La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Assocciation, Inc. v.

Ramos
[G.R. No. 127882. January 27, 2004.]

CARPIO MORALES, J:

Principle: Changes in Phraseology

Facts:
The present petition for mandamus and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along
with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of
the Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine
laws.
RA 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms.
Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.
The law prescribes the qualifications of contractors and grants them certain rights,
including timber, water and easement rights, and the right to possess explosives. Surface owners,
occupants, or concessionaires are forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from
entering private lands and concession areas. A procedure for the settlement of conflicts is likewise
provided for.
The Act restricts the conditions for exploration, quarry and other permits. It regulates the
transport, sale and processing of minerals, and promotes the development of mining communities,
science and mining technology, and safety and environmental protection.
The government's share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated, taxes and fees are
imposed, incentives granted. Aside from penalizing certain acts, the law likewise specifies grounds
for the cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and permits.
The petition arose from the 100 FTAA applications, of which 64 applications are by fully
foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully
foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
Ruling:

The agreement between the government and WMCP is a service contract that which must
be declared unconstitutional.

As priorly pointed out, the phrase "management or other forms of assistance" in the 1973
Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only "technical or financial
assistance." Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The management or operation of
mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was
precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.

As earlier noted, the phrase "service contracts" has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution's
Article on National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of
service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old terminology
("service contracts") instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms ("agreements . . . involving
either technical or financial assistance"). Such a difference between the language of a provision in
a revised constitution and that of a similar provision in the preceding constitution is viewed as
indicative of a difference in purpose. If, as respondents suggest, the concept of "technical or
financial assistance" agreements is identical to that of "service contracts," the CONCOM would
not have bothered to fit the same dog with a new collar. To uphold respondents' theory would
reduce the first to a mere euphemism for the second and render the change in phraseology
meaningless.

An examination of the reason behind the change conforms that technical or financial
assistance agreements are not synonymous to service contracts.

[T]he Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to
be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby,
in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature
would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

Case digest by: Rain Paul G. Corotan