PP vs Juan F. Fajardo et.

al

Facts: during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal
council passed Ordinance 7 providing that "any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should,
before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor," that "a fee of not less than
P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued," if said building destroys
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the
building or house. after the term of Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building on a parcel of land
registered in Fajardo's name, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded with the construction of the building
without a permit, were charged before and convicted violation of Ordinance 7.

Issue: Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit is an undue deprivation of the use of the
property in question, and thus a taking without due compensation.

Held: Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates — to permanently
deprive the latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of the property without just compensation. But while property may be regulated in the interest
of the general welfare such as to regard the beautification of neighbourhood as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Santiago vs Alalayan et.al.

FACTS: In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred
Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was passed. This law amended
the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides that:contractors being
supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;if they do, they shall refund such excess to their
customers; and that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of
energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the amending law nor
was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the capital stock of
NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of
an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the
same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

Jesus P. Morfe vs Amelito R. Mutuc 22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968

Facts: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides that “every public officer, ...after his assumption to
office and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the termination of his position,
shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets
and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and
family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year...”Jesus Morfe, disputing
that such requirement is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful
invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed
together with the prohibition against self-incrimination, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan.

Issue: Whether or not, the requirement of periodical submission of the sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
pursuant to R.A. 3019, exceeds the permissible limit of the State’s police power and is thus offensive to the due
process clause?

Ruling: No. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to
further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at
its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of
such character. The times demanded such a remedial device. In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption
of a statute’s validity must prevail over mere pleadings and stipulation of facts (Ermita-Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor
of Manila).

US vs Salaveria

FACTS:
The municipal council of Orion, Bataan, enacted, on February 28, 1917, an ordinance which, among other
things, prohibited the playing of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal holidays, and penalized the violation
thereof by a casero [housekeeper] by a fine of not less than P10 nor more than P200, and by jugadores [gamblers]
by a fine of not less than P5 nor more than P200. The justice of the peace of Orion, when this ordinance went into
effect, was Prudencio Salaveria, now the defendant and appellant. Notwithstanding his official station, on the
evening of March 8,1917, not a Sunday or legal holiday, seven persons including the justice of the peace and his wife
were surprised by the police while indulging in a game of panguingue in the house of the justice of the peace. The
chief of police took possession of the cards, the counters (sigayes), a tray, and P2.07 in money, used in the game.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 3 of Orion, Bataan, is found to be valid.

HELD:
Wherefore, although panguingue is not entirely a game of chance, since it is a proper subject for regulation
by municipal authorities acting under their delegated police power, whose laudable intention is to improve the
public morals and promote the prosperity of their people, their action should be upheld by the courts. Ordinance
No. 3 of Orion, Bataan, is found to be valid.Ordinance No. 3 Third. — The games known as "Panguingue" "Manilla,"
"Jung-kiang," "Paris-Paris," "Poker," "Tute," "Burro," and "Treinta-y-uno" shall be allowed only on Sundays an official
holidays.

BARTOLOME CAUNCA v. JULIA SALAZAR

FACTS:
Estelita Flores, 21, orphan of father and mother, illiterate, was brought to Manila to work as a maid and
stayed in the house of Julia Salazar. when her cousin Bartolome Caunca went to pay her a visit, Estelita manifested
her earnest desire to go along with him, but was prevented by Julia Salazar and Estrella Justo, both demanding the
condition that the sum of P83.85 advanced for the fare and other transportation expenses of Estelita from Buruanga
to Manila be paid first before she could leave the house of Julia Salazar although there is no evidence that any
physical force has been used to prevent her from leaving the house, Estelita failed to leave it.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?

RULING:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep
her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to found or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power
of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a
person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual
who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

AGUSTIN VS EDU

FACTS:
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229
which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of
“reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel
and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough
to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early
warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

RULING:
YES, the court held that the letter of Instruction No.229 as amended as well as the implementing rules and
regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs
and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of
road safety signs and devices. It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
possesses relevance, between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails. In
the exercise of police power, the EO is a valid exercise of such power. Police power, according to the case of Edu v
Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property to promote the general welfare.

TANADA VS TUVERA

FACTS:
Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential
Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court ordered the respondents to
publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The
petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are
not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. by the
solicitor general claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed.
And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required
therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.

Issues:
Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

Held:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in
the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-
for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude
the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

ANG TIBAY VS CIR

FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due
to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor
Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members
of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims
that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went
to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme
Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative.Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction
as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.To Filipino workers, the rights
guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all
monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

GUZMAN VS NU
FACTS:
Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU) barred them from enrolling
in the said university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was alleged that Guzman
et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises; that such mass actions were violative of school
policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades; that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so
why should they be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NU deprived Guzman et al of due process.

RULING:
Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which school policies or
duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled from. NU failed to show that it
conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one) to determine Guzman et al’s liability or alleged
participation in the said mass actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case
of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al were being denied this right, or being
disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools which provides that
“no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules
and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”

1. Equal Protection

BIRAOGO VS PTC

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
 PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although
it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO No. 1 is unconstitutional?

RULING:
E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power
to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control
of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all
executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

KABATAAN PARTYLIST VS COMELEC

FACTS:
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters
in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric
technology. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others,
the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed to submit
for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
thereto.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional requirement of
literacy and property

RULING:
NO. The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of suffrage,
but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to
vote. Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with the registration
procedure in order to vote.

GARCIA VS DRILON

FACTS:
 Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded
private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably
beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a Temporary Protection Order
against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The husband now, assails the constitutionality of RA
9262 as being violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause.

HELD:
No.Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262
singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral
word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships.
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. The unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and
the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification
under the law.

GSIS v. MONTESCLAROS

FACTS:
Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal protection
clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS denied claim, it said
surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 18 PD 1146 is constitutional.

HELD:
There is denial of due process when it out-rightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard. There is also
violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of togetherness in marriage before the
employee’s death is valid to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gains. Here, it is 3 years before
pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than 3
years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague.
There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended.

TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ

FACTS:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing a requirement the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications
for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial
court denied said petition and the NMAT was conducted and administered as scheduled.
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants
for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country.
The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by
the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT
rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules,
shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985
are constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the
general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well-being
of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation.. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public.