Republic of the Philippines and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.
and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921
MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.
Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.
Powell & Hill for appellee.
STREET, J.:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year
1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the
city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living
thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to
resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live
with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her
husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been
compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief,
to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel
fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the
defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and
directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in
the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to
blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of
the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and
weighed every line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The evidence
shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to
his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. In view of the
decision which we are to pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the resumption of married
relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the mistakes of the past; and we prefer to record
the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal
infidelity, or has given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any person. The tales of cruelty on the
part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly
colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become
involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must
therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant's cross-
complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty
universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The
enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by
her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife is
forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to
make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to
pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation, (Mercado vs.Ostrand
courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this
step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and fraught with
grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate
maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible
and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M.
Cooley, held that an action for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when the
reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a
proceeding can be maintained also appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of
South Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme court fully
recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance, where it is impossible for her to continue
safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has more than once rejected the petition of the wife for
separate maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the
wife's own improper conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597; Boyd vs.Boyd,
Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)
Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where
cruelty on the part of the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the following
eloquent words, — which are perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a
jurisdiction where, as here, a divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this, too, after
the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime. Said he:
That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted, but the question
occurs, What is cruelty? . . .
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied
with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of
language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not
threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state
undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law
can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on
the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection;
must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer
in silence. . . .
The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity is the second virtue of
courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of humanity which
confined its views merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a question easily decided
upon first impressions. Every body must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each
other, who cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of
happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings, much less the first feelings of an
individual. The law has said that married persons shall not be legally separated upon the mere
disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. . . .
To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it were, it would not be
difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true
wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular
cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with
great severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the
married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, except
for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which
they know cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of remaining
husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes. . . . In this
 case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order
general good. (Evans vs.Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.) for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is,
without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it
is her duty to return.
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded and none of the
relief sought therein can be granted.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is
declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and
The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff,
she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special
Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an
pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So ordered.
obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him. The only question which here
arises is as to the character and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.
Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part
of the complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the
conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree
were entered, in unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should
refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction
whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.

Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights
at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforcible by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the
other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be
enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial
Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can
still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted
to make a peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not
been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation
by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do
so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does not appear that this order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that
would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
 Republic of the Philippines 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when
SUPREME COURT their love was aflame.
Manila
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
EN BANC being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"),
but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged
(Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul
her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees. complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for
the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and
Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2 On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections,
then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil
register.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and
with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before
their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another
suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the
room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because
when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married
damages;.
Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were
disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06).
The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to 3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority counterclaims; and.
from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did
not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño,
Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us.
Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage,
which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is
nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act
3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to
give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or
one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered
to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to
note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage,
when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's
sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence,
such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until
annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of
First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought
and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108),
and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen
Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce
court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam
quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the
court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform
her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused
through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute,
contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is
technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior
to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our
statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil
Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned,
are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this
Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after
the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union
is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent
consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed
error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not)
would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and
the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña
Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes
us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was
begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the
defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the
record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her
hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their
shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to
the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to
assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law
an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled
to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and
has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000
only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the
latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is
not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where
he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and Escaño;
be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest
or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, damages and attorneys' fees;
although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in
good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Neither party to recover costs.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to
give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that
(a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on
appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally
agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf.
Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble
character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her
 Republic of the Philippines That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines,
SUPREME COURT and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did
Baguio City then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife,
against the latter[']s will.
FIRST DIVISION
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines,
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife,
against the latter's will.
DECISION

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home,
to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or
inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-
from oppression and wrong."1 appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in an Order13 dated August 19,
1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. 14
REYES, J.:
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15 averring that the name of the
private complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are
marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the
October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:

The Case
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
2 3
This is an automatic review of the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
each count.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18

The Facts

Criminal Case No. 99-669:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised
their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
7 Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant,
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
8
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution, finding
probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint
criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant. trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.

On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. Version of the prosecution
99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-
appellant as follows:
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which,
together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They got married
after a year of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari
store.21 Later on, they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the
businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a
trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the
trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the
daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was
the one who actively managed the businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that
objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City.26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons
stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied
her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she
went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on
the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both
frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm.30However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans
any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she
would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission. 31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to
him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at
home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and
focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in
Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were
already back in Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine. The
family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the
children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant
watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant
fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied. 35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the
accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and
transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling
well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties,
he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She
tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal
desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well." 42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom, 43KKK's
pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me," 44 MMM
woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room. 45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on
the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?" 46 The accused-appellant then
quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble,"
before closing it again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked
at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked
MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and
crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you
crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the
girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket. 50 However, their breakout
from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending
his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK
pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away,
MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out. 51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed:
"[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then
locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October 17, 1998,
KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already
ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and
prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the
beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with
the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P]
1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the
room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from
the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our
bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. 57 At this point, MMM
interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can
have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room.
Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless
mother resonate with the creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and
panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I
cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself
inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the
room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."
He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door
locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its
lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The
girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he
again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He
came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975,
he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard
work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own businesses that
included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or
com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on
October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to
Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com. 64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According
to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-
appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in
New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left
for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to
Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing
bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then
proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant
went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman. 65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over
the control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999.
The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business
earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only
a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report
to the police also belies her rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd
behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had
sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He
tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had also
become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door
and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out. 68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters
purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy
or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a
certain Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never
confronted her or them about it because he trusted her. 72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO
was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down
the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-
appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter
followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without
the accused-appellant because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-
appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the
accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents
intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No.
00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a
Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater
weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial
court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for
daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of
extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for
being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia,
as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2)
separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay
complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each
case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
 Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-
appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended
informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative
declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A.
No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the commission of the
crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual
obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the
alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external
injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was
forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the
truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if
it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she only found
out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave
threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes,
considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so
desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009,
the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On
April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in
Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is
negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure
to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood
traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man
conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of
obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or
her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was
merely using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three
ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until she marries to
become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later
buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous. 88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied her political
power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the
family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman
becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or write a
will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent
theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial
consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. 92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and England. It gives
legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a
woman not his wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a
woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in
1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show
marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as
basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute
immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had
the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for being
violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws. 99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases
where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires
such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation. 100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York declared
the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and
non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as
follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various
rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the
consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We
therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most
frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is
untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act
which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm
x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes,
marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly,
then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A
married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels
"aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing
domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman was the
property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of
the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the
common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a
separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations
omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the
act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution
such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that
the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in
a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335
of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife
to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the
CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The
Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in
addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other
appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting
all discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women. 108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of gender
equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles
of international law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated
the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and
removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most
progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing
its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty
shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable
that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
 b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; xxxx

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who
forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault
because of the sanctity of marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on
the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to
include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

xxxx

of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But
under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that
there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal
profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no
law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any
jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding
the definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for
marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The
wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction
there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is
the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it
here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we
have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our
provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to
the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal
husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the
second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not another definition of
rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit
rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I
guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract
does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape,
acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying
is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of
saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal
knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know
how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have
another classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in
the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.

MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no. HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence
is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of
pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1
understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version
which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this
bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion xxxx
perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal
husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to
the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime but instead,
we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not,
does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is
where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is
done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the
husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as
long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape. 112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually
change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be
committed by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a
legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under
the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely
clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or
intimidated into having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by
the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr.
Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x. 113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, 114 which regards
rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside
the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife
and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat
of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence are the
most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven
ever-married women experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual
violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal
brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for
rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and
cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless
the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape
cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground
that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife. 116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been
superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for human
dignity established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the
CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the
family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate
measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 117 One of such measures is R.A. No
8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always
obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The
Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women,
identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats
of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female
children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional
practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as
a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A.
No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with
his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity
equal120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a
sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments
and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities 121 that have lost their relevance in a
progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and
sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is
unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and
coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed
by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship. 124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil
marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels
aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the
court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation.125 But he
cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute
the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of
laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known;
(b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition
for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those
committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped
by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried
rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by
law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those
raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried
woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully
wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on
matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and
violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human
rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different
definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the
forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame
distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably
and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any
differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a
moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused
and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal principles and
evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed
to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate
that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may
be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish
that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing,
and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the
highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment,
conduct and attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted
with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial
proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness
stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and
certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination
and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16,
1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was
resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When
she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn
demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the
small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of
resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own
legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted. 133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While
her daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant
got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them
that as the head of the family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.
ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly
pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The xx xx
accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the
absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress. 136
Q So after that what else did he do?

Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because
he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is he is stronger than me.
demented.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and
intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
testimony of KKK, viz:
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held your two
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident: hands?

(Direct Examination) A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."

ATTY. LARGO: Q How did you say that to your husband?

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what happened? A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."

A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him. Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you? xxxx

A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand. A I shouted when I uttered that words.

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand? xxxx

A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap which means that Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
he wanted to have sex."
xxxx
Q So, what did you do after that?
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)
(Cross-Examination)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty? A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me
to do. I cannot withstand sex."
A Yes, Sir.
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he normally do that if he
have sex with you? A It was tom.

A Yes, Sir. Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that
time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with
me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs
and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual
sexual intercourse.

Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the
A Yes, Sir.
actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He
furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs. sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into
submission.
xxxx
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot
be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown? KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced
from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take
A No, Sir. place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or
at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given
is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face? when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a
sexual intercourse, which she refused.
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was
A No, only on the breast level.138 resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the
burden to prove resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she
seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she
(Direct Examination) refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.

ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about
the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that
the accused had in mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into
submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical
certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines
the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove
rape.144These details do not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. 145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which
are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently
weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was
not applied based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any
sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent. 147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as
discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness
the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is
usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. 148 Hence, the probative
value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their
declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent
with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and
crying: "Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the
accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-
appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so
hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion
from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor.
After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the
children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have
sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged inside the
children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered
her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is
the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly
crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of
force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October
16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were
clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant
opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and
her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the sexual
acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report the rape
incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in
reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is
considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin
Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and
physical injuries against the accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption
in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like
Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape
victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the
popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A
husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could
have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are
acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid
and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit
since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements
taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony
given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes
generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the ₱3 Million deposit in
the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which
is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount the
accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of
such loan, he admitted that approximately ₱3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of
evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in
the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK
when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The
accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged
love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such love letters
neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his
claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who
has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the
witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely
made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no
evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the
defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the
accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has
essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This
admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy
to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of
the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the
accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the
facility of access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was
hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The
accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at
his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be
traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was
available to the accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs
criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony of the victim,
and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to
falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to
consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO
and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the
Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17,
1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for
being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant
to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." 157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape
victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries
from the experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.1âwphi1 Considering that
the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the
appropriate amount is ₱50,000.00159 and not ₱75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an award of
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a
human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can
happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home,
committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an
affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not
own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an
exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital
coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to
felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine
whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the
marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual
cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use
this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice
system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes
untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The
award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Republic of the Philippines
Chief Justice SUPREME COURT
Chairperson Manila

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSMAIN EN BANC

Associate Justice Associate Justice
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
CERTIFICATION

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

TRENT, J.:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment
sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of
action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.

It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the
plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from
the defendant.

The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established
their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned
to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:

That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that
she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene
demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous
demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff
exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her
lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce
the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to
leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by General
Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague,
12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal
partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a
marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general
law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance
of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any
shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it
continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties
is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status
of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep.,
34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine
Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law
read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the
management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or
residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from
this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the
preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the
pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to
the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the
wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the
spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his
wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option,
do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on
account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established
by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897,
November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish
subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this
right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some
justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of
selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there was
any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person
obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive
it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro
Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father simply
claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken
by him toward providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it;
it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it
would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of
such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such
decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which
no opinion should be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court
held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a
preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to
support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married a
woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already been established by a final
judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the proposition that the
option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated
November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to
prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave
her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in
which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in
consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence,
for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her
property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support
and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the
plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein,
after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to
the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to
provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which
regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are
those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the
aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish
support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as limited
to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally
and this case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since,
until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of the product
of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to
disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary
to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with
the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the
family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is
their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that
the former has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode
where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her
property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support
 without need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon
Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the
assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spouses separated
voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for
the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the
marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme
court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one
of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons
such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the
same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband
who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court,
reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted,
said:
on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to
terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal
sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as
where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one;
and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may
be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in
the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case,
rest.

In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode, Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation
was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is
party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he
therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support
his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of Separate Opinions
article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the
situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of
MORELAND, J., concurring:
law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support
is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit
situation of the court above described.lawphil.net I based my vote in this case upon the ground that a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from
the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct,
drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905,
and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither applicable to the marital relation and repudiate his duties thereunder. In law and for all purposes within its purview,
spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final the wife still remains an inmate of the conjugal domicile; for I regard it as a principle of law universally recognized
judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not that where a person by his wrongful and illegal acts creates a condition which under ordinary circumstances would
necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here produce the loss of rights or status pertaining to another, the law will, whenever necessary to protect fully the rights
as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in or status of the person affected by such acts, regard the condition by such acts created as not existing and will recur
force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are to and act upon the original situation of the parties to determine their relative rights or the status of the person
articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the adversely affected.
Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the
husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave I do not believe, therefore, that the case is properly conceived by defendant, when the consideration thereof
insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal proceeds solely on the theory that the wife is outside the domicile fixed by the husband. Under the facts alleged in
of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their the complainant the wife is legally still within the conjugal domicile.
daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains
or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil
.Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an
exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken
the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by
this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore,
the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it
necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate
from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to
grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the
power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not
dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of
marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909 The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the
ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant, spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are mutually bound to
J.H. Junquera, for appellant.
support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of
Filemon Sotto, for appellee.
medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in
TORRES, J.:
order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the
party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo his professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law has expressly
Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was established between the married couple.
called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to
render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff
consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to
for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the
remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the
afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he
husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said
visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which
obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment
the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the
exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his
judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together
wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has
with any other relief that might be deemed proper.
been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to
recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and alleged as a his lawful wife in such an emergency.
special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was
alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against the
that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due
defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient
to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against
during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness
the plaintiff.
occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal
provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer, directing the defendants, from which such obligation might have arisen.
on the 23rd of January, 1907, to amend their answer. In compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the
same date, their amended answer, denying each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and
In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of Spain, while recognizing
requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.
the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to support another who
was not his relative, established the rule that the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger,
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court below on the 5th of April, but as the liability arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11,
1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient 1897.)
evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the
said judgment and in addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law; the motion
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves
was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course presented the corresponding bill of exceptions. The
upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of
motion of the defendants requesting that the declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had
her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the
demanded therefrom, for the reason that, according to the evidence, no such request had been made, was also
plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are
denied, and to the decision the defendants excepted.
under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves.

Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the plaintiff, by virtue of having been sent for by
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below are
the former, attended a physician and rendered professional services to a daughter-in-law of the said defendants
unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to declare whether or
during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of
not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.
his fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the
patient, or the husband of the latter.
Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from
should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by
illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Carson, J., concurs in the result.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are
Willard, J., dissents.
the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and
must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)