The Clarion Brief

Supported by:

“Surkov leaks”: Glimpse into Russia’s Management of

Georgia’s Occupied Regions

by

David Batashvili

October 2016

1
About the Research
The research has been carried out David Batashvili for The Clarion, with the financial support of
the Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Fund. David Batashvili worked at the National
Security Council of Georgia in 2008-2013. He is an author of opinion articles in Georgian and
Ukrainian outlets.

About the Organisation

The Clarion Brief is a part of the experimental media and research platform The Clarion
(www.theclarion.eu), where we look for ways to empower and engage Georgia in an ongoing
discussion about Europe. The Clarion is powered by Civil Georgia (www.Civil.ge) – a source of
reference on Georgia’s current affairs since 2001.

The United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG - www.una.ge) is the institutional parent for
these media initiatives. A veteran of Georgia’s non-governmental scene, UNAG works since
1995 to engage youth, protect the rights of the vulnerable, inform the public about the world
and strengthen country’s institutions.

Dolidze str. 2, Tbilisi 0183, Georgia

Tel.: +995 32 332 516
clarion@una.ge
http://www.theclarion.eu/

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 Executive Summary
In late October-early November 2016 a
coalition of Ukrainian hacker groups
announced it had taken over several e-mail
accounts of Vladislav Surkov - a close adviser
of Vladimir Putin, and published some of
their contents. Several sources confirmed
the e-mails’ authenticity. Many materials
from one of the accounts concern Russia’s
activities in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
The Surkov leaks reveal that the Russian
government dictates what ‘laws’ must be
adopted by the local regimes in both
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, micromanages
governance of the two territories in great
detail, and generally operates in a manner
which betrays assumption that for all
practical purposes the two occupied regions
are considered to be parts of the Russian
Federation.
The leaks belie Kremlin’s claims that it treats
the two provinces as independent states.
They reveal the deep reach of the Russian
administration into daily business of
government in these areas. The documents
also show Moscow’s persistence in the
aggressive policies against its neighbors,
particularly Georgia and Ukraine, and offer a
glimpse into the daily routine of some of
these policies. The Georgian government
and Georgia’s foreign friends and partners
should take heed of this reminder of the
enduring Russian threat to the sovereignty
of Georgia:
Georgia’s foreign friends and partners
should unambiguously recognize the reality,
depth and breadth of direct Russian control
over the occupied regions of Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali.
Georgia’s partners and aid agencies should
take note of the fact that a potential
investment in strengthening proxy
administration in Abkhazia through financial
aid, training, etc. will effectively be
conducted within the framework of the
administrative and regulatory space
imposed by Russia, undermining the
neutrality and impartiality of these agencies.
Russia’s creeping occupation of additional
areas in Georgia should be recognized as a
consistent, centrally coordinated policy,
rather than a simple demonstration of
military expediency on the ground.
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 Abstract
This policy brief looks at the revelations from the hacked and leaked e-mail accounts of Vladislav
Surkov – close adviser of Vladimir Putin on the Russian policy in Ukraine and the two regions of
Georgia under the Russian occupation. The brief mostly draws upon primary sources in the form
of the materials from one of Surkov’s hacked e-mail accounts. It focuses on the parts of these
materials that are dedicated to the occupied regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. The
Surkov leaks provide useful glimpse on the extent of direct engagement from Moscow to manage
the legislative, regulatory and administrative routines of these entities, as well as some specific
details of the routine of the Russian control over the two regions.

Background
After the Western recognition of Kosovo’s The Russian diplomacy failed in its attempt
independence in February 2008, Russia to legitimize the occupation internationally
engaged in a quick succession of political and through recognition of the Georgian regions’
military steps in preparation for military independence by a considerable number of
campaign against Georgia. other nations. The European Union nations
and the United States formally assert and
In August 2008 following a pattern of regular
support Georgia’s territorial integrity. None
and mounting military escalation on the
of the former Soviet states, including
ground, Russian army invaded Georgia
Russia’s close allies, went along with
through both Tskhinvali and Abkhazia
Moscow in recognizing independence of
regions and defeated Georgian military
either Abkhazia or Tskhinvali.
forces. Moscow then proceeded to
recognize ‘independence’ of the two regions But while it is generally acknowledged that
under the local regimes it controls, and Moscow does exercise some control over
established significant and permanent the regions, the degree of such control has
military bases there. been disputed. The Georgian position is that

4
Russia is occupying the regions, meaning whether Moscow is in fact “occupying” the
that it exercises effective military control of regions, arguing that the military did not
the territories as well as administrative exercise direct administrative control, and
control over day-to-day governance. This that this is done by local proxy
view has been backed by several political administrations whose existence precedes
statements from Georgia’s partners, but that full-scale Russian deployment and which are
did not lead to either consolidation of the elected through a contested political
legal view on this matter, or the political process.
sanctions akin to the ones imposed on Russia
Surkov leaks point to the flaws of such view.
following the annexation of Crimea.
While Mr. Surkov’s portfolio does not cover
In part, this ambiguity has been caused by military/security aspects of ‘cooperation’
the desire of the international organizations with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, the
to remain engaged in conflict resolution correspondence reveals a picture of
efforts and maintaining a degree of dialogue legislative, regulatory, and administrative
with Moscow on this matter. However, some control.
international commentators have disputed

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 The Surkov Leaks
On 23 October 2016 Ukrainian hacker group
CyberHunta 1 published on its website a
material headlined ‘CyberHunta Says Hello
to Surkov’ 2 . The group claimed that it had
gained control over an e-mail account
(v14691@yandex.ru) of Vladislav Surkov – a
close adviser of Vladimir Putin – and
published some of its contents.
The Russian government dismissed the
leaks, but their authenticity was confirmed
by a number of sources. Several people who
corresponded with Surkov confirmed that
the messages of theirs released by the
hackers were the ones they sent, while the
Atlantic Council analyzed the emails and
determined them to be genuine5.

On 25 October 2016 CyberHunta uploaded The Atlantic Council’s analysis was

the contents of Surkov’s another account
prm_surkova@gov.ru to Google Drive, also
revealing that it was operating in coalition
with other Ukrainian hacker groups 3 . On 3
November they uploaded a new portion of
e-mails, this time from Surkov’s third
account - pochta_mg@mail.ru4.
conducted by this Washington think tank’s
Digital Forensic Research Lab 6 . SBU -
Ukrainian security agency - also stated that
documents released by CyberHunta were
real 7 . A senior U.S. official told NBC News
that there was “nothing to indicate” the
material was not authentic8.

1
“Hunta” is an alternate spelling of the word “junta”, included in the group’s name in mockery of the message used
by the Russian propaganda that Ukrainian government after the revolution of 2014 is an illegitimate junta
2
“Kiberhunta Peredaet Privet Surkovu” CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian),
http://cyberhunta.com/news/kiberhunta-peredaet-privet-surkovu/
3
“Den Surka”, CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian), http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
4
“SurkovLeaks (part 2)”, CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian),
http://cyberhunta.com/news/surkovleaks2/
5
Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukrainian Hackers Release Emails Tying Top Russian Official to Uprising”, The New York
Times, 27 October 2016, last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-emails.html?_r=1
6
Simon Shuster, “Hacked Kremlin Emails Could Signal a Turn in the U.S.-Russia Cyberwar”, Time, 7 November
2016, last accessed 21 November 2016, http://time.com/4558167/cyberwar-us-russia-vladislav-surkov/
7
Reid Standish, “Hacked: Putin Aide’s Emails Detail Alleged Plot to Destabilize Ukraine”, Foreign Policy, 25
October 2016, last accessed 21 November 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/25/hacked-putin-aides-emails-
detail-alleged-plot-to-destabilize-kiev-surkov-ukraine-leaks/
8
Robert Windrem, “Payback? Russia Gets Hacked, Revealing Putin Aide’s Secrets”, NBC News, 27 October 2016,
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/payback-russia-gets-hacked-
revealing-putin-aide-s-secrets-n673956

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While Ukrainian hackers were Legislative and regulatory control
understandably interested mostly in
The laws ‘adopted’ by Sukhumi and
Surkov’s e-mails containing information
Tskhinvali are defined and at least partly
about Russia’s Ukraine policy, a large portion
written by the Russian government agencies,
of e-mails from the prm_surkova@gov.ru
belying the claims of factual administrative
account is dedicated to Georgia’s Russian-
independence of these entities from
occupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
Moscow, and also weakening their claims to
legitimacy, grounded on representing the
Georgia’s occupied territories in
“Surkov leaks” will of the governed.

Surkov has been in charge of Putin’s policy in
Georgia’s occupied regions since September
20139. It came, therefore, as no surprise to
find in Surkov’s mail daily digests about
developments in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, as
well as systematically received information
about interactions of Russian officials with
the Sukhumi (Abkhazia) and Tskhinvali
regimes, as well as their financing by Russia
and other Russian government activities in
both occupied regions. More remarkably,
the e-mails indicate just how tightly and
directly Russia controls these two territories.
Surkov’s letter to Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev, dated 21 October 2013, informs
him that the Russian Presidential Executive
Office had developed a plan for adopting
legislation in Abkhazia under President
Vladimir Putin’s orders and requests the
government ministries to work on specific
bills10. Other e-mails in Surkov’s inbox for 21
and 23 October contains this legislative plan,
which is detailed and includes deadlines for
each stage of the bills’ adoption process.11
Another document dated 21 October 2013 is
dedicated to the work of ‘intergovernmental

9
Valery Dzutsev, “Vladislav Surkov to Oversee Russian Policies Toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, The
Jamestown Foundation, 26 September 2013, last accessed 21 November 2016, https://jamestown.org/vladislav-
surkov-to-oversee-russian-policies-toward-abkhazia-and-south-ossetia/
10
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Сурков Медведеву”, 2013-10-21 (in Russian),
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
11
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “План-график разработки законов 16 10 13”,
2013-10-21 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
prm_surkova@gov.ru, e-mail message to mamonov_mv@gov.ru, “План первоочередных мероприятий
(Абхазия)”, 2013-10-23 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/

7
commission’ that includes Russian These legislation development and adoption
government and Tskhinvali regime. plans for both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali
regimes specify participation in the bills’
It reveals that Russian government agencies
development process by the Russian
had 13 working groups preparing the bills to
government agencies, including Ministries of
be adopted by Tskhinvali regime. It also
Justice, Economic Development, Finance,
obligates Tskhinvali regime to present to the
Regional Development and Foreign Affairs,
Russian government a timetable for
as well as Federal Migration Service of the
legislation adoption by the deadline of 15
Russian Federation16.
November 2013, so that these working
groups can proceed with their work in a On 4 November 2013 the head of the
timely manner12. Russian Presidential Executive Office Sergei
Ivanov wrote to Prime Minister Dmitry
A letter from 23 October includes a list of
Medvedev, requesting from him to task the
bills for Tskhinvali regime, development of
Russian government agencies with “ensuring
which must be prioritized 13 and a plan for
development and adoption” of legislation
the bills’ development 14 . Letters from 1
November contain a timetable with
deadlines for the bills’ adoption by Tskhinvali
regime15.

12
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “материалы к МПК”, 2013-10-21 (in Russian),
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
13
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Обоснование к приоритетам”, 2013-10-23
(in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
14
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Мероприятия по приоритетам”, 2013-10-23
(in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
15
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Приоритетные проекты по РЮО,
Мероприятия 01.11.13”, 2013-11-04 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Приоритетные проекты по РЮО, Перечень
по РЮО 01.11.13”, 2013-11-04 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-
surka/
16
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Приоритетные проекты по РЮО, Перечень
по РЮО 01.11.13”, 2013-11-04 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-
surka/
prm_surkova@gov.ru, e-mail message to mamonov_mv@gov.ru, “План первоочередных мероприятий
(Абхазия)”, 2013-10-23 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/

8
for Tskhinvali, in conjunction with the
entity’s relevant agencies17.
That same day Surkov himself wrote official
requests to several Russian cabinet
members for their agencies to “ensure
development and adoption” of bills for both
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali18.
Other Russian official documents directly
state that Russian government sends
Tskhinvali regime ready bills to be rubber-
stamped by the latter’s ‘parliament’19.
Involvement in administration
governance
Besides giving Abkhazia and Tskhinvali their
laws, Russian officials and agencies
micromanage their governance.
The extent of this phenomenon is evident
from the protocols of official meetings of the
‘intergovernmental commission’ working
with Tskhinvali. The tasks which several
Russian ministries are charged with in these
documents include preparation of inventory
checking of Tskhinvali regime’s institutions,
and of a timetable for transfer to a new
system of salary payments for Tskhinvali
and regime employees20.
Meanwhile, Russian Ministry of Finance is
tasked with creation of Tskhinvali regime’s
Treasury21.

17
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Иванов – Медведеву“, 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
18
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Сурков – Коновалову“, 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Сурков – Лаврову“, 2013-11-04 (in Russian),
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Сурков – Ромодановскому“, 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Сурков – Силуанову“, 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Сурков – Улюкаеву“, 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Сурков - Голодец задание“, 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
19
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Материалы к РоссЧасти, 10. Справка о
совершенств_законодательства РЮО (Минюст)”, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
20
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Материалы к РоссЧасти, 3. Проект
протокола “, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
21
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Материалы к РоссЧасти, 6. Проект
протокола МПК 9 заседания РЮО “, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/

9
This ‘intergovernmental commission’ would help formation of Ossetian ethnic
responsible for the management of majority in the district24.
Tskhinvali exists under direction of Putin’s
Both proxy regimes exist at the expense of
regional representative in North Caucasus
the Russian Federation. Official documents
and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander
regarding financing of Sukhumi and
Khloponin. 22 Besides, in 2013 and 2014 (e-
Tskhinvali regimes by the Russian
mails from later time had not been uploaded
government betray assumption that for all
at the time of writing) Surkov regularly
practical purposes the two occupied
hosted meetings with ‘ministers’ and other
territories are considered to be autonomous
leading figures of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali
regions of the Russian Federation.
regimes, dedicated to the management of
the two regions.23 The Russian government chides Tskhinvali
regime for incomplete and inadequate
A notable example of Russian policies in the
budgetary financing documentation sent to
occupied territories is a Russian document
Moscow, and engages in detailed analysis of
found in Surkov’s e-mails, dedicated to high
employment and infrastructure
schools in the Akhalgori district. The district
development policies in Tskhinvali.25
had been conquered by the Russian army in
2008 and added to the occupied Tskhinvali Russian government controls appointments
in the occupied regions. Surkov’s inbox
region. Georgians are ethnic majority in
includes reports casually discussing specific
Akhalgori. The document in question openly
candidacies for official appointments in the
discusses which policies concerning schools

22
Stanislav.Panchenko@minregion.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Отправка: В.Ю. Сурков”, 2014-
03-21 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
23
There are numerous letters in Surkov’s inbox with lists of participants of such meetings in 2013 and 2014. See
examples:
“Список участников совещания у ВЮ 07.31”, 2014-07-28 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
mamonov_mv@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Проект“, 2013-10-22 (in Russian), last accessed
21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
24
Avdeenko_VN@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Мероприятия_РЮО_6”, 2013-12-16 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
25
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Материалы к РоссЧасти, 11. Письмо
Минфина (о текущей финпомощи РА и РЮО в 2014-2016)“, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November
2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/

10
Sukhumi proxy administration - suggesting Besides political and military control, Russia
for instance to satisfy political ambitions of a is also proceeding with economic takeover
certain official by proposing him a position in of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. Russian
an oversight agency, instead of appointing as government coordinates expansion of the
deputy prime-minister.26 Russian companies into both regions.

Russia is also engaged in more general Surkov’s e-mail account contains reports of
management of the political situation in specific plans each participating Russian
Abkhazia. Materials in Surkov’s e-mails company has in the occupied territories.
reveal that Russian government Among many examples there are Rosneft
systematically uses inducements and plans to find and exploit oil on the
pressure points on Abkhazian public figures continental shelf off Ochamchire, as well as
to achieve political and power balance Russian Railways and Rosatom investments
outcomes it desires. A list of local prominent in Abkhazia.28
figures in Surkov’s inbox includes their
personal motivations that are to be The Relevance of the Surkov
exploited. One of the persons in the list is
Leaks
designated as “an instrument for Before Russia’s annexation of Crimea and

neutralization of [Raul] Khajimba”, while intervention in Donbass, Russia’s military

other two individuals are said to be “both involvement in Georgia was often

needed for splitting the opposition’s considered an outlier, while the very

Coordinating Council”27. existence of Kremlin’s aggressive

geopolitical designs was disputed by many

26
mamonov_mv@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “О ВСТРЕЧЕ С ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЕМ ПАРТИИ
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО РАЗВИТИЯ АБХАЗИИ”, 2013-10-22 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
pavlov.as.one@gmail.com, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “Документ 3”, 2014-10-03 (in Russian), last
accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
27
mamonov_mv@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ ФИГУРЫ”, 2014-05-06 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
28
avdeenko.vn@yandex.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “перечеь инвестпроектов по РА и РЮО, ИП_
РА_2410”, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
avdeenko.vn@yandex.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, “перечеь инвестпроектов по РА и РЮО,
ИП_РЮО_2410”, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/

11
Western politicians and pundits. Russian
foreign strategy is presently much better
understood in the West than it was few
years ago. Today, its aggressive posture is
rarely denied with actual conviction.
Yet the Surkov leaks shed additional light on
the detail of Russia’s management of areas
under its control. Information contained in
the leaked e-mails is important in both
narrowly Georgian context, and as a glimpse
of the broader Russian modus operandi that
involves gradual and full-scale takeover of
legislative, regulatory and administrative
functions behind the veil of “official
recognition of sovereignty” of Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali regions.
Surkov’s e-mails constitute a vivid
illustration of just how directly Russia
controls the occupied territories and actions
of proxy regimes. The leaked documents
provide a picture of sustained, systematic
political control, governance and even
micromanagement of the occupied regions
by the Russian government.
Arguably, some parts of the Russian
Federation, such as Chechnya under Ramzan
Kadyrov, have considerably greater degree
of self-rule than Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. We
should also take into account that, due to
Surkov’s personal role, the leaks deal only
with political and economic matters. Russian
military control over the two regions is an
additional key aspect not covered in the
Surkov leaks.
An important part of the security dimension
of the Russian activities in Georgia is the
process known as creeping occupation. The
term describes movement of the occupation
line, claimed by Russia to be ‘national
border’, deeper into Georgia. It additionally
disrupts lives of farmers living near the
occupation line and potentially threatens
some of the Georgian infrastructure located
in the non-occupied part of the country.
Russia’s total control over the actions of
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali regimes, additionally
demonstrated by the Surkov leaks, means
that the creeping occupation is a policy
originating in Kremlin.
The fact that Moscow determines and
manages political, security and military
activities taking place in Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali has even broader implications. It
indicates gradually diminishing space for
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali – as well as the
inhabitants of these provinces – to act
12
independently of Moscow’s will or to resist More generally, the Surkov leaks testify to
its instructions. Kremlin’s mindset about the neighbors it
targets. Materials in the e-mails concerning
The glimpse into Russia’s mode of operation
both Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate
in civilian field allows us to infer that Russian
Russia’s strategic intent in its operations
military and security commanders deployed
against targeted nations.
in the field exercise much tighter control and
management over military and security The occupied territories are casually
matters. considered to be permanent additions to the
area under Russian governance. In the
The entry into force of the agreements on
Russians’ view, they are to be directly
creation of the “joint” armed forces of Russia
managed, their economic resources – to be
with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali thus represents
exploited. The portions of e-mails dedicated
a heightened threat to Georgia. The two
to Ukraine also show Moscow’s immediate,
regions are located very close to the
short-term willingness to go beyond Crimea
Georgian heartlands in both eastern and
and Donbass, deeper into Ukrainian
western parts of the country.
territory.
Tskhinvali region borders the main Georgian
To summarize, Surkov’s revealed
highway that connects the nation’s two
correspondence offers a glimpse into the
halves. At one geographic point the
daily routine of Russia’s ongoing effort to
occupation line runs less than 500 meters
expand and consolidate a zone of control
from the highway, while, as mentioned
beyond its borders.
above, the capital Tbilisi is situated just 40
kilometers from this occupied region.

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 Conclusion and recommendations:
Foreign partners of Georgia should reinforce vigilance regarding the potential threats Russian
control over Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions poses to the non-occupied Georgia. Current focus
on the Baltic states and Ukraine, often overshadows the real threats to Georgia. Such
complacency could be dangerous.

Moscow is exercising considerable daily control over administration and governance of Abkhazia
and Tskhinvali regions, which is backed up by near-complete financial dependence of these
regions on capital inflows from Russia, as well as the integration of the local forces into the
Russian command and control systems. Both Georgian government and its foreign partners
should take heed:

 Georgia’s foreign friends and partners should unambiguously recognize the reality, depth and
breadth of the direct Russian control over the occupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
Tbilisi and its partners shall engage in cooperative effort to identify the realistic means for
reducing such dependence, which would be by definition rather limited. At the same time,
a sustainable and concerted strategy for monitoring and protecting the rights of
Georgian-speakers and other minorities is required.
 Georgia’s partners and aid agencies should take note of the fact that a potential investment in
strengthening the proxy administration in Abkhazia through financial aid, training, etc. will
effectively be conducted within the framework of the administrative and regulatory space
imposed by Russia. Such engagement would have implications for the neutrality and
impartiality of these agencies. The European Union shall engage in strategic dialogue with
Georgian authorities to adapt its policies and engagement accordingly.
 Russian creeping occupation of additional areas in Georgia must be recognized a matter of
Kremlin’s strategy, rather than isolated actions driven by military imperatives. These actions
should be consistently and vocally confronted by the Western nations’ diplomacy. Russia
attempts to present creeping occupation as a local and technical issue should be rebuffed.

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