Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board and Grand International Airways G.R. No.

119528,
March 26, 1997
207 SCRA 538

FACTS:
Private respondent GrandAir applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). This application was opposed by petitioner PAL which is a holder of a
legislative franchise to operate air transport services alleging that that the CAB had no jurisdiction to
hear the petitioner’s application until GrandAir has first obtained a franchise to operate from
Congress.

ISSUE:
WON the CAB had the jurisdiction to hear the application because GrandAir did not possess a
legislative franchise.
WON Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to authorize the operation
of domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such that Congressional mandate for the
approval of such authority is no longer necessary.

RULING:
Yes. The Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator, who, though not
possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the other requirements prescribed by the law.
There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative franchise is an
indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although
Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress’ control over any franchise, certificate or authority to
operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same.
Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate. In
many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies,
specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service.

Congress, gave CAB the power to issue permits for the operation of domestic transport services. It
has delegated to the said body the authority to determine the capability and competence of a
prospective domestic air transport operator to engage in such venture.

NOTES:
 The use of the word “necessity”, in conjunction with “public convenience” in a certificate of
authorization to a public service entity to operate –
Many and varied are the definitions of certificates of public convenience which courts and legal writers
have drafted. Some statutes use the terms “convenience and necessity” while others use only the words
“public convenience.” The terms “convenience and necessity”, if used together in a statute, are usually
held not to be separable, but are construed together. Both words modify each other and must be
construed together. The word ‘necessity’ is so connected, not as an additional requirement but to modify
and qualify what might otherwise be taken as the strict significance of the word necessity. Public
convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want of the public
and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately afford. It does not mean or require an
actual physical necessity or an indispensable thing. “The terms ‘convenience’ and ‘necessity’ are to be
construed together, although they are not synonymous, and effect must be given both. The convenience
of the public must not be circumscribed by according to the word ‘necessity’ its strict meaning or an
essential requisites.” The use of the word “necessity”, in conjunction with “public convenience” in a
certificate of authorization to a public service entity to operate, does not in any way modify the nature of
 such certification, or the requirements for the issuance of the same. It is the law which determines the
requisites for the issuance of such certification, and not the title indicating the certificate.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board and Grand International Airways G.R. No. 119528, March
26, 1997
Philippine Airlines vs Civil Aeronautics Board Case Digest
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board
(270 SCRA 538)

Facts:
Grand Air applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Chief
Hearing Officer issued a notice of hearing directing Grand Air to serve a copy of the application and notice to all scheduled
Philippine Domestic operators. Grand Air filed its compliance and requested for a Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL
filed an opposition to the application on the ground that the CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the application until Grand Air
first obtains a franchise to operate from Congress. The Chief Hearing Officer denied the opposition and the CAB approved
the issuance of the TOP for a period of 3 months. The opposition for the TOP was likewise denied. The CAB justified its
assumption of jurisdiction over Grand Air’s application on the basis of Republic Act 776 which gives it the specific power to
issue any TOP or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.

Issue: Whether or not the CAB can issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or TOP even though the
prospective operator does not have a legislative franchise?

Held: Yes, as mentioned by the CAB, it is duly authorized to do so under Republic Act 776 and a legislative franchise is not
necessary before it may do so, since Congress has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of domestic air
transport services to the CAB, an administrative agency. The delegation of such authority is not without limits since Congress
had set specific standard and limitations on how such authority should be exercised.

Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want of the public and supply a
need which the existing facilities do not adequately afford.

Thus, the Board should be allowed to continue hearing the application, since it has jurisdiction over it provided that the
applicant meets all the requirements of the law.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.
G.R. No. 11952; March 26, 1997FACTS:
This Special Civil Action seeks to prohibit respondent Civil Aeronautics Board from exercising jurisdiction over
private respondent’s Application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and to annul
and set aside a temporary operating permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board in favor of Grand International
Airways, allowing the same to engage in scheduled domestic air transportation services, particularly the Manila-
Cebu, Manila-Davao, and converse routes.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) alleges that GrandAir does not possess a legislative franchise authorizing it to engage
in air transportation service within the Philippines or elsewhere. Such franchise is, as argued, a requisite for the
issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity by the respondent Board, as mandated under Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GrandAir, on the other hand, posits that a legislative franchise is no longer a requirement for the
issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or a Temporary Operating Permit, following the
Court’s pronouncements in various jurisprudential cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of
domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such that Congressional mandate for the approval of such
authority is no longer necessary.

HELD:
It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency,
and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a
legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by a grant by local authorities as
agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the
Legislature. The trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Service Commissioner with the power to regulate
and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations, and as a general rule, courts will
not interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal right.

The Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or
Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a legislative franchise,
meets all the other requirements prescribed by the law. Such requirements were enumerated in Section 21 of R.A.
776. There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative franchise is an
indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although Section 11 of
Article XII recognizes Congress’ control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does
not mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before
each and every public utility may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to
government agencies, particularly specialized in their respective areas of public service.
Constitutional Law: Halili vs Public Service Commission
Halili vs Public Service Commission

Facts:
A petition for certiorari was filed seeking for the revocation and annulment of an order by respondent Public
Service Commission dated July 3, 1952 which changed part of the route of the bus service established by the
respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall, Manila. Petitioner herein is the holder of various
certificates of public convenience to operate auto-truck services between Balara and various points in the City of
Manila and its suburbs.
On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc. filed a petition with the respondent Commission alleging that the route
authorized in its City Hall(Manila)-Balara line is entirely different from that supported by the evidence presented
in the hearing, and praying that the certificate be amended. On the following day, July 3, and without previous
notice to the petitioner or a previous hearing thereon, ordered the modification of the line in accordance with the
petition.

Issue:
WON the order of the amendment of the route, without notice to the petitioner and other interested parties, or
hearing in which the latter may be given opportunity to be present, was lawfully and validly issued by the
Commission.
WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated.
Held:

The order by the Commission of amending the route was not validly issued and petitioner’s right to due process
was violated.
In the first place, the power to issue provisional permits is expressly authorized. In the second place, the change
ordered is not provisional merely, like that granted in a provisional permit, but final and permanent in character.
In the third place, even if the Commission is not bound by the rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head to
he constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of a right without due process of law. The "due process
of law" clause of the Constitution binds not only the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but also each and
everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. (16 C.J.S., 1149.)"Due process of law, or, in the mean accord with the
procedure outlines in the law, or, in the absence of express procedure, under such safeguards for the protection of
individual rights as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction for the particular class of cases to which the one
in question belongs," (16 C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar, the Public Service Act does not include the amendment
made in the disputed order among those may be ordered without notice or hearing in accordance with Section 17
of the Act. Is the amendment, without notice or hearing, permitted by the well settled maxims of law? We declare it
is not, because due process of law guarantees notice and opportunity to be heard to persons who would be affected
by the order or act contemplated.

In a General sense it means the right to be heard before some tribunal having jurisdiction to determine the question
in dispute.

By "due process of law" is meant orderly proceeding adopted to the nature of the case, before a tribunal having
jurisdiction, which proceeds upon notice, with an opportunity to bee heard, with full power to grant relief.

Some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be concluded thereby, shall have an
opportunity to defend himself.

A course of proceeding according to these rules and principles which have been established in our system of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights.
Suntay vs. People 101 Phil. 833 (1957) G.R. No. L-
9430, June 29, 1957
Fact: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified
complaint against Emilio Suntay who took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul’s Colleges in Quezon City with
lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then
able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. after an investigation, an
Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to
the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant
City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.
the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs and left the
Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. The offended
girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. the private
prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order “directing such government agencies as
may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign
Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law. The respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States
instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the
petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him.
The counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by
him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court
reconsider its order which the respondent Secretary denied. Hence this
petition.adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Issue: Whether petitioner should have been granted a quasi-judicial hearing by the respondent
Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him?adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Held: No, Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a
criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to
have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon
an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing
maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such
hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the
discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such
hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said
clause.adrianantazo.w
Suntay vs People GR 9430 29
June 1957

11 WednesdayMAR 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

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Facts: Emilio Suntay is facing criminal charges and flee the country. private prosecutor filed a motion
praying the Court to issue an order “directing such government agencies as may be concerned,
particularly the NBI and DFA, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. Court granted the motion and DFA Secretary and asked
the Ambassador to USA to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the
Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. Suntay wrote to the Secretary to reconsider the
action taken against him and and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court
reconsider its order. Both were denied hence the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be accorded notice and hearing prior the cancellation of his
passport?
Decision: Petition denied. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal
or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a
criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to
have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an
undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing
does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution
Case Brief: Indias vs Philippine Iron Mines
APRIL 6, 2018JEFF REY

G.R. No. L-9987 April 29, 1957

GRACIANO INDIAS, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE IRON MINES, INC., respondent.
Facts:
Graciano Indias, petitioner, filed a complaint before the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
alleging that respondent, Philippine Iron Mines, has engaged in unfair labor practice within the
meaning of Section 4(a), paragraph 1,2,3,4, and 5 of RA 875. Respondent answered the complaint
by alleging that petitioner was dismissed from the service for a cause.

Hearings were then conducted by the hearing examiner of CIR in which both parties appeared with
their counsel. After the presentation of both sides, hearing examiner rendered his report stating that
the charge filed by complainant relating to unfair labor practice, has not been substantiated by
evidence and that petitioner’s dismissal was with sufficient cause.

CIR approved the hearing examiner’s report and recommendation which dismissed the complaint
against respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was then denied by the court.
Hence, the petition for review.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the order issued by the CIR, dismissing a case without stating the facts and the
law which supports the decision, is valid.

2. Whether or not the petitioner’s allegation, that he was dismissed by respondent because of his
involvement in union activities and not because of the alteration he had with another employee who
was outside the workplace and beyond work hours, should be taken into consideration.

Held:
1. The Supreme Court found no merit in the first issue by complainant. Statement of facts or
discussion of evidence is not necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its examiner,
which already contains a full discussion of the case and findings.

2. As regards to the dismissal of petitioner, the evidence is clear that respondent served the
dismissal on the ground that petitioner committed grave misconduct due to his violent temper. His
quarrel against a co-employee resulted to a court action by the latter, showing that petitioner
possess a degree of violent character which was contrary to the company’s rules and regulations
that laborers should possess good behavior as norm of conduct in order to avoid untoward incident
in the company’s underground tunnels.

Also, the issue being contested is a question of fact in which the Supreme Court cannot consider
because under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 875, the Supreme Court is limited only to the
interpretation considering the question of law.
The order of CIR is affirmed. An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with
employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his
employer and those continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest.