Determinism, Freedom, and Blessedness in

Spinoza's Ethics

Consisting of:

A Preliminary Discussion of the Free Will Problem

The Meaning of Absolute Monism

The Identity of Creator and Creation

The Nature of Human Freedom

What the Ethics Are

The Nature and Structure of God’s Plan

A note concerning Eternity

Blessedness, or the Infinite and Concentric True Will

Sara L. Mastros

Rationalism

April, 2003

Pittsburgh

Word Count: 4139

Excluding Table of Contents and Topic Headings: 4015

A Preliminary Discussion of the Free Will Problem

The central questions about free will are “Are we, as human beings,

free to choose how we act?”, “Are our lives somehow pre-determined, either

by God, or by nature, or by some other force outside of ourselves?” and “Are

we morally responsible for our choice of actions, and the consequences

thereof?” While the most obvious choices are either Yes, No, Yes or No, Yes,

No, many kinds of complex and layered interpretations are possible. We will

see that Spinoza argues, sometimes confusingly, Yes, Yes, Yes. This type of

view is called “compatibilism”. Compatibilists argue that the notions of free-

will and pre-determinism are not mutually exclusive (i.e., that they are

“compatible”)

Briefly, determinism is the idea that everything we say or do (or think)

has been somehow “decided” ahead of time, normally either because it is a

completely necessary consequence of previous events, or because God has

“planned” the course of the universe in advance. Spinoza very clearly

believes, at least to some extent, that the universe is determined: “all things

are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity

of the divine nature” (1:29). We will discuss this in more detail in the section

below entitled “The Nature and Structure of God’s Plan”.

Our intuitive understanding of free will tells us that freedom lies in the

ability to choose without being constrained. Our intuition also leads us to

conclude that determinism and free will are somehow incompatible. We feel

that if God (or nature) has determined the course of our lives in advance,
then we cannot possible be truly free and morally responsible. Kant called

compatibilism a “wretched subterfuge… a petty word-jugglery” 1, and there

is some intuitive truth to this. It does seem to sound wrong to claim that our

actions are both determined and free, however, this is exactly the argument

that Spinoza seems to make. After all, all his metaphysical inquiry was only

a foundation for his ethics, and what can be the meaning of a code of right

behavior for someone who is not free to choose their own actions? To

answer this, it is necessary to unravel, in some detail, exactly how Spinoza

views both freedom and determination. The key to unlocking this seeming-

contradiction will be Spinoza’s view of God. For Spinoza, nothing exists

outside of God, and God indwells completely and absolutely in his creation.

The Meaning of Absolute Monism

“Monism” is a very broad term; it applies to any system of thought

which holds that there is, ultimately, only one kind of “stuff”. It is often

contrasted with dualist paradigms, such as Descartes’ view that mind and

body are two wholly distinct and separate types of substances.

Spinoza’s monism is a natural outgrowth of the Talmudic education he

received as a child. Spinoza’s Talmudic education doubtless included the

study of Maimonides, a central 12th century Jewish theologian. Maimonides2

says of God that he is, “…perfect in every manner of existence and is the

Primary Cause of all that exists,” “…[He has] absolute and unparalleled

unity,” and that God is eternal and existed prior to any other thing. Spinoza
1
In his Critique of Pure Reason
2
These are numbers 1, 2, and 4 of Maimonides’ “Thirteen Foundations of Jewish Belief”. Number three is that God
is non-corporeal un-begotten, and does not beget children.
will affirm each of these statements, and expand upon them. For Spinoza,

the idea of an absolutely eternal unity is key. Spinoza says: “Besides God no

substance can be granted or conceived. (1:14)”, “God and all the attributes

of God are eternal (1:19).” This understanding of God’s unity is essential to

understanding Spinoza. For Spinoza, the idea that anything exists (or even

could exist) outside of God is ludicrous.

In particular, the notion of free will as the ability to sin (or to deviate

from the will of God) Spinoza doubtless would have decried for a number of

reasons. His rejection of the problem of evil as insignificant is grounded in

his Jewish upbringing. Spinoza’s God is ultimately unified, and is the cause

of all that is. “I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and

create evil; I am the ONE, that does all these things (Isaiah 45:7).” God, for

Spinoza, is neither an active judge nor a free-agent; all that he is, and all that

he does3 is contained within his essence.

More surprisingly, Spinoza also does not believe that God could exist

without creation. If he could, it would indicate that God existed before he

created the universe (or, at least, that he could have). That would mean,

since God’s creation is perfect, that God was somehow lacking a perfection

before the creation. This is unacceptable. Moreover, positing a God who

existed without creation posits a God outside of creation (or, equivalently, a

creation outside of God). This is at odds with Spinoza’s general

characterizations of God.

The Nature of Human Freedom

3
It would be equally accurate to say: “all that is, and all that happens”
 The concepts of human will and freedom are very old. Despite the fact

that Plato (at least, the Plato we know) contains no discussion of the will,

Plato does speak about what it means to be free. He says that a man is free

when the rational part of his self governs the other parts, in particular, the

feelings and passions. Aristotle expanded on this, saying that an act is

unwilled if it stems from an outside cause (i.e., it is somehow compelled) or if

the action stems from the ignorance of the actor.

The Stoics, with whom Spinoza shares an intellectual kinship, say that

free will stems from the fact that even though a person’s actions may be

determined, his attitudes and beliefs are not. In particular, a person’s

judgments about what they believe to be good and evil are not determined.

Now, since the actor’s beliefs and intentions wholly decide the moral content

of an action, events which occur, whether circumstantial or “willed” are

morally neutral. This excuses God (or Providence) from moral culpability for

evil.

Spinoza’s rejection of the individual will is, if anything, even stronger

than the Stoics, because he argues that even psychological events like

emotions are determined. We cannot feel differently than we do. “All our

endeavors or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature”,

(4:appendix:1). Our intuition that we are free to choose is a consequence of

our ignorance of the causes that determine our choices. In more general

terms, Spinoza conceived of freedom as self-determinism, not

indeterminism. “I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore,
who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore

he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being

correlative) of good” (4:68:proof). Because of this, Spinoza’s ethics are

grounded in the notion of the absurdity of judging behaviors. His only goal is

to come to understand the real causes of our behaviors, and, in so doing,

attain greater knowledge of our selves.

What the Ethics Are

Morality in the traditional sense is, for Spinoza, replaced by a kind of

therapy. Like the Stoics, Spinoza thinks that the correct reaction to the

discovery of absolute determinism is to attempt to attain this knowledge of

one-self. What does it mean to “attempt” to come to knowledge in a

determined world? It seems we are here led to a rather tragic conclusion.

Our “enlightenment-status” seems predetermined and outside of our control.

However, there is some room in Spinoza to begin to resolve this dilemma.

We are in no way free to act in a manner not in accord with our nature.

However, it is within the nature of every human being to strive toward the

perfection of their nature (arête). In fact, this is exactly the nature of what it

means to be human, to strive after knowledge. Men are thinking, striving

beings, and so it is in accord with our nature to strive after knowledge. It is

in the acceptance of this as our nature (some, but not Spinoza, might say

“our purpose”) that wise men find blessedness. “For the ignorant man

[never gains] the true acquiescence of his spirit…” (5:42:note)

 Spinoza thinks that this ignorance (uncertainty) which plagues us

consists specifically in a lack of knowledge of the root causes of things.

Casual knowledge can be expressed deductively, where ideas depend on the

ideas preceding them.

As a man's wisdom increases (i.e., his ideas are connected one to

another logically), his emotions will be generated rationally (rather than by

the passions). He will begin to pursue his own interests and seek the

company of others who are guided by reason alone; this is the natural result

of becoming enlightened. While it is easy to imagine that this occurs

through some volition of the wise man, it is, in fact, a necessary

consequence of increased knowledge. In this state of objectivity, the wise

man will be stoically happy, resolute, and free from irrational emotional

responses. This is equivalent to an increase in freedom (i.e., a move toward

perfection).

The Outline and Structure of God’s Plan

There are a number of ways people conceive of the word “plan”. We

will discuss a few of them, and, ideally, slowly circle in on the meaning we

need to understand Spinoza’s sort of determinism.

The most common, and simple, way to look at a plan is to think of

God’s plan is as a “to-do list”. In this model, God has a list of certain things

that he desires to occur, but the things that happen around them are

undetermined. God designed the whole universe to satisfy this particular list

of goals. This model doesn’t work for Spinoza; this sort of goal-driven,
anthropomorphic God is unacceptable to Spinoza. “…nature has no

particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments

(1:Appendix).” Spinoza contends that God is not like a person; God does not

“want” things, and cannot have “goals”.

Spinoza, in fact, despised such a small view of God, and felt it led

immediately to a view of God as a parent-king who judges, punishes, and

rewards his creations by incomprehensible and arbitrary rules. He viewed

rational thought, and particularly mathematics as providing an escape from

this sort of thinking. “They [unenlightened people] therefore laid down as an

axiom, that God's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a

doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race

for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity

in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to

their final causes (1:Appendix).”

A second way people see God’s plan is as if it were a blueprint; a

general sketch of how the world is put together, with all the confusing details

abstracted out. This is also not Spinoza’s view, because if it were, then God

should have created only the blueprint. This creation, containing only those

things which are ordered (perfect) in the eyes of God, would have been

somehow more perfect than the creation of a complicated universe which

includes seemingly chaotic details not in the plan.

“…such persons firmly believe that there is an order

in things, being really ignorant both of things and

 their own nature. When phenomena are of such a

kind, that the impression they make on our senses

requires little effort of imagination, and can

consequently be easily remembered, we say that

they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are

ill-ordered or confused. Further, as things which are

easily imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer

order to confusion--as though there were any order

in nature, except in relation to our imagination--and

say that God has created all things in order; thus,

without knowing it, attributing imagination to God,

unless, indeed, they would have it that God foresaw

human imagination, and arranged everything, so

that it should be most easily imagined. If this be their

theory they would not, perhaps, be daunted by the

fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena,

far surpassing our imagination, and very many

others which confound its weakness. (1:Appendix).”

The model most often attributed to Enlightenment philosophy,

including that of the rationalists, is that of the “clockwork” universe. For the

modern thinker, the image of a computer running a program is more intuitive

and has greater explanatory power, but is essentially the same. More

specifically, what I mean is a Turing machine, complete with all the

“instructions” and “interpreters” that are needed to carry out those

instructions. This program would stipulate not only the laws governing

interactions between objects in the universe (what we normally think of as

physics), but would also dictate some sort of “starting position” for the

universe. While the clockwork model would likely have been rejected by

Spinoza as too simplistic, it is interesting to consider what he would have

made of the more powerful computational model.

I think he would have rejected it, but for more subtle reasons. The

idea that there is a “program” for the universe, and that the world we

experience is just an epiphenomenon4 of the “rules” of the universe might at

first have appeal for Spinoza. He does say that “all things are pre-

determined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the

very nature of God or infinite power (1:Appendix).” This seems to lend

support to this view. However, this model still subtly implies a dualism of

Creator and Created. The computer model inherently suggests that the

“programmer” could exist without the program. As we have seen, Spinoza

would ultimately reject any view of the universe which requires us to posit an

author separate from his creation, although he does distinguish between

events for which God is the “immediate” cause, and those which are only

mediated results of his actions. Moreover, this view seems to imply that God

could have created the universe in some way differently than he did; a

freedom for which Spinoza does not allow. I believe there may be a way to

reconcile the computer model into some Spinoza would have been
4
I mean this more in the technical mathematical sense thatn as a theory of mind/body.
comfortable with, however, I think, in so doing, one might very well arrive at

a model isomorphic to the “microcosm” model described below.

The model I think Spinoza requires is complicated, but ultimately

combines all the good features of the models we’ve discussed, while

accounting for Spinoza’s absolute monism and his belief in the capacity to

for men to exist in a free state. I will call this the “microcosm” model. By

microcosm, I mean most literally a “little world” wherein God’s plan (which,

we have seen, is identical to God) is exactly identical to the created

universe. The movement of every atom5, the course of every rain drop is

wholly and entirely mapped out by God, and, in fact, is completely

dependent upon the nature of God. Moreover, every person is a complete

model of that universe (we might also say, they contain that model). To

understand how Spinoza can reconcile this absolute determinism with a

concept of free action, we will need to understand Spinoza’s notion of time,

and come to see how the problem with predestination is the “pre” and not

the “destiny”.

A note concerning Eternity

Our normal understanding of time is both continuous and entropic, that

is to say, it moves smoothly from one instant to the next, always in one

direction. God, however, is eternal. By “eternal” Spinoza means “existence

itself …Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the

5
Many readers have felt the need to make quantum arguments here. While I agree they are interesting, commenting
on what 16th century philosophers might have thought of quantum mechanics seems, as Spinoza might say,
nugatory. I have written more generally on uncertainty and microcosmic models in “The Measure of All Things”
and the afterward to “Why Metaphysics Matters”.
essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of

continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a

beginning or end (1: definition 8).” We understand Spinoza to mean that

God does not experience time in the linear (imperfect) fashion in which we

experience it. The eternal (i.e., God) is unconstrained by causality, which, for

Spinoza, is a notion predicated on our flawed view of time. “Things are

conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing in relation to a

given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the

necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way

as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas

involve the eternal and infinite essence of God” (5:29:note).

God’s independence of time also makes him lack discrimination

between present and future in terms of determinability. When Spinoza says

that all things which occur are determined by God, what we can understand

is that God knows what we think of as the future in exactly the same way

that he knows the present or the past. “If the mind could have an adequate

knowledge of things future, it would be affected towards what is future in the

same way as towards what is present” (4:66:proof) If we were also able to

look at the universe in this “big picture” way, we too would be unable to act

“freely”, just as God does not. “God does not act according to freedom of

the will” (1:32:corralary 1).

Blessedness, or The Infinite and Concentric True Will

 Of “blessedness”, Spinoza says “[it is] in the Bible, called Glory and

not undeservedly”(5:36:note). This seemingly unimportant sentence is the

key to understanding Spinoza. The word “glory” to which he refers is in

Hebrew “gedulah”, and is diametrically compared in Jewish theology to

“gevorah”, which means “power” or “will”. This is an indication that we have

discovered the key to Spinoza’s “blessedness”. Blessedness is the opposite

of will.

Man, unlike God, acts in a free way. “God does not act according to

freedom of the will” (1:32:corralary 1). This means that Spinoza is implicitly

claiming that freedom is a less perfect state than lack of freedom,

which is equivalent to absolute knowledge.

We have said before that an increase in knowledge is an increase in

freedom. However, now we seem to be saying that absolute knowledge is a

complete lack of freedom, how can this be? We have previously explained

that to be freer means that more of our actions spring entirely from our own

nature (as opposed to being influenced by our emotional responses to the

world.) As we become more aware of our own nature, we become more free.

We have come to understand that it is uncertainty (lack of knowledge)

about the true causes of our behaviors (i.e., our own nature) that makes it

appear that our choices are undetermined. Recall that, for Spinoza, all that

freedom can really mean is that our actions are more and more in accord

with our nature (arête). We know that Spinoza thinks we are, essentially,

thinking beings. From this, we deduce that our virtue (arête) lies in
knowledge, wisdom, and understanding. What knowledge is it that we strive

for? Knowing Spinoza, it can only be knowledge of God, who is the universe,

and is our selves. For Spinoza, salvation lies only down this path; in knowing

ourselves, we come to know God, and in knowing God, we know ourselves so

fully that we, no longer independent agents, merge with our essence, and

lose the indeterminacy upon which our notion of free will is built.

We now come to a most startling fact. As knowledge increases

(uncertainty decreases), freedom increases. However, when we attain

absolute knowledge of ourselves, we have also attained absolute knowledge

of God. Now, God is infinite, and so must also be absolute knowledge of him.

So, absolute knowledge (zero uncertainty) is infinite knowledge. Anyone who

wrestles with infinity knows, as Spinoza must have6, that strange things

happen when you “get to” infinity. Spinoza equates absolute (infinite)

knowledge, such as God has, with a complete lack of freedom.

As knowledge is perfected, we are lead towards a complete freedom

from worry or indecision (ataraxia). This is a move toward perfection, or an

increase in reality of existence. However, perfected knowledge (absolute or

infinite knowledge) removes all indecision. That is to say, the moment of

indecision which, of necessity, accompanies choice disappears, and so we

find that, without indecision, we are not really choosing. Our actions spring

immediately and wholly from our nature, and from our reason.

6
The way I am talking about infinity, as a limit to be approached, might have been unfamiliar to Spinoza, but the
underlying notions would not have been.
 When one is fully real, one is like God, in so far as God is all things, and

all things are God. In fact, it was Spinoza’s idea that men could attain

perfect knowledge, and so render themselves morally inculpable for their

actions (as God is), that likely led to his excommunication from the Jewish

community7. It is this state of perfect knowledge--of self, the universe, and

one’s place therein--that Spinoza calls “blessedness”. “I shall therefore treat

therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control

the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness;

(5:Preface)

“Whereas the wise man…is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit…”

(5:42:note) By “scarcely at all disturbed in spirit”, we understand Spinoza to

mean a state of eudaimonia (blessedness), where the wise man is acting by

virtue of reason only, and never of passion. As a man knows himself better,

he moves closer to his reality, i.e., his essence or perfection, “by perfection

in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality--in other words, each thing's

essence, in so far as it exists, and operates in a particular manner, and

without paying any regard to its duration.” (4:preface)

For Spinoza, the realization of human freedom lies in knowing where

we fit it in the chain of causal necessity, and how the reality we encounter

could not be different from what it is. By studying the laws of the universe,

we get to know God, and when we possess this knowledge, we can have an

epiphany of rational insight (understanding), wherein we achieve a type of

7
From “Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind”, by Steven Nadler.
apotheosis. This is the way in which humans achieve immortality, according

to Spinoza.

Each human, then, is a micro-cosmos, which is to say, a microcosm of

God. By gaining wisdom, or knowledge of our place in the universe, we

come to better and better understand out selves, and, therefore, God. In this

way, we see that our progressive movement toward perfection, by acting in

a way free from irrational compulsion, is movement through a concentric

series of states, each where the actor is freer, until the actor (as a finite ego-

creature) finally disappears, subsumed completely in his knowledge of

himself as microcosm of God. By concentric, we mean to say that each state

fully contains the state before it. Knowledge of the self expands until, by

understanding the self, one comes to understand all things. When this big

picture is seen, it becomes literally impossible to choose, knowing the

correct course of action as one does.

“…being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain

eternal necessity,[the wise man] never ceases to be…” (5:42:note). This

explains the apotheotic end-point of the progression of self knowledge,

wherein the wise-man attains a sort of rationalist nirvana. “The possible

eternity of the human mind cannot…be intended to mean that I literally

survive, as a distinguishable individual, in so far as I attain genuine

knowledge; for in so far as I do attain genuine knowledge, my individuality as

a particular thing disappears and my mind becomes so far united with God
or Nature conceived under the attribute of Thought (Stuart Hampshire,

Spinoza, p 175)

Spinoza has developed a system of determinist ethics, which allow for

our intuitions about a “good life” to be phrased as a quest for wisdom.

However, it is important to note that his “striving” language rests on his

rather shaky interpretation of what it means to be “free”. For Spinoza, men

are free when they act must fully in accord with their arête, and, as thinking

beings, he is willing to claim that the essential nature of every person is to

strive after perfect knowledge. This is a powerfully modern claim, in a world

where the purpose of man was commonly thought to be to worship an

ineffable and incomprehensible God.

Spinoza was very much a product of his time, and any modern reader

must, for himself, reinterpret Spinoza’s notions, especially of “eternity” and

“freedom” in a way compatible with our modern paradigm. That being said,

Spinoza provides a powerful and seductive image of the good life as a

continual, essential, and ultimately apotheotic striving after knowledge,

leading to a grace of the self rooted not in superstition and obedience but in

the power and dignity of human reason.