1

MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment and MEYCAUYAN COLLEGE FACULTY AND PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION
(MCFPA), respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner is a private educational institution duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, and operating in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. On January 16, 1987, its board of trustees recognized the Meycauayan College Faculty and
Personnel Association as the employees union in the Meycauayan College.

Prior to said recognition or on July 17, 1983, petitioner and the union, then headed by Mrs. Teresita V. Lim, entered into a
collective bargaining agreement for 1983-1986. Article IV thereof provides:

SALARY SCALE

IV. 4.0 ANG ANTAS NG PAGPAPASUWELDO SA MGA GURO SA MATAAS NG PAARALAN AY UMAALINSUNOD SA PARAAN
NG PAGRARANGGONG KALAKIP NITO BILANG "TAKDA" AT AYON PA RIN SA SUMUSUNOD NA HALAGA NG
PAGPAPASUWELDO (IPATUTUPAD SA AÑO-ESCOLAR 1983-1986):

PAGSUBOK A (1-3 TAON) P51.50

KLASE 1 (4-5 TAON) P52.00

(6-8 TAON) P53.00

KLASE II (9-12 TAON) P54.00

KLASE III (13-14 TAON) P57.00

KLASE IV (15-17 TAON) P60.00

KLASE V (18-21 TAON) P63.00

(22 PATAAS) P70.00

When the collective bargaining agreement was entered into, the following presidential decrees were in effect:

(a) P.D No. 1389 dated May 29, 1978 adjusting the existing statutory minimum wages;

(b) P.D. No. 1713 dated August 18, 1980 providing for an increase in the minimum daily wage rates and for additional
mandatory living allowances, and ;

(c) P.D. No. 1751 dated May 14, 1980 increasing the statutory daily minimum wage at all levels by P4.00 after integrating
the mandatory emergency living allowance under P.D. Nos. 525 and 1123 into the basic pay of all covered workers. Wage
Order No. 2 increasing the mandatory basic minimum wage and living allowance was also issued on July 6, 1983 just
before the collective bargaining agreement herein involved was entered into.

During the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement, the following were issued:

(a) Wage Order No. 3 dated November 7, 1983 increasing the minimum daily living allowance in the private sector;

(b) Wage Order No. 4 dated May 1, 1984 integrating as of said date the emergency cost of living allowances under P.D.
Nos. 1614, 1634 and 1713 into the basic pay of covered workers in the private sector;

(c) Wage Order No. 5 dated June 11, 1984 increasing the cost of living allowance of workers in the private sector whose
basic salary or wage is not more than P1,800 a month; and

(d) Wage Order No. 6 dated October 26, 1984 increasing the daily living allowances.
 2

The union admits herein that its members were paid all these increases in pay mandated by law. It appears, however, that
in 1987, shortly after union president Mrs. Teresita V. Lim, who held the managerial position of registrar of the college,
had turned over the presidency of the union to Mrs. Fe Villarico, the latter unintentionally got a copy of the collective
bargaining agreement and discovered that Article IV thereof had not been implemented by the petitioner.

Consequently, on March 27, 1987, the union filed with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. III
in San Fernando, Pampanga, a notice of strike on the ground of unfair labor practice alleging therein violation of the
collective bargaining agreement particularly the provisions of Article IV thereof on salary scale.

ISSUE: 1. Whether increases in employees' salaries resulting from the implementation of presidential decrees and wage
orders, which are over and above the agreed salary scale contracted for between the employer and the employees in a
collective bargaining agreement, preclude the employees from claiming the difference between their old salaries and
those provided for under said salary scale.

RULING: "Non-compliance with the mandate of a standards law or decree may give rise to an ordinary action for recovery
while violation of a collective bargaining agreement may even give rise to a criminal action for unfair labor practice. And
while the relief sought for violation of a standards law or decree is primarily for restitution of (an) unpaid benefits, the
relief sought for violating a CBA is ordinarily for compliance and desistance. Moreover, there is no provision in the
aforecited Presidential Decrees providing that compliance thereto is sufficient compliance with a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement and vice-versa." The dispositive portion of the Secretary's order of September 9, 1987 states:

WHEREFORE, the Management of Meycauayan College is hereby ordered to:

1) Strictly effect the payment of salaries of the union members in accordance with the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement;

2) Pay the covered union members salary differential computed by subtracting the salary actually paid and received by
them per period provided in the collective bargaining agreement for school years 1983-1984; 1984-1985 and 1985-1986
including the differential for the 13th month pay for the same period. 5

The petition has no merit.

As correctly ruled by public respondent, a collective bargaining agreement is a contractual obligation. It is distinct from an
obligation imposed by law. The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the
parties. Beneficiaries thereof are therefore, by right, entitled to the fulfillment of the obligation prescribed therein.
Consequently, to deny binding force to the collective bargaining agreement would place a premium on a refusal by a party
thereto to comply with the terms of the agreement. Such refusal would constitute an unfair labor practice.

Nevertheless, as the key to the interpretation of contracts, including collective bargaining agreements, is the intention of
the parties, we examined the record and found the undisputed allegation of private respondent that the collective
bargaining agreement herein involved was entered into by the parties to improve the plight of the teachers by increasing
their salary. The parties increased the teachers' salary or rate per period, by drafting a salary scale "based on the length of
service" of the teachers and eventually came up with Article IV aforequoted. From this unrebutted allegation, it is clear
that the parties wanted to attain one goal — increase the salaries of the teachers on the basis of their length of service.
Hence, it is immaterial that the means by which said goal is achieved is through the alteration of the salary scale.

On the issue of prescription, Article 291 (now Art. 290) of the Labor Code herein invoked by petitioner, provides:

Offenses. — Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in
three (3) years.

All unfair labor practices arising from Book V shall be filed with the appropriate agency within one (1) year from accrual
of such unfair labor practice; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
 3

The one-year prescriptive period is inapplicable in this case because of peculiar factual circumstances which petitioner
has not denied. Although the collective bargaining agreement covers school years 1983 to 1986, a copy of the agreement
was only made available to the union in 1987. Immediately thereafter, the union sought its implementation. The union
members might have been aware of the existence of the collective bargaining agreement but that fact that their president
was actually a management employee being petitioner's registrar, they must have been deterred from demanding its
implementation earlier. Hence, to apply the provisions of Article 290 (Art. 291) would be unfair and prejudicial to the
union members particularly those who have served petitioner for a number of years who stand to benefit most from the
salary scale.

Article 264(g), now Article 263(g) of the Labor Code is broad enough to give the Secretary of Labor the power to take
jurisdiction over what appears at first blush to be an ordinary money claim. Claims for pay differentials may have that
character but, as earlier stated, if they arise out of a violation of a collective bargaining agreement, they assume the
character of an unfair labor practice and are, therefore, well within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor
to decide.the decision of the Secretary of Labor is hereby AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining order of February
15,1989 is LIFTED.

This decision is immediately executory. Costs against the petitioner.

ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE VS. ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE WORKERS ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. 155609, January 17, 2005

Facts: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit Catholic educational institution while respondent is a legitimate labor
organization which is currently the official bargaining representative of all employees of petitioner except the faculty and
consultants of the Graduate School, managerial employees and those who occupy confidential positions. Respondent has
an existing CBA with petitioner for the period from June 1, 1999 to May 31, 2004. For the SY 2000-2001, petitioner
increased its tuition fees for all its departments. Based on petitioner’s computation, the incremental proceeds from the
tuition fees increase for SY 2000-2001 is P1,560,942.74, 85% of which is equivalent to P1,326,801.33. Consequently,
respondent averred that 85% of P4,906,307.58, which is P4,170,360.59 should have been released to its members as
provided for in their CBA effective June 1, 2000.

Issue: How should the 70%-30% tuition fee increase be allocated?

Held: The law allows an increase in school tuition fees on the condition that 70 percent of the increase shall go to the
payment of personnel benefits. Plainly unsupported by the law or jurisprudence is petitioner’s contention that the
payment of such benefits should be based not only on the rate of tuition fee increases, but also on other factors like the
decrease in the number of enrollees; the number of those exempt from paying the fees, like scholars; the number of
dropouts who, as such, do not pay the whole fees; and the bad debts incurred by the school. The financial dilemma of
petitioner may deserve sympathy and support, but its remedy lies not in the judiciary but in the lawmaking body. The law
plainly states that 70 percent of the tuition fee increase shall be allotted for the teaching and the nonteaching personnel;
and that the payment of other costs of operation, together with the improvement of the school’s infrastructure, shall be
taken only from the remaining 30 percent. The law does not speak, directly or indirectly, of the contention of petitioner
that in the event that its total tuition income is lesser than that in the previous year, then the whole amount of the
increase in tuition fee, and not merely up to 30 percent as provided by law, may be used for the improvement and
modernization of infrastructure and for the payment of other costs of operation.

CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION vs CA

[May 31, 2006 G.R. No. 165486]
CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION – INDEPENDENT, Petitioner, versus HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, APRON MANGABAT as Voluntary Arbitrator, and CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY,
Respondents

FACTS : Petitioner union represents the teaching and the non-teaching staff of respondent university. The union has
existing collective bargaining agreements with the university. Increases in the salary of both teaching and non-teaching
personnel for the period 2000 to 2005 were provided in the collective bargaining agreements.
 4

Respondent university admits that for the salary increases for the school’s faculty, some were taken from the university
fund and the others are deducted form the incremental proceeds.

Petitioner asserts that the integrated IP granted in the CBAs should not be deducted from the personnel’s 70% share in
the IP. Petitioner filed with the NCMB a preventive mediation for the recovery of IP losses due to the university’s alleged
deduction of the cost of CBA-won economic benefits form the 70% share of the teachers and employees in the IP.

The parties submitted the case for a voluntary arbitration. On April 10, 2003, Voluntary Arbitrator Apron Mangabat
upheld the position of the university and dismissed the case. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that
petitioner used a wrong mode of appeal. It held that petitioner should have filed an appeal under Ruled 43.

ISSUE: Is the decision of the voluntary arbitrator appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43?

HELD: No. Decisions of the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor Code are appealable to the Court of Appeals. In Luzon
Developemnt Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, the Court observed that the Labor Code was
silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the voluntary arbitrator, unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which may
be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The Court noted, however, that the voluntary arbitrator is a
government instrumentality within the contemplation of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 which provides for
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator are akin to those of the
Regional Trial Court, and, therefore, should first be appealed to the Court of Appeals before being elevated to this Court.
This is in furtherance and consistent with the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the
appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial agencies not expressly excepted from the coverage of Section 9 of BP
129. Circular No. 1-91 was later revised and became Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95. The Rules of Court
Revision Committee incorporated said circular in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The inclusion of the
decisions of the voluntary arbitrator in the Rule was based on the Court’s pronouncements in Luzon Development Bank v.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the ruling in said case is
inapplicable in this case is without merit.

Moreover, petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by
the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake
of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only
when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There was no question
of jurisdiction involved in the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. What was being questioned was merely his findings of
whether the university’s practice of sourcing the integrated IP in the CBA from the 70% share of the personnel in the IP
violates the provisions of the CBA. Such is a proper subject of an appeal.

MATERNITY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL VS SECRETARY OF LABOR (Labor Law defined)

G.R. No. 78909
Date: June 30, 1984
Petitioner: Maternity Children’s Hospital, represented by Antera L. Dorado
Respondents: The Honorable Secretary of Labor and the Regional Director of Labor, Region X
Ponente: Medialdea, J.

FACTS: Petitioner is a semi-governmental hospital in Cagayan De Oro and Employing forty-one (41) employees. Aside
from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount of which is deducted from their
respective salaries. On May 3, 1986, ten (10) employees filed a complaint with the Regional Director of Labor and
Employment, Region 10, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS. Consequently, the Regional Director directed
two of his labor standard and welfare officers to investigate and ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaint.
 5

Based on the report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an order dated August 4, 1986, directing payment
of ₱ 723, 888.58, to all the petitioner’s employees. The Secretary of Labor likewise affirmed the Decision and dismissed
the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner.

In a petition for certiorari, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and the all-embracing
applicability of the award involving salary differentials and ECOLAS, in that it covers not only the hospitals employees
who signed the complaints, but also those who are not signatories to the complaint, and those who were no longer in the
service of the hospital at the time the complaint was filed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case; and

2. Whether or not the Regional Director erred in extending the award to all hospital employees?

HELD:

1. The answer is in the affirmative the Regional Directos has a jurisdiction in this labor standard case. This is Labor
Standard case, and is governed by Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code , as amended by E.O. No. 111.

“Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to
wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety,
and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated
September 16, 1987)”.

Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases,
and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship,
and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. We believed…that even in the absence
of E. O. No. 111, Regional Directors already had enforcement powers over money claims, effective under P.D. No. 850,
issued on December 16, 1975, which transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement
system.

2. The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to those employees who signed the complaint, as well
as those who did not sign the complaint, but were still connected with the hospital at the time the complaint was filed. The
justification for the award to this group of employees who were not signatories to the complaint is that the visitorial and
enforcement powers given to the Secretatry of Labor labor is relevant to, and exercisable over establishments, not over
individual members/employees, because what is sought to be achieved by its exercise is the observance of, and/ or
compliance by such firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. However, there is no legal justification for
the award in favor of those employees who were no longer connected with the hospital t the time the complaint was filed.
Article 129 of the Labor Code in aid of the enforcement power of the Regional Director is not applicable where the
employee seeking to be paid is separated from service. His claim is purely money claim that has to be subject of
arbitration proceedings and therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

G.R. No. 982767 February 15, 1995

COCOFED (Kalamansig) and/or CRISPIN ROSETE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON.
MELENCIO Q. BALANAG, Director IV, DOLE, Regional XII, Cotabato City, respondents.

Facts: Philippine Coconut Producers Federation operates petitioner COCOFED (Kalamansig), a coconut plantation utilized
as a demonstration farm for replanting and/or training area for coconut farmers, located in Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat.

On November 15, 1988, a complaint inspection was conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment, Region XII,
Cotabato City in response to complaints filed by two of petitioner's employees, Alex Edicto and Delia Pahuwayan. The
inspection revealed that petitioner was guilty of underpayment of wages, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and
 6

13th month pay. Accordingly, notice of inspection results was issued: requiring petitioner to effect restitution or
correction within five (5) days from notice.

Summary Petitioner submitted its position paper claiming that it should be classified as an establishment with less than
30 employees and with a paid-up capital of P500,000.00 or less as evidenced by the assessment of the municipal
treasurer. Moreover, complainants worked for less than eight hours, a minimum of four and maximum of six.

. . . A three (3) year actual payrolls from March 1985 to February 1989 showing the daily actual payment made by the
respondent to involved workers are substantial evidence against the mere memorandum issued by the respondents on
the matter. Further, such payrolls submitted by respondents are not mere summaries of daily efforts of workers but these
are daily records showing workers actual daily rate.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was justified in paying an amount less than the statutory minimum wage.

Held: Petitioner would have us overturn the factual finding of public respondents that its employees are daily paid
workers. This we are unable to do for the payrolls submitted by it support the latters' position. Findings of administrative
agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but finality. Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the records which show that petitioner's employees
worked for less than eight hours. Finally, there would have been no need for petitioner to make an offer increasing the
wage to P45.00 per day if complainants were indeed piece rate workers, as it claimed and if their wages were not
underpaid, as found by public respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

[G.R. NO. 167334 : March 7, 2008]

CATHOLIC VICARIATE, BAGUIO CITY, Petitioner, v. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Secretary of the Department of
Labor & Employment, and GEORGE AGBUCAY, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner contracted Kunwha Luzon Construction (KUNWHA) to construct the retaining wall of the Baguio
Cathedral. KUNWHA, in turn, subcontracted CEREBA Builders (CEREBA) to do the formworks of the church. The contract
between KUNWHA and CEREBA lasted up to the completion of the project or on 8 September 2000.4 KUNWHA failed to
pay CEREBA. Consequently, the latter failed to pay its employees.

On 29 August 2000, respondent George Agbucay, along with 81 other employees, lodged a complaint against CEREBA,
KUNWHA and petitioner before the DOLE-CAR Regional Office for nonpayment of wages, special and legal holiday
premium pay. An inspection of the premises resulted in the discovery of violations of labor standards law, such as
nonpayment of wages and holiday pay from 28 June 2000 to 5 September 2000, non-presentation of employment records,
and others.5 Petitioner, KUNWHA and CEREBA were given five (5) days from receipt of the notice of inspection results to
rectify its violations. Despite the notice, the parties failed to comply. A hearing was set wherein CEREBA manifested its
willingness to pay the affected employees on the condition that KUNWHA would pay its obligation to CEREBA. Petitioner
meanwhile manifested that the retention fee due to KUNWHA was sufficient to pay the deficiencies due the affected
employees.

On 12 March 2001, the DOLE-CAR Regional Director issued an Order6 holding CEREBA, KUNWHA and petitioner jointly
and severally liable to the 82 affected workers in the amount of P1,029,952.80 or P12,560.40 for each employee.7 During
the pendency of its motion for reconsideration, KUNWHA voluntarily settled the deficiencies due the 23 affected workers
amounting to P84,544.00.

On 21 May 2001, the Regional Director dismissed the complaint by reason of the said settlement. He also advised the
other employees to ventilate their claims in an appropriate forum considering that no employer-employee relationship
exists between the parties.9

On appeal, the Secretary of Labor reversed the ruling of the Regional Director and held that pursuant to Articles 106 and
107 of the Labor Code, the liability of KUNWHA, CEREBA and the Catholic Vicariate is solidary notwithstanding the
 7

absence of an employer-employee relationship. The Secretary of Labor ruled, however, that there existed an employer-
employee relationship between the parties since the records show that the subcontracting agreement was terminated
only on 28 September 2000, almost a month after the complaint was filed on 29 August 2000. The settlement with respect
to the 23 workers was declared unconscionable and the Order of the Regional Director dated 12 March 2001 was
reinstated.

Petitioner moved for Reconsideration12 but it was denied on 19 January 2004.13

On 28 September 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Secretary of Labor with the modification that
payments made in favor of the 23 workers amounting to P84,544.00 be deducted from whatever amount still due each of
them.

Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor acquired jurisdiction over the appeal considering that this case falls within the
exception stated in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.

Ruling: The appellate court held that petitioner was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor,
it having attended the initial hearing and therein manifested that it had in its possession the retention fee of KUNWHA
sufficient to answer for the deficiencies due the affected workers. The appellate court noted that it was only when the
judgment imposed joint and several liability that petitioner began to question the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor.
The appellate court further sustained the finding of the Secretary of Labor that the settlement is not legally acceptable as
it defied public policy for being unconscionable. Moreover, the appellate court succinctly stated that parties who did not
appeal may be benefited by the judgment of said court insofar as it is favorable and applicable to them.16

There is no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Petitioner contends that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time and even on appeal. It alleges that its
participation in the hearing before the Regional Director could not amount to estoppel because it did not have sufficient
information at that time as to the factual basis of the presence or absence of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor or his
authorized representative.17

In resolving this jurisdictional issue, the Secretary of Labor relied on the limitations set forth in Article 128(b)18 of the
Labor Code and ruled, thus:

It is worthy to note that as regards the power granted to Regional Director by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as
amended, only two (2) limitations are set forth: first, where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations
officer, and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the
normal course of inspection, and second, where the employer-employee relationship no longer exists.

xxx

Both of the above-stated limitations are wanting in this case. Records show that, when this case was filed on August 29,
2000, complainants were still employed with the respondent CEREBA working for KUNWHA's project with the Vicariate.
There was no proof that the subcontracting agreement between KUNWHA LUZON CONSTRUCTION and CEREBA Builders
was terminated as of July 2000. The letters showing the poor performance of CEREBA Builders cannot be considered as a
notice of termination of the Subcontracting Agreement for the same do not state so.

xxx

Succinctly put, since no written notice was served to respondent CEREBA Builders terminating the Subcontracting
Agreement, the employer-employee relationship between KUNWHA and complainants existed until the completion of the
subcontracting agreement on September 18, 2000. Considering this, when the complainants filed this case on August 29,
2000, the Regional Director validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. And, jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
 8

xxx

It is also equally important to note that, during the initial hearing of this case at the Regional Office, the respondents
failed to contest the findings of the Labor Employment and Enforcement Officer. The respondents failed to present
employment records and any evidence to controvert the findings despite the reasonable period of time afforded them. It
was only when respondent KUNWHA filed its Motion for Reconsideration from the Order dated March 12, 2001 of the
Regional Director that it submitted documents which the Vicariate now alleged to be not verifiable in the summary nature
of the labor inspection19

Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction is clearly intertwined with the existence of employer-employee relationship. It is
undisputed that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of fact.20 Thus, it can be
inferred that this petition also seeks a review of the factual findings of the Regional Director, as affirmed by the Secretary
of Labor and the Court of Appeals. Such review is beyond the ambit of a Petition for Review on Certiorari .

Assuming arguendo the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, the Secretary of Labor,
invoking Odin Security Agency v. De la Serna,21 correctly declared that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director when it actively participated in the proceedings held therein. In said case, petitioner
also submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Director by taking part in the hearings before him and by submitting a
position paper. Similarly, it was only when the order of the Regional Director was modified did petitioner question the
former's jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This Court declares that petitioner is barred by estoppel from raising the
issue of jurisdiction.

MRS. ALBERTA YANSON v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

G.R. No. 159026 February 11, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
ARTICLE 128

DOCTRINE:

The posting of the proper amount of the appeal bond under Article 128 (b) is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal
from a monetary award in labor standard cases.

FACTS: In 1998, Mardy Cabigo and 40 other workers filed with DOLE Bacolod a request for payroll inspection of
Hacienda Valentin Balabag owned by Alberta Yanson. DOLE Bacolod conducted an inspection of the establishment and
issued a Notice of Inspection Report, finding Yanson liable for the following violations of labor standard laws:

1. Underpayment of salaries and wages (workers being paid a daily rate of P90.00 since 1997 and P75.00 prior to such
year);

2. Non-payment of 13th month pay for two (2) years;

3. Non-payment of Social Amelioration Bonus (SAB) for two (2) years;

4. Non-payment of employers 1/3 carabao share.

In addition, DOLE Bacolod scheduled a summary investigation. Yanson did not appear in any of the scheduled hearings, or
present any pleading or document.

In a Compliance Order, DOLE Bacolod directed Yanson to pay a total of P372,444 and to correct existing violations of
occupational safety and health standards. It then issued a Writ of Execution. Yanson filed with public respondent a
Verified Appeal and posted a bond.

SECRETARY OF LABOR RULING: dismissed the appeal.

CA RULING: Petition for Certiorari was denied due course and dismissed. Hence, the present recourse.
 9

ISSUE:

1. Whether the compliance order by DOLE Bacolod, in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, was proper.
YES

2. Whether the appeal was perfected. NO.

SC RULING:

For its perfection, the appeal was subject to the requirements prescribed under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7730, viz.:

Art. 128. Visitorial and Enforcement Power. - x x x (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code
to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the
labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and
enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in
cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues
supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.

An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this article may
be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from.

When Yanson filed her Verified Appeal and Supplement to the Verified Appeal, Public respondent rejected said appeal for
insufficiency of the appeal bond. The posting of the proper amount of the appeal bond under Article 128 (b) is mandatory
for the perfection of an appeal from a monetary award in labor standard cases. Also applying the Implementing Rules,
there is one other reason for holding that Yanson failed to perfect her appeal. It is of record that she received Compliance
Order issued by DOLE-Bacolod. She was put on actual notice not only of the existence of the Compliance Order but also of
the summary investigation of her establishment. It behooves her to file a timely appeal to public respondent or object to
the conduct of the investigation. Yanson did neither, opting instead to sit idle and wait until the following year to question
the investigation and resultant order, in the guise of opposing the writ of execution.

In fine, the CA was correct in holding that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the
appeal due to the insufficiency of her appeal bond.

Even on its substance, her appeal would still not prosper. The determination made by DOLE-Bacolod on this matter binds
the Court, especially as it was not reversed by public respondent and the CA.

ODIN SECURITY AGENCY vs. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA,

G.R. No. 87439 February 21, 1990
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: On July 8, 1986, a complaint was filed by Sergio Apilado and fifty-five (55) others charging the petitioner Odin
Security Agency (hereafter "OSA"), underpayment of wages, illegal deductions, non-payment of night shift differential,
overtime pay, premium pay for holiday work, rest days and Sundays, service incentive leaves, vacation and sick leaves,
and 13th-month pay. When conciliation efforts failed, the parties were required to submit their position papers.

Private respondents alleged in their position paper that their latest monthly salary was P1,600; that from this amount,
petitioner deducted P100 as administrative cost and P20 as bond; that they were not paid their premium pay and
overtime pay for working on the eleven (11) legal holidays per year; and, that since private respondents were relieved or
constructively dismissed, they must also be paid backwages.
 10

Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that on July 21, 1986, some 48 security guards threatened mass action against it.
Alarmed by a possible abandonment of post by the guards and mindful of its contractual obligations to its
clients/principals, petitioner relieved and re-assigned the complaining guards to other posts in Metro Manila. Those
relieved were ordered to report to the agency's main office for reassignment. Only few complied, so those who failed to
comply were placed on "AWOL" status. Petitioner claimed it complied with the Labor Code provisions, and in support
thereof, it submitted the "Quitclaim and Waiver" of thirty-four (34) complainants. It further alleged that complainants
who rendered over-time work as shown by their time sheets were paid accordingly; that service incentive leaves not
availed of, night shift differential, rest days, and holidays were paid in cash.

Earlier, on October 21, 1986, seventeen (17) complainants repudiated their quitclaim and waiver. They alleged that
management pressured them to sign documents which they were not allowed to read and that if such waiver existed, they
did not have any intention of waiving their rights under the law.

Petitioner in its reply argued that complainants were estopped from denying their quitclaims on the ground of equity;
that being high school graduates, complainants fully understood the document they signed; and that complainant's
allegation of coercion or threat was a mere afterthought.

Later, six (6) of the seventeen (17) complainants who repudiated their quitclaims again executed quitclaims and waivers.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process?

HELD: The petition has no merit.

The petitioner was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact conducted by the hearing officer of the
Regional Office of the DOLE and the parties submitted position papers upon which the Regional Director based his
decision in the case. There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of due process are satisfied when
the parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers Parel, 156 SCRA 768; Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs.
Amores, 152 SCRA 237). Since petitioner herein participated in the hearings, submitted a position paper, and filed a
motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 1988 decision of the Labor Undersecretary, it was not denied due process.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the Court said that it is not right for a party who
has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

... Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards
cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee
relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. (p. 5, Decision.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the orders dated March 23, 1988 and March 13, 1989 of the Undersecretary of
Labor are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order earlier issued by this Court is lifted. No costs.

URBANES VS. SEC OF LABOR

FACTS: Petitioner Placido O. Urbanes, Jr., doing business under the name and style of Catalina Security Agency, entered
into an agreement1 to provide security services to respondent Social Security System (SSS).

petitioner, by letter of May 16, 1994, requested the SSS for the upward adjustment of their contract rate in view of Wage
Order No. NCR-03 which was issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic
Act 6727 otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act

On June 24, 1994, petitioner pulled out his agency’s services from the premises of the SSS and another security agency,
Jaguar, took over.
 11

On June 29, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE-NCR against the SSS seeking the implementation of Wage
Order No. NCR-03.

In its position paper,7 the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioner is not the real party
in interest and has no legal capacity to file the same. In any event, it argued that if it had any obligation, it was to the
security guards.

The SSS moved to reconsider the September 16, 1994 Order of the Regional Director, praying that the computation be
revised.

By Order of December 9, 1994, the Regional Director modified his September 16, 1994 Order by reducing the amount
payable by the SSS to petitioner.

The Secretary of Labor, by Order of June 22, 1995, set aside the order of the Regional Director and remanded the records
of the case "for recomputation of the wage differentials using P 5,281.00 as the basis of the wage adjustment." And the
Secretary held petitioner’s security agency "JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY liable for wage differentials, the amount of which
should be paid DIRECTLY to the security guards concerned."

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the DOLE Secretary’s Order of June 22, 1995 having been denied by Order of
October 10, 1995, the present petition was filed, petitioner contending that the DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion

Petitioner thus contends that as the appeal of SSS was filed with the wrong forum, it should have been dismissed.

The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Article 128, not Article 129, is applicable to the case. Article 128 provides:

ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the said case.

HELD: We agree with the respondent that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is well
settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is
involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining
agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief
under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged breach of its
obligation under their Guard Service Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case
belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the
labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-
employee relation exists.