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PROBLEMS:

1.X brought seven (7) sacks of palay to the PNR. He paid its freight charges and was issued Way Bill no. 1.
The cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of the train. Without any permission, X boarded the freight
wagon and not the passenger coach. Shortly after the train started, it was derailed. The freight wagon fell
on its side, killing X. There is no evidence that X brought a ticket or paid his fare at the same time that he
paid the freight charges for his cargo.Is X a passenger of PNR?

A: No, X was not a “passenger.” X, who was a “stowaway,” was a mere trespasser. Hence, the carrier
assumesno dutyof careinfavorof X. (1989)
2. CityRailways,Inc.(CRI)providestrainservice,forafee,tocommuters from Manila to Calamba, Laguna.
Commuters are required to purchase tickets and then proceed to the designated loading and unloading
facilities to board the train. Ricardo Santos purchased a ticket for Calamba and entered the station. While
waiting, he had an altercation with the security guards of CRI leading to a fistfight. Ricardo Santos fell on the
railway just as a train was entering the station. Ricardo Santos was run over by the train. He died. In the
action for damages filed by the heirs of Ricardo Santos, CRI interposed lack of cause of action, contending
that the mishap occurred before Ricardo Santos boarded the train and that it was not guilty of negligence.
Decide.
A: The contention of CRI that the heirs have no cause of action is untenable.There was alreadya perfected
contract to carry Ricardo Santos andthecarrieralreadyowedhim extraordinarydiligence.Theobligationof the
carrier to carry Ricardo Santos to his destination was breached, hence, CRI is liable for culpa-contractual.
(2008)

CASES:
1. AM Trucking, a small company, operates two trucks for hire on selective basis. It caters to only
a few customers, and its trucks do not make regular or scheduled trips. It does not even have
a certificate of public convenience. On one occasion, Reynaldo contracted AM to transport, for a
fee, 100 sacks of rice from Manila to Tarlac. However, AM failed to deliver the cargo, becauseits
truckwas hijackedwhen thedriverstopped in Bulacan to visit his girlfriend. May Reynaldo hold AM
as a common carrier?
A: Yes. Reynaldo may be held liable as common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 does not make any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. This is also consistent with the definition of public service under the Public Service Act. (De
Guzman v. CA, 168 SCRA 612 [1988])

2. Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They
used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated
in Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him out
for two weeks, His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica‟s College in Malate,
Manila. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of F3,000.00 through the petitioner‟s minibus. The group was scheduled
to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o‟clock in the afternoon. However, as several members
of the party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue
and EDSA until 8:00 o‟clock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus. The
usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at
Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being
his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Baay in Lingayen,
Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway,
running on a south to east direction, which he described as “siete.” The road was slippery
because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per
hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the
road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side,
coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconuttree
whichithadhitfellon itandsmasheditsfrontportion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the
floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It took
three persons to safely remove her from this portion. She was in great pain and could not move.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was
not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving
the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve
when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers
per hour, but it was too late.

Are the petitioners operating as common carriers during the time of the accident?
A: Yes. It does not matter that the bus carried the passengers based on a special agreement and that the
passengers are limited to a certain group. Article 1732 of the NCC makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as “a sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basisand one offeringsuch serviceon an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article
1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of
the general population. Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions. (Fabre, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111127, July 26, 1996)

(Note that the driver was considered grossly negligence considering the fact that it was raining and the road
was slippery, that it was dark, thathe drove his bus at50kilometersanhourwhenevenon a goodday the
normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain. In the
same case, petitioners argued that they were not liable because (1) an earlier departure (made impossible
by the congregation‟s delayed meeting) could have averted the mishap and under the contract, the
WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. The Court ruled that neither of these
contentions holds water because the hour of departure had not been fixed and that even if it had been, the
delay did not bear directly on the cause of the accident.)

3. On November 12, 1984, Cebu Salvage Corporation (CSC) and Maria Cristina Chemicals
Industries, Inc. [MCCII] (as charterer) entered into a voyage charter wherein petitioner was to load
800 to 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo at Ayungon, Negros
Occidental for transport to and discharge at Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental to consignee
Ferrochrome Phils., Inc. Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, 1984, petitioner received and
loaded 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo which left Ayungon
for Tagoloan the next day. The shipment never reached its destination, however, because the M/T
Espiritu Santo sank in the afternoon of December 24, 1984 off the beach of Opol, Misamis
Oriental, resulting in the total loss of the cargo. MCCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment
with its insurer, respondent Philippine Home Assurance Corporation. Respondent paid the claim
in the amount of P211,500 and was subrogated to the rights of MCCII. Thereafter, it filed a case in
the RTC against CSC for reimbursement of theamountitpaidMCCII.CSCclaimsthatitisnotliable
insistingthat the agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII hired the vessel from its
owner, ALS Timber Enterprises (ALS). Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, petitioner
did not have control and supervision over the vessel, its master and crew. Thus, it could not
allegedly be held liable for the loss of the shipment caused bythe sinking of a ship it did not
own. Will the action prosper?
A: Yes,theactionwillprosper.There is a contractof carriageof goods between CSC and MCCII; the cargo
was loadedon board the vessel; loss or non-delivery of the cargo was proven; and petitioner failed to prove
that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss or that it was due to some casualty or force
majeure. The voyage charter here being a contract of affreightment, the carrier was answerable for the
loss of the goods received for transportation.
CSC was the one that contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control over what vessel it
would use. All throughout its dealings with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The factthatit
did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did not negate its character
and dutiesas a common carrier. The MCCII (respondent‟s subrogor) could not be reasonably expected to
inquire about the ownership of the vessels which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it is
very difficult and often impossible for the general public to enforce its rights of action under a contract of
carriage if it should be required to know whom the actual owner of the vessel is. In fact, in this case, the
voyage charter itselfdenominatedthepetitionerasthe“owner/operator”of the vessel.
Thebillofladingwasmerelya receiptissuedbyALStoevidencethe factthatthegoods had beenreceived for
transportation. It was not signed by MCCII, as in fact it was simply signed by the supercargo of ALS. This
is consistent with the fact that MCCII did not contract directly with ALS. While it is true that a bill of
lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the parties, it cannot prevail over the express
provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and petitioner executed.
Finally, petitioner cannot argue that MCCII should be held liable for its own loss since the voyage charter
stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterer‟s account. This deserves scant consideration. This
simply meant that the charterer would take care of having the goods insured. It could not exculpate the
carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage. The law, in fact, prohibits it and condemns
it as unjust and contrary to publicpolicy.

The idea proposed by petitioner is not only pre-posterous, it is also dangerous. It says that a carrier that
enters into a contract of carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper if it does not own the vessel it
chooses to use. MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS
for reimbursement for its loss. Certainly, to permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for
the goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging non-ownership of the vessel it
employed) would radically derogate from the carrier‟s duty of extraordinary diligence. It would also open the
door to collusion between the carrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting of liability from
the carrier to one without any financial capability to answer for the resulting damages. (Cebu Salvage
Corporation v. Philippine Home Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 150403, January 25, 2007)
PROBLEMS:
1. Tirso Molina charters a vessel owned and operated by Star Shipping Co., a common carrier, for the
purposeof transporting two tractorstohis logging concession. The crane operator of the shipping
company somehow negligently puts the tractors in a place where they would tilt each other.
During the trip, a strong wind hits the vessel, causing severe damageto the tractors. Tirso Molina
sues the shipping company for damages. The latter cites a stipulation in the charter agreement
exempting the company from liability for loss or damage arising from the negligence of its agents.
Tirso Molina countered by stating that the aforementioned stipulation is against public policy and
therefore, null and void. Is the stipulation valid? Would you hold the shipping company
liable?
A: Yes. Thestipulationisvalidiftherewasbareboatcharter.Acommon carrier that undertakes to carry a
special cargo or charter to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a
stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid, being not against public
policy. Hence, Star Shipping Company is not liable.
2. During the elections last May, AB, a congressional candidate in Marinduque,charteredthe
helicopterownedbyLobeMiningCorporation (LMC) for use in the election campaign. AB paid
LMC the same rate normally charged by companies regularly engaged in the plane chartering
business. In the charter agreement between LMC and AB, LMC expressly disclaimed any
responsibility for the acts or omissions of its pilot or for the defective condition of the plane‟s
engine. The helicopter crashed killing AB. Investigations disclose that the pilot‟s error was the
cause of the accident. LMC now consults you on its possible liability for AB‟s death in the light
of the above findings. How would you reply to LMC‟s query?
A: I would reply to LMC that it may not be held liable for the death of AB. A stipulation with private carrier
that would disclaim responsibility for simple negligence of the carrier‟s employees is a valid stipulation.
Such stipulation, however, will not hold in case of liability for gross negligence or bad faith.
3. C Co. shipped 20,000 bags of soy beans through S/S Melon, owned and operated by X Shipping
Lines, consigned to the Toyo Factory and insured by the Surety Insurance Co., against all risks.
C Co. hired the entire vessel, with the option to go north or south, loading, stowing and
discharging at its risks and expense. The owner and the shipper agree on a stipulation exempting
the owner from liability for the negligence of its agents.
When the cargo as delivered to the consignee, there were shortages amounting to P10,500.00. The
insurance company paid for the damage and soughtreimbursementfromtheX ShippingLinesascarrier.
Isthe carrier liable?
A: X Shipping Lines is not liable if there was bareboat charter. X Shipping Lines agreed to carry a special
cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. Hence, the New Civil Code
provisions on common carriers cannot be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private
carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the ship owner from liability for the negligence of its
agents is not against policy and is deemed valid.

PROBLEM:

1. While at sea, the captain of vessel A received distress signals from vessel B, and vessel A
responded and found vessel B with engine failure and drifting off course. Upon acceptance by vessel B of
vessel A’s offer, vessel A connected two lines to vessel B and towed it safely to port. There was no grave
marine peril because the sea was smooth and vessel B was far from the rocks. In a suit for compensation
for towage, who are entitled to recover, the owner, the crew, or both? Give brief reasons. (1979 Bar)

A: The shipowner of the towing vessel is entitled to compensation. What is involved in the present case
is towage and not salvage. Hence, contract is between the owner of the towing vessel and the shipowner of
the vessel that is being towed. Services are rendered by the towing vessel for which it is entitled to
compensation. It would be different if the case involves salvage where the members of the crew of the vessel
that performed the salvage are entitled to compensation. However, there is no salvage in the present case
but a contract of towage.

PROBLEMS:
1. Aistheregisteredownerof atruckforhire.HesoldthetrucktoB and possession was immediately
delivered to B who operated the same. The truck however, remained registered in the name of
A. While operating the truck, B‟s driver ran over a child who died thereafter. The heirs of the
child sued A for damages. A‟s defense isthathecannotbeheldliableashehadalreadysoldthe
truckto B and it was B‟s driver who was responsible for the accident. Decide with reasons.
A: A is liable to the heirs of the victim. Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner remains to
be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the registered owner of
a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle.
2. A wasdrivinga jeepneyregisteredin thenameof B. Thejeepney, while being driven negligently
by A, hit and injured X, so X sued B for damages. The defense of B was that he sold the jeepney
to C and that X should sue C. Rule on B‟s defense, with reasons.
A: The defense of B is untenable and he is liable to X. Under the registeredowner rule, theregisteredowner
remainsto be liableto third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the
registered owner of a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle.
Hence, B, being the registered owner, continues to be the owner of the vehicle as regards the public and
third persons. (1979)
3. Mr. Villa, a franchise holder and registered owner of a truck for hire, entered into a lease
contract with Mrs. Santos for the lease by the latter of said truck. The lease contract was not
broughtto the knowledge of the LFTRB and was therefore not approved by the Land LFTRB.
One stormy night, the said truck was speeding along EDSA, skidded and ran over X who died
on the spot. The parents of X brought an action for damages against Mr. Villa for the death of
their son.
a. Will the action against Mr. Villa prosper? Reasons.
b. What recourse, if any, does X have?
A: a) Yes, the action against Mr. Villa will prosper. Under the registered
owner rule, the registered owner remains to be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer.
As to thirdpersons,the registered owner of a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of anyunregisteredsale
of the vehicle.This is especially true in cases involvingholdersof franchises.Theholdersoffranchisesareliable
to the public even if their vehicles are leased to another without prior approval of the appropriate
government agency.
b) An action for quasi-delict can also be maintained by the heirs of X against Mrs. Santos and/or the driver of
the vehicle. The driver may also be charged criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.

4. Johnny owns a Sarao jeepney. He asked his neighbor Van if he could operate the said jeep
under Van‟s certificate of public convenience. Van agreed and, accordingly, Johnny registered
his jeep in Van‟s name. On June 10, 1990, one of the passenger jeepneys operated by Van
bumped Tomas. Tomas was injured and in due time, he filed a complaint for damages against
Van and his driver for the injuries he suffered. The court rendered judgment in favor of
Tomas and ordered Van and his driver, jointly and severally liable, to pay Tomas actual and moral
damages, attorney‟s fees and costs. The sheriff levied on the jeepney belonging to Johnny but
registered in the name of Van. Johnny filed a third-party claim with the sheriff alleging
ownership of the jeepney levied upon and stating that the jeepney was registered in the name of
Van merely to enable Johnny to make use of Van‟s certificate of public convenience.
May the sheriff proceed with the public auction of Johnny‟s jeepney?
A: Yes, the sheriff may proceed with the auction sale of the jeepney. The vehicle remains to be the
property of the registered owner despite the alleged transfer to another. As regards the public and third
persons, the vehicle is considered the property of the registered operator. (Santos v. Sibug, 104 SCRA
520 [1990])

PROBLEM:
1. A, in Manila, shipped on board a vessel of B, chairs to be used in the movie house of consignee
C in Cebu. No date for delivery or indemnity for delay was stipulated. The chairs, however, were
not claimed promptly by C and were shipped by mistake back to Manila, where it was
discovered and re- shipped to Cebu. By the time the chairs arrived, the date of inauguration of
the movie house passed by and it had to be postponed. C brings an action for damages against B
claiming loss of profits during the Christmas season when he expected the movie house to
be opened. Decide the case with reasons.
A: C may sue B for the loss of his profits provided that ample proof thereof is presented in court. The
carrier is obligated to transport the goods without delay. The carrier is liable if he is guilty of delay in the
shipment of cargo, causing damages to the consignee. (1979)

PROBLEM:
1. If a shipper, without changing the place of delivery changesthe consignment of consignee of
the goods (after said goods had been delivered to the carrier), under what condition will the carrier
be required to comply with the new orders of the shipper?
A: Article 360 provides that if the shipper should change the consignee of the goods without changing their
destination,thecarriershallcomply with the new order provided the shipper returns to the carrier the bill of lading
and a new one is issued showing the novation of the contract. However, the shipper must pay all expenses
for the change. (1975)

PROBLEMS:
1. Maria boarded a passenger truck owned by Metro Transit and driven by Juan. While the truck was
proceeding to its destination, it fell into a ravine and several passengers, including Maria were
killed. The truck was insured under a Common Carrier‟s policy with Island Insurance
Company. State the liabilities, if any, of Metro Transit to the heirs ofMaria.
A: Metro Transit is liable to the heirs of Maria for breach of contract of carriage. It is clear that there was
breach of contract of carriage because the passenger died while riding the carrier. The fact that deathor
injurywascausedgivesrisetothepresumptionof negligence. (1968)

2. A shipped 100 pieces of plywood from Davao City to Manila. He took a marine insurance policy to
insure the shipment against loss or damage due to “perils of the sea, barratry, fire, jettison,
pirates and other such perils.” When the ship left the port of Davao, the shipman in charge forgot to
secure one of the portholes, through which sea water seeped during the voyage, damaging the
plywood. A filed a claim against the insurance company which refused to pay on the ground
that the lossor damage was due to a perilof the sea or any of the risks covered by the policy. It
was admitted that the sea was reasonably calm during the voyage and that no strong winds or
waves were encountered by the vessel. How would you decide the case? Explain.

A: The insurer validly refused to pay because the proximate cause of the damage to the plywood was not
the perils or risks insured against but rather the negligence of the shipman in charge in forgetting to secure one
of the portholes of the ship. However, A can recover his damages from the shipowner or ship agent of said
vessel, for not having exer- cisedextraordinarydiligenceon vigilanceover goods.(1983)

PROBLEMS AND CASES:


1. Peterhaileda taxicabownedandoperatedbyJimmyChengand driven by Hemie Cortez. Peter
asked Cortez to take him to his office in Malate. On the way to Malate, the taxicab collided with a
passenger jeepney, as a result of which Peter was injured, i.e., he fractured his left leg. Peter sued
Jimmyfor damages, basedupon a contract of carriage, and Peter won. Jimmy wanted to challenge
the decision before the Supreme Court on the ground that the trial court erred in not making an
express finding as to whether or not Jimmy was responsible for the collision and, hence, civilly liable
to Peter. He went to see you for advice. What will you tellhim? Explain your answer.
A: I will counsel Jimmy to desist from challenging the decision. The cause of action of Peter is culpa
contractual, hence, the carrier‟s negligence is presumed. The presumption arises because there is no
question that there was a contract of carriage between Peter and the carrier and Peter was injured while
under the care of the said carrier. Consequently, the burden of proof rests on Jimmy to establish that despite
an exercise of utmost diligence the collision could not have been avoided. (1990)
2. In an action grounded on the contract of carriage, is there a need for the court to make an express
finding of fault or negligence on thepartofthecarrierinordertoholditliableforclaimsinbehalf of the
injured or deceased passengers? Explain.
A: No, common carriersare presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in the case of
death or injuries to passengers. The burden is upon the carrier to prove that he observed the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all circumstances. (1982)
3. In a court case involving claims for damages arising from death and injury of bus passengers,
counsel for the bus operator files a demurrer to evidence arguing that the complaint should be
dismissed because the plaintiffs did not submit any evidence that the operator or its employees
were negligent. If you were the judge, would you dismiss the complaint?
A: No, I will not dismiss the complaint provided that there was proof of the death of and/or injury to
passengers. Negligence on the part of the carrier is presumed the moment the passenger with whom the
carrier had a contract is injured. The burden is on the common carrier to prove that he has a valid
defense. (1997)

4. Plaintiff alleges thst he is the owner and consignee of two cases of books, shipped in
good order and condition at New York, USA, on board the defendant‟s steamship
President Garfield, for transport and delivery to the plaintiff in the City of Manila, all freight
charges paid. The two cases arrived in Manila on September 1, 1927, in bad order and damaged
condition, resulting in the total loss of one case and a partialloss of the other. The loss in one case
is PI,630.00, and the other P700.00, for which he filed his claims, and defendant has refused and
neglected to pay, giving as its reason that the damage in question “was caused by sea water.”
Is the defendant liable to the plaintiff?
Yes, the defendant is liable. The defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty
was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them. From the time of their
delivery to the defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were
under the control and supervision of the defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The
defendant having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the
burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the
damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from liability. As to how the boxes were
damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of the
defendant and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To require the
plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force him to call and rely upon the
employees of the defendant‟s ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not recover
any damage for any reason. That is not the law.

Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and
when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to
the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that
the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise,
the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.

And the evidence for the defendant shows that the damage was largely caused by “sea water,” from
which it contends that it is exempt under the provisions of its bill of lading and the provisions of the
Article 361 of the Code of Commerce.

In the final analysis, the cases were received by the defendant in New York in good order and condition,
and when they arrived in Manila, they were in bad condition, and one was a total loss. The fact that the
cases were damaged by “sea water,” standing alone and within itself, is not evidence that they were
damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the defendant‟s control. The words perils of the sea,” as
stated in defendant‟s brief apply to “all kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering,
stranding,” and among other things, it is said: “Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are
within the expression,” and “where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the shipowner is excused.”
“Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in both words „peril‟ or „accident.‟ ”
(Amado Mirasol v. The Robert Dollar Co., G.R. No. L- 29721, March 27, 1929)

5. It appears that sometime in the evening of March 10, 1995, atthe Manila Domestic Airport, the late
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa boarded and rode a taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a passenger vehicle for hire
owned and operated by defendant corporation under the business name “Avis Coupon Taxi” (Avis)
and driven by its employee and authorized driver Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to Teacher‟s
Village, Diliman, Quezon City. At about 11:00 p.m., the taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos
Avenue [EDSA], in front of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed. While going up the Boni
Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it overtook another cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to pass another
vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the flyover
and the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, its driver
(Padilla) was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left
causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA
below. The forceful drop of the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two parts. Both driver
Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K. Ochoa were injured and rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue
Medical Center, Ochoa was not as lucky as Padilla who was alive. He was declared dead on arrival from the
accident. The death certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City cited the cause of
his death as vehicular accident. G&S argues that it is not liable because the collision was allegedly
unforeseen since its driver had every right to expect that the delivery van would just overtake him and not hit
the side of the taxi. Is G&S liable?
A: Yes, G&Sis liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial. Whatis clear fromthe records is that there existed a
contract of carriage between G & S , as the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose
Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a common carrier, G&S “is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard forallthecircumstances.”However,Jose Marcialwas notableto reach hisdestinationsafelyashe
diedduringthecourseof thetravel.“Ina contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault
or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make
an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.
This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence.” Unfortunately, G&S miserably failed to overcome this presumption because it
is clear that the accident which led to Jose Marcial‟s death was due to the reckless driving and gross
negligence of G&S‟ driver, Padilla, thereby holding G&S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of
contract of carriage. (Heirs of Marcial K. Ochoa v. G&S Transport Corporation, G.R. Nos.
170071 and 170125, March 9, 2011)

PROBLEMS AND CASES:

1. X, an 80-year old epileptic, boarded the S/S Tamaraw in Manila going to Mindoro. To
disembark, the passengers have to walk through a gangplank. While negotiating the gangplank,
X slipped and fell into the waters. X was saved from drowning and was brought to a hospital but
after a month died from pneumonia. Except for X, all passengers were able to walk through the
gangplank. What is the liability of the owner of S/S Tamaraw?
A: The owner of S/S Tamaraw is liable for the death of X. Failure to exercise utmost diligence in the
safety of passengers is presumed the moment the passenger did not reach his destination. In the
present case, X was still a passenger when he fell into the waters because he was only disembarking from
the vessel. Hence, the presumption against the carrier is operative. It is up to the carrier to prove its
exercise of utmost diligence.
Moreover, it is well-settled that if, in the use of a gangplank, a passenger falls off and is injured, the
carrier is liable for the injuries sustained irrespective of the cause of the fall if a sufficient gangplank
would have prevented the injury. (1989)
2. A bus of GL Transit on its way to Davao stopped to enable a passenger to alight. At that moment,
Santiago, who had been waiting for a ride, boarded the bus. However, the bus driver failed to
notice Santiago who was still standing on the bus platform, and stepped on the accelerator.
Because of the sudden motion, Santiago slipped and fell down, suffering serious injuries. May
Santiago hold GL Transmit liable for breach of contract of carriage?
A: Yes.Santiago mayhold GL Transit liable for breach of contract. It is well-settled that, motor vehicles
like passenger jeepneys and buses are duty bound to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time
in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries
suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their
conveyances while they do so. (Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 95582,
October 7, 1991, 202 SCRA 574) Obviously, the driver of the bus did not exercise utmost diligence
in affording Santiago reasonable opportunity to board the bus. (1996).
3. On October 14, 1993, about half an hour past seven o‟clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station (operated by LRTA) after purchasing a “token”
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the
LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area (who was an employee
of Prudent Security Agency) approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fistfight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad
later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. The moving train struck Navidad, and he was killed
instantaneously. Are LRTA and Prudentliable?
A: Yes,LRTA is liable but Prudent is NOT liable. The law requires common carriers
to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they
ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier
on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the
presumptionwouldbethatit has been atfault,anexception from the general rule that negligence must be
proved.
The foundation of LRTA‟s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises
from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common
carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire
its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task.
In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
With respect to Prudent, if at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and
related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the
employer‟s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer canthen be made liableon the basisof the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is
primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. Unfortunately, thereis nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason
that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. Hence, Prudent cannot be made
liable. (Light Railway Transit Authority v. Marjorie Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, February 6,
2003)

4. On May 13, 1985, private respondentsfiled a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death
of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on at Marivic, Sapid,
Mankayan, Benguet. It was alleged that on March 25, 1985, while petitioner Theodore M.
Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and
imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons
and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito
immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare
of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before
bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
The place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both between
Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same. The victim fell
from the platform of the bus when it suddenly physical evidence on where he was thereafter found in
relation to the bus when it stopped.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride
on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same. Is the
argument tenable? Is the carrier liable?
A: The carrier is liable. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no
knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his
intention to board the same is not tenable. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person
who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect
making a continuous offer to bus riders.
Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would
have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The
premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or
motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity
to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the
sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be
considered negligent under the circumstances.
In this case, the bus had “just started” and “was still in slow motion” at the point where the victim had boarded
and was on its platform.
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to attempt to board a train or streetcar which is
moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt to board the moving
conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from a
slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience and both the driver and conductor in this case
could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger
and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held
that the duty which the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well
as to those alighting therefrom.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the gravely injured
victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible proof of their
negligence. It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized as callous indifference. (Dangwa
Transportation Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95582, October 7, 1991)
5. On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husbandand wife, together with theirminor
daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2 years old,
boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and
operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At
the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal
belongings. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half- brother of plaintiff Mariano
Beltran, issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No
fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in
accordance with the appellant‟s rules and regulations.
After about an hour‟s trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs,
Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggage, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his
wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the
road about four or five meters awayfrom the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to
get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him,
unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for
the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose
motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said
conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus
was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs
had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running
board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landedon the side of the road almost in front of
the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to
gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The
child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier
togetherwith her parents.
Is the carrier liable?
A: Yes, the carrier is liable for damages for the death of the child,
Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his
wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated
for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the
vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the
bus. There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for
his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the
petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where
the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier‟s servant or employee in removing his baggage from the
car. The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a
place about 5 meters away from the bus,the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of
carriage also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment
the passenger alights from the carrier‟s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave
the carrier‟s premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along
the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his
destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company‟s premises, but before actually
doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith
and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed
reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the
protection of the railroad and company and its agents.

In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when
they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However,
although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the
bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving
vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the
circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier‟s agent had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a
“very cautions person”requiredby Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed bya common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although
stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before
the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of
the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the
protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can
be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The plaintiffs
sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it was alleged in the
complaint that “the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs‟ daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of
exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent.”
This allegation was also proven when it was established during the trial that the driver, even before
receiving the proper signalfrom the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board
of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its
employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of
a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption,
as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be
adjudged pecuniarily liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran. (La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 739)

6. The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel MTV Antonia,
owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having
purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. „B‟). On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived
at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been
provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank, Anacleto Viana
disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the
Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel
pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. „21) between the third party
defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was
placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started
operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto
Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes
were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said
vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of
the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three days
thereafter, on May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the Death Certificate being “hypostatic
pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder.”

Is the carrier liable? Was Viana still a passenger at the time of the accident?
Yes, the carrier is liablefor the death of the victim. The victim was stilla passenger at that time. The rule
is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port
of destination and has left the vessel owner‟s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not
ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from
the carrier‟s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier‟s premises. All persons
who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from
all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggageandprepareforhisdeparture.
Thecarrier-passengerrelationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been
carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier‟s premises to claim his
baggage.
The victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident
occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from
petitioner‟s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to
their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage. Even if he had already
disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner‟s premises was not without cause. The victim had
to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly
standard procedure in the case of petitioner‟s vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after
that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a
passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
There is no showing that petitioner was extra-ordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said
precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry
into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate
the “utmost diligence of very cautious persons” to be exercised “as far as human care and foresight can
provide” which is required by law of common carriers with respect to their passengers

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