentence in all other respects, with the
costs.
RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Dela Cruz’s plea of guilty does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under article 13,
subsection 7, of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that this plea be spontaneous and that it
be made prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution.

2. It is clear that these benefits are not deserved by the accused who submits to the law only after
the presentation of some evidence for the prosecution, believing that in the end the trial will
result in his conviction by virtue thereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILLIE AMAGUIN, GILDO AMAGUIN AND CELSO
AMAGUIN, accused.
January 10, 1994
(Accused) brothers Willie, Gildo and Celso, all surnamed Amaguin, being charged with the murder of the
Oro brothers Pacifico and Diosdado.
Facts: On their way to the plaza, Pacifico (deceased) was called by accused Celso Amaguin. After the
refusal of the deceased, the accused, Celso, with a butcher's knife in hand, rushed towards Pacifico.
Gildo, Celso's younger brother, followed with a knife and slingshot.
Celso hacked Pacifico. Gildo then stabbed Diosdado with a knife. Thereafter, Willie, the eldest of the
Amaguin brothers, appeared with a handgun and successively shot the brothers Pacifico, Diosdado and
the fleeing Danilo.
Diosdado, own kneeling, gasping for breath and pleading for his life, was again shot by Willie who next
fired anew at Pacifico. Meanwhile, Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed Pacifico who already lying
prostrate and defenseless.
*Other survivors also gave their respective versions.
The defense however maintains that it was the Oro brothers who started the fight. Accused Gildo
Amaguin recounted that Pacifico with five others went to their house and approached his brother Celso
and there deceased together with his companions initiated a fight.
Nenita Amaguin, mother of the accused brothers, affirmed that her son Celso was indeed troublesome,
but added that Willie had no prior violations against the law.
After a joint trial and finding the version of the prosecution to be more credible, the CIF of Iloilo found
Gildo Amaguin, guilty of murder and Willie Amaguin as accomplice.
Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor of the
accused?
Ruling: Yes. While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact
is, they voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be effected. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (a)
the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. All these requisites appear to have attended their
surrender.
People v. Dawaton (G.R. No. 146247)
TOPIC: CONFESSION OF GUILT

FACTS:
Edgar Dawaton was found guilty by the trial court of murder qualified by treachery and
was sentenced to death. On 20 September 1998, Leonidas Lavares and several companions,
including Dawaton were drinking in the house of the accused’s uncle. Already drunk, Leonidas
Lavares decided to sleep while the accused and his companions continued drinking. Dawaton
awakened Lavares by stabbing him at the base of the neck. Dawaton continued stabbing Lavares
until the victim died. Dawaton then ran away to the house of his other relative, where he was
later on arrested by the police.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty of death imposed by the trial court upon the accused was
correct?

RULING/ RATIO:
No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not considering the alternative
circumstance of intoxication in favor of the accused. “Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code,
intoxication of the offender shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender
commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan
to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. The allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the
crime was corroborated by the prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking companions
had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo Cortez, each one drinking at
least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four (4) shared another bottle of gin at the
house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its contents.” The Court
further stated that “Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the
commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended
the killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be
sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.”