PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of AgapitoElcano,

deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.

REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.

G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977]

Facts of the Case:

Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A criminal complaint was
instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack
of intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of damages
against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father,
the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting subsistence, for the same killing. A motion
to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion.
Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.

Issues:
1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.

2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though
a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married.
Ruling of the Court:

1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.
Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a civil case. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore,
a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted from a criminal act.
As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin
Hill. Although parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by
marriage is not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian. As in the present case, killing someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus,
making Article 2180 apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as
a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son
Singson vs BPI
23 SCRA 1117

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had been rendered
sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to
the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure
to file an appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI — in which the Singsons had
a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against the Bank were concerned.

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the name of the Singson
in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body and
informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille
& Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that
case.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service and
another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote
to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had already been
garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with them.

Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that
had been inadvertently committed.
Thus this action for damages.

ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiff’s claim for damages based
on torts?

HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in
effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane
passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter’s part, for, although the relation
between a passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature … the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort”.

In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank
realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of
nominal damages — the amount of which need not be proven — in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff’s rights.
Rafael Reyes vs. People, 329 SCRA 600
Facts:
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound
to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer “Grande” bottles. Seated at the
front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper. At around 4:00 o’clock that same
morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran,
Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck’s
right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven
because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the
Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road
by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run
over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved
to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca’s vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan
dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally
stopped. The Nissan was severely damaged and its two passengers, namely, Feliciano Balcita and
Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Durian filed with the RTC an
amended information charging Dunca with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and
damage to property. On November 29, 1989, the offended parties filed with the RTC a complaint against
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Dunca, based on quasi delict.
Respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto
they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, respondents withdrew the reservation to file a
separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex
delicto in the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver. The
RTC held that the driver was guilty. Respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the
joint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private
respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused, which the lower court granted.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident may be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver
despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the truck
driver; and

(2) Whether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite
the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver.

Held:
(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured
party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the
same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.In other words,
“the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto” either of which “may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover
damages under both types of liability.” In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate
civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioner, as employer of the accused who has been
adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because
of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file,
and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with
the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against
the employer. The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused
Dunca is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for
recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against
the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. The policy against double recovery requires that
only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the
employee or against his employer. The injured party must choose which of the available causes of action
for damages he will bring.
Manliclic vs. Calauans
FACTS:-

a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Manlictic and Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. - Lost)- Petitioner PRBL argued that
they should not be liable for damages because Petitioner driver Manlictic was acquitted in the criminal
case-Appealed to SC the decision of CA

b) Respondent’s Arguments (Calaunan - Win)-Filed a case for damages against Petitioner PRBL and
criminal case against Petitioner driverManlictic for such negligently crash its bus into Respondent’s jeep
resulting to several damages-CA promulgated a decision in his favour

ISSUE:- Whether or not Petitioner PRBL should be absolved from damages on the ground of theacquittal
of Petitioner driver Manlictic in the criminal case

RULING:Conclusion:- Petitioner PRBL is still liable for damages. The appeal is dismissed

Rule:- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with
asubstantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict orcrime –
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibilityfor quasi-delicts
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may producecivil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts orculpa extra-contractual under the
Civil Code.34It is now settled that acquittal of the accused,even if based on a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civilliability based on quasi delict.35-In other words, if an
accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civilliability arising from the crime may
be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, ifan accused is acquitted on the basis that he
was not the author of the act or omission complainedof (or that there is declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arisedid not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability
based on the crime or ex delicto. Inthis second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil
liability based thereon or exdelicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on
grounds other thanthe delict complained of.

Application: - In this case, Conclusion: - Thus, Petitioner PRBL is still liable for damages. The appeal is
dismissed
GSIS vs. Spouses Labung Deang
FACTS:Spouses Deang obtained a housing loan from the GSIS in the amount of eightthousand five
hundred pesos. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage constituted over the spouses' property
issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. As a requirement,the spouses Deang deposited the
owner's duplicate copy of the title with the GSIS.Eleven (11) months before the maturity of the loan, the
spouses Deang settled theirdebt with the GSIS and requested for the release of the owner's duplicate
copy of the title.However, personnel of the GSIS were not able to release the owner's duplicate of the
title asit could not be found despite diligent search. Thus, GSIS commenced the
reconstitutionproceedings.As a consequence of the delay, the spouses Deang filed a complaint against
GSIS fordamages, because they were unable to secure a loan, the proceeds of which could havebeen
used in defraying the estimated cost of the renovation of their residential house andwhich could have
been invested in some profitable business undertaking.
ISSUE:Whether or not the spouses Labung-Deang are entitled to temperate damages,attorney’s fees,
legal interests and costs of suit.
RULING:In a breach of contract, moral damages are not awarded if the defendant is notshown to have
acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.The fact that the complainantsuffered economic hardship
or worries and mental anxiety is not enough.There is likewise no factual basis for an award of actual
damages. Actual damagesto be compensable must be proven by clear evidence. A court cannot rely on
“speculation,conjecture or guess work” as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on
actualproof.However, it is also apparent that the spouses Deang suffered financial damagebecause of
the loss of the owners’ duplicate copy of the title. In line with this, temperatedamages may be
granted.There is no need for proof of pecuniary loss in temperate damages. The rationale
behindtemperate damages is precisely that from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniaryloss
cannot be offered.When the court is convinced that there has been such loss, the judgeis empowered to
calculate moderate damages, rather than let the complainant suffer withoutredress from the
defendant’s wrongful actAttorney’s fees which are granted as an item of damages are generally
notrecoverable. The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule and counsel’sfees are
not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The award of attorney’s feesdemands factual, legal
and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation orconjecture.
Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she
found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not
granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single
gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a
civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of
the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor
children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove
that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s
mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in
their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident,
the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless
the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key
was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent
such damage.
NOSTRADAMUS VILLANUEVA v. PRISCILLA R. DOMINGO, GR No. 144274, 2004-09-20
Facts:

Priscilla R. Domingo is the registered owner of a silver Mitsubishi Lancer Car... with Leandro Luis R.
Domingo as authorized driver. Nostradamus Villanueva was... then the registered "owner" of a green
Mitsubishi Lancer... following a green traffic light Priscilla Domingo's silver Lancer car... then driven by
[co-respondent] Leandro Luis R. Domingo was cruising... at... moderate speed

Suddenly, a green Mitsubishi Lancer... driven by Renato Dela Cruz Ocfemia darted... directly into the
path of NDW 781 '91 thereby hitting and bumping its left... front portion.

Renato dela Cruz Ocfemia was driving with expired license and positive for alcoholic breath.
Nostradamus Villanueva claimed that he was no longer the owner of the car at the time of the mishap
because it was swapped with a Pajero owned by Albert Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange.

Auto
Palace Car Exchange represented by Albert Jaucian claimed that he was not the registered owner of the
car. Moreover, it could not be held subsidiary liable as employer of Ocfemia because the latter was off-
duty as utility employee at the time of the incident.

Issues:

MAY THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM A
VEHICULAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING HIS MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE BEING OPERATED BY THE EMPLOYEE OF
ITS BUYER WITHOUT THE LATTER'S CONSENT AND KNOWLEDGE?

Ruling:
Yes.

We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible
to the public and third persons while it is being operated.[6] The rationale behind such doctrine was
explained way back in 1957 in

Erezo vs. Jepte[7]:

The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered under the
Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual
owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to... enforce the actions that they may have for
injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required to
prove who the actual owner is.

We do not imply by his doctrine, however, that the registered owner may not recover whatever amount
he had paid by virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom he had actually sold,
assigned or conveyed the vehicle.
Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service,
should primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.

The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that no vehicle may be used or
operated upon any public highway unless the same is property registered.
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred... but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so... that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefore can
be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
Whether the driver is authorized or not by the actual owner is irrelevant to determining the liability of
the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or
death caused by the operation of the... vehicle in the streets and highways. To require the driver of the
vehicle to be authorized by the actual owner before the registered owner can be held accountable is to
defeat the very purpose why motor vehicle legislations are enacted in the first... place.
Araneta v. De Joya
G.R. No. L-25172, 24 May 1974

FACTS:

Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of the Ace Advertising, proposed
to the board of directors that an employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up
special studies in television but the board failed to act on the proposal. Still, respondent sent Taylor
abroad, on September 1953, and assured J. Antonio Araneta, company director, that the trip will be
funded by other parties, as respondent later confirmed in a memorandum. From September 1, 1953
to March 15, 1954, Taylor continued receiving his salaries while abroad. His salaries was ordered and
approved by the respondent and were included in the semi-monthly payroll checks of the corporation
employees. Three of the checks were signed by the company treasurer, who also put up part of the
bill connected with Taylor’s trip and handed him letters for delivery in the US. A total of P5,043.20 was
disbursed by Ace Advertising for Taylor’s travel and studies. The company filed a complaint for
recovery of sum, with the court of first instance in Manila, alleging they had no knowledge of the
engagement neither they authorized nor ratified it. The respondent denied all charges, also alleging
that it was for the company’s benefit. A 3rd-party complaint was filed against Vicente Araneta,
company treasurer, for signing the checks, and Ricardo Taylor. Vicente Araneta and respondent
claimed they signed the documents in good faith.

The trial court ordered the respondent to pay the sum disbursed by Ace Advertising, P5,043.20, and
dismissed the third-party complaint. The respondent appealed and the CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision but reversed the judgment on the 3rd-party case stating that Vicente Araneta and Taylor were
complicit in the unauthorized disbursement of corporate moneys jointly with the appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of a quasi-delict.

RULING:

Yes. The Court upheld the decision of the CA. The Court agrees that the respondent neglected to
perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer and affirmed that the
acts of the respondent, Vicente Araneta, and Ricardo Taylor affirm their guilt of unauthorized
disbursement of corporate moneys, without evidence to prove otherwise. And as it was an
unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was these three without whose acts the
same could not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed
upon the corporation, for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place,
Art. 2194, New Civil Code; and only De Joya having been sued and made liable by the corporation, it
was the right of the latter to ask that his two joint tortfeasors be made to shoulder their proportional
responsibility.
Picart v. Smith
Facts:

Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when the
defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the
horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no sufficient time to move to the
right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he had gotten quite near, he quickly turned
to the left. The horse was frightened that it turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and
the rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse died. An action for damages was filed against the
defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

Held:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider would
pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to
his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for
the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of
situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not
longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
Africa, et al. v. Caltex Phils

G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448

FACTS:

On March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal
Avenue, Manila St. all started while a gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground
storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire
spread to and burned several neighboring house. The spouse Bernabe and heirs of Domingo Ong herein
petitioner, sued respondents Caltex (phils), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren on negligence on the part of both
of tyhem was attributed as the cause of the fire.

In the polioce and fire report they started that during the transferring of gasoline to the tank truck an
unknown Filipino Citizen lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of
the of the paid underground tank. Due to gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. The respondents
contend that it is not their negligence why the fire broke. But there was no evidence presented to prove
this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and
the branch owner failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.

RULING:

Caltex and Boquiren are liable. Though the one who accuses the other of negligence is the one with
burden to prove, in this case the principle of res ipsa loquitor applies. Res ipsa loquitur (the transaction
speaks for itself) which states: “where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person,
is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not occur if he having such control use proper care, if affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendant1s want of care.” Article 1173 states that, the
fault on negligence of the obligation consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of article 1171 and 2201 paragraph 2 shall apply.
a fired occurred therein an spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or
could have known how the fire started, were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because
of want of care.