G.R. No.
174689             October 22, 2007 He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
 identified himself with girls since childhood.1  Feeling trapped in a
vs.
 man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind!
Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice.
All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human
beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular,
does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel,
drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the
birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila
to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on
April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
1
male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery2  in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to
be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of
Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4  in favor of
petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment
or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief
asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be
more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his
sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and
acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will
be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On
the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to
deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof.
Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru
the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6  It
alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in
favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked
legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex
in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set
aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP
Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
2
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition
for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but  solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.11  A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error
Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1.  Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can
be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power
and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change
of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down
the corresponding venue,16  form17  and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name
may be allowed:
SECTION 4.  Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.  – The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any
of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with
the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18  RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
3
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that
is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue
as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit
since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at
all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To
Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is
a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21  In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22  Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical
error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
xxx       xxx       xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in
the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records:  Provided, however,  That no  correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles
407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25  However,
4
no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and
sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain  acts  (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization),  events  (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and  judicial decrees  (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality
of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned
by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that
is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of
his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations,  more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28  (emphasis
supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It
is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection,
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5.  Registration and certification of births.  – The declaration of
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth,
by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b)  sex  and
nationality  of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents
or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other
data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of
the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29  Thus,  the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other
5
laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary
usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female"32  or "the distinction
between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young"34  and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35  Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels
to the contrary."36  Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot
be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or
Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the
petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself
found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his
eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly
to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women,39  certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40  and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people
whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or Costs against petitioner.
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for SO ORDERED.
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia,
JJ., concur.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose
to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition
of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted
are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of
first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry,
where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on

when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his
sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no
law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-
equal branch of government, Congress.

6
 G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
 schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
vs.

LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t
of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1  of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2  of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC).
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent
Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were
married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and
to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of
a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied
and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of
both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
7
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab
initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as
void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid
a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed
to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties
went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States
and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not
pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC
issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for
want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed
the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was
similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never
intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to
live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWW HEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire
American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both
parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly
and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent
should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the
concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented
to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.
8
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9  to the petition,
reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by
way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10  reiterating its
arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a
marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This
has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of
availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a
couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11  A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually
concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely
to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15  established the principal test for determining the presence
of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together
at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining
the intention of evading immigration laws.16  It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes
and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a
sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the
notable case of United States v. Rubenstein17  was promulgated,
wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties
had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce
within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that
a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in
the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all.
Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a
marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a
marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the
spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such
to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an
end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have
never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into
the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v.
Hellenic Lines,19  which declared as valid a marriage entered into
solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20  The 1980 immigration case of
9
Matter of McKee,21  further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has,
therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in
order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22  At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when
a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that
the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage
to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship
in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or
build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’
supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent
is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given"
consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.25  Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in
jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke,
with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter
into such a relation.27  It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence,
the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab
initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
10
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for
any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.  Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a
valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship.
There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is
for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility
that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish
a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that
the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is
no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void
or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on.30  Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in
a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to
utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage
void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a
sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab
initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is
ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack
of merit.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of SO ORDERED.

fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances
listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely,
(1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another
man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of
the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the
ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party.
In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of

marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits,
or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it
to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable

social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave

11
 G.R. No. L-14628             September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., Respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima,
from a decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as
complainant, filed with said court of first instance a complaint for
the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural
child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and
moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted
the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the
later, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.
Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27,
1954, to pay, by way of alimony  pendente lite,  P50.00 a month,
which was, on February 16 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In
due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive
part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the
child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of
defendant, and! confirming the order pendente lite, ordering
defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum
of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of
every month; sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the
sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages;
and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as
attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant."
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory
12
damages and the moral damages, which were increased to
P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are
recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The
pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950,
Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in
Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than
she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged,
although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In
1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance under
writer in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her
and the petitioner, since one evening, in 1953, when after coming
from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board
M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot.
In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the
family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris
Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity
and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that
the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for
breach of promise to marry. Articles 43 and 44 of said Code
provides:
ART. 43. "A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise
to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall
entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such
promise is sought."
ART. 44. "If the promise has been in a public or private
instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence
of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration
of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the
 one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be
obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or
she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
"The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the
foregoing article refers must be brought within one year,
computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the
marriage.”
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philipipnes,
this Court ruled in De Jesus  vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced *
* * upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged
with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines
deemed it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from
the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
"Articles 43 and 44 of the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the
promise of marriage. But these articles are not in force in
the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the proposed
Civil Code not only as to the aspects treated of in said
articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to
furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might
arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed
are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in
case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating
liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.”
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said
Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
"ART. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly
or impliedly."
"ART. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed x
directly by the future spouses."
13
"ART. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without
the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a
male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a
female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years.
Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the
engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for
damages in case of breach of the promise."
"ART. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under
the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even
though approved by the parent or guardian."
"ART. 60. In cases referred to in the preceding articles, the
criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction shall
not be affected."
"ART. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual
promise to marry may be brought."
"ART. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be
brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor without
the assistance of his or her parent or guardian. Should the
minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may
institute the action."
"ART. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall
include not only material and pecuniary losses but also
compensation for mental and moral suffering."
ART. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents,
guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who
causes a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable
for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged
person who is rejected."
"ART. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party
breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what he
or she has received from the other as gift on account of the
promise of the marriage."
These articles were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason
therefor are set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate
Committee, from which we quote:
"The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in
the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach
of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in
many of the American States.
"The Commission perhaps thought that it has followed the
more progressive trend in legislation when it provided for
breach cf promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the
creation of such causes of action at a time when so many
States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away
with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong
direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday,
May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)”
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of
Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law
making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower court is,
accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said in justification of
said award:
"Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's
seductive powers, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for
him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-
control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-
appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may
be recovered from him under the provisions of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code."
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219,
particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the one
14
cited by the Court' of Appeals, and the language used in said
paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein
contemplated is the  crime  punished as such in Articles 337 and
338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in
the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is  morally  guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who
was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened
as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a
mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance
found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bifid"
him "by paving a fruit of their engagement even before they had the
benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the
following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the
child; (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had
allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the
birth of the child, as actual and compensatory damages; (3)
P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The
Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25
consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance,
in connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing
expenses incurred to support the child and increased the moral
damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for moral damages, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other
respects, without special pronouncement as to costs in this
instance. It is so ordered.
 G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
 fees; and the costs.
vs.

FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes,
followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but
terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as
the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-
be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving
on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That
would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared
in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as
commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
15
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders,
judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on
August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear
before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It
added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief
and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead,
on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks
the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that
he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's
residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the
court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his
counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its
order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear
on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed
the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's
aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his
petition of June 21, 1955 in the court  a quo  defendant alleged
excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default.
Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief
that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an
affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his
petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the
plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this
stating mere conclusions or opinions instead  of facts  is not valid.
(Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P.
Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in
fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought
to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence
adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of  Pangasinan vs.
Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive
evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court.
Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not
have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no
standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of
First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant
asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that
"there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for
breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in  Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise
to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the
provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not
contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant
applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued
(Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations
16
were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn.,
5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for
the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid
of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received
(Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before
the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of  mere  breach of promise to marry. As stated,
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded
were excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages.
What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral
and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally
eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said
Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could
not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil
Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive
manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages
is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the
lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
 A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and
APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
 without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples
vs.
 were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B.
ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo,
and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and
Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia
B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of
Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged
with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery
in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of
receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained
prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted
entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their
respective Comments.  2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed
by complainants.  3  The case was thereafter referred to Executive
Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for
investigation report and recommendation. The case was however
transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when
Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin
of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual
antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the records
thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
17
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts
(Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign
their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts
were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon
Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the
marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of
Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile to her,
especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing
a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately
when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is
in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the
parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the
local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage
contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant
Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts
were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting
parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to
do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between
Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that
he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple
a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by
securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a
copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five
marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him
and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of
these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo;
that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga,
and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by
him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage
license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of
the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at
any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains
unsigned up to the present.
2.  Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the
number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents
notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized
seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did
not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that
respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six
(6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that
there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were
notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial
fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected
P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry
where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered is
under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for
18
the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely
based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the
custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is
likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held
accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial
fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by
Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by
receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the
Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150
goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent
theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were
manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in
charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of
marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo;
that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on
solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid
for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were
actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992
which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that
it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted
payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the
Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is
merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of
court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one
supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has
the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of
court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog.
However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for
duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that
respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-
new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she
purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk
of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer
needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent
judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was
with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for
the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole
authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the
appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-
conditioning unit was bought from his
 employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate household
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months
after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he
would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could
not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs.
Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by
respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she
paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor
nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid;
that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to
the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the
former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court
and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash
bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman
desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure
therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was
archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the
accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the
payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
19
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention
prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is
accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge,
the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal
this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by
respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never
help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been
pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein
remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the
Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is
exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the
corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in
her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon
Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick leave) who
instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank;
that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by
the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was
instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that
respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the
check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and
the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge
Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and
Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the
administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and
we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive
presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We
commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity
reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply
substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we
hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material
portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized
without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina
Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B),
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh.
F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage
contracts to show the number of the marriage was solemnized as
required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the
contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts,
Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts,
except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed
their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this
marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In
said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of
their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent
either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of
the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The
testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses
of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken
when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9)
sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their
marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was
20
solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the
meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife
believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage
license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage
certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties and the
Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that
they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was
actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the
contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as
if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the
wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited
and the place of the parties where the reception would be held was
more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact
alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the
same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar
were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by
themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya
and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with
their marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to
the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon
and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,

K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly
be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two
pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge
Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon
would allows himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a
marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know
for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and
unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of
deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by
him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge
Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims
that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license
was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it
was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18)
years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had
been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit,
Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he
started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge
Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized
their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in
order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a
marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge
Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for
the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all
because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that
the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he
solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
21
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano
and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only
gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the
marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge
Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true
that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character
where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require
the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their
marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of
Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage
certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized
and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those
grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which
declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however,
received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid
(Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just
absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are
not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the
Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of
their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido
(Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo
and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that
Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and
Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that
actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they
did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both
admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They
were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario
by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and
sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their two
(2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and
F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee
was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by
respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of
Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license. On
her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was
solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign the
marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the
marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon.
She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the
two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she
did not even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the
marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and
their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the
solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize
their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon
submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to
corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify
in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been
that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his
chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant
Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the
marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign
their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and
Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his
precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of
three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
 stating in the monthly report the actual number of documents
2-1-94).
22
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to
be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take
each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign
their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his
alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not
true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and
Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy
herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been
to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage
contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage
(TSN, p. 53;

10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he
was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On
the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his
court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized
only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly
report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized
only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages,
respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence
several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H).
These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this
case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are
immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized
these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he
solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified
the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not
notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees,
have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the
monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for said
month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in
his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The
notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however,
shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly
report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6)
notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts.
He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts
showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid.
Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the number of
documents notarized should not be based on how many notarized
documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of
documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and
checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he
relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has
assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the
monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is
required to have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly
report of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge
he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions
(The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In
Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot
take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court
personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification
of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she
allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but
23
the preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has
assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform,
yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial
register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in
a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as
he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the data
given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether the
report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in
custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as
clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full
control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11;
11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of
falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not
account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those
documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992.
The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she
received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or
to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary
receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have
been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents
notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as
recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only
five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the
notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents
actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized as appearing
in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo
declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00.
Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court
and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really
sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each
document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional
notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering
that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by
her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization
fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she
admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees
were not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a
demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not
know of any instance when solemnization fee was returned when the
marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to
her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not
only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the
conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January
20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the
court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo,
particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she
claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents
notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never
was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees
supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she
issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding
meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs.
V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and
8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash
bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and
for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She
24
did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground
that the parties in that case where the cash bond was deposited
informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this
administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The
Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account
with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she
deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to
8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial
deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after
keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it
because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara,
she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the
court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months
after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p.
6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28,
1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an
annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just
kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She
did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer.
Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed
her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993,
or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order
for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash
bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She
further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued she
failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked
Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know
that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was
only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she
only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner
for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos
(Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check
(Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in
order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still
placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for
Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down
payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the
respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh.
22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal
Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was
bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant
position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in
October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on
August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge
Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was
only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992
when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt
as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk
of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give
rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such
action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct
25
should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs.
Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash
bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria
Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt
for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit,
however, has no probative value as she did not show that this cash
bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy
who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed
earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention
prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped while in his
custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against
said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence
adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim.
Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and
Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on
April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence
presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the
municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped
while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly
that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The
complainants should have presented records from the police of
Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal
jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused
escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim.
Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The
order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records
show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but
up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of
arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case,
however, show that in fact there was a return of the service of the
warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe
were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992
archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused
who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted because
the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge
Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who
allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the
municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case
archived was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped.
This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the
case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should
have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought
to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he
should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he
could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered
archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that he only
heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a
suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody
only that the complainants could not present records or other
documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing
fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing
fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was deposited
by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The
evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of
Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it
paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing
filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as
amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing
fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on
loans they obtained.
26
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of
the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent
Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on
sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the
filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a
letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect
that if the bank would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases
for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of
Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant
to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to
have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have them
dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February
4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over
to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an
undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable
officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the
complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it
having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely
supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report
of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the
months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven that
the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect to the
number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that
he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a
warning that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt
with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show
when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was
not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him
from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage
license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the
irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of
marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines,
he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to
comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58
SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of
cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be
accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify the
records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not
contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge
behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-
Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of
cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the
number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the
notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having
failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages
allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not
returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of
which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara
on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for
depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26,
1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and after
this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court
order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for
receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from
Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt
(Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the
Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring
27
the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on
February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the
amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said
amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is
respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk
of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or
municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot
be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of
Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for
Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall
immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from
party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the
municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be
withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular
No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme
Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides
that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental
deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court
concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of
such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court
exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing
circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated
them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the
obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of
court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown
by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her
removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam,
Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414;
August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized
to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November
25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure
to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious
misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty
and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
x x x           x x x          x x x
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every
employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.  5  Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity.  6  It applies, without qualification as to rank or position,
from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-
bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a
Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently
provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein.  7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. 8
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be
imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one,
with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the
law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects
flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the
other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate
such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the
performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on
respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that
any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will
definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to
the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those

affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein
pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or
sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the
provisions of the Marriage Law."9  This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

28
 [A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000.]
ZENAIDA S. BESO, Complainant, v. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN,
MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged
with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit
dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and
of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage
contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging —
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A.
YMAN got married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic)
Juan Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City,
Samar; . . .
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who
acted as our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and
TERESITA DEAN; . . .
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDINO YMAN
abandoned me without any reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog
City and wrote the city Civil Registrar to inquire regarding my
Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of
Calbayog City that my marriage was not registered; . . .
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge
Juan Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman
that all the copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy
(Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial
to my interest such as:
29
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not
registering our marriage before the office of the local
Civil Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge
for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman
had to be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside
his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the
following and pressing circumstances:
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically
indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.
Margarita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior
appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly
came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and
there, first, because complainants said she must leave that
same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as
scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town
for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious
problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary
Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panlungsod [member]
Ramon Dean were already with them as sponsors; third, if
they failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant
would be out of the country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse and necessitate another
publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their
plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it
would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all
other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were
considered impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired
cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage, which respondent found
all in order.
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas
worker, who, respondent realized, deserved more than
ordinary official attention under present Government policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in
good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law
so that it may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of
the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure
was also occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of
respondent:
3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage
certificate, respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the
desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to
keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all
the papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent
search in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of the
certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by
subpoena . . . Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents and
he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was
too late to contact complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman’s
claim.
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she
is out of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the
basis of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the
claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her
husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason . . . but that
said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA
DANGUYAN." . . it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage
contracting parties probably absconded with the missing copies of the
marriage certificate.
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse
but to protect the public interest by trying all possible means to
recover custody of the missing documents in some amicable way
during the expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the
City of Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer
with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of
reconstituted copies of said documents.
30
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report
dated August 11, 1998 found that respondent Judge." committed non-
feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or
future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no
longer within his area of jurisdiction.”
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of
the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge
outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the
point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote
place;
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty
when he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito
Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family
Code which provides:
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies
of the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the
local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. . ." (Emphasis ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the
respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office, he also
undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social
institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed to
locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he
should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As
a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to be conscientious
in handling official documents. His imputation that the missing copies
of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based
merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being
devoid of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the court
finds the evaluation report of the OCA well-taken.
Jimenez v. Republic 1 underscores the importance of marriage as a
social institution thus:" [M]arriage in this country is an institution in
which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it
with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence.
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It
is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community
to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."cralaw virtua1aw
library
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family
Code provides, among others, that —
"ARTICLE 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(i) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ARTICLE 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in
the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the
point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
31
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect." (Emphasis
ours)
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held
outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance
with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her
fiancé Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither
was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his
chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on
record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant
was" [a ]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more
than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in
question," [h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning
on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married." 
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but
must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without
resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. 2 A judge is not only bound
by oath to apply the law; 3 he must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so. 4 Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature
of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their
duties. 5
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his
hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to
degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of
social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent’s
cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more
disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage
and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.

An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws — let alone that
enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social
institution as marriage — and the stability of judicial doctrines laid
down by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause
and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the
performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A Judge is,
furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
authority or jurisdiction of his court. 6 Thus respondent Judge should
be reminded that —
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese
or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law
are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability. 7
Considering that respondent Judge’s jurisdiction covers the
municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
Calbayog. 8
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate
that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority
and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise
commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is
properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code
which states in no uncertain terms that —
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the
marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other
than those mentioned in Article 8. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that
respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling official
documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring
that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are
intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous
events. 9 However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judge’s part. This Court reiterates that
judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their
dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business. 10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one
directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.
11
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent
Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby
FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

ARTICLE 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the

marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the
marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate
and triplicate of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the
marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil
registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
32
 G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
 Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer, submitted his necropsy
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court,
Fourteenth Judicial District, Cebu-Bohol (now Regional Trial Court),
finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of  reclusion perpetua,  with the accessory penalties of the law; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Susana Taborada-Borromeo, in the
sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Records show that at high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old
niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada,
mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help
because Elias was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told
the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then working
in their mango plantation. Upon hearing the report of the child,
Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana's hut.
The windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep
through the bamboo slats at the wall where he saw Susana lying
down, motionless, apparently dead beside her one-month old child
who was crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on
to a bloody kitchen bolo.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes,
police officer Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. The
peace officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. Elias
answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would open the
door. When he did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her
intestine having spilled out of her abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was
at her side.
33
When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble
incoherent words.
report (Exhibits "A" & "B") which states that the cause of death was
"stab wounds, multiple chest, abdomen, left supraclavicular region
and left shoulder." There were five (5) incised wounds and six (6) stab
wounds on the deceased.
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in
holding as it did that appellant and Susana Taborada (the deceased)
were legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when
the officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage
contract executed on the occasion or later on; hence, the accused
could only be liable for homicide; (2) in failing to appreciate in favor
of appellant the mitigating circumstances of provocation or
obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same; and, (3) in convicting appellant of
the crime of parricide and in imposing upon him the penultimate
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with "the trial court's finding to
the effect that he killed Susana Taborada (the deceased) without legal
justification" The main issue raised by him is that he and Susana were
not legally married and therefore the crime committed is not
parricide, but homicide.
Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence of
marriage in order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his
client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-
victim was his legitimate wife. Hereunder is his testimony on this
point: 
Q Please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?
A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old, married, farmer, resident of
Putingbato, Babag Cebu City.
The COURT: 
 Q You say you are married, who is your wife? as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and
law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216) The presumption in favor
A Susana Taborada. of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The law presumes
morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage:
Q When did you get married with Susana Taborada? legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that persons
living together as husband and wife are married to each other. The
A I forgot. reason for this presumption of marriage is well stated in  Perido vs.
Perido, 63 SCRA 97, thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Q Where did you get married?

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

A Near the RCPI station in Babag.
marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation,
Q There is a church there?
an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
A There is a chapel. legal matrimony. ...

Q Were you married by a priest or a minister? And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry
of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the
A By a priest. celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not
Q Who is this priest? one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849).

A Father Binghay of Guadalupe.
Q Do you have any children with Susana Taborada?
A We have one.
Q How old is the child?
A I already forgot, I have been here for quite a long time already. (pp.
4-5, tsn., December 12, 1981 hearing)
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused
of the existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA
525).
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to say that the
penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. (Article 246,
Revised Penal Code) Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, provides that where the law prescribed a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstances, with no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, assuming the presence of the
mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same,
the penalty is still reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to
P30,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.

34
 G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998 In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on
the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,
 that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive
vs.
 prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed:9
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES
TRINIDAD, respondents. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.

In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioner's]

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may
marriage and filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review
on  certiorari  challenging the Court of Appeals  1  Decision
promulgated December 1, 19942  and Resolution promulgated on
February 8, 19953  in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the
decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioner's action for
partition and damages.
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a
complaint  4  for partition and damages against Private Respondents
Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First
Instance of Aklan, Branch I.  5  On October 25, 1982, Felix died
without issue, so he was not substituted as a party.6
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision  7 in
favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:8
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is
the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit
the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of
land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified
that he had been receiving [his] share from said land before and the
same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year
he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore
cannot rule on that.
complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution
which reads: 10
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants' motion for reconsideration,
dated December 15, 1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or
substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the modification of
the decision.
Hence, this petition. 11
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as
follows: 12
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court
of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four
(4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of
the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio
Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio
Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three
(3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff
demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3)
equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of
his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that
plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants

35
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 , before
plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with
them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint
had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940
and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the
land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3)
children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in
1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of
land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty
three (23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the
defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned
into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3)
individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both
parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial
court's decision: 13
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at
the time she testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being
elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-
woman for 4 years.
Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-
Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the
plaintiff because they are neighbors and she knows him from the time
of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad
and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were already dead, Inocentes
having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness recalls
36
plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July
21, 1943.
At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was
about 30 meters away from plaintiff's parents['] house and she used to
go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the defendants as
they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the
uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father
of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad.
She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and
Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is
already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels
subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land
because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels
of land, witness answered and mentioned the respective adjoining
owners. That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad
because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon.
Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went
to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the
land was never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of
Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and
she identified a woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes
Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as
Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was
pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad.
When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix
Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix
and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case,
witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for
identification. She testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes
Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which
witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the
court when . . . the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff
answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized,
witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his parents.
Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C.
The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name
of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother
respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July
21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was
also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in
question very well as she used to pass by it always. It was located just
near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely
passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the
pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not
know as she was not present during the picture taking. However, she
can identify everybody in the picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he
was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-
defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years
old and a widow. She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the
father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are
brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left
them 4 parcels of land.
That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the
parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington,
Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay.
That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well
because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to
invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and
harvesting season.
37
That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of
them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4
parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio.
That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession
of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the
produce.
As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she
was the one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the
present. The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes,
Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about
3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio
was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he
was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding
later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his father's share
but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He
testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and
uncle, they being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents
of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia
Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother,
Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father
having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato,
he showed a certificate of baptism which had been previously marked
as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned during World War 2
hut he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo,
Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with
them being their nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiff's
mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated him well and
provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the
age of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived on his own. He
got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by
the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and children lived
with the defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the
defendants when the latter invited him to live with them, he presented
a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt,
Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's daughter, his uncle and his wife.
In short, it is a family picture according to him.
Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle,
defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's son. According to him,
these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were
living with the defendants. That a few years after having lived with
them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for
partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked for [a]
lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in
controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and
fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months and
the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are: East-
Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo
Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has
only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located in
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are: East-Ambrosio
Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio, West-Patricio Trinidad and
South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs
to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the defendants and
Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The
harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners
are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-
Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
38
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and
only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters is the subject
of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo
covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one of the
owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia
Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502
RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo.
The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to
Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of
Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No.
10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax
Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio
Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in
the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his
mother they were getting the share in the produce of the land like
coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is
Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were
married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When
asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington,
Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he was not yet
born at that time.
That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in
1944 because it was wartime. That after the death of his father, he
lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his
aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of
his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of the
land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are
single and they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioner's]
highest educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old,
unemployed and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified
having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being
his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name
of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and brother. That he also
knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes and
he is already dead.
According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at
the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he
knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad
he was then residing with his aunt, "Nanay Taya", referring to
Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death
of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his
aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children before 1940 for only 3
months.
When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody
before his death, he answered, "That I do not know", neither does he
kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when
asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad
witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived
as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could
not recall because he was then in Manila working. That after the war,
he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon,
Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not
know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after the death of
Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the
defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness,
Pedro Briones, answered: "I do not know about that."
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he stated to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the
hereditary property of their father was located there. When asked if he
was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this
case before the court, witness answered that he does not know. What
39
he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is
the eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940,
according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was
around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia
Briones, was already dead before the war. When asked on cross
examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he
died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own land
because the Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When
confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the
plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in
the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes
Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as
Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES
TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single and jobless. She
testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already
dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the
death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where
he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in 1941. According
to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While his brother was
in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had married
anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did
[not] get married. When asked if she knew one by the name of
Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because Felicidad
Molato was staying in Tigayon.
However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother,
Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and
wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said,
"Yes," but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with them.
According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the
defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of Maria
Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When
asked by the court if there had been an instance when the plaintiff had
lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When
further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness
also said, "He did not."
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad
testified that her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had
3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But
inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only
remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia
Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix
Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that
her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and children. She
herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she
has [no] husband or children.
According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they
buried him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry
his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was
occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that
I[t] could not be true that Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941
because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was
still peace time, the witness could not answer the question. When she
was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture
wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she
answered; "Yes." and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad,
child of Arturio Trinidad.
According to her, she was only requested to hold this child to be
brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the
baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there
was a party, she answered; "Maybe there was."
When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture
carrying the child, witness identified herself and explained that she
was requested to bring the child to the church and that the picture
taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latter's
child was taken during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not
have a case in court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat
holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix.
When asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is
another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does not know
because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to
40
identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child
held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that she
cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can she
identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture
for the same reason.
When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who
took this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of
Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she
does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who
testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor
in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the defendants,
Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they
were her cousins.
She testified that a few months after the war broke out Inocentes
Trinidad died in their lola's house whose names was Eugenia Rufo
Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost
in his lifetime in Manila and he went home only when his father
fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That according to
her, about 1 1/2 months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes
Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and
that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad.
According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died.
According to her she was horn in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14
years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can remember
that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when the
Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further
testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because
Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would
carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who
was 76 years old and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified
that . . . she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents]
in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from
them. When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes Trinidad,
[Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for
15 days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year
because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived
with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the
street from her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not
true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the
name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was
personally present when couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a
protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes
Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in good physical condition. That
she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics
but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a
Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That during the
marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad
and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal
witness, he was not able to present a marriage contract of his parents
but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one
Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births,
deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were
destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Court's Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of
the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled: 14
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced
sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final
41
judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument,
or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for
the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single
in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the
plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New
Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the
protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n.
Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of
the marriage, nor of Inocentes' acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son,
who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs.
Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the interested parties openly and
adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership
(Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive
prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly,
the defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved
in the concept of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if
possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of
majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10)
years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription
(Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: 15
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by
preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced
sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix
and Lourdes Trinidad.
 3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,]
the decision of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on
July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August 3,
1988.
4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a legitimate child can be
attached collaterally by the private respondents.
5. Whether or not of private respondent (defendants-appellants) have
acquired ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive
prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage
and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to collateral
attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive
prescription?
The Court's Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio's
real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner
or co-heir of the decedent's estate.  16 His right as a co-owner would, in
turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative
father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully
discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision
and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the
contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule
does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and
the evidence adduced in this case. 17
42
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother
(Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the
subsistence of their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he
failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias 18 ruled that when the question of
whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the
following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a
witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such
nuptial in subsequent documents. 19
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification  20 from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages
were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of
said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case.
Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the
marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its
place. 21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by
petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the
nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported
themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year
old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local
parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house
twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away.22 On July 21,
1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth to
petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal party held at the same
house.  23  Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation
respecting marriage.  24  It further gives rise to the disputable
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.  25  Petitioner
also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and
Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother. 26
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
 Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a
final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of
a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document,
final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. 27
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence of proof in his favor
that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such
evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses,
and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
[Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil.
1988 ed., p. 246]

Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the

Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification  28 that records relative to
Trinidad family by either consanguinity or affinity,  32 her testimony does
his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when
not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by
the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his
itself, be used to establish petitioner's legitimacy.
filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal
certificate and Gerardo's testimony.
Be that as it may, the  totality  of petitioner's positive evidence clearly
preponderates over private respondents' self-serving negations. In sum,
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying
private respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue
his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix
in March 1941. Private respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified that
Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes
Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads,
Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes
because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo,
Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2). These
which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however,
pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not
is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three
directly prove petitioner's filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner
months, and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and
was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante
evasive: 33
litem motam.
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes
Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she Trinidad was married or not?
admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the
petitioner's daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was A: Not married.
requested to carry the child before she was baptized.  29  When shown
Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother — but not petitioner, his wife
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were
and the couple's children — slyly explaining that she could not clearly see you residing?
because of an alleged eye defect. 30
A: I was staying with them.
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of
filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules of Court Q: When you said "them", to whom are you referring to [sic]?
and special laws" to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in  Mendoza
vs. Court of Appeals: 31
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.

43
 x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your
aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was
single. Do you know if he had cohabited with anybody before his
death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you
have known of anybody with whom he has lived as husband and
wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of
your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was
anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son
of Inocentes Trinidad?
44
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified, that
when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes
from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their
grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in
March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew
Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that
Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes. 34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7,
1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not
convinced that Inocentes dies in March 1941.  35  The Japanese forces
occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942;  36  thus, it stands to reason
that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local
residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery In Kalibo,
because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area. 37
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad)
without objection from private respondents — a presumptive proof of his
status as Inocentes' legitimate child. 38
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by
one side outweighs that of the adverse party.  39  Compared to the
detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent
Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to
Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of
evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of
the case, including the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal
credibility.  40  Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and
convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioner's favor. It
declared:
. . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants
enjoying the status of being their nephew . . . before plaintiff [had] gotten
married and had a family of his own where later on he started demanding
for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff
had so lived with the defendants . . . is shown by the alleged family
pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were taken at a time when
plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his father's share. . . . His
demand for the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the
defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. . . . In this case, the
plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which
status was only broken when plaintiff demanded for the partition . . . as
he was already having a family of his own. . . . .
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein],
Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is
offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of
witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was
already 77 years old at the time she testified. Said witness had no reason
to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and the court sized her
up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in this case as
compared to the witness for the defendants who are either cousin or
nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant,
Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor
children. 41
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted.  42  Rather
than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his
filiation and of his parents' marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule
on the application of this doctrine to petitioner's cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in
when one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the
property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private
respondents had been in possession — in the concept of owners — of the
parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired
ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of
the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership,
the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former
repudiates the co-ownership.43  Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a
co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he
or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
45
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for
partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from
private respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until
such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was
beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any,
of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further,
the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father's name. Although
private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and
had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the
pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-
ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held: 44
. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with
respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for
whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action
for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA
342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156
SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen
to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error
in holding that petitioner's claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court's decision dated
July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
 In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of
Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City,
in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage·
docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to
have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November
1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she
(Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido
(Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to
Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her,
the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate
recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon,
Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus,
only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four
(4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943;
Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born
on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December
1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his
whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were
informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman
46
by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without
any issue.
another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims
must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she
sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties
acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim,4  essentially averring that she is the legal surviving
spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City,
their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude
Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted
to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an
heir of Eustaquio. Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido
(Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing
and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from
1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar,
Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of
Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and
marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the
 early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation
of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla
issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September
1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were
destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of the
Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish
as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of
Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born
on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio
and Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage
to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life
as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had
poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife,
but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16  Peregrina likewise
set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to
prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late
Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring
himself as single when he contracted marriage with the
petitioner although he had a common law relation with one
47
Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely:
Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed
Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002,
addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria,
Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig,
in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del
Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the
case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties
she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her
entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21  denying Tecla’s
petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion
thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against
respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA
against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial
court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence of her
marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23  the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by
declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing
on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to
be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1)
the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified
that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older
brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father,
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition
sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among
others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage
to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in
its Memorandum25  dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal
issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the
"presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a
subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/
or taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or
existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the
church has a probative value to prove the existence of a valid
marriage without the priest who issued the same being
presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence
presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla
to Eustaquio.
48
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid
marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her
certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial
court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages
during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards
the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The
trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General,
Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed
during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are
presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to
date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this
office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested,
certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and
[Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in
Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give
credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered
the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was
given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of
the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla
failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of
lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported
themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the
testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created,
according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary
to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court.
Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,
28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage
certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly
delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the
very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the
evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of
the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this
misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that
parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred.
The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by
secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible.
Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such
proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to
be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary
evidence of the contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,
necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
49
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from
its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most,
failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand
on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we
said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has
also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows]
the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of
the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person
in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find
it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to
satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies
of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and
of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was
shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence.
Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between
[Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present
during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living
witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications
 issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence –
testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the
fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the Supreme Court held
that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage
or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an
eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1)
the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified
that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older
brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father,
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition
sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded.31
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper –
praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was
completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the
unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of
the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The
marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32  this Court has
elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

marriage.1âwphi1  Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any

50
 G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913
CONSTANZA YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant,
 as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her,
vs.
 that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000
GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yañez
were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga,
Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine
Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal property. Toward the
middle of 1896, Constanza Yañez came to Manila, where her husband
was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the
month of April, 1899.
On the 4th day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a
public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live apart,
both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband
authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as
the said lady pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the same document, the
husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly
for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of
the said year 1899. The husband complied with this obligation until
August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines,
but the husband had absented himself therefrom in the early days of
February of the same year.
On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce
proceedings against her husband, alleging as cause of action the
adultery committed by him in or about the year 1899 with a certain
woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived
and cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that
she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the separation
of the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the
date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be therefore
51
liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been
determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore,
Spanish  pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to
Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the
complaint, amounted to P12,959.90.
The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the
city of Manila, as they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he
alleged that both of them were natives and subjects of Spain.
He admitted that he was married to Constanza Yañez; he also
admitted having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in
which he had undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his
wife in Madrid, but he denied the other paragraphs of the complaint.
As a special defense with regard to the allowance, he alleged: "That in
or about the month of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff,
instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her husband
and being maintained by him in his own house; that the
communication was ignored by the plaintiff, who against the will of
the defendant, continued to live separately from him that from the
year 1901, the defendant did not know her address; that since 1900,
the plaintiff has lived in comfort and has known where her husband
resided; that the plaintiff, during all of the time referred to, in addition
to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her husband,
possessed and still possesses property of her own, acquired by her, in
greater amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any case
the action has prescribed by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.)
As to the divorce, he admits that he had by the plaintiff two children
that have died. He expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5 of the
complaint, relating to the charge of adultery and also those of
paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, concerning the possession of real and personal
property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount,
and their qualification as being all conjugal property. As a special
defense, he alleged that prior to the year 1899 he conferred powers of
attorney upon the plaintiff to administer and collect property and
credits pertaining to him to the value of about 200,000 pesos; that the
plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of attorney, attached
the property and collected the credits without ever having rendered
any account of them.
As a special preferred defense, he alleged that neither the trial court
nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for
support, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of
Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine Islands, the agreement
upon the subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in
the Philippine Islands; and as to the divorce, because the action
therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts.
In conclusion, he prayed that the court find: That the court was
without jurisdiction over the two causes of action; that even if it had
jurisdiction, it could not order the payment of the sum claimed as
arrears of alimony; that, after all, the action with regard to this cause
of action has prescribed; and as to the prayer for a decree of divorce,
the defendant should be acquitted, while on the other hand the
plaintiff should be required to render to the defendant an accounting,
supported by proofs, of her operations as his attorney and
administratrix of his property in Spain.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in
common between the plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to
pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal property be
divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in
event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be
effected by commissioners according to law.
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the
appeal, the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was
proceeded with.
These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and
account of the partition to the court, who then rendered final
judgment, from which, also, both parties appealed.
52
I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
and of all other courts of the Islands to try the case, either with regard
to the fulfillment of the contract to furnish alimony, or to decree a
divorce or suspension of life in common between the spouses: lack of
jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the
litigation; and over the persons of the contending parties, because
neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of
the complaint.
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The
defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile
other than that which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the
seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint.
On the contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that
during this not inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892
until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in
March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands, had kept
open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real
property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal
society.
It is also plainly shown, without proof to the contrary, that his wife
resided in this city of Manila from the middle of 1896 until April,
1899, at which time she was permitted by him to change her
residence. It is affirmed by the defendant in point five of his answer to
the complaint, that in May, 1900, he sent a letter  instructing  the
plaintiff to return to Manila to  live with  her husband and to be
supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will
of the defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is
also affirmed in the said answer, that during all of the time referred to
in the complaint, and especially since 1900, the plaintiff knew where
her husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.)
It is also very evident that the contract, by virtue of which he
authorized his wife to move to Spain and reside there in such place
as was agreeable to her, was executed in these Islands, "in the city of
Manila on the 4th of April, 1889," as is to be seen in the heading of the
document. (B. of E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he says that
the record shows him to be a Spanish subject, inscribed in the
consulate of his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil Code, the
Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill.
Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant,
although a Spanish subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26
of the Civil Code that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who
change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may be
considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents
therein, shall be required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality,
to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or
consular agent, who must record them in the registry of
Spanish  residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married,
and any children they may have."
From this provision, which is the exclusive and irrefutable law
governing the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of the
defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of
Paris. Without this supposition of having acquired his domicile and
residence in these Islands, he could not have required his wife to
return to live with him therein because this requirement could only be
based on articles 58 of the Civil Code of Spain, according to which the
wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish
his residence, or on article 48 of chapter 5 of the Marriage Law in
force in the Philippines, which imposes upon the wife the duty of
obeying her husband, living in his company, or of following him to
wherever he transfers his domicile or residence.
And just because he was absent for a month before his wife returned
to the Philippines, he cannot be understood to have surrendered his
habitual domicile of more than seventeen years, without having
established any other afterwards, and without making any declaration
in legal form, before he absented himself, of it being his intention to
change his domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house,
real property and all manner of means of subsistence.
53
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the
plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like the one at bar either in
the place where the defendant may  reside  or be found, or in that
where the plaintiff resides.
The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but
also residence (vecindad)  in Manila. In this litigation the defendant
claims that, born as he says in Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is
not subject, in his marriage, to the rules governing conjugal property,
that are in force in the territories of Spain that are governed by the
common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their day), because they
are opposed to the Foral Law in force in the said Islands and which is
respected by the Civil Code. Even if this defense could be sustained
herein, paragraph 2 of article 15 of the said Civil Code would be
applicable. It provides:
"For the purposes of this article, residence (vecindad) will be acquired:
By residence of ten years in  common  law provinces or territories,
unless before the termination of that time he manifests his will to the
contrary; or by a residence of two years, if the interested person
declares this to be his will . . . In any case, the wife will follow the
condition of her husband. . . ."
On no occasion had the defendant manifested his will to the contrary,
not even as he was leaving, after a residence of seventeen years, a
month before the return of his wife to these Islands. On the contrary,
when he inscribed himself in the Spanish consulate, he declared his
intention of continuing to reside in the Islands as a Spaniard and not
as a Mallorquin, subject as such to the common law of Spain.
In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of
these Islands over the subject matter of the complaint that is to try an
action for divorce between two Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his
appeal: That both litigants are Spanish subjects and that they
contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with article 9 of
the Civil Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a
foreign country; that, in consequence, "all questions of a civil nature,
such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial
bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property,
marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of
their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
AUTHORITY to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage
and divorce upon the person and properties of the spouses, are
questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the
husband and wife, and, in our case, by the Spanish law by virtue of
article 9 as above set out." (Brief, p. 12.)
The appellant and defendant continues his argument, saying: That by
the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain,
"jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical
marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts," while that of civil tribunals is
limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the action for divorce
brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons,
because these courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance
with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and this Spanish law
grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical
courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con subrogate
itself.
Says this appellant: "If a law of a foreign country were of rigorous
application in a given case, a North American tribunal would have no
jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical court and therefore the North
American tribunal in applying it would have to exercise a faculty
which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court." (Brief, pp. 13, 14,
and 15.)
Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning
cannot be upheld. The question is precisely whether the courts of the
Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce
now on appeal, and it is taken for granted that the power to decree it
is one of the rights included in the personal statute, but appellant does
not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal
statute of a foreigner carries with it, to whether he transfers his
domicile, the authority established by the law of his nation to decree
his divorce, which was what he had to demonstrate.
54
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is
not comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife,
simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights
which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private
law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of
the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the
nation.
"The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure
are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally
submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have to
demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can
gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the
tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated
in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise,
one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures
which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his
rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres
Campos, "Elementos de Derecho International Privado," p. 108.)
"Justice," says the same professor, "is a principle superior to that of
nations, and it should therefore be administered without taking into
any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In
order to foster their relations and develop their commerce, all
civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own
people, but to those foreigners who contract within the country or
outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their
sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.)
Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in
its territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their
jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice because the personal
law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case to some
court that is not the territorial one of the nation?
This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding the
conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality and domicile; it
would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor of
private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain
is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany
the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not
successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or
in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign
Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in
actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code,
could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their
personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such
a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the
territory of their nation.
It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the
Supreme Court (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and
Ibañez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for,
although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city
and had their domicile herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power
and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila
did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the
litigation.
The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the
court that the defendant had committed adultery with a certain
woman in this city from the year 1899 until 1909; the third was
against the finding that the adultery was accompanied by public
scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth for having
decreed the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the separation
of the properties of the parties.
The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we
are unable to review it, so we accept the findings of the trial court.
There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even
though it were proven would not be a cause for divorce, because no
public scandal resulted therefrom nor was there contempt displayed
for the wife. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The facts must be accepted by
this tribunal as they were found by the trial court, since the evidence
cannot be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the contrary and
55
maintains that it is a proven fact, public and notorious, an assertion
that the trial court must have found to be proven. (Appellee's brief, p.
5.) In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce,
should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife.
There is no law that requires this. Law 2, title 9, of the Fourth Partida
does not require it.
The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the
finding of the trial court that there exists conjugal property, a finding
that the appellant maintains is without foundation, and that which
holds that the property in the hands of the receiver (that sought to be
divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the appellant claims
to be contrary to the law which should be applied to the case and
according to which, as alleged in the tenth assignment of error, the
whole of the property should be adjudicated to the defendant as being
exclusively his.
Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the
Balearic Islands and that is also the condition of his wife, the plaintiff.
Law: That although the rule of the Civil Code is that which legally
governs conjugal property, yet at the same time it admits, as an
exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law, according
to which, as applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the family is
that of the division of property and that of conjugal property is not
known; so that the property pertains exclusively to the spouse who, by
whatever title, has acquired it. In support of the facts, appellant cites
pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of exceptions; and of the law,
the doctrinal authority of Manresa, Gutierrez, and Alcubilla.
The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only
pertinent one, is but an affidavit filed by the defendant in which,
under oath, he himself testifies as to the Foral Law in the Balearic
Islands. The adverse party says with regard to this: "This affidavit was
never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge, and
cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a
foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, now in force in these islands, indicate the method by which
the law of a foreign country may be proved. We maintain that the
affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never submitted
as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has never been
subjected to any cross-examination, is not a means of proving a
foreign law on which the defendant relies." (Brief, pp. 6 and 7.)
Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the
Foral Law as the law of his personal status in the matter of the
regimen of his marriage, and that to allege this he be considered as
authorized by article 15 of the Civil Code, we have said before, in
dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article 15 of
the Civil Code would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be
advanced that there is a similar Foral Law in the Philippines by virtue
of paragraph 1 of the said article 15, it might be said, though there is
not at present any need to say it, that it is not in force. The two
findings attacked are in perfect accord with the law.
All the property of the marriage, says article 1407 of the Civil Code,
shall be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. No proof has been
submitted to this effect.
As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred
in holding in the judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the
marriage a dowry of 30,000 Spanish dollars. But the defendant
himself adds that the court made no order or decree regarding the
alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth
assignment of errors, claimed that the court erred in not confirming
the report of the commissioners which gave to the said plaintiff the
sum of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is unnecessary to say anything
further.
The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency,
whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in her complaint with
respect to this sum; that no arrears of payment are owing for alimony,
even though payments had been stipulated in the contract, unless they
are claimed by the person who had furnished the actual support, and
that alimony is due only when it is necessary; so that, as the plaintiff
has had no need of it for ten years, nor has she stated who has
furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her the amount of the
56
arrears for all that time; that as she has allowed ten years to elapse
before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after
five years.
The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her
complaint as to this cause of action, but she considers that in equity
such an omission can be supplied.
Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure
determines one of the requisites of the complaint: "A demand for the
relief which the plaintiff claims." The section goes on to say: "If the
recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded
must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the special
restitution of property, etc., the ground of demanding such relief must
be stated and the special relief prayed for. But there may be added to
the statement of the specific relief demanded a general prayer for such
further or other relief as shall be deemed equitable."
In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the
said section 89 [90] are complied with by setting forth in its
paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of the cause of action, that is, the
contract of the 4th of April, 1899, by which the defendant obligated
himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of money
monthly, for her support, and the failure to comply with this obligation
after the month of August, 1899. Paragraph 6, as a consequence of the
promise established in 4 and 5, says as follows: “
That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster actually owes the
plaintiff the sum of 36,100 Spanish  pesetas, that is, 7,220
dollars, which, reduced at the present rate of exchange,
amounts to the sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency." (B. of
E., p. 2.) In the case of default on the part of the defendant
"the court shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses
and assess the damages or determine the other relief to which
the plaintiff may be entitled, including the costs of the action,
and render final judgment for the plaintiff  to recover such
sum  or to receive such other relief as the pleadings and the
facts warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of the complaint.
This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer,
exactly, are the essential part of a complaint.
It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future,
which constitutes the first cause of action, but of certain sums
stipulated in a contract. This contract is a law for the contracting
parties, a law which rises superior to those general laws which
regulate the nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the
present case an entirely voluntary one) and which govern judicial
action.
An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe
like all personal ones, but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the Civil
Code, after fifteen years. But even though the provisions of article
1966 were applicable, by which an action to compel the fulfillment of
an agreement to pay alimony prescribes in five years, yet by section 50
of the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment has been made upon
any demand founded upon contract . . . an action may be brought . . .
after such payment. . . ." And the parties admit that on the 18th of
August, 1908, the plaintiff secured the payment of
6,365.68  pesetas  by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899. So that
from August, 1908, until March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the
said period of five years had not elapsed.
The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in
empowering the receiver to proceed to the separation of the property
and in appointing commissioners to make the partition and
distribution between the spouses, since the principal question in this
action hinges upon the classification of the property; that it was
erroneously classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it pertained
to the husband alone and should be adjudicated to him for the reason
that, as it reiterated in the tenth assignment of error, the conjugal
partnership was not subject to the provisions of the law governing
conjugal property, because such provision are totally foreign to the
Foral Law of the Balearic Islands.
The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, was in accordance with law. The only question before
this court is the partition of real property. All that referred to in the
57
second decision appealed from, dated September 9, 1911, is urban
real estate. Its classification as conjugal property is in accordance with
law, as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and that no consideration
of the Foral Law enters into the question has also been demonstrated.
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.
As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff only P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the
judgment be reversed and that in its place this court order the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90, plus the
additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70
per month, dating from the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of
payment, with legal interest upon the said P12,959.90 from the date
of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment, and,
furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments due
after the filing of the complaint, and which will continue to become
due until the close of this litigation.
The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total
amount of the alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to
34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum the plaintiff had collected in
Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that is, 27,834.32, was
equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the Mexican
peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine currency; fifth, that therefore
the sum of $5,566.86 Mexican currency was equivalent to P5,010
Philippine currency; and finally, as there was no evidence as to the
kind of pesetas  agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it was that
current at the time and place where the agreement was made, which
was Mexican pesetas.
In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous
in that, firstly, the parties had admitted that the pesetas referred to in
the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, were Spanish, and in view of
this admission the court was not empowered to define them as being
different from the kind admitted by the parties; secondly, if he were so
empowered, his interpretation should be governed by the terms of the
law.
With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is
made in her complaint that the defendant had obligated himself to pay
her a "monthly pension for her support of 300 Spanish pesetas, that is,
60 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency, amounts to
P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this in hi answer to the
complaint, and that by his finding in a sense other than that accepted
and not refuted in the answer of the defendant, the court violated the
provisions of section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that
the defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in
the complaint. The defendant said that he admitted having made the
agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint, and that
he stood upon its contents. The contents of the document to which he
refers is of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and obligates himself
to pay to his said wife the sum of 300 pesetas, monthly, payable de su
cuenta in the city and capital of Madrid, for her support. . . ." He did
not therefore admit the matter of the  Spanish pesetas; that does not
appear in the contents of the document — the only thing he admitted
in his answer.
As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule
contained in article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of
the country shall be taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity
in contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word "  pesetas," not being
specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept to
interpret it as being the peseta then  in use  or current when and
where the agreement was made, Mexican being then the usual and
current money in the Philippines. Furthermore, the phrase  de su
cuenta  clearly means that it was not "Spanish  pesetas" that the
contracting parties had in mind, because if the agreement had been a
specific one to pay 300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid, everyone would of
course understand that the expense of following the fluctuations of
change and of the differences in value between the money current in
the country, and the Spanish  pesetas, would have to be defrayed by
the obligated party; whereas, if nothing more than  pesetas  was
mentioned, it was necessary to decide which party should pay for the
difference in value so that the 300 pesetas stipulated here should be
300 Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the reasons of the court
below for his decision this court can offer no legal grounds. The rule
58
of interpretation cited is the one applicable and it supports the
reasoning of the decision appealed from.
The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to
her the 30,000 Spanish dollars which the commissioners proposed in
their report. First she characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the
dowry of the wife delivered to the husband, then, later, as paraphernal
property brought to the marriage.
According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners,
this amount of 30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and
with reason. If, as was claimed, it was inherited by the plaintiff from
her uncle, it really constitutes paraphernal property under article
1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the wife brings to the
marriage without being included in the dowry and that she may
acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto."
But it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife shall have the
management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the
same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer
said property. In such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage
for the value of the personal property he may receive, or to secure said
property, in the manner established for the dowry property." Not even
was there offered in evidence the public deed of delivery, nor the
equally public mortgage deed that is required by law. So that,
therefore, the necessary proof of the obligation to return paraphernal
property as here demanded does not exist.lawphil.net
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of
the 9th of September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.
The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without
special pronouncement of costs in this instance.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
 an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
vs.
 daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to
make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented
as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo  had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows.
59
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-
Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to
a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
5  Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry
filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to
a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists
on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also
60
ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily,
we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9  on
the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1.  The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who
are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of
divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses
validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted
and made into law only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the  Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
61
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals.11  In  Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy
of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a
petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious
process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that
the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity.
On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy
for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence
duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who
62
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14  Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved.15  Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in
his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
 RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
vs.
 pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for
review on certiorari2  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November
29, 2000.3  On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4  Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition
for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée
in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
63
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact,
alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition.
The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is
a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse
can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal
interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on
file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General
and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s
position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is
in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history
and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages –
void15  and voidable16  marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
64
arising after the marriage.17  Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,
19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO
227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital
rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had
already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse."23  The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24  Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that
the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was
correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in
this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens –
65
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of
right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment
or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29  The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by
(1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,
30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under
this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate
to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will
allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not
obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
66
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34  We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity
and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations,
more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own
will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In
fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically
requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the
civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
 (j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not
ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn
and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 –
both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
67
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in
the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in
detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must
be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40  As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed
as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign
divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign
decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41  by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and
REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order
the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FLORIE GRACE M.
COTE, Respondent.
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1  dated January 21, 2014
and Resolution2 dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122313.
The Facts
As culled from the records, the antecedent facts are as follows:
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent
Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City. At
the time of their marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos and were
already blessed with a son, Christian Gabriel Manongdo who was born
in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America (USA).3
On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their
marriage was irretrievably broken. This was granted on August 23,
2002 by the issuance of a decree that states among others:
A decree of absolute divorce is hereby granted to [Rhomel], the bonds
of matrimony between [Rhomel] and [Florie] are hereby dissolved
and the parties hereto are restored to the status of single persons, and
either party is permitted to marry from and after the effective date of
this decree.4
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment granting the divorce before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Florie also prayed for the cancellation of her marriage contract,
hence, she also impleaded the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the
National Statistics Office (NSO). The Office of the Solicitor General,
representing Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), deputized the
Office of the City Prosecutor to appear on behalf of the State during
the trial.5
68
On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to
be capacitated to remarry after the RTC's decision attained finality and
a decree of absolute nullity has been issued. The RTC ruled, inter alia,
that Rhomel was already an American citizen when he obtained the
divorce decree,6viz.:
[Florie] has sufficiently established that she is a Filipino citizen and
married to an American citizen. Her husband obtained a Divorce
Decree on 22 August 2002 and was authenticated and registered by
the Consulate General to the Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A.
[Florie] being a Filipino citizen and is governed by Philippine laws,
she is placed in an absurd, if not awkward situation where she is
married to somebody who is no longer married to her. This is
precisely the circumstances contemplated under Article 26, paragraph
2 of the Family Code which provides a remedy for Filipino spouses
like [Florie].
Under the above-cited provision, [Florie] is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage since the divorce had been validly obtained
abroad by her American husband, capacitating her to remarry. In this
line, the court holds that this petition be, as it is, hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring [Florie] capacitated to remarry pursuant to Article 26
paragraph 2 of the Family Code, in view of the Divorce Decree which
had been validly obtained abroad by her American spouse, dissolving
their marriage solemnized on 31 July 1995 in Quezon City,
Philippines.7
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the
RTC, believing that the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied Section 20 of said Rule and
denied the appeal because the notice was not preceded by a motion
for reconsideration.8
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a Decision9  dated January 21, 2014, the CA denied the petition.
The pertinent portions read as follows:
The fact that even the Solicitor General and private respondent were
confused as to the true nature of the petition and the procedure that
must be followed only shows that We cannot attribute a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment to the RTC.
xxxx
Besides, petitioner's omission, by itself, is a ground for dismissing the
petition. The last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court allows the dismissal of a petition for certiorari if the material
parts of the records were not attached to the petition. "Certiorari,
being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking it must strictly
observe the requirements for its issuance." Although it has been ruled
that the better policy is for petitioner to be accorded, in the interest of
substantial justice, "a chance to submit the same instead of dismissing
the petition" We cannot allow petitioner to benefit from this rule
because the need to submit the transcript of stenographic notes and
all other pieces of evidence is quite obvious for petitioner which is
questioning the sufficiency of the evidence presented. Hence, it would
be bending the rules too far if We still allow petitioner to be excused
from this lapse.10
Hence, this present petition.
The Issues
I. THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE
DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
APPLYING THE PROCEDURAL RULES FOR NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE PROCEEDINGS UNDER A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC IN
A PROCEEDING FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE
OF DIVORCE;

II. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATE HAS
NO PERSONALITY TO INTERVENE IN PROCEEDINGS FOR
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE;

III. THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE
PETITIONER TO APPEND COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF FLORIE'S DIRECT EXAMINATION
A N D H E R J U D I C I A L A F F I D A V I T I S FATA L ,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE VERY SAME DOCUMENTS
WERE INCORPORATED AND QUOTED BY FLORIE IN HER
COMMENT; and

IV. THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION DATED APRIL 7, 2011 GRANTING FLORIE'S
PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF
DIVORCE DESPITE LACK OF SHOWING THAT HER FORMER
FILIPINO HUSBAND WAS ALREADY AN AMERICAN CITIZEN
AT THE TIME HE PROCURED THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.11

Ruling of the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC12  applies in a case involving
recognition of a foreign decree of divorce.
It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact,
however, do not prevent our family courts from recognizing divorce
decrees procured abroad by an alien spouse who is married to a
Filipino citizen.
Article 26 of the Family Code states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
The wordings of the second paragraph of Article 26 initially spawned
confusion as to whether or not it covers even those marriages wherein
both of the spouses were Filipinos at the time of marriage and then
one of them eventually becomes a naturalized citizen of another
country.

69
In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III,13 the Court ruled that
the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.14
Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign
divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise
benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry.
Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file a
petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
"no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes
the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.15
To clarify, respondent filed with the RTC a petition to recognize the
foreign divorce decree procured by her naturalized (originally
Filipino) husband in Hawaii, USA. By impleading the Civil Registry of
Quezon City and the NSO, the end sought to be achieved was the
cancellation and or correction of entries involving her marriage status.
In  Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.,16  the Court briefly explained the
nature of recognition proceedings  vis-a-vis  cancellation of entries
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
70
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation. x x x.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of
a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as
the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of
the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.17
The RTC, in its Decision18  dated January 21, 2014 ruled that Florie
had sufficiently established that she is married to an American citizen
and having proven compliance with the legal requirements, is declared
capacitated to remarry.
The confusion arose when the RTC denied petitioner's appeal on the
ground that no prior motion for reconsideration was filed as required
under Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Petitioner posits that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC  do not  cover cases involving recognition of foreign
divorce because the wording of Section 1 thereof clearly states that it
shall only apply to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages, viz.:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages  and  annulment of voidable
marriages  under the Family Code of the Philippines. [Underscoring
Ours]
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court applies; Motion for Reconsideration
not a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal
The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial court misapplied Section
20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from
annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only
covers void19and voidable20marriages that are specifically cited and
enumerated in the Family Code of the Philippines. Void and voidable
mmTiages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it
never existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid
marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising after the
marriage.
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal
Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since Florie followed the
procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special
proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, an appeal
from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 321 of Rule 41
of the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
As culled from the records, petitioner received a copy of the RTC
Decision on May 5, 2011. It filed a Notice of Appeal22  on May 17,
2011, thus complying with the 15-day reglementary period for filing
an appeal.
An appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Having
satisfactorily shown that they have complied with the rules on appeal,
petitioners are entitled to the proper and just disposition of their
cause.23
This now brings the Court to the issue whether or not the RTC's denial
of petitioner's appeal is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. The
Court rules in the negative.
71
No grave abuse of discretion
Although the Court agrees with petitioner that the RTC erroneously
misapplied A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, such error does not automatically
equate to grave abuse of discretion. The Court has ruled time and
again that not all errors attributed to a lower court or tribunal fall
under the scope of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in this wise:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
24
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented and Florie
having sufficiently complied with the jurisdictional requirements,
judgment was rendered by the lower court recognizing the decree of
foreign divorce. It likewise declared Florie legally capacitated to
remarry citing the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Thus, the CA is correct in denying the Rule 65 petition for certiorari,
notwithstanding the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeaL The
dismissal, albeit erroneous, is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
The Court finds no indication from the records that the RTC acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically in arriving at its decision. A
petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
alleged and proved to exist. The burden is on the part of the petitioner
to prove not merely reversible error on the part of private respondent,
but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby  DENIED.
The Decision dated January 21, 2014 and Resolution dated June 11,
2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313 are
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on  certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is  GRANTED. The  Decision  dated
15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First
Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this  Decision  be served on the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo)
filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch
43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for
initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial
hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel
for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and
issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
72
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or
caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the
court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a
petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a
Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their
Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and
her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together and in
fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in
the event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the
said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the
aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the
cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to
return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to
leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were
offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the
allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of
merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for
a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and
legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including
marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even
if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband
because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married
to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
73
with  Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7  ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers
and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese
national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate
court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was  Van Dorn v. Judge
Romillo, Jr.8  where the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino
was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence,
this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or  a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce
or  a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the
marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former
is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code
of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16  Shortly
thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17  Aside from
amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph
was added to Article 26.18  This provision was originally deleted by
the  Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was presented
and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.20  It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because
it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22  Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof,  e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the  Committee,
the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.24 The aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to
their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced
them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have
already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to
a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
74
and obtained a favorable decree. We held in  Republic of the Phils. v.
Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of  Quita v.
Court of Appeals. In  Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship  at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad  by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision,
a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law
after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and
enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and
for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry
"in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married
to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of
marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both  Dacasin v. Dacasin28  and  Van Dorn29  already recognized a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, respectively.
In  Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement
for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband,
who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement,
alleging that it was only, the latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband
moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his
former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement,
which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but  because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse  - to support the Agreement's enforceability. The
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel.  Van Dorn v. Romillo  settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
75
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.
30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There,
a complaint was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against
his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged
to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion.
On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by
the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary
to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner,  as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which  divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond
of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109,  et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by
the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in  Fujiki  v. Marinay, et al.
32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a
Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family
court, which declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
76
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage.
The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in  Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese
husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently,
she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz
v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35  and  Garcia v. Recio,36  the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of
dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the
pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned
rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change
as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle,
Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary
ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but
also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the
legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a  divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does
not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers.37  "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis
77
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.39 Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC,
et al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis  or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be
to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
42  Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond
and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written
by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial
review.44  The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection
by the Constitution.45  When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties,
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.46  If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class  strict  judicial scrutiny is required
since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48  It includes the right of
procreation, the  right to marry, the right to exercise free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel,
and the right to vote.49  On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties
must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety
or the general welfare.51  It essentially involves a public right or
interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and
allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
78
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same
principle applies with respect to the acts of the President, which have
the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In
this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by
the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated
with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married
to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino
is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or
her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino
who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair.
Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary.
There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien
spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she
should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the
Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the
bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in
detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply in
Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent
refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage,
the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous,
costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the
floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data
whatsoever was shown to support what he intends to prove. Second,
We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under
the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57  that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts,58  that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns,59  that acquiescence resulted from a belief that
the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact,60 that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61  and that the law has
been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular
or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she
opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed
that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take
judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing
and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or
79
at the losing end of mixed marriages. And  Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien
national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition
on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical
about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas
be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is
recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been
categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my
intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social
institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But
 now that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to
discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry the
meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective
March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on
the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the
part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred
upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces
in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of
the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided
eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified
desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the
action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other
to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and
a spouse's incurable insanity.68  When the Philippines was liberated
and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have
force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30,
1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the  New Civil
Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here
or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various
sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a
matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
116,71  1062,72  238073  and 602774  were filed in the House of
Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled
"An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the
House Committee on Population and Family Relations on February 28,
2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with
134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds
for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
80
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the
respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another
person other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when
upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them
by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child
after being a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a
common child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more
than two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper
court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family
Code, restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twenty-
 one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one (21), such party freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as husband or wife;
b. Either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased,
such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or appears
to be incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection
found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at
the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5)
years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and
reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article
36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present
at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment
surgery or transitions from one sex to another, the other spouse is
entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted
in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite
earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
81
divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their
nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of
our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated.75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a
state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes
that they are good for the country.77  While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by
the Family Code.78  It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.79  It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women
and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No.
6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No.
9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004"),
R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A.
No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as amended by
R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012").
Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a
basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of
the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained
a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and
still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms"
under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she
would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes
of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital"
affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely,
these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle
of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed
according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized
that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect unions.83  Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
82
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that
the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts
are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
87 A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write  finis  to this
controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the
divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree will not suffice.89  The fact of divorce must still first be proven.
90  Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court  a quo  the
1)  Decision  of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
83
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General
in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate
of Divorce  by Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of
Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce
decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court.94 As it
appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG;
neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and
family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on  certiorari  is  DENIED. The
September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are  AFFIRMED IN PART.
The case is  REMANDED  to the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on  certiorari  under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended
Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 104253 that set aside its former Decision dated November 25,
2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's Petition
for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.
 AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE


The antecedent facts are as follows:



Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on
August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two
(2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said
country dissolving their marriage.2  Thereafter, on April 5, 2013,
petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its
Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and
recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under
Philippine Laws.3 On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
 same no longer finds application. In support of her contentions, petitioner


In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited
its findings and recalled and set aside its previous decision. According to
the appellate court, the second of the following requisites under Article 26
of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
5  This is because the divorce herein was consensual in nature, obtained
by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since
petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce
cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that
petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of
Japan was fatal to her cause.6
 not issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor process translation


On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the
following arguments:
84
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY
ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE
FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER
GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE
HUSBAND.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY
ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF
TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.7
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband,
designated as Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial
Divorce, is the more practical and common type of divorce in Japan. She
insists that it is to her great disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized
and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for her to avail of the
benefit under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, since
their divorce had already been granted abroad.8  Moreover, petitioner
asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not
prevent the application of Article 26 for said provision does not state that
where the consent of the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the
cites the ruling in  Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III  wherein the
Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the event that
he or she is divorced by a Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship.9 
As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner explains that the reason
why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the provisions of
the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable to go
to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends
could obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of
the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was issued
a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do
certificates of Japanese Law due to the potential problem in the legal
interpretation thereof.
Thus, petitioner maintains that this constitutes substantial compliance
with the Rules on Evidence.10
We grant the petition.
The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling
of Republic v. Manalo,11 the facts of which fall squarely on point with the
facts herein. In  Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was
married to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however,
filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the same
and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving their marriage.
Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the Philippines
and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in
San Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a
hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The trial court, however,
denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country.
On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and
affirmed, instead, the ruling of the CA. There, the Court held that the fact
that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted should not affect the application nor remove
him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
which states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We
observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce
proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart
from the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore,
should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.12
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court
similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the
85
divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated
the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided
under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to
Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce
decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry,
petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's
Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to
comply with certain guidelines before our courts may recognize the
subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court
has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws.13  This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.14  Since both the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 2415  of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
applies.16  Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of
the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.17
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the
existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. What
remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce
considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is  GRANTED.
The assailed Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is  REMANDED  to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 133778             March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,

vs.
 (3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot
by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action
for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family
Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant
in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the
86
time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father
with defendant is null and void ab initio;
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's
death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
action for annulment of marriage.  2  Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section
11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the
verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the
allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated
as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section
3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.  3  However, upon motion of petitioners,
this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration.  5  A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence
of which renders the marriage  void ab initio  pursuant to Article
80(3)  7  in relation to Article 58.  8  The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.  9  This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous
social institution."  10  Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage
as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life
which shall be protected by the State.  11  This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"  12  and
case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76,  14  referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status.  15  To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source
of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed
it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained
the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to
marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains
to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it
be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
87
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together
as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage,
that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is
the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
— meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years
and continuity — that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone
who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the
two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.  17  The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar
thereof. . . .
 Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being
one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license,
it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person
relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the
who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
marriage.
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
felonies,  i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.  19  The law
a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage
sanctions monogamy.
that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void  ab initio  is considered as having
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot
never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights.
be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at
least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent,
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage
only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
valid. 22 
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful

88
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except
those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution,  23  and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code.
On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent.
The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that
there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It
should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if
it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.  24  "A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake
of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 “
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though
no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no
legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral,
in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts."
89
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties
so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and
is made good ab initio. 26 
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage  27  and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect.  28  For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible.  29  Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When
such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R.
SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who
were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention
of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.  1  Four children
were born out of that marriage.  2  On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.  3 When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that
when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did
not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.  4  According to him, had he known that the late Manzano
was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then
prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of
90
gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest
whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his
plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits  5  of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In
those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been
marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.
Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with
Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply,
the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement
that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior
existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated
that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.  7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had
he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent
Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting
previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1)
of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case  the
91
marriage bonds are not severed.  Elsewise stated,legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation,
free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who
are  legally capacitated  to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification
for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by
the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to
judges,  8  who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with
the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law transgressed is
simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. 10
ACCORDINGLY  , the recommendation of the Court Administrator is
hereby ADOPTED,with the MODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to
be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 173614               September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
 to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived
vs.
 together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-
MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M.
ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case
No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11 October
2005, and reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B.
Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed
with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of
Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint
alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June
1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3  They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel,
Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26
August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor
of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio
passed away.7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred
that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license.
They argued that Article 348  of the Family Code, which exempts a
man and a woman who have been living together for at least five
years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license,
was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not
have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to
92
Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s death, or on 1 May 2004,
which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio
cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived
together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and
publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a
marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco
Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October
1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony
was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and
solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she
sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal
of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC,10  dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme
Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the
following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the
Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides
in Section 2, par. (a)11  that a petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.  The language of this rule is plain and
simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that
only the husband or the wife may file the petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading
of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive
and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs
 of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in
bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void.
12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative
defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED
with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the
filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC
rendered an Order14  dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11
October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the
ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog,15 which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a
deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after
the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-
SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies
only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.16  Where
one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file
a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its
stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the
Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased
person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage
after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now
superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by
approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order
further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic)
the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of
93
nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal and
is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of
Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the
Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule.
To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the
parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into
a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their
successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have
only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence,
during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should
solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare
his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs
have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent.
Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure
such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by
substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered
by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously
entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty
parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the
marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if
the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the
parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when
both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of
anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a
petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not
applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the
ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.
18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the
said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised
therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied
in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this
Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for
writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of
mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised
against taking a direct recourse to this Court.20  Instead, they should
initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last
resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals or
the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.
21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary
power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction.22  Moreover, notwithstanding the
dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to
entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
94
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant
case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal which is applicable,
whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file
a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father,
we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned
marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the
Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
23  What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the
marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for
doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August
1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003,
following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus,
contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the
provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Niñal, because
they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it
squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) Who may file. –  A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.  (n)
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non
indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is
required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right
of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following
manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
95
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is
to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo.
Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not
mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law.
They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is
ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of
the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
 and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita
vs.
 in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A.
TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the
case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired
that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married
couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1  dated
August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61762 and its subsequent Resolution2  dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as
void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita
twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993
in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated
by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4  In
their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as
‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world
as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate
children with Zorayda,5  filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon
City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and
96
Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6  alleged, inter alia,
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites,
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having
been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by
this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent
marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is
void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior
marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status
being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the
deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he
could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under
the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple
reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda
was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted
under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since
they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their
mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She
then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her
answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15
days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to
Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim
rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against
Sen. Tamano.12  Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and
divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction
over the case for declaration of nullity.13  Thus, Estrellita filed in
November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred
the petition to the CA14  which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP
No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to
try the case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of
nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer.
Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing
parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to
adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed
mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996,
suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary restraining
order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.
17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita
in its Decision dated September 30, 1996.18  Estrellita then elevated
the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered
Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20  As Estrellita
was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9,
1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked
for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and
Adib moved to submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita
had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground
that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of
G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon
City,25  stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages
celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court
of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction
97
over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26  we
denied Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC
rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage
with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda
were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the
Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows
that the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was
entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very
beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as
"divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the second
marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino
spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a
previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was
solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be
heard as the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the
finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She
claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after
the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano
is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce
with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted
Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to question the validity of her
marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the
CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as
she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by
asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer
despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was
prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her
pending petition for  certiorari  with the higher courts since, as an
independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings
in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that
Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being
bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute
divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil
rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial.
Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the
action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the
senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33  the CA denied Estrellita’s
Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
where it debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that
the allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the existence
of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court34  and Article 48 of the Family Code35  will not invalidate the
trial court’s judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been
adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the
issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded
Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its
judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the
case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of
Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now
argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter
was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an
answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against
98
the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36  laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss
instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and,
consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while
her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet
been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated
in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the
proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High
Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and
yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse
judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No.
126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding
of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further
proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a
suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late
senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim
Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased
without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both
parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim
law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under
Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the
deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing
to file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint
for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court
Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the
CA’s reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her
right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does
not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is
collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering
the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows
the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’
legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported
marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested
party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda
and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones
prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even
though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment
was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution
of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed
her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public
prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was
collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano
was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have
Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her
right to answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on
certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the
higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the
principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right
to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even
actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
99
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of
the period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court
until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial
of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case,
we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is
Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’
instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion
suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until
said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it
behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case
on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its
Order denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section
6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the
Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the
said Rules  but in no case less than five (5) days computed from
service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within
which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41  (Emphasis
supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein
is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally
resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the
above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings
should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to
dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In  Macias,  the trial
court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of
the case because after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it
immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex
parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the
rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the
instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed
the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by
the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an
answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment,
as it should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to
Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However,
in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a
petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the
trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action
which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the
rendition of the judgment complained of."42  Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case."43  In fact, the trial
court respected the CA’s temporary restraining order and only after the
CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present
her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45,
we never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding
with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an
answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so,
insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R.
No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present
her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be
allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with
the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have
waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the
lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final
and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back
to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the
Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as to the non-existence of
collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of
the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases
involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to
100
submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion
between the parties:
Sec. 9.  Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one
month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of
Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the
court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies
thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state
the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective
comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of
a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court
shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public
prosecutor to submit the required report,45  which we find to have
been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo
T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46  wherein he
attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no
fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of
the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even
assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of
participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals,47  the lack of participation of a fiscal does not
invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage
and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion
exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed
between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49  The
only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims
and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
50  Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to
Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52  the
law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law
applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of
the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article
13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and
this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already
bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its
provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the
effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the
time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate
to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
101
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all
laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly,
plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the
retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-
existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil
acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article
186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this
Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one
contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their
mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the
marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law,
the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano
will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have
already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view
of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the
CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities
to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for
nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent
marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,
55  Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on
March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the
husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano
may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this
interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file
the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following
manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section
2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s
interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from
filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
102
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured
spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of
the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from
impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both
Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity.
Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under
the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to
cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s
marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect
to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source
of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property
rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in
the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they
should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights
which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA
Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its
subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 204169               September 11, 2013
YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER,
 on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on
vs.
 Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the
FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN
ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
September 4, 2012 Decision2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No.
11-126203. The RTC denied the petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa with private
respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan due to insufficient evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime
in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent
introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since
then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner
came back to the Philippines and married private respondent on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple
resided in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed.
Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines,
he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent
confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband
passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20,
103
1994.6  This prompted petitioner to file a petition7  for the
declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void
Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the
following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO):
(1) Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private
respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of
marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002;
(2) Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent
and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to
prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20,
1994;
(3) Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo
marked as Exhibits "C" and "C-1" to prove the fact of the
latter’s death on July 14, 2009; and
(4) Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are
two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to
private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that
private respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the
first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June
20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of the
above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private
respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held
that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private
respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about
said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is
unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private
respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes
him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private
respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It
further ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification
is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of
said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the
testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity
and due execution of the public documents issued by said office
was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are
public documents which are considered self-authenticating and
thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as
witness. He cites Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that
books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the trial
prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of said
documents.
The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC
are not in accord with law and established jurisprudence. It
contends that both Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the
Law on Registry of Civil Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on
the character of documents arising from records and entries made
by the civil registrar and categorically declared them as public
documents. Being public documents, said documents are
admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
104
execution and genuineness and consequently, there was no need
for the court to require petitioner to present the records custodian
or officer from the NSO to testify on them. The OSG further
contends that public documents have probative value since they are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein as provided in the
above-quoted provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG submits
that the public documents presented by petitioner, considered
together, completely establish the facts in issue.
In her letter14  dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private
respondent indicated that she is not against her husband’s petition
to have their marriage declared null and void. She likewise
admitted therein that she contracted marriage with Arambulo on
June 20, 1994 and contracted a second marriage with petitioner on
November 28, 2002. She further admitted that it was due to
poverty and joblessness that she married petitioner without telling
the latter that she was previously married. Private respondent also
confirmed that it was when she found out that Arambulo passed
away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess to
petitioner about her previous marriage. Thereafter, she and
petitioner have separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioner are all public documents. As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the
RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground
that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the
NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due
execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents Office are hereby ORDERED to make proper entries into the
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because records of the abovementioned parties in accordance with this
they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And Decision.
in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since
neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented No pronouncement as to costs.
evidence to the contrary.
SO ORDERED.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
16 which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of

the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in

the instant case.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits

taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage
is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1)
that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the
City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second
marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay
City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she
married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and
that it was only on said date that private respondent’s marriage
with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that
the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is
bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still
valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

The September 4, 2012 Decision and October 16, 2012 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
11-126203 are hereby SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner
Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is
declared NULL and VOID.

105
 G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
 On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by
E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and
the Court of Appeal,2  Leouel persists in beseeching its application in
his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the
J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into
the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also
start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where
the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
106
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few
days with his own parents.
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She
never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where
he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but
all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with
the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed,
Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main,
that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of
their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
(in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set,  albeit  unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court  a quo  finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance
with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping,
but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel
asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more
or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity."
The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an
insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice
(Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use,"
but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they
say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is
lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment
107
would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy
remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of
judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void
and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient
use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of
one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological
or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment
and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained
that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason
why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7)
does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge
Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called
selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that
in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the
Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon
Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage
cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a
ground for void  ab initio  marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it
is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences
of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not
have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the
marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of
marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for
divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less
108
than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if
they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She
asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but
he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of
consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other,
because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of
age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however,
felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and
that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should
be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect
has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of
children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a
lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist,
who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated
that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid
interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will
not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate
among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that
in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence
is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge
Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa
remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and
in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also
be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is
enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he
can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still
void  ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the
psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity
continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible
that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become
manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6
109
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause
"although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be
deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other
provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are
vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice
or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes
of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would
rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they
have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological
incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil
Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground
even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil
Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the
Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by
the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically
annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their
answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are
still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of
ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
110
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency
in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of  ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;
3.  who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an
aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on
how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that
the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and
narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf.  SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly,
then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be,
however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all,
normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written
by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true  inability to
commit  oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause
111
of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular
type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by
the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to
enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the  essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality.  The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which
could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due  (cf.  John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be
declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that
the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect  did in fact  deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy  11  cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36
of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending
on the degree and severity of the disorder,  indicia  of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
112
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in
our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family
Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a  special contract of permanent union  between a
man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the  foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987
Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt
the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can
come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
 It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage
in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate.
Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen
hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial
court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the
defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception
at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the
house of defendant's mother.
113
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room
for the first night of their married life.
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then
turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same
thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were
all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there
was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the same bed since
May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private
parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential.
No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she
had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen,
to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz:
(1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and,
(3) since the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two of them, it can
still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either
one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured.
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by
the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him
and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his
114
wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why
the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are:
(1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and,
(2) (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination.
His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result
thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh.
"2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency
(Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out
that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1)
inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant
had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
 ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as
VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica
of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of
this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I complaint shall always be proved.3
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no
sexual intercourse between the parties without making any findings of
fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as
proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
115
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties
decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was
no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there
remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission
of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions
of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is
misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in
actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment
on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before
the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court
and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it
be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted
that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated
by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of
Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion
between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife
(private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other,
he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the
relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the
appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not
have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that
the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to
have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a
categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an
in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or
other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have
116
sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short
span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent
court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At
any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by
either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question
of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to
show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity.
Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not
be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed
with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she
balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse
with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show
that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his
wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.5  Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea
that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not
inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained
from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely
out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not
having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs.
Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity,
the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of
nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it
is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence
proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual
act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation,
the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform
the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family
Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
117
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or
court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared
less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and
private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love  amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 162049             April 13, 2007
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., Petitioner,
 respondent hired to follow him.
vs.

CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the Decision1  dated January 8, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65677, reversing the Regional Trial Court’s
declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent.
Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated February 4,
2004 denying reconsideration.
In Civil Case No. 94-70727, filed by petitioner Narciso Navarro, Jr.
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, he sought the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent.
As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they
got married, both in civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting
their first child. Since petitioner was still a medical student, while
respondent was a student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioner’s
parents, on whom they were financially dependent. Eventually, their
union bore four children.
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he
didn’t have time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him
even before marriage when he could not give her the things she
wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his career. Even
marriage counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that when they
quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even told him to look
for other women.
118
He filed the petition for nullification of their marriage when he found
out their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by a man whom
Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly accredited by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, testified that when
petitioner saw her on April 6, 1994, he was distraught, harassed, and
unhappy. She concluded from meetings with the petitioner that the
marriage was dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out of
the question since he claims he would go insane if he were to go back
to his wife. Relying on the view of another expert, one Dr. Gerardo
Velasco, witness de Castro opined that professionals are  per
se  incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage
because they spend a lot of time in the pursuit of their profession and
have very little time to spend with their family.
She concluded that respondent was also psychologically incapacitated
to perform the marital obligations because she knew, from the start,
that her husband was going to be a doctor, yet she did not give him
the support and understanding that was expected of a doctor’s wife.
Lilia Tayco, the housemaid of petitioner’s parents also testified that
petitioner and respondent were always quarreling because respondent
was always jealous of petitioner’s classmates.
A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted a psychiatric test
on petitioner, testified that tests showed that petitioner was a
perfectionist, short-tempered, critical, argumentative and irritable
when people do not meet his expectations. He married Cynthia only
after he got her pregnant. He had depressions and tended to escapism
when beset with problems. He was vocal about his marital problems.
He believed that the lack of communication, absence of quality time,
inadequacy in problem-solving, and many problems caused the failure
of the marriage.
For her part, respondent refused to submit to the psychiatric
examination asked by the petitioner, but said she would do so only
when her defense requires it. She averred that she had no marital
problems, not until petitioner had an illicit affair with a certain Dr.
Lucila Posadas. Petitioner denied the affair. Respondent narrated that
early 1984, she caught petitioner and Lucila inside the Harana Motel
in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation ensued. After the incident,
petitioner seldom went home until he permanently left his family
sometime in 1986.
Respondent claimed petitioner and Lucila continued to see each other
and had gone abroad together several times. She explained that she
uttered she would not make love with her husband and dared him to
look for other women only out of frustration and anger upon discovery
of the affair. She admitted hiring someone to spy on petitioner, but
added that she still loved her husband.
Cynthia’s friend since high school, Miraflor Respicio testified that
Cynthia was a good, stable, and mature person; that she was a loving
and caring mother who gave up her career to take care of her
children; and that petitioner and respondent were happy during the
early days of the marriage.
On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and
respondent were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their
marital obligations. The dispositive portion of the court’s decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage between the parties is (sic) dated
June 2, 1973 is hereby declared null and void with the
following effects:
1. The Plaintiff is hereby directed to support his children with
the Defendant in the amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) a month, which sum shall be payable on or
before the 5th day of each month, effective September, 1998;
2. The parties are hereby disqualified from inheriting from
each other by way of testate or intestate succession;
3. Either of the parties may revoke the designation of the other
as beneficiary in a life insurance policy;
119
4. The parties’ children are hereby declared legitimate, and the
custody of the parties’ minor children is hereby awarded to the
Defendant with the Plaintiff exercising his right to visit them at
least once a week;
5. The properties in the name of the parties consisting of a
house and lot located at 15 Bronze Street, Filinvest, Quezon
City are hereby deemed as their advance legitime to their
children.
SO ORDERED.2
Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. She averred
that the trial court erred when it annulled their marriage instead of
decreeing their legal separation, with the ruling that petitioner was
the guilty spouse.
In a Decision dated January 8, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that
the constant arguments, bickerings and conflicts between the spouses
did not constitute psychological incapacity. It ruled that petitioner
failed to show that any psychological incapacity in either of the two
parties existed at the time of the celebration of marriage. The
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and declared
that the marriage still subsists.
Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as issues:
(1) Are the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of
Appeals proper subject for review by the Honorable Court
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?
(2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals – that
the lower court (RTC) erred in finding the parties (petitioner
and respondent) both psychologically incapacitated under
Article 36 of The Family Code – correct or not?
(3) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals – that
the evidence failed to show that the parties (petitioner and
 respondent) were completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage – correct or not? and
(4) Which is more in accord with existing law and settled
jurisprudence, the decision of the Court of Appeals or the
decision of the trial court?3
Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on
the ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity.
Petitioner contends that the decision of the trial court was well-
founded, based on the evidence indicating that the marriage was
beyond reconciliation, and allowing the marriage to subsist would
only prolong the spouses’ agony. Respondent counters that petitioner
failed to prove psychological incapacity, and that their psychological
incapacities existed as early as the time of the celebration of their
marriage.
We shall now resolve the issue.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,4  we
categorically said that psychological incapacity required by Art. 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. These include
the obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.5
We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the intention of the law is
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
120
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.6  In Republic v. Court of Appeals,7  the Court gave the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 which are as
follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity...
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
a. medically or clinically identified,
b. alleged in the complaint,
c. sufficiently proven by experts and
d. clearly explained in the decision...
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable...
(5) Such illness must be  grave  enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage...
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts...
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition...8
incapacity.12  Thus so far, both petitioner and respondent have not
shown proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse
integral element in their personality structure that effectively
incapacitates them from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated January 8, 2003 and the Resolution dated February 4, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 65677 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

In the present case, the spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s SO ORDERED.
refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not
constitute psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner
and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage, which bore them four children.

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal"

or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations,9  it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness10 existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

It will be noted that respondent did not undergo psychological tests.

Witness de Castro’s diagnosis was based solely on petitioner’s avowals
and not on personal knowledge of the spouses’ relationship. Hence, de
Castro’s diagnosis is based on hearsay and has no probative value.11

Further, de Castro’s statement that professionals are  per

se  incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage
because their profession allows them little time for family life is highly
debatable.

Lastly, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on

the part of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage
and respondent’s scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their
immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute psychological

121
 G.R. NO. 170925 : October 26, 2009]
RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA, Petitioner, v. AURORA A.
ASPILLAGA, Respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This Petition for Review on  Certiorari  assails the Decision1  dated
September 9, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated December 20, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68179, entitled  "Rodolfo A.
Aspillaga v. Aurora A. Aspillaga."
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were
students at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of
the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted her and five months
later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to
study Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the distance,
Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication.
In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got
married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage
was "tumultuous." He described Aurora as domineering and frequently
humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that Aurora
was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial
family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora
was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by
the latter's filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an
administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7,
1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred that Aurora
failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her
a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position
in a university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon her
return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo
brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as
his concubine.
122
Aurora alleged that Rodolfo's cohabitation with her cousin led to the
disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May
1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with Besina.
Aurora claimed custody of the children.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained his
psychiatric evaluation of the parties as well as his recommendation
that the petition be granted. In this report, he stated,
"x x x x
Psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, Rodolfo Aspillaga, showed
that he is an intelligent adult male, who is egoistic and harbors
an inner sense of inadequacy, helplessness and anxiety in
losing agility. He, however, projects himself as dominant
person, to cover his deep-seated insecurity and inadequacy. He
tends to be suspicious and blames others for his mistakes. He
claims for adulation, reassurance and attention from other
people. These can be traced from an unhealthy familial
relationship during the early maturational development
specifically in the form of a domineering and protective
maternal image. Self-esteem was fragile.
Psychiatric evaluation of respondent, Aurora Apon Aspillaga, showed
history of traumatic childhood experiences. Her parents separated
when she was about one month old and was made to believe that she
was the youngest daughter of her disciplinarian grandfather. Her
surrogate sister maltreated her and imposed harsh corporal
punishment for her slightest mistakes. She felt devastated when she
accidentally discovered that she d been an orphan adopted by her
grandfather. Attempted incestuous desire by an uncle was reported.
Psychological test results collaborated the clinical findings of
sensitivity to criticism. Tendency for self dramatization and attention
getting behavior. Lapses in judgment and shallow heterosexual
relationship was projected. Sign of immaturity and desire to regress to
a lower level of development were likewise projected. Self-esteem was
also low. Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness and emptiness
hamper her objectivity.
In summary, both petitioner and respondent harbor psychological
handicaps which could be traced from unhealthy maturational
development. Both had strict, domineering, disciplinarian role models.
However, respondent's mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships
resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation
of marriage.
It is recommended that the petition to annul their marriage be
granted, on the grounds existing psychological incapacitation of both
petitioner and respondent, which will hamper their capacity to comply
with their marital obligations. Dissolution of the marital bond will
offer both of them, peace of mind."3
On May 31, 2000,4 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the parties
psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 9,
2005, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and declared the
marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied in a
Resolution dated December 20, 2005.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
DEFINITION OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY" TO THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE
CELEBRATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE.5
Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on
the ground of the parties' psychological incapacity.
The petition must fail.
As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 we categorically said
that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
123
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.7  (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the instant case, while the psychological examination conducted on
respondent found her to be mistrustful, to possess low self-esteem,
given to having shallow heterosexual relationships and immature, Dr.
Maaba failed to reveal that these personality traits or psychological
conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba
was able to establish the parties' personality disorder; however, he
failed to link the parties' psychological disorders to his conclusion that
they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as
husband and wife. We cannot see how their personality disorder
would render them unaware of the essential marital obligations or to
be incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to a marriage.
The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper (as Dr. Maaba
puts it) their performance of their marital obligations does not mean
that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to
incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that each party's
condition is so grave or is of such nature as to render said party
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
There is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is incurable
and permanent.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with
respondent,8 but failed to discharge it.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations.9  The intention of the law is to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.10
Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and
Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for several years. They
married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in
1983, showing love and contentment with one another after a year of
marriage.
The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to respondent
revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued during
their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each
other. From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully
comply with their obligations to each other and to their children.
Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and remained
faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales
activities to augment the family income. She appeared to be a very
capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and
abroad. It was only when Rodolfo's acts of infidelity were discovered
that the marriage started to fail.
As to Rodolfo's allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same
likewise fails to convince. While disagreements on money matters
would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one's marriage as to make
the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage
null and void.11
 In the present case, petitioner's disagreement with his wife's handling
of the family's finances can hardly be considered as a manifestation of
the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even
normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.12
At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties
were both found to have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is
nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient to
declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. We must
emphasize that said disorders do not manifest that both parties are
truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants.
124
Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of these disorders.
Even assuming their acts violate the covenants of marriage, such acts
do not show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity
which will prevent them from undertaking the basic obligations of
marriage in the future. At the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the
parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences,
which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity as understood
juristically.
As this Court has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family Code is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 
As regards respondent's claim for support, we find no basis to award
the same as it was not passed upon by the trial court in view of the
agreement of the parties on the issue presented for resolution, which
agreement, however, was not put into writing.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision dated September 9, 2005 and Resolution dated
December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68179
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground
(in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many
judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases.
In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled —
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration —
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the
need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the
marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
125
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime
in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and
since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of
which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to
be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he
and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985
at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony
and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla
as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A"
to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to
our culture.”
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5
heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code
Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended
to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
126
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the
Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to
the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing
such marital responsibilities and duties.”
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated."
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us
that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to
be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was
a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of
the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
127
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial
(Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
128
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 166738               August 14, 2009
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, Petitioner,
 appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya
vs.
 to assist in all hearings of the case.9
EDWARD RUMBAUA, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through
her petition for review on certiorari,1  the decision dated June 25,
20042  and the resolution dated January 18, 20053  of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095. The challenged decision
reversed the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the
marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua
(respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for
the declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following
circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her
under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial
support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented
himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working
in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service,
as personal service proved futile.5  The RTC ordered the provincial
prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and
to ensure that no fabrication or suppression of evidence would take
place.6 Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated the presence of
collusion between the parties.7
129
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition.8  The OSG entered its
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate her charges.
The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood
neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they
met again and became sweethearts but the respondent’s family did not
approve of their relationship. After graduation from college in 1991,
the respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a
job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL)
accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent
proposed to the petitioner that they first have a "secret marriage" in
order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were
married in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the
respondent, however, never lived together; the petitioner stayed with
her sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his
parents in Novaliches.
The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the
first six months of their marriage. At that point, the respondent
refused to live with the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of
their marriage would affect his application for a PAL scholarship.
Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s daily meetings became
occasional visits to the petitioner’s house in Fairview; they would have
sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent enrolled at
FEATI University after he lost his employment with PAL.10
In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret
marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to convince him to go to the
United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued
living separately from the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet
the petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send
her greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent indicated as
well in his visa application that he was single.
In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed
the petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the pain that the
discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s
action, the petitioner severed her relationship with the respondent.
They eventually reconciled through the help of the petitioner’s father,
although they still lived separately.
In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a
job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her mother went to the
respondent’s house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one
Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent
about it, he denied having an affair with Cynthia.11  The petitioner
apparently did not believe the respondents and moved to to Nueva
Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery
brought.12
The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that
communication between her and respondent had ceased. Aside from
her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy
of their marriage contract;13  and the testimony, curriculum vitae,
14  and psychological report15  of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy
Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the
following tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta Examination; a
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a
Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.
16  She thereafter prepared a psychological report with the following
findings:
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average
intellectual level. Logic and reasoning remained intact. She is seen to
be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into most situations
especially if it is within her interests. She is pictured to be faithful to
her commitments and had reservations from negative criticisms such
that she normally adheres to social norms, behavior-wise. Her age
speaks of maturity, both intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault
130
lies in her compliant attitude which makes her a subject for
manipulation and deception such that of respondent. In all the years
of their relationship, she opted to endure his irresponsibility largely
because of the mere belief that someday things will be much better for
them. But upon the advent of her husband’s infidelity, she gradually
lost hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that she has finally taken
her tool to be assertive to the point of being aggressive and very
cautious at times – so as to fight with the frustration and insecurity
she had especially regarding her failed marriage.
Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-
centered manner as he believes that the world revolves around
him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use
others for his own advancement with an extreme air of confidence
and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or guilt
feelings towards others especially to that of petitioner.
REMARKS
Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes
beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love, "age does
matter." People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her
life with another and that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who
are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die – it is a
choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she expected.
In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really
happened for her towards the young respondent – who used "love" as
a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she
extended towards him. He made her believe that he is responsible,
true, caring and thoughtful – only to reveal himself contrary to what
was mentioned. He lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse
that he was able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made
petitioner look like an innocent fool. His character traits reveal him to
suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be grave, severe
and incurable.17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19,
2002. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and
Dr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:
 xxxx
Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his
wife. Respondent imposed limited or block [sic] out communication
with his wife, forgetting special occasions, like petitioner’s birthdays
and Valentine’s Day; going out only on occasions despite their living
separately and to go to a motel to have sexual intercourse.
It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts
in this case which show the psychological incapacity of respondent, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into
lawful marriage and to discharge his marital responsibilities (See
Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is "declared grave,
severe and incurable."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between
petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin Rumbaua
is hereby declared annulled.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA Decision
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
19 The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and set aside the RTC
decision, and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.20
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did
not mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called "narcissistic
personality disorder;" it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood
and thus failed to give the court an insight into the respondent’s
developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she
came to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was "deep-
seated" and "incurable."
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity
to be psychological, although its manifestations may be physical.
Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated
party was mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have
known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them, could not
have assumed them. In other words, the illness must be shown as
131
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. In the present case, the
petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly refused to live
with her because of his parents’ objection to their marriage.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied
her motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005. 21
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that –
1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v.
Molina22 (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed with because
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took
effect only on March 15, 2003;
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the
case to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the
defects in her testimony, as well as to present additional
evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her
psychiatric report.
The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed
and set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s
decision be set aside and the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC was applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of
Molina; (b) invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the
case for further proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner
failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.23
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they
filed.
 THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis
supplied.]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC24  -- which this Court promulgated on March
15, 2003 and duly published -- is geared towards the relaxation of the
OSG certification that  Molina  required. Section 18 of this remedial
regulation provides:
SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated.lawphil.net It
may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should
be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of
the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the
132
petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took effect only on March 15,
2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was
promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural
or remedial in character; it does not create or remove any vested right,
but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already
existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect,25 as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:
26
Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the
mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied
retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any
pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its
promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes27  and Navales v.
Navales28 have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC has dispensed with the  Molina  guideline on the matter of
certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the
parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of
the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be
certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner’s objection
regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper.
The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and
the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence
are procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her
evidence during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty.
Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would
allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this
regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be
liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.
We do not find her arguments convincing.
A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to
the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage.
Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the
trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and
to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition,
a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been
guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the
aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved
party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that
would probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence
presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not,
however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for
declaration of nullity  prima facie  shows that the petitioner’s counsel
had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that
the petitioner’s counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would
justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence
and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the
petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro
Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:29
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial
court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of
counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be
admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be
an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the
133
willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to
securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision,
as in the instant case.
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested
remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the

respondent’s psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article
36 of the Family Code which provides that "a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization." In  Santos v. Court of Appeals,
30  the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. The defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of
Appeals where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of  ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
134
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in
Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized
by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.31 These
requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined
only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does
not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its terms is left to us
to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.32  We
emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-
Ting33 when we explained:
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo
Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we
find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove that
the respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband.
a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of respondent’s condition
The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a)
reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her
occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and
did not send her greeting cards during special occasions; (d)
represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her
for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao
when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological
incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. In Bier v.
135
Bier,34 we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with
the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to
be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony
reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of
jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear
of antagonizing his family. The respondent’s failure to greet the
petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special
occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mother’s
death and of representing himself as single in his visa application,
could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional
immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the
respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the
marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and
faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.
To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some
character flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however, does
not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological
malady at the time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of
fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of Navales v.
Navales:35
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not
due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the
respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information
fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her
cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not
disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony
and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent
set of standards in the manner we discussed above.36 For, effectively,
Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third
party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the
respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the
doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-
centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the
world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic
for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." Dr.
Tayag then incorporated her own idea of "love"; made a generalization
that respondent was a person who "lacked commitment, faithfulness,
and remorse," and who engaged "in promiscuous acts that made the
petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded that the respondent’s
character traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable."
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with
the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root
cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove
136
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain
the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot
avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that
the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces
of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable"
– is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her
previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the
various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a
fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition.
To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side
is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof
of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent testimony
in court cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological
report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to
establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent
was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of
the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of
marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the
conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. To
directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:
Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as
Exh. "E-7", there is a statement to the effect that his character traits
begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of
antisocial personality disorder. What do you mean? Can you please
explain in layman’s word, Madam Witness?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality disorder
cannot accept that there is something wrong with his own behavioral
manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are
eccentric; they are exemplary, demanding financial and emotional
support, and this is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent
abused and used petitioner’s love. Along the line, a narcissistic person
cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply because they love
themselves more than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person
cannot support his own personal need and gratification without the
help of others and this is where the petitioner set in.
Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?
A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral
manifestation under personality disorder [sic] this is already
considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I
say this, a kind of developmental disorder wherein it all started
during the early formative years and brought about by one familiar
relationship the way he was reared and cared by the family.
Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child disorder.
[sic]
Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?
A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long
before he entered marriage. [Un]fortunately, on the part of the
petitioner, she never realized that such behavioral manifestation of
the respondent connotes pathology. [sic]
xxxx
Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is
now lying [sic] with somebody else, how will you describe the
character of this respondent who is living with somebody else?
A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic]
because an antisocial person is one who indulge in philandering
activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of
another person, and this [is] again a buy-product of deep seated
psychological incapacity.
Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep
seated [sic], how would you describe the psychological incapacity?
[sic]
137
A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would
say incurable in nature and at this time and again [sic] the
psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor
of not being able to give meaning to a relationship in terms of
sincerity and endurance.
Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the
respondent and the petitioner, Madam Witness?
A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative
years and so if it takes enough that such psychological incapacity of
respondent already existed long before he entered marriage, because
if you analyze how he was reared by her parents particularly by the
mother, there is already an unhealthy symbiosis developed between
the two, and this creates a major emotional havoc when he reached
adult age.
Q: How about the gravity?
A: This is already grave simply because from the very start
respondent never had an inkling that his behavioral manifestation
connotes pathology and second ground [sic], respondent will never
admit again that such behavior of his connotes again pathology
simply because the disorder of the respondent is not detrimental to
himself but, more often than not, it is detrimental to other party
involved.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:
Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the
respondent never appeared at my clinic.
Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning
wife to annul their marriage with her husband in general, what can
you say about the respondent?
A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to
give meaning to their relationship. If you analyze their marital
relationship they never lived under one room. From the very start of
the [marriage], the respondent to have petitioner to engage in secret
marriage until that time their family knew of their marriage [sic].
Respondent completely refused, completely relinquished his marital
obligation to the petitioner.
xxxx
COURT:
Q: Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the
petitioner, can you really enumerate the specific traits of the
respondent?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the
dependent attitude of the respondent.
Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?
A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-
lucky simply because he never had a set of responsibility. I think that
he finished his education but he never had a stable job because he
completely relied on the support of his mother.
Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something
specific?
A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the
part of the mother merely because respondent happened to be the
only son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic]
developed between the son and the mother simply because the
mother always pampered completely, pampered to the point that
respondent failed to develop his own sense of assertion or
responsibility particularly during that stage and there is also presence
of the simple lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of
handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested by the fact
that respondent refused to build a home together with the petitioner
when in fact they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never felt
or completely ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt
guilty hurting the petitioner because on the part of the petitioner,
knowing that respondent indulge with another woman it is very, very
traumatic on her part yet respondent never had the guts to feel guilty
138
or to atone said act he committed in their relationship, and clinically
this falls under antisocial personality. 37
In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and
inconclusive, thus:
xxxx
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO
Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?
DR. NEDY TAYAG
A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up
to this very moment, no scientific could be upheld to alleviate their
kind of personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other
person suffering from any kind of disorder particularly narcissistic
personality will never admit that they are suffering from this kind of
disorder, and then again curability will always be a question. [sic]38
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the
general characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic
personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent
the respondent exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz words
that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely,
gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage,
psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own limited
way, related these to the medical condition she generally described.
The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very
basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short,
her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously
short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said
to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what
extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was
already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the
disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to
undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are
critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis
because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As
the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the
respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence
requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration.39  marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the ground of the
If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no
reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit.40  No such independent evidence, however, appears on
record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the
respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on or about
the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the
testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that
revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner
related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground
exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because
only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and
given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with
the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his
determination to improve himself through studies, his care and
attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others.
The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the
petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the
respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the
respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this
allegation is at all correct.
To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the
spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital
developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity.
139
The continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared to
have been factored in. Not a few married couples have likewise
permanently separated simply because they have "fallen out of love,"
or have outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their
younger years.
Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to
secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of
additional evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is
woefully insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitioner’s
respondent’s psychological incapacity.
The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament.
The respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital
obligations, particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse.
Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological defect from the mere
fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological
illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to
assume.41
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
75095.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, v. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO
AND COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
 In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of nullity
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2  dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution3  dated December
1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745,
which reversed the Decision4  dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891
declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del
Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as amended.6
 from the bus terminal, which he refused to perform. Rachel added that
The Facts
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17)
years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party in Bintawan,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7  Very soon, they became romantically
involved.8
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic
helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided for Jose's tuition
fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to
get married on December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in
San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named
Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed
their vows in a church ceremony held in the Philippine Independent
Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.9
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/
caregiver and has been working there ever since, only returning to the
Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she was
140
able to acquire a house and lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San
Jose, Nueva Ecija.10
of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891,
alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
essential marital obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel
claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid
discharging his duties as husband and father. According to Rachel,
Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder a
few days before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she
refused to pay for the transportation expenses of his parents; he hit his
own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which
forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they were then
staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle of the
night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives
Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an
extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a
text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love,
kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang
dito."12  Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo,
ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa'yo." On one occasion, she,
together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman
with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed
that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as
they slowly drifted apart.13
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during
its early years, and it was only later in their marriage that Jose started
frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.14
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley15  and her sisters,
Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16  which corroborated her allegations,
as well as the testimony17  of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who
prepared the Psychological Report18 (Report) on Rachel. The remarks
section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her
interview with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of
empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his
pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his own fancies and
comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes
to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his
shortcomings.19
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose
maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of his marital and
parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had provided for
his family's financial and emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to
the building and maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that
although they occasionally had misunderstandings, they nevertheless
had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their first major argument
was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they
continued to communicate through mail during her stay overseas; and
that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give
her family the financial aid that they need so long as she would not
sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-marital
affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son.20 Jose presented
as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his allegations.21
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage
between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag,
declaring that Jose's APD interferes with his capacity to perform his
marital and paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to take
responsibility for his actions, notwithstanding the overwhelming
evidence against him.23
Jose appealed24  to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek
employment, squandering of their money on vices, violent nature, and
infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent psychological
condition that incapacitates him to perform his marital obligations
required by Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. At most, they
are personality defects,  i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and
unfaithfulness, which may be considered as grounds for legal
separation under Article 5525 of the same code.26
141
The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the
RTC,28 holding that the totality of the evidence Rachel presented was
not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
29 Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal
to seek employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices,
and his temper and alleged propensity for violence were not so grave
and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond sufficient to nullify the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code; at best, they showed
that Jose was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature
which nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that the
law requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature, and the
incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report
failed to show the relation between Jose's "deprived childhood" and
"poor home condition," on one hand, and grave and permanent
psychological malady, on the other. Finally, it observed that while Dr.
Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only offered a general evaluation on
the supposed root cause of Jose's personality disorder.30
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31  which was, however, denied by
the CA in a Resolution32  dated December 1, 2015; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
erred in reversing the RTC's finding of psychological incapacity.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic social institution,33 and marriage as the foundation of the
family.34 Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the
marriage under Article 3635 of the Family Code, as amended, should
refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.36 It should refer to no less than a mental
- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as
provided under Article 6837  of the Family Code, among others,
38  include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity, and render help and support.39 In other words, it
must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.40
In  Santos v. CA,41  the Court declared that psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by: (a)
gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability,  i.e., it must be
incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.42  The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 in  Republic v.
Molina43  (Molina) whose salient points are footnoted below,44  that
incorporated the basic requirements the Court established in Santos.
Nothwithstanding the  Molina  guidelines, note, however, that an
expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with
in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the
evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.45 The
evidence need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated
spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the
spouses,  i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of
the marriage.46  In other words, the  Molina  guidelines continue to
apply but its application calls for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
142
psychological incapacity.47  To be clear, however, the totality of the
evidence must still establish the characteristics that  Santos  laid
down: gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence.
Thus, in  Dedel v. CA,48  the Court declared that therein respondent's
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with
psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
49  In  Toring v. Toring,50  the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a person's
difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake  the obligations of marriage
that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the
Family Code addresses."51  The Court equally did not consider as
tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders
invoked by the petitioning spouses in  Pesca v. Pesca,52Republic v.
Encelan,53Republic v. De Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to name
a few, and thus dismissed their petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the
petition. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists
insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity,
irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that
Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees; (2) tends to become
violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a
father to Wesley and as a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual
intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4)
engaged in an extramarital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the
conjugal dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted
that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's
findings, on the other hand, simply summarized Rachel and Wesley's
narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to conclude
that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have
become deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since early
childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent
component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond
repair despite any form of intervention."56
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in
detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted
in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters
for establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did
not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e.,
its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what
extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to what extent his
alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear
to conclude that Jose's condition has no definite treatment, making it
incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report specify
the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave,
and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his
marital obligations. Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had
a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition" that automatically
resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity without,
however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition
antedating the marriage,  i.e., specific behavior or habits during his
adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to
determine, at the very least, his background that could have given her
a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his
childhood or was already existing at the inception of the marriage. To
be sure, established parameters do not require that the expert witness
personally examine the party alleged to be suffering from
psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are
presented sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters.
57  Considering that her Report was based solely on Rachel's side
whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved
the application of a more rigid and stringent standards which the RTC
failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the
various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's immaturity,
irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological
143
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage.
To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the
marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other
failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.58 There
must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person -
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with
the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.59
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;60 a marriage, no matter
how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent
sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the
context of Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is  DENIED. The Decision dated May 29,
2015 and the Resolution dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby  AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo,
and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
 January 11, 2018 G.R. No. 218630
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
 degree of immaturity.9  Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to
vs.
 fight with him and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent
TIJAM, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May
27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985,
which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision2  rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the
Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico
and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico
(Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of
mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a
relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both their
parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive
the news well as he was worried how it would affect his image and
how his parents would take the situation.3  Nevertheless, they got
married on July 22, 2000.4
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by
bickering and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were
fighting so much that they went their separate ways most of the time
and Katrina found herself wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone.5
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents
until the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on
December 30, 2000.6  Lawrence was distant and did not help in
rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to
run a family.7 Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners,
144
parties and drinking sprees.8  Katrina noticed that Lawrence was
alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high
to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs
of Lanz.10
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's
decisions-from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way
she treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown
arguments, often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina
remembered and missed her youngest brother who was then
committed in a substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to
stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop.11
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to
leave his parents' home and never to come back. They have been
separated in fact since then.12
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano),
who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr.
Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened
sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in
some way.13
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent,
incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche;14 and that it was
present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and
irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual
love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his wife.15
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina
and Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as
void  ab initio. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
petitioner shall cease using the surname of her husband having lost
 the right over the same and so as to avoid the misconception that she
is still the legal wifo of respondent. Custody over the couple's· minor
child is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable visitation rights
accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday and Sunday, or as the
parties may agree among themselves.
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the
National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite
who, in turn, shall endorse a copy of the same to the Local Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong City, ·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate
amendment and/or cancellation of the parties' marriage can be
effected in its registry. Furnish, likewise, the parties and counsel.
SO ORDERED.16
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No.
4903-11dated8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has
been a myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based
solely on the information coming from either party in a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It
is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in
concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated, exclusively
from Katrina.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has
been a myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based
solely on the information coming from either party in a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It
is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in
concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated, exclusively
from Katrina.
145
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances
of each and every case for the nullity is different from the other and
must be appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points out that the
psychological report of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted
scientific and reliable tests18 to come up with his findings. In any case,
the decision must be based not solely on the expert opinions but on
the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings,
which the RTC and the CA have found to have been sufficient in
proving Lawrence's psychological incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence
presented by Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and the CA
that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with
Katrina.
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the
negative.
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has
been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,  i.e.,  it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence,  i.e.,  it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability,  i.e.,  it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.19
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals20has set out
the guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all
declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity cases that We have decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
 and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. xxx
(2) The  root cause  of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. xxx
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. xxx21
Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove
that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties
expected of a husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on
the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.22 Here, We find
the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
146
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's statements.1âwphi1  It
bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the
proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite
being invited to do so.
The case of  Nicolas  S.  Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and
Marilyn B. Matudan23is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and
finding of the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to
substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological
incapacity of his wife.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert
opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological
evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations
in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological
condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions
from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information
upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must
evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with
the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe
and incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using
meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not
have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's
psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not
true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy
the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.
In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on
as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it
was similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations
on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information
fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical
psychologist on the psychological condition of the respondent-
appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said
report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from.
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the
basis of what she perceives as manifestations of the same. The
report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the
alleged disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was
really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity
of a psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted
by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological
disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the
psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis
for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations apart from
Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's
mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.24
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence
hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband.
Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-
outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our
view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the
law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
147
obligations that characterize some marriages.25  It is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness
that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she was then about to assume.26
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are
hardpressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is
clearly lacking to support the factual and legal conclusion that
Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence
or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged
psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof,  i.e.,  mere
allegations are not evidence.27 Here, we reiterate that apart from the
psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate
her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony,
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary
value.28
WHEREFORE,  the petition for review on  certiorari  is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012
Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Imus Cavite, Branch
20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 4903-11 is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 165321 : August 03, 2010]
RICARDO P. TORING, PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA M. TORING AND
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the
May 31, 2004 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71882.  The CA reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-99-36662,[2]  nullifying Ricardo's marriage with respondent
Teresita M. Toring on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunt's house in
Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin's teacher in Hawaiian dance and
was conducting lessons at his aunt's house.  Despite their slight
difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance
teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and
they became sweethearts after three months of courtship.  They
eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already
pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon.
Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three
children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding,
Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that
Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage.  He asked the court to declare his
marriage to Teresita null and void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the
psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness,
148
psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran's respective
testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to the
petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her.[3]
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that
Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. He was an overseas
seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family's
living expenses and their children's tuition. Teresita, however, was not
adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times,
Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his
wife; he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people,
Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent
of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left the family's utility
bills and their children's tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying
the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for
the family, so their children had to live in a small rented room and
eventually had to be taken in by Ricardo's parents. When confronted
by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent the
funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children.
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she
was pregnant with another man's child. During one of his visits to the
country, he noticed that Teresita's stomach was slightly bigger. He tried
to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her
miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst
suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as
his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized
by "withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his
wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a
month of living with Teresita in Cebu.  Ricardo reported, too, of
rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went
out on dates with other men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic,
controlling and demanding person, who mostly had her way in
everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the
duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most
unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard
work and sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful
of him.[4]  He believed that their marriage had broken down beyond
repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one
another.[5]
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to
the demise of the marriage was Teresita's Narcissistic Personality
Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations.  To quote Dr. Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following
pervasive pattern of behaviors: a sense of entitlement as she expected
favorable treatment and automatic compliance to her wishes, being
interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she took
advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she
was unwilling to recognize her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,]
taking into consideration her own feelings and needs only, her
haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to
blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of
behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which
started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is considered to
be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not
recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is
nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain unmotivated
for treatment and impervious to recovery.[6]
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her
psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and
Teresita's eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not
personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a
personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation,
but the notice remained unanswered.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) contended that there was no basis to declare Teresita
psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological
evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only
revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties' personality
traits but not on Teresita's psychological makeup. The OSG also
argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and
sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity.  Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged
149
psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage,
nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita.
In short, the RTC believed Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation and
testimony and, on the totality of Ricardo's evidence, found Teresita to
be psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial court's
findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court
in  Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[7]  The RTC failed to
specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresita's
psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the
incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran's psychological
evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and
fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors.
Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo's allegations on Teresita's
overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for
declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as
grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial
court, particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits
that the trial court - in declaring the nullity of the marriage - fully
complied with Molina.
In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the
RTC's decision, particularly in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to
comply with this Court's guidelines for the proper interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier
arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before
the trial court failed to show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or
incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and failed as
well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise,
failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her
marital obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Ricardo's Reply[9]  reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly
discussed the root cause of Teresita's psychological incapacity and
identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder.  He claimed that
sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise
on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further
argued that alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under
Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary, citing Barcelona
v. Court of Appeals.[10]
These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the
parties filed.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no
reversible error when it set aside the RTC's decision for lack of legal
and factual basis.
In the leading case of  Santos  v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[11]  we held
that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The
psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."[12]
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code
in  Molina  and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of this article.  These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability
established in the Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
150
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA
100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
 not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.[13]
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these
basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the
continuing doctrinal validity of  Santos.  In so far as the present
factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and
applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the
151
application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases
of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter
insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she contracted.  Furthermore, the
psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the
inception of the marriage.  From these requirements arise the concept
that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage;
it simply recognizes that  there never was any marriage in the first
place because the affliction - already then existing - was so grave and
permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume
or had assumed.[14]
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality
of the petitioner's evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As
already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the
testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter's psychological
evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from where she derived a
psychological evaluation of Teresita.
a. Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation and testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita
suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations.
To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements
told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her
evaluation.  Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added
that Teresita's disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is
grave and incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and
evaluation that, in this case, became the basis for the conclusion that
no marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity
of one of the parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of
Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological
tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively
critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in
evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the
spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.
In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the psychologist's testimony
and conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to
warrant the finding of respondent's psychological incapacity because
the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were all derived from
the petitioner's statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be
discounted. In another case,  Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16]  the
Court declared that while the various tests administered on the
petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement could not be made with
respect to the respondent-husband's psychological condition.  To our
mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresita's psychological
condition, based  solely  on information fed by Ricardo, are not any
different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[17]
To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the
allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician
or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[18]  This
recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we shall
favorably appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an
Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.
Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity
outlined in  Santos  and  Molina  need not necessarily come from the
allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential -
although from sources other than the respondent spouse - to show his
or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of
marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential
obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability
of the condition.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons
intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even
152
family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity
already present at the time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who
was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresita's
psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses' eldest son who
would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case
because he could not have been there when the spouses were married
and could not have been expected to know what was happening
between his parents until long after his birth.
We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the
summary of Richardson's interview with the pyschologist: Richardson's
statement occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising eleven
sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated
instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his
father's alleged womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo
is a Catholic, while Teresita is a Mormon).[19]
We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate
that Teresita suffered from some psychological disorder as far back as
the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be
indicative of problems traceable to any basic psychological disorder
existing at the time of marriage.  For one, these points of dispute are
not uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots
of marital problems - finances, fidelity and religion. The psychologist,
too, never delved into the relationship between mother and son except
to observe their estranged relationship due to a previous argument - a
money problem involving Ricardo's financial remittances to the family.
To state the obvious, the psychologist's evaluation never explained
how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at the
time of the spouses' marriage, showed a debilitating psychological
incapacity already existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo's cause, is the failure of
Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation to fully explain the details -
  i.e.,  the what, how, when, where and since when - of Teresita's
alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.  It seems to us that, with
hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply
stated out of the blue that Teresita's personality disorder manifested
itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that the incapacity should
have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never
explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita's alleged
personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital
obligations that she failed to assume.  Neither did the good doctor
adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and
incurable was Teresita's psychological disorder.
Dr. Albaran's testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary
situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to provide the required insights
that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written
psychological evaluation.  In fact, Dr. Albaran's cross-examination
only made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she
had difficulty pinpointing the root cause of Teresita's personality
disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from Ricardo
and Richardson regarding Teresita's personal and family history. To
directly quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation
when she said that "[t]he only data that I have is that, the respondent
seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family and this could be
perhaps  the [sic] contributory to the development of the personality
disorder."[20] Dr. Albaran's obvious uncertainty in her assessment only
proves our point that a complete personality profile of the spouse,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined
from meager information coming only from a biased source.
b.   Ricardo's testimony
Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an
adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardo's characterizations of his
wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.
Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.[21]
153
Ricardo's testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible
in managing the family's finances by not paying their rent, utility bills
and other financial obligations. Teresita's spendthrift attitude,
according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house and lot
intended to be their family residence.  This kind of irresponsibility,
however, does not rise to the level of a psychological incapacity
required under Article 36 of the Family Code.  At most, Teresita's
mismanagement of the family's finances merely constituted difficulty,
refusal or neglect,  during the marriage, in the handling of funds
intended for the family's financial support.
Teresita's alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order
for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;[22]  there
must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to her spouse.[23]
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that
Teresita suffered from a disordered personality of this kind.  Even
Ricardo's added testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita's dates with
other men and her pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the
deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse
integral element and link to Teresita's allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita's alleged character
traits already existed at the inception of their marriage. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity must exist
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[24]  In the absence of
this element, a marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be
alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of
the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that
the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the
Family Code is no longer necessary.  We find this argument
completely at variance with Ricardo's main argument against the
assailed CA decision -  i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed
thoroughly the root cause of Teresita's psychological incapacity as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.  These conflicting positions,
notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further
clarify our statement in  Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and
misinterpreted to support his present petition that "since the new Rules
do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition
the root cause of the psychological incapacity."[26]
In  Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its
failure to state the "root cause" of the respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity.  The Court resolved this issue, ruling that
the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action because the petitioner
- instead of stating a specific root cause - clearly described
the  physical manifestations indicative of the psychological
incapacity.  This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with
the first requirement in the Molina case - that the "root cause" of the
psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardo's position, Barcelona does not do away with
the "root cause" requirement.  The ruling simply means that the
statement of the root cause does not need to be in medical terms or be
technical in nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders
are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical
manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological
incapacity.  Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (Rules)[27] in fact provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
154
x  x  x  x
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
shall specially allege the complete facts showing that either or both
parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the  physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause
in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was
not dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules.  What the Rules
really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the
Rules, being procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their adoption.
To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show
that Teresita suffered from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition
for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that
Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible
in taking care of their family's finances - a fault or deficiency that does
not amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the
Family Code requires.  We reiterate that irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not  by themselves  warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a person's
difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage
that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the
Family Code addresses.[28]
WHEREFORE,  premises considered, we  DENY  the petition
and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71882. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 185286               August 18, 2010
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,
 restricted by a university student’s budget. At that time, respondent
vs. RAMON REYES, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a
marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful
before making a finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously
diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On
the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite
convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very
reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not
be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 897612  which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-01-44854.3
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon
Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when
they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates
then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from
the UP Los Baños campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly
developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was
initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and
bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions.4 Since
both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and
drove home together from the university.
155
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship
which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were
held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s
good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s
habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was
taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a
degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped
out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the
Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and
her father’s death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that
time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed
at the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in
Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by
respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent
solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a
monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial
difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their
marriage, the monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from respondent
stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner.
When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent
about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow
advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game plan was
to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and
restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new
business took respondent away from his young family for days on end
without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up,
hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner
suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new
living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While
petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of
the household, respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another
attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly
unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically.
Compounding the family’s financial woes and further straining the
parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards
his family. That his business took him away from his family did not
seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in
touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence
and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up
did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more
estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave
birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and
he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the
newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find
out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business
stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family,
respondent refused to go back to work for the family business.
Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap
paper and carton trading. As with all of respondent’s business
ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which
now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not
surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having
an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his
girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter
liked respondent’s gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent
was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was,
156
more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and
their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage
was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst.
Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained
unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and
played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she
was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner
felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and
asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was
left of their marriage. Petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and
asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her
rope. Yet, even respondent’s siblings waved the white flag on
respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina,
members of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the
parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling
sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a
psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him,
respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical
psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s
siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent
acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve.
Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,5  petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the
latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that
he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he
was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a
spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr.
Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and
declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties,
the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between
petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent
RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishop’s
Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and
void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their
property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH
MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the
full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having
finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days
from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no
Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding Decree if the parties have no properties[.]
[O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in
Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision
(Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after
compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property
157
(Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties
have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel,
the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their
respective office addresses.
SO ORDERED.6
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on
motion for reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration
of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to
petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed
the RTC and declared the parties’ marriage as valid and subsisting.
Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from
the majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC)
ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No.
Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.7
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court
positing the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
 II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
V essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT
MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES’
MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36
OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE
STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT
COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION
OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED
PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8
158
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage
between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties’
psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the
oral and documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts
i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the
Court finds merit in the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a
marital partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of
the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left
the determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case
basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination
of psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the
evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of
behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/
diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra.
Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court
finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a
congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains
 to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their
essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well
as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In
short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage.
There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness
of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in
their findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder
which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to
the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their
profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as
credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological
status of the respondent. This psychological incapacity of the
respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is
serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a
helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the
respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless
to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did
not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his
assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner
and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this
belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by
his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was
blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He
totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have
been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her
sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their
marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally
constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even
the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the
remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent
confirmed this stand of his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take
relationship and not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the
fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally
be observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties
did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the
personality disorder of the respondent which renders him
159
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage,
is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible
due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the
respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that
she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality
cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They
are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist
while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the
weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and
vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute
the thunder bolt or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and
reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so
that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it
is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is
grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing
years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human
beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment
conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code
provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The
case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their
psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage,
at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated
differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed
at all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in
agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only.
Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage
remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the
physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to
sustain.9
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a
divided decision, the appellate court diverged from the findings of the
RTC in this wise:
 On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina] vis-à-vis the totality of evidence presented by herein
[petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself.
There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that
[respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist
Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed
Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality
Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to
be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic
and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to
be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine
strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as
purely advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it
chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that
they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise
unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno
nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on
the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr.
Villegas are hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they
have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the
[respondent] as they never personally examined the [respondent]
himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the
purported psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as
the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that
[respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to
determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The
undeniable fact is that based on Dayan’s personal examination of the
[respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral
observations made, background information gathered and
interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that
160
there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual therapy
and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on
[respondent], such as his failure to give regular support, substance
abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the
evidence presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the
[respondent’s] alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come and go"
attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial
support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s]
feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business
pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with
his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] "defects" were
not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live
in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them
two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended
Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would
give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino
households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned
from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter,
[respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that
[respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation,
Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr.
Villegas’ Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] "manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive
to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount
of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to
specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was
 psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof]
even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx.
In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is
that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to
be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x
x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of
difficulties in their marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled
that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a
"refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioner’s] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to
be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always
to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of
marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken
as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but
for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45
that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so
that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately
as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
161
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.10
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot
subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling that the psychological
incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree
with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid
and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals11  solidified the jurisprudential foundation
of the principle that the factors characterizing psychological incapacity
to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2)
juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.12
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing
respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents.
Belonging to an average social status, intellectual achievement is quite
important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with
high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of
them. Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to
assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to
a limited extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been
described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the
home. Doing volunteer and community services, she was not the
demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love
and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and
encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing
touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home
environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or
depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This
trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for
any undertakings (sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable,
dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong
sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her
analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to
a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind
and reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are
perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual relationship,
especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy,
insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets
(sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than
20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time
when others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic),
instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to
compensate for [respondent’s] shortcomings, the bigger was the
discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner]
felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their
marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and
belonged to the second set of brood (sic), where there were less
bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally,
he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described
to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested
clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly.
Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he
needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted
[petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted,
without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and
differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no
remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His
162
studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle
of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove
his worth, he quit work from his family employment and ventured on
his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses
failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack
of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his
negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his
spitting at her face which impliedly meant "you are nothing as
compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of
inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides.
However, this seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as
perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability
and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel
the support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own
business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and
closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful
not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy,
ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of
inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not
work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in
negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of
insight and primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in
being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is
centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of
the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son
relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual
relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and
expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong
masculine strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to
be able to assume his duties and responsibilities as a husband and
father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to
do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner,
that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere,
that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband,
who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities
of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong
clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder,
of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities
of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the
social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and
adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse, no
guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition.
His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs
lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying
defense mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the
ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to
his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe
sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He
therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority,
assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and
indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic
supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the
celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as
permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological
development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it
hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning
related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)13
163
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]’s brothers, referred [respondent] to
the clinic. According to them, respondent has not really taken care of
his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life.
He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he
never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic)
that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when
they see that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and
just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish that he’d be
more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his
wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job.
[Respondent]’s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really
disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he
always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him
anymore. She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned
that he stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not
telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs
when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When
[respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he
mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have
anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart.
He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person
but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak
points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken
advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so he’d
rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone
[or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.
xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
xxxx
B. Vocational Preference
xxxx
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
xxxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project
a reserved, aloof and detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits
withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due
to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude
himself from association with others. He feels that he is
"different" and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections.
Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt
to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his
preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency to
withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt
to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to
follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained
person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in
order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small
need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He,
too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender
feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry
within but he may choose to repress this feeling.
[Respondent’s] strong need for social approval, which could
have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him
submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort
to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels
victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive
behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of
indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are
suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations
which is likewise apt to be repressed.
164
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,]
experiencing considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to
fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also
entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with
negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no
sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he
will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and
distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on
things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he
can’t accomplish anything because he is unable to see which
path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated
by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is
unable to accomplish anything; unable to give priority to the needs of
his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis
supplied)14
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioner’s] case history and from
her psychological assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the
respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this
marriage. Based on the information available about the respondent, he
suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and
dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible
to assume the normal obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner,
she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her
best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her
comprehension of human situations is very shallow for a woman of
her academic and professional competence. And this explains why she
married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the
abuse, took so long to do something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-
Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
(spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic,
aggressive sadistic and dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
(successful wife)
165
Severity: 4 (severe)
xxxx
One has to go back to [respondent’s] early childhood in order
to understand the root cause of his antisocial personality
disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of
11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother.
[Respondent’s] father was kind, quiet and blind and
[respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately,
[respondent’s] mother grew up believing that she was not her
mother’s favorite child, so she felt "api, treated like poor
relations." [Respondent’s] mother’s reaction to her perceived
rejection was to act out—with poor impulse control and poor
mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper
tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondent’s]
role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the
business of living, he learned to use his good looks and his
charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie
convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his
deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his
siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process,
his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired
so that he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a
long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondent’s] narcissistic personality features were
manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro
and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his
grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just "come
and go," without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his
sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because
[petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.);
interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the
maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy
(e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife,
he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic
 personality features were manifested whom he has physically,
emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on
drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested
by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major
areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his
own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality
disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive
sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to
love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A
personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and
stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence
that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and
void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)15
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale,
the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since
they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or
any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se
invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,16  necessarily involves only
two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their
individual assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from
the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly,
petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
166
experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then
validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment
were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the
petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings
and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their
own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with
them, spanning the period of time they knew him.17 These were also
used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18  citing The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),
19  instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality
disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the
following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting
self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and
appropriateness of emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a
broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress
or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas
of functioning.
 D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can
be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a
manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological
effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a
general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial
Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of
the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated
by three (or more) of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to
lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing
acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of
aliases, or conning others for personal profit or
pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by
repeated physical fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated
failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor
financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to
or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from
another
167
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age
15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively
during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode.20
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the
psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled
from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder
will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of
behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare
denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan’s findings and
recommendation, the psychological incapacity of respondent is not
incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability.
In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical
psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan
and Saddock’s textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,21  treatment,
ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed
kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan’s
recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not
necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological
incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.22  As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her
separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals & Molina:23
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person’s entire
life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party’s mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence
of lack of valid consent.
… [Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting
link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three
reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and
Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these
problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and
work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business
attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a
person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the
courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does
not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not
beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert’s opinion
concerning the supposed psychological incapacity of a party.24 In Lim
v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we ruled that, even without delving into the non-
exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,26  the
stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals27 must be
independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage
grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions
of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics
of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological
incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the
inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even
168
on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their
incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality
disorders was not supported by psychological tests properly
administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests'
use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the
parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been
fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are
designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking,
or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of
seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent
it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case.
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance
that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a
basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the
factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and
established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial
personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be
normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however,
reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy,
running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal
activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in
childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior
make it seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete
absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact,
they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often
impress observers as having good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be
trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard
of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these
actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.28
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an
inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support;
(2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job
that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal
charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioner’s purported psychological incapacity, we
agree with the CA’s ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically
allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that
judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner’s] Amended
Petition was indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided
under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas’ finding
that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate
Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to
169
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such
alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological
condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological
Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was
given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere,
and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the
needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are
praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report, it was stated
that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than
20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made
by no less than [petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to
believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within the
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.29
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina:30
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the
foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is
REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
 March 8, 2017 G.R. No. 188400
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner
 cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover.12
vs RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent
LEONEN, J.:
Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to
comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations.
This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De
La Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 and
Resolution3 dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in
CA- G.R. CV. No. 76243, which reversed the Decision4  dated August
14, 2002 of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr.
(Rodolfo) first met when they were students at the University of Sto.
Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts.5
After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the
University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's Office.6 Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who
was unable to finish his college degree, found continued employment
at his family's printing press business.7
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that
Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy.8  She also
observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt
insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies and careers.9
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in
Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria Katharyn, who was
born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on April 6,
1986.10
Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He
was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even
skip work at his family's printing press to stalk her.11  Rodolfo's
170
jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year
old cousin who was staying at their house because he suspected his
In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would
have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day.13  At times, Rodolfo would
fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just so they
could have sex.14 During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie
her to the bed or poke her with things.15 Rodolfo also suggested that
they invite a third person with them while having sex, or for Maria
Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's presence.
16  Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel molested and
maltreated.17  Whenever Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's advances or
suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel.18
Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as
well as any person she thought could help her and Rodolfo.19  Maria
Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo marriage
counselling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".
20
Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected
that Maria Teresa was having an affair.21 In the heat of their quarrel,
Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa, with their
two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after
the gunpoking incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after
that, and she supported their children by herself.22
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage23  before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a
responsive pleading.24  Maria Teresa moved for the revival of the
Petition.25 The trial court granted the motion and referred the case to
the Office of the City Prosecutor for collusion investigation.
26  Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and
recommended the trial of the case on the merits.27
Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial
conference.28  The pre-trial conference was declared closed and
terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her evidence.29
Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical
psychologist, was presented as an expert witness.30 Dr. Lopez testified
that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather
information on her family background and her marital life with
Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests.31  Dr.
Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.32
After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez
concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering from any severe mental
disorder and had no indication of any organic or functional
impairment.33  Although Dr. Lopez found that Maria Teresa had an
emotionally disturbed personality, he opined that this was not severe
enough to constitute psychological incapacity.34
Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through
registered mail.35 After two (2) months, Rodolfo contacted Dr. Lopez
and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi niyo naman
ako kilala." Dr. Lopez explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's
side of the story, but Rodolfo replied with,  "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala
kayong pakialam sa akin."36
Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder
manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like reckless driving and
extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe
doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his
being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment;
and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity."37
Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of
personality disorder, even more severe than the other personality
disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.38  Dr.
Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably
caused by a pathogenic parental model. 39  Rodolfo's family
background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and
Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double
171
insanity, a symptom similar to his father's.40 Dr. Lopez further claimed
that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe
paranoia.41
Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be
annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to perform his marital
obligations.42
Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive
leading.43 He likewise did not appear during the pre-trial conference.
44 He was given a specific date to present evidence but he still failed
to appear.45 he trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a
waiver of his right to present evidence.46
On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of
evidence.47  The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to
submit its certification.48 The Office of the Solicitor General, however,
failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was
submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the
Office of the Solicitor General.49
On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its
Decision50 granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial
court gave credence to his findings as they were based on information
gathered from credible informants. The trial court held that the
marriage between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null
and void because "[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave,
serious and incurable."51  The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered, to wit:
(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE
LA FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR. null and
void on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code. Their conjugal partnership (sic)
 property relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of
properties acquired by the parties, no pronouncement as to its
liquidation and partition is hereby made;
(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both
surnamed De la Fuente shall remain legitimate. They shall remain in
the custody of the petitioner.
(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence
presented as to the capability of the respondent to give support, no
pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;
(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name,
TANI.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of
Quezon City and Mandaluyong City where the marriage was
celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion
for reconsideration.53  The Office of the Solicitor General explained
that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had
no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes.54 It was also unable
to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of
cases it was handling.55
On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration, with the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby
deemed moot and academic.
This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor
General that this case was filed on June 3, 1999 and there should be
no more delay in the disposition of the case.56
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals.57 It argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case
without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor
172
General,58  and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of
Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding
was based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set
forth in the Molina case.59
The Court of Appeals granted60  the Office of the Solicitor General's
appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was
unreliable for being hearsay, thus, the trial court should not have given
it weight.61  The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's
finding that Rodolfo's behavior descended from psychological illness
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.62
In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's
admission that she married Rodolfo with the belief that he would
change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5) years before
getting married, showed that they were in good terms during the early
part of their marriage. It also negated her claim that Rodolfo's
psychological defect existed at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage.63 The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)
Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration65 but this was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution66 dated May 25, 2009.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari.67
Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a
wider discretion on whether expert opinion was needed to prove
psychological incapacity.68  Petitioner further argued that for as long as
the trial court had basis in concluding that psychological incapacity
existed, such conclusion should be upheld.69
Rodolfo filed a Comment70  stating that he was not opposing Maria
Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more
sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."71
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,72  agreed that a
physician was not required to declare a person psychologically
incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented must be able to
adequately prove the presence of a psychological condition. The Office of
the Solicitor General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to
sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged psychological incapacity.73
The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's
psychological report stated that his assessment was based on interviews
he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties' common friends.
However, Dr. Lopez did not name the two (2) common friends in the
report.74  Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only
interviewed petitioner and Rodolfo's best friend, not two (2) friends as
indicated in his report.75 The Office of the Solicitor General insisted that
the finding of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should be dismissed as
hearsay as it was based solely on information given by petitioner to Dr.
Lopez.76
The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court
of Appeals erred in denying the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage because petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove that
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
The Petition is granted.
The 1995 case of  Santos v. Court of Appeals77  was the first case that
attempted to lay down the standards for determining psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.  Santos  declared that
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."78 Furthermore, the incapacity
"should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage[.]"79
Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,80 provided
the guidelines to be followed when interpreting and applying Article 36 of
the Family Code:
173
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The  root cause  of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/
or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of  ejusdem generis,  nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or  incurable.  Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
- subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose
of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
174
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the  defensor vinculi  contemplated under Canon
1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was
sufficient compliance with  Molina  to warrant the nullity of petitioner's
marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of
proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.
The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to
the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a
thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological
condition. The Court of Appeals cited  Republic v. Dagdag,82  where this
Court held that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts."83  The Court of Appeals then ruled that "[o]bviously, this
requirement is not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or
medical doctor testifies on the alleged psychological incapacity of one
party."84
The Court of Appeals is mistaken.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85  states that the non-examination of one of the
parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings
of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very
definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally
and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."86
Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician
to examine a person and declare him/her to be psychologically
incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented
establishes the party's psychological condition.88
Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved
that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. Respondent's
paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme
jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and
assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:
Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s]
personality by taking into consideration the psychological impression
and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the different
behaviors he manifested during the time that he and petitioner were
living together. According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual, he found the respondent to be suffering from a paranoid
personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging
behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being
distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends
and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of
remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and
severe immaturity. He also testified that this kind of disorder is
actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more
severe than the other personality disorders like the borderline and
narcissistic personality disorders.
and support to the petitioner.1âwphi1 He recommends that the marriage
be annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task
of decision-making, must give due regard to expert opinion on the
psychological and mental disposition of the parties.90
The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was
hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr.
Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological disorder probably
started during his late childhood years and developed in his early
adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform his marital obligations was likely caused by growing
up with a pathogenic parental model.
The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was
also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed
respondent's jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would often
follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him.
91 She believed that he would change after they got married;92 however,

this did not happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme
As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a and severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.93
pathogenic parental model. As he investigated the family background of
the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his father was a psychiatric
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity
patient such that the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic
were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with
contamination which is called double insanity. This, according to Dr.
paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was
Lopez is usually developed among close family members, bestfriends (sic),
something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was
sweethearts and even couples who are close to one another; that people
corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly
close to one another get psychically contaminated; that surprisingly, the
refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor,
symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of the
and suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent
respondent. The said disorder started during respondent's late childhood
refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also
years and developed in his early adolescent years.
refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.
He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live
because of the severe paranoia of the patient; that patients with this kind
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
of personality disorder could never accept that there is something wrong
help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived
with them and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage
together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed
in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather than cooperate with
to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a
them.
husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he
is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect,

175
This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards
petitioner, which show his need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic
case of coercive control. At first, respondent only inflicted nonphysical
forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and
friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However,
his jealousy soon escalated into physical violence when, on separate
instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a
pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner through different tactics
such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and
economic deprivation.94  Although not specifically named, coercive
control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been recognized in
Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children
Act of 2004:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely
to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not
limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation
of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating,
stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his
increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter
lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would
be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain
176
married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their
marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there
was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly
could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is
persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental
illness is incurable.
In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa
and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the pronouncement we made in an
opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin:95
Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our
individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to
responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges,
and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society.The state's
interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual
liberties.
Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion
of psychological incapacity should not only be based on a medical or
psychological disorder, but should consist of the inability to comply with
essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96
Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that
a straitjacket application of the  Molina  guidelines "has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by
little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions."97 Ironically, the ultimate effect of such stringent application
of the  Molina  guidelines is the perversion of the family unit, the very
institution that our laws are meant to protect.
WHEREFORE,  premises considered, the Petition is  GRANTED.  The
marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is
declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV. No. 76243 are  REVERSED  and  SET ASIDE.  The Decision
dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 208790               January 21, 2015
GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner,

vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1  rendered on January 29, 2013 and
Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision3 dated January
29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch
30, in Civil Case No. SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage
between Glenn Vifias (Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Vifias (Mary
Grace) as null and void.
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old,
respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas.
4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at
birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the
infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and
smoking during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a
bartender, while Mary Grace was a production engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she
shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace
went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary
Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5  for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.He alleged that Mary Grace
was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly
resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly
enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even whenshe
was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most
essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to
177
Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior
during their whirlwind courtship.6
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the
death of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she were single
and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was self-centered,
selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior,
she showed indifference. She eventually left their home without
informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left for an overseas
employment in Dubai.7
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They
informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and was left
to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance
must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in
adjusting to married life.8
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance
and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical
Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as "amply
aware of his marital roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and
healthy heterosexual relationship."9
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality
through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin,
Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college
graduate. She belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an
overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the time
Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and
romantically involved with another man.10
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically
harmed Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-
tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.
11
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that
Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love,
trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag
recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s
marriage.12
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious,
grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is incurable by any
form of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply embedded
within her system as it was found to have started as early as her
childhood years. Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible,
maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to
heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity,
need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of
disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly
distorted her perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting
marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in [Mary Grace]
through her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement and arrogance.
Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened
sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show proper respect for
her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the time[,] she
would do things her own way and would not pay close attention to
what her husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly
struggled for power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn],
being too considerate to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x
She is into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at
night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which
was still going on up to the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s]personality aberration can be said to
have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable factors in her
milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial
stage in the life of a person as thisis the time when the individual’s
character and behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a
178
dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating parents[,] who never
impose any restrictions [upon] their children. Considering such fact,
she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of the nurturing
figures that she had[,] who were supposed to bethe first to show
concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as
she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the
laxity she had from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be
the eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always
followed with regards to making decisions and always mandates
people to submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very essence
of morality [and] has certainly learned set of unconstructive traits that
further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and values
were not instilled in her young mind that as she went on with her life,
she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill-advised things even
if she isamply aware of the depravity of her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical
antecedence as it was already inher system even prior to the
solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.13  (Underlining
ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted
service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through her aunt,
Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend any
of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were
offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary Grace as
outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of
Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his work.15 On her
part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the psychological report
dated December 29, 2008.
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision16  declaring the
marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on account
of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the following as
grounds:
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the]
grant of the petition. Reconciliation between the parties under the
circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties, it is best that
the legal bond between them be severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the
miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic
Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who does
not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated
in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without
telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the insistence
of[Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of his wife. The
law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged to live
together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x For all
intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary on
what it really means. x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace]
failed to comply with the basic marital obligations of mutual love,
respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their
marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary
Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her marital obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a
clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the subject of
psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to
gather sufficient data and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This
[Narcissistic] personality disorder of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her
personality make-up, so grave and so permanent, incurable and
difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal incapacity leading
to psychological incapacity is already pre-existing before the marriage
and was only manifested after. It has become grave, permanent and
incurable.17 (Underlining ours and italics in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration
but it was denied by the RTC in its Order18 dated December 1, 2010.
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent
evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
179
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her
marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root
cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own
findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statements anent the gravity
and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere
generalizations and conclusions sansdetails. Besides, what
psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to
assume marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
were shown, but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition.
Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this
does not translate into a psychological illness.19
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision
reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn
and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated the reasons
below:
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, asso expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was
carefree, outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made her
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise
alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save the
marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our mind, the
above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of
psychological incapacity on her part.
While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr.
Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a psychological examination on
[Glenn], however, said examination was conducted only on him and
no evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary
Grace] was characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value
in determining the psychological incapacity of a person as she would
be in the best position to assess and evaluate the psychological
condition of the couple, she being an expert in this field of study of
behavior. Although the psychologist stated that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, she did not fully
explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she makea conclusion as
to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted that she was not
able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the information provided to
her may be subjective and self-serving. Essential in this petition is the
allegation of the root causeof the spouse’s psychological incapacity
which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriageand shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth
in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the
petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not
establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of [Mary
Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the
ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified;
180
b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d)
clearly explained in the decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to say:
"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological– not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] suchroot cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists."
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves". It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party evenbefore
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume." Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage
of the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.20  (Citations
omitted, underlining ours and emphasis and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21  dated August 7,
2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration22 filed by Glenn.
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether
or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged according to its
own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. The RTC judge should pains takingly examine the
factual milieu, while the CA must refrain from substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.23  Further, Glenn argues that in
Marcos v. Marcos,24  the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non
requirement for the respondent spouse to be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist before a marriage could be declared as a
nullity.25  However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her
testimony should be considered as decisive evidence.26  Besides, the
findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses
should be respected.27
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that
the arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere reiterations
of the matters already resolved by the CA.28
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination orassessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented
181
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to."29
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn,
Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not
sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary
Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is
outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores.
Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with
another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication
with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC.
Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the
exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess
incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not
necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v.
Rumbaua30 is emphatic that:
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling toperform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with
the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to
be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the
respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the
marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and
faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
 Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not
due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for
more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established
fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an
impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their home in 2006
indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability
to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by
Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing
evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of
the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s
testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand,
is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly objective.
Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and
acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a
proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn
even testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each
other almost everyday.32  Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and
well[-]educated person"33 in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court
finds the same as unfounded.1âwphi1  Rumbaua34  provides some
guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of
psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity
of marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the
respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information
182
fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her
cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does
notdisqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of
a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the
respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the
doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-
centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the
world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic
for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." x x
x.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with
the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root
cause of the respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder and to prove
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain
the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot
avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that
the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces
of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable"
– is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her
previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the
various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a
fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition.
To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side
is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof
of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
 xxxx
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to
establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent
was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of
the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of
marriage. Neither did she adequately explain howshe came to the
conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. x x x
xxxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short,
her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously
short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can besaid
to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what
extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was
already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the
disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to
undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are
critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis
because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related toher. x x x
If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no
reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit. No such independent evidence, however, appears on
record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the
respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on orabout
the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the
testimony and report appearto us to be no more than a diagnosis that
revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner
related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground
exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because
only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and
given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with
the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his
determination to improve himself through studies, his care and
attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The
183
evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the
petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the
respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the
respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this
allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not
a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of
either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities
and marital developments that do not amount to psychological
incapacity. x x x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s
status as the eldest among her siblings,36  her father’s being an
overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a housewife.
37  These, however, are not sufficient to establish and explain the
supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the
declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining
the statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a
person’s psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a
petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the Court
also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the
evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to
conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 170022               January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005
amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered
its March 22, 2004 decision3 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No.
75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47,
in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two
children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went to
work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar,
while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an
illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7  Lolita allegedly
left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin.
Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16,
1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s
psychological incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that
Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She
insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she
left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and
subsequent abandonment of the family home.10  He testified that
184
he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12  on Lolita
prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness,"13  but had been "unable to
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other
depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions";15  and "her refusal to go
with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship."16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage
to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not
serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita
merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she
was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity
is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the
nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19  of the CA’s decision and, in due
course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original decision
and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its
amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of
Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of
abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did
not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological
illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal
separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her
marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists
sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s
marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
 disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse
on Psychological Incapacity
185
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations";21  not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence
at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability
of the condition of the errant spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s

psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment
of their home,24  as well as his continued financial support to her
and their children even after he learned of the affair,25  but he
merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and
her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 
To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
from discharging the essential marital obligations.27  No evidence
on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity
and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation
report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The
psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not
suffer from any major psychiatric illness.28  No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's
Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-
workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the
conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with
Cesar.
its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of
the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other
during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October
7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-
Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness

as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles
apart from their marital counterparts.

While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and

relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be
compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another.
To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted
cannot serve this purpose.

Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar

abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital
relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is,
in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s

psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible error
when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social

institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against

186
 G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014 gambling cockpits as “kristo” and “bangkero sa hantak.” When he
decided to join and train with the army,12 Natividad left their conjugal
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE home and sold their house without his consent.13  Thereafter,
GRACIA, Respondent. Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain
Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez.
PERLAS–BERNABE, J.: 14  After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second

marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio

Assailed in this petition for review on  certiorari 1  are the
Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro
Decision2  dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3  dated February 3,
City.15  From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CV No. 69103 which
was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted
affirmed the Decision4  dated October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial
earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile
Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S–
because of Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be
665 declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia
incurable.17
(Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground
of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear
of the Philippines5 (Family Code). during trial, despite service of summons.18 Nonetheless, she informed
the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr.
The Facts Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s claims.19 Rodolfo
also underwent the same examination.20
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the
Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.6  They In her two–page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that
lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to
children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties
Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 suffered from “utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and
and January 15, 1972, respectively.7 unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who
abide by established norms of conduct.”22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for
also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife
declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC,
and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to
docketed as Civil Case No. S–665, alleging that Natividad was
perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental
obligations. In compliance with the Order8 dated January 5, 1999 of
condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration
the RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to
of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing,
determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and
Dr. Zalsos concluded that the “couple’s union was bereft of the mind,
found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
will and heart for the obligations of marriage.”23
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
first met Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High
representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an
School of Sindangan,10  and he was forced to marry her barely three
opposition24 to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by
(3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy.
11 At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad
Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as
was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the
187
contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under
the Family Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26  dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the
marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr.
Zalsos, holding that Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited a
behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of
personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties’ marriage
but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsos’s
observation that Natividad’s condition is incurable since it is deeply
rooted within the make–up of her personality. Accordingly, it
concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more
comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing
that Natividad’s personality traits constituted psychological incapacity
as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the
testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court.28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC, finding that while Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily
equate to psychological incapacity, “their degree or severity, as duly
testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of
psychological disorder so profound as to render [Natividad]
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.”30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied
in a Resolution31 dated February 3, 2006, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity.
188
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
“Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental
– not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be  truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among others,34 include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the  most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.35 
In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by:  (a)  gravity  (i.e., it must be
grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage);  (b)  juridical
antecedence  (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage); and  (c)  incurability  (i.e., it must
be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved).37 
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in  Republic of the
Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points are footnoted hereunder.39 These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court
established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in  Dedel v. CA,41  held that
t h e r e i n r e s p o n d e n t ’ s  e m o t i o n a l i m m a t u r i t y a n d
irresponsibility  could not be equated with psychological incapacity
as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42  incurability of Natividad’s condition remains unsupported by any
In the same light, the Court, in the case of  Pesca v. Pesca43  (Pesca),
ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein “utterly
failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent,
let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant
a declaration of nullity of the marriage,” significantly noting that the
“[e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.”
In  Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate court’s finding that the
petitioner therein had not established that her husband “showed signs
of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family
Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is
incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is
because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of
the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been
proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and
incurable in nature.”44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude
that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual
promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric
evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in
reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as
grave, deeply–rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which
she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her
report the root cause of Natividad’s condition and to show that it
existed at the time of the parties’ marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad’s behavior in relation to her failure to
perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr.
189
Zalsos’s report. Further, the finding contained therein on the
factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a
bare conclusion and even self–serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos’s
testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report,
also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament
of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the
existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by
independent evidence.45 
After poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any
such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court  a quo’s nullity
declaration. To the Court’s mind, Natividad’s refusal to live with
Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the
level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of
the parties’ marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one’s duties
is another.
To hark back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In the final analysis, the
Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present
case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that
marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family,47 the instant petition is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2,
2005 and Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA–GR. CV No. 69103 are  REVERSED  and  SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed
under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 February 6, 2017 G.R. No. 214064
MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner
 without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.6
vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS, Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on  certiorari  filed by petitioner
Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the Decision1 and Resolution,
2  dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled against the dissolution and nullity
of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts of the case follow:
As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and
Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During
their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with
his former girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous
after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they
reconciled. They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22, 1984
and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992 and in 2001.3
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for declaration of nullity
of marriage before the Regional Trial Court  (RTC)  of Dasmariñas,
Cavite, Branch 90.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious
prompting her to believe that the same was made in heaven. However,
after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering.
Their relatives and friends saw him with different women. One time,
she has just arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her
family. But to her consternation, she caught him in a compromising act
with another woman. He did not bother to explain or apologize. Tired
of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped
any communication with him.5  Felipe's irresponsible acts like
190
cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not
supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila
Marie Montefalcon  (Montefalcon)  who, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report,7  concluded that Felipe is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. A portion of
the report reads:
x x xx
The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an
early onset, with an enduring pattern and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture.  His poor parental and family molding (particularly
lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a defective
superego and he proved to be selfish, immature and negligent
person and followed a pattern of gross irresponsibility and
gross disregard of the feelings of his partner/wife disregarding
the marriage contract and the commitment he agreed on
during the wedding. In other words, the root cause of
respondent's flawed personality pattern can be in childhood
milieu. Respondent's familial constellation, unreliable
parenting style from significant figures around him, and
unfavorable childhood experiences have greatly affected his
perceptions of himself and his environment in general. The
respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his
obligations and responsibilities as married man and father.
It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the
normative and ordinary duties of marriage and family,
shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary
circumstances.  He just cannot perform his duties and
obligations as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his
own self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and
denigrate the petitioner for his own pleasures and satisfaction.
In the process, respondent was unable to assume his marital
 duties and responsibilities to his wife. He failed to render
mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).
Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no
psychological insight that he has a character problem. He
would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around
him.  People suffering from this personality disorder are
unmotivated to treatment and impervious to recovery. There
are no medications and laboratory examinations to be taken
for maladaptive behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic
Personality Disorder).
Otherwise stated, his  personality disorder is chronic and
pervasive affecting many aspects of his life, such as social
functioning and close relationships.1âwphi1  Apparently, he
has failed to develop appropriate adjustment methods. He
lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration that
caused him the failure to understand the very nature of that
sharing of life that is directed toward the solidarity and
formation of family.
x x x x8
In a Decision9  dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case No.
4853-11 declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and
void. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares the
marriage contract by the petitioner MIRASOL CASTILLO to the
respondent FELIPE IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani, Pangasinan to be
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
the Clerk of Court is directed to enter this judgment upon its finality in
the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue the corresponding Entry of
Judgment. Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani,
Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also mandated to cause the
registration of the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT in their respective Book
of Marriages.
191
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the petitioner, the
respondent, the Solicitor General, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar General with copies hereof.
Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the DECREE OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.10
On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order11  dated April 3,
2012.
On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from psychological
incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital obligations due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.12 A pertinent portion of the decision reads:
x x xx
Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe became
unfaithful as a result of unknown factors that happened during the
marriage and not because of his family background. His tendency to
womanize was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological
nature that are grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, it was only
after thirteen (13) years of marriage that he started to engage in
extra-marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, she said that
after they got married, their relationship as husband and wife went
smoothly and that she was of the belief that she had a marriage made
in heaven.
In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic
of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not
sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Since that situation does not obtain in the case, Mirasol's claim of
psychological incapacity must fail. Psychological incapacity must be
 more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned
party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the
psychological incapacity of Felipe, We cannot but rule in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January
20, 2012 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol elevated
the case before this Court raising the issue, thus:
[Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering from
grave psychological condition that rendered him incognitive of his
marital covenants under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the
totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
This Court rules in the negative.
Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that Felipe is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. The conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility
of the witnesses are entitled to great respect because of its opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Since the court  a
quo  accepted the veracity of the petitioner's premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity
drawn from the expert witness. She claims that Montefalcon was
correct in interviewing her for it was submitted that it was only her
who knew best whether her husband was complying with his marital
obligations. Moreover, the OSG admits that personal examination of
192
the respondent by the clinical psychologist is not an indispensable
requisite for a finding of psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to establish
from the totality of evidence the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The
conclusions of the clinical psychologist that he was psychologically
incapacitated and that such incapacity was present at the inception of
the marriage were not supported by evidence. At most, the
psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his marital
obligations.14  Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of the facts
from which she based her findings and was working on pure
assumptions and secondhand information related to her by one side.15
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.16  Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave
and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
o r d i n a r y d u t i e s r e q u i r e d i n a m a r r i a g e , ( b )  j u r i d i c a l
antecedence,  i.e.,  it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.17
In the case of  Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,18  this Court
laid down the more definitive guidelines in the disposition of
psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
x x xx
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or  incurable.  Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x
x such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine
(5) Such illness must be  grave  enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x
x Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the
xxx19
193
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based
strictly on the facts of each case and not on a  priori  assumptions,
predilections or generalizations.20
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article
36, it is logical and understandable to  give weight to the
expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
qua non  in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage.  At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case.  In fact, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court,
as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.22
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to
show the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the
same would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial
courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.23
records, this Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented
failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.
Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is
encumbered with a personality disorder classified as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality structure that
rendered him incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
obligations. In her direct testimony, she stated:
ATTY. BAYAUA:
Question: Were you able to interview and conduct examination on
the respondent?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that supported your
findings that the husband of Mirasol is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage?
Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and also from
my interview of the couple's common friend who validated all
information given to me by the petitioner.
Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview the
respondent?
Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the same
psychological evaluation I administered with the petitioner but he did
not respond to my invitation.
Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to gather from
your interview of the friend of the couple?
Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to me by
the petitioner during the interview.
x x xx
Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at what point
in time in the life of the respondent did he acquire this disorder that
you mentioned?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even at the
time of celebration of their marriage, although the incapacity became
194
manifest only after their marriage.  His disorder seemed to have
started during the early years of his life.
Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely source of
the disorder of the respondent?
Answer:  The disorder of the respondent seemed to have
developed during the early years of his life due to his poor
parental and family [molding] particularly lack of parental
guidance.  [His] parents separated when he was still young and
when [his] mother had another affair and lived with her common-law
husband. Respondent's familial constellation and [unfavorable]
childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself
and his environment. Respondent did not grow up mature enough to
cope with his obligations and responsibilities as a married man and
father.
x x x24
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological
evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the RTC's decision would
reveal that there was no assessment of the veracity of such allegations,
the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of
evidence presented. Also, there were no factual findings which can
serve as bases for its conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough
and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.25  The  probative force of the
testimony of an expert  does not lie in a mere statement of her
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render
to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion
is founded.26
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's personality
disorder, it was, however, admitted that she evaluated respondent's
psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered from
Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which
brought about his personality disorder as painted in the evaluation
was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner.
There was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's
upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or presented before the
trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's common friend, agreed
with petitioner's claims in the interview with the psychologist,
confirmed the information given by petitioner, and alleged that she
knew Felipe as "chick boy" or ''playboy."27 She did not testify before
the court a quo.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to establish
Felipe's psychological condition and its associations in his early life.
Montefalcon's testimony and psychological evaluation report do not
provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's
one-sided assertion. The said report falls short of the required proof
for the Court to rely on the same as basis to declare petitioner's
marriage to respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare
him psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause
thereof must still be "medically or clinically identified," and adequately
established by evidence.28  our relationship sour and it led to being stormy.
We cannot take the conclusion that Felipe harbors a personality
disorder existing prior to his marriage which purportedly
incapacitated him with the essential marital obligations as credible
proof of juridical antecedence. The manner by which such conclusion
was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the
standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.
The lack of corroborative witness and evidence regarding Felipe's
upbringing and family history renders Montefalcon's opinion on the
root cause of his psychological incapacity conjectural or speculative.
Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue are
considered since the judge had found them to be credible enough, this
Court cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to
information on Felipe's pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue
of antecedence in this case because we only have petitioner's words to
195
rely on. To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side,
as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content
of such evidence.29
Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her judicial affidavit,
to wit:
x x xx
Question: You said Madam Witness that after several months you and
respondent became sweethearts, what happened next Madam
Witness?
Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got dismayed when
respondent was also maintaining another woman who was his former
girlfriend.
Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you told him
about his relation with his former girlfriend?
Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir. This turned
Question: You said Madam Witness that you and respondent's
relationship became sour and stormy, what happened next, if any?
Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have been ended
had it not been with the timely intervention of our parents.
Respondent and I reconciled.
x x xx
Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got married with the
respondent as evidenced in fact by a Marriage Certificate. What
happened next after the marriage?
Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and wife
went on smoothly. I was of the belief that my marriage was made in
heaven and that respondent had already reformed his ways and had
completely deviated from his relationship with his ex-girlfriend;
 x x x30
Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent change
or become responsible considering that he is already a father?
Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would already
change the ways of respondent. The birth of our first child did not
actually help improve respondent's ways because respondent is really
a man who is not contented with one woman even before we got
married;
xxx31
Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what happened
next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent is back
to his old habit where he has been seen having relationship with a
different woman. This was also seen by our relatives and friends of
respondent.
x xx32
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.33 In order for sexual infidelity to
constitute as psychological incapacity, the  respondent's
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent
from discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation
to be faithful to his spouse.34  It is indispensable that the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.35
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not
emanate from a personal interview with the subject himself. Apart
from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no other
196
reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was
a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave,
deeply rooted, and incurable. We are not persuaded that the natal or
supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically
or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof,  i.e.,  mere allegations are not evidence.
36 Based on the records, this Court finds that there exists insufficient
factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and
irresponsibility can be equated with psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law. We reiterate that there was no other evidence
adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other
witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity
notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw him
with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving
and had no serious evidentiary value.
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the
CA against the dissolution and nullity of the parties' marriage due to
insufficiency of the evidence presented. The policy of the State is to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.37
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed
by herein petitioner Mirasol Castillo. Accordingly, we  AFFIRM  the
assailed Decision and Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and August
28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.