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2007 is REINSTATED. Consequently,
All other claims are hereby the decision and resolution of the
DISMISSED for lack of merit. National Labor Relations Commission
dated April 29, 2008 and July 30, 2008,
SO ORDERED.[7] respectively, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed to the NLRC on the
ground that the ELA gravely abused his discretion in finding SO ORDERED.[10]
that Sy was illegally dismissed and in ordering her
reinstatement and payment of backwages. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the said decision.
The CA, however, denied the motion in its Resolution
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ELAs finding dated July 9, 2010.
that Sy was terminated without just cause and without due Hence, the petitioners interpose the present petition
process and dismissed the case.[8] before this Court anchored on the following
2
dismissal, but merely an expiration of the probationary with reasonable standards made known to them by the
contract. As such, she was not entitled to any benefits like employer at the time of their engagement.[16] Consistently,
separation pay or backwages. in Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Paranaque City,
Inc.,[17] this Court clearly stressed that:
Sy counters that she was illegally terminated from
Labor, for its part, is given the
service and insists that the petitioners cannot invoke her
protection during the probationary period
failure to qualify as she was not informed of the standards or
of knowing the company standards the
criteria which she should have met for regular
new hires have to meet during the
employment. Moreover, no proof was shown as to her alleged
probationary period, and to be judged on
poor work performance. She was unceremoniously
the basis of these standards, aside from
terminated to prevent her from becoming a regular employee
the usual standards applicable to
and be entitled to the benefits as such.
employees after they achieve permanent
status. Under the terms of the Labor
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Code, these standards should be
made known to the [employees] on
The pertinent law governing the present case is
probationary status at the start of their
Article 281 of the Labor Code which provides as follows:
probationary period, or xxx during
which the probationary standards are to
Art. 281. Probationary
be applied. Of critical importance in
employment. Probationary employment
invoking a failure to meet the
shall not exceed six months from the date
probationary standards, is that
the employee started working, unless it is
the [employer] should show as a
covered by an apprenticeship agreement
matter of due process how these
stipulating a longer period. The services
standards have been applied. This is
of an employee who has been engaged
effectively the second notice in a
in a probationary basis may be
dismissal situation that the law requires
terminated for a just cause or when he
as a due process guarantee supporting
fails to qualify as a regular employee in
the security of tenure provision, and is in
accordance with reasonable standards
furtherance, too, of the basic rule in
made known by the employer to the
employee dismissal that the employer
employee at the time of his
carries the burden of justifying a
engagement. An employee who is
dismissal. These rules ensure
allowed to work after a probationary
compliance with the limited security of
period shall be considered a regular
tenure guarantee the law extends to
employee. (Underscoring supplied)
probationary employees.[18] [Emphases
supplied]
3
standards in order to become a regular considered for regularization and how the standards had been
employee. applied in her case. As correctly pointed out by Sy, the
dissatisfaction on the part of the petitioners was at best self-
One of the conditions before serving and dubious as they could not present concrete and
an employer can terminate a competent evidence establishing her alleged
probationary employee is dissatisfaction incompetence. Failure on the part of the petitioners to
on the part of the employer which must discharge the burden of proof is indicative that the dismissal
be real and in good faith, not feigned so was not justified.
as to circumvent the contract or the The law is clear that in all cases of probationary
law. In the case at bar, absent any proof employment, the employer shall make known to the employee
showing that the work performance of the standards under which he will qualify as a regular
petitioner was unsatisfactory, We cannot employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards
conclude that petitioner failed to meet the are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be
standards of performance set by private deemed a regular employee.[24] The standards under which
respondents. This absence of proof, in she would qualify as a regular employee not having been
fact, leads Us to infer that their communicated to her at the start of her probationary period,
dissatisfaction with her work Sy qualified as a regular employee. As held by this Court in
performance was contrived so as not to the very recent case of Hacienda Primera Development
regularize her employment.[19] Corporation v. Villegas,:[25]
For failure of the petitioners to support their claim of In this case, petitioner Hacienda fails to
unsatisfactory performance by Sy, this Court shares the view specify the reasonable standards by
of the CA that Sys employment was unjustly terminated to which respondents alleged poor
prevent her from acquiring a regular status in circumvention performance was evaluated, much less
of the law on security of tenure. As the Court previously to prove that such standards were made
stated, this is a common and convenient practice of known to him at the start of his
unscrupulous employers to circumvent the law on security of employment. Thus, he is deemed to
tenure. Security of tenure, which is a right of paramount value have been hired from day one as a
guaranteed by the Constitution, should not be denied to the regular employee. Due process dictates
workers by such a stratagem. The Court can not permit such that an employee be apprised
a subterfuge, if it is to be true to the law and social justice.[20] beforehand of the condition of his
employment and of the terms of
In its attempt to justify Sys dismissal, the petitioners relied advancement therein. [Emphasis
heavily on the case of Alcira v. NLRC[21] where the Court supplied]
stressed that the constitutional protection ends on the
expiration of the probationary period when the parties are free
to either renew or terminate their contract of employment.
Even on the assumption that Sy indeed failed to
Indeed, the Court recognizes the employers power to meet the standards set by them and made known to the
terminate as an exercise of management prerogative. The former at the time of her engagement, still, the termination
petitioners, however, must be reminded that such right is not was flawed for failure to give the required notice to Sy. Section
without limitations. In this connection, it is well to quote the 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules provides:
ruling of the Court in the case of Dusit Hotel Nikko v.
Gatbonton, [22] where it was written: Section 2. Security of tenure.
(a) In cases of regular employment, the
As Article 281 clearly states, a employer shall not terminate the services
probationary employee can be legally of an employee except for just or
terminated either: (1) for a just cause; or authorized causes as provided by law,
(2) when the employee fails to qualify as and subject to the requirements of due
a regular employee in accordance with process.
the reasonable standards made known to
him by the employer at the start of the (b) The foregoing shall also
employment. Nonetheless, the power of apply in cases of probationary
the employer to terminate an employee employment; Provided however, that in
on probation is not without such cases, termination of employment
limitations. First, this power must be due to failure of the employee to qualify
exercised in accordance with the specific in accordance with the standards of the
requirements of the contract. Second, employer made known to the former at
the dissatisfaction on the part of the the time of engagement may also be a
employer must be real and in good faith, ground for termination of employment.
not feigned so as to circumvent the x
contract or the law; and third, there must x
be no unlawful discrimination in the x
dismissal. In termination cases, the
burden of proving just or valid cause for (d) In all cases of termination
dismissing an employee rests on the of employment, the following standards
employer.[23] [Emphases supplied] of due process shall be substantially
observed:
Here, the petitioners failed to convey to Sy the
standards upon which she should measure up to be
4
x
x
x
DECISION
5
probation for a period of six (6) months beginning February Surveillance Drug Safety of Hospira, will be her immediate
15, 2005 to August 14, 2005. The said contract was also supervisor; (d) she should always coordinate with Abbott’s
signed by Abbott’s General Manager, petitioner Edwin Feist human resource officers in the management and discipline of
(Feist):10 the staff; (e) Hospira ALSU will spin off from Abbott in early
2006 and will be officially incorporated and known as Hospira,
Philippines. In the interim, Hospira ALSU operations will still
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
be under Abbott’s management, excluding the technical
aspects of the operations which is under the control and
Dear Pearl, supervision of Walsh; and (f) the processing of information
and/or raw material data subject of Hospira ALSU operations
will be strictly confined and controlled under the computer
After having successfully passed the pre-employment system and network being maintained and operated from the
requirements, you are hereby appointed as follows: United States. For this purpose, all those involved in Hospira
ALSU are required to use two identification cards: one, to
Position Title : Regulatory Affairs Manager identify them as Abbott’s employees and another, to identify
them as Hospira employees.11
Department : Hospira
On March 3, 2005, petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa
(Misa), Abbott’s Human Resources (HR) Director, sent
The terms of your employment are: Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an explanation of the
procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary
Nature of Employment : Probationary employees and further indicated that Abbott had only one
evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also
given copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Probationary
Effectivity : February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005 Performance Standards and Evaluation (PPSE) and
Performance Excellence Orientation Modules (Performance
Basic Salary : ₱110,000.00/ month Modules) which she had to apply in line with her task of
evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff.12
It is understood that you agree to abide by all existing policies,
rules and regulations of the company, as well as those, which Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance
may be hereinafter promulgated. of a probationary employee should be formally reviewed and
discussed with the employee at least twice: first on the third
month and second on the fifth month from the date of
Unless renewed, probationary appointment expires on the employment. The necessary Performance Improvement Plan
date indicated subject to earlier termination by the Company should also be made during the third-month review in case of
for any justifiable reason. a gap between the employee’s performance and the
standards set. These performance standards should be
If you agree to the terms and conditions of your employment, discussed in detail with the employee within the first two (2)
please signify your conformity below and return a copy to weeks on the job. It was equally required that a signed copy
HRD. of the PPSE form must be submitted to Abbott’s Human
Resources Department (HRD) and shall serve as
documentation of the employee’s performance during his/her
Welcome to Abbott! probationary period. This shall form the basis for
recommending the confirmation or termination of the
Very truly yours, probationary employment.13
6
essentially contained queries regarding the former’s job considering her admissions that she was briefed by Almazar
performance. Alcaraz asked if Walsh’s action was the normal on her work during her pre-employment orientation
process of evaluation. Terrible said that it was not.17 meeting30 and that she received copies of Abbott’s Code of
Conduct and Performance Modules which were used for
evaluating all types of Abbott employees.31 As Alcaraz was
On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with Walsh
unable to meet the standards set by Abbott as per her
and Terrible where she was informed that she failed to meet
performance evaluation, the LA ruled that the termination of
the regularization standards for the position of Regulatory
her probationary employment was justified.32 Lastly, the LA
Affairs Manager.18 Thereafter, Walsh and Terrible requested
found that there was no evidence to conclude that Abbott’s
Alcaraz to tender her resignation, else they be forced to
officers and employees acted in bad faith in terminating
terminate her services. She was also told that, regardless of
Alcaraz’s employment.33
her choice, she should no longer report for work and was
asked to surrender her office identification cards. She
requested to be given one week to decide on the same, but to Displeased with the LA’s ruling, Alcaraz filed an appeal with
no avail.19 the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On May 17, 2005, Alcaraz told her administrative assistant, The NLRC Ruling
Claude Gonzales (Gonzales), that she would be on leave for
that day. However, Gonzales told her that Walsh and Terrible
On September 15, 2006, the NLRC rendered a
already announced to the whole Hospira ALSU staff that
Decision,34 annulling and setting aside the LA’s ruling, the
Alcaraz already resigned due to health reasons.20
dispositive portion of which reads:
In a Decision dated March 30, 2006,29 the LA dismissed The NLRC reversed the findings of the LA and ruled that there
Alcaraz’s complaint for lack of merit. was no evidence showing that Alcaraz had been apprised of
her probationary status and the requirements which she
The LA rejected Alcaraz’s argument that she was not informed should have complied with in order to be a regular
of the reasonable standards to qualify as a regular employee employee.36 It held that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job description
7
and Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance Modules was Meanwhile, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the CA’s
not equivalent to her being actually informed of the May 18, 2010 Resolution in the Second CA Petition was
performance standards upon which she should have been denied via a Resolution dated October 4, 2010.51 This
evaluated on.37 It further observed that Abbott did not comply attained finality on January 10, 2011 for petitioners’ failure to
with its own standard operating procedure in evaluating timely appeal the same.52 Hence, as it stands, only the issues
probationary employees.38 The NLRC was also not convinced in the First CA petition are left to be resolved.
that Alcaraz was terminated for a valid cause given that
petitioners’ allegation of Alcaraz’s "poor performance"
Incidentally, in her Comment dated November 15, 2010,
remained unsubstantiated.39
Alcaraz also alleges that petitioners were guilty of forum
shopping when they filed the Second CA Petition pending the
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the CA’s
denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated July 31, 2007.40 December 10, 2009 Decision i.e., the decision in the First CA
Petition.53 She also contends that petitioners have not
complied with the certification requirement under Section 5,
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court when they failed to disclose in the
with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
instant petition the filing of the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA G.R. SP
Appeal filed before the NLRC.54
No. 101045 (First CA Petition), alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of NLRC when it ruled that Alcaraz was
illegally dismissed.41 The Issues Before the Court
Pending resolution of the First CA Petition, Alcaraz moved for The following issues have been raised for the Court’s
the execution of the NLRC’s Decision before the LA, which resolution: (a) whether or not petitioners are guilty of forum
petitioners strongly opposed. The LA denied the said motion shopping and have violated the certification requirement
in an Order dated July 8, 2008 which was, however, under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; (b) whether or
eventually reversed on appeal by the NLRC.42 Due to the not Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable
foregoing, petitioners filed another Petition for Certiorari with standards to qualify her as a regular employee; (c) whether or
the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 111318 (Second CA not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment; and
Petition), assailing the propriety of the execution of the NLRC (d) whether or not the individual petitioners herein are liable.
decision.43
The Court’s Ruling
The CA Ruling
A. Forum Shopping and
With regard to the First CA Petition, the CA, in a Violation of Section 5, Rule 7
Decision44 dated December 10, 2009, affirmed the ruling of of the Rules of Court.
the NLRC and held that the latter did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in finding that Alcaraz was illegally
At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the prohibition
dismissed.
against forum shopping is different from a violation of the
certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
It observed that Alcaraz was not apprised at the start of her of Court. In Sps. Ong v. CA,55 the Court explained that:
employment of the reasonable standards under which she
could qualify as a regular employee.45 This was based on its
x x x The distinction between the prohibition against forum
examination of the employment contract which showed that
shopping and the certification requirement should by now be
the same did not contain any standard of performance or any
too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance
stipulation that Alcaraz shall undergo a performance
with the certification against forum shopping is separate from
evaluation before she could qualify as a regular employee.46 It
and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum
also found that Abbott was unable to prove that there was any
shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between
reasonable ground to terminate Alcaraz’s
failure to comply with the certification requirement and
employment.47 Abbott moved for the reconsideration of the
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in
aforementioned ruling which was, however, denied by the CA
terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of
in a Resolution48 dated June 9, 2010.
enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or
The CA likewise denied the Second CA Petition in a initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the
Resolution dated May 18, 2010 (May 18, 2010 Resolution) latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct
and ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the contempt. x x x. 56
execution of the NLRC Decision.49 Thus, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration.
As to the first, forum shopping takes place when a litigant files
multiple suits involving the same parties, either
While the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the CA’s simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
May 18, 2010 Resolution was pending, Alcaraz again moved judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
for the issuance of a writ of execution before the LA. On June present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
7, 2010, petitioners received the LA’s order granting Alcaraz’s who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
motion for execution which they in turn appealed to the NLRC of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
– through a Memorandum of Appeal dated June 16, 2010 founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to
(June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal ) – on the ground that the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that
the implementation of the LA’s order would render its motion any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
for reconsideration moot and academic.50
8
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the
judicata in the other case.57 employer.60
In this case, records show that, except for the element of Corollary thereto, Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the
identity of parties, the elements of forum shopping do not Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides that if the
exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to question employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the
the ruling of the NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. reasonable standards upon which the regularization would be
On the other hand, the Second CA Petition pertains to the based on at the time of the engagement, then the said
propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award pending employee shall be deemed a regular employee, viz.:
the resolution of the First CA Petition and the finality of the
decision in the labor dispute between Alcaraz and the
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer
petitioners. Based on the foregoing, a judgment in the Second
shall make known to the employee the standards under which
CA Petition will not constitute res judicata insofar as the First
he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his
CA Petition is concerned. Thus, considering that the two
engagement. Where no standards are made known to the
petitions clearly cover different subject matters and causes of
employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular
action, there exists no forum shopping.
employee.
Having settled the foregoing procedural matter, the Court now In this case, petitioners contend that Alcaraz was terminated
proceeds to resolve the substantive issues. because she failed to qualify as a regular employee according
to Abbott’s standards which were made known to her at the
time of her engagement. Contrarily, Alcaraz claims that Abbott
B. Probationary employment;
never apprised her of these standards and thus, maintains
grounds for termination.
that she is a regular and not a mere probationary employee.
9
apprised of her employer’s expectations that would, in turn, especially true of a managerial employee like Alcaraz who
determine her regularization: was tasked with the vital responsibility of handling the
personnel and important matters of her department.
(a) On June 27, 2004, Abbott caused the
publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its In fine, the Court rules that Alcaraz’s status as a probationary
need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager, indicating employee and her consequent dismissal must stand.
therein the job description for as well as the duties Consequently, in holding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed
and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid due to her status as a regular and not a probationary
position; this prompted Alcaraz to submit her employee, the Court finds that the NLRC committed a grave
application to Abbott on October 4, 2004; abuse of discretion.
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its decision
stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a on the premise that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job description and
probationary status; Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance Modules was not
equivalent to being actually informed of the performance
standards upon which she should have been evaluated
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an
on.64 It, however, overlooked the legal implication of the other
employment contract which specifically stated, inter
attendant circumstances as detailed herein which should have
alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a
warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz was indeed a
period of six (6) months beginning February 15,
probationary and not a regular employee – more particularly
2005 to August 14, 2005;
the fact that she was well-aware of her duties and
responsibilities and that her failure to adequately perform the
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s same would lead to her non-regularization and eventually, her
employment offer, Bernardo sent her copies of termination.
Abbott’s organizational structure and her job
description through e-mail;
Accordingly, by affirming the NLRC’s pronouncement which is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the CA committed a
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre- reversible error which, perforce, necessitates the reversal of
employment orientation where Almazar informed its decision.
her that she had to implement Abbott’s Code of
Conduct and office policies on human resources
C. Probationary employment;
and finance and that she would be reporting directly
termination procedure.
to Walsh;
D. Employer’s violation of
Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the company policy and
adequate performance of one’s duties is, by and of itself, an procedure.
inherent and implied standard for a probationary employee to
be regularized; such is a regularization standard which need
not be literally spelled out or mapped into technical indicators Nonetheless, despite the existence of a sufficient ground to
in every case. In this regard, it must be observed that the terminate Alcaraz’s employment and Abbott’s compliance
assessment of adequate duty performance is in the nature of with the Labor Code termination procedure, it is readily
a management prerogative which when reasonably exercised apparent that Abbott breached its contractual obligation to
– as Abbott did in this case – should be respected. This is
10
Alcaraz when it failed to abide by its own procedure in pointed out that Abbott had satisfied its statutory duty to serve
evaluating the performance of a probationary employee. a written notice of termination, the fact that it violated its own
company procedure renders the termination of Alcaraz’s
employment procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of
Veritably, a company policy partakes of the nature of an
nominal damages. A further exposition is apropos.
implied contract between the employer and employee. In
Parts Depot, Inc. v. Beiswenger,68 it has been held that:
Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an
employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid
Employer statements of policy . . . can give rise to contractual
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.
rights in employees without evidence that the parties mutually
agreed that the policy statements would create contractual
rights in the employee, and, hence, although the statement of In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon),71 the Court pronounced that
policy is signed by neither party, can be unilaterally amended where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory
by the employer without notice to the employee, and contains due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it
no reference to a specific employee, his job description or illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify
compensation, and although no reference was made to the the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.72 Thus, in
policy statement in pre-employment interviews and the Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the employee
employee does not learn of its existence until after his hiring. nominal damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00.73
Toussaint, 292 N.W .2d at 892. The principle is akin to
estoppel. Once an employer establishes an express
Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court modified Agabon
personnel policy and the employee continues to work while
in the case of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot
the policy remains in effect, the policy is deemed an implied
(Jaka)74 where it created a distinction between procedurally
contract for so long as it remains in effect. If the employer
defective dismissals due to a just cause, on one hand, and
unilaterally changes the policy, the terms of the implied
those due to an authorized cause, on the other.
contract are also thereby changed.1âwphi1 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 282 of the Labor Code (now Article 296) but the
Hence, given such nature, company personnel policies create
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
an obligation on the part of both the employee and the
sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered
employer to abide by the same.
because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an
act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an
Records show that Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates, inter authorized cause under Article 283 (now Article 297) but the
alia, that the job performance of a probationary employee employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was
at least twice: first on the third month and second on the fifth initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
month from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to prerogative.75 Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was
come up with a Performance Improvement Plan during the dismissed for an authorized cause of retrenchment 76 – as
third month review to bridge the gap between the employee’s contradistinguished from the employee in Agabon who was
performance and the standards set, if any.69 In addition, a dismissed for a just cause of neglect of duty77 – the Court
signed copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to Abbott’s ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages
HRD as the same would serve as basis for recommending the at the higher amount of ₱50,000.00.
confirmation or termination of the probationary employment.70
Evidently, the sanctions imposed in both Agabon and Jaka
In this case, it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the proceed from the necessity to deter employers from future
above-stated procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there violations of the statutory due process rights of
lies a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of Alcaraz’s PPSE employees.78 In similar regard, the Court deems it proper to
form was submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a apply the same principle to the case at bar for the reason that
PPSE form was completed to formally assess her an employer’s contractual breach of its own company
performance. Neither was the performance evaluation procedure – albeit not statutory in source – has the parallel
discussed with her during the third and fifth months of her effect of violating the laborer’s rights. Suffice it to state, the
employment. Nor did Abbott come up with the necessary contract is the law between the parties and thus, breaches of
Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcaraz’s the same impel recompense to vindicate a right that has been
performance with the set company standards. violated. Consequently, while the Court is wont to uphold the
dismissal of Alcaraz because a valid cause exists, the
payment of nominal damages on account of Abbott’s
While it is Abbott’s management prerogative to promulgate its
contractual breach is warranted in accordance with Article
own company rules and even subsequently amend them, this
2221 of the Civil Code.79
right equally demands that when it does create its own policies
and thereafter notify its employee of the same, it accords upon
itself the obligation to faithfully implement them. Indeed, a Anent the proper amount of damages to be awarded, the
contrary interpretation would entail a disharmonious Court observes that Alcaraz’s dismissal proceeded from her
relationship in the work place for the laborer should never be failure to comply with the standards required for her
mired by the uncertainty of flimsy rules in which the latter’s regularization. As such, it is undeniable that the dismissal
labor rights and duties would, to some extent, depend. process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the
employee, akin to dismissals due to just causes under Article
296 of the Labor Code. Therefore, the Court deems it
In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcaraz’s
appropriate to fix the amount of nominal damages at the
probationary employment for her failure to meet the standards
amount of ₱30,000.00, consistent with its rulings in both
required for her regularization, and while it must be further
Agabon and Jaka.
11
E. Liability of individual
petitioners as corporate
officers.
It is hornbook principle that personal liability of corporate G.R. No. 192571 April 22, 2014
directors, trustees or officers attaches only when: (a) they
assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A.
they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUT-
affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in MISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G.
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; ALMAZAR, Petitioners,
(b) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or vs.
when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, Respondent.
file with the corporate secretary their written objection; (c) they
agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with
the corporation; or (d) they are made by specific provision of RESOLUTION
law personally answerable for their corporate action.80
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this case, Alcaraz alleges that the individual petitioners
acted in bad faith with regard to the supposed crude manner For resolution is respondent Pearlie Ann Alcaraz's (Alcaraz)
by which her probationary employment was terminated and Motion for Reconsideration dated August 23, 2013 of the
thus, should be held liable together with Abbott. In the same
Court's Decision dated July 23, 2013 (Decision).1
vein, she further attributes the loss of some of her remaining
belongings to them.81
At the outset, there appears to be no substantial argument in
the said motion sufficient for the Court to depart from the
Alcaraz’s contention fails to persuade. pronouncements made in the initial ruling. But if only to
address Akaraz's novel assertions, and to so placate any
A judicious perusal of the records show that other than her doubt or misconception in the resolution of this case, the Court
unfounded assertions on the matter, there is no evidence to proceeds to shed light on the matters indicated below.
support the fact that the individual petitioners herein, in their
capacity as Abbott’s officers and employees, acted in bad faith
A. Manner of review.
or were motivated by ill will in terminating
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated A careful perusal of the questioned Decision will reveal that
December 10, 2009 and Resolution dated June 9, 2010 of the the Court actually resolved the controversy under the above-
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101045 are hereby stated framework of analysis. Essentially, the Court found the
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated CA to have committed an error in holding that no grave abuse
March 30, 2006 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED with the of discretion can be ascribed to the NLRC since the latter
MODIFICATION that petitioner Abbott Laboratories, arbitrarily disregarded the legal implication of the attendant
Philippines be ORDERED to pay respondent Pearlie Ann F. circumstances in this case which should have simply resulted
Alcaraz nominal damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 on in the finding that Alcaraz was apprised of the performance
account of its breach of its own company procedure. standards for her regularization and hence, was properly a
probationary employee. As the Court observed, an
employee’s failure to perform the duties and responsibilities
SO ORDERED.
which have been clearly made known to him constitutes a
justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s non-
regularization. As detailed in the Decision, Alcaraz was well-
apprised of her duties and responsibilities as well as the
probationary status of her employment:
12
job description for as well as the duties and same would lead to her non-regularization and eventually, her
responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position; termination.3
this prompted Alcaraz to submit her application to
Abbott on October 4, 2004;
Consequently, since the CA found that the NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion and denied the certiorari
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was petition before it, the reversal of its ruling was thus in order.
stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a
probationary status;
At this juncture, it bears exposition that while NLRC decisions
are, by their nature, final and executory4 and, hence, not
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an subject to appellate review,5 the Court is not precluded from
employment contract which specifically stated, inter considering other questions of law aside from the CA’s finding
alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a on the NLRC’s grave abuse of discretion. While the focal point
period of six (6) months beginning February 15, of analysis revolves on this issue, the Court may deal with
2005 to August 14, 2005; ancillary issues – such as, in this case, the question of how a
probationary employee is deemed to have been informed of
the standards of his regularization – if only to determine if the
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s
concepts and principles of labor law were correctly applied or
employment offer, Bernardo sent her copies of
misapplied by the NLRC in its decision. In other words, the
Abbott’s organizational structure and her job
Court’s analysis of the NLRC’s interpretation of the
description through e-mail;
environmental principles and concepts of labor law is not
completely prohibited in – as it is complementary to – a Rule
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre- 45 review of labor cases.
employment orientation where [Allan G. Almazar]
informed her that she had to implement Abbott’s
Finally, if only to put to rest Alcaraz’s misgivings on the
Code of Conduct and office policies on human
manner in which this case was reviewed, it bears pointing out
resources and finance and that she would be
that no "factual appellate review" was conducted by the Court
reporting directly to [Kelly Walsh];
in the Decision. Rather, the Court proceeded to interpret the
relevant rules on probationary employment as applied to
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training settled factual findings. Besides, even on the assumption that
program as part of her orientation; a scrutiny of facts was undertaken, the Court is not altogether
barred from conducting the same. This was explained in the
case of Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v.
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbott’s Code of Serna6 wherein the Court held as follows:
Conduct and Performance Modules from [Maria
Olivia T. Yabut-Misa] who explained to her the
procedure for evaluating the performance of Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-
probationary employees; she was further notified evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings
that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise
of its employees; and in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our "own judgment
for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of
evidence lies or what evidence is credible." The factual
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally
another pharmaceutical company and had admitted conclusive on this Court.
to have an "extensive training and background" to
acquire the necessary skills for her job.2
Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases where we, in the
exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction may be
Considering the foregoing incidents which were readily
urged to look into factual issues raised in a Rule 45 petition.
observable from the records, the Court reached the For instance, when the petitioner persuasively alleges that
conclusion that the NLRC committed grave abuse of there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to
discretion, viz.:
support the factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo, as
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states in express
[I]n holding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed due to her terms that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-
status as a regular and not a probationary employee, the judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established only if
Court finds that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of supported by substantial evidence.7(Emphasis supplied)
discretion.
B. Standards for regularization;
To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its decision conceptual underpinnings.
on the premise that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job description and
Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance Modules was not
Alcaraz posits that, contrary to the Court’s Decision, one’s job
equivalent to being actually informed of the performance description cannot by and of itself be treated as a standard for
standards upon which she should have been evaluated on. It, regularization as a standard denotes a measure of quantity or
however, overlooked the legal implication of the other
quality. By way of example, Alcaraz cites the case of a
attendant circumstances as detailed herein which should have probationary salesperson and asks how does such employee
warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz was indeed a achieve regular status if he does not know how much he
probationary and not a regular employee – more particularly
needs to sell to reach the same.
the fact that she was well-aware of her duties and
responsibilities and that her failure to adequately perform the
The argument is untenable.
13
First off, the Court must correct Alcaraz’s mistaken notion: it tools should not be treated as a prerequisite for every case of
is not the probationary employee’s job description but the probationary engagement. In fact, even if a system of such
adequate performance of his duties and responsibilities kind is employed and the procedures for its implementation
which constitutes the inherent and implied standard for are not followed, once an employer determines that the
regularization. To echo the fundamental point of the Decision, probationary employee fails to meet the standards required
if the probationary employee had been fully apprised by his for his regularization, the former is not precluded from
employer of these duties and responsibilities, then basic dismissing the latter. The rule is that when a valid cause for
knowledge and common sense dictate that he must termination exists, the procedural infirmity attending the
adequately perform the same, else he fails to pass the termination only warrants the payment of nominal damages.
probationary trial and may therefore be subject to This was the principle laid down in the landmark cases of
termination.8 Agabon v. NLRC9 (Agabon) and Jaka Food Processing
Corporation v. Pacot10 (Jaka). In the assailed Decision, the
Court actually extended the application of the Agabon and
The determination of "adequate performance" is not, in
Jaka rulings to breaches of company procedure,
all cases, measurable by quantitative specification, such
notwithstanding the employer’s compliance with the statutory
as that of a sales quota in Alcaraz’s example. It is also
requirements under the Labor Code.11 Hence, although
hinged on the qualitative assessment of the employee’s work;
Abbott did not comply with its own termination procedure, its
by its nature, this largely rests on the reasonable exercise of
non-compliance thereof would not detract from the finding that
the employer’s management prerogative. While in some
there subsists a valid cause to terminate Alcaraz’s
instances the standards used in measuring the quality of work
employment. Abbott, however, was penalized for its
may be conveyed – such as workers who construct tangible
contractual breach and thereby ordered to pay nominal
products which follow particular metrics, not all standards of
damages.
quality measurement may be reducible to hard figures or are
readily articulable in specific pre-engagement descriptions. A
good example would be the case of probationary employees As a final point, Alcaraz cannot take refuge in Aliling v.
whose tasks involve the application of discretion and intellect, Feliciano12 (Aliling) since the same is not squarely applicable
such as – to name a few – lawyers, artists, and journalists. In to the case at bar. The employee in Aliling, a sales executive,
these kinds of occupation, the best that the employer can do was belatedly informed of his quota requirement. Thus,
at the time of engagement is to inform the probationary considering the nature of his position, the fact that he was not
employee of his duties and responsibilities and to orient him informed of his sales quota at the time of his engagement
on how to properly proceed with the same. The employer changed the complexion of his employment. Contrarily, the
cannot bear out in exacting detail at the beginning of the nature of Alcaraz's duties and responsibilities as Regulatory
engagement what he deems as "quality work" especially since Affairs Manager negates the application of the foregoing.
the probationary employee has yet to submit the required Records show that Alcaraz was terminated because she (a)
output. In the ultimate analysis, the communication of did not manage her time effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust
performance standards should be perceived within the context of her staff and to build an effective rapport with them; (c)
of the nature of the probationary employee’s duties and failed to train her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to
responsibilities. obtain the knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on
case processing and article review which were necessary for
the proper performance of her duties.13 Due to the nature and
The same logic applies to a probationary managerial
variety of these managerial functions, the best that Abbott
employee who is tasked to supervise a particular department,
could have done, at the time of Alcaraz's engagement, was to
as Alcaraz in this case.1âwphi1 It is hardly possible for the
inform her of her duties and responsibilities, the adequate
employer, at the time of the employee’s engagement, to map
performance of which, to repeat, is an inherent and implied
into technical indicators, or convey in precise detail the quality
standard for regularization; this is unlike the circumstance in
standards by which the latter should effectively manage the
Aliling where a quantitative regularization standard, in the
department. Factors which gauge the ability of the managerial
term of a sales quota, was readily articulable to the employee
employee to either deal with his subordinates (e.g., how to
at the outset. Hence, since the reasonableness of Alcaraz's
spur their performance, or command respect and obedience
assessment clearly appears from the records, her termination
from them), or to organize office policies, are hardly
was justified. Bear in mind that the quantum of proof which the
conveyable at the outset of the engagement since the
employer must discharge is only substantial evidence which,
employee has yet to be immersed into the work itself. Given
as defined in case law, means that amount of relevant
that a managerial role essentially connotes an exercise of
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
discretion, the quality of effective management can only be
support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
determined through subsequent assessment. While at the
might conceivably opine otherwise.14 To the Court's mind, this
time of engagement, reason dictates that the employer can
threshold of evidence Abbott amply overcame in this case.
only inform the probationary managerial employee of his
duties and responsibilities as such and provide the allowable
parameters for the same. Verily, as stated in the Decision, the All told, the Court hereby denies the instant motion for
adequate performance of such duties and responsibilities is, reconsideration and thereby upholds the Decision in the main
by and of itself, an implied standard of regularization. case.
In this relation, it bears mentioning that the performance WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated August
standard contemplated by law should not, in all cases, be 23, 2013 of the Court's Decision dated July 23, 2013 in this
contained in a specialized system of feedbacks or evaluation. case is hereby DENIED.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that not all
employers, such as simple businesses or small-scale
SO ORDERED.
enterprises, have a sophisticated form of human resource
management, so much so that the adoption of technical
indicators as utilized through "comment cards" or "appraisal"
14
appointments to full-time faculty members who did not yet
have the required postgraduate degrees provided that the
latter comply with such requirement within their probationary
G.R. No. 193897 January 23, 2013
period. The CBA granted UE, however, the option to replace
these appointees during their probationary period if a qualified
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, DEAN ELEANOR JAVIER, teacher becomes available at the end of the semester.8
RONNIE GILLEGO and DR. JOSE C.
BENEDICTO,Petitioners,
Pursuant to the new CBA, UE extended probationary
vs.
appointments to respondents Bueno and Pepanio. Two years
ANALIZA F. PEPANIO and MARITI D.
later in October 2003, the Dean of the UE College of Arts and
BUENO, Respondents.
Sciences, petitioner Eleanor Javier, sent notices 9 to
probationary faculty members, reminding them of the
DECISION expiration of the probationary status of those lacking in
postgraduate qualification by the end of the first semester of
the School Year 2003-2004. Pepanio replied that she was
ABAD, J.:
enrolled at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines
Graduate School. Bueno, on the other hand, replied that she
This case is about the employment status of college teachers was not interested in acquiring tenure as she was returning to
with no postgraduate degrees who have been repeatedly her province.
extended semester-to-semester appointments as such.
In any event, Dean Javier subsequently issued a
The Facts and the Case memorandum, stating that she would recommend the
extension of the probationary appointees for two more
semesters for those who want it based on the wishes of the
In 1992, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports University President. Respondent Pepanio requested a three-
(DECS) issued the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private semester extension but Dean Javier denied this request and
Schools,1 Article IX, Section 44, paragraph 1 (a), of which directed Pepanio to ask for just a two-semester extension.
requires college faculty members to have a master's degree The records do not show if Bueno submitted a request for
as a minimum educational qualification for acquiring regular extension. At any rate, the school eventually wrote
status.2 respondents, extending their probationary period but neither
Pepanio nor Bueno reported for work.
In 1994 petitioner University of the East (UE) and the UE
Faculty Association executed a five-year Collective Bueno later wrote UE, demanding that it consider her a
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with effect up to 1999 which regular employee based on her six-and-a-half-year service on
provided, among others, that UE shall extend only semester- a full-load basis, given that UE hired her in 1997 when what
to-semester appointments to college faculty staffs who did not was in force was still the 1994 CBA. Pepanio made the same
possess the minimum qualifications. Those with such demand, citing her three-and-a-half years of service on a full-
qualifications shall be given probationary appointments and load basis.10 When UE did not heed their demands,
their performance on a full-time or full-load basis shall be respondents filed cases of illegal dismissal against the school
reviewed for four semesters.3 before the Labor Arbiter ’s (LA) office.
Meantime, on February 7, 1996 several concerned For its defense, UE countered that it never regarded
government agencies issued DECS-CHED-TESDA-DOLE respondents as regular employees since they did not hold the
Joint Order 14 which reiterated the policy embodied in the required master’s degree that government rules required as
Manual of Regulations that "teaching or academic personnel minimum educational qualification for their kind of work.
who do not meet the minimum academic qualifications shall
not acquire tenure or regular status." In consonance with this,
the UE President issued a University Policy stating that, On March 10, 2005 the LA held that Bueno and Pepanio were
beginning the School Year 1996-1997, it would hire those who regular employees, given that they taught at UE for at least
have no postgraduate units or master’s degree for its college four semesters under the old CBA.11 The new CBA, said the
teaching staffs, in the absence of qualified applicants, only on LA, could not deprive them of the employment benefits they
a semester-to-semester basis. already enjoyed. Since UE enjoined Pepanio from attending
her classes and since it did not give Bueno any teaching load,
they were dismissed without just cause. The LA directed UE
UE hired respondent Mariti D. Bueno in 19975 and respondent to reinstate respondents with backwages.12 Dissatisfied, UE
Analiza F. Pepanio in 2000,6 both on a semester-to-semester appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
basis to teach in its college. They could not qualify for (NLRC).
probationary or regular status because they lacked
postgraduate degrees. Bueno enrolled in six postgraduate
subjects at the Philippine Normal University’s graduate school Bueno and Pepanio questioned the timeliness of the appeal
but there is no evidence that she finished her course. Pepanio to the NLRC. They pointed to the postmaster’s certification
earned 27 units in her graduate studies at the Gregorio that its office received the mail containing the LA’s Decision
Araneta University Foundation but these could no longer be on March 17, 2005 and "informed the Office of Atty. Mison
credited to her because she failed to continue with her studies right away but they only got the letter on April 4, 2005." Bueno
within five years. and Pepanio claim that the 10-day period for appeal should
be counted from March 22, 2005, five days after the
postmaster’s first notice to Atty. Mison to claim his mail.
In 2001 UE and the UE Faculty Association entered into a new
CBA7 that would have the school extend probationary full-time
15
On September 27, 2006 the NLRC Third Division set aside the For completeness of service by registered mail, the reckoning
LA Decision.1âwphi1 It rejected the technical objection and period starts either (a) from the date of actual receipt of the
ruled that the four-semester probationary period provided mail by the addressee or (b) after five days from the date he
under the old CBA did not automatically confer permanent received the first notice from the postmaster.14There must be
status to Bueno and Pepanio. They still had to meet the a conclusive proof, however, that the registry notice was
standards for permanent employment provided under the received by or at least served on the addressee before the
Manual of Regulations and the Joint Order mentioned above. five-day period begins to run.15
The non-renewal of their contract was based on their failure
to obtain the required postgraduate degrees and cannot,
Here, the records fail to show that Atty. Mison in fact received
therefore, be regarded as illegal.
the alleged registry notice from the post office on March 22,
2005 that required him to claim his mail. Respondents have
On petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered not presented a copy of the receipt evidencing that notice. The
a Decision13 on July 9, 2010, reinstating the LA’s Decision by Court has no choice but to consider the registry return receipt
reason of technicality. It held that the 10-day period for appeal bearing the date April 4, 2005 which showed the date of Atty.
already lapsed when UE filed it on April 14, 2005 since the Mison’s receipt of a copy of the LA Decision a conclusive proof
reckoning period should be counted five days from March 17, of service on that date. Reckoned from April 4, UE filed its
when the postmaster gave notice to UE’s legal counsel to appeal to the NLRC on time.
claim his mail or from March 22, 2005. This prompted UE to
file the present petition.
Two. Respondents alleged that UE failed to attach to its
petition a Secretary’s Certificate evidencing the resolution
from its Board of Trustees, authorizing a representative or
agent to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping.
16
education system and the supervision and regulation of
educational institutions to the Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports (now Department of Education). Accordingly, in
promulgating the Manual of Regulations, DECS was
exercising its power of regulation over educational institutions,
which includes prescribing the minimum academic
qualifications for teaching personnel.20
SO ORDERED.
17
the school year 2003-2004. She again mentioned in her letter
that she was a candidate for a master’s degree in English
Studies; that the schedule of her oral defense may actually
materialize anytime within the first academic semester of
2003; and that she intended to fully earn her degree that year.
She also furnished the school with a Certification from UP,
G.R. No. 188914 December 11, 2013 stating that she had already finished her coursework in her
master’s studies. Furthermore, she indicated that it was her
long-term goal to apply for a return to full-time faculty status
JOCELYN HERRERA-MANAOIS, Petitioner, by then and for SSC to consider the aforesaid matters.6
vs.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, Respondent.
Manaois eventually received a letter from the Dean of College
and Chairperson of the Promotions and Permanency Board
DECISION officially informing her of the board’s decision not to renew her
contract. The letter provides as follows:7
SERENO, CJ.:
The Permanency Board reviewed your case and after a
The present case concerns the academic qualifications thorough deliberation, the members decided not to renew your
required in attaining the status of a permanent full-time faculty contract for school year 2003-2004.
member in the tertiary level of a private educational institution.
Petitioner Jocelyn Herrera-Manaois (Manaois) assails the With due consideration to your services, the institution had
judgments1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the granted your request for a three-year extension to finish your
Resolution2 of the National Labor Relations Commission master’s degree. However, you failed to comply with the terms
(NLRC) and ruled that respondent St. Scholastica's College which you yourself had requested. In addition, your
(SSC) was not guilty of illegal dismissal. SSC did not extend specialization cannot be maximized at SSC due to the
to Manaois the position of permanent full-time faculty member college’s curriculum changes and streamlining.
with the rank of instructor because she failed to acquire a
master's degree and because her specialization could no
longer be maximized by the institution due to the changes in It is with your best interest in mind and deep regret on our part
its curriculum and streamlining. that we have to let you go. A new environment may be able to
provide you more avenues and opportunities where you can
utilize your graduate studies in Creative Writing to the fullest.
THE FACTS
18
petitioner’s specialization due to curriculum changes and THE NLRC RULING
streamlining.
On 27 July 2007, the National Labor Relations Commission
With respect to the first reason, the labor arbiter reiterated that (NLRC) issued a Resolution10 upholding the labor arbiter’s
the alleged handwritten notation on Manaois’s employment Decision. The NLRC reiterated the labor arbiter’s finding that
application showing that the approval thereof was premised the failure of petitioner to finish her master’s degree within the
on her completion of a master’s degree had not been three-year probationary period was not a valid ground for the
disclosed or made known to her at the start of her termination of employment, as the condition was not made
engagement. In fact, she was not given a copy of the approval known to her at the time of engagement. Furthermore, it
until it was attached to the position paper of SSC. The labor reasoned that an average rating was not one of the just
arbiter agreed with Manaois that the only credible evidence causes for dismissal under the Labor Code. Consequently, it
that a precondition had been set for the acceptance of her affirmed the Decision of the labor arbiter in toto.
employment application was SSC’s letter expressly stating
that she must (a) maintain a good performance and (b) submit
THE CA RULING
the necessary papers pertaining to her master’s degree.
Regarding these preconditions, the labor arbiter noted that the
allegation concerning the mere average performance rating of On 27 February 2009, the CA issued the presently assailed
Manaois given by the students was neither made known to Decision reversing the NLRC judgment on the ground of grave
her nor duly substantiated with documentary proof. Even so, abuse of discretion and thus dismissing the complaint of
the labor arbiter articulated that at the very least, the Manaois. According to the appellate court, it was compelled
performance of Manaois during her three-year probationary to conduct its independent evaluation of the facts of the case,
employment was satisfactory, as admitted by SSC itself, since the factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC
thereby satisfying the first condition mentioned in the letter. were contrary to the evidence on record.
The labor arbiter then considered the Certification issued by
UP as sufficient evidence of Manaois’s compliance with the
First, the CA ruled that various pieces of evidence showed
second condition set by SSC.
that Manaois had been, at the time of engagement, aware and
knowledgeable that possession of a master’s degree was a
Next, the labor arbiter noted that under the SSC Faculty criterion for permanency as a full-time faculty member at SSC.
Manual, the minimum requirements for the rank of instructor, As early as April 2000, which was the period during which
for which petitioner had been hired under the employment Manaois applied to become a full-time faculty member, she
contract, was a bachelor’s degree with at least 25% units of had already sent a letter indicating that she was completing
master’s studies completed. He then found that the her master’s degree, and that the oral defense of her thesis
requirement for a master’s degree actually pertained to the was scheduled for June 2000. According to the appellate
rank of assistant professor, a position that had not been court, this fact reasonably implied that she was fully aware of
applied for by Manaois. Thus, he ruled that failure to finish a the necessity of a master’s degree in order for her to attain
master’s degree could not be used either as a ground for permanent status at SSC. Furthermore, it noted that Manaois
dismissing petitioner or as basis for refusing to extend to her submitted, together with her application letter, a Certification
a permanent teaching status. from UP stating that she had already finished her course work
for her master’s degree. It then deduced that this submission
was proof that she had endeavored to substantially comply
Anent respondent’s argument citing the Manual of
with one of the requirements for permanency.
Regulations for Private Schools, the labor arbiter ruled that the
provisions therein were inapplicable insofar as the
employment status of petitioner was concerned. He explained The CA then juxtaposed her letter with the reply of SSC’s
that the manual merely referred to the requirements for tertiary Dean of Arts and Sciences, who said that petitioner must
schools to be accredited and not to the employment submit the necessary papers pertaining to the latter’s master’s
conditions of the academic personnel. Thus, he pronounced degree, as represented in her application letter. It treated this
that Sections 44(c) and 45 of the manual, which required reply as indubitable proof of SSC’s appraisal of the
tertiary schools to hire teachers who were holders of master’s requirement to obtain a master’s degree. Consequently, the
degrees, could not be used as basis for dismissing Manaois. appellate court reasoned that the disclosure of the notation on
petitioner’s application latter was already inconsequential,
since one of the topics of the exchange of correspondences
The labor arbiter then focused on the second reason of SSC
between the parties in April 2000 was the submission of
as a reflection of the true motive behind the dismissal of
petitioner’s papers for her master’s degree. This directive
Manaois. According to the labor arbiter, the clear import of the
proffered no other interpretation than that the completion of a
statement "your specialization cannot be maximized at SSC
master’s degree had been a precondition for the conferment
due to the college’s curriculum changes and streamlining" was
of Manaois’s permanent employment status.
that SSC had already decided to terminate her services,
regardless of the completion of her master’s degree. The labor
arbiter consequently ruled that this reason was not a valid The CA also noted that the employment contract of petitioner
cause for dismissing a probationary employee, reiterating that incorporated the conditions set in the SSC Faculty Manual.
probationers may only be terminated either (a) for a just The manual explicitly stated that the criteria for permanency
cause, or (b) for failure to qualify as a regular employee in included the completion of a master’s degree. According to
accordance with reasonable standards made known at the the CA, the labor arbiter gravely erred when he solely relied
time of engagement. Ultimately, the labor arbiter pronounced on the minimum requirements provided for the rank of
that Manaois had attained permanent status and that SSC’s instructor. It stressed that the criteria cited for the rank of
nonrenewal of her contract must be deemed as a dismissal instructor referred to the basis on which full-time and part-time
without just cause. faculty members were ranked, and not to the requirements to
be fulfilled in order to become a permanent faculty member.
Instead, the appellate court agreed with SSC that what
19
happened in this case was merely the expiration of an B. After having read and understood in full the
employment contract and the nonrenewal thereof. It pointed contents of the COLLEGE UNIT’s current
out that, in spite of the requests of Manaois for the extension FACULTY MANUAL, the FACULTY MEMBER
of her employment in order for her to finish her master’s agrees to faithfully perform all the duties and
degree, she failed to do so. In fact, she informed SSC that responsibilities attendant to her position as
there was still no fixed schedule for her oral defense. PROBATIONARY FULL-TIME FACULTY
MEMBER and comply with all the rules,
regulations and employment conditions of the
Thus, in the light of the foregoing pieces of evidence, the CA
SCHOOL, as provided in said FACULTY
ruled that the labor arbiter and the NLRC committed grave
MANUAL including any amendment/s pertinent
abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioner had not been made
to her position as may be hereinafter
aware of the reasonable standards of employment at the time
incorporated therein.
of her engagement. Based on her own acts, Manaois knew of
the necessity of obtaining a master’s degree in order to attain
permanent employment status. SSC was thus well within its xxxx
rights not to renew her employment contract for her failure to
qualify as a permanent full-time faculty member.
IV. EFFECTIVITY
Consequently, her complaint was dismissed.
A. x x x x
4. The faculty member must have manifested more
than satisfactory fulfillment of duties and
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responsibilities as evidenced by official records qualifications and requirements of the
especially in the areas of: x x x said rank. (Emphases supplied)
5. The faculty member must manifest awareness of As correctly pointed out by the CA, the aforecited minimum
and adherence to the school’s code of ethics for requirements provided for the rank of instructor merely refer
faculty. to how instructors are ranked, and not to the academic
qualifications required to attain permanency. It must be noted
that the section in the SSC Faculty Manual on the ranking of
6. The faculty member must be in good physical
instructors cover those who are still on probationary
health and manifest positive well being. (Emphasis
employment and those who have already attained
supplied)
permanency. It would therefore be erroneous to simply read
the section on the ranking of instructors – without taking into
Viewed next to the statements and actions of Manaois – i.e., consideration the previously quoted section on permanency –
the references to obtaining a master’s degree in her in order to determine the academic qualifications for the
application letter, in the subsequent correspondences position of permanent full-time faculty member with the rank
between her and SSC, and in the letter seeking the extension of instructor. Thus, to properly arrive at the criteria, the
of a teaching load for the school year 2003-2004; and her sections on both the permanency and the ranking of an
submission of certifications from UP and from her thesis instructor, as provided in the SSC Manual, must be read in
adviser – we find that there is indeed substantial evidence conjunction with each another.
proving that she knew about the necessary academic
qualifications to obtain the status of permanency.
At this juncture, we reiterate the rule that mere completion of
the three-year probation, even with an above-average
We also agree with the CA that the labor arbiter and the NLRC performance, does not guarantee that the employee will
gravely misinterpreted the section in the SSC Faculty Manual, automatically acquire a permanent employment status. 17 It is
which purportedly provided for a lower academic requirement settled jurisprudence18 that the probationer can only qualify
for full-time faculty members with the rank of instructor, upon fulfillment of the reasonable standards set for permanent
regardless of whether they have attained permanency or are employment as a member of the teaching personnel. In line
still on probation. The labor arbiter refers to the following with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an
section in the SSC Manual:16 institution of higher learning has the discretion and prerogative
to impose standards on its teachers and determine whether
these have been met. Upon conclusion of the probation
B. ACCORDING TO RANK
period, the college or university, being the employer, has the
sole prerogative to make a decision on whether or not to re-
Only full-time and half-time faculty members are hire the probationer. The probationer cannot automatically
ranked. Subsidiary faculty members follow a separate assert the acquisition of security of tenure and force the
ranking system. Based on academic preparation, fulfillment of employer to renew the employment contract. In the case at
duties and responsibilities, performance, research, output bar, Manaois failed to comply with the stated academic
and/or community service, a full-time or half-time faculty qualifications required for the position of a permanent full-time
member may be appointed to any of the following ranks: faculty member.
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employment of teaching and non-teaching academic policies, rules and standards of the Department and
personnel shall be governed by such rules as may from the school;
time to time be promulgated, in coordination with one
another, by the Department of Education, Culture and
c. Whose total working day of not more than eight
Sports and the Department of Labor and Employment.
hours a day is devoted to the school;
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satisfactory service. The requisites to acquire permanent
employment, or security of tenure, are (1) the teacher is a full-
time teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered three
consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must have
been satisfactory.
SO ORDERED.
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If termination is for cause, it may be done at anytime during
the probation.
Carvajal vs Luzon Development Bank
FACTS:
Carvajal was employed as a trainee-teller by Luzon
Development Bank (Bank) under a six-month probationary
employment contract. Ramirez is the President and CEO of
the Bank. A month into her employment, she was send a
Memorandum directing her to explain in writing why she
should not be subjected to disciplinary action for her eight
tardiness on November 2003. A second Memorandum was
sent to her on January for her again chronic tardiness on
December 2003. She submitted her written explanations for
both events and manifested her acceptance of the
consequences of her actions. She was terminated for three
days effective 21 January 2004. However, on 22 January, her
termination was lifted but at the same time, her services were
terminated. In the respondents’ position paper to the LA, they
explained that the reasons for her absence are chronic
tardiness, absenteeism and failure to perform satisfactorily as
a probationary employee.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can be considered a regular employee
at the time of her dismissal.
HELD:
No. Carvajal’s appointment letter reads that “Possible
extension of this contract will depend on the job requirements
of the Bank and your overall performance. Performance
review will be conducted before possible renewal can take
effect.” Therefore, petitioner knew, at the time of her
engagement, that she must comply with the standards set
forth by respondent and perform satisfactorily in order to attain
regular status. Even the NLRC upheld the petitoner’s
probationary status, stating that reinstatement is not
synonymous to regularization.
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