G.R. No. 199114 July 16, 2013
SB, however, withheld its approval and, instead,
ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, IN HER
CAPACITY AS THEN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), PETITIONER,
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY
CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.,
RESPONDENT.
DOCTRINE: Every Public official is entitled to the
presumption of good faith in the discharge of official
duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public
officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not
be charged with personal liability for damages that may
result from the performance of an official duty. Good faith
is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary
bears the burden to convincingly show that malice or bad
faith attended the public officer’s performance of his
duties.
FACTS:
1. Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s
Employment Services Regulation Division
(ESRD)
2. then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
ordered his dismissal from service as he was
found to have bribed a certain Madoline
Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the
amount of ₱6,200.00 in order to expedite the
issuance of her overseas employment certificate
3. Labrador’s dismissal was affirmed on appeal by
the CSC through a Resolution
4. his subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied through a CSC Resolution
5. Aside from the foregoing administrative
proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery
was instituted against Labrador in view of the
same infraction. Consequently
6. Sandiganbayan convicted him of the
aforementioned crime
7. Labrador’s motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution prompting him to elevate
the matter to the Court
8. the Court affirmed Labrador’s conviction and
subsequently denied his motion for
reconsideration with finality
9. Labrador’s counsel de oficio, Atty. Vicente
Espina, manifested in open court that Labrador
desires to apply for probation in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 968, as amended
by PD 1990 (Probation Law)
10. SB resolved to accord Labrador a period of
fifteen (15) days within which to file such
application, and, in the meantime, suspended
the execution proceedings
11. upon favorable recommendation of the Parole
and Probation Office, the SB, in a Resolution
granted Labrador’s application for probation
and likewise cancelled the bail bond he posted
for his provisional liberty
12. at the end of Labrador’s probation period, a
Probation Officer’s Final Report was issued,
recommending that his probation be terminated
and that he be discharged from its legal effects
13.
issued a Resolution stating that Labrador’s
application for probation was, in fact,
erroneously granted due to his previous appeal
from his judgment of conviction, in violation of
Section 4 of the Probation Law
14. owing to the probation officer’s finding that
Labrador continued to hold the position of POEA
ESRD Chief despite him having been sentenced
to suffer the penalty of temporary special
disqualification from office, the SB directed that
copies of the Resolution be furnished to
Dimapilis-Baldoz, as POEA Administrator, as
well as to the CSC Chairman for their
information
15. Dimapilis-Baldoz received a copy of the said
resolution and thereupon issued a Notice/Order
of Separation relieving Labrador of his duties
16. COA State Auditor IV, Crescencia L. Escurel,
issued Audit Observation Memorandum No.
2005-011 which contained her audit
observations on the various expenditures of the
POEA pertaining to the payment of salaries and
benefits to Labrador
17. COA issued a Notice of Disallowance finding
Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA
employees, personally liable for the salaries and
other benefits unduly received by Labrador
18. Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of
the Notice of Disallowance, asserting that the
POEA should not be held liable for the refund of
the foregoing amount since Labrador's
employment was fully and promptly terminated
upon receipt of the SB’s resolution
19. COA affirmed the notice of disallowance
20. POEA moved for the reconsideration
ISSUE: WON DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ IS
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
RULING:
 Dimapilis-Baldoz tries to exculpate herself from
the foregoing by arguing that she and her office
were not officially notified of the orders,
resolutions, and decisions of the SB or that of the
Court, affirming Labrador’s conviction of the
crime of direct bribery, and even the notices on
the subsequent actions and proceedings
undertaken by the SB
 Dimapilis-Baldoz alleged that Labrador’s 201
file is bereft of any records regarding the SB case
 While admitting that Labrador did indeed
continue to report for work despite the SB’s
Decision convicting him of direct bribery, these
antecedents show that she merely acted in good
faith and lawfully exercised her duties when she
approved the payment of Labrador’s salaries,
wages, and other personnel benefits
 every public official is entitled to the
presumption of good faith in the discharge of
official duties, such that, in the absence of any
proof that a public officer has acted with malice
or bad faith, he should not be charged with
personal liability for damages that may result
from the performance of an official duty
  Good faith is always presumed and he who
alleges the contrary bears the burden to
convincingly show that malice or bad faith
attended the public officer’s performance of his
duties
prejudice to any subsequent action or proceeding to
recover any undue amount/s received by Labrador. SO
ORDERED.

The Court observes that Dimapilis-Baldoz’s actuations

were only impressed with good faith which perforce,
negates her personal liability in this case.

 While the COA correctly affirmed the

disallowance of the salaries and benefits which
Labrador unduly received when he continued to
hold office despite his conviction, the liability for
refund cannot be imposed upon Dimapilis-
Baldoz because she had no knowledge or any
reasonable indication that the payment of
salaries to Labrador was actually improper
o Labrador’s 201 File with the POEA was
without any record of the SB case
o Dimapilis-Baldoz was only apprised of
his conviction when her office was
furnished a copy of the SB’s Resolution
which ordered the revocation of
Labrador’s probation
 Dimapilis-Baldoz’s good faith is further
strengthened by the fact that she lost no time in
issuing the Separation Order as soon as she was
apprised of Labrador’s situation
 neither will it do justice to hold Dimapilis-
Baldoz personally liable simply because she
possessed the final authority for the
disbursements and had direct supervision over
her subordinates
 although a public officer is the final approving
authority and the employees who processed the
transaction were directly under his supervision,
personal liability does not automatically attach
to him but only upon those directly responsible
for the unlawful expenditures

As Dimapilis-Baldoz’s direct responsibility therefor had

not been demonstrated, in addition to her good faith as
above-discussed, there is no cogent factual or legal basis
to hold her personally liable. In this respect, the Court
finds that the COA gravely abused its discretion.

It bears emphasizing that it is the policy of the State to

maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and
take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption. It should, therefore, be the responsibility of
each government agency, such as the POEA, to know
matters pertaining to the conduct of its own employees in
the performance of their duties and to readily take action
against those undeserving of the public’s trust.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY

GRANTED. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No.
2006-002 dated January 18, 2006 and Decision No. 2009-
121 dated October 29, 2009 issued by respondent
Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, (a) deleting the portions pertaining to
petitioner Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz’s personal
liability; and (b) adjusting the proper period of
disallowance from the date of Leonel P. Labrador’s
dismissal on May 2, 1997. The foregoing is without