CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW CASES

LONEY vs. PEOPLE

February 10, 2006
FACTS: Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end which caused
the tailings to gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
The DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of Water Code of the Philippines
(PD 1067), National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Philippine Mining Act of 1995
(RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act.
ISSUE: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property should stand (NO)

HELD: NO. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges
simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense. A complaint or
information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule 110). There is duplicity (or
multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.

Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense.

The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend against
two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of
the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.

On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se
felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot
absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what
makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
 SALVADOR vs. MAPA
November 28, 2007
KEY DOCTRINES/CONCEPTS: Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65) vs. Petition for
Review on Certiorari (Rule 45); Prescription; Ex Post Facto Laws
FACTS: On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Behest loans are
loans granted by government banks or GOCC at the behest, command, or urging by previous
government officials to the disadvantage of the Philippine government. The Committee was
tasked to inventory all behest loans and determine the courses of action that the government
should take to recover these loans.
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee
were expanded to include all non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and
non-behest loans. Said Memorandum also named criteria to be utilized as a frame of
reference in determining a behest loan.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc.
(PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Committee determined that
they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61
because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President Ferdinand
Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan
was granted. Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding
Committee, and representing the PCGG, filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for
violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, against the respondents Mapa, Jr. et. al.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. It stressed that
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as originally enacted, provides that the prescriptive period for
violations of the said Act (R.A. 3019) is ten (10) years. Moreover, the computation of the
prescriptive period of a crime violating a special law like R.A. 3019 is governed by Act No. 3326
which provides that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of the judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. Corollary thereto,
the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp., 50, ruled that
when there is nothing which was concealed or needed to be discovered because the entire
series of transactions were by public instruments, the period of prescription commenced to run
from the date the said instrument were executed.
In the case at bar, the loans were entered into by virtue of public documents (e.g.,
notarized contracts, board resolutions, approved letter-request) during the period of 1978 to
1981. Records show that the complaint was referred and filed with the Ombudsman on
October 4, 1996 or after the lapse of more than fifteen years from the violation of the law.
Therefore, the offenses charged had already prescribed.
Also pointed out was that the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was
created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum
Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a
frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be
considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become
ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Committee filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998.
ISSUE 1: WON THE PRESENT PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE
DISMISSED FOR BEING THE WRONG REMEDY IN ELEVATING THE CASE TO THE SC.
DECISION: No.
RATIO: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper mode by
which resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases are
reviewed by the SC. The remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, the SC treated
the petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that
petioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the
complaint. The averments in the complaint, not the nomenclature given by the
parties, determine the nature of the action.
ISSUE 2: WON THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED
DECISION: No
RATIO: It is well-nigh impossible for the State to have known the violations of R.A. No.
3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the
prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof
and not from the day of such commission.
ISSUE 3: WON ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO.
61 ARE EX-POST FACTO LAW[S].
DECISION: No.
RATIO: The SC did not sustain the Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly
inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was
innocent when done.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication.
Furthermore, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the
constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and memorandum orders.
In any event, the SC held that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.
61 are not ex post facto laws. An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which
makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it
was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. This Court added two (2) more to
the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and memorandum orders
clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its
composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans.
Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be
characterized as ex post facto laws.

NICOLAS vs. ROMULO

These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon,
et al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007.

The facts are not disputed.

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States
Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner
herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:
The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic
Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint under oath
filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex
A, committed as follows: That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the
Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accuseds (sic), being then members of the United States Marine Corps, except
Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with lewd design and by means of force, threat and intimidation, with abuse of superior
strength and taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal
knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with
Plate No. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Victor
St. Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and
consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW - Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic
of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States,
at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
 During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales
to the RTC of Makati for security reasons, the United States Government faithfully complied
with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was
required.

On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its
Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to

adduce sufficient evidence against accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER,
L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US
Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex, are hereby ACQUITTED to the crime
charged.

The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused

L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine Corps at the USS Essex, this
Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
RAPE defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-B, first
paragraph thereof, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of
the same Code.

Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces

Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States, accused
L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall,
thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J.
SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.

Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify

complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[2]

As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further
orders.
 On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by
a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention under
the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the
Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December
19, 2006 which states:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces
Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith,
United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S.
Embassy in Manila.

(Sgd.) KRISTIE A. KENNEY (Sgd.) ALBERTO G. ROMULO

Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic
of America of the Philippines

DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006__

and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Embassy of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with the
Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of
Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the Makati
City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S.
Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be
guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and
jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place of
detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms of the
VFA.

The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007,
as follows:
 WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS
the petition for having become moot.[3]

Hence, the present actions.

The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the
parties submitted their memoranda.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith
because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.

This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora,[4] brought by Bayan, one of
petitioners in the present cases.

Against the barriers of res judicata vis--vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis--vis all the
parties, the reversal of the previous ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of
primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well as a specific mandate
of the Constitution.

The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.

The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to
the United States military bases in the country.

It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the
Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United
States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the
Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or
military bases and facilities, which the United States retained for itself.
 This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other
places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not
Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.

Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent
allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never
advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the
Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate.

Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines;
and with the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered
by these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.

To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in

the 1987 Constitution.

The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the
Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the
situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in
our territory were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.

Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether
or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.

This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.

First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,[5] the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by
the duly authorized representative of the United States government.

The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States
Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be
taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out
or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under
the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.[6]

The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with
the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:[7]

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Signed at Washington, August 30,
1951.

The Parties of this Treaty

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two
peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight
side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war.

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and

their common determination to defend themselves against external
armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that
either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective

defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the
development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the
Pacific area.

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or

interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing
agreements or understandings between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America.
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and
justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relation from
the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.

ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty,
the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to
resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will
consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty
and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external
armed attack in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on
either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its
constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of
either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the
Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter
of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
 ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and
the United Nations of America in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of
ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.

ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may
terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party.

IN WITHNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this

Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:

(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO
(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

For the United States of America:

(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON

(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES
(Sgd.) TOM CONNALLY
(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY[8]

Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the
capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US
military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense
Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines,
 Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and their desire to strengthen international and regional
security in the Pacific area;

Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of

August 30, 1951;

Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed
forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;

Considering that cooperation between the United States and the

Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security
interests;

Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States

personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines;

Have agreed as follows:[9]

Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it

was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to
the US Congress under the CaseZablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this
reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international
agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII,
Sec. 25 of our Constitution.[10]

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of
the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence allowed
under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has
been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no
violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence.

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
 The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US
Armed Forces in the Philippines, the following rules apply:

Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the
Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the
offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military
authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and
without delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for
any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the
person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government
shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody,
which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event
Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United
States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year
period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period
will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine
authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the

Constitution, namely, that providing for the exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of
procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to allow the
transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of
procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
(Art. III, Sec. 1.).

Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a
different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused.[11]

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of
Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and
conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining
power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the
forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.[12]

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt
rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered
around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply
except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from

jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized
subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces
contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another States territory. On the contrary, the
Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different
treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be
detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA:

Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of
United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
appropriate Philippines and United Statesauthorities. United States personnel
serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material
assistance.

It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during
the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to
cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall
be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention
shall be by Philippine authorities. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19
and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States
Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not by Philippine
authorities.
 Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives
of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities
as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Medellin v. Texas ( 552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered
into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties
are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.

On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:

G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R.
No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R.
No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).

The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three
(3) days a Comment/Manifestation on the following points:

1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces

Agreement of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Jose Ernesto
Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect that treaty
stipulations that are not self-executory can only be enforced pursuant
to legislation to carry them into effect; and that, while treaties may
comprise international commitments, they are not domestic law unless
Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be self-executory and is ratified on these
terms?

2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic

law, either because it is self-executory or because there exists
legislation to implement it.

3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30,

1951 was concurred in by the US Senate and, if so, is there proof of the
US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta, J., no part.

After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:

 First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself,
because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is
intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As
a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully
complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.

Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC
Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive
agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately
implemented. The parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has
been registered under the Case-Zablocki Act.

In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the
Avena decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin
decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not self-executing and are not registrable
under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.

Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US
Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82ndCongress, Second
Session, Vol. 98 Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.

The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in
domestic courts varies from country to country.

As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require legislation
whereas others do not.

It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article
XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve
alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international
obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes
under international law.

Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi,[13] an executive

agreement is a treaty within the meaning of that word in international law and constitutes
enforceable domestic law vis--vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in
Weinberger enforced the provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential
employment to Filipinos in the US Bases here.
 Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:

1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties These are advised and consented to by the
US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution.

2. ExecutiveCongressional Agreements: These are joint agreements

of the President and Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate.

3. Sole Executive Agreements. These are agreements entered into

by the President. They are to be submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days
of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they
are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.

As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or
assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation.
The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into
on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the
United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under
Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo
shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters
pending therein, namely, the petition for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from
the judgment of conviction.

No costs. SO ORDERED.
 LADONGA vs. PEOPLE
EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005

Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular
customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No.
284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990
and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the
amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990
issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED
ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands,
he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico
bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga
spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner
is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC
rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks
that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for
violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution
failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was
present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but
by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFONSO BAUTISTA
In a joint decision, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered
two verdicts of conviction in Criminal Cases Nos. U-8191 and U-8192, finding
accused-appellant Alfonso Bautista, alias Poldo, guilty of the charge of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition and of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder and
attempted murder, respectively. Appellant insists in this present appellate review that the trial
court should not have granted affirmative weight to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Ferdinand Datario and Rolando Nagsagaray as the bases for his conviction, considering that,
inter alia, after they alledgedly caught a glimpse of appellant at the scene of the crime, they
broke their silence about his supposed participation only after more than sixteen months and
under dubious circumstances.
The initiatory criminal information in Criminal Case No. U-8191 was lodged on June 13,
1994 with Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,[1] while that in
Criminal Case No. U-8192, dated June 16, 1994, was assigned to Branch 49 of said court. On
motion of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, these cases were subsequently consolidated
and assigned to Branch 48 for trial.[2] Appellant was indicted for the commission of the
aforestated crimes, as follows:

Criminal Case No. U-8191

That on or about the 18th day of May, 1992, at Barangay Dilan, municipality of Pozorrubio,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody one (1) long firearm of unknown caliber or make, without
authority of law, and which he used in shooting Barangay Captain Eduardo Datario, Bernabe
Bayona and Cinderella Estrella[3]

Criminal Case No. U-8192

That on or about the 18th day of May, 1992, at Barangay Dilan, municipality of Pozorrubio,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack and sho(o)t on(e) Eduardo Datario hitting the latters face
with the bullet exiting through his neck, which wound caused his death, and further hitting the
ear of Bernabe Bayona and bullet exiting through his mouth, which wound would have caused
the death of said Bernabe Bayona had it not been for the timely medical assistance rendered to
him, and the bullet finally hitting (the) right leg of Cinderella Estrella, (through) which wound
accused commenced the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt act but did not
produce it by reason of some cause other than his spontaneous resistance, all to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased and the two other victims[4] (Corrections Supplied).

At the arraignment of appellant on November 10, 1994 wherein he was duly assisted by
counsel, negative pleas to the charges were entered for him pursuant to his indication in open
court.[5] Pre-trial having been waived by appellant, trial proceeded thereafter with the
presentation of several prosecution witnesses, particularly the alleged eyewitnesses Ferdinand
Datario and Rolando Nagsagaray on whose testimonies the court below principally anchored
its judgement of conviction. On the other hand, appellant himself appeared in his defense, and
one Norma Reyes, a neighbor, partly corroborated this assertions.
 Professedly convinced by the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court found appellant
guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of life imprisonment, with costs, in Criminal
Case No. U-8191. In Criminal Case No. U-8192, appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00 actual damages in the sum of
P20,000.00, and the prescribed costs.[6]
According to the evidence of the prosecution,[7] Eduardo Datario, Barangay Captain of
Dilan in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, was fatally shot by an assassin on the night of May 18 1992 at
around ten o clock. At the time of the treacherous assault, the victim was watching the
sideshows of their barangay fiesta which were being held within the school campus of the
Dilan Elementary School. Ferdinand Datario, younger brother of the deceased, recounted that
when he arrived and took his place beside his brother at the school premises, the latter was
with Rolando Nagsagaray, Bernabe Bayona and Cinderella Estrella, among others, watching a
sideshow game.
Shortly thereafter, a gun report caused the people around to scamper in different
directions. In the few seconds prior to the ensuing melee, the deceased slumped to the ground
with a gunshot wound in the area of his chin which proved to be lethal. Bernabe Bayona and
Cinderella Estrella, who were beside the victim, were likewise hit apparently by the same bullet
in succession, but they fortunately survived. Bayona sustained only a wound on the left ear
followed by a grazing wound on his left upper lip, and the bullet thereafter lodge in the left
thigh of Estrella.
The same prosecution eyewitness recalled that as soon as the long gun shot rang out, he
instinctively turned toward its source, and it was at the point that he saw the assailant, at an
approximate distance of ten meters, holding a long firearm aimed towards their group. That
assailant, according to this witness, was herein appellant who was then on the other side of a
concrete fence which was more than five feet high. The witness then turned his attention to
his brother and with the help of other persons, they brought him to a hospital where the victim
expired.[8] Rolando Nagsagaray, the other key prosecution eyewitness, testified along the
same lines. He likewise claimed to have seen appellant standing at the other side of the
concrete fence and holding a long firearm.[9] Both of them admittedly did not call the attention
of the people around them or those near the fence to the fact of the presence of appellant,
either for his identification or apprehension.
Appellant, a farm helper and resident of Lipit, Manaoag, Pangasinan, vehemently denied
any involvement in the shooting incident. He asserted in court that he never knew personally
the victims and, although he himself could not specifically recall where he was at the time of
the killing on May 18, 1992, his neighbor, Norma Reyes, testified that he was then at their
house as a guest at the birthday celebration of her husband. Appellant also recalled that when
he was arrested in September, 1993 in San Fabian, Pangasinan, reportedly in connection with
another case, he was actually waiting for one Francisco Periamil at the latters house to collect
payment of his tobacco produce. However, Periamil instead arrived with two law enforcers
who promptly arrested appellant. He was then brought to Lingayen, Pangasinan where he was
detained and it was there where he was tortured and forced to admit participation in some
unsolved killings, one of which was the murder of Eduardo Datario.[10] It was also at the time of
his arrest that the two prosecution eyewitnesses, Ferdinand Datario and Rolando Nagsagaray,
came out into the open to announce what they allegedly witnessed on the night of May 18,
1992.[11]
Appellant faults the trial court for its unwarranted acceptance of the version of
prosecution. He argues that the very long delay, which took all of sixteen months, on the part
of Ferdinand Datario and Rolando Nagsagaray in reporting to the authorities what they
allegedly saw has definitely placed the stamp of doubt, if not incredibility, on their testimonies.
On top of that, there are inherent improbabilities and inconsistencies in their declarations in
court and which, according to appellant, are factors obviously corrosive of the prosecutions
cause. With the facts in this hypothesis, the Court is inclined to agree. For, while it is true that
the matter of assigning values and weight to the testimonies of witnesses is at best the
province of the trial court, it is equally the province of appellate courts to disregard factual
findings of the former where certain facts of substance have been plainly overlooked and
misappreciated by the said lower courts.[12]
In the case at bar, the aforesaid two eyewitnesses both averred that they feared for their
lives, hence they kept silent for sixteen months. It was only after appellant had been
apprehended and had allegedly owned up to the killing of the victim that they decided to speak
and execute sworn affidavits on the matter. The trouble with their posturing is that they had all
the opportunity to pinpoint appellant as the malefactor without having to necessarily place
their lives, or of those of their families, in danger. Thus, as pointedly noted by the defense,
both these witnesses could very well have revealed what they supposedly knew to the town
mayor who took a hand in the investigation of the case, or any of the police investigators or
the barangay officials, some of whom in fact were their personal friends, but they did not. An
anonymous tip to these authorities would also have been a convinient and effective course of
action.
Witness these admission in the testimony of Ferdinand Datario:
Q When was the first time that you reveal(ed) the identity of the accused Alfonso Bautista
to the authorities or did you reveal to anybody the identity of the person who shot your
brother Eduardo Dat(a)rio?
A Only to my father, sir.
Q And when did you tell your father that it was Alfonso Bautista who shot your brother
Eduardo Datario?
A On the fourth day after the incident, sir.
COURT
Q Why did you not tell your father immediately that Alfonso Bautista shot your brother?
A Because my father might get shock(ed), Maam.
Q Why did you not reveal immediately that Alfonso Bautista was the one who shot your
brother?
A We were afraid because Alfonso Bautista usually roams around, Maam.
Q When did the police go to your house?
A Before we brought home my brother, it was the 19th of May, the day after my brother
died, Maam.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When the policeman went to your house on May 19, 1992, you have not seen Alfonso
Bautista yet and yet did not tell the police that Alfonso Bautista was the one who shot
your brother?
A Yes, Maam.
Q Why?
A We were afraid to tell, Maam.[13]
xxxxxxxxx
Q You never made any attempt to report what you saw who killed your brother on May 18,
1992?
A No, sir.
Q Now, do you know the Mayor of Pozorrubio at that time in 1992?
A Yes, sir.
Q Considering the fact that you are a barangay captains brother you are very close to him,
am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q In spite of that, you never attempt(ed) even to whisper to him what you allegedly saw on
May 18, 1992?
A No, sir.
Q Now, at that time, 1992, do you personally know any policeman in the municipality of
Pozorrubio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who were they, could you please inform us?
A Investigator Balelo, Pat. Fernandez, sir.
Q You were very close to these policemen, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in spite of that you never attempted even to whisper to them that it was Alfonso
Bautista alias Poldo who allegedly shot your brother?
A I did not, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Who called you at the police headquarters at Lingayen, Pangasinan?
A SPO 1 Jaime Fernandez went to our house, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, what did SPO1 Jaime Fernandez tell you when he went to your house and
convinced you to give your sworn statement?
A He told us to go to the police headquarters, sir?
Q Did you ask him why they were calling you at the headquarters?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what was his reason?
 A He told us that the one who shot the barangay captain was already arrested, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And what did you do when SPO1 Fernandez told you that Alfonso Bautista admitted that
he was the one who allegedly killed your brother?
A That is why we filed a case on behalf of my deceased brother, sir.
Q So that was the only evidence you relied on when you filed this complaint only 1993?
A Yes, sir.[14] (Italics and corrections in parentheses ours).
The veritable cock-and-bull account of witness Rolando Nagsagaray, which was obviously
patterned after and to corroborate that Ferdinand Datario, was even worse. Thus:
Q At the time the gunwielder shot Eduardo Datario, you already knew him?
A Yes, Maam.
Q So, what is the name?
A Alfonso Bautista, Maam.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, at what time did you go home after delivering the late Barangay Captain Datario a
the Sacred Heart Hospital?
A 1:00 oclock in the morning because he died at 1:00 oclock, sir.
Q Were you alone when you went home at that time?
A There were two (2) of us, sir.
Q Who is your companion?
A Reynaldo Datario, the brother of Eduardo Datario, Maam.
Q You never informed Reynaldo Datario of what you allegedly saw that night?
A No, sir.
COURT
Q Why did you not inform Reynaldo Datario of what you allegedly saw?
A Because I was then afraid, Maam.
Q Reynaldo Datario is the brother of Eduardo?
A Yes, Maam.
Q Now, could you please inform this Honorable Court what was the physical condition or
situation of Reynaldo Datarion when you went home.
A He cried, sir.
Q And am I right to say that while he was crying he was crying for justice for his brother at
that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in spite of that you never informed him of what you saw that night?
A No, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You do not know any baranggay official at that time?
A Napoleon Sales, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q How far is the house of Napoleon Sales to your house?
A Around 100 meters, sir.
Q Did you inform Napoleon Sales what you saw at that particular night?
A No, sir.
Q Do you know of any policeman stationed at Pozorrubio, Pangasinan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please tell us the name of the policeman?
A Balelo, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You were very close to him, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q In spite of that, you never informed him of what you saw on that particular night?
A No, Maam.
Q Who is the incumbent Mayor at that time in Pozorrubio?
A Manuel Venezuela, sir.
Q You know him very well, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in spite of that, you never informed him, whispered to him, of what you know that
night?
A No, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Do you have any parent?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were living with them that particular time.
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ever tell them of what you allegedly saw on that particular night?
A No, sir.[15]
 Ferdinand Datario even saw appellant passing near their house during the victims wake
but he never bothered to sound the alarm, so to speak. This is an inconceivable reaction on his
part, considering that there was at that time sufficient manpower in the person of fourteen
male relatives and friends then in attendance who could have physically overpowered
appellant and placed him in the custody of the law.[16] More perplexing is the fact that while
the witness is an aggrieved consaguineous brother of the victim, yet he inexplicably remained
tight-lipped over his avowed knowledge of the identity of his own brothers killer. His behavior
is certainly unnatural for one who had just lost a sibling under the circumstances in this case,
despite the opportunities under which he could have relayed what he now alleges to have
known all along which, if true, could secure retributive justice for his brother.
The rule is ordinarily to the effect that delay by a witness in divulging what he or she
knows about the commission of a crime, such as the identity of the offender, is not by itself a
setback to the evidentiary value of such a witness testimony.[17] The courts, however, have
been quick to deny evidentiary weight where such delay is not sufficiently justified by any
acceptable explanation.
For instance, well-founded fear of reprisal, or the unpredictable manner by which
individuals react when confronted by a gruesome event as to place the viewer in a state of
shock for sometime, have been considered as permissible situations resulting in delay.[18]
Invariably, however, even under the foregoing circumstances the delay must not be undue in
point of time.Thus, failure to reveal what one had witnessed about a crime for a number of
days, or weeks, or even a number of months, is allowable. But, that will not hold true where,
as in the case now being reviewed, the delay had unreasonably stretched all too far out into a
year and four months, especially in the absence of any compelling or rational basis for such
self-imposed and lengthy silence.
In similar situations, the pronouncements of this Court have laid down guidelines applying
foursquare to the instant case. The holding in People vs. Cunanan, et al.[19] was emphatic that

The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime is to reveal it to the authorities, unless, of
course, he is the author thereof. It defies credulity that no one or two but five such witnesses
made no effort to expose Cunanan if they really knew that he was the author thereof. This
stultified silence casts grave doubts as to their veracity.

In the end, we have here a specified case where evidence of identification is thoroughly
unreliable. Reason: No valid explanation was given why the Peoples witnesses did not report
the identity of appellant Cunanan to the authorities during a long period of time.

Thereafter, People vs. Cruz[20] reiterated that ruling and trenchantly stresses as follows:

2. It took forty-two (42) days after the incident for Modesto Alipio to come out and give his
sworn statement, Exhibit B, to the Philippine Constabulary narrating therein what he saw on
the occasion. x x x Failure on the part of Alipio to report to the authorities immediately a very
essential detail in the solution of the crime engenders a suspicion that he was not altogether
candid and truthful in his testimony. At any rate, the long delay, which is not caused by threat,
intimidation or coercion by herein appellant or anybody for that matter, in reporting the matter
to the authorities the mayor, barangay captain, police or the Philippine Constabulary, by one
who himself was once an army man has rendered the evidence for the prosecution insufficient
to establish appellants guilty connection to the requisite of moral certainty. x x x.
 More recently, People vs. Gonzales, et al.[21] gave another instructive illustration, to wit:

Additionally, Huntorias credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact the he only
came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on
February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police
authorities the crime he had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect
his credibility, here, the unreasonable delay in Huntorias coming out engenders doubt on his
veracity. If the silence of an alleged witness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful,
the more it should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntorias long delay in
revealing what he allegedly witnessed has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse
that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that
he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. x x x.

Even then, by themselves, the testimonies of these two prosecution witnesses are replete
with material inconsistencies and incongruities. Thus, to cite just a few, Ferdinand Datario
narrated that he in fact divulged to his father, Bernardino Datario, the identity of his brothers
assailant four days after the incident.[22] He claims that he deferred that revelation in order not
to shock his father, but he does not explain why the death of the victim would not shock his
father, but the identity of the killer would. Contrarily, Bernardino Datario, declared that he
came to know about appellants participation in the crime from Ferdinand on the very same
night that Eduardo was killed but that he (the father) likewise opted for silence allegedly on
account of fear at the time.[23]
Rolando Nagsagaray, on his part, asserted in court that after shooting the deceased,
appellant then merely walked away from the concrete fence with rifle in hand.[24] Now, said
witness could have spoken the truth since the height of the fence was about a foot more than
appellants admitted height, hence the witness could not have really seen appellant walking
away from the crime scene.[25] Besides, it sounds somewhat absurd that if appellant had to
quickly duck behind the fence immediately after firing the single shot in order to avoid
recognition, he would then nonchalantly walk away although there were many people on both
sides of the fence who would recognized him. His bringing a rifle would also naturally attract
attention.
Ferdinand Datario also admitted, and this is not disputed by the parties, that between the
concrete fence and the place where their groups was then watching the sideshow, there were
people milling around the structures erected for other sideshows, which collectively obstructed
his view.[26] Although the other prosecution eye witness, Rolando Nagsagaray, hedged on the
effect of such obstructions to their vantage location, there are considerations hereafter
explained showing the correctness of Ferdinand Datarios testimony. Actually, the prosecution
does not seriously question the existence of those structures being used by the other
sideshows.
There likewise in Nagsagarays version an evident taint of falsity. If he is to be believed,
within the swift span of a few seconds after hearing the gun report, he first glanced at his
watch and thus recalled that it was 10:30 in the evening when it happened; that in the process
he also saw the victims Eduardo Datario, Bernabe Bayona and Cinderella Estrella fall one after
the other; that, at the same time, he observed the frightened crowd running away in different
directions, although he could not name any of them; and on top of all these, he still managed
to further obtain an excellent view of appellant behind the concrete fence.[27] This exaggerated
narration of the facts simultaneously taking place is certainly beyond human experience. No
person could have had the capacity to see all these events taking place during those fleeting
seconds, considering the rapidity of their occurrence as this witness himself represents.
 There are also a number of unexplained or inexplicable facts that enshroud the
testimonies of these witnesses in uncertainty and doubt. As ordered by the lower court, an
ocular inspection of the premises was conducted by its branch clerk of court, designated as
commissioner therefor, and the salient findings are as follows:

1. The height of the fence is 1.7 meters and the distance between the fence and the center of
the basketball court is 12 meters.

2. The distance between the center of the basketball court and the place where the victim fell
down is 18 meters.

3. Between the basketball court and the fence are two full-grown acacia trees and one
star-apple tree very close to the fence. Immediately behind the fence is a house with two
mango trees nearby.[28]

What these physical features of the crime scene reveal is that, although the place was
illuminated for the barangay feria, the presence of the big trees naturally cast shadows on
wide portions thereof, especially along parts of the concrete fence. There was no specification
made by the two alleged eyewitnesses of the particular portion of the fence where they
supposedly saw appellant, except by way of a vague general direction in relation to their own
variant position, such as, to the left or right of some of them. It cannot, therefore, be said that
appellant was so clearly exposed as to be easily visible to the so-called eye-witnesses.
At the trial, it was ascertained that appellant was 5 feet 4 inches in height,[29] obviously
lower than the height of the fence. Yet, witness Nagsagaray described appellants presence at
the fence in various position, such as holding the gun at breast level,[30] or putting down the
gun and then walking towards the east,[31] despite the fact that he was obscured by the
shadows and the view was blocked by the fence. An attempt was made to show the appellant
must have been standing on top of a water container behind the fence so he could aim his gun
above it, but the records are barren of competent evidence showing whether those containers
really there that night, or who placed them there, and on which portion along the fence they
were located.In fine, we are presented with a situational problem created by a surmise
founded upon a conjecture.
The prosecution belittles appellants supposed alibi since it is easy of fabrication and is
always viewed with suspicion. However, the prosecutions own evidence which supposedly
identifies appellant as the malefactor falls far short of the requisite quantum of evidence, as
earlier explained, not to speak of the absence of any firearm presented in this court nor
satisfactory evidence of appellants possession thereof. While the defense of alibi must stand
searching scrutiny, it acquires commensurate strength where no proper and positive
identification has been made.[32] The identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.[33] After all, as a paramount element for conviction, the
prosecutions evidence must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.[34]
Strictly speaking, however, when viewed from another angle with a little more perception,
it does not appear that appellant really resorted to alibi. As conventionally understood, this
exculpation is invoked by an accused who represents, often with proffered corroboration, that
at the time the offense was committed he was elsewhere at a specific place, hence he could
not have participated therein. In the instant case, the peculiarity is that the appellant
steadfastly denied being at the scene of the crime but candidly admitted that he could not
remember or did not know whether at the time of the killing he was then in his tobacco field in
Barangay Macayog, San Jacinto since he did not even know about the crime in question.[35]
Withal, he could remember the dates of other events where he personally participated, such as
when he was arrested, when he was detained in San Fabian, and when he brought to
Lingayen.
It is of general knowledge that in rural areas where farmers live a humdrum working
existence, and where the quotidian routine of every day is just like the last, one cannot expect
them or even their families to keep diaries or records which would enable them to honestly
state where they were on particular dates, unless there was an important reason therefor.
Thus, it appeals more to common sense and realistic truth that the innocent answer of
appellant reflects more honesty than that of one who could easily fix his definite whereabouts
just to subserve his defense of alibi. The latter practice is much a matter of judicial experience
and repudiation.
It is also noteworthy that no motive was ever attributed to appellant as to why he should
kill the deceased or shoot the other victims since the evidence shows beyond cavil that he did
not even know any of them personally or had any previous association or dealings with them.
The rule is that proof of motive is unnecessary to impute a crime to the accused if the evidence
concerning his identification is convincing. A converso, if the evidence of identification is
unclear, then the jurisprudential doctrine is that proof of motive is a paramount necessity.[36]
At the trial, the witness from the Philippine National Police harped on the fact that, after
his arrest for another alleged crime, herein appellant was linked to a number of long unsolved
killings in the region, including the present case. This was an unfair proposition, such that the
defense was forced to rejoin that appellant was actually being made a scapegoat in order to
camouflage official incompetence by going through the motions of wiping clean the slate of
unsolved crimes through the expedient of indicting appellant for all of them. A sober note is
interjected by the Solicitor General who points out that those other cases should not be taken
up here for being immaterial. Indeed, entangling those other charges with the one at bar
would run afoul of the second branch of the rule of res inter alios acta[37] since, even taken
altogether, they could not constitute an exception thereto.
ACCORDINGLY, on reasonable doubt irresistibly created by the foregoing premises, the
consolidated judgments of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. U-8191 and U-8192 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Alfonso Bautista is hereby ACQUITTED
of the present charges against him and, unless otherwise detained for some other lawful cause,
his release from confinement is consequently directed. Cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLANDO ACURAM

On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding accused-appellant Orlando
Acuram guilty of murder. Supreme

On September 30, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber Apepe charged appellant with
the crime of murder, allegedly committed as follows: "On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00
o'clock in the evening, at Poblacion, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, which is within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and treachery
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with the use of his armalite rifle,
shoot at one Orlando[1] Manabat who was just standing on the highway waiting for a ride
towards home, thus, hitting and wounding the latter on the right leg or thigh, which caused his
death the following day.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.[2]

Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.[3]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment,
disposing as follows: "WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts, convincingly proved by
the prosecution, the accused, ORLANDO ACURAM, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and is meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO MANABAT the jurisprudential
sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED."[4]

The records disclose that on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Rolando
Manabat, Oscar Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work,
proceeded to the market in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was
available at that time, they decided to head for home instead. They went to the national
highway, stood at the right side facing east towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and
waited for a ride there. They flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which, however,
swerved dangerously towards them. At this juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep
"Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis man kamo " (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A
passenger inside the jeepney shouted back, "Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you
brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the air, accompanied by sparks
coming from the front right side of the jeepney. Then Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot."
The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City.
Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his companions to the Cagayan de Oro
Medical Center. Later on, they were informed that Rolando needed blood transfusion and so
they transferred him at around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in the
same city. Jjsc

Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The doctor found
the victim's blood pressure to be just forty over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was
heavily bandaged. He decided to operate on the victim when the latter's blood pressure
stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the victim underwent surgery. Unfortunately,
the victim died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the cause of Rolando's death
was "secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome secondary to blood loss, secondary to gunshot
wounds", or briefly, massive loss of blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal
circumstances, the wound would not necessarily cause death but in this case where the wound
transected the major part of the leg, the wound was fatal. He clarified that the victim sustained
only one gunshot wound which entered at the front portion of the right knee and exited at the
back of the right knee, causing two wounds.[5]

The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered that
appellant Orlando Acuram, a policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company based at San
Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was among the passengers of the errant jeepney. He was
seated at the front, right side of the jeepney and was the only one among its passengers who
was carrying a firearm. Pending investigation, he was restricted to the camp effective July 1,
1991, upon orders of his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra.[6] Appellant was
later surrendered by his commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of the
warrant of arrest issued by MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery.[7] On motion by the prosecution and
without objection from the defense, the trial court suspended appellant from the service and
ordered his detention at the provincial jail.[8]

During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney and had a
gun at that time but denied firing it. He claimed that it was impossible for him to fire his rifle
during that time since he was sitting at the front seat of the jeepney, sandwiched between the
driver and the latter's father-in-law. Moreover, he said that the rifle was locked and wrapped
by his jacket and its barrel was even pointed towards the driver.[9]

The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable. On the basis
of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as charged.
Insisting on his innocence, appellant readily filed his notice of appeal.[10] In his brief, appellant
raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: Edpmis

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED APPELLANT TOOK
FLIGHT OR ESCAPED AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE
ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT
PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED, AND THE ALLEGED WEAPON NOT
POSITIVELY TESTED.
IV. THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE POINTING TO
THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS, THE EXISTENCE OF
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF
THE VICTIM."[11]

We shall take up in seriatim the challenges posed by appellant to the credibility and sufficiency
of the evidence for the prosecution. We shall also consider the weight and credibility of his
defense.

To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting incident, we find
that his behavior proves otherwise. Appellant admits that he was at the scene of the crime at
the time the shooting happened. Considering that he is a law enforcement officer, the unusual
incident should have at least elicited his curiosity and he should have inquired about it.
However, he chose to ignore the incident and go his way.[12] That a policeman could display
such indifference to a crime committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it was true
that he reported for duty the day after the incident, the following day, he was ordered by his
commanding officer restricted within the camp pending investigation of the case. By this time,
appellant must have learned that his commanding officer had received a radio message and
that he was already a suspect. As the trial court noted, no superior officer will hold back from
any of his men involved, such a grave charge. Despite these, appellant did not present himself
before the police in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be
found.Misoedp

Thus, appellant's first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, in our view, is quite untenable. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity
and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.[13] In this case, it was appellant's
commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by
one's superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities
concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court is
correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant's
favor. Misedp

On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit. Appellant asserts that
the trial court erred in concluding that the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point, we
agree. For treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that
the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing
without risk to himself.[14] In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. As
observed by the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and the
passengers of the jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous response to the cursing, as
appellant correctly claimed.[15] Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the
victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the
will.[16]

Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator of
the crime. He claims he was not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not
positively tested. True, prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as the one
who fired the gun at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is
not the only matrix where the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[17] It is
settled that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the following
requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[18] Circumstantial evidence could be of
similar weight and probative value as direct evidence. From direct evidence of a minor fact or
facts, by a chain of circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious process of
reasoning, towards a conviction that from said fact or facts some other facts may be validly
inferred.[19]No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than
when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime.[20]
As noted by the trial court and the Solicitor General, the evidence for the prosecution is replete
with details, duly proven by the prosecution and to some extent by admissions of the defense,
enough to sustain the guilt of appellant. These are: (1) The appellant was a former member of
the Philippine Constabulary and, during the incident, was a member of the Philippine National
Police. He was skilled in handling firearms. (2) The appellant was issued a firearm (armalite
rifle) by his command, which he was then carrying with him before, during and after the
incident. (3) At the particular date, time and place of the incident, appellant was carrying his
duly issued armalite rifle inside the jeepney from where the gunfire came from. (4) The
appellant was sitting on the extreme front-right-side of the jeepney where the sparks of the
gunbursts were seen and heard by the witnesses. (5) There were no other persons with a rifle
inside the jeepney except the appellant. (6) The empty shells of an armalite rifle were
recovered at the place where the fatal shooting occurred. (7) The appellant did not go forward
to the authorities to present himself until after a warrant of arrest was issued and, in fact, until
his actual arrest.[21]

The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading to a

reasonable conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of others, was responsible for the
victim's death. They constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the
perpetrator of the offense. It is the height of desperation on appellant's part to insist that there
should be an eyewitness to the precise moment the shot was fired considering the sudden and
completely unexpected shooting of the victim.[22] Here, circumstantial evidence suffices. Edp

Appellant's insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of paraffin and ballistic tests, in
our view, is far from convincing. Suffice it to state that even negative findings of the paraffin
test do not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun. The absence of nitrates could be
explained if a person discharged a firearm with gloves on, or if he thoroughly washed his
hands thereafter.[23]

Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death of the victim on the lack
of prompt and proper medical attention given. He insists that the delay in giving proper
medical attendance to the victim constitutes an efficient intervening cause which exempts him
from criminal responsibility. This assertion is disingenuous, to say the least. Appellant never
introduced proof to support his allegation that the attending doctors in this case were
negligent in treating the victim. On the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the
attending doctor at the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by
applying bandage on the injured leg to prevent hemorrhage. He added that the victim was
immediately given blood transfusion at the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital when the
doctor found out that the victim had a very low blood pressure. Thereafter, the victim's blood
pressure stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the victim as the main blood vessel of the
victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing massive loss of blood. The surgery was finished in
three hours. Unfortunately, the victim died hours later. We cannot hold the attending doctors
liable for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim
does not break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the appellant and the
injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute efficient intervening cause. The
proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the appellant. It is settled that
anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act such as
death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the injured did not receive
proper medical attendance would not affect appellant's criminal responsibility. The rule is
founded on the practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape
from the just consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals
could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely establishing a doubt as to the immediate
cause of death.[24]

To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the crime
committed is only homicide, not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the
applicable penalty for homicide is only reclusion temporal. As there is neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance found by the trial court or shown after a review of the records, the
penalty in this case shall be fixed in its medium period of reclusion temporal, which ranges
from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months.
Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the
range of prision mayor as a minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The span of
reclusion temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
Edpsc

WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is
hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10 years of the
medium period of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years and 10 months and 1 day of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando Manabat in the amount of P50,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
 JACINTO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 162540, JULY 13, 2009
PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
In June 1997, petitioner Gemma Jacinto received a BDO check from Baby Aquino; the check
worth P10,000 was payment for Aquino’s purchases from Mega Foam Int’l., Inc., for whom the
petitioner was working as a collector. The check was deposited in the Land Bank account of
Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle, who was the petitioner’s sister and a
former Mega Foam employee. Later in July, Land Bank called Mega Foam to inform them that
the check bounced. The call was received by Mega Foam employee Rowena Ricablanca.
Ricablanca then called Anita Valencia, another former Mega Foam employee and the Capitles’
neighbor, to relay to Jacqueline the issue regarding the bounced check. Valencia told
Risablanca that the check was from Baby Aquino, and instructed her to ask Aquino for a cash
payment of P10,000; The cash was meant to be divided between petitioner Jacinto, Valencia,
Capitle, and Risablanca, whom Valencia had invited to join in the plot. Ricablanca was advised
by Mega Foam’s accountant to inform the company’s owner, Joseph Dyhengco, regarding the
plot, who in turn contacted and coordinated with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The NBI conducted an entrapment operation using marked bills, which led to the arrest of the
petitioner and her co-accused on August 21, 1997. On October 4, 1999, the RTC Caloocan City,
Branch 131, found petitioner Jacinto, Valencia, and Capitle guilty of qualified theft. Each
was sentenced to imprisonment of five (5) years, five (5) months, eleven (11) days as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days, as maximum. The three
petitioned the decision to the CA on December 16, 2003

ISSUE: Is stealing a worthless check count as an Impossible Crime?

HELD:
Yes. An Impossible Crime fulfills the following conditions:
1) An act performed as offense against persons or property.
2) An act done with evil intent.
3) Accomplishing the act is inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
In the context of the petitioner, taking the check demonstrates the intent for theft, but it was
impossible to complete the act because the check was unfunded. And since theft is not a
continuing offense, the petitioner's act of receiving the marked bills during the entrapment
should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. This is at most corroborating evidence
to strengthen proof of her intent to gain. The CA modifies its decision on December 16, 2003,
and its resolution dated March 5, 2004. Petitioner Jacinto is found guilty of an impossible
crime as per Articles 4 and 59 of the RPC, and is sentenced to to six (6) months of arresto
mayor, and to pay the costs.
 ARISTOTLE VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Frustrated or Consumated Theft

Laws Applicable: RPC Art. 6
Doctrine: Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento,
is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same
FACTS: Sometime in May 1994, petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside SM North
EDSA by security guard Lorenzo Lago, unloading cases of detergent Tide Ultramatic on an
open parking space. Minutes later, petitioner loaded the cartons of detergent while Calderon
was looking into a taxi and procedeed to leave the parking area. Lago stopped the cab,
checked the cartons, and asked for a receipt but Valezuela and Calderon reacted a fled on foot.
The same were apprehended on the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered was worth
P12,090
The two pleaded not guilty. Valenzuela said that he was with a friend to buy snacks when they
heard a gunshot fired by Lago. Calderon, on the other hand, said that he was with his cousin
when he heard a gunshot fired by Lago that caused everyone to flee on the viscinity.
RTC convicted the appellants guilty of consumated theft. CA affirmed. Petitioner contends that
he was only guilty of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprefended, he was never
placed in a position to freely dispose the articles stolen.
ISSUE: WON Valenzuela is guilty of consumated theft.
RULING: YES. Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and
attempted felonies. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Finally, it is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a subjective phase, or that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and
the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the
objective phase begins. It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase
of the offense, the crime is merely attempted On the other hand, the subjective phase is
completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, [s]ubjectively the crime
is complete.
The determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial
concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender.

The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea supplies an
important characteristic of a crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act
for there to be a crime, and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting.

We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated
theft. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft
under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. Hence,
the petition is DENIED
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FREDIE LIZADA
G.R. No. 143468-71. January 24, 2003

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Attempted Felonies

Ponente: Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr.

Doctrine: The spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal

liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime
committed by him before his desistance.

FACTS: In August 1998, the petitioner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force, violence and intimidation Analia Orillosa, his stepdaughter, by embracing,
kissing, and touching her private parts. He then proceeded with carnal knowedge to remove
her skirt and panty and placed himself on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
This allegation was repeated four times in a different occasions.
However, medical examination revealed that Analia’s hymen was intact, and the other parts of
her vagina was not injured due to an insertion of average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection.
The testimony of Rossel, Analia’s sister, also proved that no insertion of penis happened
because the petitioner stopped after he saw her.
Hence, petitioner was charged for four counts of qualified rape under four separate
information. RTC accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him
and sentenced to Death Penalty in each and every case as provided for in the seventh
paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, petitioner averred in his brief that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that the testimony of Rossel was not taken into consideration in the
decision.
ISSUE: WON Lizada is guilty of acts of lasciviousness only.
RULING: NO. Accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential
elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

 The offender commencesthe commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

 He does not performall the acts of execution which should producethe felony;

 The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneousdesistance;

 The non-performance of all acts of executionwas due to causeor accident other than
his spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his spontaneous
desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony.The law does not punish him for his attempt
to commit a felony.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission
of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her.
However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape
by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of
the victims brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joys private organ. Accordingly, as
the crime committed by the appellant is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him
should be an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE IN COMPOSITE CRIMES SUCH AS
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE

PEOPLE V. EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO

G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012

FACTS: The accused in this case is Edmundo Villaflores who was also known as “Batman” in
their neighborhood and was known to be a drug-addict. The victim is a four-year old girl
named Marita. On July 2, 1999, Marita was last seen by her mother Julia to be playing at the
rear of their residence, when her mother noticed that she was missing, she called her husband
who rushed home to find their daughter. At 6:00AM of July 3, 1999, they found Marita’s lifeless
body covered with blue and yellow sack five houses away from their home. The result of the
postmortem examination showed that the child was raped and the cause of death is asphyxia
by strangulation.

Upon police investigation, two (2) witnesses who were Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Stadium
pointed Villaflores as the culprit. Both witnesses narrated that at about 10:00AM on July 2,
1999, they saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. At noon, the three used shabu for a while,
but the witnesses did not see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores’ house. It was only on 3:00PM
that they heard cries of a child. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Batman carrying a yellow
sack which appears heavy, the same sack that he saw when they are still inside the house of
Batman. The wife of the accused also gave a supporting testimony that on the night of July 2,
1999 she saw his husband place some sacks under their house and then went closer and saw
a protruding elbow inside the sack, when she confronted his husband who was on drugs,
Villaflores said it was nothing. Based from these circumstances, the RTC convicted Villaflores
of a rape with homicide holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but
that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the
conviction.

The accused appealed and argued that both RTC and CA erred in convicting him of a
composite crime of Rape with homicide through circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE: Can the accused be convicted of a composite crime of rape with homicide through
circumstantial evidence?

HELD: YES. In order to convict Villaflores for the composite crime of rape with homicide, the
State must thus prove the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had
carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge without the
consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape.

Under the RPC as amended, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal
knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape,
because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge.
Marita’s Certificate of Live Birth disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating
her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime
on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape.
The crime becomes a composite crime of rape with homicide when it was made on the
occasion of the rape, which refers to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during
the commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, for as long as the killing is lined
to rape.
Although the best evidence to prove rape is the testimony of the victim herself, the rule held
that the Rules of Court allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime
as well as the identity of the culprit when the rape victim is herself killed; provided however,
that such circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction.

A circumstantial evidence is sufficient when (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the
facts from which the inferences derived are proven and (3) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With the
circumstances provided by the testimonies of different witnesses, the RTC and the CA
appreciated the circumstances together and were seen as strands which create a pattern and
formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the
exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with homicide.