CASE NO.

1186
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
KHAN JR VS OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
Private respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala charged petitioners
before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA 3019. In their complaint,
private respondents accused petitioners, Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L.
Malabanan, of using their positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services
Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were
shareholders. Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a
private entity and (2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the application of RA
3019. The Deputy Ombudsman denied petition. Petitioners appealed the order to the
Ombudsman raised the same issuesbut was again dismissed

In this petition for certiorari, with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order,
petitioners assail the orders dated July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996 of the Deputy
Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman, respectively. They claim that public
respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in proceeding
with the investigation of the case against them although they were officers of a private
corporation and not "public officers."

Issue:
Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:
No. In accordance with article 13 section 2, Based on the foregoing provision, the Office
of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of
GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts
or omissions of the officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore, although
the government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that
the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could not be
investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman.

Mainpoint:
The Ombudsman can investigate only the officers of the government owned
corporations with original charter. Pal, even when still owned by the government did not
have original charter.
 CASE NO. 1187
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
OMBUDSMAN VS ESTANDARTE
Facts:
Ombudsman, petitioner found Heidi Estandarte, the school Principal, guilty of
allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of school funds, irregular
financial transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. Estandarte filed a Petition for
Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction with the CA. She alleged that the Ombudsman (Visayas) violated her right to
due process when her request for a formal investigation was denied; that the DECS-
Region VI has jurisdiction over the case; and that the Ombudsman (Visayas) failed to
act with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, in which CA granted. The CA held that
the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took over
the case after it issued a memorandum considering the case closed and terminated and
after jurisdiction had already been vested in the Special Investigating Committee. Such
act violates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in
holding that it is bereft of the authority to directly impose on the respondent the sanction
of dismissal from service. It stresses that it has full and complete administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over public school teachers.

Issue: Whether or not the has exclusive jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:
No. The court do not agree with petitioner’s contention that it could assume jurisdiction
over the administrative case after the DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its
jurisdiction over the same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost
upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the
complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was
vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the
complainants, even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner. Considering
both court concerned do have jurisdiction over the cause of action of the parties herein
against each other, the better rule is to allow the litigation to be tried and decided by the
court which be in a better position to serve the interests of justice. Considering that the
respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No.
4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better
position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has already commenced
proceedings over the administrative case by constituting the Special Investigating
Committee pursuant to Section 9 of RA 4670.
 CASE NO. 1188
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
OMBUDSMAN VS LUCERO
Facts:
Petitioner Farida T. Lucero was appointed on November 18, 1999 as Clerk II of the
Land Transportation Office, Regional Office No. VII, and was assigned at the Chief
Finance Division in order to augment the personnel complement thereat. In a
Memorandum dated November 18, 1999 which was issued by Regional Director Isabelo
K. Apor, she was likewise directed to assist the Regional Cashier in collecting and
receiving miscellaneous fees/revenues. On September 29, 2000, OIC-Regional Director
Porferio I. Mendoza of LTO,Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City requested COA to
conduct an audit in the Cash Section of the Operations Division of their office. After
conducting audit, it is revealed Petitioner to have issued sixty-nine (69) altered
miscellaneous receipts. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) rendered its Decision
finding the Petitioner guilty of dishonesty and removal from the office.

Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman is empowered to order the removal of public officials or
employees in administrative cases

Ruling:
Yes, the issue raised in this Court has already been resolved in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals. In that case, the Court declared that in the exercise of
its administrative disciplinary authority under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered
not merely to recommend, but to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The
Court stated that this was the manifest intent of the legislature:

All the provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of
the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which
entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold
hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and
employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on
erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily,
impose the said penalty.
 CASE NO. 1189
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
OMBUDSMAN VS CA
Facts:
The Office of Ombudsman filed a petition for certiorari to impose its decision that was
set aside by the CA, which is the penalty for dismissal from the service of Ma. Melly
Jaud Magbanua (respondent).

Respondent was the Local Treasury Operations Assistant of the City Treasurer’s Office
in Bacolod City. On 27 February 1998, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an
examination of respondent’s cash and account. The examination disclosed a shortage
of ₱265,450. Upon demand, respondent failed to produce the missing amount.
Respondent alleged that the shortage was due to the machinations and dishonest acts
of Cash Clerk I Monina Baja. Respondent alleged that Baja, acting as Paymaster,
received payroll funds for distribution to specific offices, in which Baja denied the
allegation. The Office of Ombudsman ruled that respondent is guilty of gross neglect of
duty and for violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, meted the penalty
of dismissal from service.

Issue:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative
penalties on public officials or employees

Ruling:
Yes. In section 15, 21, and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 provide the functions and duties
of the Ombudsman. (15) It stated that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government, (21)
the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government, (25) the penalty ranging from suspension without
pay for one year to dismissal at the discretion of the Ombudsman. Therefore Office of
the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative penalties on public
officials or employees.

.
 CASE NO. 1190
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY VS PUNONG BARANGAY
Facts:
On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft
and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials
pursuant to Section 61 of Local Government Code. Upon his failure to file an Answer to
the Amended Administrative Complaint, Martinez was declared by the SB as in default.
On 28 July 2005, the SB rendered its Decision imposing the penalty of removal from
office. Municial Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated that the SB
is not empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service. However, the Decision
remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him.

Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner, the
SB and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity of decision of the SB. The trial court
issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the
Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the
petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance
with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the Order of the SB removing
Martinez from service is void.

Issue:
Whether or not the SB empowered to remove Martinez from service

Ruling:
No, The Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered. An elective local official may be
removed from office of the proper court. During the deliberations of the Senate on the
Local Government Code, the legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial
courts, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving
the removal of elective local official.

Mainpoint:
In Local Government Code, elective officials may be dismissed only by the proper court.
Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to
remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to
remove.
 CASE NO. 1191
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
PEREZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Salvador Perez and Juanita Apostol Zapanta are Mayor and Treasurer of San Manuel,
Pangasinan, respectively. They wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the purchase
of 1 computer unit costing P120,000 acquisition by personal canvass, violating Sec 362
and 267 of the Local Government Code. No public bidding occurred and no Committee
award was constituted to approve the procurement. Salvador and Juanita gave Mobil
Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, showing evident of bad faith and gross, inexcusable negligence, but this was
not include in the original information, so it was recommended by the Special
Prosecutor that the information be amended to show the manner of the commission of
the offence, based on the Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original information. The
amended information was admitted. The petitioners challenge this, saying it was the
Sandiganbayan committed GAD in accepting the amended information, which had no
approval from the Ombudsman, amounting to denial of due process. The SC granted
the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Special has the authority to file information without approval of the
Ombudsman

Ruling:
No. The Ombudsman’s margin notes order was to "study whether the
accused, assuming arguendo that there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to the seller of the subject computer” and “submit your
recommendation soonest.”It is clear that the recommendation must be submitted to one
who has authority to implement such recommendation. The Ombudsman has the power
to file informations, as well as the power to delegate his powers. Office Order No. 40-05
delegates the disposition of administrative and criminal cases (filing informations) to the
Deputy Ombudsman, but NOT the Special Prosecutor (which is included in the Office of
the Ombudsman). All that is delegated to the Special Prosecutor is the discretional
authority to review and modify the Deputy Ombudsman-authorized information,
but without departing from the basic resolution. Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor are given the same rank and salary (RA 6770), but they do NOT
have the same functions.
 CASE NO. 1192
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
BUENCAMINO VS COA
Facts:
Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino, petitioner, is the incumbent mayor of San Miguel,
Bulacan, while Constantino Pascual, private respondent, is the president of Rosemoor
Mining and Development Corporation, a company engaged in the mining of marble
blocks. Private respondent filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, public respondent,
an administrative complaint against petitioner for grave misconduct, abuse of authority
and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. Office of the Ombudsman declared petitioner
administratively liable for abuse of authority and suspended him from office for a period
of six (6) months without pay.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA, a Petition for Review with application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, the appellate court issued a TRO but preliminary injunction was denied. He
then filed a motion for reconsideration, but also denied. Hence, in an instant petition
for certiorari, Petitioner alleged that denial of preliminary injunction, the CA gravely
abused its discretion, the Decision of Ombudsman suspending him from office is not
immediately executory; and that enforcement of decision from the service during the
pendency of his appeal, the Office of the Ombudsman violated Section 27 of RA 6770,
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and the rulings of the Court in Lapid v. Court of
Appeals, Lopez v. Court of Appeals, and Ombudsman v. Laja.

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of Ombudsman violated RA 6770 rulings of the court

Ruling:
No, Honorable Court emphatically declared that Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was already amended by Administrative
Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent provision on the execution of the Ombudsman's
decision pending appeal is now similar to Section 47 of the "Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" - that is, decisions of the Ombudsman are
immediately executory even pending appeal.

Considering that an appeal under Administrative Order No. 17, the amendatory rule,
shall not stop the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from being executory, the
court hold that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
application for injunctive relief. It bears stressing at this point that Section 13(8), Article
XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own
rules
 CASE NO. 1193
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
MEDINA VS COA
Facts:
The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed the two joint orders issued by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding herein petitioner Lorna A. Medina guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty. The Resolution of the same court denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the said decision.

The instant petition originated from the audit conducted by respondent Commission on
Audit (COA) on the cash and accounts handled by petitioner in her official capacity as
Municipal Treasurer of General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite. The state auditors discovered
a cash shortage. They thus directed petitioner to immediately restitute the shortage
within 72 hours from receipt of the demand letter but petitioner allegedly failed to
comply. The state auditors submitted a report to the Provincial Auditor's Office and
recommended the relief of petitioner from her post as municipal treasurer and the filing
of criminal charges against her. On the other hand, the provisions in the Administrative
Code cited by petitioner in support of her theory that she is entitled to a formal
investigation apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service
Commission.

Issue:
Whether or not the Medina, who has administrative complaint in Ombudsman, may
appeal to the procedural rules under CSC

Ruling:
No. In particular, Section 48(2) and Section 48(3) are subsumed under Subtitle A of
Title I, which pertains to the CSC and to the procedure of administrative cases filed
before the CSC. The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that a different set of procedural rules govern.
And rightly so, the Deputy Ombudsman applied the provisions of Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman in ruling that the prerogative to elect a formal investigation
pertains to the hearing officer and not to petitioner.
 CASE NO. 1194
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
VILLASENOR VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Quezon City Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting in the death of 74 people. Villasenor
and De Mesa are presently facing criminal charged for the crime of multiple homicide
through reckless imprudence and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. They
were also charged administratively with gross negligence, gross misconduct and
conduct before Sandiganbayan. In line with administrative case, they were preventively
suspended for a period of 6 months. During the pendency of the criminal case,
respondent special prosecutor Louella Mae Oco-Pesquera filed a motion for
suspension pendente lite of petitioners.

Petitioners opposed the motion, contending that they had already been suspended for 6
months relative to the administrative case. They posited that any preventive suspension
that may be warranted in the criminal case was already absorbed by the preventive
suspension in the administrative case because both the criminal and administrative
cases were anchored on the same set of facts. Respondent court granted the
prosecution's motion for suspension. It ordered the suspension of petitioners for a
period of 90 days.

Issue:
WON the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the petitioners despite their 6 months
preventive suspension

Ruling:
No. The Court finds no merit in the argument. Criminal and administrative cases are
separate and distinct from each other. The public respondent did not abuse his
discretion of regarding preventive suspension. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public officials "shall be suspended
from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. In Gonzaga v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that such preventive suspension is mandatory; there
are no ifs and buts about it. This Preventive suspension will only last for 90 days, and
may not exceed the maximum period of 90 days.
 CASE NO. 1195
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
OMBUDSMAN VS RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
On August 26, 2003, a complaint was received by the Ombudsman against Barangay
Captain Rolson Rodriguez for the abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, and neglect of duty. On September 1, 2003, a similar complaint
was received by the Sangguniang Bayan of Binalbagan. Rodriguez was served with
noticed of the complaint on Sept 8 by SB and Sept 10 by Ombudsman. He filed a
motion to dismiss the Ombudsman case on the ground of forum shopping and motion of
to dismiss the SB case alleging that it has no factual basis. The complainants
subsequently withdraw the complaint with the SB to prioritized the Ombudsman case.
Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and oppression.CA set aside such
ruling for lack of jurisdiction. CA ruled that SB acquired primary jurisdiction over
Rodriguez because it served the notice 2 days earlier than the Ombudsman which opts
to take cognizance of the case and thus acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts with concurrent jurisdiction. Also, the rule against forum shopping applied only to
judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the jurisdiction of the case of Barangay Captain
Rolson Rodriguez

Ruling:
Yes. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a
public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In
cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
other investigative agencies of government. Republic Act No. 8249, otherwise known as
An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, limits the cases that are
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private
respondent who, as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary
grade 14 under Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

.
 CASE NO. 1196
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
OMB VS ESTENDARTE
Facts:
Ombudsman, petitioner found Heidi Estandarte, the school Principal, guilty of
allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of school funds, irregular
financial transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. Estandarte filed a Petition for
Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction with the CA. She alleged that the Ombudsman (Visayas) violated her right to
due process when her request for a formal investigation was denied; that the DECS-
Region VI has jurisdiction over the case; and that the Ombudsman (Visayas) failed to
act with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, in which CA granted. The CA held that
the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took over
the case after it issued a memorandum considering the case closed and terminated and
after jurisdiction had already been vested in the Special Investigating Committee. Such
act violates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in
holding that it is bereft of the authority to directly impose on the respondent the sanction
of dismissal from service. It stresses that it has full and complete administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over public school teachers.

Issue:
Whether or not the has exclusive jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:
No. The court do not agree with petitioner’s contention that it could assume jurisdiction
over the administrative case after the DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its
jurisdiction over the same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost
upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the
complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was
vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the
complainants, even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner. Considering
both court concerned do have jurisdiction over the cause of action of the parties herein
against each other, the better rule is to allow the litigation to be tried and decided by the
court which be in a better position to serve the interests of justice. Considering that the
respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No.
4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better
position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has already commenced
proceedings over the administrative case by constituting the Special Investigating
Committee pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
 CASE NO. 1197
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
SALVADOR VS MAPA

Facts:
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, through Atty.
Orlando L. Salvador, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the
October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in dismissing the criminal
complaint regarding the violation on Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices Act against
respondents, Mapa Jr et al, on ground of prescription, and the July 27, 1998 Order
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on

October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order
No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a
frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be
considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they
become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Supreme
Court in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Wilensky V. Fields, Fla, 267
So 2dl, 5, held that "an ex-post facto law is defined as a law which provides for infliction
of punishment upon a person for an act done which when it was committed, was
innocent. Thus, the Ombudsman dismissed it.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has a jurisdiction to declare the law unconstitutional

Ruling:
No. In the case of Estarija v. Ranada, where the petitioner raised the issue of
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's decision, the court had occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no
jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman,
therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject
administrative and memorandum orders. The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex
post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Memorandum Order
No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being
penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be
characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to
rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.

.
 CASE NO. 1198
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
OMB VS MASING
Facts:
Respondent Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated
Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was
an office clerk in the same school. Respondents were administratively charged before
the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees,
failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds. Respondents contend
that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them, but DECS has, through a committee to
be constituted under "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers * (RA No. 4670 Sec
9)." However, the motion was denied. The Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint
decision finding respondents Masing and Tayactac guilty, CA reverse the decision.

Respondent Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao. The charges were oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy
in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to
immoral or vicious habits, but CA reversed the decision again.

Issue:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers
and employees

Ruling:
Yes. Ombudsman has jurisdiction to directly discipline public school teachers. The court
reiterated the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where it emphasized that
"the Ombudsman's order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory." Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be
coursed through the proper officer. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,
also held that:

While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to
"recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x" of government officials and
employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative
may "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of RA 6770.

.
 CASE NO. 1199
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
MEDINA VS COA
Facts:
The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed the two joint orders issued by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding herein petitioner Lorna A. Medina guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty. The Resolution of the same court denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the said decision.

The instant petition originated from the audit conducted by respondent Commission on
Audit (COA) on the cash and accounts handled by petitioner in her official capacity as
Municipal Treasurer of General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite. The state auditors discovered
a cash shortage. They thus directed petitioner to immediately restitute the shortage
within 72 hours from receipt of the demand letter but petitioner allegedly failed to
comply. The state auditors submitted a report to the Provincial Auditor's Office and
recommended the relief of petitioner from her post as municipal treasurer and the filing
of criminal charges against her. On the other hand, the provisions in the Administrative
Code cited by petitioner in support of her theory that she is entitled to a formal
investigation apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service
Commission.

Issue:
Whether or not the Medina, who has administrative complaint in Ombudsman, may
appeal to the procedural rules under CSC

Ruling:
No. In particular, Section 48(2) and Section 48(3) are subsumed under Subtitle A of
Title I, which pertains to the CSC and to the procedure of administrative cases filed
before the CSC. The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that a different set of procedural rules govern.
And rightly so, the Deputy Ombudsman applied the provisions of Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman in ruling that the prerogative to elect a formal investigation
pertains to the hearing officer and not to petitioner.
 CASE NO. 1200
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
BORJA VS PEOPLE

Facts:
Petitioner Engr. Roger F. Borja, in his capacity as General Manager C of the San Pablo
Water District, was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Borja filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment. Borja alleged that there is a pending civil
case entitled Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, docketed before this Court as G.R. No.
147402, which involves the issue of whether local water districts are private or
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). He argued that the issue is a
prejudicial question, the resolution of which determines whether or not the criminal
actions against him may proceed. If this Court resolves that local water districts are
private corporations, the graft cases against him will not prosper since then he would
not be a public officer covered by Rep. Act No. 3019.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial
question warranting the suspension of the proceedings of the graft cases

Ruling:
No. the Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that the court had already rendered a
decision on the Feliciano case, ruled therein that local water districts are not private
corporations but GOCCs. Therefore, the criminal cases against Borja must proceed
because he is a public officer covered by Rep. Act No. 3019. Borja’s contention of that a
prejudicial question exist in his case is devoid of any legal basis, considering that it had
been settled, long before the Feliciano case that Local water districts are GOCCs and
not private corporations because their existence do not derived from the Corporation
Code, but from Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, making the petitioner a
public officer, therefore liable for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 CASE NO. 1223
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 JURISDICTION OVER CRIME
Natividad VS Felix
Facts:
Petitioner, Municipal Mayor of Ramos, Tarlac, Arnulfo Natividad, was being
investigated for the death of Severino Aquino. A subpoena was issued requiring him
to submit a counter-affidavit. PNP filed another complaint on Circuit Trial Court of
Gerona-Ramos Tarlac (MCTC Criminal Case No. 4923). The MCTC opined that there
was probable cause to hold accused for murder, recommended bail of P250,000, the
Provincial Prosecutor approved the filing of the information for murder but with no bail.
After Petitioner submitted his counter affidavit, a resolution was issued by a panel of
prosecutors holding that probable cause exists. They also attached an amended
information charging additional defendants. Respondent judge admitted the amended
information and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest without bail on petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner moved to remand his case for preliminary investigation with motion
to quash warrant alleging that there was no preliminary investigation and contending
that respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case because it was the Ombudsman
and not the Provincial Prosecutor who had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation. And, that the proper court which had jurisdiction over the case was the
Sandiganbayan and not respondent judge.

Issues:
Whether or not the proper court which had jurisdiction over the case was the
Sandiganbayan and not respondent judge

Ruling:
No. Ombudsman's power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The two requirements must concur for an offense to fall under the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must
be in relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.

Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement
has been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees,
except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed by public
officers or employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No.
1486, has been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the
Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate.
 CASE NO. 1224
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 JURISDICTION OVER CRIME
Lastimosa VS Vasquez

Facts:
Petitioner, Gloria G. Lastimosa, is the assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. She and
the Provincial Prosecutor refused to file a criminal charge of attempted rape against
Mayor Ilustrismo, thus, the Ombudsman filed an administrative complaint against them
for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty refraining from prosecuting.
The two were placed under preventive suspension. It was the contention of the
petitioner that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case of mayor, thus, they
cannot be forced to file the case against Ilustrismo.

Issues:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the provincial
prosecutor to assist in the case

Ruling:
Yes. In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to cal in prosecution
for the assistance as provided in Se 21 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770).when
a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman, meaning, he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review,
approve, reerse and modify his decision. Petitioner cannot legally act,on her and refuse
to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.
 CASE NO. 1225
ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 JURISDICTION OVER CRIME
Presidential VS Desierto

Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
Order of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 dismissing three complaints filed by
petitioner docketed as OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645, and its
Order of August 31, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing, motu proprio, the three
complaints without first requiring respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and
petitioner to file its reply thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner avers, is premature.
Petitioner further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman feels that petitioner's
evidence is insufficient, the Ombudsman should have first required petitioner to clarify
said evidence or to adduce additional evidence, in accordance with due process.

Issues:
Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the case

Ruling:
No. Under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that
point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon
receipt of a complaint. Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit,
then he may recommend its outright dismissal. The Ombudsman has discretion to
determine whether a preliminary investigation is proper. It is only when the Ombudsman
opts not to dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the
Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit and
petitioner, its reply.