Updates of Cases On: Prepared by

UPDATES OF CASES ON
R.A. 7610 and R.A. 9262
2010-2016
PREPARED BY:
OUTLINE
1. 2010-2016 CASES
i. Republic Act No. 7610 [Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act]
ii. Republic Act No. 9262 [Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004]
Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 1 SY 2016-2017

Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act
[R.A. 7610]
PEOPLE v. TADEO
Prepared by: Carl Vincent Mondejar
G.R. No. 168103
August 3, 2010
FACTS
AAA, the victim, was born on July 16, 1981 in Eastern Samar and was about 12 years old when
the mishaps happened. The victim, together with her siblings, BBB and CCC, lived with her aunt,
DDD, and DDD's second husband (appellant) in Antipolo from September 1992 to January 1994.
Two of AAA's cousins were also living with them. DDD and appellant were sending AAA, BBB,
and CCC to school. At the time of the mishaps, DDD was working abroad.

According to the testimony of AAA, appellant would kiss her and touch her private parts since
September 1993. AAA also claimed that appellant has raped her several times between Sep-
tember 1993 and January 1994. The victim also narrated that the appellant would rape her
when the other members of the household were absent or outside. A bolo was also always be-
side the appellant every time he raped AAA and would threaten to kill the victim's siblings and
stop sending them to school.

Around noon of December 20, 1993, AAA took a bath in a well near their house and wrapped
her body with a towel before entering the house. Appellant then followed the victim to her bed-
room, tied her hands, and raped her. A few moments later, appellant once again entered the
room and raped her again.

On January 31, 1994, appellant raped her again in the sofa after AAA took a bath. Appellant
kissed and touched her private part, while AAA resisted and scratched appellant's arms. She
was able to push him away which made the appellant run out the door.

AAA then told her older sister about the maltreatment and the latter accompanied her to the
police station. On February 3, 1994, 3 counts of rape were filed against appellant.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Oggao, a medico-legal officer. The
defense presented the accused who denied the charges against him saying that he could not
think of a reason why the complainant filed the charges. Appellant also claims that his sister-
in-law, who helped filed the complaint, was mad at him for not granting her a loan.

The Trial Court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted accused of Rape.

ISSUE
W/N the trial court erred in not acquitting the appellant despite the fact that AAA's testimony
was inconsistent and full of falsehoods.
HELD

No. Appellant claims that it was not possible for him to rape AAA in September 1993 since his
wife only left for Jeddah on October 21, 1993. He pointed out the testimony of AAA which says
that appellant only kissed her and touched her private parts but did not mention that he in-
serted her penis into her vagina. He reiterated that the criminal charges were only filed by
AAA's aunt for his refusal to grant her a loan.

The Court found the appeal of the appellant devoid of merit. The appellant's contention that he
could not have raped AAA since his wife was still around cannot prosper since, according to the
court, lust is no respecter of time or place. There have been plenty of instances when rape was
committed under circumstances as audacious as a room full of family members sleeping side
by side.

As to the contention of appellant that there was nowhere in the testimony of AAA regarding any
statement that the appellant's penis was inserted into AAA's vagina, the Court ruled that it is
wrong since AAA narrated it in her testimony as evidenced by the records.

The inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor ones and does not affect the credibility
of AAA nor remove the fact that she was raped. The inconsistencies are forgivable since a victim
of rape is unable to give an exact detail for each of the incidents.

The SC found appellant guilty of 2 counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness as
defined in the RPC in relation to Sec. 5 of RA 7610 since all the elements of the offense are
present. The action of the appellant on January 31, 1994 of laying AAA in the sofa and kissing
and touching her private parts constitute lascivious or lewd conduct couple with intimidation
according to AAA's testimony. Sec 5 of RA 7610 not only cover a situation in which a child is
being abused for profit, but also one in which a child is engaged in lascivious conduct through
coercion or intimidation. Jurisprudence has ruled that intimidation need not be irresisti-
ble, it is sufficient that it subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This
is most especially applicable to young, innocent, immature girls who could not be ex-
pected to act with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under
the same circumstances or have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.
PEOPLE v. LINDO Y VERGARA

Prepared by: Janina Santos
GR No. 189818
August 9, 2010
FACTS
AAA was 11 years old living in San Andres Bukid, Manila while accused-appellant Lindo was
her neighbor. On April 3, 2001, AAA attended a pabasa at a neighbor’s place, during which she
fell asleep under a platform that served as a stage. While asleep, Lindo took her to a place near
a creek. It was there that AAA woke up and Lindo removed her short pants and underwear, and
undressed himself. He tried inserting his penis into her vagina but it did not completely pene-
trate. Because of this, he made her bend over and inserted his penis in her anus causing her to
cry out in pain. Lindo sensed that AAA’s friend was approaching so he stopped and told AAA to
dress herself and go home. AAA told her parents about the incident who reported it to the ba-
rangay authorities. Lindo was arrested that same day. The findings of AAA’s examination by a
medico-legal stated that there were extragenital physical injuries as well as abrasians on her
anal orifice. The medico-legal said that the anal injuries could have been caused by the insertion
of a blunt object, penis, finger or pencil into the anal orifice.

Lindo raised the defense of denial and alibi stating that he reported for work as a painter at the
time of the alleged incident and when he got home, he was arrested by he barangay official and
was investigated for rape. The trial court found the testimony of AAA to be more credible than
Lindo’s defense and alibi.

Therefore, RTC ruled that Lindo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under Art.
335 of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610. Lindo raised the case on appeal to the CA, which
affirmed his conviction but modified the award of damages to AAA. The case was then raised to
the Supreme Court questioning the weight given to AAA’s testimony and credibility.
ISSUES
W/N Lindo was guilty of statutory rape under Art. 335 of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610?

W/N the RTC and CA erred in charging Lindo with only one count of rape?

HELD
As the incident happened on April 3, 2001 (after the effectivity of the amended Anti-Rape Law),
it is no longer covered under Art. 355 of the RPC, but rather Art. 266-A of R.A. 8353 or the Anti
Rape Law of 1997.

The Supreme Court sustains the conviction of accused-appellant Lindo. With regard to the pref-
erence given to the testimony of AAA, it was given more weight and credence as compared to
the defense of denial and alibi that Lindo raised. He failed to show any inconsistencies or dis-
crepancies in AAAs testimony, and failed to put the lie to her words. The court has held, time
and again, that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature, as in this case, deserve
full credence, considering that no young woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter testify about her
ordeal in a public trial, if she had not been motivated by a desire to obtain justice for the wrong
committed against her.

With regard to Lindo actually having carnal knowledge of AAA, the Supreme court ruled that
although the insertion of his penis into the vagina of AAA was incomplete (because he was un-
able to fully penetrate her), it is deemed sufficient. In People v. Tablang, the mere introduction
of the male organ in the labia majora of the victim’s genitalia consummates the crime. As AAA
was 11 years old at the time the incident happen, it is correct to state that Lindo committed the
act of statutory rape.

Yes, the CA erred in charging only one count of rape because it is clear that he is charged with
two offenses, rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) and rape as an act of sexual assault under
Art. 266-A, par. 2. was charged with having carnal knowledge of AAA, who was under twelve
years of age at the time, under par. 1(d) of Art. 266-A, and he was also charged with committing
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person under the second para-
graph of Art. 266-A. Two instances of rape were indeed proved at the trial.
PEOPLE v. FLORES
Prepared by: Miguel Pesuena
G.R. No. 188315
August 25, 2010
FACTS

Isidro Flores y Lagua was married to BBB with her adoptive child AAA. In February 1999, Lagua,
in several instances, made sexual advances to AAA, including sexual intercourse. AAA, accompanied
by a friend, sought the assistance of Kagawad Espena. Lagua, was caught by the Barangay Tanod
trying to escape. PO1 Babor, the duty investigator at the Women’s and Children’s Desk of Makati
City, took down AAA’s statements and referred her to the PNP for medico-legal examination, which
confirmed the allegations of rape.
The RTC found Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the findings of the RTC, but only on two counts of rape. With respect to the other incidents,
according to the appellate court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that
she was raped on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002.
Therefore, the appellate court concluded that her statement is inadequate and insufficient to prove the
other charges of rape.
ISSUE
W/N the acquittal of Flores on 179 counts of rape was valid
W/N the testimonies of AAA were credible enough to warrant the conviction of Flores on two counts
of rape
W/N the quaifying circumstance of relationship must apply in the case, the accused being the guardian
of AAA.
HELD
Yes, the Court is in full accord of the acquittal of the accused on 179 counts of rape as these were not
clearly established and proven and were merely general allegations that the AAA was raped for a
number of times during her stay with Flores. Only the first and last rape incidents were clearly estab-
lished through the testimonies of AAA.
Yes. Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAAs testimony credible. The RTC considered
it straightforward and consistent on material points, while the Court of Appeals described it as spon-
taneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious contradictions.
However, the prosecution did not mention the qualifying circumstance of being a guardian in the
information. They only mentioned that the accused was the adoptive parent, but failed to establish
such.
No. In People v. Delantar[45] it was held that the guardian envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic
Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged
for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child
to at least two clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it consid-
ered accused as a de facto guardian. However, this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the
higher penalty pursuant to the ruling in Garcia.
PEOPLE v. GADUYON
G.R. No. 181473
November 11, 2013
FACTS
This case involves a father raping his 12 year old daughter in three separate occasions. Three
informations were filed against the appellant. One for Qualified Rape, One for Sexual Abuse, and
One for Qualified Object Rape. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusations.

Appellant is married to the mother of AAA with whom he has three daughters with AAA being
the eldest. On August 21, 2002, AAA and the appellant was left in the house since the mother
and AAA's sisters attended the wake of her aunt in Caloocan City. At around 9 pm of the said
date, AAA was lying in her bed in the family room when appellant fondled her breasts and
touched her arms. Appellant threatened AAA not to tell her mother or else something bad will
happen to the latter.

At around 11pm of the following day, and while the mother and AAA's siblings were still away,
appellant had carnal knowledge with AAA and threatened her again afterwards. After more
than a month or on October 9, 2002 at about 10:30pm, while AAA was sleeping in a double deck
with her sister in the lower bed, AAA was suddenly awakened and she noticed that her shorts
had been lowered while appellant was lying beside her. Appellant inserted his index finger in
the vagina of AAA. The victim can only cry from the pain. Appellant once again threatened AAA
after the ordeal.

After a few minutes, AAA's mother entered into the room where her daughters were sleeping.
She noticed that AAA was covered with pillows except for her face and feet. She also noticed
that the panty of AAA was slightly lowered and was inserted at the center of her genitalia. The
mother then suspected that appellant did something bad to AAA since only she and her husband
were awake at that time. She remained silent and prayed.

At school the following day, the teachers of AAA confronted her and asked if appellant had done
anything bad to her. AAA answered yes and told them that the ordeal happened twice. The
mother and AAA then went to the police station in which a physical examination was done
showing that she was in a non-virgin state. Psychological tests also show that AAA was suffering
from a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder with depressed mood.

The defense denied the accusations against him and said that at the time of the incident on
August 21, 2002, he was overseeing their computer shop and that on August 22, the crime could
not have been committed since the mother and AAA's siblings already arrived from the wake.
The defense also believed that the accusations caused by the wife was false. This was due to the
wife's infidelity which the wife confessed to according to the appellant. Appellant's mother cor-
roborated his testimony.

The RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and sexual abuse in which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE
W/N the prosecution failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the
crimes.

HELD
No, the appellant argues that his alibi and denial deserve greater weight in evidence that the
testimony of the prosecution witness. RA 7610 defines sexual abuse. It includes the employ-
ment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist an-
other person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prosti-
tution, or incest with children. Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either di-
rectly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same
or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the

sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pu-
bic area of a person.

The information filed against appellant was for violation of Sec. 5 of RA 7610 which says that:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syn-
dicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

In paragraph (b), the following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits the act of sex-
ual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prosti-
tution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female is below
eighteen (18) years of age. This paragraph "punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuse". It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.

The testimony of AAA reveals that there was carnal knowledge with force, threat, or intimida-
tion on August 22, 2002. Appellant also committed rape with sexual assault when he inserted
his finger into the genitalia of AAA on October 9, 2002. Appellant violated RA 7610 when he
subjected AAA, 12 years old, to sexual abuse by means of lascivious conduct through intimida-
tion or influence when he mashed her breasts and stroke her arms on August 21, 2002.

Appellant stresses the inconsistencies of AAA and other prosecution witnesses on the alleged
rape and disclosure of AAA's ordeal. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by appellant's con-
tention. The Court said that the inconsistencies only refer to consequential matters and does
not warrant the acquittal of the crime since the decisive factor for rape is whether or not the
crime has been sufficiently proven. Victims do not keep in their memory an accurate account of
the manner in which they were violated. Rape victims, especially children, should not be
expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation.

PEOPLE v. VIVENCIO ROALLOS y TRILLANES

Prepared by: Miguel Pesuena
G.R. No. 198389
December 11, 2013
FACTS
Vivencio Roallos Trillanes, a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and BBB,
AAA’s mother, worked as his secretary and treasurer. On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m.,
AAA, 15 years of age, went to BBB’s office at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB, however, was
then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mother’s office and wait for the
latter to return. When the office was emptied, Roallos chatted with AAA. After a while, he
started to make advances, holding hear breasts and slowly slid his hands to her abdomen. AAA
then stomped her feet and pushed her chair towards Roallos, causing him to leave the office.
However, he returned after 10 minutes and forcefully kissed AAA on the cheek. She once again

stomped her feet and Roallos finally left. As soon as BBB came back, she saw AAA, crying, who
subsequently relayed to her what just happened. Due to this, BBB and AAA immediately went
to the police station where they filed the report against Roallos. The latter was arrested and
brought to the police station for investigation. He denied all charges by stating that he was only
stayed with AAA in the office and that the reason why he went out twice was due to his meeting
with clients.
RTC rendered a Decision finding Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The MR was also denied by the RTC. CA likewise affirmed the
decision.
Roallos alleges that the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
only applies when the victim is a child engaged in prostitution or when they indulge in lascivi-
ous conduct due to the coercion of an adult or a syndicate. Thus, he claims that he is not liable
for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged
in prostitution. In any case, he avers that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not suffi-
cient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in affirming Roallos’ conviction for the offense of sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
HELD
NO. The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed against
Roallos clearly makes out a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are
as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
2. The act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts to-
wards AAA, i.e., that he mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter. It likewise al-
leged that AAA, at the time she was subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos, was only 15 years of
age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are
set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos
Roallos’ assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. "The law covers
not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article
III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only
to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is
deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under
the coercion or influence of any adult."

EMILIO RAGA y CASIKAT v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 200597
February 19, 2014

FACTS
One night in the year 2000, AAA, the 5 year old child of herein accused Emilio Raga, was sud-
denly awakened when her father Raga removed her clothes and tried to insert his penis into
her vagina. When Raga was unsuccessful in inserting his penis into her, he inserted his finger
instead. He proceeded in doing this several times while holding his penis until a white sub-
stance came out of it afterwards. AAA told her mother about what Raga did to her but her
mother did nothing about this.
Sometime in 2004, AAA, who was already 9 years old at that time, was sleeping in the room
while her siblings were asleep in the living room with Raga. AAA was awakened when Raga
carried her from the room to the living room. Raga let her watch bold movies but AAA would
just turn away. Thereafter, AAA Raga removed AAA’s clothes, laid on top of her and tried to
insert his penis into her vagina. Since he was unsuccessful in doing this, he inserted his finger
instead. There is history of Raga whipping AAA, and because she feared that he might strike her
again, she did not do anything while he was sexually abusing her.
AAA claims that she was raped several times but can only remember two dates specifically, the
2000 and 2004 incident. Raga denied these allegations and raised his alibis. As regards the year
2000 incident, he raised the alibi that he was a stay-in-worker in his place of work. For the 2004
incident, he ssaid that he caught AAA watching bold movies and he reprimanded her by hitting
her buttocks with a slipper to discipline her. The day after, he saw AAA and his wife talking to
women from Bantay Bata, stating that that was the last time he saw AAA. Upon learning the
charges upon him, he was surprised and voluntary surrendered.
In both criminal cases charged against him, the RTC ruled that Raga was guilty beyond reason-
able doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault under 266-A paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code and was in accordance with Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
Raga appealed to the CA. The CA sustained the conviction of Raga.
ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s guilt for the crimes charged?
HELD
No, the CA was correct in sustaining the conviction of Raga. From the careful examination of the
records, there is no reason to disturb the determination of AAA’s credibility. Her straightfor-
ward, candid and intrepid revelation in coming forward to avenge the immoral defilement upon
her person is more convincing and plausible compared to the weak and uncorroborated de-
fense of petitioner. Her general statements remained consistent throughout trial as she re-
counted the sordid details of her tormenting experience in the hands of her own father.

During the hearing of the case, the judge as the advantage of observing the witness’ manner of
testifying, her “furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath” which serves as useful aids for the
determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. With these, the judge can determine whether
the witnesses are telling the truth. Unless certain facts of substance and value were over-
looked, which if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial court’s assess-
ment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor

of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMENIGILDO DELEN

Prepared by: Raymond Villafuerte
G.R. No. 194446
April 21, 2014
FACTS
AAA, who was born on March 29, 1992, was the daughter of Petitioner Hermenigildo Delen y Es-
cobilla (Delen). One night, she was awakened with Delen removing her shorts and panty. He then
removed his shorts and went on top of her. He inserted his penis into her organ and told her not to
create any noise because their neighbors might hear them, warning her that he would kill her if she
would report the incident. AAA could not do anything but cry. Subsequently, at around 6:00 a.m. on
January 17, 2005, AAA woke up with her legs spread apart and tied to wooden panels on the wall.
He then lay on top of her and began to insert his penis into her organ, which caused her pain. While
he was doing said act, he told AAA not to report the incident; otherwise, he threatened to cut her
tongue and kill her. Thereafter, he untied her.
On January 23, 2005, Delen asked AAA to look for a lighter. When AAA failed to find one, he told
her to go inside a room in their house. There, he kicked AAA in the buttocks, hit her head with a
hammer and smashed her head on the wooden wall. She suffered injuries on her forehead and the
back of her head. Afterwards, she told Delen that she was going to use the toilet so she was able to
go out of their house. She ran to the street and went to the house of a neighbor, Ate Annie. Delen
looked for her there so she hid under the bed. After he left, AAA was brought to the house of Nanay
Loleng, a neighbor of Ate Annie. They treated AAA’s wounds and put her to sleep. When she woke
up, the barangay tanods were already at the place. They first talked to AAA then they called the police
so that Delen could be apprehended. When Delen was arrested, AAA was brought to the police station
where she gave her statement. AAA was then taken to the hospital where she was treated and exam-
ined by doctors.
The RTC found Delen guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the crimes of Child Abuse (by infliction of
physical injury) under Section 10(a), Article 6 of RA 6710 and Qualified Rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction. Delen now seeks a reversal through this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC and Court of Appeals erred in their decision of convicting Delen of Child Abuse and
Rape- NO
HELD
Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse" is defined as the
maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes the physical abuse of a child,
among other acts.
In this case, AAA positively identified Delen as the person who kicked her in the buttocks, hit her
head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on January 23, 2005. Because of his brutal
and inhumane acts, AAA suffered bruises and contusions in different parts of her body. The Medi-
coLegal Certification of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano clearly reflected the fact that AAA indeed
sustained contusions, coupled with a finding that she suffered multiple physical injuries secondary to
mauling.

To exculpate himself from the charges of child abuse and rape, Delen merely denied the accusations
of AAA. The Court finds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in rejecting the accused
appellant’s bare denials. Undeniably, he did not present any clear and convincing evidence to sub-
stantiate his claims that another person with mental defect could have raped AAA and that her injuries
were caused when she fell in a canal beside their house. He also failed to present any evidence to
prove that AAA was impelled by ill motive to testify against him. Settled is the rule that where no
evidence exists to show any convincing reason or improper motive for a witness to falsely testify
against an accused, the testimony deserves faith and credit.
PEOPLE v. BARCELA
Prepared by: Benson Thomas Aquino
G.R. No. 183896
April 23, 2014
FACTS
Barcela was charged with the following crimes: 1] Qualified Rape, 2] Violation of Article 266-A(2)
in relation to R.A. No. 7610; and 3] Violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness):
Private complainants BBB and AAA were living, along with the appellant, their mother, grandmother
and sister in a two-storey house where all of the family members sleep together in one room in San
Pedro, Laguna, because the other rooms [were] being rented to other people. AAA was seven (7)
years old when her stepfather, appellant Barcela, committed the despicable by sexually abusing her.
She was lying on the floor sleeping one early morning in 2002, when she was awakened and noticed
that her stepfather lifted her clothes and removed her shorts. Appellant then placed his hand on his
organ as AAA lay still with her hands on the floor shocked by what was happening. Appellant suc-
cessfully inserted his penis inside complainant AAA’s vagina. While committing the bestial act, ap-
pellant threatened her not to tell anyone what he was doing to her, otherwise he would kill her.
Her elder sister BBB also suffered the same horrible fate. On 12 November 2004 at around 3:00
o’clock in the morning, appellant Barcela made a similar sexual assault upon BBB who was only
fourteen (14) years at that time. It happened while BBB was sleeping in one room with her stepfather,
mother and other sister. Appellant was lying at her right side. Suddenly, appellant lifted her skirt,
removed her underwear and inserted his finger inside her vagina. After accomplishing the atrocious
act, appellant threatened to kill her if she [would] disclose to anyone what happened to her. BBB was
very afraid because of the threat that she pretended to be asleep after being raped. On that same night,
BBB also saw her stepfather molesting her sister AAA. BBB also testified that prior to being raped
in 2004, appellant had been regularly touching her private organ.
AAA informed her mother, grandmother and her sister BBB of what happened to her. Sadly, her
mother did not believe her but her grandmother and sister BBB (who also suffered the same fate)
believed her. BBB then informed her classmate, teacher and school principal of the grim experience
she and her sister underwent in the hands of her stepfather. Her grandmother was summoned by the
principal and, together, they reported to the police the rape incidents. In order to protect herself, AAA
stayed at the "Kanlungan" shelter. As a result of the loathsome episode in their lives, AAA and BBB
both felt afraid, ashamed and aggrieved.
Private complainants were eventually examined by Dr. Roy Camarillo, a medico-legal officer of the
Philippine National Police. In his medico-legal report, he concluded that BBB sustained a shallow
healing laceration in her hymen caused by the insertion of a hard object which may be a penis, finger
or a flat hard object. As regards the examination conducted on AAA, he concluded that there was no
evident injury at the time of the examination but testified that the injury that AAA incurred may have
totally healed as the rape occurred two (2) years from the time of the examination.

ISSUE
W/N Barcela violated R.A. 7610
HELD
The Court also upholds Barcela’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL of Acts of Lascivious-
ness committed against a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which reads:
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: x x x. (Italics supplied)
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Here, it was proven with certitude that Barcela had repeatedly molested BBB by regularly touching
her vagina since 2003 when she was still in Grade III. This act is covered by the definition of "las-
civious conduct" under Section 2 (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation
of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement R.A. No. 7610:
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the geni-
talia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with intent to abuse, humil-
iate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or private area of a person.
The circumstance of relationship, Barcela being the common-law husband of BBB’s mother, cannot
be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance to increase the imposable penalty. While it is
true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity
(such as Acts of Lasciviousness), regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower
degree of the offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender." The relationship between
Barcela and BBB is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned.
PEOPLE v. ALHAMBRA y MASING

Prepared by: Kevin Dominic G. Dinsay
G.R. No. 207774
June 30, 2014
FACTS
Alhambra was charged with the crime of rape and acts of lasciviousness under Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 of his own seventeen (17) year old daughter, AAA.

Upon medical examination, AAA’s hymen showed deep healed lacerations, which evinces the
conclusion that “an erect penis, a finger, or a blunt instrument” had caused the lacerations, “alt-
hough it cannot be determined how many times the vagina was penetrated.”
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA af-
firmed the decision of the lower court.
Alhambra alleged that he cannot be convicted for the crime of sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is neither a child exploited in prostitution nor a child
subjected to other sexual abuse.
ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated February 2, 2011, which found Alhambra
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and of sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

HELD
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c)
when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
The Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the ele-
ments of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA testified that Alhambra succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with her on October 16, 2004, and, thus, being AAA’s father, is presumed to
have employed force and/or intimidation. Both the lower courts found AAA’s testimony in this
matter straightforward and worthy of credence.
Alhambra’s assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse is
plainly without merit. The law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit
but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious con-
duct. A child is deemed subjected to “other sexual abuse” when he or she indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.
As established by the prosecution, Alhambra was only able to consummate his lascivious design
towards AAA through coercion and with the use of his influence over the latter as her father.

PEOPLE v. GERANDOY
Prepared by: Danica Evangelista
G.R. No. 202838
September 17, 2014
FACTS
Julito Gerandoy was charged with two counts of the crime of rape under Article 266-A, para-
graph 1 in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code for having sexual intercourse
with AAA, a 13 year-old girl, who happens to be his own daughter, with the qualifying circum-
stance of use of a deadly weapon.
The RTC found Gerandoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt for each count of rape. Upon appeal,
the CA modified the decision, thus:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby MODIFIES the assailed Decision
dated February 13, 2009 of the Regional Trial Comi, Branch 29, Surigao City in Criminal
Case Nols]. 6624 and 6625. The Accused-Appellant Julito Gerandoy is found GUILTY of
two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation with Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
7610 or Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA ruled that the two counts of rape have not been sufficiently established by the prosecu-
tion with moral certainty but nevertheless still found the accused liable for acts of lascivious-
ness in relation with Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610. It found credible the testimony of
AAA that the accused hugged, kissed her lips and nipples, caressed her body and touched her
breasts. The appellate court dismissed the argument that it is highly unlikely that the victim
would be sexually abused in a small room surrounded by her own siblings. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
W/N the CA ruled correctly in modifying the RTC decision- YES
HELD
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 describes how
rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Rape is qualified if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil de-
gree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Upon review, we find the positive
and credible testimony of AAA sufficient to convict the accused of the crime of rape.
The appellate court lowered the crime from rape to acts or lasciviousness upon finding that the
testimony of the victim was incomplete to constitute all the elements of rape. Lascivious con-
duct is defined as intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus
or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humili-
ate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturba-
tion, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. The elements of sexual abuse
are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
It is deemed that a child is sexually abused under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, when

he or she is subjected to other lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.
There must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation, which subdues the free
exercise of the offended party's free will.
In this case, the prosecution established that Gerandoy again entered the room where AAA was
sleeping and performed lascivious acts against her. Despite AAA 's objection, Gerandoy touched
parts of her body. He continued his sexual advances by undressing AAA and forced her to lie
down. He kissed AAA's lips, mounted himself on top of her and touched and sucked AAA's nip-
ple.

ROSALDES v. PEOPLE
Prepared by: Ivy Lou F. Flores
G.R. No. 173988
October 8, 2014
FACTS
Michael Ryan Gonzales, seven years old, then Grade 1 pupil, was hurriedly entering his class-
room when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, herein petitioner, Felina Rosaldes,
who was then asleep. Rosaldes asked Gonzales to apologize but he did not obey but instead
proceeded to his seat. Rosaldes went to Gonzales and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held
him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. The boy’s body hit a desk and he subse-
quently lost consciousness. Rosaldes picked the boy by his ears and repeatedly slammed him
down on the floor.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting Rosaldes of child abuse. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner constitute child abuse
penalized under Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610, and not under the RPC
HELD
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment
of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned
the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority.

Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same au-
thority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school adminis-
trator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority
inflict corporal punishment upon the child.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly: x x x x (b) “Child abuse” refers to
the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1)
Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival,
such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured

child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent inca-
pacity or death.

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act
by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual.

PEOPLE VS JOSON
G.R. No. 206393
January 21, 2015
FACTS
Appellant is the brother of AAA, the victim 14 years of age. AAA lives with appellant and the
latter's common law wife. On May 14, 2009 at 1:00 am in the morning, when the wife of appel-
lant was away, the latter had carnal knowledge with AAA. In the morning after, appellant left a
note apologizing to AAA for what he has done and that AAA should not tell the ordeal to appel-
lant's wife as to preserve their family. At around afternoon of the same date, AAA told the ordeal
to the appellant's wife. And on June 1, 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the in-
cident to the police. The prosecution presented the birth certificate of AAA to prove that she
was still a minor at the time the rape was committed on May 14, 2009. A medico legal was also
presented by the prosecution.

Appellant raised the defense of alibi, saying that he was in Cavite at the time of the incident and
only went back to his house in Dasmarinas on May 26, 2009. The appellant also said that the
accusation was fueled by the fact that AAA resented him since he and his wife were strict with
her. Appellant also denied writing the apology letter and even submitted a specimen handwrit-
ing in court

RTC convicted appellant of rape in relation to RA 7610 in which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE
W/N appellant should be convicted for the crime of Rape as defined in article 266 A of the RPC
in relation to RA 7610

HELD
Yes. Appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of rape as defined
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the elements of force, threat or in-
timidation. Appellant argues that AAA did not allege that she was threatened by appellant with
the use of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor did appellant say anything to threaten or in-
timidate her. With respect to moral ascendancy, appellant contends that the Court in a recent
case did not consider a brother as one of those close kin who has moral ascendancy over a vic-
tim that would substitute for force and intimidation. Appellant further points out that there was
no showing of any resistance on the part of AAA to his alleged sexual advances.


For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecu-
tion must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accom-
plished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or oth-
erwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. AAA's testimony
has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own brother
as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his penis
into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust.

PEOPLE v. SANTOS y ENCINAS
GR No. 205308
February 11, 2015
FACTS
Santos was charged with 16 informations with one count of rape in relation with R.A. 7610 and
15 counts of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of R.A.
7610. The 15 counts of acts of lasciviousness constitutes Santos’ kissing of AAA’s neck and lips
and licking her vagina from July 1997 to September 1998. Santos also put his penis in her mouth
on July and August 1997.
AAA, the eight year old granddaughter of accused Santos testified that she was grabbed while
she was playing outside her house. She did not shout for help because Santos covered her
mouth and brought her to a room inside his house. In the house, he licked her vagina and poked
his penis into her vagina. Santos also kissed her lips and neck. AAA testified that once a month
from July 1997 to September 1998, Santos would forcibly put his penis inside her mouth. He
would give her money ranging from1.50 pesos to 5 pesos after he was done with her. AAA did
not tell anyone about the incident because she was scared.
AAA’s mother testified that a relative informed her that Santos has also been molesting her
other minor daughter BBB by making BBB hold his penis. When AAA was asked by her mother
about the molesting incidents, she finally told her mother about the truth behind such incidents.
AAA and BBB were brought by their mother to the hospital to be checked by medico-legal. The
findings stated that AAA’s hymen was intact with wider opening.
Santos raised the defense of denial in sexually abusing AAA, saying that he was always at sea
during the alleged incidents as he was a fisherman.
The trial court ruled that Santos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under
Art. 335 of the RPC, in relation with R.A. 7610 and acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 in rela-
tion with R.A. 7610. However, he raised the case on appeal. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision. It stated that the defense of denial cannot overcome the positive testimony of AAA
which was consistent, straightforward and sufficiently established the culpability of Santos. At
the same time, his alibi of being a fisherman at sea does not preclude his presence at the crime
of the scene. Moreover, no further witnesses were able to corroborate Santos’ alibi.
ISSUES
W/N the CA erred in upholding the decision of the RTC?


W/N the act of inserting the penis into another person’s mouth is considered as a violation of
rape or acts of lasciviousness?
HELD
No, the CA did not err in upholding the decision of the RTC. Santos’ guilt was clearly established
by the witnesses and the evidences of the prosecution. Denial and alibi, which are self-serving
negative evidence and easily fabricated, especially when uncorroborated, cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of a credible witness. Appellant’s de-
nial and uncorroborated defense of alibi cannot prevail over the credible and positive
testimony of AAA that appellant raped her and committed acts of lasciviousness against
her. AAA’s testimony was replete with delicate details which she could not have concocted her-
self. She was consistent in her testimony and never wavered even during cross-examination.

Under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape
is also committed when a person inserts his penis into another person’s mouth through force
or intimidation. However, since the two incidents of Santos putting her penis into AAA’s
mouth happened prior to the effectivity of RA 8353, the informations for Criminal Case
Nos. 7588 and 7589 correctly charged the accused with acts of lasciviousness (violation
of Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610).
DIMAKUTA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 206513
October 20, 2015
FACTS
Petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom alias Boyet was indicted for Violation of Section 5
Paragraph (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory Act committing a lascivious conduct upon the
person of one AAA, who was then a sixteen (16) year old minor, by embracing her, touching her
breast and private part against her will and without her consent.
RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. When asked to comment on the appeal, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opined that petitioner should have been convicted only of
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in view of the prose-
cution’s failure to establish that the lascivious acts were attended by force or coercion because
the victim was asleep at the time the alleged acts were committed. The CA adopted the recom-
mendation of the OSG. Petitioner applied for probation.
ISSUE
W/N the change in the offense charged from Acts of Lasciviousness of R.A. No. 7610 to the RPC
grants the accused the privilege of probation
HELD
In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation Law that “no application for pro-
bation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judg-
ment of conviction,” prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies because the law is unmistakable about it. Indeed, the law is very clear and a contrary
interpretation would counter its envisioned mandate. Courts have no authority to invoke "lib-
eral interpretation” or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and as

illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. To be sure,
the remedy of convicted felons who want to avail of the benefits of intertwined with the present
petition.

The petition should be denied.

VITANGCOL v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 207406
January 13, 2016
FACTS
Norberto married Alice Eduardo. After some time, Alice began hearing rumors that her husband
was previously married to another woman. She eventually discovered that Norberto was pre-
viously married to a certain Gina Gaerlan, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with
the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against
Norberto.
The RTC convicted Norberto guilty of bigamy for contracting a second marriage with Alice de-
spite his subsisting valid marriage with Gina. On appeal, the CA sustained the guilty verdict.
Hence, this petition.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence
a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office
has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He
argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage li-
cense—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. Norberto claims that
the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
ISSUE
W/N the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage
license issued to Norberto and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage
and exculpates him from the bigamy charge- NO
HELD
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements:
[first,] that the offender has been legally married;
[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the
civil registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage li-
cense allegedly issued in their favor. Contrary to petitioner's claim, all the elements of bigamy
are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner's first marriage was solem-
nized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on
August 3, 1988. Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code govern the validity of his first mar-
riage. Thus, Art. 53 of the Civil Code provides the requisites of marriage. The fourth requisite—
the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either con-
tracting party habitually resides. To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, "the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties." The Certificate from the Office of the
Civil Registrar presented by petitioner does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was sol-
emnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No.
8683519 does not exist. In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a
marriage license number freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the mar-
riage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987.
The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years,
four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring
the first marriage as spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner's belief that there was
no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.
Assuming without conceding that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a mar-
riage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner's first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code. The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case. Should the
requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy,
Article 349 of RPC becomes useless. "All that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to ... contract
a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage
is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration
of nullity of the first." The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner
admitted that he subsequently married Alice. As for the last element of bigamy, that the subse-
quent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy
was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to
Gina having been judicially declared void. Persons intending to contract a second marriage
must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed
with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy re-
gardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

VIRGINIA JABALDE y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE

GR No. 195224
June 15, 2016
FACTS
In 2000, Lin Bito-on, the minor victim, was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan Elementary School. He
testified that they were playing “langit lupa” during recess with his classmate Ray Ann, Marco,
Nova and another classmate. While they were playing, he touched the shoulder of Nova which
caused her to fall down and wound her head. As he was helping her up, one of his classmates
called Nova’s mother Jabalde (who happens to be victim Lin’s grandmother as well). Jabalde
arrived thereafter and slapped him on his neck and choked him. He was able to get out of the
chokehold so he ran towards their house and told his mother Aileen about what happened. He

was sent to hospital for treatment. Dr. Munoz issued a medical certificate to him stating that Lin
sustained abrasions on his right mandibular area, lateral neck, left lateral neck and the back of
his neck. They were signs of fingernail marks and were still fresh as indicated by the greenish
color of the abrasions. They were also thought to be caused by a hard object or mildly inflicted
on the child.
The defense presented herein-accused Jabalde herself. She stated that while she was teaching
someone ran into the classroom and shouted that her daughter’s head was punctured. Thinking
that her daughter died, she fainted. She thereafter regained consciousness. Students went to
her classroom again shouting the same thing with regard to her daughter puncturing her head.
She said that she went to look for her daughter but ended up finding her grandson Lin crying
“Lola, forgive me, forgive me”. Jabalde went to her daughter’s classroom, saw her there, and
brought her to her own classroom to apply first aid on her.
The Court found Jabalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of Section 10(a) of
Art. VI of R.A.7610. Jabalde appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied his
appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES
W/N the RTC erred in appreciating the acts of Jabalde as constitutive of violation of Section
10(a), Article 6 of R.A. 7610?
HELD
Yes, the RTC erred because Jabalde is found to be in violation of slight physical injuries under
Art. 266(2) of the RPC and not child abuse under R.A. 7610. Jabalde was accused of slapping
and striking Lin, but the records do not show that Jabalde intended to debase, degrade, or de-
mean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human being. The laying of hands on Lin was
an effect of Jabalde’s emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter’s head was
punctured which made her think that she was already dead. Moreover, testimony of Dr. Munoz
stated that the abrasions may have been mildly inflicted. This runs contrary to the accusation
that she intended to abuse or maltreat Lin, because if she did, she could have easily hurt the 7
year old boy with heavy blows. As a mother, the idea of the death of her child caused an instinc-
tive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger in the form of the mild
abrasions inflicted on Lin. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked the intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that is essential in the child of crime abuse.

She was proven guilty of 266(2) because the essential element of “dolo” or malice was coupled
with her employment of physical injuries on Lin. The testimonies stated that when she struck
Lin, she shouted “Better that you are able to free yourself because if not I should have killed
you”. The laying of hands and the utterance of words threatening the life of Lin established the
fact that she intended to cause or inflict physical injuries on Lin. She is therefore guilty for slight
physical injuries against Lin.


PEOPLE vs. TALAP-TALAP
G.R. No. 209344
June 27, 2016
FACTS
Around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31, 2001, the victim, AAA, who was then four (4) years
old, was playing at the basketball court near their house located at Barangay Dimanayat, San Luis,
Aurora. Accused-appellant then approached and asked her to go with him to a nearby mango tree
where he promised to give her candies. When AAA agreed, accused-appellant took her hand and led
her to the mango tree which was near his house. Upon reaching the mango tree, accused-appellant
immediately removed AAA's short pants and panty then proceeded to mash her private organ and
inserted his finger into her vagina. Thereafter, accused-appellant made her lie down on the ground
and inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant warned AAA not to tell anybody about what
he did to her, otherwise he will kill her.
Stricken by fear, AAA went home without telling anybody about her ordeal. However, the next morn-
ing, AAA's mother, BBB, observed that her daughter had difficulty urinating. She examined AAA's
vagina and found that it was swollen. BBB then cleaned AAA's sex organ and asked her the reason
why it was swollen. AAA then told BBB that accused-appellant molested her. Upon learning about
what happened to her daughter, BBB brought her child to one of their Barangay Kagawads to report
the incident. A criminal complaint was filed against accused-appellant. There, the authorities gathered
information regarding AAA's molestation where AAA reiterated her statements. Thereafter, AAA
was examined by a medical doctor who prepared a medico-legal report. Subsequently, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora filed an Information5 with the RTC of Baler, charging accused-
appellant with the crime of statutory rape.
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the prosecution and raised the defense of
alibi.
Accused-appellant's basic contention is that he was wrongly convicted because the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In support of his claim, he posits the following arguments:
(1) AAA's unexplained delay of five (5) days in reporting her alleged rape to her mother, as well as
her failure to immediately identify accused-appellant as the supposed perpetrator of the crime, greatly
affects her credibility; (2) AAA's credibility is also subject to question considering her failure to
clearly narrate her alleged rape during her testimony in court and that what she did was merely to
confirm the leading questions propounded to her by the prosecutor; (3) AAA's actuations immediately
after her supposed rape, wherein she showed no outrage or fear towards accused-appellant, are not
the natural reaction of the victim of a crime.
ISSUE
W/N accused violated RA 7610 (Committed statutory rape)- YES
HELD
Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has, in fact, been committed. When the offended party is of tender age
and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

Besides, the testimony of AAA is corroborated by the findings of the physician who examined her
indicating "swelling and tenderness of the labia majora" "swelling, redness and tenderness of the
labia minora," "whitish discharge from the vaginal os," "multiple erosions at the perineum and labia
minora," "broken hymen at the 4 & 5 o'clock positions.” When asked about her findings, the physician
concluded "that there was a penetration of the area causing all these erosions, all these wounds [and]
lacerations and there was a penetration of something that was hard breaking into the hymen.”
With respect to the penalty for rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
RPC, it is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, AAA was four (4) years
old. This calls for the application of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. 7610), or The Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which defines sexual abuse
of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5 (b), Article 111, to wit:
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The abovequoted paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a
child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not
only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one - through coercion, intimidation
or influence - engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.
In connection with the above provision of law, Section 2 (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 32 of
R.A. No. 7610, defines "Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genilalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person.
In the present case, AAA was four years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant
to the above-quoted provision of law, accused-appellant was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of ap-
plying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that AAA was below
twelve (12) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and considering further that
accused-appellant's act of inserting his finger in AAA's private part undeniably amounted to lascivi-
ous conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Thus, as held in People v. Ching:

The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under
Article [336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353], in relation to Section 5 (b),
Article 111 of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium

period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by pri-
sion mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the
franiers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses
committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which
must be applied when the victims arc children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or
those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."
Anti-Violence Against Women and

Their Children Act of 2004
[R.A. 9262]
ANG v. CA and SAGUD

G.R. No. 182835
April 20, 2010
FACTS
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a for-
mer boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
Complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in
Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the
end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his
wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Before Rustan got married, how-
ever, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did
not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take
on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. In 2005, Irish received through multi-
media message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s
face superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was
0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture
of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003. After she got the obscene
picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent
through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand,
read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor who referred her to the police. The police officers ar-
rested Rustan. After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, and convicted
Rustan of violating Sec. 5(h) of RA 9262.
ISSUE
W/N a “dating relationship” existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in RA
9262- YES

W/N a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already con-
stitutes a violation of Sec. 5(h) of RA 9262- YES
HELD
Sec. 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person
against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relation-
ship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legiti-
mate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any
form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman.
Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of vio-
lence against women and their children is committed through any of the follow-
ing acts:
xxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties
are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender
and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. But it seems clear that the law did not
use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that
the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance"
to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair." R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "vio-
lence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the
law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. The dating relation-
ship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse
taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off"
variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on
a continuing basis." The Court held that an "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two
lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.


Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form
of harassment. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that con-
stitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which trans-
lates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children.
Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO. v. RTC
G.R. No. 193960
January 07, 2013
FACTS
Karlo was charged with violation of Republic Act 9262 because he allegedly used physical violence
against ABC, her former girlfriend. When the Information was filed against him by the Office of the
City Prosecutor, and a warrant of arrest issued against him, he filed a Motion for Judicial Determina-
tion of Probable Cause and to Quash Information. According to him, he cannot be charged with vio-
lation of Republic Act 9262 because the incident subject of the case happened after their break-up,
which ABC admitted in her affidavit, hence there is no more “dating relationship” which will make
the case fall under Republic Act 9262, and the appropriate case should be slight physical injuries only
cognizable by the MTC. His motion was denied by the RTC, hence he filed a Rule 45 petition directly
with the Supreme Court on pure question of law.
ISSUE
W/N A person can be charged with Republic Act 9262 even if there is no longer a dating relationship.
HELD
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) “Violence against women and their children”
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or with-
out the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be
considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he
has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or
is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against
the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a

consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, apply-
ing the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts,
then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence
of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner’s
assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity because there
is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical
harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient
justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to pur-
posely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women
with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view
of promoting the protection of women and children.
The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless
in the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.

GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
FACTS
On March 23, 2006, private respondent Rosali Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a petition before the RTC of Bacolod for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) against her husband, petitioner Jesus Garcia, with R.A. 9262, “An Act Defining Violence
Agasint Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Pen-
alties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” (VAWC). Private respondent, due to her husband’s marital
infidelity, claimed to be a victim of multidimensional abuse, ranging from physical, emotional and
even including economic.
Petitioner had an affair with a bank manager of Robinson’s Bank, Bacolod. The admitted infidelity
gave rise to a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally hurt. There was
evident physical violence done to the private respondent. Threats of deprivation of support were also
apparent, as much as it was significant, considering that private respondent and her minor children
relied to petitioner for support.
The trial court found reasonable ground to believe that the danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children was imminent and has a high chance of being recurring, thus the issuance
of the TPO on March 24, 2006, with a validity for 30 days. The following month, the trial court, upon
motion of the private respondent, amended the TPO and extended the effectivity for another 30 days.
Numerous other TPOs were granted in favor of private respondent.
Upon appeal, the CA filed a TRO against the implementation of the TPO but dismissed the case
due to the fact that petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262, which should
have been brought up at the earliest opportunity. The denial of the subsequent motion for re-
consideration brought forth this present petition, with the contention that gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the father or husband of the remedies provided for by the law.

ISSUE
W/N R.A. 9262 is constitutional with regard to the equal protection clause of the Constitution- YES
HELD
The Court rules that the assailed law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
equal protection being simply a requirement that all persons or things similarly situated be treated in
the same manner, with respect to both rights accorded and responsibilities demanded.
In Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, the Court held that classification is allowed by the
Constitution as long as it: 1) contains substantial distinctions, 2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, 3) be not limited to existing conditions, and 4) applies equally to each member of the same class.
The Court finds that all four requisites concur with regard to the VAWC.
In all, the VAWC aims to address the apparent and significant inequality between men and
women. Our society, and laws, are deemed patriarchal throughout the course of our history.
Statistics also show that domestic abuse and violence are shouldered and experienced mostly
by women, rather than by men. The law aims to address the discrimination brought about by
prejudices against women and the biases that the legal and socio-economic systems of our so-
ciety espouse.

BBB v. AAA
Prepared by: Miguel Alberto I. Pesuena
G.R. No. 193225
February 09, 2015

FACTS
BBB and AAA allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA
was then a medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship,
a boy named CCC. During the relationship with BBB, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD
(born on December 11, 1997) and EEE (born on October 19, 2000). BBB and AAA married in
civil rights on October 10, 2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including
CCC’s, was amended to change their civil status to legitimated because of the marriage.

BBB alleges that AAA`s jealousy was the cause of their frequent arguments. AAA was suspicious
of his relations with his female co-workers. Due to their repeated fights, BBB left the family
home and thereafter, AAA left the family home as well with their children. This made it difficult
for BBB to see his children and cause for the family expense to be doubled.

On the other hand, AAA alleges that their arguments stem from BBB`s womanizing and when
confronted about it, he would even curse. AAA`s breaking point came when FFF, BBB`s alleged
mistress, insulted and humiliated AAA in public while infront of BBB. AAA decided to leave the
conjugal home and stayed with a friend along with her children but soon after, came back but
left CCC at their friend`s house. What made matters worse, according to AAA, was the apparent
biases of BBB in favor of DDD and EEE. That despite his promise to treat CCC as his own, BBB
would still treat the latter differently from the two kids, putting CCC at a disadvantage. AAA
found out that BBB has not been paying rent for the condominium that they lived in thus forcing
them to move out and at the same time, AAA had to look for a job to support the family. She also
found out that BBB was stalking them through one of his friends, GGG who lives in the same
compound as AAA does.

Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, [AAA] filed an applica-
tion for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same perma-
nent after due hearing, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Application was granted
and Temporary Protection Order was made permanent. Furthermore, both the RTC and the CA
found that under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, BBB had subjected AAA and
their children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital
infidelity, which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and psychological dis-
tress.
Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Render Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). BBB alleges that on July 29,
2013, he and AAA had entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental au-
thority over, and support of DDD and EEE. According to BBB, AAA should be presumed to have
acted with due care and full knowledge of the contents of the MOA which she signed. Further,
BBB’s alleged involvement with FFF is an issue which need not be resolved in a judgment based
on compromise.

ISSUES
W/N judgment should be rendered based from the MOA or compromise agreement between
AAA and BBB- NO

W/N EEE is entitled to support from BBB- YES

HELD
The Court cannot take the simplest course of making a decision by rendering a judgment merely
based on compromise as prayed for by BBB. Alleging psychological violence and economic
abuse, AAA anchored her application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially being assailed is the Per-
manent Protection Order issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, how-
ever, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise
agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of Re: Rules on VAWC explicitly prohibits compromise on
any act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon, the Court
declared that “violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault.”
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an
incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the
ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against
subjecting the instant petition to compromise applies.

BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which allegedly renders
moot the provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological
son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him.

This Court is not persuaded.

Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “[o]nly children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.” Article 178 states that “[l]egitimation
shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.”

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such
being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s
marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but
falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds applica-
tion and it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations.
He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations.
He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and pursu-
ant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a
legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s support.

Updates of Cases On: Prepared by

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Updates of Cases On: Prepared by

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

UPDATES OF CASES ON

R.A. 7610 and R.A. 9262

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 1 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 2 SY 2016-2017

PEOPLE v. LINDO Y VERGARA

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 3 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 4 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 6 SY 2016-2017

PEOPLE v. VIVENCIO ROALLOS y TRILLANES

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 7 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 8 SY 2016-2017

Raga appealed to the CA. The CA sustained the conviction of Raga.

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 9 SY 2016-2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMENIGILDO DELEN

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 10 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 11 SY 2016-2017

PEOPLE v. ALHAMBRA y MASING

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 12 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 14 SY 2016-2017

The RTC rendered judgment convicting Rosaldes of child abuse. CA affirmed.

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 15 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 16 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 17 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 18 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 19 SY 2016-2017

VIRGINIA JABALDE y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 20 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 21 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 22 SY 2016-2017

Thus, as held in People v. Ching:

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 23 SY 2016-2017

Anti-Violence Against Women and

ANG v. CA and SAGUD

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 25 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 26 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 27 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 29 SY 2016-2017

Submitted to Atty. Mel Sta. Maria Page 30 SY 2016-2017

Вам также может понравиться