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ATLAS FERTILIZER v.

SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (1997)


ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners, who are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms, are assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (plus the implementing rules
and regulations).
They are questioning the extension of the agrarian reform to aquacultural lands, even if Article 13 Section 4 of the
Constitution only mentions agricultural lands; this in effect would violate the equal protection clause. The provisions
also distort employment benefits, and deprive the petitioners of their government-induced investments (violating
Sections 1 and 3)
The constitutionality of the provisions in CARL have been ruled upon in the cause of Luz Farms Inc., v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (1990), regarding the inclusion of land devoted to raising farm animals in its coverage. The same
provisions are being raised, now questioning the inclusion of lands for aquaculture (fishponds and prawn farms).
Petitioners are arguing that in the case of Luz Farms, the Court has impliedly ruled that lands devoted to fishing are
not agricultural lands, since the fishponds and prawn farms are only incidental and not principal to the aquaculture
business, and thus must be excluded for the CARL (just like how lands devoted to raising animals are excluded). They
also contend that since there are no farmer or farmworkers who tend to the land, there are no benefits that can be
obtained from Art. 13, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
While the case was going on, R.A. 7881 was passed by Congress on February 20, 1995. The Act amended pertinent
provisions, thereby excluding fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage of CARL.
The constitutionality of the assailed provisions are moot and academic. While the Court will not hesitate to declare a
law or an act void when unconstitutional, the Court will not preempt the Legislative of Executive branches from
correcting or clarifying laws or acts by amending them.

LACSON v. PEREZ (2001)


MELO, J.:
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President GMA, after an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,
etc., attempted to breaking into the Malacanang Palace, issued PD 38, stating that there was a state of rebellion in
the NCR. She also released General Order 1, directing the AFM and the PNP to suppress the rebellion, leading to
several warrantless arrests of alleged leaders and promoters.
Petitioners questioned the factual basis for the declaration of a state of rebellion, and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
On May 6, GMA ordered the lifting of the declaration, rendering the instant petitions as moot and academic. Further,
the Secretary of Justice has denied that it has issued any order to arrest specific persons in connection with the
rebellion, they merely implemented PD 38. In suppressing rebellion, authorities may resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, as provided under Sec. 5, Rule 11 of the Rules of
Court.
SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2004)
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
On the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP stormed into Oakwood
Premiere Apartments in Makati City. The president issued PD 427 and General Order 4, declaring a state of rebellion
and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. The PD read that members of the AFP seized the building, planted
bombs, publicly declared their withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the Government. They continued to
rise and showed open hostility for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government and depriving the President
of her powers, thereby constituting rebellion. General Order No.4, in accordance to Art. 7, Sec. 18 of the Constitution,
called out the AFP and PNP to help quell the rebellion, with due regard to constitutional rights.
By the evening of the same day, the occupation has ended. The state of rebellion was lifted only on August 1, 2003,
through PD 435.
Three petitions were filed. Sanlakas and Partido Manggagawa contend that Art. 7, Sec. 18 of the Constitution does
not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. Further, because of the cessation of the
occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation.
The SOLGEN commented that petitions have been rendered moot since the declaration was lifted.
ISSUE: WON the petitions have merit
The Court agrees that since PD 435 already lifted the declaration, there is not more actual case or controversy. As a
rule, the Courts do not adjudicate moot cases, however, Courts may decide a question if it is capable of repetition yet
evades review.
JOYA v. Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) (1993)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
In 1990, then Chairman of PCGG requested Cory Aquino for her authority to sign the proposed Consignment
Agreement between the Philippines through the PCGG, and Christie, Manson, and Woods International, Inc.,
concerning a scheduled sale of 82 Old Masters Paintings and 71 cartons of Antique Silverware seized from the
Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila, which were alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos,
his relatives, and his cronies.
She authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York to auction off
the subject are pieces for and in behalf of the Philippines. However, the Commission on Audit submitted to Aquino
the audit findings and observation on the Agreement, questioning the authority of PCGG Chairman to enter into the
Consignment Agreement. They also noted that the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; PCGG
had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the US; and that the assets were historical relics and had
cultural significance, and thus prohibited by law to be disposed of.
The PCGG defended the Consignment Agreement. The Director of the National Museum also issued a certification
that the items did not specifically qualify as part of protected cultural properties or heritage.
A Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
was filed by 35 petitioners, seeking to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction. The Court denied the
petition for preliminary injunction, since the petitioners did not present a clear legal right right to a restraining order
since they do not suffer any damages.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have legal standing
HELD:
Judicial review may only be done if the requisites are met:
1. Actual case or controversy
2. Raised by the proper party (Legal Standing)
3. Raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. Constitutionality is the lis mota
First two are the most important requisites. Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, meaning, there must be a personal and substantial
interest, where he sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act. Interest must be material
and an interest in issue affected by the decree, not mere interest in the question involved. It must be personal, not
based from a third or related party.
There are exceptions to legal standing, like when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement
of public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution; or when a taxpayer questions the
validity of governmental acts authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claims that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists, they are deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country’s artistic wealth, based on Arts. 14-18 of the 1987 Constitution on Arts and Culture, and The
Cultural Properties and Protection Act. They also contend that the paintings and silverworks are public properties.
The Court finds no merit due to the lack of basis in fact and in law.
They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation. Thus, these paintings legally belong to the foundation. The silverware were given to Marcos couple as
gifts for their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the administration was toppled,
the paintings and silverware were taken from the Malacanang and Museum, and transferred to Central Bank Museum.
If these properties were acquired by the government, only the true owners may raise the question.
This cannot be file an action for mandamus filed by concerned citizens, because it may only be raised when there is
a public duty set forth in the Constitution. It cannot be a taxpayer’s suit because there is no illegal disbursement of
public funds.
The Court may adjudicate despite lack of legal standing when there is an actual case or controversy and when
paramount public interest is involved. There is none here.
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ROMULO (2005)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
10 labor unions are questioning the constitutionality of EO 185 of 2003, which transferred all administrative supervision
over the NLRC, its regional branches, and all its personnel, including executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters, from
NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Petitioners contend that NLRC was created by the PD 442 – Labor Code, and was an integral part of DOLE, under
the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice. Then Cory Aquino issued EO 292, which attached the NLRC
to DOLE for both policy and program coordination and for administrative supervision. RA 6715 (1989) amended that
and transferred NLRC’s administrative supervision to the NLRC chairman. This EO 185 reverts back administrative
supervision to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Petitioners are contending that EO 185 amends RA 6715, which only Congress can do.
Respondents through the OSG allege that there is no actual case or controversy, since petitioners failed to cite how
EO 185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights and existence as labor unions or as taxpayers. Thus,
they have no legal standing.
ISSUE: WON EO 185 can be placed in judicial review when petitioners have no legal standing
HELD: Petition is dismissed
Even if there is an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review if those who assail it
do not have legal standing or a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the act being challenged. For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
The labor unions representing their members were not able to prove that they have sustained or will sustain any
personal injury attributable to the enactment of EO 185, especially since it would not affect the NLRC’s power to
review, reverse, revise or modify their decisions. Those who can file may be NLRC personnel or Congress since they
claim that the EO cannot amend, modify, or repeal laws.
The petitioners also have no legal standing as taxpayers, since they were not able to prove that there would be an
illegal disbursement of public funds. The OSG also mentioned that Labor Unions are even exempt from paying taxes.
The rule of standing is merely procedural and may be relaxed when public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
There being no exceptions in the case at hand, procedural rules must still apply. The need for locus standi is intended
to assure vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and to warrant the judiciary’s overruling the determination of a
coordinate, democratically elected organ of the government – the very essence of representative democracies.
For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their
dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly
confronts our judiciary today.
TANADA v. TUVERA (1985)
ESCOLIN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Tanada et. al., sought a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents Tuvera et. al., as public officials, to
publish and/or cause the publication of several Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instruction, General Orders, Executive
Orders, Letters of Implementation, and Administrative Orders to the Official Gazette.
The OSG would have the case dismissed because the petitioners have no legal standing since they would not sustain
any personal or direct prejudice by the non-publication.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a Petition for Mandamus can be filed when a tribunal,
corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The aggrieved person may file a verified petition to pray that judgement be rendered commanding the
defendant to do the act required to protect the rights of the petitioner.
As a general rule, a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some
private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he
holds with the public. Nevertheless, when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and do not need to
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and is thus interested
in the execution of the laws.
Petitioners here therefore have the right to bring the suit because the right sought to be enforced is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If they cannot institute the proceeding, it would be difficult
to conceive of any other person that could.
CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY (2002)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
In 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
and construction in Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
In 1977, Marcos issued PD 1084 creating Public Estate Authority (PEA), and tasked them with reclaiming land,
including foreshore and submerged areas, and developing any and all kinds of lands. He also issued PD 1085 which
transferred to PEA the lands reclaimed from the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation Project. He also issued a
memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP so that all future works in MCCRRP shall be funded
and owned by PEA.
In 1988, Cory Aquino issued Special Patent 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land reclaimed
under the MCCRRP. The Register of Deed issued TCTs in the name PEA, covering the reclaimed islands known as
Freed Islands.
In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands, as well as
the submerged areas around them.
In 1996, Senate President Maceda delivered a privilege speech and denounced JVA as the grandmother of all scams.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations conducted a joint investigation and found that the lands sought to be transferred to
AMARI are under public domain and cannot be alienated, thus rendering the TCTs void and the JVA illegal.
In 1997, Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order 365, creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study
on the legality of the JVA, who then upheld the constitutionality of the JVA.
In 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published that FVR issued an order to renegotiate the JVA between
PEA and AMARI. Thus, petitions for prohibition, preliminary injunction, mandamus, and TROs were filed.
In March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petitions. However, on March 30, PEA and AMARI had already
signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement, which Estrada approved.
ISSUE: WON the renegotiated contract may be declared null and void on constitutional and statutory grounds, based
on the LEGAL STANDING of the petitioner.

HELD:
On mootness because of subsequent events – The signing of the Amended JVA and its approval by the president
cannot operate to moot the petition since there is still a matter of implementation which could still be precluded by the
constitutionality of alienating lands of public domains to private corporations.
On legal standing – PEA argues that there is no affirmative statutory duty that he needs to perform, and that petitioner
will not suffer any concrete injury. This has no merits.
The petitioner may bring a taxpayer’s suit because PEA is a government corporation, and under the Government
Auditing Code, the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. Thus, PEA has to make
public disclosure of such and the Filipinos are awarded their constitutional right to information and to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of public domain among Filipino citizens. A mandamus may be filed.
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
IBP v. ZAMORA (2000)
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
In 2000, in view of the alarming increase in violent crimes, like robberies, kidnappings, and carnappings, in Metro
Manila, ERAP verbally tasked the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Art. 7 of the Constitution,
he tasked the Secretary of National Defense, Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of PNP and the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government to execute and implement this. PNP Chief issued a Letter of Instruction which detailed how
Task Force TULUNGAN was to be conducted. In a Memorandum addressed to the AFP and PNP Chiefs, ERAP also
confirmed his directive on the deployment of the Marines temporarily for a reasonable period, until the situation has
improved. Areas for deployment include Monumento Circle, North Edsa, Araneta, Greenhills, Megamall, Makati,
LRT/MRT Stations, and NAIA.
The IBP prayed to have the deployment of the Marines and LOI declared null and void for unconstitutionality.
- No emergency situation would justify, even remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work,
hence violating art. 2, sec. 3 (civilian authority is supreme over military)
- Deployment constitutes insidious incursion by military in a civilian function of governments, violating art. 16,
sec. 5(4) (no member of the armed forces in active service, shall be appointed to a civilian position in gov or
goccs)
- Deployment creates dangerous tendency to rely on military
- Militarizing law enforcement makes the military more powerful than what it should be
The IBP claims that they are the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the duty to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution
The SolGen contends that the IBP has no legal standing
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have legal standing to question if the President may call the armed forces to assist PNP
HELD: No.

Legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the act or decree.
IBP asserts no basis other than its standing as the association of lawyers with a duty to uphold the rule of law. This is
too general an interest. No member would sustain any form of injury as a result of the operation.
The Court may still take cognizance of cases which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing, when such
question is paramount with public interest and/or of transcendental importance.
In this case, it involves peace and order and thus the Court may relax the rules on standing.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC (2004)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Congress passed R.A. 8046 in 1995, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of an
automated election system and allowed the pilot-testing for the March 1996 ARMM elections. In 1997, another R.A.
was enacted to authorize the Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) and mandated the poll body to
acquire automated counting machines (ACMs). These were intended to be used in the May 11, 1998 presidential
elections. However, Comelec decided against the national implementation, and limited automation in the ARMM
elections. Still, due to failure of the machines to accurately read ballots, the poll body ordered the manual counting in
Sulu. The 2001 elections also postponed the automation due to time constraints.
In 2002, Comelec adopted a Resolution for a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct
biddings for the 3 phases of its AES: 1 - Voter Registration and Validation; 2 - Automated Counting and Canvassing;
3 - Electronic Transmission. In 2003, GMA issued EO 172, which allocated P2.5B for the AES; and another 500M
upon the request of the Comelec. The Comelec issued an Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid, which provided
that the public bidding was to be conducted under a two-envelope/stage system - with the first being the establishment
of the bidder’s eligibility, and the second being the actual bidding.
Of the 57 bidders, the Bids and Awards Committee of the COMELEC found MPC and Total Information Management
Corporation (TIMC) eligible, but both obtained several failed marks in the technical evaluations. Nonetheless, Comelec
awarded the billion-peso contract to MPC. Upon publication, five individuals and entities wrote a letter to Comelec
protesting the award of the contract in spite of the glaring irregularities in the manner of the bidding. The petitioners
cited the noncompliance with eligibility, as well as the technical and procedural requirements.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have legal standing
HELD: Yes, the petitioners may bring the suit.
Petitioners are claiming to be suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters, and concerned citizens, and
that the issue at hand is of transcendental importance and of national interest. They alleged that Comelec’s flawed
bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would directly affect the success or failure of
the upcoming election process. Any taint of the sanctity of the ballot would affect the people’s faith in the democratic
system of government. Further, the awarding of the Contract would involve the disbursement of public funds in huge
amounts.
The Court agrees.
The outcome of the 200 elections will affect the nation’s political and economic future, and thus there can be no
serious doubt that the subject matter is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. The allowance of
legal standing on the ground of the issues’ paramount public interest and transcendental importance is based on the
liberal policy that allows the SC to hear cases involving an issue of overarching significance to our society.
Finally, as taxpayers, the petitioners are allowed to sue when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
KMU LABOR CENTER v. GARCIA (LTFRB) (1994)
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
In 1990, DOTC issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair to allow provincial buses to charge passengers rates within a
range of 15% below and above the LTFRB official rate. However, Chairman Fernandos found it not legally feasible
and thus suggested that the implementation of the fare range scheme be further studied and evaluate.
In 1992, Secretary of DOTC issued DO 92-587 which defined the policy framework on the regulation of transport
services, which, among other things, resolved that in determining public need, the presumption of need for a service
shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be
with the oppositors. AND, deregulated passenger fares, allowing operators to fix their own fares (except for the lowest
class of passenger services which shall fall within the ±15% range of the provided reference rate).
In 1993, the LTFRB, upon the suggestion of the DOTC for the swift action on adoption, implemented DO 92-009,
issuing the rules and procedures for the 1992 DO. This further changed that the presumption of public need for a
service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed
service shall be the oppositor'(s); and that the fare range system for provincial buses and jeeps shall be widened to a
+20% -25% limit.
In 1994, the private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, PBOAP, availed itself of the
price increase without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of public hearing.
KMU Labor Center filed a petition to the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment, without having to file a petition for
that purpose is unconstitutional, invalid, and illegal. But this was dismissed for lack of merit and because KMU must
first resolve the issue with PBOAP. Hence the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON KMU has legal standing
HELD: Yes.
Judicial power is the power to hear and decided causes pending between parties, who have the right to sue in the
courts of law and equity. One who is directly affected by and whose interest in immediate and substantial in the
controversy, has the standing to sue.
KMU was able to prove that its members avail the use of public transportation, and are thus directly affected by the
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares.

Even if they do not have legal standing, the court may act liberally in instances of transcendental importance. This
was brought by several cases such as those concerning Emergency Powers, where the Court rules that ordinary
taxpayers, members of congress, and even associations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions to question
the constitutionality of certain acts. There are far reaching implications, as well as issues that are capable of repetition
yet evade review.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. COURT OF APPEALS (2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
was subsequently passed. Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. ARCO-Phil. filed a petition for
declaratory relief to declare certain sections regard illegal recruitment and its penalties, as unconstitutional. Petitioners
also alleged the RA 8042 is self-executory and does not an IRR.
Illegal Recruitment – Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers,
and that includes referring, contract services, promising, or advertising, for employment abroad, whether for profit or
not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or someone who does not hold authority under the Labor Code. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
Respondents ARCO argue that said provisions violate Art.3 Sec.1 of the Constitution, by violating the equal protection
clause AND the due process of workers to seek employment abroad plus Art. 2 Sec. 12, and Art. 15 Sec. 1 and 3(3)
ART 2 SEC 12 - The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
ART 15 SEC 1 - The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development
SEC 3(3) - The right of the family to a family living wage and income
The respondents say that the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies, excludes all other
licensed and authorized recruiters; and that the RA places licensed and authorized recruitment agencies on the same
footing as illegal recruiters because the RA did not properly distinguish them. It also argues that recruitment agencies
usually operate with more than 3 persons, and so they are forced to shut down.
Petitioners assert that ARCO is not the real party-in-interest because it failed to show how a non-stock non-profit
corporation could sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement.
ISSUE: WON the respondents ARCO have legal standing as an association representing its members of licensed and
authorized recruiters.
HELD: YES. ARCO has locus standi
It was held in TELEBAP v. COMELEC that standing jus tertii (3rd party rights), would be recognized if it can show that
the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party’s rights would be diluted unless
the court rules on the matter.
In this case, the respondents represent 11 licensed and authorized recruitment agencies, which are its members. In
its Articles of Incorporation, it said that the purpose of its creation is to support growth and development of the
manpower industry. Thus, it may sue for and in behalf of such agencies. It cannot, however, represent the unskilled
workers because it did not even implead such in their petition.
GMA NETWORK V. COMELEC (2014)
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
This case involved the constitutionality of certain regulations promulgated by the COMELEC regarding the political
ads for the 2013 national and local elections. Specifically, the constitutionality of Comelec’s limitations placed on
aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and political parties.
RA 9006 of the Fair Election Act imposed a maximum of 120 minutes for candidates, and 180 minutes for political
parties. The limit used to be on a “per station” basis, but subsequent resolutions have changed this to a total aggregate
basis for the 2013 elections. However, petitioners are contending that such limitation violates freedom of press, impairs
the people’s right to suffrage and their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect.
Respondents allege that petitioners do not have locus standi since the rights and freedoms are not personal to them,
since they belong to the candidates, political parties, and the Filipino electorate in general, since the limit is for the
candidates and not the media outlet. There can also be no legal standing on the basis of fear of injury, according to
them. That would not constitute an actual case ripe for adjudication.
Petitioners disagree, they are assailing the constitutionality of the interpretations Comelec has imposed. They have
suffered a threatened injury in the form of risk of criminal liability directly because of the alleged unconstitutional and
unlawful interpretation
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have locus standi
HELD: Yes.
The question of locus standi is inherent to a constitutional question. One of the respondents is Senator Cayetano,
who was a candidate is therefore directly injured by the act. As for the media outlets, they have standing in view of
the direct injury they may suffer relative to their duty of disseminating information.
If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their clients,
with more reason should establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional
freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of their own freedom of the
press. So, we uphold the standing of petitioners on that basis.
ARTURO TOLENTINO v. COMELEC (2004)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
After GMA’s succession to the Presidency in 2011, GMA nominated Sen. Guingona as Vice President, which the
Congress confirmed. Following the confirmation, the Senate certified the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Senate
called on COMELEC to fill in the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the upcoming
regular 2001 elections, wherein the candidate with the 13th most number of votes shall serve the remaining term of
Sen. Guingona (2004). A Comelec resolution to this effect was passed.

Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed a petition for prohibition against
COMELEC, in order to enjoin them from declaring with finality the 13th senator (Ralph Recto). Petitioners claim that
the senators failed to indicate whether they intended to run for the regular or special elections, thus there could not
have been 2 separate elections.

ISSUE: WON the petition is moot; WON the petitioners have legal standing
HELD: Not moot. No Standing, but still decided on.
The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELEC’s failure to
comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such
question, however, may not be decided before the date of the election.

Respondents claim that the petitioners cannot file as taxpayers because there was no illegal disbursement of public
funds by COMELEC, nor did they suffer personal injury because of the resolutions.
A party will have standing when he can show that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
alleged illegal act; that the injury is fairly traceable to the action; and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
In their capacity as voters, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance shared in substantially
equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all.

The Court may relax procedural matters even if the interest is “too general” in cases where petitioners has
constitutional issues which deserve attention due to their seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedents. (IBP v
ZAMORA).
OPLE v. TORRES (1998)
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of Administrative Order 308 entitled the Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System on the following grounds: usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and its violation on the right to privacy.
Respondents argue that there is no justiciable question; that AO was issued within the executive and administrative
powers of the president [FIDEL RAMOS]; that the funds for implementation may be sourced from the concerned
agencies; and that the AO actually protects an individual’s interest in privacy.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has legal standing

HELD: YES.
Respondents assert that since there are still no implementing rules and regulations for the Administrative Order, the
case is not yet ripe for adjudication. The court finds no merit in that.
Senator Ople has the standing to bring the suit raising the issue that the Administrative Order usurps legislative’s
power to create laws. Further, as a taxpayer and member of the GSIS, Ople may also bring about the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and GSIS funds in the implementation of the AO.
The case cannot be moot for not yet having its IRR, because they themselves have begun implementing the National
ID Card system.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v. SECRETARY REYES 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners collectively referred to as Resident Marine Mammals are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises and other
sea animals which inhabit the waters in and around Tanon Strait. Human petitioners are acting as the legal guardians
of said animals.
The government through the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with
JAPEX, where they planned to explore, develop, and produce petroleum resources in the areas of Tanon Strait. They
also wanted to drill one of the exploration wells, where Tanon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988.
DENR still granted an Environmental Compliance Certificate to DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration. In 2008, JAPEX and the government terminated the service contract and the activities ceased.
ISSUE: WON the animals through their human petitioners have legal standing
HELD: YES.

Mootness is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., petitioners assert that they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit,
thus they have the right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created
in their favor and for their benefit, pour autrui (for others).
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine
Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected
residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed
in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.
Respondents argue that under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, of entities authorized by
law, can be parties in a civil action. They argue that in Oposa vs. Factoran, the petitioners were still representing
natural persons, although some unborn.

However, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allows citizen suits to
be brought up by Filipino citizens for cases involving violations of our environmental laws, where previously,
environmental cases were just dismissed for lack of standing.
Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties
to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish
the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of
said order.
Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated
in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
The petitioners herewith are not merely representing the animals, but the general people as well since the whole
habitat is concerned.
ARCETA v. MANGROBANG (2004)
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
The City Prosecutor of Navotas charged Ophelia Arceta with violations of BP 22, for issuing a check when she
knowingly did not have funds or credit. Despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, accused failed to pay the payee
with the face amount or to make arrangements.
Arceta did not have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the grounds of the
unconstitutionality of BP 22, reasoning that the Lozano Doctrine (which upheld the constitutionality of the BP since it
punished the act as an offense against public order, not necessarily against property) was still in place.
Another Gloria Dy was also charged for violating BP 22, but likewise did not move to dismiss her charges because
she knew it would inevitably follow the Lozano ruling.

Arceta and Dy raised the following questions: the effects of non-payment and payment in accordance to BP22, does
BP22 violate that “no person shall be imprisoned for debt,” and is BP22 a valid exercise of police power?

ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional?


HELD:
Judicial Review requires the following requisites:
1. Actual and appropriate case or controversy
2. Personal and interest of the party – legal standing
3. Raised at the earliest opportunity
4. Constitutionality is the very Lis Mota of the case
The petition for certiorari cannot go through because the petition itself is devoid of any attachments that question the
jurisdiction of the lower court (in accordance to Rule 65 – certiorari). The petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of
courts; raising an issue at the earliest opportunity does not mean it should be brought up to the Supreme Court
immediately.
The constitutionality of BP22 is also not the Lis Mota of the case. There is a presumption of Constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that is not doubtful, speculative,
or argumentative.