POLITICAL LAW executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
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AY 2017-2018 (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel)
Disclaimer: The contents of this reviewer are from the Coffee
Notes 2017 (Political Law Compendium), Nachura’s Outline
Reviewer in Political Law, Pre-Weeks, and MemAid. The contents
were specifically selected based from the matters, which were given
emphasis, during class discussions. This reviewer is most useful for
examinations. This material has not yet been subjected to proof-
reading.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
According to Cooley, a constitution is that body of rules and
maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty
are habitually exercised.
According to Malcolm, it is that written instrument enacted by
direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers
of the government are established, limited and defined, and by
which those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit
of the body politic.
“A constitution is firm and immovable, as a mountain amidst the
strife of storms, or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the
waves.” (Vanhorne vs. Dorrance)
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance
and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates
(Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS).
In Marcos vs. Manglapus, the Supreme Court held that “it must be
borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation
of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to State for the common
good.”
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY: That funda-
mental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution
that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
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since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS).
The Philippine Constitution is a WRITTEN, ENACTED and
RIGID type of constitution. It is embodied in a single document,
enacted by the Congress acting as Constitutional Convention or
Constitutional Assembly ratified by the Filipino people in a plebiscite
called for such purpose.
CLASSIFICATIONS
1. WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN
a. Written — one whose precepts are embodied in
one document or set of documents;
b. Unwritten — consist of rules which have not been
integrated into a single, concrete form but are
scattered in various sources, such as statutes of
a fundamental character, judicial decisions,
commentaries of publicists, customs and
tradition, and certain common law principles.
2. ENACTED (CONVENTIONAL) OR EVOLVED
(CUMULATIVE)
a. Enacted (Conventional) — a conventional
constitution is enacted, formally struck off at a
definite time and place following a conscious or
deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or
ruler;
b. Evolved (Cumulative) — it is the result of political
evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time but
changing by accretion rather than by any
systematic method.
3. RIGID OR FLEXIBLE
a. Rigid- is one that can be amended only by a
formal and usually difficult process;
b. Flexible- one that can be changed by ordinary
legislation.
QUALITIES OF A GOOD WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
1. BROAD – Not just because it provides for the organization
of the entire government and covers all persons and things
within the territory of the State but because it must be
comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency.
2. BRIEF – It must confine itself to basic principles to be
implemented with legislative details more adjustable to
change and easier to amend.
3. DEFINITE – To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which
could result in confusion and divisiveness among the
people.
ESSENTIAL PARTS OF A GOOD WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
1. Constitution of Liberty – The series of prescriptions
setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the
citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of
those rights. E.g. Art. III
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 2. Constitution of Government – The series of provisions
outlining the organization of the government, enumerating
its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its
administration, and defining the electorate, E.g. Arts. VI,
VII, VIII and IX
3. Constitution of Sovereignty – The provisions pointing
out the mode or procedure in accordance with which
formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought,
E.g., Art. XVII
HISTORY OF PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
1. Biak-na-bato
2. Malolos
3. 1935 Constitution
4. 1943 Constitution
5. 1973 Constitution
6. 1986 Freedom Constitution
7. 1987 Constitution
The 1897 Constitution of Biak-na-Bato, or
Constituciong Halal sa Biak-na-Bato, promulgated by the
Philippine Revolutionary Government on November 1, 1897, is the
provisionary Constitution of the Philippine Republic during the
Revolution against Spain. It provides that the Supreme Council,
vested with the supreme power of government, shall conduct
foreign relations, war, the interior, and the treasury.
The 1899 Political Constitution of the Republic, known
as the Malolos Constitution, was approved by President Emilio
Aguinaldo on January 21, 1899 and served as the Constitution of
the First Philippine Republic. It provides for a parliamentary form of
government, but the President, and not a Prime Minister, acts as
the head of government. Legislative power is exercised by the
Assembly of Representatives of the Nation, and judicial power is
lodge in a Supreme Court.
The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, ratified on
May 17, 1935, establishes the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
defining its powers, composition and organization as it function as
the Government of the Philippine Islands. It is based on the principle
of separation of powers among the three branches of government.
Executive power is vested in the President and shall serve for a
single-six year term. Legislative power is vested in a unicameral
National Assembly, and judicial power is exercised by the Supreme
Court. It also provides that upon proclamation of Philippine
Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall be
known as the Republic of the Philippines. The 1939 Amendment
liberalized all laws and made few changes on the economic
provisions of the Tydings-Mcduffie Law. The 1940 Amendment, by
virtue of Resolution No. 73, provide for the establishment of a
bicameral Congress, composed of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, and limits the term of office of the President to four
years, but may continue to serve for a maximum of eight years. The
amendment also provides for the creation of a Commission on
Elections. The 1947 Amendment, known as the Parity
Amendment, gave Americans equal rights with Filipinos in the
exploitation of Philippine Natural resources.
The 1943 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, or the Constitution of the Second Philippine
Republic, was ratified by the general assembly of the KALIBAPI. It
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is based on the system of separation of powers among the
executive, legislative, and the judiciary. It served as a temporary
constitution, for it stipulated that one year after the end of the World
War II, it shall be replaced by a new constitution.
The 1973 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, or Ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, ratified by the
Citizens Assemblies on January 17, 1973, provides for a shift from
a presidential form of government to a parliamentary system. The
President serves as a symbolic head of State, executive power is
exercised by the Prime Minister with the assistance of the Cabinet,
and legislative power is vested in a unicameral National Assembly.
In 1976, the National Assembly was replaced by the Batasang
Pambansa, by virtue of PD 1033 issued by President Ferdinand
Marcos. The 1973 Constitution as amended (amended in 1981 and
1984) provides for a semi-parliamentary form of government, where
the President, no longer acts as a symbolic head, but acts as the
head of state and the chief executive. The Office of the President
has been restored to its originalstatus under the 1935 Constitution.
Legislative power is vested in a unicameral Batasang Pambansa.
The Prime Minister, who is subordinated to the President, acts as
the Head of the Cabinet.
The 1986 Provisional Constitution, popularly known
as the Freedom Constitution, promulgated by President Corazon
C. Aquino on March 25, 1986, was a provisional constitution after a
successful People Power Revolution. Under the Freedom
Constitution, executive and legislative powers are exercised by the
President, and shall continue to exercise legislative powers until a
legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution.
Furthermore, the President is mandated to convene a Constitutional
Commission tasked to draft a new charter.
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines (In Filipino: Ang Konstitusyon ng Republika ng
Pilipinas), ratified on February 2, 1987, is the fourth fundamental
law to govern the Philippines since it became independent on July
4, 1946.
INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
The cases of Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS and Francisco vs. HRET
provide for the rules on constitutional construction.
1. Determine Self-Executing vs. Non Self-Executing
Provisions (Manila Prince Hotel Case Doctrine):
A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid
of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.
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 2. In Case of Doubt, Constitutional Provisions are Self-
Executing (Manila Prince Hotel Case Doctrine):
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing.
3. Specific Tools of Constitutional Construction
(Francisco vs. House of Representatives Case
Doctrines):
First, verba legis non est recedendum that is,
wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est
anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought
to be prevented or remedied. Nonetheless, they must only
inform themselves with the four corners of Constitution.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole.
The members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for
the benefit of one person without considering that it could
also affect others.
These tools must be applied sequentially.
4. Extraneous Materials Can ONLY be used if the Above-
Mentioned Rules Fail:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult
the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear.
CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION
A constitution is likened to a “traveler”, as it cannot “stand-
still” for it must cater to the exigencies of time.
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
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three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of
all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such
a convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.
AMENDMENT broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. It implies
such an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument, as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed.
REVISION broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle
in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of
the constitution.
To determine whether a change in the constitution is an amendment
or a revision, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test.
1. QUANTITATIVE TEST asks whether the proposed
change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." The
court examines only the number of provisions affected and
does not consider the degree of the change.
2. QUALITATIVE TEST inquires into the qualitative effects
of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental
plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject
of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
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 government and the system of check and balances.”
(Lambino vs. COMELEC)
It is necessary to determine the character of the proposed change
because different procedure applies and initiative by people can
only propose amendments.
STEPS IN AMENDING/REVISING THE CONSTITUTION:
1. Proposal (Sections 1-3, Art. XVII): A proposal for
revision may come from (a) Congress or (b) Constitutional
Convention; A proposal for amendments may come from
(a) Congress, (b) Constitutional Convention, or (c) People,
through the power of initiative.
As to People’s Initiative, see Sec. 2, Art. XVII for
the necessary number of signatories of the petition. The
petition must be authored by the people, thus they must
sign the entire proposal; no agent or representative can
sign on one’s behalf. The proposal must likewise be
embodied in the petition (RA6735; Lambino v COMELEC).
Note: No amendment in this manner shall be authorized
following ratification more often than once every five years
thereafter.
2. Approval
a. In determining the necessary vote for the act of
the Congress, as a Constituent Assembly,
approving the proposal, “all its members” shall
mean in reference to the ABSOLUTE NUMBER
OF SEATS in the Congress, VOTING
SEPARATELY.
b. As to a Constitutional Convention, upon being
called upon by the Congress, the necessary vote
to approve proposals is only the MAJORITY of
the members the Constitutional Convention.
c. In cases of People’s Initiative, a petition is
deemed approved and subject for ratification
upon CERTIFICATION by the COMELEC of the
sufficiency of the petition.
3. Ratification (Section 4, Art. XVII): The ratification
process will depend on the mode of proposal.
a. A proposal for amendments or revision made
under Sec. 1 (by Congress or by Constitutional
Convention) shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite, which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.
b. A proposal for amendment made under Sec. 2
(by People’s Initiative) shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite,
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days
nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.
The Congress CANNOT DIRECTLY amend or revise the
Constitution, through the exercise of its LEGISLATIVE
POWER. It can only PROPOSE AMENDMENTS or REVISIONS,
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through the exercise of its CONSTITUENT POWER, acting as a
Constituent Assembly. The Congress may likewise call into
existence a Constitutional Convention, which can PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS or REVISIONS. On the other hand, the People
through initiative can only PROPOSE AMENDMENTS – and
NOT A REVISION. There is only a proposal, because the
amendments or revisions must still be ratified by the people in
a plebiscite called for that purpose.
The power to propose amendments and revisions to the
Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people,
as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours
— to make and hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution
merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence,
when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself. Constituent power is
not inherent to the Congress (Gonzales vs. COMELEC).
In the case of Gonzales vs. COMELEC, it was also ruled that the
Congress can both make a proposal and call for a Constitutional
Convention.
The Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, may propose
amendments or revisions or call a Constitutional Convention;
AND as a Legislative Body, may provide for the details of the
Constitutional Convention. While the authority to call a
Constitutional Convention is vested with the Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details
DOES NOT EXCLUSIVELY pertain to the Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are ALSO
matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all
matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or
removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And
as long as such statutory details do not clash with any specific
provisions of the Constitution, they are valid (Imbong vs. Ochoa).
The use of the word “election” in the singular meant that the entire
Constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only.
Thus, submission for ratification of piece-meal amendments by the
Constitutional Convention was disallowed (Tolentino vs.
COMELEC).
Ratification of the Constitution may be held simultaneously in a
general election. The proposed constitutional amendments may be
submitted at a plebiscite scheduled on the SAME DAY as the
regular elections. What is important, in case that the plebiscite is
conducted in the same day as a general election, is that there are
two distinct and separate elections, characterized in the ballots.
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The proposal need not the approval of the President. The President
cannot likewise propose any amendment or revision of the
Constitution, but he may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which in turn can act upon them
pursuant to the mandated legal procedures.
In Sanidad vs. COMELEC, the Court held that the exercise of the
power to propose amendment or revision is a justiciable
controversy, thus a JUDICIAL QUESTION. However, once it has
been ratified, it ceases to be justiciable; thus a POLITICAL
QUESTION, which the Court must inhibit itself from reviewing.
THE CONCEPT OF STATE
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all
the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories
over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting
of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
STATE is a community of persons, more or less numerous,
permanently occupying a definite portion of territory,
independent of external control, and possessing a government
to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda)
ELEMENTS OF A STATE
1. People
2. Territory
3. Government
4. Sovereignty
PEOPLE
As an element of a state, “people” simply means a community of
persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining the
continued existence of the community and held together by a
common bond of law. It is of no legal consequence if they possess
diverse racial, cultural, or economic interests.
Adequate number for self-sufficiency and defense, and of both
sexes for perpetuity. Accordingly, at least some portion of the
people must be citizens of the State.
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TERRITORY
Sec.1, Art. I of the 1987 Constitution provides for the coverage of
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines. It extends to the (a)
Philippine Archipelago and (b) all other territories which the
Philippines exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction. The components
of a territory are terrestrial, fluvial, maritime, and aerial domains.
MODE OF ACQUIRING TERRITORY
1. Prescription
2. Accretion
3. Cession
4. Occupation
ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE: It is a principle where appropriate
points are set along the coast of the archipelago including the
outermost islands and then connect those points with straight
baselines. All waters within the baselines are considered internal
waters of the archipelago state. It is adopted in the constitution
when it says that, “the water around, between and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.”
BASELINE LAWS: Baselines laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision
the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. It gives
notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty
over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone
(Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77) (Magallona v. Ermita).
STRAIGHT BASELINE METHOD: Imaginary straight lines are
drawn enclosing the outermost points of outermost islands of the
archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which should not be
more than 9:1 (water to land); provided that the drawing of baselines
shall not depart, to any appreciable extent, from the general
configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the baselines
shall be considered internal waters; while the breadth of the
territorial sea shall then be measured from the baselines.
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UN CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA:
1. 12 nautical miles from the baseline – Territorial Sea
(Exercise Sovereignty)
2. 24 nautical miles from the baseline – Contiguous Zone
(Regulations on Customs, Fiscal, Immigration, Sanitation)
3. 200 nautical miles from the baseline – Exclusive Economic
Zone (Right to exploit living and non-living resources)
Although the contiguous zone and most of the exclusive economic
zone may not, technically, be part of the territory of the State,
nonetheless, the coastal State enjoys preferential rights over the
marine resources found within these zones.
The contention that 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters
under RA 9522 was lost is not correct. RA 9522, by optimizing the
location of base points, increased the Philippines’ total maritime
space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone) by 145, 216 square nautical miles. The reach of the
exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way
beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under
the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping
exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will
have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III (Magallona v. Ermita).
In Magallona vs. Ermita, the Court further enunciated that two
problems may arise in case the Philippines does not comply by the
UNCLOS III. By not complying, (1) it will be an open invitation for
other states to exploit our resources, and (2) it will weaken our
country’s standpoint in claims involving maritime disputes.
The demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit
its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community
since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international
community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines.
UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space- the exclusive
economic zone- in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS
III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the
resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS
III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other
States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before
UNCLOS III (Magallona v. Ermita).
REGIME OF ISLANDS
Article 121 of UNCLOS III provides: "Regime of islands. —
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf."
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GOVERNMENT
The agency or instrumentality, through which the will of the State is
formulated, expressed and realized.
Government, as an element of a state, is defined as “that institution
or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes
and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable
men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people
forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them.”
Traditional functions of the government:
1. Constituent – mandatory for the government to perform
because they constitute the very bonds of society, such as
the maintenance of peace and order, regulation of property
and property rights, etc.
a. The keeping of order and providing for the
protection of persons and property from violence
and robbery.
b. The fixing of the legal relations between man and
wife and between parents and children.
c. The regulation of the holding, transmission, and
interchange of property, and the determination of
its liabilities for debt or for crime.
d. The determination of contract rights between
individuals.
e. The definition and punishment of crime.
f. The administration of justice in civil cases.
g. The determination of the political duties,
privileges, and relations of citizens.
h. Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the
preservation of the state from external danger or
encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests (Bacani v. Nacoco).
2. Ministrant – those intended to promote the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people, and which are
merely optional for government to perform. Merely
optional.
“The most important of the ministrant functions
are: public works, public education, public charity,
health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade
and industry. The principles determining whether or not a
government shall exercise certain of these optional
functions are: (1) that a government should do for the
public welfare those things which private capital
would not naturally undertake and (2) that a
government should do these things which by its very
nature it is better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals.” (Bacani v. Nacoco)
However, in PVTA vs CIR, the Court noted that the distinction
between the two functions had become blurred. "The growing
complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
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private enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development
was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice."
DOCTINE OF PARENS PATRIAE: Literally, parent of the people.
As such, the government may act as guardian of the rights of the
people who may be disadvantaged or suffering from some disability
or misfortune (GRP v. Monte de Piedad).
CLASSIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT
As to the existence or absence of title and/or
control/legitimacy:
1. De jure – has a rightful title but no power or control, either
because the same has been withdrawn from it or because
it has not yet actually entered into the exercise thereof. It
is one established by authority of legitimate sovereign. A
de jure government is a government of right; a government
established according to the Constitution of the State, and
lawfully entitled to recognition and supremacy and the
administration of the State but is actually ousted from
power or control, it is the true and lawful government.
2. De facto – actually exercises power of control but without
legal title. It is one established in defiance of the legitimate
sovereign. A de facto government, on the other hand, is
that government which unlawfully gets the possession and
control of the rightful legal government, and maintains
itself there by force and arms against the will of the rightful
legal government, and claims to exercise the powers
thereof. It is a government of fact.
a. De facto proper – government that gets
possession and control of, or usurps, by force or
by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
government and maintains itself against the will
of the latter.
b. De facto government of paramount force –
established and maintained by military forces
who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy
in the course of war.
c. Independent government – established by the
inhabitants of the country who rise in insurrection
against the parent state, such as the government
of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the
Union during the war of secession (Co Kim Cham
v. Valdez Tan Keh).
As to concentration of powers in a governmental branch:
1. Presidential – there is separation of executive and
legislative powers.
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2. Parliamentary – there is fusion of executive and
legislative powers in parliament, although the actual
exercise of executive powers is vested in a Prime Minister
who is chosen by, and accountable to, Parliament.
As to centralization of control:
1. Unitary – one in which the control of national and local
affairs is exercised by the central or national government;
single, centralized government, exercising powers over
both the internal and external affairs of the State.
2. Federal – one in which the powers of the government are
divided between two sets of organs, one for the national
affairs and the other for local affairs, each organ being
supreme within its own sphere; consists of autonomous
local government units merged into a single state, with
national government exercising a limited degree of power
over the domestic affairs but generally full discretion of the
external affairs of the State.
ACT OF STATE: In its broadest sense, it is an exercise of
sovereign power which cannot be challenged, controlled or
interfered with by municipal courts. It refers to the political acts of a
State which are exercised as exclusive prerogatives by the political
departments of the government and not subject to judicial review
and for the consequences of which, even when affecting private
interests, they will not hold legally responsible those who command
or perform them.
In its limited sense, it refers to the acts taken by the State
concerning as affecting aliens, like the inherent right of every
sovereign State to exclude resident aliens, like the inherent right of
every sovereign State to exclude resident aliens from its territory
when their continued presence is no longer desirable from the
standpoint of its domestic interest and tranquility.
SOVEREIGNTY
The supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which
that State is governed (Laurel v. Misa).
Juristically speaking, sovereignty means the supreme,
uncontrollable power, the jures sumi imperri, the absolute right to
govern. It is the supreme will of the State, the power to make laws
and enforce them by all the means of coercion it cares to employ.
DUAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY
1. Internal- which means the supremacy of a person or body
of persons in the State over the individuals or association
of individuals within the area of its jurisdiction
2. External- which means the absolute independence of one
State as a whole with reference to the other States.
External sovereignty is nothing more than the freedom of
the Sate from subjection to or control by a foreign State,
that is the supremacy of the State as against all foreign
wills.
DOCTRINE OF AUTO-LIMITATION: It is the doctrine wherein the
Philippines adheres to the exercise of its sovereignty. It means that
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 7 of 79
any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights (Reagan v. CIR).
EFFECTS OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION: There is no change
in sovereignty. Sovereignty is not suspended; what is suspended is
the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant.
Political laws, except those of treason, are merely
suspended. The reason for the exception on the crime of treason is
that because citizens owe absolute and permanent allegiance to
their country. Accordingly, suspension of political laws does not
apply to enemies at war.
On the other hand, municipal laws remain in force unless
changed by the belligerent occupant. Municipal laws remain in
force, because they regulate the relations between private
individuals in order to preserve public order (Laurel v. Misa).
Political laws are those laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. Examples are laws
on citizenship, right of assembly, freedom of speech, press, etc.
Non-political (municipal) laws are those which regulate the social,
economic, or commercial life of the country of the inhabitants with
each other. Examples are civil, or commercial laws.
PRINCIPLE OF JUS POSTILIMINIUM: At the end of the
occupation, when the occupant is ousted from the territory, the
political laws which had been suspended during the occupation
shall automatically become effective again (Peralta v. Dir. Of
Prisons.) In the same vein, political laws of the belligerent
occupants are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly
re-enacted by the affirmative act of the new sovereign. Municipal
laws remain in force. Municipal laws which are inconsistent with
those of the occupied territory require a proclamation to be declared
inoperative (Macariola v. Asuncion).
During belligerent occupation, judicial decisions rendered by
the invader continue its force and effect even after the
cessation of the invasion. The fact that the belligerent occupant
is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore,
exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague
Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the
courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny
validity to such judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor,
who is presumed to be intent upon causing as much harm as
possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and
prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered
and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious design;
in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals of the occupied
territory, and rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of
treachery and aggression. As there are vested rights which have
been acquired by the parties by virtue of such judgments, the
restored government or its representative cannot reverse or
abrogate them without causing wrong or injury to the interested
parties, because such reversal would deprive them of their
properties without due process of law (Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan
Keh).
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EFFECTS OF A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT: A revo-
lutionary government is bound by no constitution. However, the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the Constitution. After
installing itself as a de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good
faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
During the interregnum when no constitution or bill of rights existed,
directives and orders issued by the government officers were
validso long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted
them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders
should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration
(Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR. 104768, July 21, 2003).
DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
Article XVI, Sec. 3: The State may not be sued without its consent.
There can be no legal right against the authority which makes
the law on which the right depends (Republic v. Villasor).
However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or
implied. The doctrine is also known as the Royal Prerogative of
Dishonesty.
Waiver of immunity by the State does not mean a concession
of its liability. By consenting to be sued, the State does not
necessarily admit that it is liable. In such a case, the State is merely
giving the plaintiff a chance to prove that the State is liable, but the
State retains the right to raise all lawful defenses.
Waiver of immunity is legislative in nature, and therefore the
same cannot be given by the President (Republic vs Sandoval)
or other administrative officers (VMPSI vs CA).
A suit is against the State, when:
1. The Republic is sued by name;
2. The suit is against an unincorporated agency; or
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer,
but the case issue that ultimate liability will belong not to
the officer, but to the government.
Note: The Doctrine of State Immunity applies to
complaints filed against officials of the State for
acts performed by them in the discharge of their
duties, within the scope of their authority. A suit
against public officers in the discharge of official
functions, which are governmental in character is
a suit against the State.
Thus, the test is if the enforcement of the decision rendered
against the public officer or agency impleaded will require an
affirmative act from the State (Sanders vs Veridiano).
General Rule: The State may not be sued.
Exception: When it gives its consent.
Forms of Consent
1. Express Consent
a. General Law:
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 8 of 79
 i. Act No. 3083 and CA 327, as
amended by PD 1445: Money claims
arising from contracts which could serve
as a basis of civil action between private
parties to be first filed with COA, before
a suit may be filed in court. The COA
must act upon the claim within sixty (60)
days. Rejection of the claim authorizes
the claimant to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
ii. Local Government Code, Sec. 22, par
2: LGUs have the power to sue and be
sued
b. Special Law (Merritt vs Government of the
Philippine Islands)
2. Implied Consent
a. When the State commences litigation, it
becomes vulnerable to counterclaim. However,
as an exception, when the State intervenes not
for the purpose of asking an affirmative relief, but
only for the purpose of resisting the claim
precisely because of immunity from suit, there is
no waiver.
b. When the State enters into a business
contract. But, it is necessary to distinguish
whether between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is
that State immunity now extends only to acts
jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are
an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States
and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes (US v Guinto).
c. When it would be inequitable for the State to
claim immunity. The immunity may not be
invoked as a shield, in the same manner that it
cannot serve as an instrument in perpetrating an
injustice (Amigable vs Cuenca).
Rules Regarding Suits Against Government Agencies
1. In cases of INCORPORATED agencies, which has a
separate and distinct personality from the State, having a
charter of its own, such as GOCCs, attention must be
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given whether the charter provides that it has a right to sue
and be sued. In such cases, it is an express consent.
If the charter is silent, inquiry to its function based
on the purpose for which it was created may be made.
In case if it is incorporated under the Corporation
Code, it has a right to sue and be sued, thus an express
consent. Note: Municipal Corporations are now covered
by Sec. 22 of the LGC.
2. In cases of UNINCORPORATED agencies, inquiry must
be made as to their principal functions and purpose.
If it primarily performs governmental functions, it
is not suable, even in the exercise of proprietary functions
incidental or indispensable to its governmental functions.
(Bureau of Printing vs BPEA; Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc. vs Customs Arrastre Service and Bureau
of Customs) If it primarily performs proprietary functions, it
is suable.
SCOPE OF CONSENT
Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of
judgment against it. Such execution will require another waiver,
because the power of the court ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment, unless such
disbursement is covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law (Republic vs Villasor).
STATE IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATES
Immunity is enjoyed by other States, consonant with the public
international law principle of par in parem non habet imperium. The
Head of State, who is deemed the personification of the State, is
inviolable, and thus, enjoys immunity from suit.
The process done whenever a foreign state is sued and
pleads its immunity form suit is called SUGGESTION.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process
of “suggestion,” where the foreign State or the international
organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of
State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is
immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Atttorney General to submit
to the court a “suggestion” that the defendant is entitled to immunity.
In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the
Foreign Affairs Office issues a certification to that effect instead of
submitting a “suggestion.”
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign
government or the international organization to first secure an
executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic
immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Affairs Office
conveys its endorsement to the courts varies (The Holy See vs
Del Rosario, Jr.).
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
The provisions of Art. II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable rights, but guidelines for legislation.
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Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
Essential features of Republicanism
1. Representation
2. Renovation
Manifestations of Republicanism
1. Ours is a government of Laws and not of men
(Villavicencio v Lukban).
2. Rule of Majority
3. Accountability of public officials
4. Bill of rights
5. Legislature cannot pass Irrepealable laws
6. Separation of powers
A republican government is a government of the people, by the
people, and for the people, a representative government wherein
the powers and duties of government are exercised and discharged
for the common good and welfare (Guido vs. Rural progress
Administration).
Some characteristics of a republican form of government are:
1. The people do not govern themselves directly but through
their representatives;
2. It is founded upon popular suffrage; and
3. There is the tripartite system of government, the mutual
interdependence of the three (3) departments of
government (Vargas vs. Rilloraza).
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. (Sec. 1, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The
ultimate power resides in the people. The acts of their
representatives are merely manifestations of such sovereignty.
Whatever power their elected representatives have are their own
powers, exercised only through such elected officials. Such power
the elected officials have is only borrowed from the people.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.
DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION: By virtue of this clause, our
Courts have applied the rules of international law in a number of
cases even if such rules had not previously been subject of statutory
enactments, because these generally accepted principles of
international law are automatically part of our own laws.
“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers
to norms of general or customary international law which are
binding on all States, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of
national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person’s right
to life, liberty, and due process and pacta sunt servanda, among
others.
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DOCTRINE OF TRANSFORMATION: International law principle is
transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism,
such as local legislation.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Section VII, Article 21 of the Constitution
which provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be
applied to domestic conflicts (Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn.
of the Phil vs. Health secretary Duque, et al).
Rule in case of conflict between a rule of international law and
the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state:
1. Efforts should first to be exerted to harmonize them, so as
to give effect to both.
2. In case the conflict is irreconcilable, jurisprudence dictates
that the municipal courts should uphold municipal law.
Note: Qualify if the issue is presented before the:
Local courts, municipal laws will prevail; International
tribunals, international laws will prevail.
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the
State and the integrity of the national territory.
How is civilian supremacy ensured or institutionalized?
1. The installation of the President, the highest civilian
authority, as the commander-in-chief of all the armed
forces of the Philippines.
2. The requirement that the members of the AFP swear to
uphold and defend the Constitution, which is the
fundamental law of the land.
Note: But this does not mean that civilian officials are superior to
military officials. Civilian official are superior to military officials only
when a law makes them so.
In relation to Martial Law: Art. VII, Section 18. The President shall
be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person
or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 10 of 79
 The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are
able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend
the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil
service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but
is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will
of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein. It was said that, without violating the Constitution, a
person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will,
against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his
country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense
(People vs Lagman and Zosa).
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
It means that the State should not use its money and coercive power
to establish religion. It should not support a particular religion. The
State is prohibited from interfering with purely ecclesiastical affairs.
The church is likewise prohibited from meddling in purely secular
affairs. But it does not mean that there is total or absolute
separation. The better rule is symbiotic relations between the
church and State.
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Reinforced By:
1. Sec. 5, Art. III (freedom of religion clause)
2. Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C (religious sect cannot be registered as
a political party)
3. Sec. 5(2), Art. VI (no sectoral representative from the
religious sector)
4. Sec. 29(2), Art. VI (prohibition against appropriation for
sectarian benefit.
Exceptions:
1. Sec. 28(3), Art. VI (churches, parsonages, etc., actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious purposes shall
be exempt from taxation)
2. Sec. 29(2), Art. VI (prohibition against appropriation for
sectarian benefit, except when priest, etc., is assigned to
the armed forces, or to any penal institution or government
orphanage or leprosarium
3. Sec. 3(3), Art. XIV (optional religious instruction for public
elementary and high school students)
4. Sec. 4(2), Art. XIV (Filipino ownership requirement for
educational institutions, except those established by
religious groups and mission boards.
Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds
and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. (Aglipay vs Ruiz)
Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or property rights.
Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the
courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title,
use, or possession of church property.
In the leading case of Fonacier v Court of Appeals, the SC
enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving religious
institutions or organizations, there is one area which the court
should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.
The definition of religion has been expanded to include even non-
theistic beliefs such as Taoism or Zen Buddhism. It has been
proposed that basically, a creed must meet four criteria to qualify as
religion under the First Amendment. First, there must be belief in
God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the
believers’ life. Second, the religion must involve a moral code
transcending individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely
subjective. Third, a demonstrable sincerity in belief is
necessary, but the court must not inquire into the truth or
reasonableness of the belief. Fourth, there must be some
associational ties, although there is also a view that religious
beliefs held by a single person rather than being part of the
teachings of any kind of group or sect are entitled to the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause. (Estrada vs Escritur)
Test to Determine Validity of Governmental Regulation
Touching on the Wall of Separation (Lemon Test)
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion
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 In Estrada vs Escritur, the Court discussed the TWO
identifiably different, even opposing , strains of jurisprudence on the
religion clauses.
First is THE STANDARD OF SEPARATION, which may
take the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer version
of strict neutrality or separation , or what Mr. Justice Carpio refers
to as the second theory of governmental neutrality.
Although the latter form is not as hostile to religion as the
former , both are anchored on the Jeffersonian premise that a “wall
of separation” must exist between the state and the Church to
protect the state from the church . Both protect the principle of
church-state separation with a rigid reading of the principle.
On the other hand, the second standard, the
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY OR ACCOMMODATION, is
buttressed by the view that the wall of separation is meant to protect
the church from the state.
FIRST STANDARD (Strict Separation and Strict Neutrality or
Separation): The STRICT SEPARATIONIST believes that the
Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state from the
church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no
interaction between the two. According to this Jeffersonian view, an
“absolute barrier” to formal interdependence of religion and state
needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not receive aid,
whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust
its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on
believers. Only the complete separation of religion from politics
would eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions and
provide for a free choice among political views, thus a strict “wall of
separation” is necessary.
Strict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is deeply
embedded in American history and contemporary practice that
enormous amounts of aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion
from government in return for huge amounts of mostly indirect aid
from religion. For example, less than twenty-four hours after
Congress adopted the First Amendment’s prohibition on laws
respecting an establishment of religion, Congress decided to
express its thanks to God Almighty for the many blessings enjoyed
by the nation with a resolution in favor of a presidential proclamation
declaring a national day of Thanksgiving and Prayer. Thus, strict
separationists are caught in an awkward position of claiming a
constitutional principle that has never existed and is never likely to.
The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the STRICT
NEUTRALITY OR SEPARATIONIST VIEW, (or, the governmental
neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education,
where the Court declared that Jefferson’s “wall of separation”
encapsulated the meaning of the First Amendment.
However, unlike the strict separationists, the strict
neutrality view believes that the “wall of separation” does not require
the state to be their adversary.” Rather, the state must be NEUTRAL
in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.
“State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than
it is to favor them.” The strict neutrality approach is not hostile to
religion, but it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a
basis for classification for purposes of governmental action ,
whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or
obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government
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action. It does not permit, much less require, accommodation of
secular programs to religious belief.
The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however,
is if applied in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead
to a de facto voiding of religious expression in the Free Exercise
Clause. As pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring
opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp] strict neutrality
could lead to “a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and
a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious” which is
prohibited by the Constitution. Professor Laurence Tribe
commented in his authoritative treatise, viz: To most observers. . .
strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with the very idea of a free
exercise clause. The Framers, whatever specific applications they
may have intended, clearly envisioned religion as something
special; they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing the free
exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science. The strict
neutrality approach all but erases this distinction. Thus it is not
surprising that the [U.S.] Supreme Court has rejected strict
neutrality, permitting and sometimes mandating religious
classifications.
Thus, the dilemma of the separationist approach, whether
in the form of strict separation or strict neutrality, is that while the
Jeffersonian wall of separation “captures the spirit of the American
ideal of church-state separation,” in real life, church and state are
not and cannot be totally separate. This is all the more true in
contemporary times when both the government and religion are
growing and expanding their spheres of involvement and activity,
resulting in the intersection of government and religion at many
points.
SECOND STANDARD (Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation):
The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised
on a different view of the “wall of separation,” associated with
Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the
Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church,
the wall is meant to protect the church from the state Benevolent
neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the
public life of the United States as shown by many traditional
government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment
Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of “In God We
Trust” on American currency; the recognition of America as “one
nation under God” in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the
Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral argument
with the invocation “God save the United States and this Honorable
Court”; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of
paying a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination,
to lead representatives in prayer. These practices clearly show the
preference for one theological viewpoint— the existence of and
potential for intervention by a god — over the contrary theological
viewpoint of atheism. Church and government agencies also
cooperate in the building of low-cost housing and in other forms of
poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction, in
foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral
dimension.
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In
its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be
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national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the
right to self-determination.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its
territory.
The Constitution prescribes a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons. The policy includes the prohibition not only of the
possession, control, and manufacture of nuclear weapons but also
nuclear arms tests. Exception to this policy may be made by the
political departments; but it must be justified by the demands of the
national interest. (“consistent with the national interest.”) But the
policy does not prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Different Concepts of Social Justice:
1. Calalang v Williams – In Public Law
Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Salus
populi est suprema lex.
2. Almeda v CA – In Agrarian Law
Social justice is "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
3. Ondoy v Ignacio – In Labor Law
As between a laborer, usually poor and
unlettered, and the employer, who has resources
to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social
justice in these cases is not equality but
protection.”
4. Salonga v Farrales – In Obligations and Contracts
Social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the
rights of property owners who under our
Constitution and laws are also entitled to
protection.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom equivalent
to the habeas corpus writ;
Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality
of statutes;
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and
legality of a judicial decision;
Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative
actions;
Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants’ rights derived from
the agrarian reform process.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the
life of the unborn child was to prevent the legislature from
passing a law that would allow abortion. They did not intend to
ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should
be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible
(Imbong vs Ochoa).
First, it is NOT an assertion that the unborn is a LEGAL person.
Second, this is not an assertion that the life of the unborn is placed
exactly on the level of the life of a mother. When necessary to save
the life of the mother, the life of the unborn may be sacrificed; but
not when the purpose is merely to save the other from emotional
suffering, for which other remedies must be sought, or to spare a
child from the life of poverty, which can be attended to by welfare
institutions.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement
in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not [even] be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries
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with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment
(Oposa vs Factoran).
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it, the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. It implies
the judicious management and conservation of the country’s
forests, else the ecological, environmental balance would be
irreversibly disrupted. It is what is known as the inter-generational
responsibility of the present generation to preserve the forests.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national
economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
“economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a
developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on
external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean
autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to
the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy,
especially in such strategic industries as in the development of
natural resources and public utilities (Tanada vs Angara).
Although the constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nevertheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary for the promotion of the general welfare.
The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. While it does not encourage their
unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all
economies in the word, is to strike a balance between preventing
local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
services.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the
private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investments.
Laissez Faire: It means let alone. It means that the government
should leave the economic and social forces at work without any
interference on its part. It is the foundation of capitalism. This
provision has been rejected by the Constitution because of the
expanded provisions on social justice.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.
There should be national unity and development, not only in cities
and urban centers but also in the rural areas. The indigenous
cultural communities are, in fact, the paces that deserve attention
of the government, the same being the place where trivial Filipinos
lived since time immemorial. Their culture is a rich heritage. Their
ancestral land should be preserved.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the
welfare of the nation.
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication
and information in nation-building.
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
Local autonomy means giving the local government units not only
more and greater powers, but also providing them with ampler
means and resources in order to enable them to meet their enlarged
responsibilities.
Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress, which has
the power to create and abolish municipal corporations, due to its
general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of
control over local governments. And if Congress can grant a
municipality the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power (Basco vs PAGCOR).
Autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
“decentralization,” and does not make the local governments
sovereign within the State or an imperium in imperio.
There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and
in the process to make local government “more responsive and
accountable,” and “ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit
of national development and social progress.” It relieves the
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it
to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
“general supervision” over them, but only to “ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law.” He has no control over their acts
in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local government units
declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
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minimum intervention from central authorities (Limbona vs
Mangelin).
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law.
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to
reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the
part of said agencies (Legaspi vs CSC).
Three basic principles emphasized by section 27 and 28
1. PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. Under this
principle, public officials in all ladders of our government
should always remember that they were merely entrusted
by the people to perform duties and responsibilities of their
offices for a fixed period of time. They were chosen to
serve the people, not to cheat them. Their offices are not
their own, nor can they be treated as private properties
which they can manage or dispose of at their whim and
caprice.
2. OURS IS A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS AND NOT OF
MEN. The law should be applied equally without fear or
favor. No one in this Republic, not even the President, is
above the law.
3. TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC SERVICE. Because public
officials are mere trustees of the people, they should
observe loyalty and fidelity to the people who have
entrusted to them specific duties for a specific tenure. The
lessons that we have learned during the 21 years of martial
rule teach us that graft and corruption, abuse of power and
authority, and oppression of the rights of the people, can
cause chaos and revolution.
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
They are supposed to co-exist with the state. The moment the State
comes in to being, it is deemed invested with these three (3) powers
as its innate attributes. They are exercised primarily by the
legislature.
General Limitations of the Inherent Powers of the State
The exercise of these fundamental powers is subject at all times to
the limitations and requirements of the Constitution, and may in
proper cases be annulled by the courts of justice.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
POLICE POWER
It is the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive,
the least limitable, and the most demanding of the inherent powers.
It may be exercised aslong as the activity or the propert sought to
be regulated has some relevance to the public welfare. Salus
pupuli est suprema lex – the will of the people is the supreme law.
Requisites for a Valid Exercise of Police Power
1. That the activity or property sought to be regulated affects
the public welfare. The interest of the public, generally, as
compared to a particular class requires interference by the
State. (Lawful Subject)
2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Both the ends and the means
must be legitimate. (Lawful Means)
Basic Limitations on the Exercise of Police Power
1. Due Process Clause
2. Equal Protection Clause
The government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses, and occupations
to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must
be reasonable and not arbitrary. To forestall arbitrariness, the
means used must have a reasonable relation to the end in view
(Gancayco vs City Government of Quezon City).
WHO MAY EXERCISE
The power is inherently vested in the Legislature. However, the
Congress may validly delegate this power to the President, to
administrative bodies, and to lawmaking bodies of local government
units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers, as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body (MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Association).
LGUs exercise the power under the general welfare clause
(Secs. 16, 391, 447, 458, and 468 of RA 7160): Section 16. General
Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. xxx
Additional Limitations When Exercised by a Delegate
1. There must be an express grant by law.
2. Within territorial limits (for LGUs)
3. Must not be contrary to law; activity prohibited by law
cannot, in the guise of regulation, be allowed; an activity
allowed by law may be regulated, but not prohibited.
The Powers of Eminent Domain and Taxation may be used as
implements of Police Power, as cited in Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform and in
Lutz vs Araneta, respectively.
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Police power cannot be bargained away through the medium
of contract or treaty. The non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power, whenever the contract deals with a subject affecting
the public welfare. The treaty is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law; it can never curtail or restrict the
scope of police power.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
It is the power to forcibly take private property for public use, upon
payment of just compensation.
Also called the power of expropriation, eminent domain is described
as the “highest and most exact idea of property remaining in
the government” that may be acquired for some public
purpose through a method “in the nature of a compulsory sale
to the state”.
Two Stages of Eminent Domain Cases:
1. The determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit;
2. The determination of the court of the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken.
Requisites for a Valid Exercise of the Power of Eminent
Domain
1. Necessity: There must be a necessity which must be of
public character.
When exercised by:
a. Congress – The question of necessity is a political
questions, which the courts must inhibit from
resolving.
b. Delegate
i. Under specific delegation of authority - The
question of necessity is a political
questions, which the courts must inhibit
from resolving.
ii. Under general delegation of authority - The
question of necessity is a justiciable
question.
2. Private Property: Generally, all private property capable
of ownership may be expropriated. It may include public
utility (Republic vs PLDT) and even private property
devoted for public use (City of Manila vs Chinese
Community of Manila). The exceptions are money and
chooses of action.
3. Taking: It normally results in the actual taking or
appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated
property, but may also be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of the condemned property,
without loss of title and possession.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Requisites of Taking:
a. Expropriator must enter a private property.
b. Entry must not be for a momentary period only.
c. Entry must be under a warrant or color of authority.
d. Property must be devoted for public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected.
e. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property (Republic vs Castellvi).
4. Public Use: The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to
clear cases of the “use by the public” has been discarded.
Public use has now acquired an expansive meaning to
include any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage,
or what is productive of general benefit of the public.” As
long as the public has a right to use, whether
exercised by one or many members of public, a
“public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues
sufficient to constitute a public use (Manosca vs CA).
5. Just Compensation: It is the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken; the fair market value of the property (which
is the price that may be agreed upon by the parties, who
are willing but are not compelled to enter into a contract of
sale), plus consequential damage, minus consequential
benefits.
It embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment for the land within a reasonable time from
the taking (Republic vs Lim).
General Rule: Reckoning point is determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.
This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commence-
ment of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint (Republic vs
Castellvi).
Exception: Where the filing of the complaint occurs
after the actual taking, just compensation is determined
as of the date of the taking.
Effect of Non-Payment
While the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of
just compensation does not entitle the private landowner
to recover possession of the expropriated lots,” however,
in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property (Republic vs Lim).
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 6. Due Process: It requires that the property owner must be
given an opportunity to be heard in the determination o the
fair market value of the property.
Power of Eminent Domain Exercised by LGUs through a Valid
Delegation
The power of eminent domain as exercised by LGUS is not, strictly
speaking, a power of eminent domain, but merely a power of inferior
domain, which means that local government units can only exercise
such power which is delegated to it.
The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU
can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power
of eminent domain;
2. It is exercised for the public use, purpose and welfare;
3. There must be payment of just compensation; and
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property south to be expropriated
(Municipality of Paranaque vs VM Realty).
POWER OF TAXATION
The power by which the sovereign, through its law-making body,
raises revenue to defray the necessary expenses of government.
Taxes are the enforced proportional contribuions from persons and
property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the
support of government and for all public needs.
It covers persons, property, or occupation to be taxed within the
taxing jurisdiction. It is inherent in the power to tax that a State be
free to select the subjects of taxation.
Justice Malcolm believed that the power to tax “is an attribute of
sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of government.” This
led Chief Justice Marshall of the US Supreme Court, in the
celebrated case of McCulloch v. Maryland, to declare: “The power
to tax involves the power to destroy.” This might be construed to
mean that the power to tax includes the power to regulate even to
the extent of prohibition or destruction (Cooley) since the inherent
power to tax vested who to tax, what to tax and how much tax is to
be imposed.
However, instead of being regarded as a blanket authorization of
unrestrained use of the taxing power for any and all purposes, it is
more reasonable to say that the maxim “the power to tax is the
power to destroy” is to describe not the purposes for which the
taxing power may be used but the degree of vigor with which the
taxing power may be employed in order to raise revenue (Cooley)
The power to tax includes the power to destroy if it is used
validly as an implement of the police power in discouraging
and in effect, ultimately prohibiting certain things or
enterprises inimical to the public welfare. X x x But where the
power to tax is used soley for the purpose of raising revenues, the
modern view is that it cannot be allowed to confiscate or destroy. If
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
this is sought to be done, the tax may be successfully attacked as
an inordinate and unconstitutional exercise of the discretion that is
usually vested exclusively in the legislature in ascertaining the
amount of the tax. Justice Isagani Cruz
It is not the purpose of the government to throttle private business.
On the contrary, the government ought to encourage private
enterprise. Taxpayer, just like any concern organized for a lawful
economic activity, has a right to maintain a legitimate business. As
aptly held in Roxas, et al v. CA, et al.: “The power of taxation is
sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be
exercised with caution to minimize injury to the propriety rights of a
taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the
tax collector kill the ‘hen that lays the golden egg.”
WHO MAY EXERCISE
Generally, the legislature, but also upon valid delegation to any of
the following:
1. Law-making bodies of the LGUs (Art. X, Sec. 5 of the 1987
Constitution)
2. The President (Art. VI, Sec. 28, Par. 2) or as an incident of
emergency powers that Congress may grant to him (Art.
VI, Sec. 23, Par. 2)
LIFEBLOOD DOCTRINE: The lifeblood theory constitutes the
theory of taxation, which provides that the existence of government
is a necessity; that government cannot continue without means to
pay its expenses; and that for these means it has a right to compel
its citizens and property within its limits to contribute.
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. (Art.
VI, Sec. 28)
Difference of Equality and Uniformity
In other words, equality in taxation simply means that the tax shall
be strictly proportional to the relative value of the property (Cooley)
In contrast, uniformity in taxation means that persons or things
belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the same rate
(Dimaapao, Tax Principles and Remedies).
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of regressive
taxes. What it simply provides is that Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation. The Constitutional provision should
be construed to mean simply that “direct taxes are to be preferred
and indirect taxes, as much as possible, should be minimized.” (E.
Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines) Indeed, the mandate to
Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve a progressive tax system.
This is a mere directive upon Congress, not a justiciable right or a
legally enforceable one. We cannot avoid regressive taxes but only
minimize them (Tolentino vs Sec. of Finance).
Distinct Limitations on the Exercise of the Power of Taxation
1. Due process of law: Tax should not be confiscatory. With
the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the
nature, object, extent, coverage and situs of taxation. But
where a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and
unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will
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 not hesitate to strike it down, for despite all its plenitude,
the power to tax cannot override constitutional
prescriptions.
2. Equal protection clause: Taxes should be uniform and
equitable (Sec28. (1), Art. VI)
3. It must be for a PUBLIC PURPOSE: Generally, under the
express or implied provisions of the constitution, public
funds may be used only for public purpose. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right
to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation
except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of
a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another
purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for
other than for a public purpose.
It is considered for public purpose if the
proceeds thereof are used for the support of the
government, or for some organized object of
government, or for the welfare of the community. A
public purpose in taxation implies a direct relation
between the primary object of an appropriation to the
public enjoyment. The essential point is that it affects
them as a community and not merely as individuals.
If the taxation was made for a special purpose
[Sec. 29(3), Art. VI] – it must be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only; when purpose is
fulfilled, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.
Double Taxation
It happens when additional taxes are laid on the same subject by
the same taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing period and for
the same purpose.
Despite the lack of a specific prohibition, however double taxation
will not be allowed if it results in a violation of the equal protection
clause. Hence, if certain properties are subjected to an additional
tax whereas others similarly situated are not similarly taxed, the
owners of the properties would have a right to complain.
There is no double taxation where one tax is imposed by the State
and other is imposed by the city; it being widely recognized that
there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license
fees or taxes be enacted with respect to the same occupation,
calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivision
thereof (Punzalan v. Municipal Board of Manila).
Tax Exemptions
No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed, without the
concurrence of a majority of ALL the members of the Congress (Art.
VI, Sec. 25, par. 4).
Note: As distinguished from ordinary legislation, tax measures
require absolute majority of the entire composition of both Houses
of the Congress, voting separately. While ordinary law requires only
the majority of the members present, as long as quorum exists.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Entities and Matters Exempt from Some Kind of Taxes by the
Constitution
1. ART. VI, SECTION 28. (3) Charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
Note: The exemption extends to facilities, which
are incidental to and reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the main purposes.
Otherwise stated, the use of the school building
or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, no by jurisprudence.
2. ART. XIV, SECTION 4. (3) All revenues and assets of non-
stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the
dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such
institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner
provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including
those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to
such exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law
including restrictions on dividends and provisions for
reinvestment.
3. ART. XIV, SECTION 4. (4) Subject to conditions
prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or
contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively
for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
ARTICLE III: BILL OF RIGHTS
The bill or rights is the sanctuary of protection for all persons,
citizens, or non-citizens, against any and all kinds of abuses of
power and authority by the government, or any of its officials and
employees, or even against any unwarranted violation of such rights
by any other persons. It serves not only as a limitation but also a
deterrent to further violations of fundamental liberties. It is the
essence of constitutional democracy.
The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual
and the State. Its concern is not the relation between individuals or
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of
Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private
sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
DUE PROCESS
“A law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial” [Darmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518], “Responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice” [Ermita-Malate
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 18 of 79
Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila, 20 SCRA
849].“The embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play”
[Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp 32-33].
Rights Protected by the Due Process Clause
1. LIFE includes the right of an individual to his body in its
completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to
the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable
[Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp.
320321]. See: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200.
2. LIBERTY includes “the right to exist and the right to be free
from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude, x xx (It)
includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways x xx” [Rubi v. Provincial Board
of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660],
3. PROPERTY is anything that can come under the right of
ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents
more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to
secure, use and dispose of them [Torraco v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197].
Universal in application to all persons, without regard to any
difference in race, color or nationality. Artificial persons are
covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is
concerned [Smith Bell &Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163]. The
guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means of livelihood
[Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 275].
Aspect of Due Process
1. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: It serves as a restriction
on the government’s rule-making power. It looks into and
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property.
Violation of substantive due process makes the law
unconstitutional.
Requisites:
a. There must be a valid law, upon which it is based;
b. The law must have been passed or approved to
accomplish a valid governmental objective;
c. The objective must be pursued in a lawful manner;
d. The law, as well as the means to accomplish the
objective, must be valid and not oppressive.
Note: Publication of laws is part of substantive
due process.
Void-for-Vagueness Rule
When a statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that man of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its
application, that law is deemed void. Such kind of statute
violates the first essential requisite of due process of law
because it denies the accused the right to be informed of
the charged against him (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan).
Overbreadth Doctrine
A facial challenge of the statute when a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
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unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. For an "on-
its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a
mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a
departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and
controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile
abstract context having no factual concreteness.
2. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: It is a guarantee of
procedural fairness. It refers to the regular methods of
procedure to be observed before one’s life, liberty, or
property can be taken away from him. Violation of
procedural due process makes the proceeding invalid.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness (Ynot vs IAC).
Requisites for Procedural Due Process in Judicial
Proceedings
1. That the impartial court or tribunal trying the
case is properly clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it;
2. That jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over
the person of the accused;
3. That the accused is given an opportunity to
be heard. To be heard does not mean verbal
arguments in court, as one may be heard
also through pleadings;
4. That judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing (Allonte vs Savellano).
Requisites for Procedural Due Process in
Administrative Proceedings
1. Right to hearing- it includes right to present
one’s case and submit evidence to support
thereof;
2. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its own Independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy;
3. The tribunal must consider the evidence
Presented;
4. Evidence presented must be substantial,
which means relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion;
5. The Decision must have something to
support itself;
6. The Decision must be based on evidence
presented during hearing or at least
contained in the record and disclosed by the
parties; and
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 7. The decision must be rendered in a manner
that the parties can know the various issues
involved and the reason for the decision
rendered (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations).
Requisites for Procedural Due Process in Academic
Institution Proceedings
1. The students must be informed in WRITING
of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
2. They shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
3. They shall be informed of the evidence
against them;
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and
5. The evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case (ADMU vs Judge
Capulong).
Procedural Due Process in Extradition Proceedings:
Neither the treaty nor the extradition law precludes these
rights from a prospective extradite. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not
go against the treaty or the implementing law (Sec. of
Justice v. Lantion).
Procedural Due Process in Deportation Proceedings:
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, considering that it is a harsh
and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of
such person to due process should not be denied. Thus,
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings (Lao Gi “Chia”, Sr. v. CA).
EQUAL PROTECTION
All persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Natural and
juridical persons are entitled to this guarantee; but with respect to
artificial persons, they enjoy the protection only insofar as their
property is concerned.
There is no difference between a law which actually denies equal
protection of the law and a law which permits of such denial. A law
may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibitions (People vs Vera).
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material
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to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition
of the constitution (Biraogo vs PTC).
Classification
It means the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particular and different from all others in these same
particulars.
Requisites for a Valid Classification
Persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be
treated differently if there is a basis for valid classification. The
equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid
classification, so long as the following requisites are present:
1. Substantial distinctions which make for real differences.
2. Germane to the purpose of the law. The distinctions which
are the bases for the classification should have a
reasonable relation to the purpose of the law.
3. Not limited to existing conditions only.
4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class
(People vs Cayat).
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Art. III, Sec. 2 is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures, but
only UNREASONABLE searches and seizures.
There is no exact and fixed definition of the term “unreasonable.” All
illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable, while lawful one
are reasonable (Alvarez vs CFI).
The protection is available to all persons, including aliens, whether
accused of a crime or not. Artificial persons are also entitled to
the guarantee, although they may be required to open their books
of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of police
and taxing powers. The right is personal; it may be invoked only
by the person entitled to it. As such, the right may be waived,
either expressly or impliedly, but the waiver must be made by the
person whose right is invaded, not by one who is not duly authorized
to effect such waiver (Stonehill v. Diokno).
The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures by private individuals. If the search is
made at the behest or initiation of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as
to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government (People v. Marti).
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Unreasonable Searches and Seizures is a Judicial Question
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure
in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable
from a consideration of the circumstances involved (Valmonte v. De
Villa).
A warrant of arrest is an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, to take a person, into custody, in order that he may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense.
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and bring it before the court (Rule 126, Sec. 1).
WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANTS
General Rule: Only the judge has the power to issue a warrant after
the proper procedure has been duly taken.
For a search warrant: (Rule 126, Sec. 2) General Rule: It
should be filed with the court, whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed. Exception: (1) For
compelling reasons, it can be filed with the court within
whose judicial region the crime was committed or
where the warrant shall be enforced. (2) But if the
criminal action has been filed, the application for a search
warrant can only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending. (3) As per Administrative
Matter 99-20-09-SC, in cases of search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff Customs Code, as
amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be
enacted in Congress, and included herein by the Supreme
Court. The Executive Judges, and whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present in
the station, the Vice-Executive Judges, of the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City shall have the authority to act on
applications filed by the NBI, PNP, and the Anti-Crime
Task Force. The applications shall be personally endorsed
by the Heads of the said agencies, for the search of places
to be particularly described therein, and the seizure of
property or things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and
to issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in
places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said
courts.
The warrant must direct that it be served in the
day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property
is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that
it be served at any time of the day or night (Rule 126, Sec.
9).
A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days
from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (Rule 126, Sec.
10)
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
For a warrant of arrest: It is always issued by the Court,
where the criminal action is pending, as it can only be
issued after the filing of an information, upon finding of
probable cause by the prosecutor. It can be enforced
anywhere in the Philippines.
An arrest may be made on any day and at any
time of the day or night. (Rule 113, Sec. 6)
Unlike a search warrant, no time limit is fixed
for the validity of a warrant of arrest. So long as the
warrant has not been recalled, or the person named
therein arrested, or had otherwise submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, the warrant remains good and can
still be executed even if a previous negative return was
made to the issuing court.
Exception: The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may
issue warrants to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an
executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the
purpose (Morano vs Vivo).
REASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
General Rule: Searches and seizures to be lawful must be
accompanied by a valid warrant.
Exception: Valid warrantless arrests and warrantless searches and
seizures
Requisites of a Valid Warrant
1. Existence of probable cause, in connection with one
specific offense: It is concerned with probability and not
absolute certainty.
For a search warrant: “such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.”
For a warrant of arrest: “such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested.”
2. Determination of probable cause was done personally
by the judge
For a search warrant: Sec. 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court provide that “the judge must, before issuing the
warrant, PERSONALLY EXAMINE IN THE FORM OF
SEARCHING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach
to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted (Silva vs Hon. Judge of RTC of Negros
Oriental). The examination must not be merely routinary or
pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.
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 For a warrant of arrest: What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
THE JUDGE IS NOT REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY
EXAMINE THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
a. Personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or
b. If on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause (Soliven vs Makasiar).
3. After examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce
Oath: It is any form of attestation by which a party signifies
that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully
and truthfully; and it sometimes defines as an outward
pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to his God. The true test of sufficiency of
an affidavit to warrant is whether it has been drawn in
such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon
and affiant be held liable for damages caused. (Alvarez
vs CFI)
4. The complainant or witnesses has personal
knowledge of the facts upon which the issuance of
warrant may be justified.
When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it
is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists
probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the
facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more
witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is
necessary (Alvarez vs CFI).
5. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
General warrants are proscribed and unconstitutional. A
general warrant is not valid, as it infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of
the things to be seized. A Scatter Shot Warrant is a kind
of general warrant which is issued for more than one
offense.
For a search warrant: A description of the place to be
searched is sufficient, if the officer with the warrant can,
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended.
A description of the object is sufficient, if the
object sought to be seized can be identified with sufficient
particularity, in relation to the averments of the offense. It
is not required that a technical nor a precise description is
given.
Under Rule 126, Sec. 3: A search warrant may
be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and
other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
According to Uy vs BIR, a search warrant may be
said to particularly describe the things to be seized:
a. When the description described therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow;
b. When the description expresses conclusion
of fact, not of law, by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the
searches and seizures; or
c. When the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.
For a warrant of arrest: It is said to particularly describe
the person to be seized, if it contains the name/s of the
person/s to be arrested. If the name of the person to be
arrested is not known, then a “John Doe” warrant may be
issued. A “John Doe" warrant will satisfy the constitutional
requirement of particularity of description, if there is some
description personae, which will enable the officer to
identify the accused.
Valid Warrantless Arrests
1. Rule 113, Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful. —
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense (in flagrante
delicto);
b. When an offense has just been committed, and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it
(hot pursuit); and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another
A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace
officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.
It is essentially a form of entrapment, since the peace
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 officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to
commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such
ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal
intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way
of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of
the offense. The warrantless arrest must immediately
precede the entrapment.
Membership in organizations like NPA is a continuing
offense, thus, a person can be arrested anytime, as it is
deemed to be an instance of arrest in flagrante delicto
(Umil vs Ramos).
There must be a large measure of immediacy between
the time the offense is committed and the time of the
arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a
warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense
of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making
the arrest has personal knowledge of certain facts
indicating that the person to be taken into custody has
committed the crime. Reliable information does not satisfy
as “personal knowledge” (People vs Del Rosario).
2. Rule 113, Sec. 13: Arrest after escape or rescue. — If a
person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person
may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant
at any time and in any place within the Philippines.
3. Rule 114, Sec. 23: Arrest of accused out on bail. — For
the purpose of surrendering the accused, the bondsmen
may arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a
certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested
by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and
discretion.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without permission of the court where
the case is pending.
4. When the right is waived by the person arrested,
provided he knew of such right and knowingly decided not
to invoke it.
Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures
1. When the right has been voluntarily waived (consent
searches)
Objections to the warrant of arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea. Failure to do so
constitutes a waiver of his right against unlawful restraint
of liberty (People v. Codilla).
2. Rule 126, Sec. 13: Search incident to lawful arrest. —
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Note: A valid arrest must precede the search, the
process cannot be reversed. It may be made only within
the permissible area of search, or the place within the
immediate control of the person being arrested (Espano vs
CA).
3. Searches of moving vehicles
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a
warrant, because the vehicle can be moved quickly out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles are also
allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided that such
searches are made at borders or “constructive borders”,
like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State (Papa
vs Mago).
4. Custom searches; however, rule is not available in
dwelling places.
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require
said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the
Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search
any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box
or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But
in the search of a dwelling house , the Code provides that
said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace”
(People vs Mago).
5. Visual search at checkpoints
In Valmonte vs De Villa, the Court held that
between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the
manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits,
are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.
6. When there is a genuine reason to “stop-and-frisk,” in
light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant a belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed. A mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a stop-and-frisk (Malacat vs Court of Appeals).
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 23 of 79
 Its objective is either to determine the identity of
a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily, while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information (Terry vs Ohio).
The two purposes of stop-and-frisk searches are:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation.
Stop-and-search is different from stop-and-frisk.
In stop-and-search, there is probable cause, while in stop-
and-frisk, there is genuine reason. In stop- and-frisk, the
commission of the offense need not be obvious to ordinary
man, but a seasoned police officer can determine the
possible offense.
In stop-and-search, search may be extend in the
place within the immediate control of the person, while in
stop-and-frisk it only extends to bodily searches or limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
7. Conduct or aerial target zoning and saturation drives in
the exercise of military powers of the President.
8. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary, and building regulations.
9. Plain View Doctrine: It states that objects within the sight
of an officer, who has a right to be in a position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied, when
a police officer is searching for the object subject of the
warrant, but nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an
incriminating object.
The 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another, until something incriminating at last emerges.
Requisites of Plain View Doctrine:
a. The executing law enforcement officer has a prior
justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise
properly in a position from which he can view a
particular order;
b. The officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently;
c. The evidence must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure; and
d. Plain view justified the seizure of evidence
without further search.
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Art. III, Sec. 3, par 2: It states that all evidence obtained in violation
of Sec. 2, Art. III, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
“Fruit of Poisonous Tree”
Once the primary source (“the tree”) is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (“the
fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the
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principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be
used to gain other evidence, because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Exclusionary Rule applies to principal evidence. Fruit of
Poisonous Tree Doctrine applies to secondary evidence.
The illegally seized object must be returned, if it is not a prohibited
object. If it is a contraband, it can be confiscated.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding
party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime (People vs
Del Rosario).
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The right to privacy has been concisely defined as the right to be
left alone. It has also been defined as the right of a person to be
free from unwarranted publicity, and the right to live without
interference by the public, in matters with which the public is not
necessarily concerned.
Requisites of Existence of Right to Privacy
1. Subjective Test: A person has exhibited an actual
expectation of privacy.
2. Objective Test: The expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The factual circumstances of the case determine the
reasonableness of the expectation. However, other factors, such
as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a
particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this
expectation (Ople vs Torres).
Zones of Privacy
1. Art. III, Sec. 1 – Due Process Clause
2. Art. III, Sec. 2 – Right against unreasonable searches and
seizure
3. Art. III, Sec. 3 – Privacy of communication and
Correspondence
4. Art. III, Sec. 8 – Right to Form Association
5. Art. III, Sec. 6 – Liberty of Abode and travel
6. Art. III, Sec. 17 – Right Against Self Incrimination
7. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect
the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable
torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into
the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or
employee or any private individual liable for damages for
any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,
and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications.
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 8. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
9. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the
Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act
and the Intellectual Property Code.
10. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information (Ople vs
Torres).
Inclusions of Right of Privacy
1. Decisional Privacy – right to independence in making
certain important decisions.
2. Informational Privacy – right in avoiding of disclosure of
personal matters
a. The right not to have private information
disclosed.
b. The right to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion (Disini vs Sec. of Justice).
Intrusion, When Allowed
1. By lawful order of the court; or
2. When public safety or order requires otherwise, as may be
provided by law.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them breaking the cabinets and drawers of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his or her
integrity or right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her
(Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals.)
Anti-Wire Tapping Act (RA 4200), Sec. 1: It shall be unlawful for
any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording
is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200 (Ramirez vs
CA).
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with
the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein , following the
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused."
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communication, but not those which are public in character
(Navarro vs CA).
A person, who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends
to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery,
particularly under circumstances where the said person did not
employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled
access to the Web page or the photograph itself. Without proof that
they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of
their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they
have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question (Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College).
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Scope: All forms of communication are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of expression clause. It includes the
following:
1. Free speech and free press
2. Freedom of assembly
3. Freedom of petition
4. Right to association or the right to form association
5. Right to religious freedom
Speech, expression and press include every form of expression,
whether oral, written, tape, or disc recorded.
The Constitution guarantees the liberty to utter what is in his mind
and also guarantees him the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.
In the case of Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, the Court
enunciated that there are several theories and schools of
thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to
freedom of expression. First, this relates to the right of the people
to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions. Second, free speech should be encouraged
under the concept of a market place of ideas. This theory was
articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate good desired is
better reached by the free trade in ideas." Third, free speech
involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is
"a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment," among others.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one,
"voluntary associations perform an important democratic role in
providing forums for the development of civil skills, for deliberation,
and for the formation of identity and community spirit, and are
largely immune from any governmental interference." Fifth, the Bill
of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals
and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through
[the] framework [of democratic governance." Lastly, free speech
must be protected under the safety valve theory. This provides that
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"nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of
violence[.]"
Availability: The Constitutional right guaranteeing the freedom of
expression is available only against government intrusion. This is
apparent in the provision, since “no law” shall be passed abridging
the freedom. However, an action for damages pursuant to Article 32
of the New Civil Code can be raised by an aggrieved party against
another private individual.
Freedom of expression is not absolute, since it is always
subject to the police power of the State. This is premised on the
need to protect society from the injurious exercise of said freedom
and the need to promote or protect public welfare, public safety,
public morals, and national security.
General Rule: Prior restraints on speech are generally invalid.
Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of
speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a
weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, “any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.” The Government
‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
enforcement of such restraint.’ There is thus a reversal of the normal
presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
Exception: There are those which may be permitted under the
constitution, if the restraint to be imposed meets the burden of proof
necessary to uphold its validity. This burden of proof depends on
whether the restraint is in the form of content-based regulations or
content-neutral regulations.
Exceptions to the Exception: There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words ¾ those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace (SWS, Inc. v. COMELEC). It includes, but not limited to,
pornography, false or misleading commercial statement, advocacy
of imminent lawless action, danger to national security, movies,
television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to
numerous people, including the youth, who must be insulated from
the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech.
Doctrines Applied to Free Speech
1. Facial Challenge: A facial challenge is allowed to be
made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected
speech. The theory is that “when statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in
a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society
of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
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by a statute drawn with narrow specificity (Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan).
The established rule is that a party can question
the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is
unconstitutional. The exception is the so-called “facial
challenge.” But the only time a facial challenge is allowed
is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression.
2. Overbreadth Doctrine: A governmental purpose may not
be achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan).
Types of Regulations:
1. Content-based: It is when the restraint is aimed at the
message or idea of the expression and are usually
imposed because of fear of how people will react to a
particular speech.
Presumption: These regulations are censorial
and therefore bear a heavy presumption of constitutional
invalidity.
Test for validity: The challenged act must
overcome the clear and present danger rule to be valid.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger
rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
2. Content-neutral: It is when the restraint aims to regulate
the time, place, or manner of the expression in public
places, without any restraint on the content of the
expression.
Presumption: As it merely regulates, there is
less presumption of constitutional invalidity. But, the
burden of proof still rests with the authorities.
Test for validity: Only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity. The
O’Brien Test is to be applied. A government regulation is
justified if:
(1) It is within the constitutional power of
government;
(2) It furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
(3) The governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
(4) The incidental restriction on the freedom is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing
content-based from content-neutral regulations and is said
to have "become canonical in the review of such laws." It
is noteworthy that the O'Brien test has been applied by this
Court in at least two cases. Under this test, even if a law
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest,
it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is
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 "not unrelated to the suppression of free expression."
Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless
be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is
greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in question (SWS, Inc. v. COMELEC).
Tests for Valid Governmental Interference to Freedom of
Expression:
1. Clear and Present Danger Rule: Whether the words are
used in such circumstances and of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that the State has the right to prevent.
“The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances
can be punished”.
2. Dangerous Tendency Rule. As explained in Cabansag v.
Fernandez, if the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency of an evil which the State has the right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and the probable effect of the utterance
were to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative
body seeks to prevent.
3. Balancing of Interests Test. “When particular conduct is
regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, or partial abridgment of
speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the
two conflicting interests demands the greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented”. In Zaldivar
v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court said that the “clear
and present danger rule” is not the only test which has
been recognized and applied by the courts. Another
criterion for permissible limitation on freedoms of speech
and of the press is the “balancing of interests test”, which
requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation (Ayer Productions v. Capulong).
Kinds of Privilege Communication
1. Absolutely privileged communication
2. Qualifiedly privileged communication
a. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral, or
social duty.
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report, or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.
c. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest
(Borjal v. Court of Appeals).
As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie
privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. A pertinent illustration
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of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good
faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a
public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some
interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found
to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness
and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may
still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be
made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is
destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an
interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of
public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient
if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith
believe he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of
the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint
should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the
respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will
not take the case out of the privilege. In the usual case MALICE can
be presumed from defamatory words. PRIVILEGE destroys that
PRESUMPTION. The onus of proving malice then lies on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood
and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such
excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws
over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona
fides (US v. Bustos).
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public concern are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against
a public person on his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.
If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts (Borjal v. CA).
FREEDOM OF SPEECH INCLUDES THE FREEDOM TO
COMMENT ON OFFICIAL CONDUCT: The leading case of U.S. v.
Bustos is authority for the rule that the individual is given the widest
latitude in criticism of official conduct. The interest of society and
the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A
public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
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comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence
and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism
does not authorize defamation. The guaranties of a free speech
and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether
the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for
proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace
or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will
be effectively muzzled. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who
contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged
to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated
breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct,
embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in
a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt
which is summarily punish able by the courts. The rule is
otherwise after the cause is ended. It must, however, clearly appear
that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
administration of justice before the author of the publications should
be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against
the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty
of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the
court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to
reconsider or amend it (People v. Alarcon).
The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right
of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion
into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to
be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters
of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be
invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public
interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy
is the right to be free from "unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which
are outside the realm of legitimate public concern (Ayer Productions
PTY Ltd. V. Capulong)."
Public Figure
"A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate
interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity.
Obviously to be included in this category are those who have
achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public,
as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist,
or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It
includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes
and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a
personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in
short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention
is focused upon him as a person. Such public figures were held
to have lost, to some extent at least, their right of privacy. Three
reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the decisions"
that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
complain when they received it; that their personalities and their
affairs had already become public, and could no longer be regarded
as their own private business; and that the press had a privilege,
under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have
become legitimate matters of public interest (Ayer Productions PTY
Ltd. V. Capulong).
IMMORAL LITERATURE COMES WITHIN THE AMBIT OF FREE
EXPRESSION, BUT NOT ITS PROTECTION: In the case of Pita v
Court of Appeals, the Court held that undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or
literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its
protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently
been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
present danger" that would warrant State interference and action.
The determination of what is obscene is a judicial function.
The latest definition of obscene, however, is the Miller
Test, which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and
established "basic guidelines," to wit:
(a) Whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest;
(b) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and
(c) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Assembly and Petition
The right to assemble is not subject to prior restraint. It may not be
conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization
from government authorities. However, the right must be exercised
in such a way as will not prejudice the public welfare, as held in De
la Cruz v. Court of Appeals.
If the assembly is to be held in a public place, a permit for the use
of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly
required. But the power of local officials in this regard is merely one
of regulation, not prohibition (Primicias v. Fugoso; Reyes v.
Bagatsing).
Thus, in B.P. 880 [Public Assembly Act of 1985], a permit to hold
a public assembly shall not be necessary where the meeting is to
be held in a private place, in the campus of a government-owned or
-operated educational institution, or in a freedom park. Where a
permit is required, the written application shall be filed with the
mayor’s office at least 5 days before the scheduled meeting and
shall be acted upon within two days, otherwise the permit shall be
deemed granted. Denial of the permit may be justified only upon
clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create
a clear and present danger to public order, safety, convenience,
morals or health. Action on the application shall be communicated
within 24 hours to the applicant, who may appeal the same to the
appropriate court. Decision must be reached within 24 hours. The
law permits law enforcement agencies to detail a contingent under
a responsible officer at least 100 meters away from the assembly in
case it becomes necessary to maintain order.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 28 of 79
The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger” to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
“Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from
the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil
will result if free speech is practiced; that the danger apprehended
is imminent and the evil to be prevented is a serious one.” Imminent
danger can justify prohibition only if the evil apprehended is
relatively serious. That speech is likely to result in some violence or
in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state (Primicias
v. Fugoso).
However, in Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, the suspension or
dismissal of the public school teachers, who staged a strike to
dramatize their grievances, was held valid. They were not being
penalized for their exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition, but because of their successive, unauthorized and
unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their
students.
As applied to student rallies and demonstrations, in Malabanan v.
Ramento, the Supreme Court emphasized that the students did
not shed their constitutional rights to free speech at the
schoolhouse gate, and permitted the students to re-enroll and
finish their studies. If the assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who
are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as
to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes
or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should
not be disproportionate to the offense.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." In the hierarchy of civil
liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions" (PBM Employees Association v. Philippine Blooming
Mills).
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether
real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always
wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance
and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be
the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a
crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble
and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who
took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if
the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be
pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly
conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be
sought out and punished therefore, but the utmost discretion must
be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious
conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a
tumultuous uprising." (Bayan v. Ermita).
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
(Correlate with Discussion in Article II, Sec. 6)
Three (3) Principal Parts of Section 5:
1. Non-establishment clause (First Sentence);
2. Free exercise clause (Second Sentence); and
3. Non-religious test clause (Third Sentence)
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
It prohibits the state from passing laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of
public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property
(Garces v. Estenzo)
It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, not mere RELIGIOUS TOLERATION.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, however, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial
of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated (Aglipay v. Ruiz).
Tests to Determine When There is No Violation of
Establishment Clause (Lemon Test):
1. The statute has a secular legislative purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion (Lemon v. Kurtzman).
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The
first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 29 of 79
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare (Iglesia ni
Cristo v. CA).
Freedom to Believe: The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve)
as he pleases concerning the hereafter. However absurd his beliefs
may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the
majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not
be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his
inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Freedom to
believe is not subject to regulation.
Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs: But where the individual
externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public,
his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State.
As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other
rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a
proper regard for the rights of others. Justice Frankfurter put it
succinctly: 'The constitutional provision on religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave
religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma.”
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information (American Bible Society v. City of
Manila).
Tests to Apply in Cases of a Valid Regulation
Generally speaking, a legislative act that purposely aids or inhibits
religion will be challenged as unconstitutional, either because it
violates the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause or
both. But the more difficult religion cases involve legislative acts
which have a secular purpose and general applicability, thus a
valid law, but may incidentally or inadvertently aid or burden
religious exercise.
1. Clear and Present Danger Test: When words are used
in such circumstance and of such nature as to create a
clear and present danger that will bring about the
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent
(Schenck v. U.S., No. 437, 438, March 3, 1919);
2. Compelling State Interest Test: The test stems from
applying the lens of Benevolent Neutrality, which
recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals
and interests, but at the same time, strive to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interest. The benevolent neutrality theory believes that
with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. The purpose of
accommodations is to remove a burden on, or
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion. Thus, to pass the Compelling State Interest Test,
ALL of the the following questions must be answered in
sequence and affirmatively:
a. “Has the statute or government action created a
burden on the free exercise of religion?”
b. “Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to
justify this infringement of religious liberty?”
c. “Has the state in achieving its legitimate
purposes, used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed
any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state?” (Estrada vs.
Escritur).
Note: These tests presuppose that there is a valid law, which
provides for a regulation. In determining which test to apply, after
applying the Lemon Test, determine whether the law is one which
regulates free speech in relation to religious freedom or one which
goes in the very essence of religious freedom. In case of the former,
apply the Clear and Present Danger Rule. In case of the latter, apply
the Compelling State Interest Test
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
LIBERTY OF ABODE
It includes the right to choose one’s residence, to leave whenever
he pleases and to travel wherever he wills.
Limitations of Liberty of Abode
Liberty of Abode is not an absolute right. It may be limited by law
and may be impaired by lawful order of the court.
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
It refers to the right to move from one place to another
Scope
The right to travel, under the Bill of Rights, only includes: (1) the
right to travel from the Philippines to another country; and (2) the
right to travel within the Philippines (Marcos v. Manglapus).
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under Art. 13(2), Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which provides that everyone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country;
and Art. 12(4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter
his own country (Marcos v. Manglapus).
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In the case of Marcos v. Manglapus, the President exercised her
Residual Powers, which belongs to the government but DOES
NOT belong to any of its branches. It is an inherent power of the
government which is exercised by the President being the HEAD of
the State. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the
general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights
of certain individuals. It is founded on the duty of the President, as
steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not
only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not
forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation
demand. It is a (1) power borne by the President's duty to preserve
and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a (2) power
implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed.
Limitations of Right to Travel
1. Interest of national security, public safety or public health,
as may be provided by law
2. A lawful order of the court is also a valid restriction on the
right to travel.
Note: Sec. 6, Art III of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted
to mean that while the liberty to travel may be impaired even without
court order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretions to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of “national
security, public safety or public health and as may be provided by
law.” (Silverio v. Court of Appeals).
The Right to Travel may be impaired by courts of justice, even
for reasons other than the promotion of national security,
public safety, or public health (Silverio v. Court of Appeals).
RESTRICTION OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS A NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCE OF A BAIL: A court has the power to prohibit a
person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance. "Its object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him,
pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as
much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of
the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the
law may require of him." The condition imposed upon petitioner
to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
The result of the obligation assumed by surety to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court,
was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which
they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they
would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction (Manotoc v.
Court of Appeals).
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
(Correlate with Discussion in Article II, Sec. 26).
The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It
is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in
government (Valmonte v. Belmonte).
The right to information on matters of public concern is a self-
executing provision. What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent
with the declared State policy, disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest. The right may be properly invoked in a
MANDAMUS proceeding. For every right of the people as
fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
who govern, to respect and protect that right.
Government agencies are without discretion in refusing
disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. The
power to regulate the manner of examining public records
does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to
be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of,
or access to, particular information and the authority to regulate the
manner in which the access of the information is to be afforded. The
manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government or agency in custody thereof (Legaspi
v. CSC).
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to “access to official records,” the constitution
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern
(Valmonte v. Belmonte).
Except perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination
is unlawful or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty
under the law of registration officers concern themselves with the
motives, reasons, and objects of the persons seeking access to the
records. The authority to regulate the manner of examining public
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit (Subido v.
Ozaeta).
Scope of the Right
In Chavez v. PCGG, it was held that the right to information
contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction. Otherwise, the people can
never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, or if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
However, the right only affords access to records, documents and
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 31 of 79
papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them at
his expense. The exercise is also subject to reasonable regulations
to protect the integrity of public records and to minimize disruption
of government operations.
Test
In every case, the availability of access to a particular public record
must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought:
1. Being of public concern or one that involves public
interest. In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public (Legaspi v. CSC); and
2. Not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee
Limitations on the Right to Information:
The right does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information rooted in separation of powers, nor to information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national
security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused
(Chavez v. PCGG). Likewise, in Garcia v. Board of Investments, the
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Board of Investments in
denying the petitioner access to trade and industrial secrets.
Judicial Privilege
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence prohibiting
the revelation of confidential or “secret” information that causes
damage to public interest even in judicial and other proceedings
such as the sui generis impeachment trial. As far as the Court is
concerned, its Members and officials involved in all proceedings are
duty-bound to observe the privileged communication and
confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration of justice
were to be preserved – i.e., not even Members of the Court, on their
own and without the consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on
matters covered by the prohibitions and exclusions, particularly with
respect to matters pending resolution before the Supreme Court.
The following are privileged documents or
communications, and are not subject to disclosure:
1. Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and
the actions taken by the Court on each case included in
the agenda of the Court’s session on acts done material to
pending cases, except where a party litigant requests
information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant
to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
2. Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in
court sessions on cases and matters pending before the
Court;
3. Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative”
in nature, in particular, documents and other communica-
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
tions which are part of or related to the deliberative
process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers.
4. Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court
officials and employees in the course of their official
functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged
even after their term of office.
5. Records of cases that are still pending for decision are
privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except only
for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made
available by the court to the general public.
6. The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy
demands that the highest officials of each department be
exempt from the compulsory processes of the other
departments.
7. These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an
institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her individual
capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual
justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or judge, not
even the Chief Justice, may claim exception without the
consent of the Court (In Re: Production of Court Records
and Document).
Deliberative Process Privilege
The rules on confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to
“freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding
unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s comments. The
privilege against disclosure of these kinds of
information/communication is known as deliberative process
privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching
a decision. “Written advice from a variety of individuals is an
important element of the government’s decision-making process
and that the interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced
the government to disclose those recommendations;” the privilege
is intended “to prevent the ‘chilling’ of deliberative
communications.”
The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have
in passing recognized the claim of this privilege by the two other
branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
when the Court declared that - [t]he information x x x like internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or
executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-
equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. It is unthinkable
that the disclosure of internal debates and deliberations of the
Supreme Court or the executive sessions of either Houses of
Congress can be compelled at will by outside parties.
Thus, a Senator may invoke legislative privilege when he
or she is questioned outside the Senate about information gathered
during an executive session of the Senate’s legislative inquiry in aid
of legislation. In the same manner, a justice of the court or a judge
may invoke judicial privilege in the Senate sitting as an
Impeachment Court, for proceedings in the performance of his or
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 32 of 79
her own judicial functions. What applies to magistrates applies with
equal force to court officials and employees who are privy to these
deliberations. They may likewise claim exemption when asked
about this privileged information.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative
process privilege, the agency must show that the document is
both (1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.
A document is “predecisional” under the deliberative
process privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision
to which it relates. In other words, communications are
considered predecisional if they were made in the attempt to
reach a final conclusion.
A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects
the give-and-take of the consultative process. The key question in
determining whether the material is deliberative in nature is
whether disclosure of the information would discourage
candid discussion within the agency. If the disclosure of the
information would expose the government’s decision making
process in a way that discourages candid discussion among the
decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts’ ability to perform
their functions), the information is deemed privileged (In Re:
Production of Court Records and Document).
Right to Information Relative to Diplomatic Negotiations
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the
right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
"information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion
of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest. The nature of diplomacy
requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential nature (AKBAYAN v. Aquino).
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
The right to form associations cannot be impaired without due
process of law. Right to form associations shall not be impaired,
except through a valid exercise of police power. It is deemed
embraced in freedom of expression because the organization can
be used as a vehicle for the expression of views that have a bearing
on the public welfare.
The Right to Join Associations Include the Right Not to Join
The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the
freedom not to associate. The right to choose whom one will
associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that
partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees
the right to form an association. It does not include the right to
compel others to form or join one (Sta. Clara Homeowners
Association v. Gaston).
The assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not
prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with
labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding
their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to
sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so;
the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union
compel them to join (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union).
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does
not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already
a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized
and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as
he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers (In Re: Edillion).
The Right to Strike is Not Included in The Guarantee of
Association to Government Employees
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are
fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions
from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private
industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through
compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the
minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized
private sector are settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements (SSS Employee’s Association v.
Court of Appeals).
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
(See previous discussion under the Fundamental Powers of
the State: Power of Eminent Domain)
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
When is There Impairment
There is impairment when there is a change in the terms of a legal
contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance,
or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 33 of 79
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided
in its terms (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union).
A law impairs a contract when it enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner change the intentions of the parties (U.S. v. Diaz Conde),
and this is true even if the change is done indirectly.
The degree of diminution is immaterial. As long as the original rights
of either party are changed to their prejudice, there is already
impairment of the obligation of contract. However, not all
impairment are prohibited. Only those unreasonable are prohibited.
Moratorium Laws are Constitutional
The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations
decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the
legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign power".
The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of the moratorium
statute lies in the determination of the period of a suspension of the
remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution
(Rutter v. Esteban).
Limitations on the Non-Impairment of Contracts
In every contract, there are two (2) implied elements aside from the
stipulation of the parties that:
1. A future date or a future time, a state may exercise its
inherent powers that may validly change the terms of their
contract.
2. All existing laws are deemed included in the contract.
The legislature cannot bargain away the police power through the
medium of a contract. Neither may private parties fetter the
legislative authority by contracting on matters that are essentially
within the power of the lawmaking body.
Like the police power, the other inherent powers (eminent
domain and taxation) may validly limit the impairment clause
(City of San Pablo v. Judge Reyes and Meralco).
In every contract, there is an implied reservation that it is
subject to the police power of the State. Not only are existing
laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.
The policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes
the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual
relations are worthwhile – a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. (Ortigas &
Co. v. Feati Bank and Trust Co.).
B.P. 22 does not impair the freedom to contract. The freedom of
contract, which is constitutionally protected, is freedom to
enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts that contravene public
policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks
cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial
instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the
state. (Lozano v. Martinez).
A trial court may not order the cancellation of a mortgage lien
annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment of
a promissory note and substitute such lien with a surety bond
approved by the same court to secure the payment of the
promissory note. The substitution of a mortgage with a surety bond
to secure the payment of the note would in effect change the terms
and conditions of the mortgage contract (Ganzon v. Inserto).
The non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative
power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power (China Banking
Corp v ASB Holdings).
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty.
Free access to the court does not mean that the courts cannot
impose filing fees. The court may impose reasonable fees (U.S.
v. Kras).
Extended to Natural Persons Only
The Constitution has explicitly premised the free exercise clause on
a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer.
Extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it
works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to
abuse, particularly by corporations and entities bent on
circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of
compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too
time consuming and wasteful for the courts (In Re: Query of Mr.
Roger Prioreschi).
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this Section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Custodial Investigation
It is any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way (People v. Judge Ayson,
citing Miranda v. Arizona).
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 34 of 79
When Available
The rights under Sec. 12, Art. III are available when the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry unto an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, as when the suspect
has been taken into police custody and the police carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements (People v. Andan).
It shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who
is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law (R.A. 7438, Sec. 2).
The rights under custodial investigation are not available in
administrative proceedings (People v. Judge Ayson).
A person under normal audit investigation is not under custodial
investigation, because an audit examiner can hardly be deemed to
be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the rule (Navallo v.
Sandiganbayan).
A police line-up is not considered part of any custodial inquest
because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached
and because the process has not yet shifted from investigatory to
accusatory stage and it is usually the witness or complainant who
is interrogated and who gives statement in the course of the line up
(Gamboa v. Cruz). However, after the start of the custodial
investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in
a police line-up is inadmissible (People v. Macam).
Rights of a Person Suspected and Subsequently Charged
1. Before case is filed for preliminary investigation but after
being put into custody or otherwise deprived of liberty, and
on being interrogated by police:
a. The continuing right to remain silent and counsel;
b. To be informed thereof;
c. Not to be subjected to force, violence, threat or
intimidation which vitiates free will; and
d. To have evidence obtained in violation of these
rights inadmissible as evidence (CONST. Art. III,
Sec. 12).
2. After the case is filed in court:
a. To refuse to be witness against himself;
b. Not to have prejudice imputed on him as a result
of such refusal;
c. To testify on his behalf; and
d. To cross-examination; while testifying, to refuse
questions which tend to incriminate him for some
crime other than the present charge;
3. While Testifying in Court:
a. To refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime other
than that for which he is prosecuted. (People v.
Judge Ayson).
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be
informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be
presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule,
therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat
to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution.
He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the
latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms
(People v. Pinlac).
Waiver of the Right
Only the right to remain silent and the right to counsel may be
waived, but not the right to be informed of these rights. The
waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel. The
burden of proving that there was valid waiver rests on the
prosecution. The presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.
A confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement by a person acknowledging that he has
committed or participated in the commission of a crime. But before
it can be admitted in evidence, the Constitution demands strict
compliance with the requirements of Secs. 12 and 17, Art. Ill,
because a confession of guilt constitutes formidable evidence
against the accused, on the principle that no one will knowingly,
freely and deliberately admit authorship of a crime unless prompted
by truth and conscience, particularly where the facts given could
only have been known by the accused (People v. Fabro).
Confession made DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION must
conform to Sec. 2(d) of R.A. 7438. It is provided that any
extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter’s absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older
brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal
judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
Confessions MADE VOLUNTARILY AND SPONTANEOUSLY
are not covered by the rights on custodial investigation. In the
case of People v. Andan, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true
that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control"
over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3)
of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police
authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor
for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was
going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the
mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional
rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
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committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion
by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false,
not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence
we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
Accordingly, confessions to the media are not part of
custodial investigation. Appellant's confessions to the media were
likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response
to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news
reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they
interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and
control of the police. They were there to check appellant's
confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them
an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him
on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence.
Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even
supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and
consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news
reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There
was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the
news reporters. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual
and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed
to the State and its agents.
Spontaneous statements not elicited trough questioning is not
part of custodial investigation. In the case of People v. Dy, the
oral confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that "he had
shot a tourist" and that the gun he had used in shooting the victim
was in his bar which he wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police
is competent evidence against him. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in
evidence against him (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may in
a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that,
any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he
heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need
not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in
substance. Note: This presupposes that custodial investigation
has not yet taken place, as if it had, the guarantees of the
Constitution and of the law, such as the need for a confession
to be written, should be upheld.
Exclusionary Rule
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision
is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police inter-
rogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical
and psychological, is forcefully apparent (People v. Andan).
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation
or the so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during such
investigation. "The admissibility of other evidence, provided they
are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or
rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation" (Ho Wai Pang v. People)
The inadmissibility of evidence in violation of the rights of an
accused during custodial investigation may be waived, if not
objected to during trial (People v. Judge Ayson).
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
It is not only the uncounseled confession that is condemned as
inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. In the case of
People v. Alicando, the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged
bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled
confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. We
have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our
jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule
known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United
States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is
also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is
obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit
of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally
seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based
on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State
should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Bail
The security given for the release of a person in custody of law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under conditions specified under the
Rules of Court (Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 1).
Forms of Bail:
1. Corporate surety;
2. Property bond;
3. Cash deposit; and
4. Recognizance (Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 1).
Availability
The right to bail may be invoked once detention commences even
if no formal charges have yet been filed (Teehankee v Rovira). It is
a basic principle that the right to bail can be availed of only by a
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person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty, and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a
petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed
(Cortes v. Judge Catral).
Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
suspend right to bail (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 13).
In Comendador v. de Villa, it was held that traditionally, the right to
bail has not been recognized and is not available to the
military, as an exception to the Bill of Rights. This much was
suggested in Arula v. Espino, where the Court observed that "the
right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist”. The denial of the right to bail to the
military does not violate the equal protection clause because there
is substantial distinction between the military and civilians.
Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, still he cannot
be denied bail before conviction if it is a matter of right. The remedy
is to increase the amount of bail (Sy Guan v. Amparo).
DUTIES OF THE COURTS WHENEVER AN APPLICATION FOR
BAIL IS FILED BEFORE THEM: In the light of the applicable rules
on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court
reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail
is filed:
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for
bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19,
supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied (Basco v.
Rapatalo).
Hearing is Mandatory When an Application for Bail is Made
Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice
of hearing is required to be given the prosecutor, or at least he must
be asked for his recommendation, because in fixing the amount of
bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors
(Basco v. Rapatalo).
Standards for Fixing Amount of Bail
1. Financial ability of accused;
2. Nature and circumstances of offense;
3. Penalty for offense;
4. Character and reputation of accused;
5. Probability of his appearance at trial;
6. Age and health of accused;
7. Weight of evidence against him;
8. Forfeiture of other bail;
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
9. Whether he was a Fugitive from justice when arrested ;
and
10. Pendency of other cases where he is on bail (Rules of
Court, Rule 114, Sec. 9).
WHEN BAIL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT
Uncontestably, bail is a matter of right if a person is charged with an
offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
death (Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 4). Nonetheless, bail is still a
matter of right even if the offence is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when after due hearing it is found that evidence of guilt is
NOT strong.
When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or higher, a hearing on the motion for bail must
be conducted by the judge to determine whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong (Baylon v. Judge Sison). The prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. The exercise of discretion of the court is only limited in
the determination of the gravity of guilt of the accused.
Discretion when applied to a court of justice means sound discretion
guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must
not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular." If after
summary hearing, it is determined that the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, the court has no choice but to deny the
application for bail. Inversely, if the court finds that the evidence
of guilt of the accused is weak, the court has no discretion but
to grant bail (Basco v. Rapatalo).
All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this rule:
1. Before or after conviction by the MTC; and
2. Before conviction of the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (Rules of
Court, Rule 114, Sec. 4).
WHEN BAIL IS DISCRETIONARY
Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail. The court, in its
discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty
after the same bail bond, during the period to appeal subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
WHEN BAIL SHALL BE DENIED
No person, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, shall
be admitted to bail if charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
or death; AND evidence of GUILT IS STRONG (Rules of Court,
Rule 114, Sec. 7).
Upon conviction by the RTC, imposing a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
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 1. That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteracion;
2. That the accused is found to have previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
3. That the accused committed the offense while on
probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
4. That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
5. That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit another crime (Rules of
Court, Rule 114, Sec. 5).
In People v. Fortes, the Court held that if an accused who is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a
penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the
accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
situation, the court would not have only determined that the
evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient to
deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise ruled that
the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail
must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Waiver of Right to Bail
The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law (People v. Judge Donato).
Cancellation of Bail
Bail is deemed automatically cancelled upon:
1. Acquittal of the accused;
2. Dismissal of the case; or
3. Execution of the judgment of conviction (Rules of Court,
Rule 114, Sec. 22).
Right to Bail and Right to Travel
The object of bail is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the
state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the
same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court
as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and
do what the law may require of him. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. To allow the accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines would render nugatory the courts'
orders and processes and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts
from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the
Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts (Manotoc v. CA).
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Right to Bail in Extradition Proceedings
The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But,
the Court believed that the right to due process is broad enough to
include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. In US v. Judge
Puruganan, it was held that after a potential extraditee has been
arrested and placed under the custody of the law, bail may be
applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing evidence showing that (a) once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and
(b) there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court
in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein. However, this ruling in Puruganan was
modified in Government of HongKong v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia,
where the Court said that it cannot ignore the modern trend in
public international law which places a primacy on the worth
of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty, its
principles are now recognized as customarily binding upon the
members of the international community.
Five Major Postulates of Extradition Proceedings
Extradition is defined as the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government
to hold him in connection with criminal investigation directed against
him or execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal and
criminal law of the requesting state or government. The following
are its major postulates:
1. Extradition is a major instrument for the suppression of
crime.
2. The requesting state will accord due process to the
accused.
3. Proceedings are sui generis.
4. Compliance shall be in good faith.
5. There is an underlying risk of flight.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Rights Covered by Sec. 14, Article III
1. Criminal Due Process
2. Presumption of Innocence
3. Right to be Heard by Himself and of Counsel
4. Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the
Accusation Against Him
5. Right to Speedy, Impartial, and Public Trial
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 6. Right to Meet Witnesses Face to Face
7. Right to Compulsory Process to Secure Attendance of
Witnesses and Production of Evidence
CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
Requisites of Criminal Due Process:
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal
proceedings, in particular, require:
1. That the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it;
2. That jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person
of the accused;
3. That the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. That judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by
giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the
conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until
now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time (Tatad
v. Sandiganbayan).
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under
its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have
no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn
and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of
a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice. The sovereign people as the aggrieved
parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is
constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non---trial
of the century---and that the pre---determined judgment of
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio (Galman v.
Sandiganbayan).
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
It is based on the principle of justice. The presumption is not
designed to protect the guilty but to prevent the conviction of one
who is innocent, for it is a rule that accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. Proof must survive the test of reason. Presumption of
innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The conviction must be based on moral certainty, for it is better to
acquit a guilty person rather than to convict an innocent man
(People v. Dramayo).
The right to presumption of innocence can be invoked only by an
individual accused of a criminal offense; a corporate entity has no
personality to invoke the same (Feeder International Line v. Court
of Appeals).
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Reasonable Doubt
It is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and
an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon
the certainty of guilt (People v. Dramayo).
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (Rules of Court, Rule
133, Sec. 2).
Circumstantial Evidence
In People v. Bato, the Supreme Court held that in order that
circumstantial evidence may warrant conviction, the following
requisites must concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Equipoise Rule
The equipoise rule is applicable only where the evidence of the
parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused (Corpus v. People).
RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND OF COUNSEL
Rights of the Accused Before Arraignment
The Rules of Court provides that if the defendant appears without
attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires
the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney,
the Court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him. A
reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney (Rules of
Court, Rule 116, Sec. 6). Under this provision, when a defendant
appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with:
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if
he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court
must assign counsel de oficio to defend him; and
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own
the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor
(People v. Holgado).
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court
must be presumed in matters of this kind to have complied with the
provisions of law prescribing the procedure to be followed in the trial
had before it (People v. Agbayani).
Rights of the Accused During Trial
1. Right to present evidence and to be present at the trial. It
includes the right to testify in one’s favor and the right to
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 be given time to call witnesses. If accused of two offenses,
he is entitled to a trial of each case, and it is error for the
court to consider in one case the evidence adduced
against him in another;
2. Right to be assisted by counsel. Right to counsel during
the trial is not subject to waiver, except if the accused is
allowed by the court to defend himself (Rules of Court,
Cule 116, Sec. 6); and
3. Right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 14, Par. 2).
The Right to Counsel is Not Waivable
The right to counsel during trial is not waivable; regardless of the
desire of the accused, the court should appoint counsel to represent
the accused. That is based on Rule 116 of the rules of court…”court
shall appoint a counsel de officio, even if the accused does not want
one” The reason for this is that even the most intelligent or
educated men may have no skills in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure. And without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does
not know how to establish and justify his innocence.
Preference in the Choice of Counsel
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning
the right to counsel will show that the “preference in the choice of
counsel” pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
custodial investigation rather than one who is accused in criminal
prosecution. And even if the application of the concept were to be
extended to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential
discretion cannot partake of discretion so absolute and arbitrary as
would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the
predilection of the accused. Thus, there is no denial of the right to
counsel where the counsel de oficio was appointed during the
absence of the accused’s counsel de parte pursuant to the court’s
desire to finish the case as early as possible under the continuous
trial system (Amion v. Judge Chiongson).
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF
THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
Purposes and Scope of Right to be Informed
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may
decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had (U.S. v. Karelsen).
Contents of an Information
According to Sections 6 and 8 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, in
order that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him may not be
violated, the information must state:
1. the name of the accused
2. the designation given to the offense by statute
3. a statement of the acts or omission so complained of as
constituting the offense
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
4. the name of the offended party
5. the approximate time and date of the commission of the
offense; and
6. the place where the offense had been committed.
The information must set forth the facts and circumstances that
have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that
the accused can prepare for and undertake his defense. One such
fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more persons is
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his
plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it.
Evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to
respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential
that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made
conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements. Where no such allegation is made in the information,
the court’s finding of conspiracy violates the constitutional
requirement (People v. Quitlong).
In Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that it is the
description, not the designation of the offense, that is
controlling. The Supreme Court held that the contention of the
accused is wrong, because a reading of the information which has
been reproduced clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the
petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal
prosecution. The Constitution requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was
indicted and what penal offense he has to face. This duty is an
affirmative one which the court, on its own motion, must perform,
unless waived. To emphasize its importance, no such duty is laid
on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may
be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he
must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must
demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its
own volition. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature
of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully
informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized
against him. He is thus in a position to enter his plea with full
knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so
immediately. He may move to quash (Borja v. Mendoza).
Waiver of the Right to be Informed
Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him may not be waived, but the defense may
waive the right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of
“not guilty”. The right cannot be waived for reasons of public
policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed
against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an
indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be convic-
ted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the complaint or information (People v.
Flores). Consequently, failure to object to the multiple offenses
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 40 of 79
alleged in the criminal information during the arraignment is
deemed a waiver of the right (Abalos v. People). Thus, in
Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said that the
accused may be convicted of as many offenses charged in the
information and proved during the trial, where he fails to object
to such duplicitous information during the arraignment.
Judgment in Case of Variance Between Allegation and Proof
Under Rule 120, Sec. 4, when there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which
is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved (Pecho v. People).
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL, AND PUBLIC TRIAL
Speedy Trial
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of
criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The concept of
speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether
the right has been violated involves the weighing of several factors
such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct
of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the
defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage
caused to the accused. The right to speedy trial is violated only:
1. When the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or
2. When unjustified postponements are asked for and
secured; or
3. When without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried (People v. Tee).
If the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest
time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from
a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense
as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible
with his opportunity to present any valid defense. An accused
person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be
oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an
unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings anterior and
pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed
(Conde v. Rivera; Flores v. People).
Remedy in Case of Violation of Speedy Trial
The accused is entitled to dismissal of the case, and, if he is under
detention, to release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for
violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense (Flores v.
People).
Right to Speedy Trial Cannot Be Invoked When it Violates Due
Process Entitled to the Prosecution
The right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the
same would result in a clear denial of due process to the
prosecution. It should not operate in depriving the State of its
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inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally in
seeing to it that all those who approach the bar of justice is afforded
fair opportunity to present their side. For it is not only the State; more
so, the offended party who is entitled to due process in criminal
cases. In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the
people’s equally important right to public justice. (Uy v. Hon. Arsenio
P. Adriano).
Waiver of Right to Speedy Trial
One’s failure to timely question the delay in the trial to a case would
be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to
question the same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided,
the speedy trial right, like any other right conferred by the
Constitution or statute, may be waived when not positively asserted.
A party’s silence may amount to laches. The right to a speedy trial
is a privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not
complain (Uy v. Hon. Arsenio P. Adriano).
Impartial Trial
The accused is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
An impartial judge, at all times, manifests depth commitment and
concern to the cause of justice according to legal norms. He is a
cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of
purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with
the rest of his fellow mortals (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz).
It is demanded that the judge may not play the double role of
prosecutor and judge in one and the same case. He must maintain
an attitude of neutrality in regard to the prosecution and the
accused. Influence on the judge, even if unconscious, which
prevents a calm and careful review of the evidence can nullify his
decision (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz).
Public Trial
Public trials when anyone interested in observing the manner a
judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. The reason for this safeguard
is the belief that the accused is afforded further protection, that his
trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the
Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present.
Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right.
Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than
others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re
Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being
public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel
present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." (Garcia
v. Domingo).
General public may be excluded when the evidence to be
presented in the proceeding may be characterized as offensive to
decency or public morals.
The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible
press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field.
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The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right
of an accused to fair trial. Our idea of a fair and impartial judge
is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We
have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges
are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation.
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not
per se fatally infect their impartiality (People v. Teehankee, Jr.)
A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial; it only
implies that court doors must be open to those who wish to come,
sit in available seats, and conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process (Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of
the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the
Former President Estrada).
There must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a
judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue
influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial (Re: Petition for radio and
television coverage of the multiple murder cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan).
RIGHT TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE (RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION)
Two-fold purpose of this right:
1. To afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony
of the witness by cross-examination; and
2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment of the
witness (U.S. v. Javier).
The testimony of a witness who has not submitted himself to cross-
examination is not admissible in evidence. The affidavits of
witnesses who are not presented during the trial, and thus, are not
subjected to cross-examination are inadmissible because they are
hearsay (U.S. v. Javier).
If cross-examination actually commenced, but, for lack of material
time, was not completed, and the witness in the meantime died
before cross-examination could be resumed, so much of the
testimony as had already been covered by cross-examination is
admissible (People v. Seneris).
The right to confrontation is available only during trial, which begins
only upon arraignment. Thus, unlike in the preliminary investigation
proper, an accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be present
during the preliminary examination nor to cross-examine the
witnesses presented against him before his arrest, the purpose of
said examination being merely to determine whether or not there is
sufficient reason to issue a warrant of arrest. (Dequito v. Arellano).
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more
defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-
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accused is not admissible against the latter, who was not able to
cross-examine him (Talino v. Sandiganbayan).
Right to confrontation is not absolute, as there are exceptions
to it, namely: (1) The admissibility of “dying declarations;” and (2)
trial in absentia under Section 14(2).
Waiver of Right to Cross-Examination
Right to cross-examination may be waived expressly or impliedly.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the
right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in
the record (De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate Court).
RIGHT TO COMPULSARY PROCESS TO SECURE
ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES AND PRODUCTION OF
EVIDENCE
The different processes that may be resorted to compel attendance
of parties in court as well as witnesses are: subpoena ad
testificandum, subpoena duces tecum, warrant of arrest,
contempt, perpetuation of testimony, and modes of discovery.
Subpoena ad testificandum
It is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to
testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation
conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition
(Rules of Court, Rule 21, Sec. 1).
Subpoena duces tecum
It is a process directed to a person requiring him to bring with him
any books, documents or other things under his control (Rules of
Court, Rule 21, Sec. 1).
Failure to obey the process is punishable as contempt of court; if
necessary, the witness may even be arrested so he can give the
needed evidence.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum
may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following
requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things
requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of
the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be
reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of
definiteness) (Roco v. Contreras).
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
The basic purpose of trial in absentia is to speed up the disposition
of criminal cases considering that if the accused would not always
be present, that would derail the trial of the cases.
When available
Trial in absentia is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused
has been arraigned, notified of date/s of hearing, and his absence
is unjustified (People v. Judge Salas).
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Waiver of the Right to be Present in Trial
The right to be present during the trial may be waived; provided that,
after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose
of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, unless he
unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is
the person named as the defendant in the case on trial (Rules of
Court, Rule 115, Sec. 1).
Effects of Waiver of Right to Appear
1. There is a waiver of the right to present evidence;
2. The prosecution can present evidence if accused fails to
appear; and
3. The court can decide without the accused’s evidence.
Requisites for Trial in Absentia
1. The accused has already been arraigned;
2. He has been duly notified of the trial; and
3. His failure to appear is unjustified (People v. Mapalao).
Presence of the Accused, When Mandatory
1. During arraignment and plea (Rules of Court, Rule 116,
Sec. 1).
2. During trial, for identification, unless the accused has
already stipulated on his identity during the pre-trial and
that he is the one who will be identified by the witnesses
as the accused in the criminal case; or
3. During promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense
(Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 6).
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to
rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait
for the time until the accused who escaped from custody
finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of
proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the
constitutional provision on trial in absentia (People v. Mapalao).
Trial in absentia is not also violative of the right to be presumed
innocent because the judgment may not necessarily result in
conviction. The judgment will still be based on the evidence
presented as the prosecution is still bound to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is no violation
of the right to due process because he was given the opportunity to
be heard (Jimenez v. Nazareno).
An accused who escapes from confinement, or jumps bail, or
flees to a foreign country, loses his standing in court, and
unless he surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
court, he is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief from
the court, including the right to appeal his conviction (People
v. Mapalao).
One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-
appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in
absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and
promulgation can be made by simply recording the judgment
in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his
counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at
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the promulgation of judgment is served through his bondsmen
or warden and counsel (People v. Valeriano).
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
It is a writ issued by the court directed to a person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and the cause of his
capture and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf.
Availability
The high prerogative of the writ was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and
is the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It
secures to the prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the
issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding:
1. Deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in a restraint
of a person;
2. Court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
3. An excessive penalty has been imposed, in which case the
sentence is void as to such excess (Feria v. CA).
The writ will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of liberty is in the custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.
The ultimate purpose of the writ is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the
right under which he was detained. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
is, at its inception, illegal, supervening events, such as the
issuance of a judicial process, may prevent the discharge of
the detained person (Jackson v. Macalino).
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus
should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had
been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context
includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies
authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration (Go v. Ramos).
A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary
restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a
denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation
of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
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developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those
applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of
the writ (Moncupa v. Enrile).
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
court’s jurisdiction over a habeas corpus case nor impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The
remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the
court to the lack of preliminary investigation and demand, as a
matter of right, that one be conducted (Paredes v. Sandiganbayan).
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
It is the right granted, after the immediate determination of the
legality of the deprivation of physical liberty. Only the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, and NOT the writ.
SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS: Article VII, Section 18. The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may,
in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are
able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Even prior to the 1987 Constitution, which expressly provides for
the power of the Judiciary to review suspension of the privilege, the
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Supreme Court held in the case of Lansang v. Garcia, that it has
the power not just to determine executive arbitrariness in the
manner of arriving at the suspension, but also the power to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension.
Since the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of
the executive department, the executive department will have to
open whatever findings it might have to the scrutiny of the
Supreme Court, if the President wants his suspension
sustained (IBP v. Zamora).
Suspension of Privilege Does Not Suspend Right to Bail
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If
the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or
implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have very
easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable
by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong and except when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended (In re: The issuance of Writ
of Habeas Corpus for Dr. Aurora Parong, et.al vs Ponce Enrile). The
aforementioned case was decided prior to the 1987
Constitution. It is now expressly provided under Art. III, Sect.
13 of the Constitution that the right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.
Writ of Amparo
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with a violation with an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity (Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Sec. 1).
Scope
The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. In the amparo context, it is more
correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from
threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" clause in
the latter part of Section 1 of the amparo rule is a form of violation
of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision
(Reyes v. Gonzales).
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
The President may be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The President,
being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily
possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior
within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine (In the
Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in
favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo).
Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 44 of 79
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party (Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data, Sec. 1).
It is intended to insure the human right to privacy by requiring the
respondent to produce the necessary information to locate the
missing person or such data about him that have been gathered in
secret to support the suspicion that he has been taken into custody
in violation of his constitutional rights or, worse, has been salvaged
without benefit of lawful trial. The writ may also be sought to secure
destruction of such secret information gathered in violation of the
person’s right to privacy to justify summary action against him by
the government or any private entity.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all
parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in
all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings
(Lopez, Jr. v. Ombudsman).
Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and
determination of causes. It should be their constant effort to
assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed
except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal
thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It
goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be
reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant
circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings
may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged
only after full and free presentation of evidence by all the parties,
specially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice
to any part (Padua v. Ericta).
In case of violation of the right to a speedy trial, the remedy for
violation of said right is dismissal obtained through
mandamus (Roque v. Ombudsman).
The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A
simple mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient.
In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has
been violated, the following factors must be considered and
balanced:
1. The length of delay;
2. The reasons for the delay;
3. The assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and
4. The prejudice caused by the delay (Tilendo v.
Ombudsman).
An accused cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement
of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The Constitution does
not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where
the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the
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fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by
private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally,
he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the
offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced
(Flores v. People).
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Accusare
It means “no man is bound to accuse himself.” The origin is basically
older than our constitution.
Basis of the Fundamental Right
1. POLICY – this is because of the fact that it would place the
witness against the strongest temptation to commit
perjury.
2. HUMANITY – This is because of the fact that it would be
to extort a confession of truth and the degree of which the
law abhors (Chavez v. CA).
Incriminating question
A question would have a tendency to incriminate if it tends to elicit,
even just one, of the elements of a criminal act.
Scope
The right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial
compulsion and production of documents, papers and chattels
in court except when books of account are to be examined in the
exercise of police power and the power of taxation. An accused
may be compelled to be photographed or measured, his
garments may be removed, and his body may be examined,
without violating the person’s right against self-incrimination.
The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
his guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence (People v.
Malimit).
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the
offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may
be used as evidence against him (US v. Tan Teng).
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands,
or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because
it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in
the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. An order requiring
the accused to write so that his handwriting may be validated with
the documentary evidence is covered by the constitutional
proscription against self-incrimination. However, a different
application shall be given whenever the defendant, at the trial
of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 45 of 79
writing or signature is in his own hand, as he may, on cross-
examination, be compelled to write in open court in order that
the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one
in question (Beltran v. Samson).
Morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused was received in
evidence, and is thus not in violation of the right against self-
incrimination (US v. Ong Siu Hong).
An order by the judge for the witness to put on a pair of pants for
size was allowed (People v. Otadora).
A woman accused of adultery may be compelled to be tested for
pregnancy (Villaflor v. Summers).
Taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of
counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination (People v. Gallarde).
Availability
The right is available not only in criminal prosecutions, but also in
all other government proceedings, including civil actions and
administrative or legislative investigations.
Who May Invoke the Right against Self-Incrimination
1. The accused in a criminal case. He may refuse to take
the witness stand altogether. It has been said that forcing
a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the
fundamentals of a republican government"; that "it may
suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the
pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom."
An accused occupies a different tier of protection from an
ordinary witness. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an
accused as a witness for the People would be to
incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and
prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction." This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in
a joint trial. (Chavez v. CA); and
2. A witness in any suit, but only relating to particular
questions asked of him in the witness stand. The
questions he can refuse to answer are those which tend to
establish his participation or guilt in a criminal act that has
not yet been judicially proven (Rules of Court, Rule 132,
Sec. 3, Par.(4)).
Note: Only natural persons are protected by the self-incrimination
clause. It has no application to juridical persons (Bataan Shipyard
v. PCGG).
Effect of Violation
Once the primary source is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is
inadmissible (People v. Alicando).
Waiver of the Right against Self-Incrimination
The right can be waived either directly or by failure to invoke it,
provided the waiver is certain and unequivocal and intelligently,
understandingly and willingly made. Thus, the accused who takes
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the witness stand voluntarily and offers testimony in his behalf may
be cross-examined and asked incriminating questions on any
matter he testified to on direct examination.
Immunity Statutes
1. Transactional Immunity Statute: The testimony of any
person or whose possession of documents or other
evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth
in any investigation conducted is immune from criminal
prosecution for an offense to which such compelled
testimony relates.
2. Use and Fruit Immunity Statute: This statute prohibits
the use of the witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits
in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution
of the witness (Mapa v. Sandiganbayan).
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
It is the condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or
imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he
is paid or not. It is every condition of enforced or compulsory service
of one to another no matter under what form such servitude may be
disguised (Rubi vs Provincial Board).
General Rule: No involuntary servitude shall exist.
Exceptions:
1. As punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly
convicted (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 18, Par.(2));
2. Service in defense of the State (CONST. Art. II, Sec 4);
3. Naval enlistment (Robertson v. Baldwin);
4. Posse comitatus – obligation of the individual to assist in
the protection of the peace and good order of his
community (U.S. v. Pompeya); and
5. Return to work order in industries affected with public
interest (Kaisahan ng Mangagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco
Sawmills).
Two Types of Involuntary Servitude
1. Slavery – The civil relation in which one man has absolute
power over the life, fortune and liberty of another.
2. Peonage – It is a condition of enforced servitude by which
the servitor is restrained of his liberty and compelled to
labor in liquidation of some debt or obligation real or
pretended, against his will.
A court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his
stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its
jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary
to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential
to the due administration of justice (Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan).
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
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penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Fine, When Excessive
A fine is considered excessive when it is clearly shown that the
nature of the violation compared with the fine is disproportionate, or
if it exceeds the utmost limit of the punishment which the vindication
of the law demands (U.S. v. Valera).
Cruelty
In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, the Court held
that "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life."
Guides for Determining Whether a Punishment is Cruel or
Unusual
1. It must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity
of human being.
2. It must not be applied arbitrarily
3. It must not be acceptable to contemporary society
4. It must not be excessive, thus serving a penal purpose
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man
is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary
suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely (Echagaray v. Secretary of Juctice).
Where an unforeseeable accident adds to the suffering of the
convict, a penalty otherwise valid does not become cruel or
unusual. This may take place in a situation, when insufficient
dosage of substance used for lethal injection was administered, as
such instance may be compared to a fire incident in a prison cell
(Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice).
To violate constitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and
plainly oppressive, disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the senses of the community (People v. Estoista).
Rationale of Abolishment of Death Penalty in the Constitution
1. It inflicts traumatic pain not just on the convict but also on
the family, even if the penalty is not carried out
2. There is no convincing evidence that it acts effectively as
a deterrent for serious crime.
3. Penology favors reformative rather than vindictive
penalties.
4. Life is too precious a gift to be placed at the discretion of a
human judge.
5. The law itself by imposing to many safeguards manifests
a reluctance to impose death penalty
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Restoration of Death Penalty by the Legislature
Death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. The Legislature may restore the penalty of death, if it
finds compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. This means that
the congress must first, describe what is meant by heinous
crimes; second, specify and penalize by death only crimes that
qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description
set in the death penalty billand/or designate crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court; and third, the congress in enacting this death penalty bill
be singularly motivated by compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes
Note: Currently, Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of
death penalty. Republic Act No. 9745 prohibited the use of torture
as punishment to ensure that the human rights of all persons are
respected at all times.
Automatic Review of Death Penalty
All death penalty imposed by the trial courts are subject to the
automatic review of the supreme court regardless whether the
accused jumped bail or does not intend to appeal. The
constitutionally imposed power of the Supreme Court to imposed an
automatic review a decision imposing a death penalty cannot be
waived either by the accused or by the courts. In essence, trial
courts imposing death penalty are merely commissioners; it is
a mere recommendation to the SC. The judgment of conviction
entered on the trial is not final and it cannot be executed; thus it is
wholly without force and effect until the cause has been proved
upon by the Supreme Court (People v. Mapalao; People v. Esparas;
People v. Mateo).
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment
of a poll tax.
Coverage
1. Debt — it is any civil obligation arising from a contract. It
includes even debts obtained through fraud since no
distinction is made in the Constitution.
2. Poll Tax — it is the specific sum levied upon any person
belonging to a certain class without regard to property or
occupation.
The constitutional guarantee only covers the non-performance
of obligations ex contractu and not those obligations arising
from law, ex delicto, quasi-delict, delict. As long as the obligation
to pay arises ex contractu, it is considered a private matter between
the creditor and the debtor and the punitive arm of the State cannot
be employed in a criminal action to enforce the former’s right.
While debtor cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt, he
can be validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt
through fraud (Lozano v. Martinez).
Tax is not a debt but an obligation that arises from law. Failure to
pay the same can be validly punished with imprisonment. The only
exception is to pay a poll tax.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 47 of 79
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Reason behind the Principle of Double Jeopardy
In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the
accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for
the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and
capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would
eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina
and the will to fight (Lejano v. People). Thus, Green v. United States
expressed the concern that "the underlying idea,one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent, he may be found guilty." (Philippine Savings Bank v.
Bermoy).
Two Types of Double Jeopardy
1. Double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense:
Same offense or attempt to commit or frustration thereof
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the original
complaint or information; and
2. Double jeopardy of punishment for the same act:
When an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall bar another
prosecution for the same act (People v. Relova).
Note: Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the IDENTITY OF OFFENSES CHARGED; Where
one is punished by law and an ordinance, the inquiry is on the
IDENTITY OF THE ACTS (People v. Relova).
Test for Identity of Offenses
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant
a conviction for the other. This so-called "same-evidence test"
which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the
Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said
Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when
the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential
ingredients of the former as alleged in the information
constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of
the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the
latter. In other words, one who has been charged with an offense
cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though
the latter be lesser or greater than the former. "As the Government
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
cannot begin with the highest, and then go down step by step,
bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein,
neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with
precisely the same result." (Melo v. People).
Test for Identity of Acts
The question of identity of the acts which are claimed to have
generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the
location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the
accused as set out in the two informations are so related to
each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as
having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts
have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent
or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be
appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of
giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different
legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).
Reason for the Classification of Two Types of Double Jeopardy
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two
offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under
different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation
where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and
another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence
of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the
Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal
ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized
by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an
offense under a statute. The two offenses would never
constitute the same offense having been promulgated by
different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate
to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never be
(People v. Relova).
When can be Invoked
The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused
is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been
convicted or acquitted of such offense or (b) the prosecution
appeals from a judgment in the same case (Philippine Savings Bank
v. Bermoy).
When an accused has been acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information (Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec.7).
The mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not
an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy, since the
first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 48 of 79
or termination of the case without the consent of the accused.
(People v. Pineda).Thus, it is first necessary to establish that a
first jeopardy has attached, before further inquiring whether or
not double jeopardy is to apply.
The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are:
1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second,
2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated by a
previous (a) conviction, (b) acquittal, (c) termination of the
case without he consent of the accused, or (d) dismissal
upon the merits , and
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that
in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only after:
1. Upon a valid complaint or information;
2. Filed before a competent court;
3. After arraignment, when a valid plea has been entered;
4. Defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent (People v. Tampal).
Double jeopardy does not attach, when the first action is
administrative in nature. Likewise, double jeopardy does not attach
in preliminary investigations (Icasiano v. Sandiganbayan).
There having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo
rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy
with respect to the appeal (People v. Balisacan).
DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASE
General rule: Dismissal with the express consent or upon motion
of the accused does not result in double jeopardy.
Note: The reason for this rule is the operation of the sister
doctrines of waiver and estoppel, which require two sine qua non
conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the
defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such
dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily
amount to an acquittal (People v. Obsania).
Exceptions:
1. Dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence; or
2. Denial of the right to speedy trial (Philippine Savings Bank
v. Bermoy). Note: "If the defendant wants to exercise his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for
the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the
prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is
denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or
cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to
prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's
motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting
to an acquittal of the defendant (Esmena v. Pogoy).
Difference Between Acquittal and Dismissal
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is
acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's
guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the
case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals
terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court
of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc. (People v. Salico).
Permanent Dismissal and Provisional Dismissal
The dismissal of the action may either be a permanent dismissal or
a provisional dismissal. A permanent dismissal of a criminal case
may refer to the termination of the case on the merits, resulting in
either the conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of
the case because of the prosecution’s failure to prosecute; or to the
dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the
proceedings in violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is dismissal
without prejudice to reinstatement thereof before the order of
dismissal becomes final, or to the subsequent filing of a new
information within the periods allowed under the Revised Penal
Code or the Revised Rules of Court (Condrada v. People).
RECONSIDERATION & APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL
General rule: An acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground
of double jeopardy, whether it happens in the trial court level or
before the Court of Appeals. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal
places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the
crime of which he has already been absolved.
Exceptions:
1. When the court that absolved the accused gravely abused
its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction; or
2. When a mistrial or sham trial has occurred. In any of such
cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 (Lejano v. People).
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENTS
Allows the prosecution for another offense, if subsequent
development changes the character of the first indictment under
which he may have already been charged or convicted.
This rule of double jeopardy does not apply, when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy (People v. Adil).
An offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily
included in another offense, for the purpose of determining the
existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence
during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the
second offense was then inexistence, no jeopardy could attach
therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a
subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy.
By the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under
such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to
recognize the existence of a condition where such condition in
reality does not exist (Melo v. People).
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 49 of 79
Conviction of accused shall not bar another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense originally charged
when:
1. Graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising
from the same act or omission;
2. Facts constituting the graver offense arose or discovered
only after the filing of the former complaint or information;
and
3. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the
consent of prosecutor or offended party (Rules of Court,
Rule 117, Sec. 7).
INSEPERABLE OFFENSES
Where one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from
the same act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions,
as such is tantamount to splitting a sing cause of action. However,
it is possible for one act to give rise to several crimes: separate
prosecutions for each crime may be filed provided the elements of
the several crimes are not identical.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Ex Post Facto Law
One that would make a previous act criminal although it was not so
at the time it was committed. A law can never be considered ex post
facto as long as it operates prospectively since its strictures would
cover only offenses committed after and not before its enactment.
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant,
are prohibited in this jurisdiction.
Characteristics
1. It refers to criminal matters;
2. It is retroactive in application; and
3. It is prejudicial to the accused.
Kinds of Ex Post Facto Laws
1. Law making an act criminal which was not so before its
passage;
2. Law aggravating the penalty for a crime committed before
its passage;
3. Law inflicting a greater or more severe penalty;
4. Law altering the legal rules of evidence and allowing the
receipt of less or different testimony than what the law
required at the time of commission, in order to convict
accused;
5. Law assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes a penalty of deprivation of right for
something which when done was lawful; and
6. Law depriving accused of some lawful protection to which
he had been entitled, such as protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty (U.S.
v. Diaz-Conde).
Bill of Attainder
It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial. It
substitutes legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. Thus,
it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
punishment on them without judicial trial that it becomes a bill of
attainder.
ARTICLE IV: CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship
It is the membership in a political community which is personal and
more or less permanent in character. It denotes possession within
that particular political community of full civil and political rights
subject to special disqualifications, such as minority. Reciprocally,
it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community. The core
of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights such as the right
to participate in the government principally through the right to vote,
the right to hold public office, and the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
1. By Birth
a. Jus sanguinis – the acquisition of citizenship on
the basis of blood relationship; All inhabitants of
the islands who were Spanish subjects on April
11,1899, and residing in the islands who did not
declare their intention of preserving Spanish
nationality between said date and October 11,
1900, were declared citizens of the Philippines
[Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902; Sec. 2, Jones Law
of 1916], and their children born after April 11,
1899.
b. Jus soli – the acquisition of citizenship on the
basis of place of birth; As held in Roa v. Collector
of Customs, which was uniformly followed until
abandoned in Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor;
but applied again in Talaroc v. Uy, until
abandoned with finality in Teotimo Rodriguez Tio
Tiam v. Republic. Those declared as Filipino
citizens by the courts are recognized as such
today, not because of the application of the jus
soli doctrine, but principally because of the
doctrine of res judicata.
2. By Naturalization – it is a legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the privilege of a native born citizen
3. By Marriage of a woman to a foreigner, whose laws
automatically make the wife a citizen of his country.
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Citizens of the Philippine
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
a. Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris.
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 b. Those who declared citizens by judicial
declaration, applying jus soli principle (Tio Tiam
v. Republic).
c. Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
d. Those who are citizens, under the 1935
Constitution.
e. Those who are citizens, under the 1973
Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Caram Rule
Under the 1935 Constitution, those born in the Philippines of foreign
parent, who before the adoption of the Constitution had been
elected to public office in the Philippines, are considered Filipino
citizens (Chiongbian v. de Leon).
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ had seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens,
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate
(Tecson v. COMELEC).
Note: Simply put, considering all the Constitutions that has passed,
in determining the citizenship of a person, in relation to his father
and mother, the following points can be deduced:
1. If born before January 17, 1973 (effectivity of 1973
Constitution), only persons, whose fathers are Filipinos
(whether legitimate or illegitimate), are citizens of the
Philippines. If such person is born of a foreigner and a
Filipino mother, he/she must elect Philippine Citizenship,
upon reaching the age of majority.
2. If born on January 17, 1973 (effectivity of 1973
Constitution) and onwards (1987 Constitution), persons,
who are born of either a Filipino father or mother, are
citizens of the Philippines, without need of any election.
3. Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution still recognizes the
right of persons born, under the 1935 Constitution, of a
foreigner and a Filipino mother to elect Philippine
Citizenship.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
Natural-Born Citizens
Generally, they are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth, without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine Citizenship. Those who were born of foreigners and
Filipino mothers and had elected Filipino Citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Procedure for Election of Persons Born of Foreigners and
Filipino Mothers (CA 625)
The election of Philippine Citizenship, upon reaching the age of
majority, shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized
to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines. If the party concerned is
absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein
authorized before any officer of the Government of the United
States2 authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward such
statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry
of Manila.
The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in
the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never
married. As such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino
citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority (Republic v. Lim).
Jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an
informal process. In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare, the Court
held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship (Co v. HRET).
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the
age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of
Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. Based
on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege
(In Re: Ching)
If it was only the registration of the documents of election with the
civil registry that was belatedly done – and not the act of election –
there was still a valid election of Philippine Citizenship (Cabiling Ma
v. Fernandez).
Status of Foundlings
Foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on
the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. That
foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship
is supported by treaties and the general principles of international
law (Poe-Llmanzares v. COMELEC).
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 51 of 79
Naturalization
It is the process by which a foreigner acquires, voluntarily or by
operation of law, the citizenship of another state. It is the grant of
citizenship upon application or by some act which would qualify an
individual for a new nationality.
Modes of Naturalization:
1. Direct: Citizenship is acquired by:
a. Individual, through judicial or administrative
proceedings;
b. Special act of legislature;
c. Collective change of nationality, as a result of
cession or subjugation; or
d. In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as
nationals of the State where they are born.
2. Derivative: Citizenship conferred on:
a. Wife of naturalized husband;
b. Minor children of naturalized person; or on the
c. Alien woman upon marriage to a national.
Direct Naturalization Under Philippine Laws
Under current and existing laws, there are three (3) ways by which
an alien may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
1. Judicial naturalization under CA No. 473, as amended;
2. Administrative naturalization under RA No. 9139; and
3. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress, bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
This is discretionary on Congress; usually conferred on an
alien who has made outstanding contributions to the
country.

Commonwealth Act No. 473 Republic Act No. 9139

Qualifications 1. Not less than 21 years of age on the date of the
hearing of the petition;
2. Resided in the Philippines for a continuous pe-
riod of not less than 10 years; may be reduced
to 5 years if he honorably held office in
Government, established a new industry or
introduced a useful invention in the Philippines,
married to a Filipino woman, been engaged as a
teacher in the Philippines (in a public or private
school not established for the exclusive
instruction of persons of a particular nationality
or race) or in any of the branches of education
or industry for a period of not less than two
years, or bom in the Philippines;
3. Good moral character; believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution; must
have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period
of his residence in the Philippines in his relations
with the constituted government as well as the
community in which he is living;
4. Own real estate in the Philippines worth not less
than P5,000.00, or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation;
5. Speak and write English or Spanish and any of
the principal Philippine languages;
6. Enrolled his minor children of school age in any
of the public or private schools recognized by the
Government where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught as part of the
school curriculum, during the entire period of
residence in the Philippines required of him prior
to the hearing of his petition for naturalization.
Disqualifications 1. Opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;
1. Must be born in the Philippines and residing
therein since birth;
2. Must not be less than 18 years of age, at the
time of filing of his/her petition;
3. Must be of good moral character and believes
in the underlying principles of the Constitution
and must have conducted himself/ herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during
his/her entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relatioins with the duly
constituted government as well as with the
community in which he/she is living;
4. Must have received his/her primary and
secondary education in any public school or
private educational institution duly recognized
by the Department of Education, where
Philippine history, government and civics are
taught and prescribed as part of the school
curriculum and where enrolment is not limited to
any race or nationality, provided that should
he/she have minor children of school age,
he/she must have enrolled them in similar
schools;
5. Must have a known trade, business, profession
or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives
income sufficient for his/her support and that of
his/her family; provided that this shall not apply
to applicants who are college degree holders
but are unable to practice their profession
because they are disqualified to do so by
reason of their citizenship;
6. Must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or
any of the dialects of the Philippines; and
7. Must have mingled with the Filipinos and
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs and traditions and ideals of the
Filipino people.
The same as in Commonwealth Act No. 473.

POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018 Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 52 of 79
 2. Defending or teaching the necessity or propriety
of violence, personal assault or assassination
for the success or predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers in polygamy;
4. Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5. Suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious disease;
6. Who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
Philippines is at war, during the period of such
war;
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Procedure 1. Filing of declaration of intention one year prior to
the filing of the petition with the Office of the
Solicitor General. The following are exempt from
filing declaration of intention: (a) Born in the
Philippines and have received their primary and
secondary education in public or private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited
to any race or nationality. (b) Resided in the
Philippines for 30 years or more before the filing
of the petition, and enrolled his children in
elementary and high schools recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or
nationality. (c) Widow and minor children of an
alien who has declared his intention to become
a citizen of the Philippines and dies before he is
actually naturalized.
2. Filing of the petition, accompanied by the
affidavit of two credible persons, citizens of the
Philippines, who personally know the petitioner,
as character witnesses. order that there be a
valid publication, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the petition and notice of hearing
must be published; (b) the publication must be
made once a week for three consecutive weeks;
and (c) the publication must be in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province where the applicant
resides. In addition, copies of the petition and
notice of hearing must be posted in the office of
the Clek of Court or in the building where the
office is located.The same notice must also
indicate, among others, the names of the
witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to
introduce at the trial.
3. At least 6 months after the lastpublication, but in
no case within 30 days before any election, the
hearing shall begin.
4. If the petitioner is able to prove his qualifications
and no disqualifications, petition shall be
granted and it will become final after 30 days
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Filing with the Special Committee on Naturalization of a
petition (see Sec. 5, RA 9139, for contents of the petition);
publication of pertinent portions of the petition once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation, with copies thereof posted in any
public or conspicuous area; copies also furnished the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, the civil registrar of petitioner’s place of
residence and the National Bureau of Investigation which
shall post copies of the petition in any public or
conspicuous areas in their buildings offices and premises,
and within 30 days submit to the Committee a report
stating whether or not petitioner has any derogatory
record on file or any such relevant and material
information which might be adverse to petitioner’s
application for citizenship; Committee shall, within 60
days from receipt of the report of the agencies, consider
and review all information received pertaining to the
petition (if Committee receives any information adverse to
the petition, the Committee shall allow the petitioner to
answer, explain or refute the information);
Committee shall then approve or deny the petition. Within
30 days from approval of the petition, applicant shall pay
to the Committee a fee of P100,000, then take the oath of
allegiance and a certificate of naturalization shall issue.
Within 5 days after the applicant has taken his oath of
allegiance, the Bureau of Immigration shall forward a
copy of the oath to the proper local civil registrar, and
thereafter, cancel petitioner’s alien certificate of
registration.
The Special Committee shall be composed of the Solicitor
General, as chairman, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or
his representative, and the National Security Adviser, as
members, this Committee has the power to approve, deny
or reject applications for naturalization under this Act.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 53 of 79
 from notice. But the order shall only be
executory after the period of two years, during
which the petitioner shall be under probation.
5. Hearing after two years. At this hearing, the
applicant shall show that during the two--- year
probation period, applicant has (a) not left the
Philippines; (b) dedicated himself continuously
to a lawful calling or profession; (c) not been
convicted of any offense or violation of rules; and
(iv) not committed an act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.
6. Oath taking and issuance of the Certificate of
Naturalization.
Effects 1. On the wife: Vests citizenship on wife if she After the approval of the petition for administrative natura-
herself may be lawfully naturalized (as lization and cancellation of the applicant’s alien certificate
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Moy Ya Lim of registration, applicant’s alien lawful wife and minor
Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration). children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien
2. On the minor children: (a) Minor children born certificates of registration with the Committee, subject to
in the Philippines before the naturalization shall the payment of the required fees.
be considered citizens of the Philippines. (b)
Minor child born outside the Philippines who But, if the applicant is a married woman, the approval of
was residing in the Philippines at the time of her petition for administrative naturalization shall not
naturalization shall be considered a Filipino benefit her alien husband, although her minor children
citizen. (c) Minor child born outside the may still avail of the right to seek the cancellation of their
Philippines before parent’s naturalization shall alien certificate of registration.
be considered Filipino citizens only during
minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines. (d) Child born
outside the Philippines after parent’s
naturalization shall be considered a Filipino,
provided that he registers as such before any
Philippine consulate within one year after
attaining majority age, and takes his oath of
allegiance.
Denaturalization Grounds: The Special Committee on Naturalization may cancel
1. Naturalization certificate is obtained fraudulently certificates of naturalization issued under this act in the
or illegally. following cases:
2. If, within 5 years, he returns to his native country 1. If the naturalized person or his duly authorized
or to some foreign country and establishes representative made any false statement or
residence there; provided, that 1---year stay misrepresentation, or committed any violation of
in native country, or 2---year stay in a law, rules and regulations in connection with the
foreign country shall be prima facie evidence of petition, or if he obtains Philippine citizenship
intent to take up residence in the same. fraudulently or illegally;
3. Petition was made on an invalid declaration of 2. If, within five years, he shall establish
intention. permanent residence in a foreign country,
4. Minor children failed to graduate through the provided that remaining for more than one year
fault of the parents either by neglecting to in his country of origin or two years in any
support them or by transferring them to another foreign country shall be prima facie evidence of
school. intent to permanently reside therein;
5. Allowed himself to be used as a dummy. 3. If allowed himself or his wife or child with
Effects of Denaturalization: acquired citizenship to be used as a dummy;
If the ground for denaturalization affects the intrinsic 4. If he, his wife or child with acquired citizenship
validity of the proceedings, the denaturalization shall commits any act inimical to national security.
divest the wife and children of their derivative
naturalization. But if the ground was personal to the
denaturalized Filipino, his wife and children shall retain
their Philippine citizenship.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018 Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 54 of 79
The “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000” would grant
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born
and residing in the Philippines. In So v. Republic, the Supreme
Court declared that CA 473 and RA 9139 are separate and
distinct laws. The former covers aliens regardless of class,
while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and
all along thought that they were Filipinos, who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to
Filipino customs and traditions.
The intention of the legislature in enacting RA 9139 was to make
the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less
technical, and more encouraging. There is nothing in the law from
which it can be inferred that CA473 is intended to be annexed to or
repealed by RA 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely
to prescribe another mode of acquiring. Philippine citizenship
which may be availed of by native-born aliens. The only
implication is that a native-born alien has the choice to apply
for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain
their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed,
under the law, to have renounced it.
LOSS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
1. By naturalization in a foreign country.
2. By express renunciation of citizenship.
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21
years of age;
4. By rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country;
5. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization.
6. By having been declared by competent authority a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted;
7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner, if by
virtue of the laws in force of her husband's country, she
acquires her nationality.
Forfeiture of foreign citizenship does not restore Philippine
Citizenship formerly lost (Labo v. COMELEC). The lost of foreign
citizenship acquired through subsequent naturalization does not
automatically confers previous Philippine Citizenship. Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the
Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant
simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek
naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings (Frivaldo v.
COMELEC).
The fact that a person is a holder of an alien certificate of registration
does not conclusively mean that the person is not a Filipino Citizen.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino
citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an
American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us
here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was
incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had
lost his Philippine citizenship. However, the petitioner failed to
positively establish this fact (Aznar v. COMELEC).
Collateral Attack on Citizenship is Prohibited
Under the Philippine law, an attack on the person’s citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity (Vilando v. HOR).
Res Judicata in Citizenship Cases
General Rule: The doctrine of res judicata does not ordinarily apply
to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases.
Exceptions:
1. A person’s citizenship is resolved by a court or an
administrative body as a material issue in the
controversy, after a full---blown hearing;
2. With the active participation of the Solicitor General or his
representative; and
3. The finding of his citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme
Court. Then the decision on the matter shall constitute
conclusive proof of such party’s citizenship in any other
case or proceeding (Labo v. COMELEC).
RE-ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
1. Under RA 9225, bv taking the oath of allegiance required
of former natural-born Philippine citizens who may have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their acqui-
sition of the citizenship of a foreign country.
2. By Naturalization
3. By Repatriation, under RA 8171
4. By direct act of the Congress
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity
or ware to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient. Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not
that cheaply recovered. It may be restored only after the returning
renegade makes a formal act of rededication to the country he has
abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election t public office (Labo v. COMELEC).
Republic Act No. 9225
Also known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003 (which took effect September 17, 2003); the law declares
the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country are deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republilc: “I, _______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 55 of 79
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize
and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.” [Sec. 3, R.A. 9225]
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath [Sec. 3, R.A.
9225].
The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below 18 years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship
upon the effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines [Sec. 4, R.A. 9225].
Those who retain or reacquire Phiilippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
1. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must
meet the requirements under Sec. 1, Art. V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189, otherwise known as “The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing
laws;
2. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
3. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
4. Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice;
5. The right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are
occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens
[Sec. 5, R.A. 9225].
Note: A Filipino-American, or any dual citizen cannot run for
elective public office in the Philippines unless he personally swears
to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy
is not sufficient. Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225 categorically requires the
individual to state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is
renouncing all foreign citizenship, failing which, he is disqualified
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
from running for an elective position. The fact that he may have won
the elections, took his oath and began discharging the functions of
the office cannot cure the defect of his candidacy.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Dual Allegiance
Refers to the situation where a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. This results from
an individual’s volition and is prohibited by the Constitution.
Dual Citizenship
Arises when, as a result of concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a citizen of said states. This is involuntary.
Considering the citizenship clause of our Constitution, it is possible
for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess
dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children
are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship (Mercado v. Manzano).
The Supreme Court stressed that the constitutional policy is
not against dual citizenship, but dual loyalty, such as that often
manifested by naturalized Filipinos who, while professing
allegiance to their adoptive land, retain their allegiance to their
native land and even involve themselves in its political affairs
(Mercado v. Manzano).
Note: Enjoyment of the status of dual citizen will depend on the
willingness of the foreign country to share the allegiance of the
Filipino with the Philippines. If the adopted country demands total
allegiance, then the latter must make a crucial choice between the
country he has deserted and the greener pasture of his adopted
land.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and
in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance." Only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to
run for public office. If we allow dual citizens, who wish to run for
public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards
continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special
privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the
prohibition in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) (Maquiling v. COMELEC).
Doctrine of Indelible Allegiance
An individual may be compelled to retain his original nationality
even if he has already renounced or forfeited it under the laws of
the second State whose nationality he has acquired.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 56 of 79
 SEPARATION OF POWERS
CONCEPT
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. [Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081,
July 15, 1936]
While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to
be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or
perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the
principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command.
The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher
court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his
actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no
exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the
judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less." [In re: Manzano, A.M.
No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]
Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive
department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives
which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided
under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law…. Clearly,
these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere
of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in "the
various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation
of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of
powers principle. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013]
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping
and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. [Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]
POLITICAL QUESTION VS. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure". A purely justiciable
question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said
right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach
of right. Before and after the ratification and effectivity of the New
Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the
consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as
above-stated. [Casibang vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-38025, August 20,
1979]
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion
is alleged and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under
Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or
the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck
down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 57 of 79
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. [Ongsiako Reyes vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
PRINCIPLE OF BLENDING OF POWERS
Instances when powers are not confined exclusively within one
department but are assigned to or shared by several departments,
e.g., enactment of general appropriations law.
PRINCIPLE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
This allows one department to resist encroachments upon its
prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the
other departments, e.g., veto power of the President as check on
improvident legislation, etc.
ROLE OF JUDICIARY
The judicial power, as defined in Sec. 1, Art. VIII, “includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse, of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government”.
CRITERION OF VALID EXERCISE OF POWER
The first and safest criterion to determine whether a given power
has been validly exercised by a particular department is whether or
not the power has been constitutionally conferred upon the
department claiming its exercise — since the conferment is usually
done expressly. However, even in the absence of express
conferment, the exercise of the power may be justified under the
doctrine of necessary implication, i.e. that the grant of an express
power carries with it all other powers that may be reasonably
inferred from it. Note also that there are powers which although not
expressly conferred nor implied therefrom, are inherent or
incidental, e.g., the President’s power to deport undesirable aliens
which may be exercised independently of constitutional or statutory
authority, because it is an “act of State”.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Generally, “potestas delegata non potest delegare”, delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another. What has been delegated
cannot be further delegated.
PERMISSIBLE DELEGATIONS AS EXCEPTIONS TO THE
GENERAL RULE OF NON-DELEGATION
1. Tariff powers of the president
2. Emergency powers to the president
3. Delegation to the local government units
4. Delegation to the people at large
5. Delegation to the administrative agencies
I. TARIFF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
SEC. 28(2), ART. VI (1987 CONSTITUTION): The Congress may,
by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
Delegated Tariff Powers May Be Delegated to the President
for Revenue Raising Purposes
Petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of
which this Court may take judicial notice — that the Bureau of
Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of
the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of
governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that
generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the
government — The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation
[PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at
the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are
frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory
purposes. Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name
given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities,
the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or
exported to, a foreign country." The levying of customs duties on
imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting
local industries — where such local industries actually exist and are
producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very
same customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing
governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes
are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only.
[Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992]
II. EMERGENCY POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT
SEC. 23(2), ART. VI (1987 CONSTITUTION): In times of war or
other national emergency, the Congress may by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Limitations of the Emergency Powers of the President
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved
with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law
repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that
the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional
scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to
repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either.
If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the
delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly
pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain;
"that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may
become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for
Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal
might not meet with the approval of the President, and the Congress
might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would
create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers
by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a
two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to
delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is
not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 58 of 79
Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says: "It is generally agreed that the
maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at
the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers. Yet
how, in view of the scope that legislative delegations take
nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be
maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers
recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . ." [Araneta vs.
Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]
Under the 1935 Constitution, Delegated Emergency Powers
Cease When the Congress Meets in Regular Session
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the
Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its
authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies
operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the
emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended
while Congress was in session and be revived after each
adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a
two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the
President during congressional recess, and the President in turn
could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress,
laws enacted by the latter.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders
Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first
special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the
Act, we think we are giving effect to the purpose and intention of the
National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
"consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President)
may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a
regular session, the power of Congress to legislate is not
circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
[Araneta vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]
Withdrawal of Emergency Powers Does Require a Law
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and
did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally
declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that
the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would
lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress
might delegate its powers by a simple majority, it might not be able
to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back.
This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of
agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the
sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same
way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in
eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that
the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
Rodriguez vs. Gella [G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953]
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III. DELEGATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
Such transfer is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative
power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local
regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject, of course, to
the interposition of the superior classes in cases of necessity. This
recognizes the fact that local legislatures are more knowledgeable
than international lawmaking body on matters of purely local
concern, and are in a better position to enact appropriate legislative
measures thereon.
IV. DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE AT LARGE
The courts have sustained the delegation of legislative power to the
people at large. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are specific
provisions where the people have reserved to themselves the
function of legislation. The provision for the creation of referendum
and plebiscite. This is more of a reservation than a delegation
considering the fact that the people are repositories of all
governmental powers.
Basic Difference Between Referendum and Plebiscite
Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject
legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of
two classes, namely: referendum on statutes which refers to a
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed
by Congress; and referendum on local law which refers to a petition
to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. Plebiscite is the
electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people [Sec. 2 (c) and (e), Republic Act
No. 6735].
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate,
referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body.
Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves
without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate
approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a
legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative
are understandably more complex than in a referendum where
expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the
ballot. [Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to
initiative and referendum as "powers" or "legal processes", these
can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or
"the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in this
Decision.] From the above differentiation, it follows that there is
need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its
authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing
of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to
the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted by the electorate. This is especially true
where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and
should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each
such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised
that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be
submitted to the electorate," although "two or more propositions
may be submitted in an initiative". [Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996]
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 59 of 79
V. DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (Power of
Subordinate Legislation)
The authority delegated by the law-making body to the
administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry
out the provisions of a law and implement the legislative policy. I is
in the nature of a quasi-legislative power.
Reason for Non-Delegation
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on
the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. The
classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The
legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws
to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have."
This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not
through the intervening mind of another. [People vs. Vera, G.R. No.
45685, November 16, 1937]
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the
three major powers of the Government but is especially important
in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances
when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities
to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power,
however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if
not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation
of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception. [Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633,
October 18, 1988]
Reason for Permissible Delegation
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them. The reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities
and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has
found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
legislation." [Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633,
October 18, 1988]
Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power to Adminis-
trative Agencies
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power, viz,, the completeness test
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and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is enforce it Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative. With this power, administrative bodies
may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new
Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
[Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633, October 18,
1988]
The Standards May Be Implied
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. [Tablarin vs.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]
ARTICLE VI – The Legislative Department
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
While Comprehensive, the Powers of Congress Remains
Limited
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v.
Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean,
are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each
of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four
walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can
only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given
powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against
which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which
it cannot leap.
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it
is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable
subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are
chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec.
3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of
candidates for senators. [Pimentel. Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
161658, November 3, 2008]
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 60 of 79
SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four
Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law.
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
The Qualifications of the Members of Congress are Exclusive
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject
to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3)
literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated
qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess
any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly
amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36
(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void
and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws
must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience
to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed. [Pimentel. Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658,
November 3, 2008]
SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
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Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
DIRECT REPRESENTATIVES
Composition of the House of Representative May be Increased
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit
on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as
aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the
latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative
enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. [Tobias vs.
Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994]
Reapportionment of Legislative Districts May Be Made
Through Special Law
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution
(Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did
not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing
a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly
what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to
hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an
unequitable situation where a new city or province created by
Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive
the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible.
It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. [Mariano, Jr. vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]
The Power to Reapportion Legislative District Cannot be
Exercised by COMELEC
On the basis of their extensive debate, the Constitutional
Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 61 of 79
Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of
the phrase "minor adjustments" was again clarified in the debates
of the Commission. That consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also
give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The
power granted by section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to
adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was created...."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No.
2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to
the Third District of Leyte. [Montejo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
118702, March 16, 1995]
The Minimum Population for Cities Only Applies for the First
Apportionment
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to
more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to
at least one congressional representative. [Mariano, Jr. vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]
Initial and Subsequent Apportionment of Legislative Districts
for Provinces Do not Require a Minimum Population
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000
minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial
legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI
of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does
not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be
entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves
the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be
applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should
such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering
moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere
fact of its creation and regardless of its population. [Aquino vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010]
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PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES
Four Inviolable Parameters of the Party List
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the
Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four
inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district
representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats
allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
--------------------------------------- x 20 = No. of Party List
.80 representatives
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be
shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to
ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having
a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from
the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the
very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to
have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of
small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according
to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio" 22 to ensure meaningful local
representation.
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to
a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's
pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each
qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having
hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit
ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 62 of 79
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
House.
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion
to their total number of votes." [Veterans Federation Party vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000]
Panganiban Formula for Distribution of Seats Reserved to
Party List System
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and
the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that
the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations
and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the
parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two -
percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats.
The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth
be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of
seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that
for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled
by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding
it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for
all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of
votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent,
but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one
additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than
four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional
seat.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of
additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based
on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = --------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Panganiban Formula was Expressly Abandoned
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation
to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the
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maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence
of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we
do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the
two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-
list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered
by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
[BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179171, APRIL 21, 2009]
Old Guidelines in Determining Participation in the Party-List
System
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified
in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-
list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of
enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified
merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show,
however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Third, the Court notes the express constitutional provision
that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system.
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 63 of 79
 (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
 communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of,
or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or
organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and
operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the
requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section
9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. –
No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age
on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must
at least be twenty- five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-
defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
New Guidelines in the Party List System
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. 
 particular organization complies with the requirements of the
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. 
 Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates
in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is
by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition. 
 Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or
that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of
such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013]
Other Sectors May Be Represented Aside From Those Listed
in the Law
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under- represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
Constitution and RA 7941.
Religion Cannot be the Basis of Disqualification
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment
clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.”
Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the

POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018 Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 64 of 79
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated,
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects. [Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010]
Questions on the Qualifications of Party List Representatives
Still Rests on the HRET
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list
representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same
deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate
in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts
or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three
years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the
HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By
analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins. [Palparan v. HRET, G.R. No. 189506,
February 11, 2010]
Failure to Participate in the Two Preceding Elections should be
taken separately from the Failure to Obtain 2% of the Votes
The law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last
two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which
it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate
reasons for delisting.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies
in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list
organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a
party list organization that does not participate in an election
necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To
be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s
clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the
two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of
these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a
strained application of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an
interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law
and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law. [Philippine
Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. COMELEC, April 29, 2010]
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Effect of the Change of Computation in BANAT
We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to
state that a party- list group or organization which qualified in the
second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for
the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two
elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification
should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list
votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a
seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than
the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should
now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or
organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it registered.
The COMELEC Cannot Withhold the List of Nominees
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names
of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is
certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under
said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it
extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires
to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the
coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law
something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely
nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing
or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List"
the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an
absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections.
The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7941. [Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 177271, May 24, 2007]
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Residence is Synonymous with Domicile in Election Law
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which
the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place
for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile
in favor of another domicile of choice.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 65 of 79
these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile. [Romualdez-Marcos
vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995]
Conditions for Losing Domicile of Origin
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change
of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 
 then should such qualification be required at the time of election or
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and 
establishing a new one; and 
 insists? Literally, such qualifications — unless otherwise expressly
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Mere Residence, which is Not Equivalent to Domicile, is
Enough
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of
this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs. Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the
practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those
most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if
a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law
for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either
by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this
Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not
petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area
now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at
the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the
same. [Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18,
1995]
Citizenship Must Be Possessed at the Time Term of Office
Begins
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least
one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people
and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins
to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation
and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day
the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began—
he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as
of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern
his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should
give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent
with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from
a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be
noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why
at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence — should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern,
i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term — in
this case, on June 30, 1995. [Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
120295, June 28, 1996]
SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
The Congress May, by Law, Shorten the Tenure of the
Members of Congress, but not the Term
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the
term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse
"term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the
Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not
be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the
period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may
be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said
officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at
all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office
(see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official
covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he
is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The
term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its
unexpired portion. [Dimaporo vs. Mitra, G.R. No. 96859, October
15, 1991]
SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election
of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
shall be held on the second Monday of May.
SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 66 of 79
SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.
Reason for the Grant of Immunity of Speech
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is
founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating
forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence,
but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they
could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions
of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the
motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the
forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and
promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into
every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies,
and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the
manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in
committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity
and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority
of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity. [Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No.
7399, August 25, 2009]
Requirements for the Application of Parliamentary Immunity of
Speech
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the
acts in question. [Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, August 3, 1966]
Members of Congress May Be Held Liable by the House to
which they Belong
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other
place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art.
1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which
is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly
of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public
to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of
every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty
may occasion offense." Such immunity has come to this country
from the practices of Parliament as construed and applied by the
Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no
longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of
Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison,
suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The
appendix to this decision amply attests to the consensus of
informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of
legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion.
[Osmeña vs. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]
SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify
the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise
from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall
he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.
Forfeiture of Congressional Seat Due Acceptance of
Incompatible Occurs When the Member of Congress Takes An
Oath to the Incompatible Office and Starts to Discharge the
Functions Thereof
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a
public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 67 of 79
created or reorganized by law, — which new office is incompatible
with the one formerly occupied by him — , qualifies for the discharge
of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters
into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said
newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding
salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was
occupying by virtue of his former appointment, and he cannot
question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was
last appointed. He is excepted from said rule only when his non-
acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or
when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies.
[Zandueta vs. De la Costa, G.R. No. 46267, November 28, 1938]
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Indirect Intervention in a Pending Case is Included in the
Disqualification
The Supreme Court, finding that under the facts and circumstances,
there had been an indirect "appearance as counsel before any
administrative body" which is a circumvention of the prohibition
under Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, held that the
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the Securities and
Exchange Commission case falls within the ambit of the said
constitutional prohibition.
Certain salient circumstances militate against the
intervention of Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez in the quo
warranto case filed before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of
stock in the subject company, representing ten (10) shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact," that
is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May
14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979
before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he
moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as
counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was
objected to by petitioners. Realizing perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal
interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted that in the
case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he
appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of
respondent Acero therein. Under those facts and circumstances, we
are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance
as counsel before . . . any administrative body" and in our opinion,
that is a circumvention of the prohibition contained in Section 11,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. That which the Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or implied prohibited. [Puyat vs. De Guzman]
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date
is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of
its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty
of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to
any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
The Required Number to Elect a Senate President
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They
contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the
Senate President "by majority vote of all its members" carries with
it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and
"minority", as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue
that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to
that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate
President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly,
those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such
chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to
determine the minority leader belongs.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number
of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more
than half of any total." The plain and unambiguous words of the
subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President
must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not
by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
"majority", much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is
no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other
than the usual meanings of these terms.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 68 of 79
 In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily,
no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader. [Santiago vs. Guingona,
Jr., G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998]
Difference Between Majority of All The Members of the House,
and Majority of the House
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House"
shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". There is a difference between a majority of "all the
members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore that even if the twelve did
not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one,
at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there
would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for
Cuenco, one against and one abstained. [Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R.
No. L- 2821, March 4, 1949]
Rules of Each House May be Disregarded; Exception
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was
a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts
have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules
are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing
view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle
is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved. [Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No.
127255, August 14, 1997]
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What Constitutes Disorderly Behavior is Purely Political
Question
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be
disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the
power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a
coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of
powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been
said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and
is supreme within its own sphere.
"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause
the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the state Senate is given the power to expel
a member, the courts will not review its action or revise even a most
arbitrary or unfair decision." [Osmeña vs. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-
17144, October 28, 1960]
Members of the Congress under R.A. 3019
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision
is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino
Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court affirmed the order
of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of Congress.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be
deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from
Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs
of either branch.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage
the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan
did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order. [Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18,
2001]
The Speaker of the House May Be Held in Contempt for Refusal
to Implement an Order of Suspension of the Members of
Congress
The issue before us had long been settled by this Court in Ceferino
S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan in G.R. No. 118354 (August 8,
1995).We ruled that the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft
law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is
imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 69 of 79
measure resorted to upon the filing of a valid Information. Its
purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his
prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with
documentary evidence and from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal
proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or
expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed
sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for
disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
We note that the term of then Congressman Ceferino
Paredes, Jr. expired on June 30, 1988.This rendered moot and
academic the instant case. [De Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan G.R.
No. 130240, February 5, 2002]
The Contents of the Legislative Journal are Conclusive Upon
the Courts
From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are
as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity
of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and
the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his
argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was
stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the
determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other
words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the
Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed
by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special
session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If
the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant
evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative
force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon entertain oral evidence, liable to loss
by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery
of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public
policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and
unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be
taken away for one purpose, it must be taken for all, and the
evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less
certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts
between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling
matters." [U.S. vs. Pons, G.R. No. 11530, August 12, 1916]
Enrolled Bill Shall Prevail Over Legislative Journal on
Questions on the Provisions of the Law
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is
patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that
the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction
"and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde",
not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the
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statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of
the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill
— which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor
of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. [Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931, February
28, 1963]
Enrolled Bills Are Conclusive Both in Contents and
Proceedings
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon
the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we
held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we
explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which
the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are
bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy. [Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, G.R. No.
105371, November 11, 1993]
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 70 of 79
Extent of Authority of the Electoral Tribunals
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And
this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power
claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may
regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off
the power of the commission to lay down the period within which
protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would
be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be
invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the
National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the
legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created
with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission
retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred
to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly
has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate
on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the
entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this
result should not be permitted. [Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]
Decisions of the Electoral Tribunals are Not Appealable
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders
upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its
jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be
corrected by certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies to
respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body
has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained
in the case of Lazatin v. The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus:
"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the Power by
the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as `intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature'. Earlier, this grant of power to
the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as 'full, clear
and complete'. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power
was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission The same may be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the
1987 Constitution. Thus, 'judicial review of decisions or final
resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in
the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . .
upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration
of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such a
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy
for such abuse." [Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990]
The Power to Appoint Members of the Electoral Tribunals
Representing Each House Rests on the Respective Houses
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives
the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from
among its district and party-list representatives those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the
Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12
seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments.
Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally
defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted
6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. [Pimentel
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 141489,
November 29, 2002]
Members of the Electoral Tribunals Representing Each House
are Not Required to Inhibit Even if They Are Involved in the
Controversy
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be
staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and
"legislative" components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated
one part of this proposition when it held that said provision ". . . is a
clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests . . . shall be
resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in
that Chamber are represented." The other part, of course, is that
the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or
representatives of the Supreme Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that
the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 — an unmistakable
indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election
contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution.
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which
it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators. To our mind, this is the overriding
consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 71 of 79
discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced
by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions
that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of
the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24
Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in
the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last
time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution
provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or
for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and
sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-
Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify
himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest. [Abbas vs. Senate
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. L-83767, October 27, 1988]
Members of the Electoral Tribunals representing Each House
Enjoy Security of Tenure
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a
myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives,
or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the
political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the
electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-
partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence — even independence
from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to
party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for having cast a "conscience vote" in
favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of
the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as
sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for
other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this
case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the
LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure. [Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710,
September 26, 1991]
Pre-Proclamation Controversies Are Not Allowed in the
Election of the Members of Congress
It is clear from the above-quoted provision of the law that "pre-
proclamation cases (are) not allowed in elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives." What is allowed is the correction of "manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be
manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of
canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections
thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
[Chavez vs. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 315 (1992)]
Conditions Before the Electoral Tribunals Acquire Jurisdiction
Over the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of the Members
of Congress
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue
of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after
a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered
a Member of the House of Representatives?
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2)
a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. [Ongsiako Reyes vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 72 of 79
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
Proportional Representation Allows Rounding Up for the
House of Representatives
The composition of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in
the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which
may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members
in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members,
which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The
remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna
Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and
the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party
in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House
membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the
basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."
[Coseteng vs. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990]
Proportional Representation Does Not Allow Rounding Up for
the Senate
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission
on Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in
the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is
not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be
elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties in the Commission on
Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a
breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give
the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the
fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived
of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation
is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can
by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority.
By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority
party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No
party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To
allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to
confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the
Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on
the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
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rightful membership in the Commission. We lay down the following
guidelines accordingly:
1. In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at
least two duly elected senators for every seat in the
Commission on Appointments.
2. Where there are more than two political parties
represented in the Senate, a political party/coalition
with a single senator in the Senate cannot
constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission. 

We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect
12 Senators to the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution
does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must
necessarily include twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members
of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution requires is
that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under
Section 18, the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members and in Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of
all its members "to discharge such powers and functions herein
conferred upon it".
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the
election and presence of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives in order that the
Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their functions even if
not fully constituted and even if their composition is expressly
specified by the Constitution. Among these are the Supreme Court,
Civil Service Commission, Commission on Election, Commission on
Audit. They perform their functions so long as there is the required
quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on
Appointments may perform its functions and transact its business
even if only ten (10) senators are elected thereto as long as a
quorum exists. [Guingona vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October
20, 1992]
SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate
and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at
the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge
such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress
shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with
law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and
expenses incurred for each Member.
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
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before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress
shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which
it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.
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(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed
to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year,
the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider
it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item
or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
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SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall
be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If
the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
enacted.
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for
a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve
or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or
local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor
signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
ARTICLE VII – Executive Department
SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines.
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election.
SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the
same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and
in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from
office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected
by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter.
The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than
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four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President
and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall
be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the
Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in
the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote
of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
SECTION 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the
following oath or affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or
Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God.”
(In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
SECTION 6. The President shall have an official residence. The
salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from
the Government or any other source.
SECTION 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall
assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall
act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 75 of 79

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect
shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect
shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the
Vice-President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or
shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a
Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent
disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph.
SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President
until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected
and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation
of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or
the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of
the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not
earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this
Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third
reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election
shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be
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exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI
of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be
suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before
the date of the next presidential election.
SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President
as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile,
should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
within five days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not
in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as the President; otherwise, the President
shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public
shall be informed of the state of his health. The Members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be
denied access to the President during such illness.
SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 76 of 79
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his
tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President
shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President
within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of
office.
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
SECTION 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign
loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty
days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to
the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for
loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or
government-owned and controlled corporations which would have
the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
SECTION 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within
thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis
of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and
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sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures.
SECTION 23. The President shall address the Congress at the
opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any
other time.
ARTICLE VIII – Judicial Department
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous
year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which
under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
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by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage
of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must
have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of
lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof
unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.
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(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years,
and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio
of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations
for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions
and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the
list.
SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall
be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased.
SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges
of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until
they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated
to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,
or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
SECTION 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
POLITICAL LAW COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER (Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel) || AY 2017-2018
SECTION 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case
submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached
in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed
by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to
the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member
who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or
resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements
shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor.
SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months
from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification
to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall
forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall
state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued
within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the
court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been
incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
SECTION 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from
the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit
to the President and the Congress an annual report on the
operations and activities of the Judiciary.
“That In All Things,
God May Be Glorified!”
Mabanglo, Vicson A. || 4S || Page 79 of 79