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EN BANC

A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC March 2, 2010

RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11, 2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU A.
AMANTE, PIAB-C, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Bef ore us f or consideration are the interrelated matters listed below.

a. The subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received by this Court on January 18,
2010),issued by the Of f ice of the Ombudsman on the "Chief , Of f ice of the Administrative Services
or AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court, Manila," f or the submission to the Of f ice of
the Ombudsman of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known f orwarding address of f ormer
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and f ormer Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria -Martinez.
The subpoena duces tecum was issued in relation to a criminal complaint under (b) below, pursuant
to Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. The Of f ice of
the Administrative Services (OAS) ref erred the matter to us on January 21, 2010 with a request for
clearance to release the specif ied documents and inf ormation.

b. Copy of the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v.
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J, cited by the Ombudsman as basis f or the the
subpoena duces tecum it issued. We secured a copy of this criminal complaint f rom the Ombudsman
to determine the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum sought.

c. Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on February 9, 2010), signed by Acting
Director Maribeth Taytaon-Padios of the Of f ice of the Ombudsman (with the approval of
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro -Gutierrez), dismissing the Lozano complaint and ref erring it
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to the Supreme Court f or appropriate action. The order was premised on the Memorandum issued
on July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who directed that all complaints against judges
and other members of the Judiciary be immediately dismissed and ref erred to the Supreme Court
f or appropriate action.

1
OUR RULING

I. The Subpoena Duces Tecum

In light of the Ombudsman’s dismissal order of February 4, 2010, any question relating to the legality and
propriety of the subpoena duces tecum the Ombudsman issued has been rendered moot and academic .
The subpoena duces tecum merely drew its lif e and continued viability f rom the underlying criminal
complaint, and the complaint’s dismissal – belated though it may be – cannot but have the ef f ect of
rendering the need f or the subpoena duces tecum academic.

As guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members of this Court, past and present, in relation
to complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial f unctions, we deem it appropriate to discuss f or the
record the extent of the Ombudsman’s authority in these types of complaints.

In the appropriate case, the Of f ice of the Ombudsman has f ull authority to issue subpoenas, including
subpoena duces tecum, f or compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and
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inf ormation relating to matters under its investigation. The grant of this authority, however, is not
unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the Constitution and
our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and ef f icacy
of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum,
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operates under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance. For the production of documents to
be reasonable and f or the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the
f irst place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.

In the present case, the "matter" that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum was a criminal
complaint f iled by the complainants Lozano f or the alleged violation by retired Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019,
as amended (the Anti-Graf t and Corrupt Practices Act).

A f irst step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its att endant compulsory processes) is within
the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and to issue), is to consider the nature of the powers of the
Supreme Court. This Court, by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power
is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual controversies, but also to determine whether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or
4
instrumentality of government. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power
ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is f inal. This constitutional scheme cannot
be thwarted or subverted through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the
Court and its Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the Court.
Ef f ectively, such criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that, by constitutional
mandate, is f inal and already beyond question.

A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this Court has had the occasion to rule on the
liability of Justices of the Supreme Court f or violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019—the very same provision
that the complainants Lozano invoke in this case.

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In In re Wenceslao Laureta, the client of Atty. Laureta f iled a complaint with the Tanodbayan charging
Members of the Supreme Court with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 f or having
knowingly, deliberately and with bad f aith rendered an unjust resolution in a land dispute. The Court
unequivocally ruled that insof ar as this Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graf t and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such collective decision is "unjust" should not
prosper; the parties cannot "relitigate in another f orum the f inal judgment of the Court," as to do so is to
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subordinate the Court, in the exercise of its judicial f unctions, to another body.

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In re Joaquin T. Borromeo reiterates the Laureta ruling, particularly that (1) judgments of the Supreme
Court are not reviewable; (2) administrative, civil and criminal complaints against a judge should not be
turned into substitutes f or appeal; (3) only courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a situation where

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the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a judgment of the Court is unjust is an absurdity.
The Court f urther discussed the requisites f or the prosecution of judges, as f ollows:

That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust
judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the f oregoing considerations, the indispensable
requisites are that there be a f inal declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the
manif estly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice and
bad f aith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on the part of the judge in rendering sai d judgment or order.

Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our constitutional scheme, only this Court
– not the Ombudsman – can declare a Supreme Court judgment to be unjust.

8
In Alzua v. Arnalot, the Court ruled that "judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to
respond in civil action f or damages, and provided this rationale f or t his ruling: Liability to answer to
everyone who might f eel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the
possession of this freedom and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either
respectable or usef ul." The same rationale applies to the indiscriminate attribution of criminal liability to
judicial of f icials.1avvphi1

Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint f or violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, based on the
legal correctness of the of f icial acts of Justices of the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and should not be
entertained. This is not to say that Members of the Court are absolutely immune f rom suit during their term,
f or they are not. The Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their
removal f rom of fice if they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graf t and
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corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Only af ter removal can they be criminally
proceeded against f or their transgressions. While in of f ice and thereaf ter, and f or their of f icial acts that do
not constitute impeachable of f enses, recourses agains t them and their liabilities theref or are as def ined in
the above rulings.

Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in f act, specifically grants the Ombudsman the authority to investigate
impeachable of f icers, but only when such investigation is warranted:

Section 22. Investigatory Power. The Of f ice of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any
serious misconduct in of f ice allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, f or the purpose
of f iling a verif ied complaint f or impeachment, if warranted.

Conversely, if a complaint against an impeachable of ficer is unwarranted f or lack of legal basis and for
clear misapplication of law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman should spare these of ficers f rom the
harassment of an unjustif ied investigation. The present criminal complaint against the retired Justices is
one such case where an investigation is not warranted, based as it is on the legal correctness of their
of f icial acts, and the Ombudsman should have immediately recognized the criminal complaint f or what it
is, instead of initially proceeding with its investigation and issuing a subpoena duces tecum.

II. The Ombudsman’s Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint

As the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the criminal complaint (Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline Lozano-
Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J) clearly implied, no complete dismissal took
place as the matter was simply "ref erred to the Supreme Court f or appropriate action."

Although it was belatedly made, we cannot f ault this Ombudsman action f or the reasons we have already
discussed above. While both accused are now retired f rom the service, the complaint against them still
qualif ies f or exclusive consideration by this Court as the acts complained of spring f rom their judicial actions
while they were with the Court. From this perspective, we theref ore pass upon the prima f acie merits of
the complainants Lozano’s criminal complaint.

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a. Grounds f or the Dismissal of the Complaint

By its express terms, the criminal complaint stemmed f rom the participation of the accused in the
Resolution the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843. The retired Chief Justice and retired Associate Justice allegedly committed
the f ollowing unlawf ul acts:

1) Overturning the f indings of fact of the CA;

2) Stating in the Resolution that the "Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP property," when the
DENR Survey Report stated that the "UP title/property overlaps the Chin-Mallari property;"

3) Issuing a Resolution, f or which three Justices voted, to set aside a Decision f or which f ive Justices
voted.

By these acts, the retired Members of this Court are being held criminally accountable on the theory that
they violated the Constitution and the law in their ruling in the cited cases, thereby causing "undue injury"
to the parties to these cases.

Af ter due consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint against retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. We f ully
expound on the reasons f or this conclusion in the discussions below.

a. Contrary to the complainants’ position, the Supreme Court has the power to review the lower courts’
f indings of fact.

The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to review, revise, reverse, modif y, or
af f irm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, f inal judgments and orders of
10
the lower courts. It has the authority to promulgate rules on practice, pleadings and admission to the bar,
11
and suspend the operation of these rules in the interest of justice. Jurisprudence holds, too, that the
Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the f actual f indings of the lower courts, among other
prerogatives, in the f ollowing instances: (1) when the f indings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inf erence made is manif estly mistaken, absurd of impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of f acts; (5)
when the f indings of f act are conf licting; (6) when, in making its f indings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the f indings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the f indings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the f acts set f orth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply brief s are not disput ed by the
respondent; and (10) when the f indings of f act are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
12
contradicted by the evidence on record. Thus, contrary to the complainants Lozano’ assertions in their
complaint, the Supreme Court, in the proper cases, can and does rule on f actual submissions bef ore it,
and even reverses the lower court’s f actual f indings when the circumstances call f or this act ion.

b. Constitutional Provisions were misused.

The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly misquot ed and misused applicable constitutional
provisions to justif y their case against the retired Justices. We ref er particularly to their use (or strictly,
misuse) of Article X, Section 2(3) of the 1973 Constitution which they claim to be the governing rule
that the retired Justices should have f ollowed in acting on Pael. This constitutional provision states:

4
Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at least f ive Members, but if such
required number is not obtained the case shall be d ecided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modif ied or reversed
13
except by the Court sitting en banc.

For f ailure of the retired Justices to act according to these terms, the complainants claim that the f ormer
subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a vote of a majority of only three members, the decision of the
First Division unanimously approved by its f ull membership of f ive members.

Had the complainants bothered to caref ully consider the f acts and developments in Pael and accordingly
related these to the applicable constitutional provision, they would have discovered that Pael was decided
in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution, not the 1973 Constitution, was the prevailing Charter. They then would
have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and decided by Division bef ore the Supreme Court
under the 1987 Constitution. Section 4(3), Article VIII of this Constitution provides:

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in
no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modif ied or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc." (Emphasis supplied.)

This was the provision that governed in 2003 and still governs to this day. Thus, the complainants’
argument and basis f or their criminal complaint – that in ruling on a motion f or reconsideration, all f ive
members of the Division should concur – is totally wrong.

c. The elements of the of f ense charged are not suf f iciently alleged in the complaint

14
A public of f icial can violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in two ways: (1) by causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benef it,
15
advantage or pref erence; in either case, these acts must be committed with manif est partiality, evident
bad f aith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.

"Partiality" is def ined as a bias or disposition to see and report matters as wished f or, rather than as they
are. "Bad f aith" connotes not only bad judgment or negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious
wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to f raud . "Gross negligence," on the other hand, is
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but willf ully and intentionally, with a conscious indif ference to consequences as far
16
as other persons are concerned.

The criminal complaint in this case f ailed to allege the f acts and circumstances showing that the retired
Justices acted with partiality, bad f aith or negligence. A judicial of f icer’s act in reviewing the f indings of fact
in a decision and voting f or its reversal cannot by itself constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 in the absence of f acts, alleged and p roven, demonstrating a dishonest purpose, conscious
partiality, extrinsic f raud, or any wrongdoing on his or her part. A complainant’s mere disagreement with
the magistrate’s own conclusions, to be sure, does not justif y a criminal charge under Section 3(e ) against
the latter. In the absence of alleged and proven particular acts of manif est partiality, evident bad f aith or
gross inexcusable negligence, good f aith and regularity are generally presumed in the perf ormance of
17
of f icial duties by public officers.

For the criminal complaint’s f atal omissions and resultant f ailure to allege a prima f acie case, it rightf ully
deserves immediate dismissal.

III. The Complainants’ Potential Liability f or Filing the Ombudsman Complaint

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In light of the above conclusions and under the attendant circumstances of the criminal complaints, we
cannot avoid considering whether the complainants Lozano acted properly as members of the Bar, as
of f icers of this Court, and as prof essionals governed by norms of ethical behavior, in f iling their complaint.

In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a slanted view of the powers of this Court to suit their
purposes; f or these same purposes, they wrongly cited and misapplied the provisions of the Constitution,
not just any ordinary statute. As lawyers, the complainants must be f amiliar and well acquainted with the
f undamental law of the land, and are charged with the duty to apply the constitutional provisions in light of
their prevailing jurisprudential interpretation. As law practitioners active in the legal and political circles, the
complainants can hardly be characterized as "unknowing" in their misuse and misapplication of
constitutional provisions. They should, at the very least, know that the 1973 Constitution and its provisions
have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, and that they cannot assail – invoking the 1973
Constitution – the judicial acts of members of the Supreme Court carried out in 2003 when the 1987
Constitution was in ef f ect. Their misuse of the Constitution is made more reprehensible when the overriding
thrust of their criminal complaint is considered; they used the 1973 provisions to f alsely attribute malice
and injustice to the Supreme Court and its Members.1avvphi1

In our view, the complainants’ errors do not belong to the genre of plain and simple errors that lawyers
commit in the practice of their prof ession. Their plain disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of
constitutional provisions constitute serious misconduct that ref lects on their f itness f or continued
membership in the Philippine Bar. At the very least, their transgressions are blatant violations of Rule 10.02
of the Code of Prof essional Responsibility, which provides:

Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a f act that which has not
been proved. (Emphasis provided.)

To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good f aith, an identical provision
is f ound in Cannon 22 of the Canons of Prof essional Ethics. Moreover, lawyers are sworn to "do no
f alsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court…" bef ore they are even admitted to the Bar. All these
the complainants appear to have seriously violated.

In the interest of due process and f air play, the complainants Lozano should be heard, in relation to their
criminal complaint bef ore the Ombudsman against retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired
Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, on why they should not be held accountable and accordingly
penalized f or violations of their duties as members of the Bar and of ficers of this Court, and of the ethics
of the legal prof ession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al.
v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J f or utter lack of merit, and DECLARE
as MOOT and ACADEMIC the question of compliance with the subpoena duces tecum dated January 11,
2010 that the Ombudsman issued against this Court.

We hereby ORDER the complainants Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline Lozano -Endriano
to EXPLAIN IN WRITING to this Court, within a non-extendible period of 15 days f rom receipt of this
Resolution, why they should not be penalized as members of the Bar and as of f icers of this Court, f or their
open disregard of the plain terms of the Constitution and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and their
misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions in their criminal complaint bef ore the Of f ice of
the Ombudsman, entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

6
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
The pertinent part of the Memorandum reads:

Hencef orth, on the basis of the f oregoing, and in keeping with the spirit of the stated doctrine, all criminal
complaints against judged and other members of the Supreme Court shall be immediately DISMISSED
and REFERRED to the Supreme Court f or appropriate action. The dismissal shall not in any manner touch
on the merits of the complaint, and shall be made f or the sole purpose of ref erring the same to the Supreme
Court. (emphasis f ound in the original.)

2
Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770 reads:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Of f ice of the Ombudsman shall have the f ollowing powers
f unctions and duties:

xxxx

(4) Direct the of f icer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide
in its rules of procedure, to f urnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered
into by his of fice involving the disbursement or use of public f unds or properties, and report any irregularity
to the Commission on Audit f or appropriate action;

(5) Request any government agency f or assistance and inf ormation necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section 13, Rule XI of the Constitution are similarly phrased:

Section 13. The Of f ice of the Ombudsman shall have the f ollowing f unctions and duties:

xxxx

(4) Direct the of f icer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law, to f urnish it with copies of documents relating to co ntracts or transactions entered into by his of fice
involving the disbursement or use of public f unds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit f or appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency f or assistance and inf ormat ion in the discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and inf ormation.

7
3
See: Sections 3 and 4, Rule 21, Rules of Co urt.

4
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.

5
232 Phil 353 (1987).

6
To quote the pertinent portions of Laureta, pp. 384-388:

As aptly declared in the Chief Justice’s Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in
toto, "It is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme—the third great department of government
entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with f inality all justiciable disputes public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them ‘unjust.’" It is
elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo v. Llorente (18 Phil 257,
263[1911]) ‘controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand
that at the risk of occasional error, judgment of courts determining controversies submitted to them should
become f inal at some def inite time f ixed by law or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be
thereaf ter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them f or the purpose of correcting errors
of f act or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have f allen…."

Respondents should have known that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to
‘rendering knowingly unjust judgment’ ref er to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to
him f or decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of
the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either of
the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal
article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as th is Court or its
Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment
after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti -Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper. (emphasis supplied)

xxxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the
Supreme Court f or of ficial acts done by him in good faith and in regular exercise of official duty and judicial
f unctions is to subvert and undermine the very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary
to the executive. xxxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court’s resolution and claim that the memb ers acted "with deliberate
bad f aith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high of f ice to act
upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolution and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular perf ormance of of f icial duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the
separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the f inal arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.

Dissatisf ied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers mandated by
the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted
by them and their adversaries f or f inal determination to and by the Supreme Court and which f all within
judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court
and in such inf erior courts as may be established by law.

7
311 Phil 441, 509 (1995).

8
21 Phil 308, 326 (1912).

9
CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2.

10
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(2).

8
11
Id., Section 5(5).

12
Reyes v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009; Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 157851, June
29, 2007, 526 SCRA 73, 83-84; Malison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147776, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA
109. 117; and Buenaventura v. Republic, G.R. No. 166865, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 271, 282.

13
Part of the Criminal Complaint-Af f idavit for Corrupt Practices, signed by Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty.
Evangeline Lozano-Endriano, received by the Ombudsman on September 8, 2009, Ombudsman Records,
pp. 1089-1189,1090.

14
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the f ollowing shall constitute corrupt prac tices of any public of f icer and are
hereby declared to be unlawf ul:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benef its, advantage or pref erence in the discharge of his of ficial administrative or judicial
f unctions through manif est partiality, evident bad f aith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to of f icers and employees of the of f ices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

xxxx

15
Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, 492 Phil 669, 677 (2005).

16
Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil 712, 721 (2003); and Mendoza-Arce v. Of f ice of the
Ombudsman, 430 Phil 101, 115 (2002).

17
Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil 712, 722 (2003).

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