G.R. No.

L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs.

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,
respondents.

The Case: This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. Facts: That in the elections
of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly
for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the greatest number of votes; The national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3,
1935, confirmed the election of Angara to the said body. On December 8, 1935, Pedro Ynsua filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest” On December 20, 1935, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest. That on December 27, 1935, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging
that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the
election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation; The Electoral Commission
promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest." Petitioner sets forth that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is valid and should be
respected and obeyed because it was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented.
The respondents contended that the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its
proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by
which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Issue Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming
to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? Ruling The separation of powers
is a fundamental principle in our system of government. Each department of the government has
exclusive authority of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments. The Constitution has allotted powers to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government. In cases of conflict, the judicial department can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments. Before the present
Constitution, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members. The current Constitution transferred all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature, mentioned above, to the Electoral Commission. Such transfer of power
from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, and carried with it the implied power to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. In order to have an
independent constitutional organ on election related activities, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. The confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to
said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to
prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly
should be filed. Therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner.

TANADA V. YULO

Petitioner: JUAN TAÑADA Respondents: JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice, EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID,
Judge of First Instance of the Thirteenth Judicial District, and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of
Alabat, Tayabas

Act No. 3899 – “…the present justice and auxiliary justice of the peace who shall, at the time this Act
takes effect, have completed sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on January first, nineteen
hundred and thirty-three…”

FACTS:

1. Juan Tañada was appointed justice of the peace of Alabat, Tayabas on December 4, 1911. He
continued in that position until when at his own request and pursuant to the provisions of section 206 of
the Revised Administrative Code he was transferred on September 8, 1934 to Perez, Tayabas.

2. Petitioner turned 65 yrs old on October 5, 1934. Thereupon, in accordance with instructions from
DOJ, CFI Tayabas directed petitioner to cease to act as justice of peace. Petitioner surrendered under
protest and instituted original action of quo warranto.

ISSUE: Whether or not DOJ erred in directing petitioner to cease to act as justice of peace on grounds of
the provision in Act No 3899

RULING:

1. It was clear in the provisions of the Act that only those who have complete 65 years of age at the time
of its effectivity shall cease to hold office on January 1, 1933. Giving effect to the case of Regalado vs
Yulo, it does not apply to justice of peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act who completed 65
years of age after January 1, 1933. Also, the transfer of a justice of the peace does not amount to an
appointment as in the case of Nicolas vs Alberto.
2. It is fundamental that the determination of the legislative intent from the language itself is the
primary consideration. This must be adhered to even though the court is convinced that the legislature
intended to enact something different. To depart from the meaning expressed by words is to alter the
statue, is to legislate not to interpret.

3. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language use, the subject matter, and the
purposes of those framing them are able to find their true meaning. It is different from judicial
legislation wherein the court supplies the provisions of the law because someone believed it was just
omitted and it was in fact the intent of the legislature.

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION V. TECSON

Plaintiff-appellant: NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION

Defendant-appellee: MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., MIGUEL D. TECSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER

FACTS:

1. On November 14, 1955, CFI Manila rendered judgment against Miguel Tecson on civil complaint filed
by Price Stabilization Corporation (PSC). On November 21, 1995, a copy of decision was served upon
defendants. 2. On December 21, 1965, NAMARCO, as successor of PSC, filed with the same court a
complaint against same defendants for the revival of judgment rendered. 3. Tecson moved to dismiss
said complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription because more than 10 years have
passed. CFI granted Tecson’s motion on the ground that the revival of judgment has expired on
December 19, 1965 considering that 1960 and 1964 are leap years. 4. NAMARCO appealed with CA
alleging that the expiration is on December 21, 1965. Petitioner says that it would be erroneous to
accept December 19 as the expiration date because a year means a “calendar year” and since what is
being computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of
computation. 5. CA certified the case to SC upon the ground that the question raised is one of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for revival of judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.

RULING:

Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure
to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be
upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised
Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress.
If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this
may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

NOTES:

Pursuant to Art 1144 of Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues” which “commences from the time the judgment sought to be
revived has become final” (Art 1152). The judgment took effect on December 21, 1955 or 30 days from
notice of judgment received by the defendants on November 21, 1955 – no appeal having been taken
therefrom.

REGALADO V. YULO

Petitioner: FELIPE REGALADO

Respondent: JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice, JUAN G. LESACA, Judge of First Instance of Albay, and
ESTEBAN T. VILLAR

FACTS:

1. Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, on April 12, 1906.

2. On September 13, 1934, Regalado became sixty-five years of age. As a consequence, shortly
thereafter, the judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance with instructions from the
Secretary of Justice, designated Esteban T. Villar, justice of the peace of Tabaco, Albay, to act as
justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay.

3. Regalado surrendered the office to Villar under protest. On December 17, 1934, Villar qualified as
justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, and entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office.

4. Petitioner Regalado insists that the law is clear and accordingly needs no interpretation but
respondents admit that the provisions of the second proviso are not very specific and that
according to the real intention of the law the only sensible and proper construction is that all
justice of peace who had completed the age of 65 years whether appointed prior or subsequent
to the Act shall cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.

ISSUE: Whether or not Regalado should cease to hold office pursuant to Act 3899.

RULING:

The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the
statute. If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by
interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law. In
other words, the courts cannot assume some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute
to accomplish this supposed intention.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS VS ANG CHIO KIO

Petitioners: THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Respondents: ANG CHO KIO @ ANG MING HUY and THE COURT OF APPEALS

-An appeal by certiorari-

Prayer: Render judgment ordering the striking out from said decision of the portions recommending to
the Executive Secretary 'to allow the (petitioner) (respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy) to leave this
country in the first available transportation abroad' but otherwise affirming the dismissal of the petition
for habeas corpus.
FACTS:

1. Respondent had been charged, tried and convicted for various offenses committed in the Philippines.
After serving 6 ½ years out of 45 yrs 10 mos 21 days of his sentence, he was pardoned on July 4, 1959 by
the President on the condition that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and never to
return to this country.

2. On June 26, 1996, he arrived at MIA via PAL from Taipeh under the name “Ang Ming Huy”. Identified
by inspector Mariano Cristi as the “Ang Chio Kio” who was deported to Taipeh, the respondent was
arrested and the Executive Secretary ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion
for having violated the conditions of his pardon.

3. Ang Chio Kio filed a motion for reconsideration with the Executive Secretary. The latter’s failure to act
on the motion prompted the respondent to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the CFI Rizal
making the Director of Prisons and Executive Secretary as respondents.

4. CFI dismissed the respondent’s petition saying that he was validly recommitted to prison. He appealed
to CA but the latter affirmed the CFI’s decision on dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. There
was, however, a special division of five justices where three justices concurred and two dissented on the
dispositive portion that allowed the respondent to leave the country by the first available transportation.
The majority opinion contains the recommendation that allow the respondent to leave because they see
it best to the interest of the security and peace of the country.

5. In due time, OSG filed a motion for reconsideration with CA praying for the deletion of the
recommendation that allow the respondent to leave the country. The CA, by a vote of 3-2, denied the
motion. Hence this appeal for certiorari with the SC.

6. Petitioners claim that the recommendation is not part of the decision binding upon the parties and is
uncalled for. It gives a political complexion since courts are not empowered by law to make such
recommendations to the President. The courts should not interfere with the political acts of the Chief
Executive by sending an undesirable alien out of the country.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in making a recommendation to allow respondent to leave this country on the
first available transportation abroad.

HELD:
The case before the CA was for habeas corpus and therefore the only question that should have been
resolved was if CFI had rightly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. The CA was not called upon to
review any sentence imposed upon the respondent. The recommendatory power of courts are limited to
those expressly provided in the law.

SC did not see it proper that the recommendation would suggest a modification or a correction of the act
of the Chief Executive since it interferes with the President’s exercise of political powers. It is not within
the province of the judiciary to express an opinion or suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom of the
action of the President on matters purely political in nature.

RATIO:

The decision of the court should contain only opinion that is relevant to the question that is before it.
After all, the courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation
and application of it. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions which may only reflect
unfavorably upon their competence.

CASE DIGEST 7 CORPUZ VS PEOPLE

Petitioner: LITO CORPUZ Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS:

1. Private complainant Tangcoy was engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him and offered to
sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed and turned over 98,000
worth of jewelry. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds and return unsold items within
a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds or returning the unsold
items. When Tangcoy was able to meet Corpuz, the latter promised that he will pay for them but to no
avail. Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner.

2. After trial, RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The case was elevated to CA and the
latter affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence the motion for reconsideration with SC.

3. Petitioner contends that the penalty imposed which was an incremental penalty (where the
punishment to be meted out to a convict increases as the amount involved in estafa gets higher) of “18
years imprisonment in addition to the fines” by the court a quo violates the equal protection clause and
the prohibition against oppressive and cruel punishment. At the time when the RPC was enacted in 1932,
the value of the peso was considerably higher compared to its present value, wherein devaluations may
have been caused by inflation. Thus, he asked the Court to suspend the execution of the sentence or
amend the same to accord respect to his constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can suspend the execution of sentence with respect to his rights against
excessive penalties

RULING:
1. In ruling for the constitutionality of the assailed RPC provision, the Court explained that it has no
authority to modify the range of penalties, as such would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature’s perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through the Court’s decision.

2. Ultimately, these provisions do not need to be voided or declared unconstitutional, as people who
transgress the law must be meted out with penalities. However, the issues raised in Corpuz reveal the
necessity to revise the RPC in order for the penal code to truly reflect the current conditions and avoid
penalties shocking to conscience. While our justices may be great mathematicians and social scientists, it
is not for the Court to quantify the wisdom of our laws, lest this result to judicial activism.

CASE DIGEST 8 DE MESA VS PEPSI

FACTS:

1. The case arose from the same set of facts as the cases of Mendoza vs Pepsi and Rodrigo vs Pepsi.

2. Petitioners are holders of soft drink bottle caps bearing the number 349 allegedly a winning
combination in a contest sponsored by respondents.

3. Numerous holders of the supposedly winning 349 crowns were not honored which led these rejected
crown holders to file separate complaints for specific performance and damages.

4. In the Mendoza and Rodrigo case, RTC dismissed complaint. Petitioners appealed with CA but was
dismissed for lack of merit. Unfazed, petitioners filed with SC a petition for review which was denied for
failure to sufficiently show that CA committed any reversible error.

5. However, prior to the resolution of the 2 cases, herein petitioners filed with RTC a motion for leave (1)
adopt previous testimonial and evidence (2) archive the case until final resolution of the 2 cases which
were pending with CA. RTC granted the motion.

6. Meantime, the Rodrigo case became final and executory in view of SC’s denial of petition. Hence,
respondents filed with RTC a motion to dismiss the complaints invoking the principle of stare decisis. RTC
granted the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present case is barred by SC’s ruling on the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases

RULING: The petition is denied.

1. Since the instant case involves the same legal rights and relations of the parties, facts, applicable laws,
cause of action, issues, and evidence as the previously resolved cases, there is nothing left to be argued.
The issue has been settled and SC’s final decision in the said cases must be respected. The Court’s hands
are now tied by the finality of said judgments.

2. The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of Civil Code. It enjoins
adherence to judicial precedents and requires courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision
of the SC. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts.
The doctrine is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

CASE DIGEST 9 DOTC VS CRUZ

FACTS:

1. The material antecedents of the case are the same with Mamaril vs CSC. DOTC requested CSC to attest
that at least 2 of 4 DLLS positions be made permanent. The request was granted by CSC through Resolution
01-0233. CSC advised DOTC that the incumbents of the formerly co-terminous positions had no vested
right to occupy the already permanent positions and that they were not automatically appointed thereto
and the positions which were made permanent could only be filled up by following CSC rule and DOTC
policies. 2. DOTC sought CSC’s written confirmation for which the latter replied through Resolution 01-
0502 stating that the incumbents are ipso facto appointed to such positions under permanent status if
they meet the minimum requirements. 3. In light of the contrary advice previously given by former
chairman, DOTC sought clarification. CSC issued Resolution 01-1409 amending the previous resolution by
stating that the two incumbents were no longer existing employees. 4. Mamaril and Cruz filed a motion
for reconsideration. Thus, CSC issued Resolution 02-1504 setting aside the previous resolution thus
reinstating the previous employees to their positions. 5. DOTC filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by Resolution 03-1019. In the same resolution, CSC declared that the incumbents are not
entitled to back salaries. Mamaril filed a motion for reconsideration insofar as CSC held that she was not
entitled to backwages. CSC denied the motion. 6. Cruz and Mamaril filed separate petitions for review
with CA assailing previous resolution on backwages. CA dismissed Mamaril’s motion for lack of verification
and certification against forum. Hence she petitioned for review on certiorari with SC which was denied
for being procedurally and substantially without merit. The decision became final and executory on May
2006. 7. Meanwhile, on June 2003, CA rendered a decision for Cruz’s petition setting aside CSC’s
resolution and ordering DOTC to pay Cruz his back salaries. This is because of prevailing jurisprudence that
supports awards for backwages to illegally dismissed civil servants. The court finds the DOTC cited case of
Octot vs Ybanez case to be inapplicable. 8. DOTC filed a motion for reconsideration on June 2007 relying
on the Court’s application of Octot vs Ybanez case in Mamaril vs CSC case under the doctrine of stare
decisis since the facts in Mamaril are identical.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mamaril vs CSC case is applicable to the case under the principle of stare decisis

RULING: The court finds for the petitioner.

The question of whether a government employee who was dismissed from service in good faith is entitled
to back salaries upon reinstatement has already been resolved in Mamaril vs CSC. The case is binding and
applicable to the present case following the doctrine of stare decisis which means “to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established”. The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon
the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment which results therefrom.

When the SC has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. It is grounded on
the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions.

CASE DIGEST 10 PEOPLE VS CARMEN

FACTS:

1. Defendant was charged with illegal possession of firearms on September 5, 1964. He claimed to be
exonerated because he had an appointment as Secret Agent and as Confidential Agent with authority to
possess and carry the firearm. He contended that he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of SC’s decision
in People vs Macarandang (1959) and People vs Lucero (1958).

2. On December 27, 1968, the trial court while conceding on the basis of evidence that defendant really
had authority to carry firearms, still held defendant criminally liable on the ground that the SC rulings in
the mentioned cases were reversed and abandoned in People vs Mapa (1967).

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant should be convicted in view of the complete reversal of the
Macarandang (1959) and Lucero (1958) doctrine in the Mapa (1967) case.

RULING: Appellant is acquitted

1. The interpretation upon a law by SC constitutes a part of the law as of the date the law was originally
passed since the Court merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate.

2. The doctrine laid down in Lucero (1958) and Macarandang (1959) was part of the jurisprudence at the
time the appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question (1964). It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in the Mapa case (1967), but when a doctrine of SC is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen
for the guidance of society.
 CASE DIGEST 11 ALBERT VS CFI MANILA

Petitioners: MARIANO ALBERT

Respondents: CFI MANILA, UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., AND JOSE ARUEGO

FACTS:

1. Albert sued University Publishing for breach of contract. He died before the case proceeded to
trial. Albert died and Justo Albert (his administrator) substituted him. CFI then favored Justo and
ordered UPC to pay him.
2. The CFI then ordered for the execution against UPC but at some point, Justo petitioned for a
writ of execution against Aruego (its president) because he and the sheriff discovered that UPC
wasn’t registered in the SEC. UPC countered by saying that Aruego was not a party to the case
so the petition should be denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Aruego is a party to the case.

RULING:

1. This is not the first time that the Court has ordered the execution of a judgment against a
person who was not formally named as a party defendant in the action. The Court’s stand has
been consistent that the judgment for payment shall be enforced against a person although not
by name impleaded in the suit. Reasons therefore are concretely expressed in Mangubat vs
Osmena.
2. In the Torres vs Caluag case, Torres was not a party defendant in the suit but was still issued a
writ of execution ejecting her from the property because she testified in the court, she had her
day in court and had laid squarely before said court the issue of ownership. The Court then
explicitly stated that the fact that petitioner was not formally made a party defendant is a mere
technicality that does not serve the interest of justice.

Luzon Brokerage Company Inc. v. Maritime Bldg. Co.

Plaintiff-appellee: LUZON BROKERAGE CO., INC

Defendant-appellant: MARITIME BUILDING CO., INC., and MYERS BUILDING CO., INC.,
defendants, MARITIME BUILDING CO., INC
Case: Direct appeal from the dispositive portion of the decision of the CFI Manila
FACTS:
1. Myers Building Co entered into a “Deed of Conditional Sale” contract in favor of Maritime
Building Co. over 3 parcels of land with improvements for 1M. Maritime paid 50,000 upon
execution. The balance was to be paid in monthly installments of 10,000 @ 5% p.a. (later
lowered to 50,000 @ 5.5% p.a.). The parties agreed that: a. If Maritime defaults, the contract
will be annulled at Myer’s option b. All payments already made shall be forfeited c. Myers shall
have the right to reenter the property and take possession

2. Maritime Building failed to pay the installment for March 1961 for which their president
requested for a moratorium on payments. a. Maritime’s suspension of payments arose from an
award of backwages in a Labor Case in favor of members of the Luzon Labor Union. Schedler
claims he is being sued for the backwages for which F.H. Myers allegedly promised to indemnify
him when Schedler bought F.H. Myer’s stock. b. Parsons, the President of Myers Building,
replied that the payments are addressed to the company, not the estate of F.H. Myers.

3. The request was denied but the former still failed to pay monthly installments on the
succeeding months.

4. Myers Building sent a demand letter but was unfortunately unclaimed by Maritime Building.
The former wrote another letter advising it of the cancellation of their contract and demanded
the return of the property.

5. In the meantime, Myers Building demanded upon Luzon Brokerage (Maritime Building lessee)
the payment of monthly rentals and the surrender of the same to it.

6. Luzon Brokerage filed this action for interpleader to avoid paying to the wrong party. The
former filed a cross-claim against Maritime Building praying for the confirmation of its right to
cancel said contract.

7. CFI Manila ruled that Maritime committed breach of contract for failure to pay monthly
installment and that Myers is entitled to cancel the contract, forfeit the payments made,
repossess the property, and collect the rentals thereof. Hence this direct appeal by Maritime
with the SC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Maritime was guilty of breach in bad faith. 2. Whether or not Myers is
entitled to extrajudicially rescind the Deed of Conditional Sale
HELD
1. The non-payment of the installments was designed to coerce Myers Bldg Co. into answering
for an alleged promise of the late F. H. Myers. Maritime cannot ignore the fact that whatever
obligation F. H. Myers his estate had assumed was not, and could not have been, an obligation
of the corporation, Myers Bldg Co. Hence, the breach was tainted with dolo or a "conscious and
intentional design to evade the normal fulfillment of existing obligations" (Capistrano Vol. 3).
Having acted in bad faith, Maritime is not entitled to ask the court to grant further time to make
payment.
From another point of view, it is irrelevant whether appellant Maritime's infringement of its
contract was casual or serious, for as pointed out by this Court in Manuel vs. Rodriguez, in
contracts to sell, the failure to pay in full is not a breach but simply an event that prevented the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force
2. SC repeatedly held in Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs that a judicial action for the
rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms. As further explained in UP v. de Los Angeles, the party
who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or rescinded without previous court
action, but it proceeds at its own risk. For it is only the final judgment of the corresponding court
that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action taken was or was not correct in law.
But the law definitely does not require that the contracting party who believes itself injured
must first file suit and wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its
interest.
RATIO:
The case upholds the principle of stare decisis by citing the governing principle of precedents
“which has given consistency and stability to the law” by which lawyers and litigants may know
the law in concrete controverted cases. Once a question of law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The Supreme Court is described as
having the last word on what the law is, as it is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. As
such, the lower courts are enjoined to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.