Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 21

People v Basay

G.R. No. 86941 219 SCRA404 (1993)

FACTS:
Jaime Ramirez and Teodoro Basay were accused of killing four (4) people and burned
their house after.Both accused signed a Joint waiver, but was disregarded by the court because
when they signed sain joint waiver,they were not represented by a counsel. Jaime Ramirez is a
farmer, he only finished Grade II and that he doesn’t know how to read. He, however,
understands the Cebuano dialect. The referred sworn statement in English was taken on March
7, 1986 andsubscribed and sworn to only on March 14, 1986 before Judge Teopisto Calumpang.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to counsel and to remain silent
during custodial investigation wereviolated.

RULING:

The SC declared in People v Nicandro that one’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent
and tocounsel contemplates the “Transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle”. Thus it is not enough for the interrogatot to
merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article III of the 1987
Constitution;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PABLITO ANDAN


269 SCRA 96 (1997)

FACTS:
Marianne Guevarra, was raped and murdered by Pablito andan.
The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the police
headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the
investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered a request
that they talk privately to which the mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the
Andan agreed to tell the truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in
violation of the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.

RULING:
Yes.A municipal mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police and
may be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. However, Andan’s confession to the mayor was not made in response
to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all and no police
authority ordered the appellant to talk to the mayor.

People vs. Endino


GR 133026 (20 February 2001)

Facts:
Gerry Galgarin , uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at
Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give
himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown overthe ABS-CBN evening news program TV
Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and
claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers.
Issue:
Whether the ABS- CBN interview recording Galgarin’s confession is admissible as evidence

Held:
The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of
custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed be enforced into
confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would
have been sympathetic with him.

People v. Malngan
G.R. No. 170470 (September 26, 2006)

Facts:
the accused-appellant, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., hurriedly was
seen leaving the house of her employer Thirty minutes later, Barangay Chairman Bernardos
group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid.. When
Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had
the opportunity to ask accused-appellant at the latters detention cell why she did the burning of
her employers house and accused-appellant replied that she set the house on fire because
when she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer shouted at her
.

Issue: Whether the all confession without the assistance of competent and independent counsel
of the appellant-accused is inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
No,the testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for
accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid
constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the
relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private
individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza
undoubtedly are.

People vs. Lauga


G.R. No. 186228 (March 15, 2010)

Facts:

Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One
of the witnesses he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear.
He invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga
admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga
contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even
if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible
in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.
Issue:
Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer
admissible in evidence?

Held:
`No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government
unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in
evidence.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Galman v Sandiganbayan
144 SCRA 43 (1986)

Facts:
Galman, the accused gunman and killer of the late Sen. Aquino Sr., together with other
petitioners filed an action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed
serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of
the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due
process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people
when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and
documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased,
prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest
doubts the sincerity of government to find out thetruth about the Aquino assassination.

Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such
pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the
case.

Decision:
Yes. The Court found that there was a double jeopardy. Where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case its right to due process is thereby
violated. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of
judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who
seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without
fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. OLALIA, JR.


G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the
same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Petitioner filed a
motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling:
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty. In light of the recent developments in international law,
where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the
Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to
post bail.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the
Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is
punishable byreclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.

HELD:
1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.


Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of
the court.

CYRIL CALPITO QUI v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 196161; September 26, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of RA 7610 or the Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
the Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner as charged. Petitioner posthaste filed before the
appellate court an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail. The OSG urged for the denial of the bail
application on the ground of petitioner’s propensity to evade the law and that she is a flight-risk,
as she in fact failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the issuance of three
warrants for her arrest. The CA denied petitioner’s application for bail, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to bail pending appeal.

HELD:
The petition is bereft of merit. Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114.
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of
that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the
allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution
and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.

Re: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121,
CALOOCAN CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE
[A.M. NO. 06-9-545-RTC - January 31, 2008]

Facts
On October 27, 2006, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in respondent's sala. Per
Report of the judicial audit team, it was established that from October 6, 2006 to October 23,
2006, respondent conducted hearings, issued orders, decided cases and resolved motions,
acting as if the order of suspension which the respondent received on October 6, 2006 was only
a "mirage." The Report was brought to the attention of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by Court
Administrator Christopher O. Lock (CA Lock).

Issues:
1. Whether or not grounds exist to cite SSP Velasco for indirect contempt of Court;

Ruling:
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect
contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.
Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of
the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.

ANTONIO LEVISTE V. CA
GR. No. 189122 (March 17, 2010)

Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as...
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight
on his... part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for bail.
.

Issue:
Whether or not bail should automatically be granted

Ruling:
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused.

People v. Alvin Abulon


530 SCRA 674 (2007)

Facts:
Accused was the father of the complainant, on March 14 and 15 acccused raped his
13year old daughter and on the 16th of March accused committed acts of lasciviousness to
thecomplainant. Prosecution presented as witness the 6-year old brother of the victim, which
corroborated the information provided by thevictim in which the father upon the commission
of the crime also had a knife pointed at thevictim and as well as on her siblings and threatened
her that if she would report such instance tothe authorities he would kill them.

Issue: Whether or not testimonies of the witnesses are admissible in court.


HELD:
- In rape cases, the conviction or the acquittal of the accused most often depends on the
credibility of the complainants testimony. By the very nature of the crime, it is
generallyunwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victims
testimony is STRAIGHTFORWARD AND MARKED WITH CONSISTENCY despite the grueling
examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded.

Re: Petition for Radio and Television coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against Maguindano
Governor Ampatuan
652 SCRA 675 (2007)

Facts:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were
killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao.
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of
court proceedings. Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has
attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the
accused, and the number of media personnel killed.

Issue: Whether or not the Right to Public Trial be Granted to the petitioner

Ruling:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.

Harry Go vs People
G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012

Facts:
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos,
Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the
hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to
his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of
Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity
Hospital in Laosthat he couldn’t travel back to the Philippines due to ill health.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation committed by the MeTC in
applying the ruled on deposition-taking in civil case to criminal cases.

Held:
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is
true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the
witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method
of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner
and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

REYNALDO H. JAYLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015

Facts:
Petitioners Reynaldo Jaylo (Jaylo), William Valenzona (Valenzona) and Antonio Habalo
(Habalo), together with Edgardo Castro (Castro), were officers of the Philippine National Police
Western Police District placed on special detail with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In
June of 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (US DEA) approached the NBI with
information on the sale of a considerable amount of heroin in the Philippines. Jaylo was assigned
by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim to head the team that would conduct a buy-bust operation
with the aid of US DEA undercover agent Philip Needham (Needham).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was deprived of his rights

RULING:
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to appear
at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the
said judgment.
The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge
is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court.

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo


G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

Facts:
The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected
of being members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in
various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led
by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother,
Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. After eighteen months of restrained
liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition
for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.

Held:
Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion. The right
to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity
and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword
of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed
against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and
liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights.

Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM vs. Atty. MARIJOY D.


G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became
pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina
mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to
complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted
through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.

“ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD:
The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there
was no enforced disappearance in this case.
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts.Since it is extant from the pleadings
filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a
child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

EDGARDO NAVIA v. VIRGINIA PARDICO


G.R. No. 184467 : June 19, 2012

FACTS:
A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita
M. Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur
Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she
saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked
Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and
told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a
complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian
Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition
for Writ of Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD:
RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and
effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.”

SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE

BELTRAN V. SAMSON
53 PHIL. 570 (1929)

Facts:
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his
handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that
such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such
examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have
gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against
himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional provision under examination.

Held:
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain
absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting
for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. The purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is
required to furnish evidence against himself. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection
of innocent persons.

Agustin V CA
G.R. No. 162571 (June 15, 2005)

Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City
RTC.
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and
hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

Issue:
W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of
unreasonable search

Held:
No.Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

Galman V Pamaran
138 SCRA 294 (1985)

Facts:
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane
that had just landed at the Manila InternationalAirport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired
point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a
span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be
unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.


Held:
Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the
said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for
the requirements of due process.
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict.

MAPA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
231 SCRA 783 1994

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However
he was granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him,
provided that he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United
States Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda
Marcos were being tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by
the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand
Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and
thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended that the
immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

HELD:
Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from
being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.
Failure of the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by
the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the law and the parties’
implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were not able to testify against the Marcoses
in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

JESUS T. TANCHANCO v. THE HONORABLE SANDI-GANBAYAN


[G.R. NOS. 141675-96 November 25, 2005]

Facts:
Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator from 1972 to 1986, during the presidency of
Ferdinand Marcos. His co-petitioner Romeo Lacson (Lacson) was the Deputy Administrator of the
NFA when he was the Administrator.
On 6 May 1988, Tanchanco and the PCGG entered into a Cooperation
Agreement, occasioned by the desire of Tanchanco to cooperate with the Philippine
government in connection with the latter's efforts in the location and pursuit of government
properties "purloined" by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, their agents and others who hold
property on their behalf.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioners can be granted of immunity under the Cooperation Agreement

Ruling:
Accordingly, the invocation of immunity may have been the proper subject of
petitioners' instant motion, and properly cognizable by the Sandiganbayan even after the plea
had been entered.

The Plain Meaning of the Cooperation Agreement


It is stipulated that the government "shall not bring any additional civil or criminal charges
against Tanchanco arising from: (a) service in or for the Marcos government; and (b) any other
actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his/her (sic) cooperation as defined in this
Agreement."

Jesus P. Disini vs. Sandiganbayan


(PCGG) G.R. No. 180564; 22 June 2010

Facts:
The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminio’s companies, had been attended by
anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two
Westinghouse cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign
proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but
18 years later, upon the Republic’s application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against
Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents before that court in an action that
the Republic filed against Herminio.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the
Immunity Agreement; Held:
The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in
determining the extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant
appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative
importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. The grant, therefore, of immunity to
Disini against being compelled to testify was ultimately a grant of immunity from criminal
prosecution, something that fell within the express coverage of the immunity given him. The
questioned immunity did not contravene the state’s public policy respecting the recovery of
illegally acquired wealth under the regime of former President Marcos.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018

Facts:
On February 18, 2008, a complaint was filed against former Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon
Mayor Alejandro E. Gamos (Gamos), Municipal Accountant Rosalyn E. Gile (Gile), and Municipal
Treasurer Virginia E. Laco (Laco) for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On March
30, 2015, two Informations for malversation of public funds were filed against Gamos, Gile, and
Laco before the Sandiganbayan.
On February 1, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued its assailed Resolution, dismissing the cases,
on the ground of delay, depriving the respondents-accused Gamos, Gile and Laco of their right
to a speedy disposition of their cases. Sandiganbayan found that seven years had passed since
the filing of the First Complaint in 2008 until the filing of the Informations before it.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the cases before it on the ground of delay.

Ruling: Yes. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed apropos the four-
fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or
non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay.
It is not unreasonable for the investigating officer to embark into the detailed investigation
of the cases.

PEOPLE VS. VELASCO


G.R. No. 110592; January 23, 1996

FACTS:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila was
appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of unlawfully selling
“shabu,” in violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article
1 of “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” (R.A. 6425).

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having been acquired
through a warrantless arrest.
RULING:
) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest when
done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may be done if the person to be
arrested is actually committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.
Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up cannot be
justified under the said provision.

IVLER vs. HON. MODESTO


G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle.
On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property (YES)

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC.


Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.

PEOPLE V. RELOVA
148 SCRA 292

FACTS:
. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and
examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia.
They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city
government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building to lower or decrease
the readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case
was dismissed on the ground of prescription, theft was subsequently filed..

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense ?

Held:
Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense
because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances
or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable
by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the
same act”. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia
will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
EX POST FACTOR LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER

ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK vs. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL


G.R. No. L-19329 December 22, 1989

Facts:
The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes
Katigbak.
The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son,
Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak
allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 1379 is an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the penalty
of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said
R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted.

Ruling:
Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the
learned Trial Judge in 1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962
clearly and categorically pronounced by the Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.
The mere fact that the preliminary investigation was terminated against the
objection of Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily signify that he was denied the right to such
an investigation.

Salvador V Mapa Jr.


564 Phil. 31 (2007)

Facts:
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.

The Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992
under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November
9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining
behest loans.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime defined by Sec. 3(3) and (g) of RA 3019 has already prescribed
at the time the petitioner field his complaint.
Ruling:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, The Court ruled that the government as
the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of
those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of
discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans.The constitutionality of laws is presumed.

VALEROSO V PEOPLE
546 SCRA 450 2008

Facts:
Petitioner was a former barangay captain. Philippine National Bank (PNB) hired the petitioner as
caretaker of its lot. Consequently, the petitioner put up on the said lot a sign which reads “No Trespassing,
PNB Property” to ward off squatters. Despite the sign, Mrs. Julita Castillo, believing that the said lot was
owned by her grandparents, constructed a nipa hut thereon.
Petitioner, together with Jorge Valeroso, Fernando Operario, Peter Morales and Rolando de
Guzman, tore down and demolished Mrs. Castillo’s hut. She thus filed with the MTC of Bataan a criminal
complaint for malicious mischief against the petitioner and his cohorts. MTC, RTC and CA found
petitioner guilty. Valeroso, Operario, Morales and de Guzman were acquitted.

Issue: w/n petitioner’s being designated as caretaker of the property necessarily clothed him with
authority to demolish the structure of the complainant without further resort to legal niceties (such as
obtaining a written order form the Court authorizing such demolition.

Held:
All the foregoing elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Art. 327 of the RPC are
present: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) That such act
does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another’s
property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISISON ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. Morales
G.R. No. 206357 November 12, 2014

Facts:
On October 18, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee). A
few months later, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 prescribing certain criteria
to be used by the Ad Hoc Committee as a guide ininvestigating and studying loans granted by
government financing institutions that amount to behest loans.
One of the loan accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for investigation was that of
Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC).

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
Affidavit-Complaint dated January 6, 2003 on the ground of prescription.

Ruling:
The petition is without merit. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable
under said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years.This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years
with the passage ofBatas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. This
does not mean, however, that the longer prescriptive period shall apply to all violations of RA
3019.

BOCEA vs. Teves


661 SCRA 589 (December 6, 2011)

Facts:
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No.
9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.

Held:
No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members
of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise,
and the lack of judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial.
CITIZENSHIP

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE D. CHING


316 SCRA 1 (1999)

FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila
A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.
After having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City,
Ching filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations and passed but he was not allowed
to take the oath because of his questionable citizenship status.
the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does,
it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
.

ISSUE: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time."

RULING: The Court holds that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of
fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of
the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.

FRIVALDO V COMELEC
174 SCRA 245 (1989)

FACTS:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo.
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos.

ISSUE : Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are
merely secondary to this basic question.

HELD :
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ


G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents.
In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic
of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship
May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.”
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen: by naturalization, by repatriation, and by direct act of
Congress.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
NICOLAS-LEWIS V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162759, 4 Aug 2006

FACTS:
Petitions for certiorari and mandamus for exercising their rights to suffrage under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act or RA No. 9189. Petitioners are dual citizens who retained or
reacquired Philippine Citizenship under RA No. 9225, or Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. COMELEC denied their petitions on the ground that they fail to meet the
qualification of 1-year residency required by the Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of
1-year residency requirement.

RULING:
Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress
enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its
Section 4 of the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification
rule under the Section 5(d) of the same Act.

MAQUILING Vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

of the case.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts
to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

RULING:

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport
does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive;

RENATO M. DAVID V EDITHA A. AGBAY


G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

Facts:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime
in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental
Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the
subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Issues:
1. whether petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225; and
Ruling:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,”
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


513 SCRA 267 (2007)

Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No.
528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual
income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able
to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of
Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 473.

Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation
by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. In naturalization proceedings, it is the
burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good
moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.
CHAN TECK LAO. CHAN TECK LAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-25300 January 4, 1974

Facts:

The application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao was denied on October 31, 1949.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court on June 15, 1950, reversed this Court's decision." It was then
noted that more than ten years later, on July 16, 1962, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the
petition for the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization, raising the alleged jurisdictional
question based on the subsequent Tan Ten Koc ruling that there was no showing or proof that
the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Tarlac, where the
petitioner then resided.

Issue: Whether or not the naturalization of Chan Teck Lao is valid.

Ruling:

Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to litigations, some authorities
recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. ...
The same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship
as a material matter in issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by the Court. For the
"effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision
have the respect of and be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts
themselves.

Republic vs. Sagun Case Digest


G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012
Facts: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after
getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local
Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Issues:
1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible?
Held:
1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was erroneous for
the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as such
pronouncement was not within the courts competence.

Вам также может понравиться