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BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
The fact that defendants did not at all question the plaintiff’s tenancy over
their respective land in question for several years, there is an implied
admission or consent to the establishment of tenancy relationship between
the parties. The relationship may be considered established where the
landowner knew of the cultivation of the land by the farmer and he tolerated
the same (PACHECO VS. DESIDERIO, CA G.R. NOS. SP-06078-CAR,
FEBRUARY 25, 1977).
The fact that complainant has a hut erected on the landholding shows he is a
tenant since only tenants are entitled to a homelot where he can built his
house thereon as an incident to his right as a tenant (CRUZ VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 129 SCRA 222).
AGRARIAN DISPUTE
ABANDONMENT/MORTGAGE/VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Persons therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered
tenants, and who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the
land, ceases to hold and is considered as having abandoned the land as
tenant; and ceases to enjoy the status, right and privileges of one (GABRIEL
VS. PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Anyone who wishes to contest the rights of the farmer to land given to him
by the government in accordance with our agrarian laws has the burden of
proving that the farmer does not deserve the government grant.
CLOA/CLT/EP
It being so, We rule that the EPs’ previously issued to defendant-appellee
partakes the nature of a “public document which is entitled to full and credit
in the absence of competent evidence that its due execution was tainted with
defects and irregularities that could warrant declaration of its nullity
(ANCHUELO VS. IAC, 147 SCRA 434).
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) does not vest in
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. It is only after
compliance with the conditions set forth in PD No. 27 which entitled him to
an Emancipation Patent (EP) that he acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding (PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO, 183 SCRA
252).
TORRENS
Lands under Torrens Title cannot be acquired by prescription (Sec. 39, Act
No. 196; Rosario vs. Auditor General, L-1187, April 30, 1958).
TENANCY
The six (6) essential requisites for the establishment of tenancy relationship
are:
1. The parties are the LANDOWNER and the TENANT;
2. The SUBJECT is AGRICULTURAL LAND;
3. There is CONSENT;
4. The PURPOSE is AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION;
5. There is PERSONAL CULTIVATION;
6. There is SHARING OF HARVEST.
CABALLES VS. DAR - 168 SCRA 247
QUA VS. CA — 198 SCRA 236; GRAZA VS. CA — 163 SCRA 39
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and
lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation
(HILARIO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 148 SCRA 573).
INTRUDER
It is a settled rule that tenancy relationship can only be created with the
consent of the true and lawful owner and not by the imposition or usurpation
by any intruder or usurper (GRAZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 163 SCRA
41; BERENGUER VS. COURT OF APPEALS 164 SCRA 432).
Mere cultivation by a usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to
work on the land as a tenant and thereby involve the protective mantle of
security of tenure under the law (GONZALES VS. ALVAREZ, ET AL., G.R.
NO. 77401, February 7, 1990).
RES JUDICATA
For res judicata to set in, the following requisites should be clearly
established:
1. There is a FINAL FORMER JUDGEMENT;
2. That the former judgment was rendered by a COURT HAVING
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER and THE PARTIES;
3. The former judgment is a JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS; and
4. That there is between first and second action, IDENTITY OF
PARTIES, OF THE SUBJECT MATTER and CAUSE OF ACTION.
Once a ruling or judgment has become final, all the issues therein or implied
thereto should be laid to rest (ZANSIBANIAN RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, 135 SCRA 235; DE
BORJA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. L-37944, JUNE 30, 1988).
FINAL JUDGEMENT
Final judgment are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed.
Otherwise, there would be a wavering of trust to the courts. In the absence of
an appeal from a trial court decision, the judgment becomes final and
executory. It becomes the law of the case. Having been rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, that judgment may no
longer be altered even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may
contain. They cannot be corrected by a special civil action of certiorari, filed
long after the judgment had become final and executory (SAN JUAN VS.
RALLOS G.R. 45063, 15 April 83, Third Div. Fernan, J.;
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL VS. MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT G.R. 54243, 21 JULY 89, Second Div. Paras, J.).
Once a decision has become final, the court can no longer amend or modify
the same, much less set it aside. To allow the court to amend the final
judgment will result in endless litigation. Every litigation must come to an
end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a
litigant’s right has been adjudicated in a valid judgment of a competent
court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for
another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits.
For, if endless litigation were to be encouraged, unscrupulous, litigants, will
multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice
(MARQUEZ VS. CA G.R. 79743, 6 November 1989, Second Div.
Sarmiento, J.; NGO BUN TIONG VS. JUDGE SAYO, G.R. 45825, 30
JUNE 1988, Second Div. Paras, J.).
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the only jurisdiction left to
the trial court is to order its execution (BACLAYON VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 182 SCRA 761).
A decision no matter how erroneous becomes the law of the case between
the parties upon attaining finality (BALAIS VS. BALAIS, 159 SCRA 37).
An execution is the fruit and end of the suit, and is aptly called the life of the
law (GARCIA VS. ECHIVERI, 132 SCRA 631).
APPEAL
Beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within the scope of the
power of review of any court. (BORILLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 209
SCRA 130). The filing of appeal within the reglementary period is
MANDATORY (FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE
PHIL. VS. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY EMPLOYEES
UNION, 212 SCRA 39)
Public policy and sound practice demand that the risk of occasional errors
judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at same definite
date fixed by law; Litigation must end and terminate something and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprive of the fruits of the verdict. Court must,
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown
upon any attempt to prolong them. (LI KIM THO VS. GO SIY KAO, ET
AL., L-2676, Jan. 31, 1949, 82 Phil. 776, 778; MASAGANA TELAMART,
INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, L-69623, May 31,
1985) (COMPEDIUM OF PHIL. JURISPRUDENCE, SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS FROM 1845-1980). Volume II, By Celso L. Magsino, page
33).
APPEAL PROCEDURE
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense. The rules of procedure are used only to secure not override substantial
justice (GREGORIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 72 SCRA 120). Therefore,
we ruled in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453 that a SIX DAY
DELAY in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And
again in RAMOS VS. BAGASAO, 96 SCRA 395, this Court held that a
delay of FOUR (4) DAYS in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for
extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of
equity (VELASCO VS. GAPAYA, JR., 152 SCRA 440).
PROCEDURE
In the word of the Supreme Court, “The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. It’s proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of the contending parties (MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS.
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 PHIL. 523, 529).
Consequently, lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be
overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an
honest mistake or unforseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the
adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority (CASE and
NANTZ VS. HUGO ET AL., 430 G. Mo. 11, p. 4620; ALIGARES VS.
AGUILAR ET AL., G.R. NO. L-57361, JAN, 30, 1954).
It is settled, jurisprudence than an issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for
the first time an appeal (REPARATIONS COMMISSION VS. VISAYAN
PACKING CORPORATION, 193 SCRA 531; MATIENZO VS.
SERVIDAD, 107 SCRA 276). In the word of Supreme Court Justice Isagani
A. Cruz — They must choose one or the other and stand or fall by whatever
choice they make.
Perfection of an appeal within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional
so that the failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory (ANDAYA VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSIONS, 188 SCRA 253).
SECURITY OF TENURE
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessee, which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood (BERNARDO VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, 168 SCRA 439).
The right to surrender possession of the tenanted land can only be exercised
by the tenant (SEE SEC. 27 (2) R.A. 3844; MANUEL VS. VALENTIN ,
C.A. G.R. NO. 03982, MARCH 15, 1976).
The right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide tenants. It
also applies to ACTUAL TILLERS of the land. Pursuant to Department
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
for the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 27, security of tenure is
likewise available to actual tillers of the land (MEJORADA VS. OHAGAN,
ET AL., CA G.R. NO. SP-01665, July 7, 1975).
The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished
by mere expiration of the term or period in the possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sell, alienates or transfer, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor (SECTION 10, RA
NO. 3844).
A tenant can only be ejected by the Court for cause and such cause for
dispossession must be proven and justified (ANCHETA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 200 SCRA 409).
The appellant has these many years (from 1968 to the present) succeeded in
evading payment of rentals while at the same time holding on the land
bespeaks much louder than words his evident bad faith in trying to enrich
himself at the expense of another, a situation that is unjust when practiced by
a landowner. We are not unaware of the special concern that the state takes
over agricultural tenant and/or lessors, the tillers of the country’s economy,
for these protection should be meant only to save the man from harassment
and undue advantage; it was certainly not meant to aid and abet wrongful
inroads by the tenant into legitimate rights of landowners/lessors who, too,
deserve equal protection of the law. Otherwise, there would be neither rhyme
nor justification in all of the land reform measures of the government, x x x
(PABUSTAN VS. ANGELES C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-01632, OCT. 11, 1974).
It devolves upon agricultural lessee, as his legal obligation, to pay the lease
rental when it falls due. A lessee cannot be authorized to remain in
possession and cultivation of farmholding without giving the landowner his
share in the produce, for the law recognizes the basic right of the landowner
to enjoy his legitimate share of the produce of his property. Thus, PD 816
has been promulgated in pursuance of the policy of the government to
equalize the rights and obligation of the landowners, agricultural lessor and
agricultural lessee (VILLANUEVA VS. MENDOZA, CA-G.R. NO. 06612-
SP, JUNE 17, 1977).
The tenant who has been in possession and cultivation of litigated land must
be held liable for rentals which he failed to pay beginning the x x x to the
present, since this is a legal obligation which he cannot evade (Sec. 26, RA
3844 as amended by RA 6389). Should he fail to pay the same he shall
suffer the consequences decreed by PD 816, Sec. 3. (CANJA VS. BANGOY
CA-G.R. NO. 06433-R, MAY 31, 1977).
FORUM - SHOPPING
TECHNICALITIES OF LAW
May disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based
on evidence (RUIZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 577).
Following the stand of the S.C., the Board will not allow substantial justice
to be sacrificed at the altar of procedural law.
DUE PROCESS
The requirement of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit their respective position papers and submit any
evidence they may have in support of their defense (MUTUC VS. COURT
OF APPEAL, 190 SCRA 43; ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. DE LA
SERNA, 182 SCRA 472).
The failure of the courts to consider all issues raised in the complaint is a
violation of procedural due process; The issues raised by a party should not
be left undecided, especially, so when such issue have been raised on time
and insisted upon at all stages of the proceeding (GRECILLA VS. CIR, G.R.
NO. L-24489, SEPTEMBER 28, 1968).
EVIDENCE
AFFIDAVITS
Affidavits are often unsatisfactory at best. The affiant swears that what he
started is true, but he does not swear that it is the whole truth, nor has the
adverse party an opportunity to inquire whether it is so . . . . . . Affidavits on
the same side are sometimes uniform in appearance as eggs in the shell, but
if one of them be prodded with the point of cross-question or two, the yolk is
at once exposed SALONGA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON EVIDENCE, p. 373,
1965 ed.).
He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence (TOP-WELD MANUFACTURING INC., VS. ECEB, S.A., 138
SCRA 118; LEGASCA VS. DE VERA, 79 PHIL, 376; RODRIQUEZ VS.
VALENCIA, 81 PHIL. 787).
Petitioner or anyone in his right mind for that matter, would not waste his
time, effort and money, especially if he is a poor, to prosecute an unworthy
action. If at all, petitioner is an example of a poor tenant farmer who, due to
sheer poverty, was constrained to mortgage his only land to somebody else
— a situation which Presidential Decree No. 27 sought to prevent by
providing an explicit prohibition on transfer (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187
SCRA 96).
Lastly, it is already settled that, this Board, unfettered by the technical rules
of evidence and procedure, can rule on unassigned errors as long as this will
enable it to arrive at a just solution of the conflict before the court (Board)
(DE LEON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 205 SCRA 612).
PARTIES IN A CASE
It is generally accepted that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger (ED. A. KELLER & CO. VS. EDLERMAN &
BUCKMALL STRATEMSHIP CO., 38 PHIL. 514, 520; GATCHALIAN
VS. ARLEGUI, 75 SCRA 234 [1977] ).
And strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court
(BIEN VS. SUNGA, 117 SCRA 249 [1982]).
An EXECUTION case can be issued only against a party and not against one
who did not have his day in court (GALANG, ET AL., VS. VYTIEMPO, 92
PHIL. 344; CASTANEDA VS. DE LEON, 55 O.G. 625; MARTINEZ, ET
AL., VS. VILLACETE, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-18698, AUGUST 31, 1962).
Notice to counsel of record is binding upon the client (DURAN VS.
PAGARIGAN, 106 PHIL. 90).
Recovery of real property is one of the actions that survive against the
decedents’ representatives (BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS VS. HEIRS OF
KALAW, L-8805, AUGUST 14, 1967).
L. B. P.
LBP assumed the responsibility of financing the acquisition of agricultural
lands by LESSEES through PRE-EMPTION and REDEMPTION pursuant
to Sec. 11-12, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389 (LBP CIRCULAR NO.
3, SERIES OF 1980).
V. O. S.
Decisions of the PARAD and RARAD on preliminary determination of just
compensation for landholdings covered by the Agrarian Reform Program are
NO LONGER APPEALABLE to the Board as the remedy is to file an
original action with the Special Agrarian Court (ESTATE OF JUAN
MIRANDA VS. LBP DARAB CASE NO. 0585; LBP VS. DARAB, C.A.-
G.R. NO. SP-30325).
LANDOWNERS’ RIGHT
Landlords, especially small farmers, deserves protection; Tenants are not to
be solely protected by law (CALDERON VS. DE LA CRUZ, 138 SCRA
173).
The concept of “social justice” was not meant to perpetuate an injustice to
landowner - lessor (CABATAN VS. CA, 95 SCRA 323).
For what he has consented to, he cannot now set up as an injury, Justice
Edgardo Paras — one who trifles with the law must suffer the fruits of his
scheme (ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 209 SCRA 350).
Social justice is not for the tenant alone. (NILO VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
28 SCRA 519)
The protective mantle of social justice cannot be utilized as an instrument to
hoodwinks court of justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the
plea of helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the
landowner. False pretenses cannot arouse the sentiment of charity in
compassionate society (DEQUITO VS. LLAMAS, 66 SCRA 505).
VESTED RIGHT
Vested right is some right or interest in property that has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Rights are vested
when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
property of some person as present interest (BALBOA VS. FARRALES, 51
PHIL. 498).
JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
It is a fundamental rule, that what determined the jurisdiction over the
subject matter is the allegation made in the complaint. Jurisdiction cannot be
made to depend upon the pleas and defenses made by the defendant in his
answer or motion to dismiss” (CARDENAS VS. CAMUS, G.R. NO. L-
17191, JULY 30, 1962, cited in the new Rules of Court by Martin, Second
E.d., Vol. I; MARTINEZ LEYBA VS. EFREN V. MENDOZA, NO. 43157-
R, APRIL 30, 1971; 68, NO. 23, O.G. 4513, JUNE 5, 1972).
CONTRACT
Well settled that to determine the nature of the contract, courts are not bound
by the name or title given to it by the contracting parties. Contracts are not
what the parties may see fit to call them but what they really are as
determined by the principle of law. (BALURAN VS. NAVARRO, 70 SCRA
309).
We agree with petitioner that as a landholder he has full liberty to enter into
a civil lease contract covering his property. What we want to indelibly
impress, however, is that once a landholder enters into a contract lease
whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said
landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or
with help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then such
contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement, and perforce comes
under the direct coverage of tenancy laws. Otherwise, it would be easy to
subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of law of
protecting the under privilege and ordinary credulous farmer from the
unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry
(TEODORO VS. MACARAEG, 27 SCRA 7).
DEEMED OWNER
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of PD
No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was deemed owner of the land in
question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of
the soil. As such he gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were
granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued
possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make
any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary
succession, to his successors (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 96).
HOMESTEAD
We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to
uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate
personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by
tenancy relations (PATRICIO VS. BAYOG, 112 SCRA 41).
LEASEHOLD SYSTEM
While it is true that there have been no presidential proclamations to the
effect that measures have been adopted to insure efficient management of
the agricultural processing phases of crops covered by marketing allotments,
it would be nothing short of regressive to deny sugarland share tenants of
their right to elect the leasehold system. Considering the policy of the
government as enunciated in Section 4 of the Code as amended, which
mandates the automatic conversion of share tenants to leaseholders,
individual sugarlands should not be discriminated against. Hence, any share
tenant in sugarlands may, in accordance with law, exercise his option to
change his relationship with the landowner into the leasehold system.
However, all sugarland tenants who do not avail of said option may still be
subject to existing lawful arrangements with the landowner in the absence of
the presidential proclamation adverted to in Section 4 (WILFREDO DAVID
VS. CA, ET AL., GR. NO. L-57719-21, MAY 6, 1988).
This Courts has time and time again sustained the constitutionality of
Section 14, holding that the contested section is a reasonable and valid
exercise of the police power of the State to alleviate the socio-economic
situation then prevailing in the fundamental constitutional mandates
providing that “[T]he promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State”
and that the State “ shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant
. . . in agriculture”. We finds neither cogent reason nor sufficient justification
to heed the petitioner’s proposition to revised or later the view we have so
far adhered to on the constitutionality of section 14 (DE RAMAS VS. CAR,
1 SCRA 171; CAYETANO DE BORJA VS. CAR, 79 SCRA 557).
CERTIORARI
NOTE: 1. Section 1, Rule XIV, DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure;
2. Section 54, RA 6657
From the above rule and provisions of law, the mode of view that the losing
party before this Board should avail of is not a Petition for Review but a
special civil action on Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (DCN 0218).
Under Section 54, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, any decision of the DAR can be brought to this court
“BY CERTIORARI”. In this case, what petitioner filed is not by certiorari
but a petition for review. It also appears that the docketing fees of P116.00
have not been remitted as required under Section 2 (b) of Rule 6, Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. For these reasons, petition for review
is hereby DISMISSED (ADRIANO JARDIEL VS. ROSARIO PLANAS,
CA G.R. NO. SP-UDK-94, JANUARY 30, 1990).
Basically, for certiorari to prosper, it must be shown in the petition that the
DAR has no JURISDICTION, or acted in excess thereof, or with grave
abuse of discretion. The function of certiorari is to keep an inferior court,
Board, tribunal or officer within its jurisdiction, to relieve persons from
arbitrary acts — that is, of acts which they have no authority to perform and
not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in their findings or
conclusions. For certiorari to issue, it must not only be shown that the board,
tribunal or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, but also that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law (ARCAYA VS. TELERON,
ETC., ET AL., L-37446, MARCH 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 367).
And, certainly, QUESTIONS OF FACT CAN NOT be reviewed by
certiorari.
Grave abuse of discretion MUST BE SHOWN (PALM AVENUE REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, 153 SCRA 579).
On matters, where the trial courts are given discretion to grant or deny relief
to a party in an action pending before them, the policy of the Supreme Court
is NOT INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF SUCH DISCRETION
UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY SHOWN THAT IT WAS GRAVELY ABUSED
(TRINIDAD, ET AL., VS. HON. MOYA, ET AL., NO. L-16886, APRIL 30,
1965).
REDEMPTION
In an action for redemption, CONSIGNMENT OR TENDER OF
REDEMPTION AMOUNT is a jurisdictional requirement (BASBAS VS.
ENTENA, 28 SCRA 665).
Timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either tender of the
price or valid consignation thereof (CONEJERO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 16 SCRA 775).
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
A compromise is basically a CONTRACT perfected by mere consent (GO
VS. IAC, 183 SCRA 82; ART. 2037, NEW CIVIL CODE).
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution and by law (BACALSO
VS. RAMOLETE, ET AL., 21 SCRA 519).
Jurisdiction of the DARAB is centered by Sec. 14 of E.O. No. 129-A, in
relation to Sec. 17 of E.O. No. 229, and Section 50 of RA 6657.
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language
of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly
what it says (INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES
UNION (IBAAEU) VS. INCIONG, 132 SCRA 663). where the law speaks
in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation
(SUCALDITO AND DE GUZMAN VS. HON. MONTEJO, 193 SCRA
556), but only room for application (CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT CO.
VS. MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, 24 SCRA 708).
Between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails
(NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
XXV, 190 SCRA 477).
Jurisdiction is the authority of the tribunal to try a case (HERRERA VS.
BARRETO, 25 PHIL. 245).
Jurisdiction is fixed by law (VICTORIA BISCUIT CO., INC. VS.
BENEDICTO, 7 SCRA 611).
Jurisdiction may be challenged at any stage of the proceeding
(CRISOSTOMO VS. CA, 32 SCRA 54).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion (ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, 69 PHIL. 642).
The settled rule is that the conclusions and findings of fact of a trial court are
entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for
strong and cogent reasons (LEC VS. ROMILLO, 161 SCRA 589; ALBA VS.
JUNTADER, 160 SCRA 8; MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 156
SCRA 597). We find no such strong or cogent reason in the present case as
would warrant Our disturbance of the foregoing findings of the court a quo.
On the contrary, Our examination of the assailed rulings discloses that the
same are supported by substantial evidence (ROMEO PUJALTE VS. THE
PROV’L TREASURER OF PALAWAN, ET AL., CA G.R. CY NO. 18833-
34).
EXECUTION
The Court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control
over its process of execution (Vda. de PAMAN VS. SENERIS, 115 SCRA
709).
CARP COVERAGE
As to whether the lands are CARP covered. The Supreme Court has this to
say:
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential
commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. “Agricultural Lands” are only those
lands which are “arable and suitable agricultural lands” and “do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
The rule on the liberal construction of social legislation is applicable only
where there is no doubt or ambiguity in the law, and not when the law itself
is clear (TAMAYO VS. MANILA HOTEL CO., 101 PHIL. 810 [1957]).
It is not within the province of judiciary to legislate. It cannot, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of the statute and include therein situations
not provided nor intended by the law makers. They should not revise even
the most, arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative, nor rewrite the law to
conform with what they think should be the law.
It is noteworthy that the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed by
Congress to establish owner-cultivatorship and family-size farm as the basis
of Philippine agricultural, to achieve a dignified existence for the small
farmers to be more independent, self reliant and responsible citizens and a
source of a genuine strength in our democratic society (DE JESUS VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 175 SCRA 559).
Those who are involved in the execution of agrarian laws that is the farmer
beneficiary’s interest must be primarily served. This also hold the Agrarian
Laws are to be liberally construed in favor of farmer-beneficiary. Anyone
who wishes to contest the rights of the farmer to the land given to him by the
government in accordance with our agrarian laws has the burden of proving
that the farmer does not deserve the government grant (TORRES VS.
VENTURA, 187 SCRA 97).
Land for the landless, is a slogan that underscore the acute imbalance in the
distribution of the precious resource among our people. But it is more than a
slogan. Through the broaden centuries, it has become a battle cry
dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us
for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. (ASSOCIATION OF SMALL
FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DAR SECRETARY, GR. NO.
78742, JULY 14, 1989).
Where person cultivate the land and did not receive salaries but a share in
the produce or cash equivalent thereof, the relationship created between
them and the landowner is one of tenancy and not employment (SINTOS
VS. SCRA 223).
The mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder’s share does not
necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former where there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay (TANEDO VS. DE LA
CRUZ, 1 SCRA 1106).
PD 946 being a special law, it shall have precedence over the Rules of Court
which is of general applicability. — Finally, Presidential Decree No. 946.
being a special law, the same shall have precedence over the Rules of Court
which is of general applicability (DE JOYA VS. LANTIN, 19 SCRA 893
[1967]; PAPA VS. MAGO, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]).
JUST COMPENSATION
I. DEFINITION
Just Compensation in general has been defined as fair market value. It is the
price which a buyer will pay without coercion and seller will accept without
compulsion. Just compensation cannot be an absolute amount disregarding
particularities of productivity, distance to the trade center. Land valuation is
not an exact science but an exercise fraught with inexact estimates. What is
important is that the land value approximates as closely as possible, what is
broadly considered a just.
II. JURISDICTION
Where the total amount of compensation being offered by the government to
the landowner does not exceed TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00),
the proceeding shall be conducted by the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) concerned. Where the compensation so offered is
TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) BUT NOT MORE THAN FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00), the proceedings shall be handled by the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). If the amount exceeds
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) the proceedings shall be deducted
at the DARAB Adjudication Board Central Office.
PAYMENT:
Under Voluntary Land Transfer, the landowner will be paid directly in cash
or in kind by the farmer-beneficiary under terms mutually agreed upon them
subject to DAR approval.
The cash portion shall vary according to the size of the landholdings. The
larger the landholding, the smaller the cash portion. The underlying principle
is that small landowners are presumed to have greater need for cash to aid
them in their bid to shift their capital from agriculture to industry.
Full payment in cash in not feasible. This will tremendously increase the
current funding requirements for CARP which the government can ill afford
at present. Furthermore this will infuse a large amount of money into
economy which could result in inflation.
Compared with previous LBP bonds, the present bonds are definitely more
attractive.
a. Past LBP bonds have a maturity of 25 years. This means, bond holders
can only get the principle at the end of 25 years. On the other hand, the new
LBP bonds matures every year from the date of issue until the tenth year.
b. The New LBP bonds also bear market rates of interest the same as
those of 91-day treasury bill Old LBP bonds have a fixed six percent (6%)
interest rate.
c. Finally, these bonds have alternative uses. They may be used by the
landowners; his successors, or his assignees, for any of the following:
* acquisition of land or other real properties of the government,
including assets under the Asset Privatization Trust, and other assets
foreclosed by governments financial institutions;
* acquisition of shares of stock of government owned or controlled
corporation, or share of stocks owned by the government in private
corporation.
SECURITY OF TENURE
Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a
thing without other limitations than those established by law. As an incident
of ownership, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from
donating his naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect
the rights of the tenant. Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right to
work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship is established.
xxx xxx xxx
[S]ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Sec. 10 of the
same Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relations is not
extinguished by the alienation or transfer of legal possession of the
landholding. (TANPINGCO VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 76225, 207 SCRA 652
[1992], CITED IN PNB VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO.
105760)
At this stage in the country’s land reform program, the agricultural lessee’s
right to security of tenure must be “firmed-up” and not negated by
inferences from facts not clearly established in the record nor litigated in the
courts below. Hand in hand with diffusion of ownership over agricultural
lands, it is sound public policy to encourage and endorse a diffusion of
agricultural land use in favor of the actual tillers and cultivators of the soil. It
is one effective way the development of a strong and independent middle-
class in society (GRACIANO BERNAS VS. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA, G.R. NO. 85041).
LEGAL POSSESSOR
Property; Agrarian Reform Law; Leases; A Legal possessor may lease the
property by way of agricultural leasehold. — There is no dispute, as it is
admitted by the parties in this case, that Benigno Bito-on was granted
possession of the property in question by reason of the liberality of his sister,
Natividad (the private respondent). In short, he (Benigno) was the LEGAL
POSSESSOR of the property and, as such, he had the authority and capacity
to enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. Consequently,
there is no need to dwell on the contentions of the private respondent that
her brother Benigno was not a usufructuary of the property but actually a
bailee in commodatum. Whatever was the true nature of his designation, he
(Benigno) was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the property and the law
expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute
an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed
(GRACIANO BERNAS VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL
and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA, G.R. NO. 85041, AUGUST 5, 1993).
APPEALS
Civil Actions; Parties may not change theories on appeal. — The long settled
rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is not allowed to change his theory of
the case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that
“courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in
issue” and that a judgment going outside the issues and purporting to
adjudicate something upon which the parties were not heard is not merely
irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid. The rule is based on the fundamental
tenets of fair play and, in the present case, the Court is properly compelled
not to go beyond the issue litigated in the court a quo and in the Court of
Appeals of whether or not the petitioner, Graciano Bernas, is an agricultural
leasehold lessee by virtue of his installation as such by Benigno Bito-on, the
legal possessor of the landholding at the time Bernas was so installed and,
consequently entitled to security of tenure on the land. Should grounds for
the dispossession of Bernas, as an agricultural leasehold lessee, subsequently
arise, then and only then can the private respondent (landowner) initiate a
separate action to dispossess the lessee, and in that separate action, she must
allege and prove compliance with Sec. 36 (1) of the Code which consist of
among others, a one year advance notice to the agricultural leasehold lessee
(the land involved being less than 5 hectares) and readiness to pay him the
damages required also by the Code.
Property; Agrarian Reform; Leases; Landowner who gives to another legal
possession of his land cannot complain that the latter’s agricultural lessee
used the land for a purpose not agreed upon. — There was, as admitted by
all, no privity or tie between Natividad and Bernas. Therefore, even if
Bernas had improperly used the lots as ricelands, it was Benigno who could
have objected thereto since it was his (the legal possessor’s) landholding that
was being “improperly” used. But he (Benigno) did not. It is not for
Natividad (as landowner) to now complain that Bernas used the land “for a
purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon.” Bernas had no
agreement with her as to the purpose for which the land was to be used. That
they were converted into ricelands (also for agricultural production) can only
mean that the same (conversion) was approved by Benigno (the undisputed
agricultural lessor-legal possessor). It is thus clear that sec. 36, par 3 of the
Code cannot be used to eject Bernas.
EJECTMENT
Same; Same; Agricultural lessee installed by legal possessor cannot be
ejected by landowner on the land’s return to the latter. — Clearly, the return
of legal possession from Benigno to Natividad cannot prejudice the rights of
Bernas as an agricultural leasehold lessee. The grounds for ejectment of an
agricultural leasehold lessee are provided for by law. The enumeration is
exclusive and no other grounds can justify termination of the lease. The
policy and letter of the law are clear on this point.
INTERVENTION
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Intervention; Intervention is not a matter of
right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts
which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. —
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when
the applicants shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention [Gibson vs. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30,
1979, 92 SCRA 219]. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of
Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or when he is so suited as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or an officer thereof. The Court has ruled that such interest must be actual,
direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant [Gracia v.
David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939); Batama Farmer’s Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. vs. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526, November 29, 1971, 42
SCRA 408; Gibson vs. Revilla, supra.]
CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER
SHARE TENANCY
Tenancy; When share tenancy exists. — A share tenancy exists where, as in
this case, a person has physical possession of another’s land for the purpose
of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop. Where the contract
entered into by the parties provided that plaintiff would take care of the
plants that are planted and those still to be planted on the lands within a
period of five years, giving the defendant, as owner of the lands, a share in
the crop, a tenancy relationship was established between the parties
(MARCELO VS. DE LEON, L-12902, JULY 29, 1959; CITED IN
SILVERIO LATAG VS. MARCELO BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
CARETAKER
Same; Caretaker of the land is considered a cultivator. — A caretaker of an
agricultural land is also considered “cultivator” of the land (SILVERIO
LATAG VS. MARCELO BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
DAMAGES
Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Agrarian Court has jurisdiction over tenant’s
claim for damages. — Plaintiff-appellant’s claim for damages was based on
his having been allegedly dispossessed unlawfully or unjustifiably by the
defendant-appellee of the two parcels of land under his care and
management. The action, therefore, relates to an incident arising from the
landlord and tenant relationship which existed before the filing of the
complaint. Under the circumstances, the Court of Agrarian Relations has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case, even if the tenancy
relationship no longer existed at the time of the filing of the action
(BASILIO VS. DE GUZMAN, L-12762, APRIL 22, 1959; MILITAR VS.
TORCILLERO, L-15065, APRIL 28, 1961).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
CULTIVATION
Same; Same; Cultivation is an important factor to determine the existence of
share tenancy. Cultivation, defined. — Now well-settled is the rule that
cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of a share
tenancy relationship. As to the meaning of cultivation, this Court has already
held that: “x x x. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the
tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion to growth
and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products
of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique
agricultural enterprise. Unlike the rice, the planting of coconuts seedlings
does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground
of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the
surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every
thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when
the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging
or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees applying
fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact
that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handless all phases of
farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although
at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows
that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer (COCONUT COOPERATIVE
MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 164 SCRA 570).
Same; Same; Same; Sharing of harvests, if taken together with the other
factors characteristic of tenancy, strengthens respondents’ claim that they are
share tenants of petitioners. — Further supportive of the existence of a share
tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents is their agreement
to share the produce or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner
COCOMA. Though not a decisive indication per se of the existence of
tenancy relationship, such sharing of the harvests, taken together with the
other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar,
strengthens the claim of respondents that, indeed, they are tenants
(COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC.
(COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 570).
LANDHOLDER
Same; Words and Phrases; Landholder, defined. — Thus, assuming, without
conceding, that respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico are considered
tenants of the land, petitioner COCOMA submits that, being only an agent of
defendants Fule and Escudero, it can not be held liable for the acts of its
principals. Petitioner’s contention is not in accordance with applicable laws,
because — “A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who,
either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to
another the use or cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares
under the share tenancy system.” In accordance with the above provision,
petitioner COCOMA is the landholder of the subject landholdings for (a) it
is a “juridical person” being a domestic corporation established under the
laws of the Philippines; (b) it is the “legal possessor” of the land for it has
the sole management and administration thereof; (c ) it has authorized or
retained the private respondents to cultivate the land; and (d) it has shared
the harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully, making it appear that they are
laborers instead of tenants (COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA
571).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Same; Evidence; Substantial evidence is all that is required in agrarian cases.
— As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private
respondents’ thirty percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975,
made by the Court of Agrarian Relations and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, is erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from
such computation, as it is a part of the findings of facts and conclusions
drawn therefrom by the respondents appellate court. Such findings and
conclusions should not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of proof that
they are unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court of Appeals
had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary. In Bagsican vs.
Court of Appeals, it was held that: “x x x in agrarian cases, all that is
required is mere substantial evidence COCONUT COOPERATIVE
MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 164 SCRA 572).
Agrarian Law; Tenancy relationship; Jurisdiction. — Private respondent, in
her original complaint before the lower court, alleged that petitioner violated
the Land Reform Code and could be ejected under P.D. 816. Petitioner
answered that he was a tenant of private respondent. There was, at that point
in time, no need of referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform as the
landowner-tenant relationship was admitted. However, when private
respondent’s amended complaint — where she alleged violation of a civil
law lease agreement-was admitted, the issue of actual tenancy-raised by
petitioner in both his Answer and Amended Answer-had to be referred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform for determination as this was now a genuine
issue (OCIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 216 SCRA 510 G.R. NO.
105088, DECEMBER 11, 1992).
EXECUTIVE ORDER 229 VEST
SHARE TENANCY
Agrarian Reform; “Share tenancy” defined. — The law defines “agricultural
tenancy” as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable,
either in produce or in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The
Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142
SCRA 136).
Same; Same. — With petitioner reference to this case, “share tenancy” exist
whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for a agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with
either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the
tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of
his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided
between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166 (25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land
Reform Code; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Statutes; Contracts; An agreement which states that the rights and
obligations of a person allowed by the landowner to cultivate and take care
of his coconut farm, shall be governed by R.A. 1199, is not abrogated by the
subsequent repeal of said law by R.A. 3844, which abolished share tenancy
and which does not include coconut lands, inasmuch as the vested rights of a
share tenant to security of tenure would be adversely affected thereby. — On
August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy
and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10,
1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share
tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. On the basis of this
national policy, the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the
case at bar and the lower court’s committed grave error in upholding the
respondent’s status as share tenant in the petitioners’ landholding. The
petitioners’ arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the
advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act
and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement not only
towards the leasehold system but towards eventual ownership of land by its
tillers. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a
reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial
rights whatsoever (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Same; Same; Same. — It is important to note that the Agricultural
Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844)
have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389)
even if the same have been substantially modified by the latter. However,
even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a
statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute is a mere
general principle. Among the established exceptions are when the vested
rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired (Aisporna vs.
Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA
136).
Same; Mere fact that a person was not the one who seeded the land with
coconuts does not mean that he could not be a tenant thereof. — Cultivation
is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy
relationships. It is admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with
others, who had originally cleared the land in question and planted the
coconut trees, with respondent coming to the landholding only after the
same were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it was not respondent
Benitez who had actually seeded the land does not mean that he is not a
tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the
tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of
growth and the case of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the
products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique
agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconuts seedling does
not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of
sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the
surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every
thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when
the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging
or smoking the plantation, taking case of the coconut trees, applying
fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact
that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handless all phases of
farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although
at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows
that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals,
142 SCRA 136).
Same; Statutory abolition of share tenancy did not end the rights of share
tenants in coconut and sugar land even if leasehold tenancy in these types of
lands has not yet been installed. — Before we close this case, it is pertinent
to reiterate that the respondent’s right as share tenant do not end with the
abolition of share tenancy. AS the law seeks to “uplift the farmers from
poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant,
strong and responsible citizens x x x active participants in nation-building”,
agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first
step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be
achieved by the government program of land reform. It is true that leasehold
tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented.
The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its
application and the consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has
to be enacted. Nonetheless, whenever it may be implemented, the eventual
goal of having strong and independent farmers working on the lands which
they own remains. The petitioners’ arguments which would use the
enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or
eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit (Guerrero vs.
Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Same; Tenant may not be ejected except by final judgment. —- Under
the Land Reform Code the tenants are entitled to the enjoyment and
possession of their landholdings except when their dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory (JESUS
SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56
SCRA 612).
Same; Same; Pres. Aquino’s loss of legislative powers did not have the
effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when she possessed it;
Reasons. — The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July
27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and
took over legislative power from her. They are not “midnight” enactment
intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229,
were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these
measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any
statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by
subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso
facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature
that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino’s loss of legislative
power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her
when and as long as she possessed it.
Same; Same; Same; Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an
appropriation measure; Reasons. — That fund, as earlier noted, is itself
being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements
of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however,
Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the
creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the
fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is
agrarian reform.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents. — The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the
constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be
expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title
of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if
the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be
inferred from the title.
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can issue to require
action only but not specific action. — Finally, there is the contention of the
public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue
to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific
department of the government. That is true as general proposition but is
subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the
rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary
duty itself but not to the discretion to be exercised. In other words,
mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever
a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty
imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy
of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts
by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court,
public official, or board should refuse to great detriment of all parties
concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the
law clearly gave it jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first case to
require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of
the cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court declares that the content and manner
of the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of
the Constitution. — With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that
the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-
quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We
do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced
our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered
institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to
the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of
our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will
result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer’s hopes
even as they approach realization and
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than
those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits; Case at bar. — In
connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742
that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has
already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial
action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the
administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered
by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subject
of their petition. Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any
event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention
rights, if any under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the
new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the
whole more liberal than those granted by the decree PETITIONS to review
the decisions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Same; Same; Generally, compromises are favored and cannot be set aside if
the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions to each other
in order to terminate a case. — Compromise are generally to be favored and
cannot be set aside if the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal
concessions to each other in order to terminate a case. This holds true even if
all the gains appears to be on one side and all the sacrifices on the other
(MARIO V. AMARANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA
104).
Remedial Law; Ejectment; Rent Control Law; Under the Rent Control Law,
the prohibition against the ejectment of a lessee by his lessor is not absolute.
— Under the Rent Control Law, the prohibition against the ejectment of a
lessee by his lessor is not absolute. There are exceptions expressly provided
by law, which include the expiration of a lease for a definite period. In the
instant case, it was noted that the rentals were paid on a month-to-month
basis. Thus, the lease could be validly terminated at the end of any given
month upon prior notice to that effect on the lessee. After all, when the
rentals are paid monthly, the lease is deemed to be for a definite period, i.e.,
it expires at the end of every month (MARIO V. AMARANTE VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA 104).
Landlord and tenant; Agricultural Tenancy Act (Rep. Act No. 1199); Non-
retroactivity of amendment by Rep. Act No. 2263 as to succession to
tenancy relationship. - Since the law in force at the date when the tenant died
was Rep. Act No. 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him
and respondent landowner was terminated by reason of such death, the
subsequent enactment of Rep. Act No. 2263 did not operate to confer upon
petitioner, son of the deceased, any successional right to continue as tenant.
In case of Ulpiedo vs. CAR, L-13891, October 31, 1960, it was held: “The
amendment to Section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263,
providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant’s
death or incapacity ‘between the landholder and one member of the tenant’s
immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second
degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally
x x x’ which took on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively.” To hold
otherwise would lay open this particular provision of the law to the objection
of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that
has already become vested (EUGENIO CHAVEZ VS. THE COURT OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Same; Same; Right of succession to tenancy under Rep. Act No. 2263;
Exception. — Section 9 of Republic Act No. 2263 provides an exception to
the right of succession by a relative of the tenant within the second degree,
namely, if the landholder “shall cultivate the land himself personally or
through the employment of mechanical farm implements” (EUGENIO
CHAVEZ VS. THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 9
SCRA 412).
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; Certiorari cannot be a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. — Generally, an order of
dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper
subject of appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Accordingly, although
the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is
available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the
injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate
and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or
lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occassioned by the petitioner’s
own neglect or error in the choice of remedies (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO,
ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Instant action was resorted to as a substitute for
the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. — The petitioners admit that they
received a copy of the trial court’s order dismissing their complaints on 4
October 1991. The instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond
the 15-day period to appeal from the order. The petitioners have not even
attempted to explain why they were unable to appeal from the challenged
order within the reglementary period. This civil action then was resorted to
as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none of the
exceptions to the rigid rule barring substitution of remedies was alleged to
exist in this petition, or even indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be
dismissed (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I.
BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Jurisdiction; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; Trial Court
correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil
Case Nos. 1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-91-C, 1686-91-C and 1688-91-C.
— Even if we were to accept this petition in the broader interest of justice, it
must still fail for the trial court correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter in Civil Cases Nos. 1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-91-
C,1686-91-C, and 1688-91-C. Jurisdiction thereon was originally vested in
the National Housing Authority (NHA) under P.D. No. 957, as amended by
P.D. No. 1344. Under E.O. No. 648 of 7 February 1981, this jurisdiction was
transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
which, pursuant to E.O. No. 90 of 17 December 1986, was renamed as the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET
AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court agrees that the complaints do involve
unsound real estate business practices on the part of the owners and
developers of the subdivision who entered into Contracts to Sell with the
petitioners. — We agree with the trial court that the complaints do involve
unsound real estate business practices on the part of the owners and
developers of the subdivision who entered into Contracts to Sell with the
petitioners. By virtue of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344 and our decision in Solid
Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, the NHA, now HLRB, has the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. In addition to involving unsound
real estate business practices, the complaints also involve specific
performance of the contractual and statutory obligations of the owners or
developers of the subdivision. The claims for annulment of the “Kasulatan
ng Bilihan” in favor of HABACON and the certificates of title issued to him
and for damages are merely incidental (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL.,
VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incidental claims for damages may be resolved
by the HLRB. — In CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. Vs. Hibionada, we further
declared that incidental claims for damages may be resolved by the HLRB
(Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA,
ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Tenant may not be ejected except by final judgment. — Under
the Land Reform Code the tenants are entitled to the enjoyment and
possession of their landholdings except when their dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory (JESUS
SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56
SCRA 612).
Agrarian Reform Law; Court agrees with the DARAB’s finding that Obrique
et. al, are not tenants. — We agree with the DARAB’s finding that Obrique,
et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by
Obrique, et al., pursuant to the livelihood program called “Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Program”, it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants
in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of
the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal
service fee and land use participant’s fee in consideration of all the kinds of
assistance given to the participants by the CMU (CENTRAL MINDANAO
UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO
A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86)
Same; Same; Same; Private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be
landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP. — In
view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to
be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP
(CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR
quasi-judicial powers. — Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR
quasi-judicial powers as follows: The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform x x x (CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION
BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of
the CARP; Definition of agrarian dispute. — Section 17 of Executive Order
No .129-A is merely a repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt
that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in
the implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the same
law as any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy
stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture (CENTRAL
MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR.
LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Purpose and nature of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. —
The Agricultural Lnad Reform Code has been designed to promote
economic and social stability. Being a social legislation, it must be
interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent, which is
“to achieve independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source
of genuine strength in our democratic society” (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).
POSITION PAPER/AFFIDAVITS
COMPLY WITH DUE PROCESS
Labor Law; Due Process; The requirements of due process are satisfied
when the parties are given opportunity to submit position papers. — The
petitioner was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact
conducted by the hearing officer of the Regional Office of the DOLE and the
parties submitted position papers upon which the Regional Director based
his decision in the case. There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the
requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given an
opportunity to submit position papers (Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phil., Inc., vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 78787, December 18, 1989; Asiaworld Publishing House
vs. Ople, 152 SCRA 224; Manila Doctors Hospital vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA
262). What the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice
but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Antipolo Realty
Copr. Vs. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399). There is no denial of
due process where a party is given an opportunity to be heard and present his
case (Ong, Sr. vs. Parel, 156 SCRA 768; Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs.
Amores, 152 SCRA 237). Since petitioners herein participated in the
hearings, submitted a position paper, and filed a motion for reconsideration
of the March 23, 1988 decision of the Labor Undersecretary, it was not
denied due process (ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO C.
DE LA SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction once vested continues until the
entire controversy is decided. — The fact is, the Regional Director and the
Undersecretary did have jurisdiction over the private respondents’ complaint
which was originally for violation of labor standards (Art. 128[b], Labor
Code). Only later did the guards ask for backwages on account of their
alleged “constructive dismissal” (p. 32, Rollo). Once vested, that jurisdiction
continued until the entire controversy was decided (Lee vs. MTC, 145
SCRA 408; Abadilla vs. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92; and Pucan vs. Bengzon, 155
SCRA 692; ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA
SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Same; Same; Damages; Litis Pendentia; Private respondent cannot deny that
the complaint for damages was meant to prevent petitioners from ejecting
her. — Private respondent cannot deny that the complaint for damages, taken
in its full context, was meant to prevent petitioners from ejecting her from
Unit No. 1166 of the Victoria Apartment. Indeed, a careful examination of
the complaint reveals that it demanded, as private respondent’s main relief,
that petitioners be permanently enjoined from doing any act to force out
and/or cause her ejectment from said apartment unit. Private respondent’s
complaint for damages bears unmistakable earmarks that show off its true
nature and character touching as it does, on her alleged right to continued
possession of the premises (UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC.,
ET AL., VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is the right of the lessee to
occupy the subject apartment unit, the same should be properly threshed out
in an ejectment suit and not in an action for damages where the question of
possession is likewise the primary issue to be resolved, even if the unlawful
detainer suit was filed later than the one for damages. — The issue of
whether private respondent had the right to occupy subject apartment unit
should therefore be properly threshed out in an ejectment suit and not in
action for damages where the question of possession is likewise the primary
issue to be resolved. We cannot simply ignore the fact that private
respondent, after her unjustified refusal to vacate the premises, was aware
that an ejectment case against her was forthcoming. It is therefore evident
that the filing of the complaint for damages and preliminary injunction was
but a canny and preemptive maneuver intended to block the action for
ejectment which petitioner was to take against private respondent. The
matter raised in the Regional Trial Court of Manila may be properly
determined in the ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court, in
consonance with the rule prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact
that the unlawful detainer suit was filed later than the one for damages does
not change the situation of the parties (Rosales vs. CFI, 154 SCRA 153
[1987]; UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; An implied agreement that ownership shall not pass to
the purchaser until he had fully paid the price is valid and therefore, binding
and enforceable between the parties. A contract which contains this kind of
stipulation is considered a contract to sell. — In effect, there was an implied
agreement that ownership shall not pass to the purchaser until he had fully
paid the price. Article 1478 of the Civil Code does not require that such a
stipulation be expressly made. Consequently, an implied stipulation to that
effect is considered valid and, therefore, binding and enforceable between
the parties. It should be noted that under the law and jurisprudence, a
contract which contains this kind of stipulation is considered a contract to
sell (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Option Contract; Sales; An option is not a sale of property but
a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by which the owner of
property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his
property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he
does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something, that is, the right or
privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. — An option, as
used in the law on sales, is a continuing offer or contract by which the owner
stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property
at a fixed price within a certain time, or under, or in compliance with, certain
terms and conditions, or which gives to the owner of the property the right to
sell or demand a sale. It is also sometimes called an “unaccepted offer”. An
option is not of itself a purchase, but merely secures the privilege to buy. It is
not a sale of property but a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a
contract by which the owner of property agrees with another person that he
shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time.
He does not sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell
something, that is, the right or privilege to buy at the election or option of
the other property. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it imposes no
binding obligation on the person holding the option, aside from the
consideration for the offer. Until acceptance, it is not, properly speaking, a
contract, and does not vest, transfer, or agree to transfer, any title to, or any
interest or right in the subject matter, but is merely a contract by which the
owner of property gives the optionee the right to or privilege of accepting
the offer and buying the property on certain terms (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Sales; In Article 1590, the vendor is bound to make payment
even with the existence of a vindicatory action if the vendee should give a
security for the return of the price. — Petitioner was justified in suspending
payment of the balance of the purchase price by reason of the aforesaid
vindicatory action filed against it. The assurance made by private
respondents that petitioner did not have to worry about the case because it
was pure and simple harassment is not the kind of guaranty contemplated
under the exceptive clause in Article 1590 wherein the vendor is bound to
make payment even with the existence of a vindicatory action if the vendee
should give a security for the return of the price (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Agrarian Law; An heirs does not have to cultivate personally the 7-hectare
retention area. — There is no merit in the petitioners’ contention that the
Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain their shares of the agricultural
lands of the estate for failure to comply with the requirement that “such
landowner is cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it” (p. 23, Rollo).
The Secretary interpreted that provision to mean “that the tenants in the
exempted and retained riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of Sison, the
petitioners-tenant, as agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate
the same. The concerned Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate
the retained and exempted areas, unless the petitioners, as agricultural
lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of cultivation and vacate and
surrender the said areas to the Heirs” (p. 23, Rollo; Italics ours) (THE
TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by
FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 210 SCRA 545).
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished
from agricultural tenancy. — There are important differences between a
leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either
rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the
leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land,
where as the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing
leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other
lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by
the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws
(TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked by
tenant or immediate farm household. — The law is explicit in requiring the
tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of
Republic Act 1199, as amended, defines a “tenant” as a person who, himself
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates
the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent for
purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce
or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the
same Act limits the relations of landholder and tenant to the person who
furnishes the land and to the person who actually works the land himself
with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household.
Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for the existence of leasehold
tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household work the land
(TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Same; Same; Same; Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense. — Moreover, “rules of procedure are intended to promote,
not to defeat substantial justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in
a very rigid and technical sense” (Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing
Association v. C.A. 106 SCRA 630 [1981]; Director of Lands v. Romamban,
et al., 131 SCRA 431 [1984]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO
C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; PD 946 being a special law, it shall have precedence
over the Rules of Court which is of general applicability. — Finally,
Presidential Decree No. 946 being a special law, the same shall have
precedence over the Rules of Court which is of general applicability (De
Joya v. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893 [1967]; Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 [1968];
CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169
SCRA 129).
COMPROMISE
Action; Suit between members of the same family; Requisite before suit is
filed; Article 222, New Civil Code construed. — Article 222 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of the
same family this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained,
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made. The only
way to make it so appear is by a proper averment to that effect in the
complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being filed or maintained unless such
efforts at compromise appear, the showing that such efforts had been exerted
is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. Hence, the
failure of the complaint to plead that the plaintiff previously tried in earnest
to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of
action. It may be so attacked at any stage of the case on appeal (CECILIO
MENDOZA VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 19
SCRA 756).
Same; Compromise; Support; Validity of marriage; Article 222 is not
applicable to a suit to claim future support or to the validity of a marriage.
— A claim for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise. It is,
therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222. The validity of a
marriage is also a non-compromisable issue. Since no valid compromise is
possible on these issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise them
would be superfluous (CECILIO MENDOZA VS. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 19 SCRA 756).
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Agrarian Law; Contracts; Court of Appeals; Finding of the Court of Appeals
on a question of fact — whether or not petitioner voluntarily surrendered his
landholding by means of a document entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli ng
Karapatan — will not generally be disturbed. — We are in accord with the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the document designated as “Kasulatan
ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan” was voluntarily executed by the petitioner. It is
supported by the evidence. The issue as to whether petitioner voluntarily
surrendered the landholding is clearly factual. Being a question of fact, it is
for the Court of Appeals to decide and its findings will not be disturbed by
this Court unless clearly baseless or irrational (ROMAN JACINTO VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; The Tenancy Act 1199 prohibited surrender of his landholding by the
tenant to take effect in the future. — Neither can he invoke the provisions of
Section 49, in relation to Section 50, of Republic Act No. 1199. What
Section 49 prohibits is the stipulation by the agricultural tenant and the
landowner on the date of the tenant should leave or surrender the land in the
future. Thus, it has been held that an agreement between a tenant and a
landholder whereby the former shall return his landholding to the latter after
one crop year cannot justify the tenant’s dispossession because said
agreement is expressly prohibited by law. But as explained by this Court in
Datu, et al., v. Cabangon, supra, it is different if the tenant voluntarily
surrenders his landholding because the voluntary surrender of his
landholding by a tenant is a ground sanctioned by law for terminating the
tenancy relationship (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Fact that tenant did not immediately vacate ½ portion of his
landholding does not make the surrender thereof by means of contract less
voluntary. — The fact that petitioner did not at once vacate the other one-
half portion of the landholding after the execution of the contract does not
make the stipulations thereof any less voluntary. His continued possession of
one-half of the property (until the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction in 1967) became possible only because he was
entitled, under the terms of the contract, to harvest the “extra” crop as part of
the consideration, and once said harvest was completed, his possession
became that of a mere squatter (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; P.D. 27 does not apply retroactively. In the case at bar the Court of
Appeals already rendered judgment finding that tenancy relationship
between petitioner and respondent was extinguished and said judgment was
rendered prior to the effectivity of P.D. 27 on October 21, 1972. — Neither
can We find merit in petitioner’s claims that with the advent of Presidential
Decree No. 27, he has become the owner of the land. Firstly, said decree
applies only in favor of bona fide tenants. It cannot be denied, however, that
at the time of the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 (October 21,
1972), the Appellate Court had already rendered its judgment finding that
the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private respondent had been
extinguished. Secondly, the decree cannot operate retroactively in favor of
petitioner who had surrendered one-half of the land in July 1966 and, by
virtue of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by the Court of
Agrarian Relations, was dispossessed of the other half in February 1967
(ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA
263).
Same; P.D. 316 in relation to P.D. 583 prohibiting and penalizing the
ejectment of agricultural tenants do not apply to the petitioner who was no
longer in possession of the land when said Decrees took effect. — Nor does
Presidential Decree No. 316, prohibiting the ejectment of tenant-tillers from
their farmholdings, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 583, prescribing
penalties for the unlawful ejectment, exclusion, removal or ouster of tenant-
farmer, apply to petitioner’s case. In the first place, at the time the aforesaid
decrees were promulgated, petitioner was no longer in possession of the
land. If at all, the said decrees must operate in favor of the present tenant
(ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA
263).
ABANDONMENT
Tenancy; Tenancy relationship is extinguished by tenant’s abandonment of
the land; Findings of Agrarian Court, supported by substantial evidence, will
not be disturbed. — A tenancy relationship is extinguished by the
“abandonment of the land by the tenant” (Sec. 9 Rep. Act 1199). Because a
tenant has possession of the land only through personal cultivation, his
leaving the land amounts to his abandonment thereof. Where the tenancy
relationship was terminated by the tenant, through his own voluntary act, he
cannot invoke the protection of the principle of security of tenure. The
finding of the Court of Agrarian Relations, that the tenant abandoned the
land, will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence
(SEVERINO GAGOLA VS. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET
AL., 18 SCRA 992).
Civil Law; Ownership; The owner has the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. — Under Article 428 of the
New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership
therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked
title to the land (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Tenancy Law; The law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation
is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. — As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals
(168 SCRA 439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.
Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the
leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when the agricultural
leasehold relationship is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of
the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land
did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However, the donation itself is
valid (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland
and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the
disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No.
3844, as amended. — Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing
to accept payment of disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to
cultivate the landholding in question, the real issue is who should pay the
compensation. We rule that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as
the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build
a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance
compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as
amended (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is of the opinion and so hold that the trial
court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance
compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest.
— In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the trial
court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance
compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest.
And having arrived at this conclusion, we do not deem it necessary to pass
upon the other errors assigned by the petitioner for as stated in Filamer
Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 485 [1990]), a person
who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is
a stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance
compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is
in a position to for it (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Actions; Res Judicata; Justice and Equity of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend its
operation. — Petitioners raised before the respondent court that inasmuch as
the judgment award in favor of the La Torre spouses had already been fully
satisfied when the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 21846 was sold to
them as the highest bidder in the execution sale, the La Torre spouses no
longer have any right to levy upon TCT No. 60152 registered in the name of
the Buan spouses. Regrettably, respondent court did not pass upon this issue.
It implied, however, that the issue is no longer a tenable subject for
resolution inasmuch as the Court of Appeals’ decision in C.A.-G.R. No.
14768 from which the order of execution stemmed had already become final
and executory, and as such, is already beyond question. x x x. Taken in this
light, the respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the issue
unresolved, a final decision being unreviewable and conclusive. But judging
from the facts presented by the present case, it beyond doubt that serious
injustice will be committed if strict adherence to procedural rules were to be
followed. It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial injustice, this Court is empowered to suspend its operation. x x x.
In the present appeal, rather than dismissing the issue of overpayment as not
within the scope of the power to review, this Court deems it best to decide
the same on the merits (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA
BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Where two parcels of land are levied upon pursuant to a writ of
execution and the proceeds from the sale of one satisfies in parcel of land
should be cancelled. — In the civil action for a sum of money between the
La Torre spouses and G.L. Mejia Enterprises, Inc., the judgment award in
favor of the former amounted to a total sum of P20,729.00 exclusive of legal
interest. It is undisputed that pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the
court, two parcels of land then registered in the name of the judgment debtor
were levied upon, the first one covered by TCT No. 21846 having been sold
at the auction sale to the La Torre spouses themselves for P33,958.54. It is
therefore mathematically conclusive that by reason of this sale, the judgment
award in favor of the La Torre spouses in the total sum of P20,729.00 had
already been satisfied in full. Correspondingly, the notice of levy annotated
on the other parcel of land now covered by TCT No. 60152 should have
been cancelled (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; The levy and execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond
the original judgment award. — However, instead of cancelling the
annotation, the La Torre spouses pursued the execution of the remaining
property levied upon despite the apparent satisfaction of the judgment debt.
This property was by then already registered in the name of the Buan
spouses who resisted the attempted execution. It is beyond question that as
per the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the levy and
attempted execution of the second parcel of land is void for being in excess
and beyond the original judgment award granted in favor of the La Torre
spouses. For, as this Court held in the case of Mutual Security of Insurance
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (153 SCRA 678 [1987], “where the writ of
execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it
life, the writ has pro tanto no validity” (italics supplied). Stated
categorically, an execution has been regarded as void when issued for a
greater sum than is warranted by the judgment (Windor Steel Manufacturing
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 275 [1981]; SPOUSES
LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Writs of execution cannot be equated with judgments which
are final and conclusive. — At this point, it is proper to emphasize that writs
of execution cannot be equated with judgments which are final and
conclusive (Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 28 SCRA
1033 [1969], such that although the decision of the lower court in the action
for a sum of money is conclusive, the part of the writ issued which went
beyond the money award is not valid at all (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN
and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Where the Court of Appeals set aside only
the preliminary injunction, missing the fact that a permanent injunction was
also issued by the lower court, logic dictates that the Court of Appeals’
decision also intended the inclusion of the permanent injunction; A judgment
is not so confined to what appears on the face of the decision but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. — It appears however that
the respondent court missed altogether the fact that a permanent injunction
was issued by the lower court (Branch 56) in its decision dated August 8,
1990 such that it set aside only the preliminary injunction earlier issued.
Logic dictates however that owing to the nature of the order being set aside,
it is a necessary consequence that the Court of Appeals’ decision also
intended the inclusion of the permanent injunction in its questioned
resolution. For if not, the appellate court would be rendering for naught its
own reversal of the May 8, 1990 Order. Besides, although the decision of the
respondent court did not so state explicit terms, it is beyond cavil that a
judgment is not so confined to what appears on the face of the decision but
also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto (Gonzales vs.
Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]; SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN
and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Same; Torrens System; When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued; The Torrens system was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership. — The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA
78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor
of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National
Power Corporation c. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the
public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v.
CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution allows natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship to acquire private lands; BP 185 governs the
disposition of private lands in favor of natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship. — But what should not be missed in
the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows
private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor.
Section 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the pertinent
provisions. Section 8 is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973
Constitution. Pursuant thereto, B.P. 185 was passed into law. From the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been
passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the
disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185 (REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA
567).
Same; Same; Same; A foreign national may apply for registration of title
over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of
the Philippines from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the law. — Even if private respondents were already
Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in
question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof
by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land
sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are
already private in character since private respondents’ predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since
1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his maximum area of 1,000 sq. m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). It is undisputed that
private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens
of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel
of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels
of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a
private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the
mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that
private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessor-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must be approved (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
TITLE VENUE
Actions; Civil Procedure; Venue; Where the language used in the contract
clearly evinces the parties’ intent to limit the venue of all suits between
them, this means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts
provided for in Rule 4, sec. 2(b). — In the case at bar it is clear from the
parties’ contract that the venue of any action which they might bring are the
courts of competent jurisdiction in Pasay City, whether the action is for
“breach [of the lease agreement] or damages or any other cause between the
LESSOR and LESSEE and persons claiming under each.” The language
used leaves no room for interpretation. It clearly evinces the parties’ intent to
limit to the “courts of appropriate jurisdiction of Pasay City” the venue of all
suits between the lessor and lessee and those between parties claiming under
them. This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts
provided for in Rule 4, sec 2(b) (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS.
JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; By laying in Pasay City the venue for all suits, the
parties made it plain that in no other place may they bring suit against each
other. — This case, therefore, differs from the cases cited by petitioner. It is
true that in Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, a stipulation that “The parties
agree to sue and be sued in the City of Manila” was held to merely provide
an additional forum in the absence of any qualifying or restrictive words.
But here, by laying in Pasay City the venue for all suits, the parties made it
plain that in no other place may they bring suit against each other for
“breach [of their lease contract] or damages or any other cause between
[them] and persons claiming under each [of them]” (VIRGILIO B.
GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234
SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; It is irrelevant that neither party resides in Pasay City
since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of an action without regard to
their residence. — Petitioners contend that neither they nor the private
respondent Jaime Blanco reside in Pasay City. This fact is, however,
irrelevant to the resolution of the issue in this case since parties do stipulate
concerning the venue of an action shall be in the City of Manila. It was held
that it was reasonable to infer that the parties intended to fix the venue of
their action, in connection with the contract sued upon, in the proper court of
the City of Manila only, notwithstanding that neither one was a resident of
Manila (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Inclusion of the spouses of lessee and the
President of the lessor is not necessary in action based on an alleged breach
of lease contract. — It is nonetheless contended that the stipulation as to
venue is inapplicable because (1) only one of the petitioners (Virgilio B.
Gesmundo) and only one of the private respondents (JRB Realty) are parties
to the lease contract and (2) their cause of action is not based on the lease
contract. The contention is without merit. Petitioner Edna C. Gesmundo is
the wife of the lessee Virgilio B. Gesmundo, while Jaime R. Blanco is the
president of the lessor JRB Realty Corporation. Their inclusion in this case
is not necessary. What is more, as already noted, by its terms the stipulation
applies not only to the parties to the contract but to “any persons claiming
under each” (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Civil Procedure; Default; Affidavit of Merit; Grounds for a motion for new
trial. — We agree that the verified motion of petitioner could be considered
as a motion for new trial. The grounds alleged by petitioner in his motion are
the same as the grounds for a motion for new trial under Rule 37, which are
(1) that petitioner’s failure to file his answer was due to fraud, mistake,
accident or excusable negligence; and (2) that he has a meritorious defense.
Petitioner explained that upon receiving the summons, he immediately saw
private respondent and confronted him with the receipt evidencing his
payment. Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would instruct
his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The prior payment of the loan sought
to be collected by private respondent is good defense to the complaint to
collect the same loan again. The only reason why respondent court did not
consider the motion of petitioner as a motion for new trial was because the
said motion did not include an affidavit of merit. The allegations contained
in an affidavit of merit required to be attached to a motion to lift an order of
default or for a new trial need not be embodied in a separate document but
may be incorporated in the petitioner itself. As held in Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66
SCRA 425 (1975): “Stated otherwise, when a motion to lift an order of
default contains the reasons for the failure to answer as well as the facts
constituting the prospective defense of the defendant and it is sworn to by
said defendant, neither a formal verification or a separate affidavit of merit is
necessary” (AUGUSTO CAPUZ VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
233 SCRA 471).
Same; Same; Although the Rent Control Law allows unilateral increases in
rentals by the lessor within the period and the maximum rates provided
therein, still the demand for such increase must be made upon the lessee
himself since the courts have no authority to fix the same for the parties
where no valid demand for an increased rent has been made by the lessor. —
It should be borne in mind that although the rent control laws allow
unilateral increases in rentals by the lessor within the period and the
maximum rates provided therein, still the demand for such increase must be
made upon the lessee himself. The courts have authority to fix the same for
the parties where no valid demand for an increased rent has been by the
lessor. Hence, in the case of Orlino vs. Court of Appeals, we reversed the
MTC’s award of increase in rental in accordance with Section 1 of B.P. Blg.
877, after finding that the award was merely based on the prayer in the
complaint, although no previous demand was made on the defendant-lessee.
In the present case, the demand letters to vacate sent to the petitioners only
mentioned the purchase of the apartment units by the private respondent.
Nothing in the record shows that there were prior disputes on the rentals or
that there was a demand for increased rentals made by the private respondent
or its predecessor on the petitioners. Hence, the MeTC did not have the
authority to decree the increase in rental rates (TEODORO ARAOS, ET
AL., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA770).
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished
from agricultural tenancy. — There are important differences between a
leasehold tenancy and civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either
rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the
leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land,
whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing
leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other
lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by
the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws
(TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked by
tenant or immediate farm household. — The law is explicit in requiring the
tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of
Republic Act 1199, as amended, defines a “tenant” as a person who, himself
and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household,
cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s
consent for purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8
of the same Act limit the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who
furnishes the land and to the person who actually works the land himself
with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household.
Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for the existence of leasehold
tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household work the land
(TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
NOTARIAL LAW
Same; Same; Same; The passage of time and a person’s increase in age may
have decisive influences in his writing characteristics, thus, in order to bring
about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison
must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. — A
comparison of Erlinda’s signature in the “Bilihang Tuluyan” with her
signatures on the other documents reveals that the slight differences in
strokes are overshadowed by the significant similarities. These similarities
suffice to convince us that the signature of petitioner Erlinda on the deed of
sale between her and respondent Eusebio in genuine; a fortiori, the deed of
sale between them is valid. Moreover, it is highly noticeable that the
signatures of Erlinda that were analyzed by the trial court are on documents
executed several years apart, to wit, 29 July 1963, 17 August 1967 and 20
June 1986. The passage of time and a person’s increase in age may have
decisive influences in his writing characteristics. Thus, authorities are of the
opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the
standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to be
suspected signature (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Contracts; Action for Annulment of Contracts; Prescription; An action for
annulment of a contract entered into by minors or other incapacitated
persons shall be brought within four years from the time the guardianship
ceases. — As regards the second ground, Art. 1391 of the Civil Code is
specific that the action for annulment of a contract entered into by minors or
other incapacitated persons shall be brought within four years from the time
the guardianship ceases. Conformably with this provision, Erlinda should
have filed a complaint for annulment within four (4) years from 1966 when
she turned 21. Her claim of minority has undoubtedly prescribed when the
complaint was filed in 1986 (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Land Titles; Public Lands; Homestead; Sec. 101 of the Public
Land Act vests in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the
authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of
title and for reversion of the homestead to the Government. — Furthermore,
petitioners’ action for the cancellation of OCT No. P-1796 was not property
was a public land. We have held in a multitude of cases, among which are
Lopez v. Padilla and Maximo v. CFI of Capiz, that Sec. 101 of the Public
Land Act vests only in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
the authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation
of title and for reversion of the homestead to the Government. A recognized
exception is that situation where plaintiff-claimant seeks direct
reconveyance from defendant public land unlawfully and in breach of trust
titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust, but
such principle is in no way applicable nor even invoked in this case
(ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An original certificate of title issued on
the strength of a homestead patent is equivalent to a certificate issued in a
judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one
year from the date of issuance thereof. — In addition, an original certificate
of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent is equivalent to a
certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible after one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof; in this
case, one year from 28 April 1977. The exception is where an action for the
cancellation of a patent and the certificate of title pursuant thereto is
instituted on the ground that they are void because the Bureau of Land had
no jurisdiction to issue them at all, the land in question having been
withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the
patent and the grant of a certificate of title to another person, which does not
obtain in this case (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Equity; Equity, which has been aptly described as “justice outside legality,”
is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
rules of procedure. — As aforestated, the trial court granted relief to
petitioner Erlinda based on equity since it found that respondent-spouses de
Guzman acted in bad faith when they acquired the land. Equity, which has
been aptly described as “a justice outside legality,” is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Besides,
respondent-spouses de Guzman did not act in bad faith because there was no
evidence of impropriety in the sale made by respondent Renato Manalo to
them (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Same; The Division Clerks of Court shall determine the
finality of the decision by making allowance for delay of the mails. —
However, Sec. 6 requires that in making entries of judgments, the Division
Clerks of Court shall determine the finality of the decision by making
allowance for delay of the mails, computed from the last day of the period of
appeal from the decision or final resolution, as follows: forty five days, if the
addressee is from Luzon, except Metro Manila; and ten days if the addressee
is from Metro Manila (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 128).
Same; Same; A lost appeal could not be retrieved by a motion for new trial.
— Neither did she move to have her appeal reinstated after it was dismissed,
nor did she offer any explanation for her failure to file her brief. It was only
on March 1, 1993, or more than 60 days after the lapse of the 90-days
extension granted by the appellate court, the she filed her motion for new
trial. The petitioner probably hoped that her lost appeal could be retrieved by
a motion for new trial. It was not (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; Same; Payment of the value of the check either by the drawer
or by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonor
given to the drawer is a complete defense. — Payment of the value of the
check either by the drawer or by the drawee bank within five banking days
from notice of the dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense. The
prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency
of his funds or credit at the time of the issuance and on its presentment for
payment is rebutted by such payment. This defense lies regardless of the
strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution to prove the elements of
the offense (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Remedial Law; Unlawful Detainer; The rule is that the one year period
provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a
complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the last
letter of demand to vacate. — Petitioners correctly cite our ruling in Sy Oh
v. Garcia upholding the established rule that the one (1) year period provided
for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for
unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the LAST letter of
demand to vacate, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his
right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
meanwhile in the premises (SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR.,
represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 744).
Same; Same; Notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the
increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated
by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. — “The notice giving the
lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate
the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful
detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby
merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5( c), P.D. 902-A specifically provides
SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the election
or appointment of officers of a corporation. — In intra-corporate matters
concerning the election or appointment of officers of a corporation, Section
5, PD 902-A specifically provides: “SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and
adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over
corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it
as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: x x x x x x x x
x (c ) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,
officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations”
(LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Generally speaking, the relationship of a person
to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee, is not
determined by the nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of
the relationship as they actually exist. — The matter of petitioner’s not being
elected to the office of Executive Vice-President Chief Operating Officer
thus falls squarely within the purview of Section 5, par. (c ) of P.D. 902-A.
In the case of PSBA v. Leano, supra, which involved an Executive Vice-
President who was not re-elected to the said position during the election of
officers on September 5, 1981 by the PSBA’s newly elected Board of
Directors, the Court emphatically stated: “This is not a case of dismissal.
The situation is that of a corporate office having been declared vacant, and
that of TAN’s not having been elected thereafter. The matter of whom to
elect is a prerogative that belongs to the Board, and involves the exercise of
deliberate choice and the faculty of discriminative selection. Generally
speaking, the relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer or
as agent or employee, is not determined by the nature of the services
performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as they actually exist.”
(LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; A corporate officer’s dismissal is always a
corporate act. A corporate officer’s dismissal is always a corporate act and/or
an intra-corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the reason or
wisdom which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the reason behind the non-election of
petitioner to the position Executive Vice President-Chief Operating Officer
arose from, or is closely connected with, his involvement in the alleged
irregularities in the aforementioned cases which, upon investigation and
recommendation, were resolved by the PAL Board of Directors against him
and other senior officers. Evidently, this intra-corporate ruling places the
instant case under the specialized competence and expertise of the SEC
(LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The principal function of the SEC is the
supervision and control over corporation, partnership and associations with
the end in view that investment in these entities may be encouraged and
protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of economic
development. — The jurisdiction of the SEC has likewise been clarified by
this Court in the case of Union Glass and Container Corporation, et al., thus:
“This grant of jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the nature and
function of the SEC under the law. Section 3 of PD No. 902-A confers upon
the latter ‘absolute jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
corporations, partnerships or associations, who are grantees of primary
franchise and/or license or permit issued by the government to operate in the
Philippines x x x.’ The principal function of the SEC is the supervision and
control over corporations, partnerships and associations with the end view
that investment in these entities may be encouraged and protected, and their
activities pursued for the promotion of economic development (LESLIE W.
ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that SEC can take cognizance
of a case. — It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the SEC
must be exercised. Thus the law explicitly specified and delimited its
jurisdiction to matters intrinsically connected with the regulation of
corporations, partnerships and associations and those dealing with the
internal affairs of such corporations, partnerships or associations. Otherwise
stated, in order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy
must pertain to any of the following relationships: (a) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the public; (b) between the
corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members, or officers; (c ) between he corporation, partnership or association
and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned, and (d) among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The affirmative reliefs and monetary claims
sought by petitioner in his complaint reveal that they are actually part of the
perquisites of his elective position; hence, intimately linked with his
relations with the corporation. — The fact that petitioner sought payment of
his backwages, other benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees in his complaint for illegal dismissal will not operate to
prevent the SEC from exercising its jurisdiction under PD 902-A. While the
affirmative reliefs and monetary claims sought by petitioner in his complaint
may, at first glance, mislead one into placing the case under the jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter, a closer examination reveals that they are actually part
of the perquisites of his elective position; hence, intimately linked with his
relations with the corporation. In Dy v. NLRC, et al., the Court, confronted
with the same issue ruled, thus: The question of remuneration, involving as
it does, a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer,
an integral part, it might be said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor
problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and
management, and is in fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the
Corporation Code” (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is still within the competence of and expertise
of the SEC to resolve all matters arising from or closely related with all
intra-corporate disputes. — The Court has likewise ruled in the case of
Andaya v. Abadia that in intra-corporate matters, such as those affecting the
corporation, its directors, trustees , officers and share-holders, the issue of
consequential damages may just as well be resolved and adjudicated by the
SEC. Undoubtedly, it is still within the competence and expertise of the SEC
to resolve all matters arising from or closely connected with all intra-
corporate disputes (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
APPEAL FEE
Civil Procedure; Appeal, Perfection of; Mere fact that one party has already
filed his notice of appeal does not mean that the appeal has already been
perfected; The perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the
last day to appeal by any party.— The mere fact that one party has already
filed his notice of appeal does not mean that the appeal has already been
perfected because the adverse party still has the reglementary period within
which to perfect his appeal. There can be several reasons for this, but one
will suffice for purposes of this case, namely, the latter party since
presumably, they received the decision also on October 5, 1985, (the same
date it was received by petitioner herein), respondents still had fifteen (15)
days within which to appeal. They filed a motion for execution pending
appeal on October 11, 1985, (note that they had up to October 20, 1985
within which they could still appeal, before the judgment as to them would
be final) therefor before the appeal is deemed perfected as to themselves.
(See Universal Far East Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 642). Note
that under the law (Sec. 23 of the Interim Rules, See Batas Pambansa Bilang
129) — The perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last
day to appeal by any party (ALEJANDRO MAGTIBAY VS. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 168 SCRA 177).
APPEAL FEE
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule that date of mailing is date of filing, not
applicable in the instant case, as the records reveal that the petition for
review was filed, not by mail but by personal service. — The procedural
aspect of this case is the issue of the timeless of the petition for review.
Petitioner claimed that on July 14, 1986, he posted with the Central Post
Office of Manila his petition, under Registry Receipt No. 1608, which was
received by respondent Court of Appeals, through its authorized
representative Dever Catindig, on July 17, 1986. In support thereof, he
submitted Registry Receipt No. 1608 and a certification of Postmaster
Wilfredo R. Ulibarri (Rollo, p. 68). He therefore avers that as held in the
case of NAWASA v. Secretary of Public Work and Communications, 16
SCRA 536 [1966], that the date of mailing by registered mail is considered
the date of filing of any petition to pleading, therefore he filed his petition on
time. The contrary is however, shown by the record which reveals that
petitioner filed his petition for review with the Court of Appeals not by mail
but by personal service on July 15, 1986 at 3: 25 p.m. as stamped on the
front page of the petition (Annex “3”, Rollo, p. 101). As against the
certification of the postmaster which is not conclusive to prove that the
registered letter alluded to is the subject petition for review, coupled with the
lack of registry return card that would have shown the receipt thereof by the
authorized representative of the Court of Appeals, the evidence of receipt by
personal delivery is more persuasive as it tallied with the records of said
court (RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).
Same; Same; Failure to perfect appeal in the manner and with the period
provided for by law rendered the judgment final and executory. — Hence,
the Court of Appeal did not err when it ruled that it is bereft of jurisdiction to
pass upon the assailed decision of the trial court which has become final and
executory as of July 14, 1986 (Rollo, p. 99). This Court has invariably ruled
that perfection of an appeal the manner and within the period laid down by
law is not or mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to perfect an
appeal required by the rules has the effect of rendering judgment final and
executory (Quiqui v. Boncaros, 151 SCRA 417 [1987]; RICARDO
MEDINA, SR., VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL, ET AL.,
181 SCRA 837).
DUE PROCESS
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Right to be heard; Due process is not
violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever
reason, not to be heard; If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak,
he cannot later complain that he was unduly silenced. — The Court cannot
agree. The argument assumes that the right to a hearing is absolute and may
not be waived in any case under the due process clause. This is not correct.
As a matter of fact, the right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked,
and validly as long as the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his
behalf. The circumstance that the chance to be heard is not availed of does
not disparage that opportunity and deprive the person of the right to due
process. This Court has consistently held in cases too numerous to mention
that due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has
chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard. It should be obvious that if he
opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to
complain that he was unduly silenced (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA
605).
Labor Law; Surety Bond; It is too late now for the petitioner to challenge the
stipulation.
If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal what it should have done
was object when its conclusion as a condition in the surety bond was
required by the POEA. — At any rate, it is too late now for the petitioner to
challenge the stipulation. If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal,
what it should have done was object when its inclusion as a condition in the
surety bond was required by the POEA. Even of the POEA had insisted on
the condition, as now claimed, there was still nothing to prevent the
petitioner from refusing altogether to issue the surety bond. The petitioner
did neither of these. The fact is that, whether or not the petitioner objected, it
in the end filed the surety bond with the suggested condition. The
consequence of its submission is that is cannot now argue that it is not bound
by that condition because it was coerced into accepting it (STRONGHOLD
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 205 SCRA 605).
Same; Same; Purpose of surety bond; The purpose of the surety bond is to
insure that if the rights of overseas workers are violated by their employers,
recourse would still be available to them against the local companies that
recruited them for the foreign principal. — The surety bond required of
recruitment agencies is intended for the protection of our citizens who are
engaged for overseas employment by foreign companies. The purpose is to
insure that if the rights of these overseas workers are violated by their
employers, recourse would still be available to them against the local
companies that recruited them for the foreign principal. The foreign
principal is outside the jurisdiction of our courts and would probably have
no properties in this country against which an adverse judgment can be
enforced. This difficulty is corrected by the bond, which can be proceeded
against to satisfy that judgment (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA
605).
Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; The technicalities raised by petitioner do
not impair the rudiments of due process or the requirements of the law and
must be rejected in deference to the constitutional imperative of justice for
the worker. — Give this purpose, and guided by the benign policy of social
justice, we reject the technicalities raised by the petitioner against its
established legal and even moral liability to the private respondent. These
technicalities do not impair the rudiments of due process or the requirements
of the law and must be rejected in deference to the constitutional imperative
of justice for the worker (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).
P.D. 772
Land Titles; Anti-Squatting Law; P.D. 772; Purpose for which the land is
intended and not the place where it is located that is material. — We find the
Solicitor General’s contention well taken. That it is the purpose for which
the land is intended and not the place where it is located that is material is
clear from the text of the statute. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 772 provides: Section 1.
Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in
occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than
one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the
court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency (ALEX
JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234
SCRA 524).
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party in Interest; The real
party in interest is the party who stands to benefit or be injured by the
judgement or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. — The Court has
defined the real party-in-interest in the recent case of Samahan ng mga
Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 68357, Sept. 26, 1988), as follows: The real party-in-interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. `Interest’ within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. x x x (Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Phil.,
Vol. I, p. 126 cited in House International Building Tenants Association, Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 705). Furthermore, the Court in
Walter Ascona Lee, et al. v. Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr., et al. (G.R. No.
60937, May 28, 1988) said; xxx xxx xxx “x x x A real party in interest
plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in interest defendant
is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates
the legal rights of the former” (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL.,VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It has been held in some cases that there is
substantial compliance with the rules on service of summons when it
appears that the summons and complaint are actually received by the
corporation through its clerk, though the latter is not authorized to receive
the same. — A liberal interpretation of Section 13, Rule 14 has been adopted
in the case of G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA
466 [1988]: Although it may be true that the service of summons was made
on a person not authorized to receive the same x x x, nevertheless since it
appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the
corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial
compliance, with the rule on service of summons. Indeed the purpose of said
rule as above stated to assure service of summons on the corporation had
thereby been attained. The need for speedy justice must prevail over a
technicality” (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Agrarian Relations; tenancy; Judgements; General rule that the findings of
facts of the Court of Agrarian Relations, are accorded respect; Substantial
evidence, concept of. — This Court has consistently held that the findings of
facts of the Court of Agrarian Relations will not be disturbed on appeal
where there is substantial evidence to support them and all that this Court is
called upon to do insofar as the evidence is concerned, in agrarian cases, is
to find out if the conclusion of the lower court is supported by “substantial
evidence” (Bagsican vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226).
Substantial evidence in support of the findings of the Court of Agrarian
Relations does not necessarily import preponderant evidence as is required
in ordinary civil cases. — Substantial evidence has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, “direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot
substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the trial court in
determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled
to belief. (Picardal vs. Lladas, 21 SCRA 1483).
Administrative Law; Status; R.A. No. 6758; Allowances; Under R.A. 6758,
incumbents who were receiving RATA as of July 1, 1989 are entitled to
continue receiving the same. —Under the second sentences of the
aforementioned provision, such other compensation includes the RATA.
Hence, RATA being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 are entitled to
continue to receive the same. Republic Act No. 6758 has therefore, to this
extent, amended LOI No. 97. By limiting the benefit of the RATA granted by
LOI No. 97 to incumbents, Congress has manifested its intent to gradually
phase out this RATA privilege under LOI No. 97 without upsetting its policy
of non-diminution of pay (Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on
Audit, 214 SCRA 653 [1992]; MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT 238 SCRA 714).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The date July 1, 1989 does not serve as a cut-off
date with respect to the amount of RATA but becomes crucial only to
determine those who may be entitled to its continued grant. — With regard
to the question as to what is the basis of the RATA to be given to incumbents
after July 1, 1989, petitioners contend that according to LOI No. 97 they are
entitled to RATA equivalent to 40% of their basic salary. With the effectivity
of R.A. No. 6758, the 40% must be adjusted based on the standardized
salary. Respondent COA, however, alleges that starting July 1, 1989, the
RATA is no longer based on 40% of the basic salary but on the highest
amount of RATA received by the incumbents as of June 30, 1989. The issue
has been answered in Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit,
214 SCRA 653 (1992), where we held: “* * * The date July 1, 1989 does not
serve as a cut-off date with respect to the amount of RATA. The date July 1,
1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer was
an incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to
its continued grant. The given date should not be interpreted as fixing the
maximum amount of RATA to be received by the official” MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT 238 SCRA 714).