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Pork Barrel System presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for

the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund be declared unconstitutional and null and void considering
that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
delegability of legislative power; (c) local autonomy.

Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the
manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government,
including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary
funds: First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it
appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment
measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and Second, there is the
Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which
allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the
Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.

1. Does it violate Separation of Power?

Yes, Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch
of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. Thus, for all the foregoing reasons,
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which
they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or informal practices
institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the
Constitution has vested as its own. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr. 710 SCRA 1 , November 19, 2013).

2. Does it violate Non-delegability of Legislative Power?

Yes, the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is
lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is
clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." (Belgica vs.
Ochoa, Jr. 710 SCRA 1 , November 19, 2013)

3. Does it violate the provisions on Local Autonomy?

Yes, Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since
it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development. n particular, the Court observes that the gauge of
PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account
the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. (Belgica vs. Ochoa,
Jr. 710 SCRA 1 , November 19, 2013)
Minority House at the House of Representatives questioning the composition of the
minority bloc and the minority leadership of Quezon Representative Danilo Suarez.
Baguilat argued, who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for
Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader in light of the "long-standing
tradition" and under Section 16(1) of the Constitution “The Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Speaker of the House of Representative, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. Can Baguilat take relief on the
court?

No, The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court.
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings." These
"legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives].
Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of
a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of
Representatives].
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking
jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, will not
review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. (Belgica vs Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).

What is the concept of Procedural Due Process in the administrative Proceedings?

` The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice
and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply
means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. 'To be heard' does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one
may also be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments
or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. (Disciplinary Board, LTO
vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 224395, July 3, 2017)

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a
trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him
and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is
simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained. (Ledesma v.
Court ofAppeals [565 Phil. 731, 740 [2007])
An Ordinance was passed in the Quezon City and subsequently opposed by an
association of youth minor as it deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to
travel without substantive due process. They claim that the liberty to travel is a
fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny
test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such
as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.
In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.

Would Overbreadth Doctrine applicable in the case?

No. Association of young and minor have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free
speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to
necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably
almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Ann overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent
effect on the speech of those third parties (SPARK vs Quezon City G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017)

What are the three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications?

 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise
of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or
(ii) burdens suspect classes.
 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect
classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications
based on gender and legitimacy.
 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two
tests.

Is Strict Scrutiny Test applicable in above Scenario?

Yes, Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest. (SPARK vs
Quezon City G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

Distinguish Petition for Disqualification from Petition to Deny Due Course to a


Certificate of Candidacy.

On one hand, a disqualification case under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is hinged on
either (1) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country or (2) his
commission of certain acts of disqualification. It must be stressed that one who is disqualified
under Sec. 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to
continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her
statutory eligibility. On the other hand, a denial of due course to or cancellation of a Certificate of
Candidacy proceeding under Sec. 78 is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the
material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person
lacks relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in
the Certificate of Candidacy. (Tagolino vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
202202, March 19, 2013)

Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in
1981 and acquired Australian citizenship. On 2008, at age 35, return to the
Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo, in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Took an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently renounced his
Australian citizenship. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential
property in the same village where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010
elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’
COC on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation in the same since
he failed to comply with (1) the requirement of R.A. 9225 being a mere guest or
transient visitor in his brother’s house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his
domicile. Was the contention of Erasmo, correct?

No. The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes
of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a
person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence
in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. There is no hard and fast rule to
determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is
a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
(Jalosjos vs Comelec G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he
should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist
that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public
office. What matter that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile. (Jalosjos vs Comelec G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued Administrative Order No. 16, series of 2008 (A.O.
No. 16, s. 2008),5 setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed
"Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps). This government intervention scheme,
also conveniently referred to as CCTP, "provides cash grant to extreme poor
households to allow the members of the families to meet certain human development
goals. Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the CCTP by providing it
with funding under the GAA of 2012 which is the biggest allotment given to the CCTP
was in the GAA of 2011 at Twenty One Billion One Hundred Ninety-Four Million One
Hundred Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P21,194,117,000.00). Now challenges before
the Court the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTP
which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs.

No. Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.


o Decentralization of administration - when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and make local governments
‘more responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities.’ The President exercises ‘general supervision’
over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
can substitute their judgments with his own.

o Decentralization of power - involves an abdication of political power in


favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. This amounts to ‘self-
immolation,’ since the autonomous government becomes accountable
not to the central authorities but to its constituency. (Pimentel vs Ochoa
G.R. No. 195770 July 17, 2012)