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CASE DIGEST: Sanders vs.

Veridiano II

Sanders vs. Veridiano II


No. L-46930 | 1988, June 10
Petitioner: Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, jr.
Respondent: Hon. Regino, Veridiano II (presiding Judge, CFI Zambales, Olongapo)
Anthony M. Rossi and Ralph L. Wyers
CRUZ, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which
includes the said station. Private respondents were American citizens with permanent address in the
Phil and were both game room attendants of the NAVSTA.
Herein respondents were then advised that there employment was changed from permanent full
time to permanent part-time. They filed a case of the US Dept. of Defense then was gave a
recommendation for their reinstatement. The controversy of the case was when Sanders sent a letter
to Moreau that he disagrees with the recommendation. Because of the letters private respondents
filed a case with CFI of Zambales, the plaintiffs claim that the letters contains libelous content and has
caused them the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings.
The lower court ruled that the defendants acted maliciously and in bad faith. Motion to lift the
default order and motion for reconsideration of the denial on the motion to dismiss which was
subsequently denied by the respondent court.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction
Whether or not petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the
acts where they are sued for damages.

Ratio:
Since the facts lead to that the petitioners are acting in the discharge of their official duties, the
petitioners are being sued as gov’t. Officials of USA. If the trial will proceed damages will not be on
the petitioner’s personal capacity but of the petitioner’s principal. The USA government. Thus making
the action a suit against that government without its consent. The government of the United States
has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered against them
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are sued by are acts in
the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA had supervision of its personnel and matters relating to their work and employment. As for
Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
with the conversion of the private respondent’s type of employment even before the grievance
proceedings had even commenced.
Decision/ Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8, 1977, August 9, 1977,
and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No.
2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26, 1977, I made PERMANENT. No costs SO
ORDERED.

Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

Facts:

Farmer-rallyists(KMP), led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and
demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by
landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments; There was a marchers-police confrontation
which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino
issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an
investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the
deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic
and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity


(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held:

The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The
recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims
does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the
creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as
the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the
recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State. The State cannot be made
liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries
suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State
as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the
atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts
cannot be considered official. RELEVANT INFOS that maybe asked: In the aftermath of the
confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O. 11, for
brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was
composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court
Festejo vs. Fernando
FACTS:

Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando, Director of the Bureau of Public Works,
for taking possession of three parcels of land she owned and causing an irrigation canal to be
constructed thereon without obtaining first a right of way, without her consent and knowledge
, and against her express objection. Festejo demanded the return of the land and its
restoration to its former condition.

ISSUE:

Is the Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?

HELD:

Defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the
boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former
condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties
imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land
southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land
appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before construction began.

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be
sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his
tortious act.

If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him
by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or


otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may
thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power
conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting
under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly
without authority.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (Festejo vs.
Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954)
USA VS GUINTO

G.R. No. 76607 182 SCRA 644 February 26, 1990


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City,
ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

Facts:

The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case
at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not
consented.

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Among those who submitted
their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.

The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had
made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and
the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions
and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions
pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the
ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability, but trial court
denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts
done by them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions:

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such
society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other
states.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the
state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.

Rulings:
The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial
enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their
facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the
grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.
Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United
States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not
involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity of the record
in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not
before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the
basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded
to the court below for further proceedings.
__________________________________________________________________________________________

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. CA


G.R. No. 91359, September 25, 1992
Grino-Aquino, J.

Facts:
The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487(otherwise known as the “Private
Security Agency Law”), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint:

SEC. 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. - Any Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership,
or association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is owned and
controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no person shall
organize or have an interest in, more than one such agency except those which are already existing at the
promulgation of this Decree: x x x.” (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)

SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. -The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in
consultation with the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators ,Inc. and subject to
the provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
purpose of this Act.”

VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and
institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which
is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying
Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for
the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades,
requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO
Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located...”. As such membership
requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against
monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.

On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within
Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.

On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline
recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security
agency (Annex D, Petition).

The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license.

As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one.

VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO
and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from
PADPAO

Issue:

Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State
without its consent

Held:
Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution).
Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government
exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued
without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel
the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory
damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s
fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be
enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded.
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC¬-SUSIA
are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice,
gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.

The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the
legal nature of the act.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to
professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of
security services, clearly, a governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the
purpose of R.A.5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen or security guard agencies.

__________________________________________________________________________________________
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