PP V. MORO MACARANDANG
JABINAL
FACTS:
Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao.
Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions,
invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as
secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and evidence. He was
granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the
office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist
on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in
his possession 1 Riot shotgun.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls
among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the
“peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license
to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of “peace
officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879.
Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted.
PP V. MAPA
FACTS:
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his
defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas.
He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense
providing evidences of his appointment.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain
any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The Court’s ruling
overturned that of People v. Macarandang.
PEOPLE VS.
FACTS:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver
without the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration
because, although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the said firearm. The accused further contended that in
view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero. The trial court
found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on
the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and
abandoned in People vs. Mapa**. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme
Court’s rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.
RULING:
The appellant was acquitted. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the
reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, “Judicial decisions applying and
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system.” The
interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as
of the date the law was originally passed, since the court’s construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends
to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of
the legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet”—the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in
Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land,
at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned
by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability
would attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The
appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to
be punishable.
PEOPLE V. SANTAYANA
FACTS:
Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years, and to
pay the costs.
ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS, which
apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms, exempts him from securing a
license or permit corresponding thereto.
HELD:
Yes. At the time of appellant’s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was
enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the
appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a
‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by Section 879”.
PEOPLE VS NAZARIO
FACTS:
Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to pay
municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands.
Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager of fishponds in
places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the
amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum.” He admits to the
non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional, or
assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner
or manager.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain.
2. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused.
HELD: No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to
be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above provision that the Accused
falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the
term “manager”. While it appears that the National Government is the owner of the
fishpond, the Government never shared in the profits they generated. It is therefore,
logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. And
obviously, the word owner cannot be construed to include the Government because of
the ancient principle that the government is immune from taxes.
PRIMICIAS V. MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA
FACTS:
Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with
violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”.
Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the
issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said
ordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan is valid.
HELD:
No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act
No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land
and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law
prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it
“must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal
ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.
ORTIGAS & CO. vs. FEATI BANK
FACTS:
Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a
building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Appellant demanded
that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots. The
latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being constructed in
accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant having filed building and planning
permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
ISSUE:
W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots
Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on
the lots in question and if Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal
Resolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along
EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that the same rendered
"ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant.
Resolution No. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality. Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as
vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractual
obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27.
PEOPLE V. CONCEPCION
FACTS:
Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Concepcion, a co-
partnership. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was
found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall
not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of
the bank or to agents of the branch banks.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was
repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921.
ISSUE:
W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which
were repealed by Act No. 2938.
HELD:
In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747
provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act.
Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to take
away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature
which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense,
such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction
to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law.
ALONZO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee.
By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the
lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a
fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the
right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time
had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales.
ISSUE:
1. W/N there was a valid notice.
2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly.
HELD:
Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales
satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware
of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Article
1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners
claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it,
the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to
ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date
of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. The co-heirs in
this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
to them.
ALFREDO RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 74
hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian and
Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the
municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to pay them
not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify said
private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a
private counsel.
ISSUE:
W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case.
HELD:
No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal
shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court.
Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall
act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such
powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s interest would be
best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These laws are
implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a
private lawyer.
SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a
confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated him.
Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. The act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and filed a criminal case.
ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense.
HELD:
The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ V. RAUL M. GONZALES
FACTS:
A year following the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary Ignacio
Bunye disclosed to the public how the opposition planned to destabilize the
administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly
between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was alleged to have been audio-
taped through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Secretary Raul Gonzales of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) warned reporters who are in possession of copies of the
said conversation, as well as those broadcasting companies and/or publishers that they
may be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Consequently, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a press release strengthening the
prohibition on the dissemination of the same – that the broadcasting/airing of such
information shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued by the Commission. Petitioner Francisco Chavez filed a
petition against respondent Chavez and NTC, praying for the issuance of writs of
certiorari and prohibition for the nullification of the acts, issuances and orders of
respondents – as they were outright violations of the freedom of expression and of the
press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of
the press.
HELD:
Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by
either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which
limits speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, a standard
when courts balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and (c) the clear
and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the
government has a right to prevent.
It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of
a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. However, respondents’
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press
Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version
and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the
who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the
tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission
and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly,
given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise
of freedom of speech and of the press. The need to prevent their violation cannot per se
trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can
lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy
the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of
free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
NUEZ VS. APAO
FACTS:
The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable
decision of the latter’s pending case in the Court of Appeals. Complainant earlier sought
the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to
PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter,
he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the
money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a
favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing,
the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation
with the PAOCC.
During the hearing of this case, respondent would like the court to believe that
she never had any intention of committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a
favorable decision came from complainant and that it was complainant and the law
enforcers who instigated the whole incident. When she was asked if she had sent the
text messages contained in complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her cellphone
number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not
remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant. Respondent
thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and
texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the text messages are admissible as evidence in court?
HELD:
Yes. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the
text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter
asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the
former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the
Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence65 which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone
conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
“Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has
personal knowledge thereof . . . .”
In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore
had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent
herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from
which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have
had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her
counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and
complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. The Court has no doubt as to the
probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof
of respondent in this case.
MAMBA v. GARCIA

FACTS:
On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866
(illegal possession of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan
Provincial Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia of
the Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan. Respondent set the preliminary investigation,
but the same was subsequently postponed and reset as respondent was not present,
although the complaining officers appeared in court. Later, the preliminary investigation
was again reset. On the day before the new date of preliminary investigation, the
accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the NBI that at the first scheduled preliminary
investigation, the arresting officer demanded P30,000.00 from him in consideration of
the withdrawal of the criminal case against him. According to Bulatao, the demand was
reiterated by Salvador and respondent judge. As Bulatao told them that he could not
afford it, the amount was reduced to P6,000.00. Based on Bulatao’s report, the NBI set
out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge. Bulatao was given a tape recorder to
record his conversation with whoever will receive the money. After handing the money
to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the
NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's court then rushed to the judge's chambers
and arrested the two police officers after recovering marked bills in their possession.
After the matter was referred by this Court to the Executive Judge for
investigation, the latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of evidence for the
respondent. The records show that hearings were set on different dates, but
respondent did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence
only his counter-affidavit was considered, in which respondent claimed that it was
Bulatao who asked permission to talk to the two police officers.
ISSUE: Whether the investigating judge’s reliance on the taped conversation is proper?
HELD:
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between
Bulatao and the two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations
without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in
evidence in any proceeding.
In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in
accordance with the evidence. We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not
just of improper conduct but of serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is such conduct
which affects a public officer's performance of his duties as such officer and not only
that which affects his character as a private individual.
ZULUETA VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr.
Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took
the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and
photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the evidence of
her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine against her
husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court
rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to
Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta
filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: The papers and other materials obtained from forcible intrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification
from medical practice.
RULING/HELD:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is
no less applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
GAANAN V. INDETERMINATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
 Atty. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of
his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. Thatsame day,
Laconico called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him
on the settlement of the direct assault case. When complainant Pintor called up,
Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone call through the
extension phone.
ISSUE:
W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec.1
of RA 4200.
HELD:
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category
as the devices enumerated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order to determine the true intent of
the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of Empire Insurance
Company v. Rufino, held that the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec. 1 of RA4200,
although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend
instruments of the same nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Furthermore, it is a general rule
that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
ALFON V. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she was
petitioning to have her name changed are the following:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy.
2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name.
3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon.
4. She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name.
ISSUE:
W/N legitimate and legitimated children are required to use the surname of
their father.
HELD:
No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to
"exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should
choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally entitled.
Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon.
CHING VS. GOYANGCO
FACTS:
 Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During the marriage, they
acquire a certain property in Cebu. In 1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the
property in favor of his common-law-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his
children with Epifania discovered the sale. They thus filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against Ching, praying for
the nullification of the deed of sale and of the TCT and the issuance of a new one in
favor of their father Goyanko.
ISSUE:
Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his common-law wife valid?
HELD:
No. The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to
common law relationships. Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts
whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning. Article 1352 also
provides that: “Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.”
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to
each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during
marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between
spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal
partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of
undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of
marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple
living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, “the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.” As the
conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wife, it was
null and void.
MATABUENA V. CERVANTES
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After
the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void.” The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the
prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent
were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for
the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility
of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other,
there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to
the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were
legitimated by marriage.
MELCHOR V. COA
FACTS:
 On July 15, 1983, Petitioner, as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-
Industrial School of Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for
the construction of one of the school buildings. The school accountant issued a
certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed to sign as a
witness to the contract, which was approved by the Minister of Education. During
construction, the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increase, but
eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. Consequently, the matter was
referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in post audit on the
ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant
of the school as witness to it. For this reason the petitioner was made personally liable
for the amount paid to the contractor.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the contract was null and void.
2. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to
the contractor.
HELD:
No. The chief accountant’s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as
substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the
contract. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore the
approval of the Minister of Education. Also, it was highly inequitable for the Court to
compel the Petitioner, who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 968, to
shoulder the construction cost of the building, which was being utilized by the school
when he was not reaping benefits from it.
BDO VS. EQUITABLE BANKING CORP.
FACTS:
Equitable Bank drew six crossed manager’s check payable to certain member
establishments of Visa Card. Subsequently, the checks were deposited with Banco De
Oro (BDO) to the credit of its depositor. Following normal procedures and after stamping
at the back of the checks the usual endorsements, BDO sent the checks for clearing
through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC). Accordingly, Equitable
Banking paid the checks; its clearing account was debited for the value of the checks and
BDO’s clearing account was credited for the same amount. Thereafter, Equitable Banking
discovered that the endorsements appearing at the back of the checks and purporting to
be that of the payees were forged and/or unauthorized or otherwise belong to persons
other than the payees. Equitable Banking presented the checks directly to BDO for the
purpose of claiming reimbursement from the latter. However, BDO refused to accept
such direct presentation and to reimburse Equitable Banking for the value of the checks.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not BDO is estopped from claiming that checks under
consideration are non-negotiable instruments.
(b) Whether or not BDO can escape liability by reasons of forgery.
(c) Whether or not only negotiable checks are within the jurisdiction of PCHC.
RULING:
(a) YES. BDO having stamped its guarantee of “all prior endorsements and/or
lack of endorsements” is now estopped from claiming that the checks under
consideration are not negotiable instruments. The checks were accepted for deposit by
the petitioner stamping thereon its guarantee, in order that it can clear the said checks
with the respondent bank. By such deliberate and positive attitude of the petitioner it
has for all legal intents and purposes treated the said cheeks as negotiable instruments
and accordingly assumed the warranty of the endorser when it stamped its guarantee of
prior endorsements at the back of the checks. It led the said respondent to believe that
it was acting as endorser of the checks and on the strength of this guarantee said
respondent cleared the checks in question and credited the account of the petitioner.
Petitioner is now barred from taking an opposite posture by claiming that the disputed
checks are not negotiable instrument.
(b) NO. A commercial bank cannot escape the liability of an endorser of a check
and which may turn out to be a forged endorsement. Whenever any bank treats the
signature at the back of the checks as endorsements and thus logically guarantees the
same as such there can be no doubt said bank has considered the checks as negotiable.
The collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to
ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of
presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making
the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements.
 (c) NO. PCHC’s jurisdiction is not limited to negotiable checks only. The term
check as used in the said Articles of Incorporation of PCHC can only connote checks in
general use in commercial and business activities. Thus, no distinction. Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Checks are used between banks and bankers
and their customers, and are designed to facilitate banking operations. It is of the
essence to be payable on demand, because the contract between the banker and the
customer is that the money is needed on demand.
COMENDADOR V. DE VILLA
FACTS:
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on
December 1 to 9, 1989.
January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted
pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to investigate the petitioners.
January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually
addressed to the petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the
charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of
victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the
proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file
their objections in writing through a Motion for Summary Dismissal.
February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by
invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory
challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.
HELD:
Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to
peremptory challenge was originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408
(Articles of War).
November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing
the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to
military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.
January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the termination
of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created there under, the
reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules,
we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No.
408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
LBP VS CA
FACTS:
Yap and Santiago are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the
DAR, subjecting it for transfer to qualified CARP beneficiaries. Aggrieved by the
compensation valuation of DAR and LBP, respondents filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with a preliminary mandatory injunction. The case was referred to CA for
proper determination and disposition.
Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of discretion and
acted without jurisdiction when they opened trusts accounts in lieu of the depositing in
cash or bonds, before the lands was taken and the titles are cancelled. Respondents
claim that before the taking of the property, the compensation must be deposited in
cash or bonds.
DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit was a substantial compliance
with the rule on taking and compensation. LBP confirms that the certificate of deposit
expresses "reserved/deposited".
CA ruled in favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR filed a petition. DAR, maintain that
the word "deposit" referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the
opening of a trust account as form of deposit.
ISSUE:
Whether the opening of trust account tantamount to deposit.
RULING:
Contention of DAR is untenable. Section 16 of RA 6657 provides: (e)Upon
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)
 It is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds, there
is no ambiguity.
SONGCO V. NLRC (1990)
All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor
FACTS:
F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., filed with the Department of Labor an application seeking
clearance to terminate the services of Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres, and Amancio Manuel
allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. This application was
seasonably opposed by the employees alleging that the company is not suffering from
any losses.
Songco, Cipres and Manile alleged that they are being dismissed because of
their membership in the union. At the last hearing of the case, they manifested that they
are no longer contesting their dismissal. However, they argued that they should receive
separation pay.
Under the employment contract, each of the dismissed employees receive a
monthly salary of P40,000 plus commissions for every sale they made. On the other
hand, the CBA entered between Zuellig and the union contained the provision that an
employee, who is permanent lay-off, should receive an amount equivalent to one
month's salary per year of service. On the other hand, Article 284 of the Labor Code and
Implementing Rules provide that the retrenched employees should receive a separation
pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher.
The dismissed employees alleged that their earned sales commission should be
included in their monthly salary for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.
In defense, Zuellig argued that if it were really the intention of the Labor Code
to include commission in the computation of separation pay, it could have explicitly said
so in clear and unequivocal terms. Furthermore, in the definition of the term "wage",
"commission" is used only as one of the features or designations attached to the word
remuneration or earnings.
The Labor Arbiter ordered the company to pay the dismissed employees their
separation pay equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of commissions,
allowances, etc.) for every year of service. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
decision.
HELD:
Article 97(f) of the Labor Code is explicit that commission is included in the
definition of the term "wage". It has been repeatedly declared that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or
construction but only for application.
In the instant case, since the commissions were earned by actual market
transactions attributable to the employees, these should be included in their separation
pay. In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average
commissions earned during their last year of employment.
All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor
It should always be the final consideration that in carrying out and interpreting
the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives
meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for
in Article 4 of the Labor Code and Article 1702 of the Civil Code that “all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code shall be resolved
in favor of labor.” (See Abella v. NLRC)
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT V. MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU
FACTS:
Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from
1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been
met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June
26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under
Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days
within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant
Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags
of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice
was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the
distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest
bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account.
Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962
ISSUE:
W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.
HELD:
Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The
remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any
municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer
may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property
subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question,
together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the
distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this
being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted
as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction.
GONZAGA VS. CA
FACTS:
The respondents, Spouses Abagat, filed a complaint against the petitioners,
Spouses Gonzaga, for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
The petitioners filed their motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against
the intervenors, the Spouses Gregorio, and appended thereto their third-party
complaint for indemnity for any judgment that may be rendered by the court against
them and in favor of the respondents. However, the petitioners did not include in their
prayer that judgment be rendered against the third-party defendants to refund the
P90,000.00, the petitioners failed to file a cross-claim against the intervenors for specific
performance for the said refund. Worse, the court denied the petitioners’ motion. The
petitioners failed to assail the trial court’s order of denial in the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the issue of the refund?
RULING:
No. The trial court does not have such jurisdiction.
The petitioners did not include in their Pre-Trial Brief a prayer for the refund of
the amount of P90,000.00 to be made by the intervenors. The rule is that a party is
entitled only to such relief consistent with and limited to that sought by the pleadings or
incidental thereto. A trial court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grants relief
to a party beyond the scope of the pleadings. Moreover, the right of a party to recover
depends, not on the prayer, but on the scope of the pleadings, the issues made and the
law. A judgment which determines questions not within the court’s jurisdiction, because
not in issue, is, to that extent, void
Under Section 7 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure - “The proceedings in
the pre-trial shall be recorded… Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall,
explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control
the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest
injustice.”
And under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the same Rules – “When issues not raised by
the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.”
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
FACTS:
Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money against
Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached some of the
properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a superseded bond. The latter in
turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released.
Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian,
which was granted. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian
failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin
prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was
granted.
ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid.
HELD:
The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a
final and executory judgment. It applies to the payment of any judgment that may be
recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment
including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such
counter bond. The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not
only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending
appeal.
TAN V. COMELEC
FACTS:
BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite
for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively
composing the new province. The parent provinces, which will get also affected, were
not included in the plebiscite.
ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional?
HELD:
It is unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held in
all units affected, including the parent province, and not just the new areas. The draft bill
provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units, and not just the areas constituting
the new province, but the final bill only limited it to the latter.
Gordon v. Veridiano II
FACTS:
Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City
Drugstore. A ‘test buy’ operation at San Sebastian Drugstore, wherein agents were sold
200 tablets of Valium without a doctor’s prescription, gave rise to the closure ordered by
the FDA. Before such order was promulgated, the Mayor revoked the Mayor’s Permits
issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently, a signboard was posted by the
Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. On May 7, 1980, FDA
approved Respondent’s request to exchange the locations of the two drugstores (which
were 5m apart and in the same building). Upon knowledge of this, Petitioner then
revoked the Mayor’s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore.
ISSUE:
The conflict between the FDA’s and the mayor’s power to grant and revoke
licenses for the operation of drugstores.
RULING:
The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore, the
Mayor however did not. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however, the authority
rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction).
LAGMAN V. CITY OF MANILA, ET AL.
FACTS:
Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the
transportation of passengers and freight. The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and
enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled “An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and
Streets within the City of Manila, and For Other Purposes.”
ISSUE:
W/N the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
HELD:
No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. No. 548 and the
Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former
act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts. Moreover,
the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to
deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic.
US V. DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato
(murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged before he
pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the
Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness stand, Defendant denied
all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-
accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police
officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may
result in a palpable miscarriage of justice, nevertheless, the law provides for his
dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution.
ISSUE:
W/N Defendant should be discharged.
HELD:
Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the
Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the
legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary
to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to
faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the
truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal
as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made
prior to his trial.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS:
Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan City.
Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the
Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under protest.
ISSUE:
 W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing
fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34.
HELD:
No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of the Tariff
and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only. Sec. 2901
did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was amended by the
presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the
meaning of the provision from the original. Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to
national ports only, it is obvious that the private ports are not included. Kiwalan is not a
national port in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E.O. 72.
BUENASEDA V. SECRETARY FLAVIER
FACTS:
The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman
under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987
Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend
to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials
and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office.
ISSUE:
W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the
investigation of administrative complaints.
HELD:
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said
institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution
refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in
administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. This
statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient
investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a
punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
TAÑADA V. TUVERA
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required
by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE:
W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the
necessity of publication.
HELD:
No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication
in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court,
therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the
unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately.
PAMIL V. TELERON
FACTS:
Respondent Fr. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. The petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed for Gonzaga’s
disqualification based on Sec. 2175 of the Administrative Code which stated that in no
case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office.
ISSUE:
W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected.
HELD:
The vote was indecisive. Seven believed Sec. 2175 was no longer operative. Five
believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Though
the five were a minority, the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision
ineffective, hence it was presumed valid. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty.
Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution,
the supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of political rights. Sec. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for
ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. Also,
legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative
intent to repeal the former statutory law.

Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute
repugnance between the two. No such repugnance is discernible. Sec. 2175 has neither
been repealed nor superseded. The section also admitted no exception, therefore there
can be none. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation.