8.

LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Republic of the Philippines negligence in the

SUPREME COURT performance of his duty
Manila obligation to us, to
defend us in the
FIRST DIVISION aforesaid case. That the
said attorney without
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995 informing us the reason
why and riding high on
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN the trust and confidence
Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. we repose on him either
MANAS, and TRINIDAD abandoned, failed to
NORDISTA, complainants, act accordingly, or
vs. seriously neglected to
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent. answer the civil
complaint against us in
the sala of Judge
Teresita Capulong Case
DAVIDE JR., J.: No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro
Manila so that we were
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the deduced [sic] in default.
complainants, former clients of the
respondent, pray that the latter be 2. That under false
disbarred for "malpractice, neglect pretenses Atty. Fojas
and other offenses which may be assured us that
discovered during the actual everything was in order.
investigation of this complaint." They That he had already
attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit answered the complaint
wherein they specifically allege: so that in spite of the
incessant demand for
1. That we are him to give us a copy he
Defendants-Appellates continued to deny same
[sic] in the Court of to us. Only to disclose
Appeals Case No. CA- later that he never
G.N. CV No. 38153 of answered it after all
which to our surprise lost because according to
unnecessarily the him he was a very busy
aforesaid Petition [sic]. A man. Please refer to
close perusal of the case Court of Appeals
reveals the serious decision dated August
misconduct of our 17, 1993.
attorney on record, Atty.
Amado Fojas 3. That because of Atty.
tantamount to Amado Foja's neglect
malpractice and and malpractice of law
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
we lost the Judge
Capulong case and our
appeal to the Court of
Appeals. So that it is only
proper that Atty. Fojas
be disciplined and
disbarred in the practice
of his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent
admits his "mistake" in failing to file the
complainants' answer in Civil Case
No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it
was cured by his filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which was
unfortunately denied by the court. He
asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91
was a "losing cause" for the
complainants because it was based
on the expulsion of the plaintiff
therein from the Far Eastern University
Faculty Association (FEUFA) which
was declared unlawful in the final
decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050.
Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in
the Regional Trial Court is not
imputable to [his] mistake but rather
imputable to the merits of the
case, i.e., the decision in the
Expulsion case wherein defendants
(complainants herein) illegally
removed from the union (FEUFA)
membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . .
." He further claims that the
complainants filed this case to harass
him because he refused to share his
attorney's fees in the main labor case
he had handled for them. The
respondent then prays for the
dismissal of this complaint for utter
lack of merit, since his failure to file the
answer was cured and, even
granting for the sake of argument
that such failure amounted to
negligence, it cannot warrant his
disbarment or suspension from the
practice of the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the
respondent's Comment.
Issues having been joined, we
required the parties to inform us
whether they were willing to submit
this case for decision on the basis of
the pleadings they have filed. In their
separate compliance, both
manifested in the affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago,
Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro
Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were
the President, Vice-President,
Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively,
of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled
from the union Paulino Salvador. The
latter then commenced with the
Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a complaint
(NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare
illegal his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990,
Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin
declared illegal Salvador's expulsion
and directed the union and all its
officers to reinstate Salvador's name
in the roll of union members with all
the rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto. This resolution was affirmed in
toto by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
172, a complaint against the
complainants herein for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-
V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the
respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the said case on grounds of (1) res
judicata by virtue of the final decision
of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-
10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction,
since what was involved was an intra-
union issue cognizable by the DOLE.
Later, he filed a supplemental motion
to dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita
Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion
and ordered the dismissal of the
case. Upon Salvador's motion for
reconsideration, however, it
reconsidered the order of dismissal,
reinstated the case, and required the
complainants herein to file their
answer within a nonextendible period
of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the
respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and dismissal of the
case. This motion having been
denied, the respondent filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari, which
was later referred to the Court of
Appeals and docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his
subsequent motion for
reconsideration were both denied,
the respondent still did not file the
complainants' answer in Civil Case
No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff
Salvador's motion, the complainants
were declared in default, and
Salvador was authorized to present
his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to
set aside the order of default and to
stop the ex-parte reception of
evidence before the Clerk of Court,
but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a
decision ordering the complainants
herein to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff Salvador the amounts of
P200,000.00 as moral damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or
corrective damages; and P65,000.00
as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the
respondent, elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, which, however,
affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was
about to appeal the said decision to
this Court, but his services as counsel
for the complainants and for the
union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant Veronica
Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is
whether the respondent committed
culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing
to file for the complainants an answer
in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which
reason the latter were declared in
default and judgment was rendered
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

against them on the basis of the honor to the bar, and helps maintain
plaintiff's evidence, which was the respect of the community to the
received ex-parte. legal profession. 7

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is The respondent admits that it was his

obliged to act either as adviser or duty to file an answer in Civil Case No.
advocate for every person who may 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do
wish to become his client. He has the so in this wise:
right to decline
employment, subject, however, to
1 [I]n his overzealousness
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional to question the Denial
Responsibility. Once he agrees to Order of the trial
take up the cause of a client, the court, 8 [he] instead, thru
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause honest mistake and
and must always be mindful of the excusable neglect, filed
trust and confidence reposed in a PETITION
him.2 He must serve the client with FOR CERTIORARI with the
competence and diligence,3 and Honorable Court,
champion the latter's cause with docketed as G.R. No.
wholehearted fidelity, care, and 100983. . . .
devotion.4 Elsewise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the And, when the Court of
client, warm zeal in the maintenance Appeals, to which G.R. No.
and defense of his client's rights, and 100983 was referred, dismissed
the exertion of his utmost learning the petition, he again
and ability to the end that nothing be "inadvertently" failed to file an
taken or withheld from his client, save answer "[d]ue to honest
by the rules of law, legally mistake and because of his
applied.5 This simply means that his overzealousness as stated
client is entitled to the benefit of any earlier. . . . "
and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land In their Reply, the complainants
and he may expect his lawyer to allege that his failure to file an answer
assert every such remedy or was not an honest mistake but was
defense.6 If much is demanded from "deliberate, malicious and
an attorney, it is because the calculated to place them on the
entrusted privilege to practice law legal disadvantage, to their damage
carries with it the correlative duties and prejudice" for, as admitted by
not only to the client but also to the him in his motion to set aside the order
court, to the bar, and to the public. A of default, his failure to do so was
lawyer who performs his duty with "due to volume and pressure of legal
diligence and candor not only work."9 In short, the complainants
protects the interest of his client; he want to impress upon this Court that
also serves the ends of justice, does the respondent has given
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
inconsistent reasons to justify his
failure to file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In
his motion for reconsideration of the
default order, the respondent
explained his non-filing of the
required answer by impliedly invoking
forgetfulness occasioned by a large
volume and pressure of legal work,
while in his Comment in this case he
attributes it to honest mistake and
excusable neglect due to his
overzealousness to question the
denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the
one hand and "volume and pressure
of legal work" on the other are two
distinct and separate causes or
grounds. The first presupposes the
respondent's full and continuing
awareness of his duty to file an
answer which, nevertheless, he
subordinated to his conviction that
the trial court had committed a
reversible error or grave abuse of
discretion in issuing an order
reconsidering its previous order of
dismissal of Salvador's complaint and
in denying the motion to reconsider
the said order. The second ground is
purely based on forgetfulness
because of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second
ground, the fact remains that the
respondent did not comply with his
duty to file an answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was
compounded by his erroneous belief
that the trial court committed such
error or grave abuse of discretion and
by his continued refusal to file an
answer even after he received the
Court of Appeals' decision in
the certiorari case. There is no
showing whatsoever that he further
assailed the said decision before this
Court in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove
his claim of overzealousness to
challenge the trial court's order.
Neither was it shown that he alleged
in his motion to lift the order of default
that the complainants had a
meritorious defense. 10 And, in his
appeal from the judgment by
default, he did not even raise as one
of the errors of the trial court either
the impropriety of the order of default
or the court's grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to lift
that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal
work provide no excuse for the
respondent's inability to exercise due
diligence in the performance of his
duty to file an answer. Every case a
lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a
breach of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which
requires him to serve his clients, the
complainants herein, with diligence
and, more specifically, Rule 18.03
thereof which provides: "A lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render
him liable."
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

The respondent's negligence is not They could prove that the

excused by his claim that Civil Case
No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing
cause" for the complainants since the
claims therein for damages were
based on the final decision of the
Med-Arbiter declaring the
complainants' act of expelling
Salvador from the union to be illegal.
This claim is a mere afterthought
which hardly persuades us. If indeed
the respondent was so convinced of
the futility of any defense therein, he
should have seasonably informed the
complainants thereof. Rule 15.05,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising
his client, shall give a
candid and honest
opinion on the merits
and probable results of
the client's case, neither
overstating nor
understanding the
prospects of the case.
plaintiff was not entitled to all
the damages sought by him or
that if he were so, they could
ask for a reduction of the
amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule
that the respondent is not free from
any blame for the sad fate of the
complainants. He is liable for
inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS
is hereby REPRIMANDED and
ADMONISHED to be, henceforth,
more careful in the performance of
his duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and
Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.

Then too, if he were

unconvinced of any defense,
we are unable to understand
why he took all the trouble of
filing a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of res judicata and
lack of jurisdiction and of
questioning the adverse ruling
thereon initially with this Court
and then with the Court of
Appeals, unless, of course, he
meant all of these to simply
delay the disposition of the civil
case. Finally, the complainants
were not entirely without any
valid or justifiable defense.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Republic of the Philippines only to the client but also

SUPREME COURT to the court, to the bar or
Manila to the public. That
circumstance explains
EN BANC the public concern for
the maintenance of an
A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, untarnished standard of
1989 conduct by every
attorney towards his
MA. LIBERTAD SJ client. 1
CANTILLER, complainant,
vs. Subject of this administrative
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. complaint is Humberto V.
POTENCIANO, respondent. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and
a member of the Philippine Bar under
Eduardo Cabreros, Jr. for Roll No. 21862. He is charged with
complainant. deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation,
and also with gross misconduct,
RESOLUTION malpractice and of acts
unbecoming of an officer of the
court.

PER CURIAM The essential facts are as follows: 2

Public interest requires Complainant herein is the sister of

that an attorney exert his
best efforts and ability in
the prosecution or
defense of his client's
cause. A lawyer who
performs that duty with
diligence and candor
not only protects the
interests of his client; he
also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the
bar and helps maintain
the respect of the
community to the legal
profession. This is so
because the entrusted
privilege to practice law
carries with it the
correlative duties not
Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an
action for "ejectment" docketed as
Civil Case No. 6046 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Another action, likewise involving
Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was
then pending before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro
Manila docketed as Civil Case No.
54117 for "reconveyance with
damages." Both actions involve the
apartment unit being rented by
complainant and her sister.
When the two cases were
concluded, Peregrina came out the
losing party. Civil Case No. 54117 for
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
reconveyance was ordered
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court
on June 8, 1987 while Civil Case No.
6046 for ejectment was decided by
the Metropolitan Trial Court against
her.
On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the
writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 6046 for ejectment, complainant
and Peregrina were served a notice
to vacate the rented premises within
four (4) days from receipt of notice.
Desperate and at a loss on what to
do, they consulted a certain Sheriff
Pagalunan, on the matter.
Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them
to herein respondent. After such
introduction, the parties "impliedly
agreed" that respondent would
handle their case. Forthwith, a
petition entitled "Annulment of
Judgment, Annulment of Sale and
Damages with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Order,
etc." was prepared by respondent to
forestall the execution of the order to
vacate in Civil Case No. 6046.
In the afternoon of October 9,1987,
the complainant was made to sign
by respondent what she described as
a "[h]astily prepared, poorly
conceived, and haphazardly
composed petition for annulment
3 given to the judge who would issue
of judgment. Complainant alleges
that respondent promised her that
the necessary restraining order would
be secured if only because the judge
who would hear the matter was his
"katsukaran" (close friend).
Thereupon, the petition was filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed as
Civil Case No. 55118. Respondent
demanded from the complainant
one thousand pesos (P l,000.00) as
attorney's fee which the latter paid
that same afternoon.
However, when the case was raffled
and assigned to Branch 153, the
presiding judge asked respondent to
withdraw as counsel in the case on
the ground of their friendship.
On October 11, 1987, respondent
went to the house of complainant
and asked her to be ready with two
thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) to be
given to another judge who will issue
the restraining order in the ejectment
case (Civil Case No. 6046).
Complainant and her sister were only
able to raise the amount of one
thousand pesos which they
immediately gave to respondent.
Later respondent informed the
complainant and her sister that he
could not locate the judge who
would issue the restraining order. The
parties, then, instead went to the
Max's Restaurant where respondent
ordered some food - including two
plastic bags of food allegedly to be
the restraining order. At this juncture,
respondent asked for the remaining
balance of the two thousand pesos
(P 2,000.00) which he earlier
demanded. Complainant gave her
last money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Sometime after the filing of Civil Case
No. 55118, respondent informed
complainant and Peregrina that
there was a need to file another case
with the Regional Trial Court to
enable them to retain possession of
the apartment. For this purpose,
respondent told complainant to
prepare the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to be
deposited with the Treasurer's Office
of Pasig as purchase price of the
apartment and another one
thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover
the expenses of the suit. Respondent
stressed to the complainant the need
and urgency of filing the new
complaint.
Complainant and Peregrina raised
the said amounts through the
kindness of some friends and
relatives. On October 26,1987, the
money was handed over to the
respondent.
On the same date, a complaint for
"Specific Performance, Annulment of
Simulated or Spurious Sale with
Damages," later docketed as Civil
Case No. 55210, was filed by
respondent with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 165, Pasig, Metro
Manila.
At the hearing of the preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on
October 30, 1987, respondent,
contrary to his promise that he would
secure a restraining order, withdrew
his appearance as counsel for
complainant. Complainant was not
able to get another lawyer as
replacement. Thus, no restraining
order or preliminary injunction was
obtained. As a consequence, the
order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046
was eventually enforced and
executed.
Sometime thereafter, it came to
complainant's knowledge that there
was really no need to make a deposit
of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00)
relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After
further inquiry, she found out that in
fact there was no such deposit
made. Thus, on December 23,1987,
complainant sent a demand letter to
respondent asking for the return of
the total amount of eleven thousand
pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former
earlier gave to the latter. However,
this letter was never answered and
the money was never returned.
Hence, complainant lodged this
administrative complaint against
herein respondent.
Meanwhile, on December 29,1987,
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
dismissed Civil Case No. 55118 for
failure to state a cause of action.4 On
January 20,1988, Civil Case No. 5521
0 was likewise dismissed for being
identical with Civil Case No. 55118. 5
Respondent in his answer contends
that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118
and 55210 was done in good faith
and that the allegations of
complainant relative to the
administrative charge against him
are all lies, product of one's
imagination and only intended to
harrass him. 6
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
This Court agrees that the petitions in
Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210
appear to be poorly prepared and
written. having represented himself
capable of picking up the cudgels for
the apparently lost cause of
complainant respondent should
have carefully prepared the
pleadings if only to establish the
justness of his representation. The little
time involved is no excuse.
Complainant reposed full faith in him.
His first duty was to file the best
pleading within his capability.
Apparently respondent was more
interested in getting the most out of
the complainant who was in a
hopeless situation. He bragged about
his closeness to the judge concerned
in one case and talked about the
need to "buy" the restraining order in
the other. Worse still he got P
10,000.00 as alleged deposit in court
which he never deposited. Instead
he pocketed the same. The pattern
to milk the complainant dry is
obvious.
When a lawyer takes a client's cause,
he thereby covenants that he will
exert all effort for its prosecution until
its final conclusion. The failure to
exercise due diligence or the
abandonment of a client's cause
makes such lawyer unworthy of the
trust which the client had reposed on
him. The acts of respondent in this
case violate the most elementary
principles of professional ethics . 7
The Court finds that respondent failed
to exercise due diligence in
protecting his client's interests.
Respondent had knowledge
beforehand that he would be asked
by the presiding judge in Civil Case
No. 55118 to withdraw his
appearance as counsel by reason of
their friendship. Despite such prior
knowledge, respondent took no steps
to find a replacement nor did he
inform complainant of this fact.
Even assuming that respondent had
no previous knowledge that he
would be asked to withdraw, the
record is quite clear that four (4) days
prior to the hearing of the preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 55118
respondent already filed a motion
therein withdrawing as complainant's
counsel interposing as reason
therefor his frequent attacks of pain
due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void,
respondent failed to find a
replacement. He did not even ask
complainant to hire another lawyer in
his stead. 8
His actuation is definitely inconsistent
with his duty to protect with utmost
dedication the interest of his client
and of the fidelity, trust and
confidence which he owes his
client. 9 More so in this case, where by
reason of his gross negligence
complainant thereby suffered by
losing all her cases.
The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on
October 26, 1987, the same day that
he had already filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel for complainant
in Civil Case No. 55118, reveals his
lack of good faith as an advocate.
He also failed to appear for the
complainant in said case. It was all a
show to get more money from her.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
This adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law. When confronted with
this evident irregularity, he lamely
stated that while he did not physically
appear for complainant he
nevertheless prepared and drafted
the pleadings.
His services were engaged by
complainant hoping that the
property subject of the ejectment
proceeding would be returned to
her. In fact, it was respondent who
persuaded complainant that the
filing of these two cases
simultaneously were the means by
which this objective can be
achieved. His duty was not only to
prepare the pleadings but to
represent complainant until the
termination of the cases. This he failed
to do.
His representation that there was an
immediate need to file Civil Case No.
55210 when he already knew that he
could no longer physically handle the
same is an act of deception of his
client.10 It shows lack of fidelity to his
oath of office as a member of the
Philippine bar.
The allegation of respondent that the
ten thousand pesos (P 10,000.00) was
given to him as fee for his services, is
simply incredible. Indeed, such
amount is grossly disproportionate
with the service he actually
rendered. 11 And his failure to return
even a portion of the amount upon
demand of complainant all the more
bolsters the protestation of
complainant that respondent does
not deserve to remain as an officer of
the court.
Lawyers are indispensable part of the
whole system of administering justice
in this jurisdiction. At a time when
strong and disturbing criticisms are
being hurled at the legal profession,
strict compliance with one's oath of
office and the canons of professional
ethics is an imperative.
Lawyers should be fair, honest,
respectable, above suspicion and
beyond reproach in dealing with their
clients. The profession is not
synonymous with an ordinary business
proposition. It is a matter of public
interest.
WHEREFORE, after considering the
entirety of the circumstances present
in this case, this Court finds Atty.
Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty
of the charges against him and
hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for an indefinite
period until such time he can
demonstrate that he has
rehabilitated himself as to deserve to
resume the practice of law.
Finally, respondent is hereby ordered
to return to complainant herein the
sum of eleven thousand pesos
(P11,000.00) with legal interest from
the date of this resolution until it is
actually returned.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-
Herrera, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,

Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the

SUPREME COURT Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Manila Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither
filed a supersedeas bond nor paid
FIRST DIVISION the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The
RTC affirmed in toto the decision of
the MTC.

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995 The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed
Co's appeal from the decision of the
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, RTC for failure to comply with Section
vs. 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b)
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
MONTERO, respondent. (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According
to the CA, Co should have filed a
petition for review and not an
ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
QUIASON, J.:
The judgment of the MTC became
This is a complaint for disbarment. final and executory on November 19,
Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, 1986.
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court, this Court resolved to refer it to On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Motion was filed by respondent
(IBP) for investigation, report and as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No.
recommendation. 11404, arguing that the decisions of
the MTC and the RTC were null and
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of void for being contrary to law, justice
Governors rendered a decision, and equity for allowing the lessor to
finding respondent guilty of increase by 300% the rentals for an
malpractice and recommending old house. Respondent, admitting his
that he be suspended from the mistake in filing an ordinary appeal
practice of law. instead of a petition for review,
prayed that he be allowed to file an
I action for annulment.

Pacifica Millare, the mother of the
complainant, obtained a favorable
judgment from the Municipal Trial
Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which
ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the
premises subject of the ejectment
case (Civil Case No. 844). Co,
through respondent as counsel,
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave
due course to respondent's
Manifestation and Motion and let the
records remain with it. However, on
November 10, 1987, the said court
ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV
No. 11404 to be remanded to the
court a quo.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed
with the CA a Petition for Annulment
of Decisions and/or Reformation or
Novation of Decisions of the MTC and
the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690),
insisting that the decisions were not in
accordance with existing laws and
policies. On December 17, 1987, the
CA dismissed the petition for
annulment or novation explaining
that —
. . . , aside from the reliefs
provided in these two
sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule
38), there is no other
means whereby the
defeated party may
procure final and
executory judgment to
be set aside with a view
to the renewal of the
litigation, unless (a) the
judgment is void for want
of jurisdiction or lack of
due process of law, or
(b) it has been obtained
by fraud, . . . . There is no
allegation in the present
complaint to the effect
that the judgments in the
former cases were
secured through
fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35;
Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed
an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Set Motion for
Reconsideration for Oral Arguments
of the CA decision. The CA denied
the motion. Again, respondent
requested the CA to set his Motion For
Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.
In a resolution dated February 12,
1988, the CA denied the Motion for
Oral Argument and in a resolution
dated October 18, 1988, denied the
motion for reconsideration of the
February 12 Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court
(G.R. No. 86084) questioning the
decisions of the MTC and the RTC in
favor of petitioner's mother. In a
Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we
denied the petition for having been
filed and paid late on December 12,
1988 and November 12, 1988,
respectively. A motion for
reconsideration from such resolution
was likewise denied with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Prohibitory or
Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of
complainant filed a Motion for
Execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 844. Respondent filed an
Opposition to the Motion for
Execution on the ground that the
case was still pending review by the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and
therefore the motion for execution
was premature. On August 23, 1988,
the MTC ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, which
was denied. The RTC affirmed the
order for the issuance of the writ of
execution. Thus, a writ of execution
was issued on October 18, 1988.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
On October 26, 1988, respondent
filed a special civil action (SP CV No.
624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued,
Abra for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with
preliminary injunction against the
MTC, Provincial Sheriff and
complainant's mother, seeking to
annul the writ of execution issued in
MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil
Case No. 344. Respondent alleged
that the order granting the writ of
execution was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction since a petition to
annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No.
11690) was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial
sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred
the implementation of the writ of
execution until the petition filed in SP
CV No. 624 for certiorari was
resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No.
624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set
Aside and Declare Null and Void the
Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch
1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the
Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory
Order, respondent again filed an
Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari,
Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No.
17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the
findings of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
required to represent his client "within
the bounds of the law." The Code
enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair
and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client (Rule
19.01) and warns him not to allow his
client to dictate the procedure in
handling the case (Rule 19.03). In
short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the
law, permits the attorney to use any
arguable construction of the law or
rules which is favorable to his client.
But the lawyer is not allowed to
knowingly advance a claim or
defense that is unwarranted under
existing law. He cannot prosecute
patently frivolous and meritless
appeals or institute clearly groundless
actions (Annotated Code of
Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]).
Professional rules impose limits on a
lawyer's zeal and hedge it with
necessary restrictions and
qualifications (Wolfram, Modern
Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
required to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration
of justice. Implementing said Canon
are the following rules:
Rule 12.02. — A lawyer
shall not file multiple
actions arising from the
same cause.
xxx xxx xxx
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Rule 12.04. — A lawyer
shall not unduly delay a
case, impede the
execution of a judgment
or misuse court
processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or
wrongfully use the judicial process,
like the filing of dilatory motions,
repetitious litigation and frivolous
appeals for the sole purpose of
frustrating and delaying the
execution of a judgment (Edelstein,
The Ethics of Dilatory Motions
Practice: Time for Change, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976];
Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit
Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil
Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully
protected and her defenses were
properly ventilated when he filed the
appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But
respondent thereafter resorted to
devious and underhanded means to
delay the execution of the judgment
rendered by the MTC adverse to his
client. The said decision became
executory even pending its appeal
with the RTC because of the failure of
Co to file a supersedeas bond and to
pay the monthly rentals as they fell
due. Furthermore, his petition for
annulment of the decisions of the
MTC and RTC which he filed with the
CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was
defective and dilatory. According to
the CA, there was no allegation
therein that the courts had no
jurisdiction, that his client was denied
due process, or "that the judgments in
the former cases were secured
through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of
Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):
A judgment can be
annulled only on two
grounds: (a) that the
judgment is void for want
of jurisdiction or for lack
of due process of law, or
(b) that it has been
obtained by fraud. . . .
(at p. 534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that
the records of the case be
remanded, respondent knew very
well that the decision of the MTC was
already ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong,
Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218
SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment
of a superior court is
remanded to the trial
court for execution, the
function of the trial court
is ministerial only; the trial
court is merely obliged
with becoming modesty
to enforce that
judgment and has no
jurisdiction either to
modify in any way or to
reverse the same. . . . (at
p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA
250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six
appeals, complaints or petitions to
frustrate the execution of the MTC
judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 —
Appeal from the
decision rendered in Civil
Case No. 844 of the
Municipal Trial Court,
Bangued, Abra, with the
Regional Trial Court,
Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404
— Appeal from the
decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690
— An Action For the
Annulment of Decisions
And/Or Reformation or
Novation of Decisions
filed with the Court of
Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 —
Petition For Review
On Certiorari filed with
the Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040
— Appeal And/Or
Review By Certiorari, Etc.
filed also with the Court
of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624
— Petition For Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus
with Preliminary Issuance
of Prohibitory Order filed
with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1,
Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions
filed by respondent to forestall the
execution of the same judgment,
respondent is also guilty of forum
shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876
(1989), the Court explained that
forum shopping exists when, by
reason of an adverse decision in one
forum, defendant ventures to
another for a more favorable
resolution of his case. In the case
of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72
SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained
that:
Such filing of multiple
petitions constitutes
abuse of the Court's
processes and improper
conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and
degrade the
administration of justice
and will be punished as
contempt of court.
Needless to add, the
lawyer who filed such
multiple or repetitious
petitions (which
obviously delays the
execution of a final and
executory judgment)
subjects himself to
disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not
knowing any better) or
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

for willful violation of his

duties as an attorney to
act with all good fidelity
to the courts and to
maintain only such
actions as appear to him
to be just and are
consistent with truth and
honor (at p. 275).

By having wilfully and knowingly

abused his rights of recourse in his
efforts to get a favorable judgment,
which efforts were all rebuffed,
respondent violated the duty of a
member of the Bar to institute actions
only which are just and put up such
defenses as he perceives to be truly
contestable under the laws (Garcia
v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As
correctly noted by the Committee on
Bar Discipline "in filing a number of
pleadings, actions and petitioner,
respondent 'has made a mockery of
the judicial processes' and
disregarded canons of professional
ethics in intentionally frustrating the
rights of a litigant in whose favor a
judgment in the case was rendered,
thus, 'abused procedural rules to
defeat ends of substantial justice'"
(Report and Recommendation, IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).

WHEREFORE, respondent is
SUSPENDED for one year.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and

Kapunan, JJ., concur.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
THIRD DIVISION
[Adm. Matter No. MTJ-95-1063.
August 9, 1996.]
ALFONSO C. CHOA, Complainant, v.
JUDGE ROBERTO S.
CHIONGSON, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER; HIS
RESPONSIBILITY TO HIS CLIENTS; MUST
BE DONE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
REASON AND COMMON SENSE. —
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity
to the cause of his client, full devotion
to his genuine interest, and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of
his rights, as well as the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, he must
do so only within the bounds of the
law. He must give a candid and
honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his client’s case
with the end in view of promoting
respect for the law and legal
processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to
honestly debatable under the law.
He must always remind himself of the
oath he took upon admission to the
Bar that he "will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same" ;
and that he "will conduct (himself] as
a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as
to [his] clients." Needless to state, the
lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not
be pursued at the expenses of truth
and the administration of justice, and
it must be done within the bounds of
reason and common sense. A
lawyer’s responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of his client
does not warrant a course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party. As
an officer of the court and its
indispensable partner in the sacred
task of administering justice, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show
respect to its officers.
2. ID.; ID.; HIS RIGHT TO CRITICIZE THE
COURTS; MUST BE EXERCISED
RESPONSIBLY. — It does not however,
follow that just because a lawyer is an
officer of the court, he cannot
criticize the courts. That is his right as
a citizen, and it is even his duty as an
officer of the court to avail of such
right. Nevertheless. such a right is not
without limit. The right to criticize,
which is, guaranteed by the freedom
of speech and of expression in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right
carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom
from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. Any criticism against a
judge made in the guise of an
administrative complaint which is
clearly unfounded and impelled by
ulterior motive will not excuse the
lawyer responsible therefor under his
duty of fidelity to his client. As we
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
stated in Ng v. Alfaro, 238 SCRA 486,
491-492 [1994], lawyers, as officers of
the court, should not encourage
groundless administrative cases
against court officers and
employees. The time of the latter
should not be wasted in answering or
defending groundless complaints;
every minute of it is precious and must
be reserved for the enhancement of
public service. Our precious time too
should not be diverted to such cases.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the resolution of 9 February 1996,
this Court dismissed the instant
complaint for want of merit and
directed Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz,
counsel for the complainant, to show
cause within fifteen days from notice
why he should not be disciplinary
dealt with for his apparent failure to
comply with the duties and
responsibilities of a member of the
Bar. Such duties and responsibilities
were noted in the following
paragraph of the
resolution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for
the complainant, must have been
aware of the utter lack of merit of the
charges against the Respondent. As
a Member of the Philippine Bar he is
bound: (1) by his oath, not to,
wittingly or willingly, promote or sue
any groundless, false, or unlawful suit
nor give aid nor consent to the same;
(2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just; and (3) to
uphold the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It was incumbent upon
him to give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable
results of the complainant’s case
(Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of
Professional Responsibility) with the
end in view of promoting respect for
the law and legal processes (Canon
1, Id.). He should, therefore, be
required to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken
against him for his apparent failure to
observe the foregoing duties and
responsibilities.
Atty. Quiroz received a copy of the
foregoing resolution on 16 February
1996, and on 2 March 1996, he filed a
Motion for Extension of Time wherein
he prayed that he be given an
extension of six days from 2 March
1996 — the expiry date of the original
period to file his compliance to the
show-cause order — within which to
file his compliance to or motion for
reconsideration of the resolution.
In the resolution of 25 march 1996, this
Court granted Atty. Quiroz’s motion
but only insofar as the filing of his
compliance was concerned, as
clearly shown in the notice of the
resolution sent to him reading as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Quoted hereunder, for your
information, is a resolution of the Third
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Division of this Court dated MAR. 25,
1996:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Administrative Matter MTJ-95-1063
(Alfonso C. Choa v. Judge Roberto S.
Chiongson, etc.) — The first motion of
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for
complainant, for extension of six (6)
days form March 2, 1996 or until
March 8, 1996 within which to file
compliance with the resolution of
February 9, 1996 which directed him
to show cause, why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for his
apparent failure to comply with his
duties and responsibilities, is
GRANTED, with WARNING that no
further extension will be given.
It appears that on 8 March 1996 Atty.
Quiroz filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator a pleading
entitled Compliance/Motion for
Reconsideration. This pleading is
more of a motion for reconsideration.
It was filed on the last day of the
period he solicited in his motion for
extension. Since the resolution of 25
March 1996 granted only an
extension of the period to submit his
compliance, it necessarily follows
that the motion for reconsideration
was filed beyond the reglementary
period. It bears stressing that
paragraph 5 of this Court’s en banc
resolution of 7 April 1988 provides
that, as a general policy, no motion
for extension of time to file a motion
reconsideration shall be granted
after the Court has rendered its
judgment. Accordingly, the motion
for reconsideration must forthwith be
DENIED for having been filed late. In
any event, it has no merit whatsoever
except, perhaps, as to its sophistry.
The only issue then left is the
sufficiency and adequacy of his
explanation which is, nevertheless,
inexorably linked to the motion for
reconsideration. Atty. Quiroz asserts
that he never had the intention to
prosecute or sue any groundless,
false, or unlawful suit or to file the
instant complaint in addition to the
appeal or in lieu thereof; that he
assisted the complainant in the
honest belief that the latter has really
a cause of action against the
respondent; and that he "was not
ventilating in the instant case the
complainant’s grievances relative to
the respondent’s judgment finding
[the complainant] guilty of perjury
but was only raising the matter to
show that indeed the respondent
was biased because of such next-
door-neighbor relationship."cralaw
virtua1aw library
These explanations deserve scant
consideration. The claim of "honest
belief," which amounts to a claim of
good faith, fails to convince us in light
of what follows.
Nothing is further from the truth than
the claim of Atty. Quiroz that he "was
not ventilating in the instant case the
complainant’s grievances relative to
the respondent’s judgment finding
[the complainant] guilty of perjury
but was only raising the matter to
show that indeed the respondent
was biased because of such next-
door-neighbor relationship." He was in
fact, attacking the judgment of
conviction by asserting that the trial
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
court’s only recourse was to acquit
the complainant because (a) the
allegations in the information do not
constitute the offense of perjury; (b)
the complainant’s petition for
naturalization, which was the basis for
the charge of perjury, having been
withdrawn with finality, had become
functus officio, i.e., as if the petition
was not filed at all, and, therefore,
whatever false statement contained
therein was no longer required by law
and had ceased to be on a material
matter; (c) the respondent had
admitted in evidence exhibits which
are obviously inadmissible; and (d)
the respondent had sentenced the
complainant with the penalty higher
than that provided by law without
applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The upshot of these allegations is that
the complainant’s (Mr. Choa’s)
conviction of the crime of perjury is
baseless or unfounded in law and in
fact and is nothing but the product of
the respondent’s prejudice against
Mr. Choa because the respondent
happens to be a "next-door
neighbor" of Mr. Choa’s wife, the
private complainant in the perjury
case. Considering that Mr. Choa
seasonably appealed from the
judgment of conviction. Atty. Quiroz
knew or ought to know that all the
matters which he may find relevant or
material for the reversal of the
judgment and the consequent
acquittal of his client, Mr. Choa, may
be raised with the appellate court,
and that this Court, not being the
venue for such appeal, cannot
resolve the appeal even by way of
an administrative complaint against
the judge who convicted Mr. Choa.
If Atty. Quiroz then assisted Mr. Choa
in the preparation of this case, he
had nothing in mind but to harass the
respondent Judge and to unduly
influence the course of the appeal in
the criminal case by injecting into the
mind of the appellate judge that,
indeed, something was definitely
wrong with the appealed decision
because the ponente thereof is now
facing a serious administrative
complaint arising from his improper
conduct therein. It might even be
said that the filing of this case was to
send a signal to the appellate judge
in the criminal case that an
affirmance of the challenged
decision would clearly be erroneous,
if not equally baseless and
unfounded as that of the trial court
below.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity
to the cause of his client, full devotion
to his genuine interest, and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of
his rights, as well as the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, 1 he must
do so only within the bounds of the
law. 2 He must give a candid and
honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his client’s case 3
with the end in view of promoting
respect for the law and legal
processes, 4 and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. 5
He must always remind himself of the
oath he took upon admission to the
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Bar that he "will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same" ;
and that he "will conduct [himself] as
a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as
to [his] clients." Needless to state, the
lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not
be pursued at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice, 6
and it must be done within the
bounds of reason and common
sense. 7 A lawyer’s responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of
his client does not warrant a course of
action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions against the other
party. 8 Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116
As an officer of the court and its
indispensable partner in the sacred
task of administering justice, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show
respect to its officers. This does not
mean, however, that a lawyer
cannot criticize a judge. As we stated
in Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar: 9
It does not, however, follow that just
because a lawyer is an officer of the
court, he cannot criticize the courts.
That is his right as a citizen, and it is
even his duty as an officer of the
court to avail of such right. Thus, in In
Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580
[1970]), this Court explicitly
declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of
the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he "professionally answerable
to a scrutiny into the official conduct
of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as
a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec.
657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the
bar have the best opportunity to
become conversant with the
character and efficiency of our
judges. No class is less likely to abuse
the privilege, or no other class has as
great an interest in the preservation
of an able upright bench. (State
N.W. 212, 216).
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be
critical of the foibles of the courts and
judges is to seal the lips of those in the
best position to give advice and who
might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so
far as the bar is concerned, "the
merits of a sitting judge may be
rehearsed, but as to his demerits
there must be profound silence."
(State v. Circuit Court [72 N.W. 196]).
Nevertheless, such a right is not
without limit. For, as this Court warned
in Almacen:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
But it is a cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism,
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct, that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
x x x freedom of expression itself can be
The lawyer’s duty to render respectful
subordination to the courts is essential
to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the assertion of their
clients’ rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect — are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize,
which is guaranteed by the freedom
of speech and of expression in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every rights
carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom
from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. In Zaldivar v. Gonzales
(166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was
held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to
the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him
that right, lest of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs an
occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the
requirements of equally important
public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no
antimor between free expression and
the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of
secured only within the context of a
functioning an orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context,
in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which
are accepted by the general
community.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use
of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust a judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or
tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of people in the integrity
of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice
by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive
language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55
SCRA 107 [1974]) or abrasive and
offensive language (Yangson v.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of
disrespectful, offensive, manifestly
baseless, and malicious statement in
pleadings or in a letter addressed to
the judge (Baja v. Macandog, 158
SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of
19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools
Teachers Association v. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza v.
Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of
disparaging, intemperate, and
uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

SCRA 87 [1989].

Any criticism against a judge made in

the guise of an administrative
complaint which is clearly unfounded
and impelled by ulterior motive will
not excuse the lawyer responsible
therefor under his duty of fidelity to his
client. As we stated in Ng v. Alfaro, 10
lawyers, as officers of the court,
should not encourage groundless
administrative cases against court
officers and employees. The time of
the latter should not be wasted in
answering or defending groundless
complaints; every minute of it is
precious and must be reserved for
the enhancement of public service.
Our precious time too should not be
diverted to such cases.

We find the explanation of Atty.

Quiroz to be unsatisfactory.

WHEREFORE, we hereby impose upon

ATTY. RAYMUNDO A. QUIROZ a FINE in
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) to be paid within five (5)
days from notice hereof. He is further
WARNED that a commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and

Panganiban, JJ., concur.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40136 March 25, 1975
COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS
UNION and FILEMON G.
ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
LO BU and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Filemon G. Alvarez for petitioners.
Yolando F Busmente for respondent
Lo Bu.
FERNANDO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
The jurisdiction of respondent Court of
Appeals is assailed
this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding. It is taken to task for
entertaining an appeal from the
Court of First Instance on a replevin
suit which was correctly dismissed as
it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge
that was resorted to for the purpose
of frustrating the execution of a
judgment in an unfair labor practice
controversy, one moreover already
passed upon and sustained by this
Court. Petitioner Cosmos Foundry
Shop Workers Union is the prevailing
party in that labor dispute which
unfortunately had dragged on since
1961, all its efforts to obtain what was
due it being rendered illusory through
the machinations of a certain Ong
Ting, now deceased, and the private
respondent Lo Bu. The lack of
competence of respondent Court of
Appeals to proceed further is thus
rather obvious. It is about time that
there be an effective vindication of
the rights of petitioner labor union, so
long set at naught and disregarded,
by the employment of techniques,
which certainly deserve no
encouragement, much less
approval. There was a grave infirmity
then in the Court of Appeals having
dismissed the appeal, reinstating it in
its resolution of December 19, 1974.
Certiorari and prohibition lie.
The facts show that on January 16,
1973, petitioner Cosmos Foundry
Shop Workers Union was able to
obtain from the Court of Industrial
Relations the third alias writ of
execution for the satisfaction and
enforcement of the judgment in its
favor.1 Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff
in Mario Abiog of Manila, who was
especially deputized to serve the writ,
did so on January 17 and 18, 1973
levying on the personal properties of
the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New
Century Foundry Shop for the
purpose of conducting the public
auction sale.2 It was then that
respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent
motion to recall writ of execution,
asserting lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations, a point
stressed in another motion dated
February 2, 1973, on the further
ground that petitioner Cosmos
Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to
put up an indemnity bond. The Court
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
of Industrial Relations in its order
dated February 23, 1973 denied his
motions. So likewise was the motion
for reconsideration, as shown in its
order dated March 23, 1973. Private
respondent appealed by certiorari
such order to this Court. It was
docketed as G.R. No. L-36636.3This
Court, in its resolution dated July 17,
1973, denied the petition for certiorari
of private respondent.4 In the
meanwhile, there was a replevin suit
by private respondent in the Court of
First Instance of Manila covering the
same properties. Upon receipt of the
order from this Court denying
certiorari, petitioner labor union filed
a second motion to dismiss the
complaint. It was therein alleged that
private respondent has no cause of
action, he being a fictitious buyer
based on the findings of the Court of
Industrial Relations in its order dated
June 22, 1970 and affirmed by the
Supreme Court in its resolution dated
July 17, 1973. The lower court
dismissed the complaint.5 That is the
decision elevated to the Court of
Appeals, and it is precisely because
of its obvious character as a further
delaying tactic that this petition is
filed.
Petitioner labor union has made out a
case for certiorari and prohibition.
1. The order of the Court of Industrial
Relations in the unfair labor practice
case dated June 27, 19706 for the
satisfaction and enforcement of
which the third alias writ of execution
was issued in favor of petitioner labor
union starts with the following: "This
concerns complainant's motion for
the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, dated March 12, 1970,
"allowing the Sheriff to serve the Writ
and returnable within 60 days and
the said writ should be directed to
Cosmos Foundry Shop or New
Foundry Shop which is the firm name
use(d) by the respondent in lieu of the
Cosmos Foundry Shop ... The original
writ of execution had been returned
wholly unsatisfied as respondents had
no visible properties found in their
names, and the foundry shop where
Mrs. Ong Ting and her family reside at
Maisan, Valenzuela, Bulacan, is the
"New Century Foundry Shop" (return
of the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of
Bulacan, dated March 11, 1970).
Consequently, in its Order of March
19, 1970, the Court directed the
examination of Mrs. Ong Ting and the
Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning
the latter's and Ong Ting's property
and income. Extensive hearings were
conducted."7
Then comes this relevant portion:
"From the evidence and the records,
the Court finds that after the Cosmos
Foundry Shop was burned, Ong Ting
established the New Century Foundry
Shop. He and his family resided in the
premises of the shop at 118 Maisan
Road, Valenzuela, Bulacan. After his
proposals to settle the present case
for P5,000.00 in September 1968, for
P25,000.00 in October 1968, and for
P40,000.00 on December 22, 1968,
were successively rejected by
complainant's counsel, Ong Ting,
after hinting of taking measures to
avoid liability, soon executed a deed
of absolute sale on December 31,
1968, selling all his business, including
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
equipment, machineries,
improvements, materials, supplies
and rights, in the New Century
Foundry Shop, to his compadre Lo Bu,
for P20,000.00, which he
acknowledged so fully paid ... The
deed does not bear the conformity of
Mrs. Ong Ting. On January 7, 1969,
when Lo Bu applied for the original
registration of the firm name, he gave
his name as the manager and the
capital of the business as P30,000.00
... Notwithstanding such sale to Lo Bu,
Ong Ting filed a verified urgent
motion to reopen the case on
January 25, 1969, and a verified
motion for reconsideration of the
Decision on May 12, 1969. In the latter
motion, it was alleged that as a result
of the fire, "Ong Ting lost everything;
we cannot squeeze blood out of
nothing ... " This allegation was made
despite the recent alleged sale to Lo
Bu, from which he realized
P20,000.00." The absence of good
8 1973. 10 It denied the petition for
faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu
as the alleged vendee was made
clear thus: "There was no actual turn
over of the business to Lo Bu, the
alleged manager in absentia. At the
time Ong Ting died, he was still
residing in the premises of the shop ...
His family continued to reside therein
without paying any rental to Lo Bu. His
young 19-year-old son Delfin Ong
became in-charge of the shop and
the workers. His daughter Gloria Ong
became the cashier. Mrs. Ong Ting
became the manager and she
supervised the work. .. The alleged
sale was no doubt intended to
circumvent any judgment this Court
might render unfavorable to
respondents. It is clearly fictitious. And
such a declaration by this Court is well
within its jurisdiction because what is
being sought is the enforcement or
implementation of its order. Having
acquired jurisdiction, the Court may
employ means to carry it into effect
(Sec. 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court)." 9
That was why in the dispositive portion
of the aforesaid order, an alias writ of
execution was issued against the
properties held in the name of the
New Century Foundry Shop at 118
Maisan Road, Valenzuela, Bulacan
for the satisfaction of the judgment in
this unfair labor practice proceeding.
As noted, there was a replevin suit by
the same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu,
which was dismissed by the Court of
First Instance of Manila precisely
because in the meanwhile the finality
of the writ of execution became
definitely settled when this Court
issued its resolution of July 17,
certiorari filed by the private
respondent, Lo Bu, for the purpose of
annulling the third writ of execution
issued in accordance with the
dispositive portion of the order of the
Court of June 22, 1970.
2. To all intents and purposes then,
that is the law of the case. What is
worse, private respondent Lo Bu
certainly cannot plead ignorance, as
he himself was the petitioner in the
certiorari proceeding before this
Court. He failed, and ii was not
surprising, for on the facts as found,
he was a principal in the nefarious
scheme to frustrate the award in
favor of petitioner labor union. There
was thus a ruling as to the bad faith
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
that characterized his pretension of
being the alleged vendee. In Cruz v.
Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions 11 it was shown that to avoid
the legal consequences of an unfair
labor practice, there was a fictitious
sale resorted to, as in this case. Under
the circumstances, the bad faith
being evident, the ostensible vendee
was precluded from taking
advantage of the situation. So it must
be here. Moreover, that is merely, as
stated earlier, to accord deference
to the fundamental principle of the
law of the case, his petition for
certiorari having been dismissed by
this Court. There is this excerpt from
the recent decision of Mangayao v.
De Guzman: 12 "The latest case in
point as of the time the order
complained of was issued
is Kabigting v. Acting Director of
Prisons, a 1962 decision. As
emphasized by the ponente, the
then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Makalintal: 'It need not be stated that
the Supreme Court, being the court
of last resort, is the final arbiter of all
legal questions properly brought
before it and that its decision in any
give case constitutes the law of that
particular case. Once its judgment
becomes final it is binding on all
inferior courts, and hence beyond
their power and authority to alter or
modify. If petitioner had any ground
to believe that the decision of this
Court in Special Proceeding No.
12276 should further be reviewed his
remedy was to ask for a such a plea could be looked upon
reconsideration thereof. In fact he
did file two motions for that purpose,
both of which were denied. A new
petition before an inferior court on
the same grounds was unjustified. As
much, indeed, was clearly indicated
by this Court in its resolution of April 3,
1959, herein above reproduced in its
entirety. The import of the resolution is
too plain to be misunderstood.' So it
has been from 1919, when in
Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v.
Deutsche-Australische Dampschiffs
Gesellschaft, this Court, through
Justice Street, categorically declared
that a decision that has become the
law of the case "is not subject to
review or reversal in any court." What
is more, in 1967, there is a
reaffirmation of the doctrine by this
Tribunal in People v. Olarte where it
was stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
that a ruling constituting the law of
the case, "even if erroneous, ... may
no longer be disturbed or modified
since it has become final ... " Then,
in Sanchez v. Court of Industrial
Relations, promulgated in 1969, there
is the pronouncement that the law of
the case 'does not apply solely to
what is embodied in [this Court's]
decision but likewise to its
implementation carried out in fealty
to what has been ... decreed.'" 13
3. Private respondent, in his special
and affirmative defenses, alleged
that petitioners have a plain and
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law being the appellees in
the pending case in the Court of
Appeals sought to be dismissed in this
suit for certiorari. As a general rule,
with sympathy. That is the ordinary
course of judicial procedure. There
would be no basis for legitimate
grievance on the part of petitioners.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
It is not so however in this case. The
sad plight of petitioner labor union
had been previously noted. It is about
time that a halt be called to the
schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu
in his far-from-commendable efforts
to defeat labor's just claim. It would
be repugnant to the principle of
social justice 14 and the mandate of
protection to labor 15 if there be
further delay in the satisfaction of a
judgment that ought to have been
enforced years ago.
4. One last point. It was set forth in the
Petition 16 that respondent Lo Bu filed
an urgent motion with the Court of
Industrial Relations to recall the writ of
execution alleging as one of his
grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the sale of the
New Century Foundry Shop, followed
by another motion praying for the
return of the levied properties this
time asserting that petitioner labor
union failed to put up an indemnity
bond and then a third, this time to
allow the sheriff to keep the levied
properties at his factory, all of which
were denied by the Court en banc in
its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in
the certiorari proceeding, dismissed
by this Court for lack of
merit. Counsel
17 Yolando F.
Busmente in his Answer to this
petition, filed on February 20, 1975,
had the temerity to deny such
allegations. He simply ignored the
fact that as counsel for respondent Lo
Bu, petitioner in L-36636, he did
specifically maintain: "On January 26,
1973, in order to vindicate his rights
over the levied properties, in an
expeditious or less expensive manner,
herein appellant voluntarily
submitted himself, as a forced
intervenor, to the jurisdiction of
respondent CIR, by filing an urgent
'Motion to Recall Writ of Execution,'
precisely questioning the jurisdiction
of said Court to pass upon the validity
and legality of the sale of the 'New
Century Foundry Shop' to him,
without the latter being made a party
to the case, as well as the jurisdiction
of said Court to enforce the Decision
rendered against the respondents in
Case No. 3021-ULP, by means of
an alias writ of execution against his
properties found at the 'New Century
Foundry Shop;' ... ; Petitioner
appellant's urgent motion aforesaid
was set for hearing on February 5,
1973, and inasmuch as the auction
sale of his properties was set for
January 31, 1973, the CIR issued an
order on January 30, 1973, one day
before the schedule sale, ordering
the Sheriff of Manila not to proceed
with the auction sale; ... ; On February
3, 1973, herein petitioner-appellant
[Lo Bu] filed another urgent motion
dated February 2, 1973, praying for
the return of his properties on the
ground that the judgment creditor
(respondent-appellee) failed to put
up an indemnity bond, pursuant to
the provision of Section 17, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court; ... On February 10,
1973 respondent-appellee Cosmos
Foundry Workers Union interposed its
opposition to herein petitioner-
appellant's urgent motions dated
January 26, 1973 and February 2,
1973, ... ; On February 27, 1973, herein
petitioner-appellant received an
order from respondent CIR, dated
February 25, 1973, denying his urgent
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
motions and ordering the Sheriff of
Manila to proceed with the auction
sale of his properties "in accordance
with law;" ... " 18 Such conduct on the
part of counsel is far from
commendable. He could, of course,
be casuistic and take refuge in the
fact that the paragraph of the
petition, which he denied, was, in
addition to being rather poorly and
awkwardly worded, also prolix, with
unnecessary matter being included
therein without due regard to logic or
coherence or even rules of grammar.
He could add that his denial was to
be correlated with his special
defenses, where he concentrated on
points not previously admitted. That is
the most that can be said of his
performance, and it is not enough.
For even if such be the case, Attorney
Busmente had not exculpated
himself. He was of course expected
to defend his client's cause with zeal,
but not at the disregard of the truth
and in defiance of the clear purpose
of labor statutes. He ought to
remember that his obligation as an
officer of the court, no less than the
dignity of the profession, requires that
he should not act like an errand-boy
at the beck and call of his client,
ready and eager to do his every
bidding. If he fails to keep that
admonition in mind, then he puts into
serious question his good standing in
the bar.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is
granted and the order of December
19, 1974 of respondent Court of
Appeals reinstating the appeal is
nullified and set aside. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted,
respondent Court of Appeals being
perpetually restrained from taking
any further action on such appeal,
except that of dismissing it. Triple
costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Antonio and
Fernandez, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Aquino, J., is on leave.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment enjoining
the Court of Appeal from
entertaining the appeal of private
respondent in CA-G.R. No. 56485-R
entitled Lo Bu, etc. vs. Cosmos
Foundry Shop Workers Union & F.
Alvarez.
After petitioners had secured a
judgment in the Court of Industrial
Relations against Cosmos Foundry
Shop and by virtue thereof obtained
a writ of execution against said Shop
and the Sheriff had levied on
properties found therein, herein
private respondent appeared and
asserting his rights over the levied
properties by virtue of a sale made to
him by the Shop, impugned the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to
carry out the purported execution.
The Industrial Court sustained its
authority and on certiorari to the
Supreme Court by respondent the
petition was dismissed (G.R. No. L-
36636). In the meanwhile, respondent
sued for replevin of the same
properties in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Case No. 89994.
In its answer to the replevin action,
petitioners invoked the resolution of
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
this Court in G.R. No. L-36636 and
moved to dismiss the complaint,
which motion was granted. When
respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals, petitioners filed the present
petition for prohibition.
No doubt, as things stand now, the
remedy pursued by petitioners is not
the appropriate one. The ground of
dismissal upheld by the trial court was
in essence res adjudicata. Ordinarily,
against such dismissal, the remedy is
appeal and, of course, such an
appeal cannot be stopped by
prohibition. And if only because the
Court of Appeals has not been given
any opportunity at all to pass on its
own alleged lack of jurisdiction, the
present action would seem to be
premature.
From another point of view, however,
it is quite obvious that to allow the
respondent Court of Appeals to
entertain respondent's appeal would
be sanctioning, as the main opinion
finds, the apparently endless
ingenious schemes, if judicial, of
respondent to further delay the
execution of the subject judgment
which became final and executory
almost two years ago after a
protracted litigation that started way
back in 1961, since thirteen
yesteryears from now. Law and
justice demand that petitioners
should not be further denied the fruit
of their legal efforts, to secure redress,
particularly because in the order of
the Industrial Court denying
respondent's motion to recall the writ
of execution against Cosmos Foundry
Shop, the court found said Shop and
respondent to have indulged in a
simulated transaction covering the
properties in question purposely to
avoid satisfaction of the judgment in
favor of petitioners.
To reiterate, the ground of dismissal of
respondent's replevin suit is a legal
one, res adjudicata, termed in the
main opinion as "law of the case".
Indeed, the Court of Industrial
Relations had already found the sale
to respondent of the Cosmos Foundry
Shop to be fraudulent, and that
decision was sustained by this Court.
In that proceeding, even the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court was
questioned. Thus, both the merits of
the respective claims of the parties as
well as the validity of the action of the
Industrial Court is now beyond
question. And that was the basis of
petitioners' motion to dismiss the
replevin action. Under these
circumstances, any appeal from the
order of dismissal should have come
directly to this Court, the issue passed
upon by the trial court being purely
legal, premised as it is on conclusions
of fact of the Court of Industrial
Relations no longer assailable as a
matter of law by respondent.
In other words, the Court of Appeals
would have no alternative anyway
than to certify that appeal to Us, and,
accordingly, We can already decide
the present action as if certification
had in fact been made. The
pleadings and the issues before Us
now could not be substantially
different, if We took the roundabout
way of directing such certification to
be made before We render Our
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

decision. It is, but proper, therefore, be considered as non-existing and

that in the interest of a faster, more that court should be enjoined from
effective and less technically taking any further action thereon,
cumbersome administration of even as We decide the case now as
justice, We should here and now put if it had been duly appealed to us
an end to the controversy between without the need of any further
the parties herein. proceeding, since, as already
observed, the necessary pleadings
Contrary to the claim of respondent are in effect already before Us.
regarding the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Court to pass on the
question of the alleged fictiousness of
the sale to respondent, there is at
least the decision of this Court
in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa
sa La Campana vs. De los Angeles, 36
SCRA 142, holding that the power of
control over the Sheriff in relation to
the implementation of writ of
execution issued by the Industrial
Court belongs to that court and not
to any Court of First Instance. (at pp.
155-6.) But even assuming there
could be in truth some doubt on the
matter, the fact is that issue was
actually included in the previous
proceeding in that court sustained by
this Court in G.R. No. L-36636. If that
ruling is in anyway erroneous, We
cannot change it anymore. As far as
the parties are concerned that is the
law of the case. Even a ruling on
jurisdiction has the effect of res
adjudicata. Much less then could any
other court disregard it. And
inasmuch as the trial court simply
adhered to this view, its order of
dismissal can hardly be assailed as
erroneous.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is my

considered view that for want of
appellate jurisdiction, the impugned
appeal in the Court of Appeals may
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3695 February 24, 1992
DOMINGO C.
GAMALINDA, complainant,
vs.
AYTYS. FERNANDO ALCANTARA and
JOSELITO LIM, respondents.
R E SO L U T I O N
NARVASA, C.J.:
In his verified letter-complaint dated
June 19, 1991, 1 complainant
Domingo Gamalinda charges retired
Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty.
Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their
profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso sa
kanilang propesyon"), deception,
threats, dishonoring and injuring the
reputation of said complainant and
bringing about the loss of his land.
The Court finds the charges to be
without basis and accordingly
dismisses them.
The administrative complaint against
retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is
a futile attempt to resurrect the
charges filed against him in Adm.
Matter No. MTJ-90-494, which were
dismissed by this Court in its resolution
of September 8, 1988 for having
become moot and academic. Adm.
Matter No. MTJ-90-494 was filed only
on July 22, 1987, or five (5) months
after the respondent judge's
retirement from the service on
February 3, 1987. No motion for
reconsideration having been
seasonably filed by complainant,
that resolution has become final and
executory. It serves as a bar to a
relitigation of the same charges
against respondent judge. 2 That
those charges are now being
brought against respondent judge in
his capacity as an attorney does not
help the cause of complainant, for
the change in the form of action or
remedy pursued does not bar the
application of the rule of res
judicata. 3
On the other hand, the record
establishes that Atty. Lim was merely
performing his duty as counsel for the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3827 when
he did what is now complained of. 4
In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII,
Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had
sued the heirs of Apolinario
Gamalinda 5 for reconveyance, with
damages, of the eastern half of Lot
No. 3217 of the cadastral survey of
Victoria, Tarlac, which was allegedly
inadvertently included in the original
certificate of title of Apolinario
Gamalinda. In the course of the trial,
plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of
preliminary injunction against the
"defendants, their agents,
representatives or other persons
acting in their behalf, ordering them
to desist from threshing and carting
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
away the palay harvest on Lot No.
3217 of the Cadastral Survey of
Victoria, . . . until further order of this
Court. . . ." 6 This injunction was made
permanent in the decision of the
lower court rendered on July 26, 1977
in favor of the plaintiffs.
Pending appeal to the Court of
Appeals, complainant herein
entered a portion of the area in
dispute, in the belief that the whole of
Lot No. 3217 belonged to him by
virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Quitclaim 7executed
in his favor by the heirs of Apolinario
Gamalinda on May 6, 1985. It must be
noted that at that time title to Lot No.
3217 was still in the name of
Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus, when
Maximiano Tiburcio, Protacio
Cabatino and Maximo Mateo,
tenants of Salud Balot, entered the
portion being cultivated by
complainant, the latter reported the
incident to the police.
From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was
complainant who intruded into her
land. Relying therefore on the
injunction issued by the lower court,
she filed through counsel, Atty. Lim, a
motion to declare complainant
Gamalinda in contempt of court.
Complainant interposed the defense
that the area in dispute in Civil Case
No. 3827 was different from the area
occupied by him. To resolve the issue,
the lower court with his agreement,
ordered a resurvey of Lot No. 3217.
The result of the resurvey showed that
contrary to complainant's claim, the
lot occupied by him was the very
same land involved in Civil Case No.
3827. Accordingly, the lower court
declared complainant in contempt
in an order dated July 24, 1986 which
was affirmed on appeal by the Court
of Appeals in a decision rendered on
March 21, 1998. 8
Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino
and Mateo are tenants of Salud Balot
and complainant is the successor-in-
interest of the heirs of Apolinario
Gamalinda, the defendants in Civil
Case No. 3827, it is clearly erroneous
for complainant to claim that neither
he nor Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo
had anything to do with said civil
case. Being privies to the parties, they
are necessarily bound by the orders
rendered in said case.
On October 12, 1987, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision,
affirming in toto the judgment of the
lower court in Civil Case No.
3827. 9 After the appellate court's
decision had become final, Atty. Lim
moved for the execution of the
affirmed judgment, 10 and when the
writ of execution was returned
unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent Motion to
Require Domingo Gamalinda to
Surrender TCT 186299 to the Clerk of
Court and to Authorize the Latter to
Execute Reconveyance of Lot 3217-A
in Favor of Plaintiffs." 11 That motion
was granted by the lower court, but
complainant refused to surrender the
Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299,
prompting Atty. Lim to file the
questioned "Motion to Declare
Owner's Copy of TCT 186299 Null and
Void," 12 which the lower court
granted on July 31, 1989.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

It is clear from the foregoing that the
questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all
done in line with his duty to prosecute
his clients' cause in Civil Case No.
3827. The first motion was filed to
protect his clients' possessory rights
over the property in dispute while the
second motion was made to procure
execution of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3827.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and must be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in
him. 13He shall serve his client with
competence and diligence, 14 and
his duty of entire devotion to his
client's cause not only requires, but
entitles him to employ every
honorable means to secure for the
client what is justly due him or to
present every defense provided by
law to enable the latter's cause to
succeed. 15 An attorney's duty to
safeguard the client's interests
commences from his retainer until the
effective release from the case 16 or
the final disposition of the whole
subject matter of the
litigation. During that period, he is
17
lower and appellate courts in Civil
Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake
instrument, suffice it to say that this is
a matter that should have been
litigated in said case instead of being
raised for the first time in these
proceedings. In any case, there
being no showing that Atty. Lim was
aware of any defect in that deed,
the charge of deception against him
will not lie. Absent, too, is any showing
that Atty. Lim had anything to do with
the preparation of the criminal
information, and for the same reason
he cannot be called to account for
it.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative
charges against retired Judge
Fernando Alcantara and Atty.
Joselito Lim are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

expected to take such reasonable

steps and such ordinary care as his
client's interests may require.

This is precisely what Atty. Lim was

doing when he filed the motions
complained of. He should be
commended, not condemned, for
diligently and competently
performing his duties as an attorney;

With respect to the complainant's

contention that the Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land relied upon by the
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25137 July 28, 1969
J. P. JUAN & SONS, INC., herein duly
represented by its Treasurer, Rodolfo
S. Juan, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LIANGA
INDUSTRIES, INC.,Defendant-
Appellant.
Magsarili, Muro and Alcantara for
plaintiff-appellee.
Jose M. Luison for defendant-
appellant.
TEEHANKEE, J.:chanrobles virtual law
library
In this appeal certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals as
involving an issue of law, we are
called upon once more to reiterate
the established doctrine first
enunciated by this Court in 1943 1 that
a general denial in an answer,
although termed a "specific denial",
fails to tender an issue and entitles
plaintiff to a judgment on the
pleadings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
In a complaint originally filed
with the City Court of Manila on
October 30, 1963, plaintiff sought
recovery from defendant of the sum
of P900.00, representing the unpaid
balance of office equipment
amounting to P1,890.00 sold and
delivered on October 15, 1962 by
plaintiff to defendant under a
purchase order, copy of which was
duly annexed to the complaint.
Plaintiff also asked for the payment of
legal interests and costs and P200.00
for attorney's fees. Judgment was
rendered on December 9, 1963 by
the City Court in favor of plaintiff and
defendant appealed the same to
the Court of First Instance of
Manila. 2 Defendant filed its Answer
on January 27, 1964, where it "denied
specifically all the allegations of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
complaint", which are the material
allegations referring to its purchase of
the office equipment, its partial
payment and refusal and failure to
pay the unpaid balance of P900.00
despite repeated demands of
plaintiff and alleged as a "special and
affirmative defense" that "defendant
has no obligation to pay to the
plaintiff the amount or sum of money
claimed in the
complaint." Defendant did not deny
3
under oath the authenticity of the
purchase order annexed to the
complaint, as required by Rule 8,
section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff, in its Manifestation
submitted at the pretrial conference
held by the lower Court on June 15,
1964, stated that its documentary
evidence consisted of:
a-1. Purchase order between plaintiff
and defendant already marked Exh.
'A' in the Inferior
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
a-2. Demand letter dated August 16,
1963 already marked Exh. 'B' in the
Inferior
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
a-3. Demand letter dated October
24, 1963, already marked Exh. 'C' in
the Inferior
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
a-4. Charge invoice dated October
16, 1962, marked Exh 'D' in the Inferior
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
and that "defendant refused
amicable settlement on the
case," and moved for judgment on
4
the pleadings. The Record on Appeal
does not show that defendant
submitted any manifestation in turn
as to its evidence or defenses.
The lower Court thereafter
rendered its decision granting
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings and upholding plaintiff's
position that "when defendant's
answer denies the allegations of the
complaint because the defendant
'has no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief' and
'specifically denies' other allegations,
'the real fact being those hereunder
stated', said denials are in fact mere
general denials amounting to
admissions of the material allegations
of the complaint." It held that "The
facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint
are of the kind that plainly and
necessarily must be within
defendant's knowledge, and of
which the defendant cannot
logically pretend ignorance, ..." and
that "The material allegations of the
complaint must, therefore, be
deemed as admitted by the
defendant ..." Summing up, the lower
Court found that "Said material
allegations deemed admitted by the
defendant establish that on October
15, 1962, the defendant purchased
from the plaintiff office equipment
listed in the Purchase Order No.
001/62, a photostatic copy of which
was attached to the complaint as
Annex A, the authenticity of which
has not been denied under oath. The
equipments therein listed, with a total
selling price of P1,890.00, were
delivered to the defendant which
paid only the amount of P990.00,
thereby leaving an unpaid balance
of P900.00. Notwithstanding the fact
that said purchase was payable in
thirty days from October 15, 1962, the
defendant failed and refused to pay
the outstanding balance of P900.00
despite repeated demands for
payment." 5 It therefore rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiff,
although it made no award for
attorney's fees for lack of
proof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
Defendant filed its notice of
appeal from the lower Court's
decision, on the ground that the
same is 'contrary to law and the
evidence" and asked that its appeal
be elevated to the Court of Appeals,
resulting in further delay in the
resolution of this simple collection
case, for as noted by the appellate
Court in its Resolution certifying the
appeal to this Court "No facts as facts
are disputed in this appeal. The
defendant-appellant simply insists
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
that it had tendered issues of fact
and the Court a quo thus erroneously
rendered judgment on the pleadings.
The questions presented are issues
only of law. Consequently, the power
of appellate review in this instance
belongs to the Supreme Court. (Sec.
17, R.A. 296, as
amended)."chanrobles virtual law
library
We find defendant's appeal to
be frivolous. No error was committed
by the Court below in ruling that
defendant-appellant's "specific
denials" are in law general denials
amounting to admissions of the
material allegations of the complaint
and in rendering judgment on the
pleadings, in accordance with the
settled doctrine in this jurisdiction
based on the provisions of Rule 8,
section 10 and Rule 9, section 1 in
relation to Rule 19, section 1 and Rule
20, section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
SEC. 10. Specific denial. - The
defendant must specify each
material allegation of fact the truth of
which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth
the substance of the matters which
he will rely upon to support his denial.
Where a pleader desires to deny only
a part or a qualification of an
averment, he shall specify so much of
it as is true and material and shall
deny only the remainder. Where the
defendant is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment
made in the complaint, he shall so
state, and this shall have the effect of
a denial. (Rule 8, Sec. 10, Rules of
Court)
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
SEC. 1. Allegations not
specifically denied deemed
admitted. - Material averment in the
complaint, other than those as to the
amount of damage, shall be
deemed admitted when not
specifically denied. Allegations of
usury are deemed admitted if not
denied specifically and under oath.
(Rule 9, Sec. 1, Rules of
Court).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarych
anrobles virtual law library
SEC 1. Judgment on the
pleadings. - Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved. (Rule 19, Sec. 1, Rules of
Court).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarych
anrobles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgment at
the pre-trial. - If at the pre-trial the
court finds that facts exist upon which
a judgment on the pleadings or a
summary judgment may be made, it
may render judgment on the
pleadings of a summary judgment as
justice may require. (Rule 20, Sec. 3,
Rules of Court).
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
This doctrine was first established
by the Court twenty-six years ago in
the case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos
Investments, Inc., 6 where this Court, in
applying the provisions on specific
denials required of the defendant in
Rule 9, section 7 of the then new Rules
of Court, now found in Rule 8, section
10 of the Revised Rules of Court
above-quoted, held that
"Defendant's answer wherein it
merely 'denies generally and
specifically each and every
allegation contained in each and
every paragraph of the complaint,' is
but a general denial. It is not a
specific denial under section 7 of Rule
9, because it does not deal
specifically with each material
allegation of fact, nor does it set forth
the substance of the matters upon
which the defendant relies to support
his denial. It does not serve the
purpose of requiring the defendant
to make a specific denial, which is to
compel him to specify the matters
which he intends to disprove and
disclose the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial, thereby
limiting the issues and avoiding
unnecessary delays and surprises.
Under the old procedure the plaintiff
was compelled by defendant's mere
general denial to prove facts alleged
in the complaint which the
defendant did not even attempt to
dispute. The new procedure does
away with that unnecessary burden.
(Moran on the Rules of Court, volume
1, page 93.)" 7 This doctrine has since
been applied uniformly in a long line
of cases. 8 chanrobles virtual law
library
Time and again, this Court has
stressed that "An unexplained denial
of information and belief of a matter
of records, the means of information
concerning which are within the
control of the pleader, or are readily
accessible to him, is evasive and is
insufficient to constitute an effective
denial. ..." 9 and that "the form of
denial ... adopted by the appellants,
although allowed by the Rules of
Court (referring to lack of sufficient
knowledge or information) must be
availed of with sincerity and in good
faith, - certainly neither for the
purpose of confusing the adverse
party as to what allegations of the
complaint are really put in issue nor
for the purpose of
delay." 10 chanrobles virtual law
library
Defendant-appellant has no
cause to complain of the judgment
appealed from. Its claim that it
tendered an issue with its "affirmative
defense" of "having no obligation to
pay to the plaintiff the amount or sum
of money claimed in the complaint"
was correctly held by the Court
below to be a mere conclusion not
premised on an allegation of material
facts. Its "specific denial" of the
material allegations of the complaint
as to its purchase of the office
equipment from plaintiff under the
purchase order annexed to the
complaint and refusal to pay the
unpaid balance of P900.00 due
thereon, without setting forth the
substance of the matters relied upon
to support its general denial, when
such matters were plainly within its
knowledge and it could not logically
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
pretend ignorance as to the same,
therefore, failed to properly tender
an issue. Furthermore, its failure to
deny under oath the authenticity of
the purchase order annexed to the
complaint, as required by Rule 8,
section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Court 11 was properly deemed an
admission of the genuineness and
due execution thereof. There is
nothing in the record to justify
defendant's pretense in its brief (p.
13) that the said purchase order
"merely shows the defendant's offer
to buy the (articles) from the plaintiff,"
as against the material averments of
the complaint, deemed admitted by
it, that the articles were delivered to
it, and that it paid an amount of
P990.00 on account of the purchase
price, leaving an unpaid balance of
P900.00, which it had failed and
refused to pay all this time. Verily, as
this Court pointed out in the Sy-quia
vs. Marsman case, supra, fn. 8, the
Court will not sanction a strategy of
evasion systematically adopted by a
defendant of trapping and confusing
the plaintiff as to what facts the
plaintiff has to prove or what issues
must be met, for "it is violative of fair
disclosure of facts required by the
Rules."chanrobles virtual law library
Cases such as this contribute to
the needless clogging of the court
dockets. The Rules of Court were
devised to limit the issues and avoid
unnecessary delays and surprises.
Hence, the mandatory provisions of
Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court
for a pre-trial conference for the
simplification of the issues and the
consideration of all matters which
may aid in the prompt disposition of
an action. The Rules further require in
Rule 7 section 5 that "every pleading
of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual
name" and that "the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading
and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay" with the express
admonition that "for a willful violation
of this rule, an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action." The
cooperation of litigants and their
attorneys is needed so that the
salutary objectives of these Rules may
be
attained.chanroblesvirtualawlibraryc
hanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with treble costs against defendant-
appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,
Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 1054 March 25, 1975
JUAN AZOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY EUSTAQUIO
BELTRAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
If there were truth to the facts
imputed to respondent Eustaquio
Beltran, a member of the Philippine
bar, he would indeed be liable for
malpractice and gross misconduct.
He was accused of taking or causing
to be detached from the rollo of
Special Proceedings No. 667 of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, the financial report of
complainant Juan Azor as executor,
as well as the order of the court
terminating the same; of thereafter
filing a motion to require complainant
to render an accounting and to
deliver the property left in the will to
the beneficiaries; and of having
instructed his client Lorelie Bornales
and the latter's mother, Aniana
Sadol-Escriba to enter forcibly a
parcel of land forming a part of the
estate when he knew of its having
been previously sold, thus
necessitating a complaint for forcible
entry. The answer with supporting
documents of respondent did
present an entirely different picture.
What motivated complainant to file
this administrative case became
apparent as respondent represented
clients with opposing interest. With
the allegations of facts in the
complaint thus being controverted,
the matter was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Complainant and respondent with
their witnesses were duly heard. On
October 11, 1974, the report and
recommendation came from
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
and Assistant Solicitor General Alicia
V. Sempio-Diy.1 The recommendation
is for the dismissal of the charges.
Such a recommendation is based on
a thorough analysis of the evidence
presented. As to the first count: "The
records are entirely bereft of any
direct, positive and competent
evidence to support the charge that
respondent detached and removed
official records from the Office of the
Clerk of Court of Camarines Sur,
particularly the financial report in,
and the order of closure of, Special
Proceeding No. 667. If at all,
complainant appears to have merely
assumed that because, when he was
allegedly shown by the clerk of court
the records of said case, the same
purportedly contained at the time
only the probated will and
respondent's motion for an
accounting therein ... then
respondent must have spirited away
the financial report filed therein by
complainant and the order of the
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
court for the closure of said
proceedings. On the other hand,
respondent did not only vigorously
deny the imputation that he took said
records from the expediente of the
case, ... but he also submitted in
evidence a certification of the
branch clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur attesting
to the fact that the records of the
aforecited probate proceedings,
including the allegedly missing
financial report and order, are all
intact and unaltered ... . Needless to
state, mere assumptions cannot be
the basis of any finding against any
member of the bar who, as an official
of the court, is presumed to act with
the utmost decorum and good faith
in all his dealings. This presumption in
favor of the respondent in the
probate proceedings in question can
not be overcome by complainant's
aforesaid mere assumption or
imputation without any evidence in
support of the same."2 As to the
accusation that not withstanding
that respondent filed a motion for
accounting on July 5, 1971 despite his
previous knowledge that the
complainant as executor had
already filed his financial report and
that in fact the probate proceedings
had been closed and terminated,
the report characterized it as
"unfounded and baseless." It
explained why: "Complainant further
insists in his memorandum that if
respondent had really examined
the expediente of the probate
proceedings, then he could not have
failed to see therein his
(complainant's) financial report filed
on July 8, 1958 ... and the order of the
court decreeing the closure and
termination of the case ... This
contention conveniently ignores the
explanation given by respondent
that when he examined the records
of said case on July 5, 1971, he found
on the last page thereof the financial
report of complainant of May 11,
1959, ... together with the latter's
motion for the consideration and
approval thereof, but that as said
motion appeared not to have been
resolved by the court, he then got the
impression that the probate
proceedings had not yet been finally
terminated; hence, his motion for
accounting of July 5, 1971 ... That
such explanation is reasonable and
believable is shown by the fact that
even the probate court thereafter
ordered complainant to render the
accounting prayed for ... showing
that even the probate court had
apparently found complainant's
financial report ... on the last page of
the record of the case still unacted
upon, which situation likewise led it to
believe that the case had not yet
been terminated. Of course, had
respondent made a more diligent
and exhaustive examination of the
records of said probate proceedings,
he would have found somewhere
therein complainant's financial report
of July 8, 1958 and the court's order of
closure of January 5, 1959, and he
would not have filed his motion for
accounting in question. Be this as it
may, however, we fail to discern in
respondent's filing of his aforesaid
motion for accounting any
deliberate attempt or intention on his
part to mislead the probate court in
said case, or to cause complainant
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
discredit or put him in disrepute so as
to justify disciplinary action against
him in this case.3 There was no
justification either for the allegation
that respondent induced his clients,
Lorelie Bornales and the latter's
mother Aniana Sadol-Escriba, to
enter forcibly one of the parcels of
land subject of Special Proceeding
No. 667, so the report concluded.
Thus: "In this case, respondent has
clearly shown that his legal services
were sought by one of the Bornales
sisters for the first time only on July 5,
1971, or after the supposed forcible
entry by Escriba and the Bornales
sisters on July 1, 1971 into the land in
question ... . In the absence of any
factual basis, the particular charge in
question must likewise fail."4
The Court accepts such
recommendation. The investigation
appeared to be thorough and the
appraisal of the evidence both
meticulous and correct. Respondent
should he absolved of the charges
hurled against him. Complainant
ought to have displayed a greater
sense of responsibility. He should have
refrained from imposing on this Court
or the Office of the Solicitor General
a needless burden and
inconvenience. Apparently what
motivated him in filing his complaint
was the zeal with which respondent
fought for the interests of his client.
Complainant should be aware that
this Court does not look with favor
upon accusations arising from
dissatisfaction and resentment at the
mode in which a lawyer diligently
and tenaciously prosecutes matters
entrusted to him. Instead of being
condemned under the
circumstances, he should be
commended. Nor is this all. There are
intimations in the record that the ill-will
of complainant was aroused by
respondent coming into possession of
information that did cause a
reflection on the discharge of his trust
as executor. Incensed, he would
utilize what appeared to be a
dominant economic position in the
community to make things difficult for
respondent. Such an actuation,
meriting disapproval then, is even
more reprehensible now under the
temper of the present dispensation
that seeks to do away with every
vestige of malodorous practices
indulged in by the rich and the
powerful in the community.
Fairness to both complainant and
respondent compels the observation
that the latter, as a member of the
bar, is called upon to be much more
careful and meticulous in examining
the records of a case and noting
every pleading, even if as has
happened in not a few cases, the
papers are not kept in as orderly a
manner as is both proper and
desirable.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for
malpractice and gross misconduct
against respondent Eustaquio Beltran
is dismissed. Let a copy of this
resolution be entered on his record.
Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and
Aquino, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Republic of the Philippines decision, filed the Notice of Appeal

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27231 March 28,
1969
ALFONSO VISITACION, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
VICTOR MANIT, substituted by his
widow LEONARDA MANIT and
daughters VIRGINIA DUNGOG,
VICTORIA BATUCAN and MERLINDA
MANIT, defendants-appellants.
Amadeo Seno for plaintiff-appellee.
Jesus P. Garcia for defendants-
appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu and certified
by the Court of Appeals to this Court,
since the issues raised on appeal are
all questions of law.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution
of January 17, 1967 certifying the
case as falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of this Court points out that
this appeal is "unique" in the sense
that the appellant purports to be not
the original defendant, Victor Manit,
now deceased, nor his heirs, his
widow and three daughters of age,
substituted for him upon his death,
per the title of this case above, but
rather his counsel of record, Atty.
Jesus P. Garcia, who on April 13, 1960,
after the trial court's adverse
and cash bond on Appeal as
"Attorney for Victor Manit deceased"
and on the same date filed the
Record on Appeal as "Jesus P.
Garcia, in his capacity as officer of
the Court and as former counsel of
the deceased." 1 The Record on
Appeal and appeal bond were
thereafter approved on April 25, 1960
by the trial court and the case
forwarded on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, and in turn certified to this
Court.
The case originated on January 18,
1956 when plaintiff appellee filed this
case against defendant Victor Manit
to hold him liable subsidiarily as
employer for the death of plaintiff's
son, Delano Visitacion, as a result of
injuries sustained in a vehicular
collision involving laid defendant's
driver Rudolfo Giron, who was found
insolvent after having been
convicted and sentenced in a
previous criminal case arising out of
said death, to indemnify the victim's
heirs in the amount of
P3,000.00.lawphi1.ñet
An Answer to the complaint was
filed in due course by Atty. Garcia on
behalf of defendant. On June 1,
1956, the case was heard, without
defendant or his counsel being
present, and plaintiff presented his
evidence and the case, was
submitted for decision. On June 6,
1956, defendant, however, filed a
motion for new trial which was
granted by the trial court on June 9,
1956.2
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Plaintiff presented his oral and
documentary evidence and was
cross-examined by Atty. Garcia. 3 The
record further shows that on March
19, 1958, Atty. Garcia commenced
the presentation of evidence on
behalf of defendant. He presented
defendant's wife, Leonarda Manit
who testified that her husband, Victor
Manit "had no business of his own,
because he is sickly" and that she was
the one operating and managing
their transportation business of three
trucks. 4
On October 14, 1958, when the case
was scheduled for continuation of
the trial, Atty. Garcia manifested that
the original defendant, Victor Manit
had recently died, and the trial court
on the same date directed him to
furnish plaintiff's counsel the names of
the said defendant's heirs, so that
plaintiff could amend the complaint
accordingly. On August 11, 1959,
plaintiff's counsel submitted a Motion
to Admit the Amended Complaint
attached thereto, furnishing copy of
said pleadings to Atty. Garcia, who
acknowledged receipt thereof as
"Attorney for the defendant." The only
amendment in the complaint
consisted in impleading the widow
and heirs of the deceased original
defendant in substitution for him,
pursuant to Rule 3, section 17 of the
Rules of Court. At the hearing of the
said motion on the same date, the
trial court, after noting that there was
no opposition thereto by Atty.
Garcia, admitted the Amended
Complaint in its Order of August 11,
1959, wherein "(A)s prayed for by
counsel for the defendants,
defendants are hereby given fifteen
(15) days' time within which to file an
answer to said amended
complaint." No answer to the
5
amended complaint having been
filed, the original answer stood as
defendants' answer to the amended
complaint, in accordance with Rule
11, section 3 of the Rules of Court. 6
The case was again set for hearing
on January 28, 1960 with notice to the
parties through their counsels of
record. One day before the hearing,
on January 27, 1960, Atty. Garcia filed
a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel",
alleging that "the heirs of Victor Manit
have not hired (him) to represent
them and consequently, (his)
continued appearance in
representation of a dead client
would be illegal" and asking the trial
court "that he be relieved as counsel
in the above-entitled case for the
reasons stated herein." 7
When the case was called on the
next day, neither defendants nor
Atty. Garcia appeared, and the trial
court noting "defendants' apparent
lack of interest as can be gleaned
from the records" considered them to
have renounced their right to appear
and present evidence to contest
plaintiff's claim. It did not pass upon
Atty. Garcia's Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel and proceeded to render
judgment in favor of plaintiff, the
dispositive part of which provides as
follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the Court
pronounces judgment in favor
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
of the plaintiff and against the
defendants; and hereby
sentences the defendants,
jointly and severally, to pay the
plaintiff the amount of
P3,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Delano Visitacion,
plus P3,000.00 in concept of
moral damages, and the
additional sum of P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, as well as the
costs of this action.8
Atty. Garcia's Motion for
Reconsideration, based on the same
grounds hereinafter discussed having
been denied by the trial court, he
filed the present appeal, and assigns
the following errors in his "Brief for
Defendant-Appellant":
First Error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONTINUING WITH THE CASE
WITHOUT THE NEW DEFENDANTS
BROUGHT TO ITS JURISDICTION
BY SUMMONS AND WITHOUT
EVEN INFORMING SAID
DEFENDANTS THAT THEY HAVE
BECOME PARTIES TO THE CASE.
Second Error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
IGNORING THE MOTION TO
WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FILED
BY A LAWYER WHO HAD LOST
AUTHORITY TO RE PRESENT A
DEAD CLIENT.
Third Error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
RENDERING A PREMATURE
JUDGMENT IN AN UNFINISHED
CASE WHERE THE NEW
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT GIVEN
THEIR DAY IN COURT.
He prayed therein that the
appellate Court render judgment:
(a). Annulling the decision
appealed from;
(b). Remanding the case to the
lower court for further
proceedings by serving
summons on the defendants
and giving them a chance to
present their evidence;
(c). Relieving the undersigned
counsel from all responsibility in
connection with this case in
view of the death of his client;
and
(d). Granting such other and
further reliefs and remedies in
accordance with law and
equity. (Appellants' Brief, p. 10)
We hold this "unique" appeal by the
counsel of record, Atty. Jesus P.
Garcia, allegedly "in his capacity as
officer of the Court and as former
counsel of the deceased Victor
Manit" to be untenable.
There are two fundamental errors on
which Atty. Garcia's appeal is
premised. First, if he presents this
appeal "in his capacity as officer of
the Court and as former counsel of
the deceased Victor Manit", his
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
appeal should be thrown out, as not
being a party to the case, much less
a party in interest, he has no legal
standing whatsoever to prosecute
this appeal. Second, in filing his
Notice of Appeal and Cash Appeal
Bond, he represented himself as
"Attorney for Victor Manit,
deceased", depositing the sum of
P60.00 as appeal bond "to answer or
respond for the costs which the
appellate court may award against
the herein defendant-
appellant," 9 thus representing anew
to the trial Court that he was duly
authorized to present the appeal on
behalf of the estate of the original
defendant, Victor Manit deceased,
who had earlier been substituted in
the case by his heirs, the widow and
three daughters of legal age. The trial
Court was perfectly correct in relying
upon this representation in
accordance with Rule 138, section 21
of the Rules of Court which provides
that "(A)n attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any
case in which he appears ...." This
appeal must accordingly be dealt
with as an appeal on behalf of said
heirs as defendants-appellants and
not in the "unique" concept with
which Atty. Garcia would
circumscribe it.
1. As to the first error assigned,
no error was committed by the
trial court in continuing with the
ease and handing down its
decision against defendants-
appellants. The contention that
said defendants-appellants, as
substituted parties-defendants
by virtue of their being the heirs
of the deceased original
defendant pursuant to the trial
court's Orders of October 24,
1958 and August 11, 1959 in
accordance with Rule 3,
section 17 of the Rules of
Court 10 , should have been
brought within the Court's
jurisdiction by summons is
fallacious. For the record shows
that Atty. Garcia at the time
acknowledged receipt of the
Amended Complaint
substituting said defendants-
heirs for the deceased original
defendant as "Attorney for the
defendants", presented no
opposition thereto, and
furthermore prayed for and
was granted by the Court a
period of 15 days to file an
answer to the Amended
Complaint. Having been duly
impleaded and having
submitted to the Court's
jurisdiction through their
counsel, Atty. Garcia, the
issuance of a summons was
unnecessary. The other
contention that "there is oven
no record showing that these
defendants were at all
informed that they had
become parties to the above-
captioned case" 11 is equally
fallacious. Nowhere in
appellants' brief is there an
assertion by Atty. Garcia, that,
he, as their attorney of record,
and in compliance with his
duty as such and as an officer
of the Court, failed or
neglected to inform them of
the admission of the Amended
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Complaint substituting them for
the deceased original
defendant.
2. Appellants claim in their
second assignment of error
that the trial court erred in
ignoring the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel filed by
Atty. Garcia. In the face of
Atty. Garcia's previous
representations and
appearance as counsel of
record for the substituted
defendants, his last hour
motion to withdraw as counsel
and disclaimer that said
defendants have hired him to
represent them — which he
filed one day before the date
set for resumption of the
hearing — came too late and
was properly ignored by the
Court. The Court could not
accept this turn-about on his
mere "say-so." His motion was
not verified. Aside from the fact
that his said motion carried no
notice, in violation of the
requirement of Rule 15, section
4 of the Rules of Court, and
could therefore be treated as
a "mere scrap of paper", 12 the
said motion was likewise fatally
defective in that it carried no
notice to his clients on record,
the defendants-appellants, as
required by Rule 138, section 26
of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, it is well settled
that "(A)n attorney seeking to
withdraw must make an
application to the court, for the
relation does not terminate
formally until there is a
withdrawal of record; at least
so far as the opposite party is
concerned, the relation
otherwise continues until the
end of the litigation." 13 The trial
court's ignoring of the last-hour
motion and its handing down
of its decision on the day of the
hearing, upon the failure of
defendants and their counsel
to appear, in spite of their
having been duly notified
thereof, was in effect a denial
of counsel's application for
withdrawal. Atty. Garcia's
unexplained failure to appear
was unexcusable. He had no
right to presume that the Court
would grant his withdrawal. If
he had then appeared and
insisted on his withdrawal, the
trial court could then have had
the opportunity to order the
appearance of defendants-
appellants and verify from
them the truth of his assertion
that they had not "hired him to
represent them."
3. The trial court, therefore, did
not render a "premature
judgment in an unfinished case
where the defendants were
not given their day in court", as
claimed in the last error
assigned by appellants. As
stated earlier, the record shows
that on March 19, 1958, the
original defendant's widow,
Leonarda Manit was placed by
Atty. Garcia on the witness
stand during the deceased's
lifetime and testified that her
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
husband "has no business of his
own, because he is sickly" and
that she was the one operating
and managing
transportation business of three
trucks since as early as 1952,
some years before the filing of
the complaint on January 18,
1956. 14In effect, the widow,
Leonarda Manit had then
submitted herself to the Court's
jurisdiction, asserting as she did
that she was the one operating
the business and that her
husband had no business of his
own. The widow and her three
children of age as heirs of the
deceased cannot therefore
claim ignorance of
pendency of the case, and
that notwithstanding that she
was the actual operator and
manager of the business, that
she has been kept in complete
ignorance of its subsequent
developments, after
husband's death over 10 years
ago. Almost 10 years have
elapsed since they were
substituted in 1959
defendants for the deceased,
and it taxes all credibility for
them to claim now in their brief
that "said new defendants did
not even know that they
became parties in
Amended Complaint," and 15
that all this time not the slightest
effort was made by them to
find out from Atty. Garcia or
from the Court for that matter
what had happened to the
case nor did Atty. Garcia in
compliance with his duty as an
officer of the Court inform them
of the decision handed down
by the Court Over 9 years ago.
their Having failed to appear on the
day set for trial without any
justifiable explanation to the
Court nor having presented an
affidavit of merits as to the
existence of valid and lawful
defenses, they cannot now
complain of having been
deprived of their day in Court.
The circumstances of the case and
the appeal taken all together lead to
the conclusion that the last-hour
withdrawal application of Atty.
Garcia and his appeal "as officer of
the the Court and then counsel of the
deceased" was but a device to
prolong this case and delay in the
execution of the judgment, which
should have been carried out years
ago. The imposition of double costs is
therefore in order.
her
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with double costs to be paid by the
as attorney for defendants. So ordered.
Concepcion C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando and Capistrano, JJ.,
concur.
the Barredo, J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO
RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL,
SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari
seeks to declare null and void two (2)
resolutions of the Special First Division
of the Court of Appeals in the case of
Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa
De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286.
The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration and
directed entry of judgment since the
decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution
dated 27 October 1987 denied
petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed
out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have
denied the petition outright for not
being verified as required by Rule 65
section 1 of the Rules of Court.
However, even if the instant petition
did not suffer from this defect, this
Court, on procedural and substantive
grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The firewall of a burned-out building
owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in
view of its proximity to the weakened
wall but the former failed to do so. On
the basis of the foregoing facts, the
Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by
the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered
judgment finding petitioners guilty of
gross negligence and awarding
damages to private respondents. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals in a decision promulgated
on August 17, 1987, a copy of which
was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9,
1987, the last day of the fifteen-day
period to file an appeal, petitioners
filed a motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was
denied in the Resolution of October
27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of
Appeals did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of
time to file a motion for
reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
reconsideration. It correctly applied
the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No.
70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461,
that the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be
extended. In its Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142
SCRA 208), this Court en
banc restated and clarified the rule,
to wit:
Beginning one month after the
promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration may be
filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional
Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may
be filed only in cases pending with
the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases
Division of the intermediate
Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643],
reiterated the rule and went further to
restate and clarify the modes and
periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15,
1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule,
and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a
one-month grace period
from the promulgation
on May 30, 1986 of the
Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas
case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the
rule barring extensions of
time to file motions for
new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet,
not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein
filed their motion for
extension on February
27, 1986, it is still within the
grace period, which
expired on June 30, 1986,
and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied
in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28,
1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however,
petitioners' motion for extension of
time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration
of the grace period on June 30, 1986.
Hence, it is no longer within the
coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from
the expiration of the grace period to
the promulgation of the decision of
the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge
in the ignorance of their counsel
regarding said rule for their failure to
file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Petitioners contend that the rule petitioners prior negligence should

enunciated in the Habaluyas case be disregarded, since the doctrine of
should not be made to apply to the "last clear chance," which has been
case at bar owing to the non- applied to vehicular accidents, is
publication of inapplicable to this case.
the Habaluyas decision in the Official
Gazette as of the time the subject WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
decision of the Court of Appeals was the Court Resolved to DENY the
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' instant petition for lack of merit.
view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr.,
decisions in the Official Gazette Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions
of the Supreme Court particularly
where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published
in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court

of Appeals committed no grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court's decision holding petitioner
liable under Article 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting
from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting

petitioners argument that private
respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate
the tailoring shop and , therefore,
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35113 March 25, 1975
EUGENIO CUARESMA, petitioner,
vs.
MARCELO DAQUIS, PHHC, CESAR
NAVARRO, NICANOR GUEVARRA,
Sheriff of Quezon City or his Deputy
and JUDGE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO,
respondents. ATTORNEY MACARIO O.
DIRECTO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
The predicament in which
respondent Macario O. Directo, a
member of the Philippine bar, now
finds himself is one of his own making.
In a petition for certiorari filed with this
Court on behalf of one Eugenio
Cuaresma, he included the following
categorical allegations: "4. That your
petitioner has no knowledge of the
existence of said case (Civil Case No.
12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch) aforecited between the
respondents Marcelo Daquis, PHHC,
and Cesar Navarro, and wherein the
respondent Judge, [gave] due
course to the complaint, and the
subject matter in litigation; 5. That on
May 26, 1972, the respondent Judge
issued an order of demolition,
ordering the respondent Sheriff of
Quezon City or his deputy to demolish
the house of your petitioner etc., and
on the same day May 26, 1972, the
Sheriff of Quezon City through his
deputy [gave] three (3) days to your
petitioner to remove his house or face
demolition, ... ;6 ... 7. That your
petitioner was not given a day in
court to present his side of the case,
in violation of law, and of the dictum
of due process of the constitution, ...
"1 Thereafter, after receipt of the
comments of respondents, it turned
out, as set forth in a resolution of this
Court of August 4, 1972, "that
petitioner was fully aware of the
existence of said civil case because
on December 14, 1971 Atty. Macario
Directo, as counsel of petitioner,
addressed to respondent Marcelo
Daquis a letter which indicates that
both counsel and petitioner were
aware of the existence of the case. It
also appears that, before
respondents Marcelo Daquis and
Cesar Navarro filed a motion for a writ
of Possession in Civil Case No. Q-
12176, petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma,
along with the other occupants of
the lot in question, was given thirty
(30) days notice to vacate the
premises which period was even
extended for another thirty (30) days,
but that, despite that notice,
petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma refused
to vacate the lot involved in the case.
It further appears that on May 3, 1972,
Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel for
petitioner, filed a motion for
intervention in the aforementioned
Civil Case No. Q-12176; and on May
13, 1972, same counsel filed a motion
to quash or recall the writ of
execution, and an opposition to the
issuance of a writ of demolition. On
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
May 22, 1972, respondent Judge
Pacifico de Castro issued an order
denying the motion to intervene as
well as the motion to quash or recall
the writ of execution."2 It was then set
forth in such resolution that there was
no truth to the allegation that on May
27, 1972, the date of the filing of the
petition for certiorari in the present
case, petitioner had no knowledge of
the existence of Civil Case No. 12176.
Respondent Macario O. Directo was
then given ten days to show cause
why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for deliberately
making false allegations in such
petition. Thereafter, on August 16,
1972, came a pleading which he
entitled Compliance. This is his
explanation: "What your petitioner
honestly meant when he alleged that
he [has] no knowledge of the
existence of said Civil Case No.
12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, was from the time the plaintiff
Marcelo Daquis instituted the said
case in June 1968 up to and after the
time the Court issued the decision in
the year 1970. The plaintiff Marcelo
Daquis entered into a conditional
contract of sale of the lot involved in
said Civil Case No. 12176 with the
PHHC. There were four (4) purchasers,
the plaintiff, two others, and your
petitioner. Because of the
requirement of the PHHC that only
one of them should enter into the
contract, Marcelo Daquis was
chosen by the others to enter into the
same. Since this was a sale on
installment basis, by agreement of all
the purchasers, duly acknowledged
by the PHHC, the monthly dues of the
petitioner and the two others, were
remitted to Marcelo Daquis, who in
turn remits the same to the PHHC. In
June 1968 plaintiff Marcelo Daquis
instituted Civil Case No. 12176 in the
CFI of Quezon City. From June 1968
up to the time and after the decision
was issued by the court, plaintiff
Marcelo Daquis never informed your
petitioner of the said case."3 He
reiterated in a later paragraph that
all he wanted to convey was that his
knowledge of the aforesaid civil case
came only after the decision was
issued. He closed his Compliance
with the plea that if there were any
mistake committed, "it had been an
honest one, and would say in all
sincerity that there was no deliberate
attempt and intent on his part of
misleading this Honorable Court,
honestly and totally unaware of any
false allegation in the petition."4
The above explanation lends itself to
the suspicion that it was a mere
afterthought. It could very well be
that after his attention was called to
the misstatements in his petition, he
decided on such a version as a way
out. That is more than a bare
possibility. There is the assumption
though of good faith. That is in his
favor. Moreover, judging from the
awkwardly worded petition and
even his compliance quite indicative
of either carelessness or lack of
proficiency in the handling of the
English language, it is not
unreasonable to assume that his
deficiency in the mode of expression
contributed to the inaccuracy of his
statements. While a mere disclaimer
of intent certainly cannot exculpate
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

him, still, in the spirit of charity and

forbearance, a penalty of reprimand
would suffice. At least, it would serve
to impress on respondent that in the
future he should be much more
careful in the preparation of his
pleadings so that the least doubt as
to his intellectual honesty cannot be
entertained. Every member of the
bar should realize that candor in the
dealings with the Court is of the very
essence of honorable membership in
the profession.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Macario O.

Directo is reprimanded. Let a copy of
this resolution be spread on his
record.

Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and

Aquino, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Republic of the Philippines Instance of Lanao del Norte a

complaint for the recovery of her
SUPREME COURT alleged share in two commercial lots
situated in Iligan City against the
Manila herein defendant-appellant,
Wenceslao Ben Zubiri, and the
EN BANC Standard Vacuum Oil Co., the
occupant of portions of the said
G.R. No. L-16745 December 17, properties. The plaintiff alleged that
1966 the said lots were conjugal, having
been purchased by her and her late
AURORA CAMARA VDA. DE ZUBIRI, husband during their marriage, so
plaintiff-appellee, that at least one-half of the same
belonged to her "plus the equal share
vs. of the heir or heirs of the decedent."
Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that
WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, ET AL., the said parcels were in the
defendants. possession of the defendant who,
"unless he can prove before this
WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, Honorable Court that he is a duly
defendant-appellant. recognized natural child of the late
Jesus Zubiri, [he] has no right, interest,
and participation whatsoever over
the abovementioned two lots."
C. Jumapao for plaintiff and
appellee.
On May 5, 1959, four (4) pleadings
were filed in the aforementioned
L. E. Petilla and Napoleon Dejores for
case, namely: 1) the herein
defendant and appellant.
appellant's answer which showed on
its face that it was signed by the latter
REGALA, J.:
in his own behalf and unassisted by
counsel; 2) a Stipulation of Facts,
This is an appeal from the order of the
signed by the plaintiff, assisted by
Court of First Instance of Lanao del
counsel, and the defendant, without
Norte in Civil Case No. IL-219, dated
such assistance; 3) a motion to render
September 15, 1959 denying the
judgment on the pleadings, again
defendant-appellant's motion to
signed by the plaintiff, duly assisted
postpone, and from its order of the
by counsel, and the defendant-
same date denying the latter's
appellant herein, signing alone,
petition to set aside judgment.
without benefit of counsel; and 4) the
On April 17, 1959, the plaintiff- defendant Standard Vacuum Oil
appellee, Aurora Camara Vda. de Company's answer to the above
Zubiri, filed with the Court of First complaint.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
On May 6, 1959, the trial court
rendered judgment in accordance
with the aforementioned Stipulation
of Facts. Since in both the answer of
the herein defendant-appellant and
the stipulation of facts the latter
admitted practically all the
allegations of the complaint, the
decision rendered in accordance
therewith was actually in favor of the
plaintiff.
On June 5, 1959, the defendant-
appellant, for the first time thru
counsel, filed with the trial court a
petition to set aside judgment upon
two grounds, to wit: first, the three
pleadings filed on May 5, 1959,
namely: appellant's answer, the
stipulation of facts and the motion to
render judgment on the pleadings
were all prepared by the plaintiff's
counsel and that he, the appellant,
was made to sign all of them when he
was ill and, therefore, incapable of
realizing the full consequences of the
act; and, second, that the plaintiff's
cause of action was barred by a prior
judgment. Under this latter ground,
the appellant represented that the
properties claimed by the plaintiff
had already been determined and
adjudicated to him in a previous
decisions, under Special Proceedings
No. IL-2 of the Court of First Instance
of Lanao del Norte, which has since
become final. Attached to this
petition to set aside judgment were
two affidavits of merit executed by
the defendant-appellant himself and
Vicente A. Miranda, the Clerk of
Court of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu before whom the three
pleadings repudiated in the petition
were subscribed. In the affidavit of
Vicente A. Miranda, it was recited
that the said pleadings were sworn to
before him "at the resident of the
affiant [defendant-appellant] at F.
Ramos Street [Cebu City] because he
was then sick and confined in bed
and "suffering from fever, with an ice
cap on his head and profusely
perspiring."
On June 12, 1959, the trial court
required the plaintiff to answer the
abovementioned petition to set
aside judgment within 15 days from
receipt of the notice thereof and,
thereafter, the said petition was set
for hearing on August 29, 1959.
On August 22, 1959, or a week before
the scheduled hearing, the counsel
for the defendant-appellant filed
with the trial court a motion to
postpone the hearing set for the 29th
on the ground that he, the
defendant's counsel, could not
release himself from his current
employment as to be free to attend
the said hearing. On August 29, 1959,
however, the court denied the
motion to postpone and proceeded
with the scheduled hearing despite
the absence of the defendant's
counsel and, after hearing the
plaintiff's argument, likewise denied
the petition to set aside judgment.
The subsequent motion for
reconsideration thereof having been
denied too, the defendant-appellant
interposed the present appeal.
Although the allowance or denial of
petitions for postponement and the
setting aside of previous duly issued
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
orders rest principally upon the sound
discretion of the magistrate to whom
they are addressed (Tell v. Tell, 48 Phil.
70; Macke v. Camps, 5 Phil. 185; Salva
v. Palacio, et al., G.R. No. L-4247,
January 30, 1952), the exercise of this
power, however, ought to be
prudent and just. It should always be
predicated on the consideration that
more than the mere convenience of
the courts or of the parties of the
case, the ends of justice and fairness
would be served thereby. In the case
at bar, this consideration seems to
have been incompletely observed.
In the first place, the motion for
postponement under consideration
was the very first filed by the counsel
for the appellant. It was filed with the
court a full week prior to the
scheduled hearing, with due and
proper notice to the opposing party.
Its ground was not unreasonable and
hardly flimsy since it is not denied that
then, the counsel for the appellant
was under some contractual
commitments from which he needed
time to be release. Under these
circumstances, it does seem that the
denial of the motion prevented
rather than serve the ends of justice.
Secondly, the appellant's petition to
set aside judgment, which was
verified and duly supported by two
affidavits of merit, was grounded on
very serious allegations, to wit: that it
was the plaintiff's counsel who
prepared and induced the
defendant to sign all the pleadings
upon which the assailed decision was
based, including and particularly the
said defendant's answer, that the
dismissal of the same, in the absence
of the petitioner and without
affording him the chance to be
heard thereon, indeed was
incompatible with the exercise of
sound judicial discretion. This Court is
gravely concerned with the truth of
the above accusation — something
which, on account of the lower
court's precipitate dismissal of the
appellant's petition to set aside
judgment is now hidden and
undeterminable — particularly
because the very face, tenor, and
form of the appellant's alleged
answer established a prima facie
case, so to speak, for the petitioner.
Thus, the said alleged answer reads in
full:
ANSWER
Comes now the defendant,
Wenceslao Zubiri alias Ben in his own
behalf, and to this Honorable Court
most respectfully states:
1. That the defendant admits the
allegations contained in the
complaint of the case.
2. That upon the request and
suggestion of the defendant and with
the conformity of the plaintiff and her
lawyer, both parties, plaintiff and
defendant have agreed to settle the
above entitled case amicably and to
submit a STIPULATION OF FACTS for
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
the corresponding decision, with the
aim in view to finish this case as soon
as possible, and to avoid troubles in
coming to Iligan City from Cebu City,
losing precious time of this Hon. Court
and unnecessary expenses in the
future.
Cebu City (for Iligan City) Philippines,
May 2, 1959.
(SGD.) Wenceslao (Ben) Zubiri
WENCESLAO ZUBIRI
alias Ben
defendant
A copy of this ANSWER was delivered
personally to Atty. C. Jumapao,
counsel for the Plaintiff at Mango
Avenue, 470, Cebu City, and another
copy was served personally to
defendant Standard Vacuum Oil
Company, Cebu City, this 2nd day of
May, 1959.
(SGD.) Wenceslao (Ben) Zubiri
WENCESLAO ZUBIRI
alias Ben
A mere glance at the above-quoted
two-paragraph Answer should have
prompted the trial court to wonder
and inquire if the defendant was
aware of what he was committing
thereby. The admission in paragraph
1 of the same was so total and
unqualified a repudiation of the
defendant's own interest that indeed,
especially as it was avowed in the
said pleading that the defendant
was unassisted by counsel, the trial
court should have insisted upon some
assurance that the defendant was
solely and fully accountable therefor.
After the defendant represented
under oath that the plaintiff's counsel
was the principal author of the same,
and the one who talked him into
participating in it, the intervention of
the lower court became an absolute
necessity.
To be sure, the active participation of
a lawyer in one party's affairs relating
to a pending case in which the said
lawyer is the counsel for the opposing
party is brazenly unethical to say the
least. The Canons of Legal Ethics very
explicitly declare that "it is
unprofessional to represent
conflicting interests" (No. 6), and
command that —
A lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented
by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
should deal only with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that
may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he
should not undertake to advise him as
to the law. (No. 9)
As we have already said in the case
of Cantorne v. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23, the
simultaneous representation by a
lawyer of both parties to a suit
constitutes malpractice which should
be severely condemned and the
lawyer corrected by disciplinary
action. If but for this consideration
alone, the court below should have
allowed the motion for
postponement pleaded by the
appellant and heard the merits of the
latter's petition to set aside judgment.
Moreover, the affidavits of merit
appended to the petition to set aside
judgment recited that the
defendant-appellant was seriously
sick at the time he was made to sign
and swear to the above three
repudiated pleadings. To be sure, no
less than the officer before whom the
said pleadings were subscribed and
sworn to admitted that this
verification was conducted at the
appellant's residence in Cebu where
the latter was confined "suffering from
fever, with an ice cap on his head
and profusely perspiring." Under the
circumstances, therefore, the mental
capacity of the appellant to
responsibly assent to commitments
set forth in the same three pleadings
became doubtful and the trial court
should have exerted its earnest efforts
to resolve the doubt. Especially so
when account is taken of the fact
that the subject matter of the suit was
not just an insubstantial sum but
properties allegedly worth some
P165,000.00.
Finally, one of the grounds invoked by
the defendant-appellant in his
petition to set aside judgment was
the alleged finality of a judicial
decision in which the properties
involved in the above complaint
were involved in Special Proceedings
No. IL-2 of the Court of First Instance
of Lanao and that the decision in the
said case declaring him as the sole
heir of his deceased father, had since
become final. In brief, the appellant
maintained that inasmuch as the
plaintiff-appellee's claim under her
complaint was predicated upon her
alleged right as an heir of the late
Jesus Zubiri, the same was barred by
the aforesaid judgment which, to
repeat, allegedly held that the
defendant-appellant was the sole
and only heir of the same decedent.
By denying the appellant's petition to
set aside judgment, therefore, the
lower court failed to determine the
truth and validity of the
aforementioned ground. And yet, if it
was true that the plaintiff's complaint
was barred by a prior judgment then
the order denying the petition to set
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

aside judgment — in other words, necessary responsive pleading

maintaining the decision rendered thereto. No pronouncement as to
upon the alleged stipulation of costs.
another decision that was totally
inconsistent and irreconcilable with
what was held, and had become
final, under the decision in Special Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,
Proceedings No. IL-2, considering that Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
in this latter case it was held that only J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
the herein appellant was entitled to JJ., concur.
participate in the decedent's estate
while in the decision upon the
alleged stipulation of facts, the
appellee as well was determined to
be so entitled to participate.

Of course, the appellee assails the

proceedings under Special
Proceedings No. IL-2 as void on the
ground of fraud. She claims that the
herein appellant misrepresented in
the said case that the late Jesus Zubiri
had no other heir save him even as
he knew that she, the plaintiff-
appellee, was another such heir and
that she was still living. This does not
alter nor diminish the need for
granting the appellant's petition to
set aside judgment, however, and
hearing the plaintiff's complaint upon
its merits. The vice, if any, in Special
Proceedings No. IL-2 may well be
determined at such hearing.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the

order of the court below denying the
appellant's petition to set aside
judgment is hereby revoked and set
aside. Let the said petition be
granted and the plaintiff-appellee's
complaint under Civil Case No. IL-219
be heard or tried on its merits, after
the herein appellant shall have been
allowed to file his answer or the
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21906 December 24,
1968
INOCENCIA DELUAO and FELIPE
DELUAO plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
NICANOR CASTEEL and JUAN
DEPRA, defendants,
NICANOR CASTEEL, defendant-
appellant.
Aportadera and Palabrica and
Pelaez, Jalandoni and Jamir plaintiffs-
appellees.
Ruiz Law Offices for defendant-
appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of
May 2, 1956, the decision of May 4,
1956 and the order of May 21, 1956,
all of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, in civil case 629. The basic
action is for specific performance,
and damages resulting from an
alleged breach of contract.
In 1940 Nicanor Casteel filed a
fishpond application for a big tract of
swampy land in the then Sitio of
Malalag (now the Municipality of
Malalag), Municipality of Padada,
Davao. No action was taken thereon
by the authorities concerned. During
the Japanese occupation, he filed
another fishpond application for the
same area, but because of the
conditions then prevailing, it was not
acted upon either. On December 12,
1945 he filed a third fishpond
application for the same area, which,
after a survey, was found to contain
178.76 hectares. Upon investigation
conducted by a representative of
the Bureau of Forestry, it was
discovered that the area applied for
was still needed for firewood
production. Hence on May 13, 1946
this third application was
disapproved.
Despite the said rejection, Casteel
did not lose interest. He filed a motion
for reconsideration. While this motion
was pending resolution, he was
advised by the district forester of
Davao City that no further action
would be taken on his motion, unless
he filed a new application for the
area concerned. So he filed on May
27, 1947 his fishpond application
1717.
Meanwhile, several applications
were submitted by other persons for
portions of the area covered by
Casteel's application.
On May 20, 1946 Leoncio Aradillos
filed his fishpond application 1202
covering 10 hectares of land found
inside the area applied for by
Casteel; he was later granted
fishpond permit F-289-C covering 9.3
hectares certified as available for
fishpond purposes by the Bureau of
Forestry.
Victor D. Carpio filed on August 8,
1946 his fishpond application 762
over a portion of the land applied for
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
by Casteel. Alejandro Cacam's
fishpond application 1276, filed on
December 26, 1946, was given due
course on December 9, 1947 with the
issuance to him of fishpond permit F-
539-C to develop 30 hectares of land
comprising a portion of the area
applied for by Casteel, upon
certification of the Bureau of Forestry
that the area was likewise available
for fishpond purposes. On November
17, 1948 Felipe Deluao filed his own
fishpond application for the area
covered by Casteel's application.
Because of the threat poised upon his
position by the above applicants
who entered upon and spread
themselves within the area, Casteel
realized the urgent necessity of
expanding his occupation thereof by
constructing dikes and cultivating
marketable fishes, in order to prevent
old and new squatters from usurping
the land. But lacking financial
resources at that time, he sought
financial aid from his uncle Felipe
Deluao who then extended loans
totalling more or less P27,000 with
which to finance the needed
improvements on the fishpond.
Hence, a wide productive fishpond
was built.
Moreover, upon learning that
portions of the area applied for by
him were already occupied by rival
applicants, Casteel immediately filed
the corresponding protests.
Consequently, two administrative
cases ensued involving the area in
question, to wit: DANR Case 353,
entitled "Fp. Ap. No. 661 (now Fp. A.
No. 1717), Nicanor Casteel,
applicant-appellant versus Fp. A. No.
763, Victorio D. Carpio, applicant-
appellant"; and DANR Case 353-B,
entitled "Fp. A. No. 661 (now Fp. A.
No. 1717), Nicanor Casteel,
applicant-protestant versus Fp.
Permit No. 289-C, Leoncio Aradillos,
Fp. Permit No. 539-C, Alejandro
Cacam, Permittees-Respondents."
However, despite the finding made in
the investigation of the above
administrative cases that Casteel
had already introduced
improvements on portions of the area
applied for by him in the form of dikes,
fishpond gates, clearings, etc., the
Director of Fisheries nevertheless
rejected Casteel's application on
October 25, 1949, required him to
remove all the improvements which
he had introduced on the land, and
ordered that the land be leased
through public auction. Failing to
secure a favorable resolution of his
motion for reconsideration of the
Director's order, Casteel appealed to
the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
In the interregnum, some more
incidents occurred. To avoid
repetition, they will be taken up in our
discussion of the appellant's third
assignment of error.
On November 25, 1949 Inocencia
Deluao (wife of Felipe Deluao) as
party of the first part, and Nicanor
Casteel as party of the second part,
executed a contract —
denominated a "contract of service"
— the salient provisions of which are
as follows:
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
That the Party of the First Part in
consideration of the mutual
covenants and agreements
made herein to the Party of the
Second Part, hereby enter into
a contract of service, whereby
the Party of the First Part hires
and employs the Party of the
Second Part on the following
terms and conditions, to wit:
That the Party of the First Part
will finance as she has hereby
financed the sum of TWENTY
SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P27,000.00), Philippine
Currency, to the Party of the
Second Part who renders only
his services for the construction
and improvements of a
fishpond at Barrio Malalag,
Municipality of Padada,
Province of Davao, Philippines;
That the Party of the Second
Part will be the Manager and
sole buyer of all the produce of
the fish that will be produced
from said fishpond;
That the Party of the First Part
will be the administrator of the
same she having financed the
construction and improvement
of said fishpond;
That this contract was the result
of a verbal agreement entered
into between the Parties
sometime in the month of
November, 1947, with all the
above-mentioned conditions
enumerated; ...
On the same date the above
contract was entered into, Inocencia
Deluao executed a special power of
attorney in favor of Jesus Donesa,
extending to the latter the authority
"To represent me in the administration
of the fishpond at Malalag,
Municipality of Padada, Province of
Davao, Philippines, which has been
applied for fishpond permit by
Nicanor Casteel, but rejected by the
Bureau of Fisheries, and to supervise,
demand, receive, and collect the
value of the fish that is being
periodically realized from it...."
On November 29, 1949 the Director of
Fisheries rejected the application
filed by Felipe Deluao on November
17, 1948. Unfazed by this rejection,
Deluao reiterated his claim over the
same area in the two administrative
cases (DANR Cases 353 and 353-B)
and asked for reinvestigation of the
application of Nicanor Casteel over
the subject fishpond. However, by
letter dated March 15, 1950 sent to
the Secretary of Commerce and
Agriculture and Natural Resources
(now Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources), Deluao withdrew
his petition for reinvestigation.
On September 15, 1950 the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued a decision in DANR Case 353,
the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
In view of all the foregoing
considerations, Fp. A. No. 661
(now Fp. A. No. 1717) of
Nicanor Casteel should be, as
hereby it is, reinstated and
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
given due course for the area
indicated in the sketch drawn
at the back of the last page
hereof; and Fp. A. No. 762 of
Victorio D. Carpio shall remain
rejected.
On the same date, the same official
issued a decision in DANR Case 353-
B, the dispositive portion stating as
follows:
WHEREFORE, Fishpond Permit
No. F-289-C of Leoncio
Aradillos and Fishpond Permit
No. F-539-C of Alejandro
Cacam, should be, as they are
hereby cancelled and
revoked; Nicanor Casteel is
required to pay the
improvements introduced
thereon by said permittees in
accordance with the terms
and dispositions contained
elsewhere in this decision....
Sometime in January 1951 Nicanor
Casteel forbade Inocencia Deluao
from further administering the
fishpond, and ejected the latter's
representative (encargado), Jesus
Donesa, from the premises.
Alleging violation of the contract of
service (exhibit A) entered into
between Inocencia Deluao and
Nicanor Casteel, Felipe Deluao and
Inocencia Deluao on April 3, 1951
filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Davao for specific
performance and damages against
Nicanor Casteel and Juan Depra
(who, they alleged, instigated
Casteel to violate his contract),
praying inter alia, (a) that Casteel be
ordered to respect and abide by the
terms and conditions of said contract
and that Inocencia Deluao be
allowed to continue administering
the said fishpond and collecting the
proceeds from the sale of the fishes
caught from time to time; and (b)
that the defendants be ordered to
pay jointly and severally to plaintiffs
the sum of P20,000 in damages.
On April 18, 1951 the plaintiffs filed an
ex parte motion for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, praying
among other things, that during the
pendency of the case and upon their
filling the requisite bond as may be
fixed by the court, a preliminary
injunction be issued to restrain
Casteel from doing the acts
complained of, and that after trial the
said injunction be made permanent.
The lower court on April 26, 1951
granted the motion, and, two days
later, it issued a preliminary
mandatory injunction addressed to
Casteel, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
POR EL PRESENTE, queda usted
ordenado que, hasta nueva
orden, usted, el demandado y
todos usu abogados, agentes,
mandatarios y demas
personas que obren en su
ayuda, desista de impedir a la
demandante Inocencia R.
Deluao que continue
administrando personalmente
la pesqueria objeto de esta
causa y que la misma continue
recibiendo los productos de la
venta de los pescados
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
provenientes de dicha
pesqueria, y que, asimismo, se
prohibe a dicho demandado
Nicanor Casteel a desahuciar
mediante fuerza al encargado
de los demandantes llamado
Jesus Donesa de la pesqueria
objeto de la demanda de
autos.
On May 10, 1951 Casteel filed a
motion to dissolve the injunction,
alleging among others, that he was
the owner, lawful applicant and
occupant of the fishpond in question.
This motion, opposed by the plaintiffs
on June 15, 1951, was denied by the
lower court in its order of June 26,
1961.
The defendants on May 14, 1951 filed
their answer with counterclaim,
amended on January 8, 1952,
denying the material averments of
the plaintiffs' complaint. A reply to the
defendants' amended answer was
filed by the plaintiffs on January 31,
1952.
The defendant Juan Depra moved
on May 22, 1951 to dismiss the
complaint as to him. On June 4, 1951
the plaintiffs opposed his motion.
The defendants filed on October 3,
1951 a joint motion to dismiss on the
ground that the plaintiffs' complaint
failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The motion,
opposed by the plaintiffs on October
12, 1951, was denied for lack of merit
by the lower court in its order of
October 22, 1951. The defendants'
motion for reconsideration filed on
October 31, 1951 suffered the same
fate when it was likewise denied by
the lower court in its order of
November 12, 1951.
After the issues were joined, the case
was set for trial. Then came a series of
postponements. The lower court
(Branch I, presided by Judge Enrique
A. Fernandez) finally issued on March
21, 1956 an order in open court,
reading as follows: .
Upon petition of plaintiffs,
without any objection on the
part of defendants, the
hearing of this case is hereby
transferred to May 2 and 3,
1956 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.
This case was filed on April 3,
1951 and under any
circumstance this Court will not
entertain any other transfer of
hearing of this case and if the
parties will not be ready on that
day set for hearing, the court
will take the necessary steps for
the final determination of this
case. (emphasis supplied)
On April 25, 1956 the defendants'
counsel received a notice of hearing
dated April 21, 1956, issued by the
office of the Clerk of Court (thru the
special deputy Clerk of Court) of the
Court of First Instance of Davao,
setting the hearing of the case for
May 2 and 3, 1956 before Judge
Amador Gomez of Branch II. The
defendants, thru counsel, on April 26,
1956 filed a motion for
postponement. Acting on this motion,
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
the lower court (Branch II, presided
by Judge Gomez) issued an order
dated April 27, 1956, quoted as
follows:
This is a motion for
postponement of the hearing
of this case set for May 2 and 3,
1956. The motion is filed by the
counsel for the defendants
and has the conformity of the
counsel for the plaintiffs.
An examination of the records
of this case shows that this case
was initiated as early as April
1951 and that the same has
been under advisement of the
Honorable Enrique A.
Fernandez, Presiding Judge of
Branch No. I, since September
24, 1953, and that various
incidents have already been
considered and resolved by
Judge Fernandez on various
occasions. The last order issued
by Judge Fernandez on this
case was issued on March 21,
1956, wherein he definitely
states that the Court will not
entertain any further
postponement of the hearing
of this case.
CONSIDERING ALL THE
FOREGOING, the Court
believes that the consideration
and termination of any
incident referring to this case
should be referred back to
Branch I, so that the same may
be disposed of therein.
(emphasis supplied)
A copy of the abovequoted order
was served on the defendants'
counsel on May 4, 1956.
On the scheduled date of hearing,
that is, on May 2, 1956, the lower
court (Branch I, with Judge
Fernandez presiding), when informed
about the defendants' motion for
postponement filed on April 26, 1956,
issued an order reiterating its previous
order handed down in open court on
March 21, 1956 and directing the
plaintiffs to introduce their evidence
ex parte, there being no appearance
on the part of the defendants or their
counsel. On the basis of the plaintiffs'
evidence, a decision was rendered
on May 4, 1956 the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
EN SU VIRTUD, el Juzgado dicta
de decision a favor de los
demandantes y en contra del
demandado Nicanor Casteel:
(a) Declara permanente el
interdicto prohibitorio
expedido contra el
demandado;
(b) Ordena al demandado
entregue la demandante la
posesion y administracion de la
mitad (½) del "fishpond" en
cuestion con todas las mejoras
existentes dentro de la misma;
(c) Condena al demandado a
pagar a la demandante la
suma de P200.00
mensualmente en concepto
de danos a contar de la fecha
de la expiracion de los 30 dias
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
de la promulgacion de esta
decision hasta que entregue la
posesion y administracion de la
porcion del "fishpond" en
conflicto;
(d) Condena al demandado a
pagar a la demandante la
suma de P2,000.00 valor de los
pescado beneficiados, mas los
intereses legales de la fecha
de la incoacion de la
demanda de autos hasta el
completo pago de la
obligacion principal;
(e) Condena al demandado a
pagar a la demandante la
suma de P2,000.00, por gastos
incurridos por aquella durante
la pendencia de esta causa;
(f) Condena al demandado a
pagar a la demandante, en
concepto de honorarios, la
suma de P2,000.00;
(g) Ordena el sobreseimiento
de esta demanda, por
insuficiencia de pruebas, en
tanto en cuanto se refiere al
demandado Juan Depra;
(h) Ordena el sobreseimiento
de la reconvencion de los
demandados por falta de
pruebas;
(i) Con las costas contra del
demandado, Casteel.
The defendant Casteel filed a
petition for relief from the foregoing
decision, alleging, inter alia, lack of
knowledge of the order of the court a
quo setting the case for trial. The
petition, however, was denied by the
lower court in its order of May 21,
1956, the pertinent portion of which
reads as follows:
The duty of Atty. Ruiz, was not
to inquire from the Clerk of
Court whether the trial of this
case has been transferred or
not, but to inquire from the
presiding Judge, particularly
because his motion asking the
transfer of this case was not set
for hearing and was not also
acted upon.
Atty. Ruiz knows the nature of
the order of this Court dated
March 21, 1956, which reads as
follows:
Upon petition of the
plaintiff without any
objection on the part of
the defendants, the
hearing of this case is
hereby transferred to
May 2 and 3, 1956, at
8:30 o'clock in the
morning.
This case was filed on
April 3, 1951, and under
any circumstance this
Court will not entertain
any other transfer of the
hearing of this case, and
if the parties will not be
ready on the day set for
hearing, the Court will
take necessary steps for
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
the final disposition of this
case.
In view of the order above-
quoted, the Court will not
accede to any transfer of this
case and the duty of Atty. Ruiz
is no other than to be present in
the Sala of this Court and to
call the attention of the same
to the existence of his motion
for transfer.
Petition for relief from judgment
filed by Atty. Ruiz in behalf of
the defendant, not well taken,
the same is hereby denied.
Dissatisfied with the said ruling,
Casteel appealed to the Court of
Appeals which certified the case to
us for final determination on the
ground that it involves only questions
of law.
Casteel raises the following issues:
(1) Whether the lower court
committed gross abuse of
discretion when it ordered
reception of the appellees'
evidence in the absence of the
appellant at the trial on May 2,
1956, thus depriving the
appellant of his day in court
and of his property without due
process of law;
(2) Whether the lower court
committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the
verified petition for relief from
judgment filed by the
appellant on May 11, 1956 in
accordance with Rule 38, Rules
of Court; and
(3) Whether the lower court
erred in ordering the issuance
ex parte of a writ of preliminary
injunction against defendant-
appellant, and in not dismissing
appellees' complaint.
1. The first and second issues must be
resolved against the appellant.
The record indisputably shows that in
the order given in open court on
March 21, 1956, the lower court set
the case for hearing on May 2 and 3,
1956 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning
and empathically stated that, since
the case had been pending since
April 3, 1951, it would not entertain
any further motion for transfer of the
scheduled hearing.
An order given in open court is
presumed received by the parties on
the very date and time of
promulgation,1 and amounts to a
legal notification for all legal
purposes.2 The order of March 21,
1956, given in open court, was a valid
notice to the parties, and the notice
of hearing dated April 21, 1956 or one
month thereafter, was a superfluity.
Moreover, as between the order of
March 21, 1956, duly promulgated by
the lower court, thru Judge
Fernandez, and the notice of hearing
signed by a "special deputy clerk of
court" setting the hearing in another
branch of the same court, the
former's order was the one legally
binding. This is because the incidents
of postponements and adjournments
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
are controlled by the court and not
by the clerk of court, pursuant to
section 4, Rule 31 (now sec. 3, Rule 22)
of the Rules of Court.
Much less had the clerk of court the
authority to interfere with the order of
the court or to transfer the cage from
one sala to another without authority
or order from the court where the
case originated and was being tried.
He had neither the duty nor
prerogative to re-assign the trial of
the case to a different branch of the
same court. His duty as such clerk of
court, in so far as the incident in
question was concerned, was simply
to prepare the trial calendar. And this
duty devolved upon the clerk of
court and not upon the "special
deputy clerk of court" who
purportedly signed the notice of
hearing.
It is of no moment that the motion for
postponement had the conformity of
the appellees' counsel. The
postponement of hearings does not
depend upon agreement of the
parties, but upon the court's
discretion.3
The record further discloses that
Casteel was represented by a total of
12 lawyers, none of whom had ever
withdrawn as counsel. Notice to Atty.
Ruiz of the order dated March 21,
1956 intransferably setting the case
for hearing for May 2 and 3, 1956, was
sufficient notice to all the appellant's
eleven other counsel of record. This is
a well-settled rule in our jurisdiction.4
It was the duty of Atty. Ruiz, or of the
other lawyers of record, not
excluding the appellant himself, to
appear before Judge Fernandez on
the scheduled dates of hearing
Parties and their lawyers have no right
to presume that their motions for
postponement will be granted.5 For
indeed, the appellant and his 12
lawyers cannot pretend ignorance of
the recorded fact that since
September 24, 1953 until the trial held
on May 2, 1956, the case was under
the advisement of Judge Fernandez
who presided over Branch I. There
was, therefore, no necessity to "re-
assign" the same to Branch II because
Judge Fernandez had exclusive
control of said case, unless he was
legally inhibited to try the case — and
he was not.
There is truth in the appellant's
contention that it is the duty of the
clerk of court — not of the Court — to
prepare the trial calendar. But the
assignment or reassignment of cases
already pending in one sala to
another sala, and the setting of the
date of trial after the trial calendar
has been prepared, fall within the
exclusive control of the presiding
judge.
The appellant does not deny the
appellees' claim that on May 2 and 3,
1956, the office of the clerk of court of
the Court of First Instance of Davao
was located directly below Branch I.
If the appellant and his counsel had
exercised due diligence, there was
no impediment to their going upstairs
to the second storey of the Court of
First Instance building in Davao on
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
May 2, 1956 and checking if the case
was scheduled for hearing in the
said sala. The appellant after all
admits that on May 2, 1956 his
counsel went to the office of the clerk
of court.
The appellant's statement that parties
as a matter of right are entitled to
notice of trial, is correct. But he was
properly accorded this right. He was
notified in open court on March 21,
1956 that the case was definitely and
intransferably set for hearing on May
2 and 3, 1956 before Branch I. He
cannot argue that, pursuant to the
doctrine in Siochi vs. Tirona,6 his
counsel was entitled to a timely
notice of the denial of his motion for
postponement. In the cited case the
motion for postponement was the first
one filed by the defendant; in the
case at bar, there had already been
a series of postponements. Unlike the
case at bar, the Siochi case was not
intransferably set for hearing. Finally,
whereas the cited case did not
spend for a long time, the case at bar
was only finally and intransferably set
for hearing on March 21, 1956 — after
almost five years had elapsed from
the filing of the complaint on April 3,
1951.
The pretension of the appellant and
his 12 counsel of record that they
lacked ample time to prepare for trial
is unacceptable because between
March 21, 1956 and May 2, 1956, they
had one month and ten days to do
so. In effect, the appellant had
waived his right to appear at the trial
and therefore he cannot be heard to
complain that he has been deprived
of his property without due process of
law.7 Verily, the constitutional
requirements of due process have
been fulfilled in this case: the lower
court is a competent court; it lawfully
acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant (appellant) and the
subject matter of the action; the
defendant (appellant) was given an
opportunity to be heard; and
judgment was rendered upon lawful
hearing.8
2. Finally, the appellant contends that
the lower court incurred an error in
ordering the issuance ex parte of a
writ of preliminary injunction against
him, and in not dismissing the
appellee's complaint. We find this
contention meritorious.
Apparently, the court a quo relied on
exhibit A — the so-called "contract of
service" — and the appellees'
contention that it created a contract
of co-ownership and partnership
between Inocencia Deluao and the
appellant over the fishpond in
question.
Too well-settled to require any
citation of authority is the rule that
everyone is conclusively presumed to
know the law. It must be assumed,
conformably to such rule, that the
parties entered into the so-called
"contract of service" cognizant of the
mandatory and prohibitory laws
governing the filing of applications for
fishpond permits. And since they
were aware of the said laws, it must
likewise be assumed — in fairness to
the parties — that they did not intend
to violate them. This view must
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
perforce negate the appellees'
allegation that exhibit A created a
contract of co-ownership between
the parties over the disputed
fishpond. Were we to admit the
establishment of a co-ownership
violative of the prohibitory laws which
will hereafter be discussed, we shall
be compelled to declare altogether
the nullity of the contract. This would
certainly not serve the cause of
equity and justice, considering that
rights and obligations have already
arisen between the parties. We shall
therefore construe the contract as
one of partnership, divided into two
parts — namely, a contract of
partnership to exploit the fishpond
pending its award to either Felipe
Deluao or Nicanor Casteel, and a
contract of partnership to divide the
fishpond between them after such
award. The first is valid, the second
illegal.
It is well to note that when the
appellee Inocencia Deluao and the
appellant entered into the so-called
"contract of service" on November
25, 1949, there were two pending
applications over the fishpond. One
was Casteel's which was appealed
by him to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources after it was
disallowed by the Director of Fisheries
on October 25, 1949. The other was
Felipe Deluao's application over the
same area which was likewise
rejected by the Director of Fisheries
on November 29, 1949, refiled by
Deluao and later on withdrawn by
him by letter dated March 15, 1950 to
the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Clearly, although
the fishpond was then in the
possession of Casteel, neither he nor,
Felipe Deluao was the holder of a
fishpond permit over the area. But be
that as it may, they were not however
precluded from exploiting the
fishpond pending resolution of
Casteel's appeal or the approval of
Deluao's application over the same
area — whichever event happened
first. No law, rule or regulation
prohibited them from doing so. Thus,
rather than let the fishpond remain
idle they cultivated it.
The evidence preponderates in favor
of the view that the initial intention of
the parties was not to form a co-
ownership but to establish a
partnership — Inocencia Deluao as
capitalist partner and Casteel as
industrial partner — the ultimate
undertaking of which was to divide
into two equal parts such portion of
the fishpond as might have been
developed by the amount extended
by the plaintiffs-appellees, with the
further provision that Casteel should
reimburse the expenses incurred by
the appellees over one-half of the
fishpond that would pertain to him.
This can be gleaned, among others,
from the letter of Casteel to Felipe
Deluao on November 15, 1949, which
states, inter alia:
... [W]ith respect to your
allowing me to use your
money, same will redound to
your benefit because you are
the ones interested in half of
the work we have done so far,
besides I did not insist on our
being partners in my fishpond
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
permit, but it was you "Tatay"
Eping the one who wanted
that we be partners and it so
happened that we became
partners because I am poor,
but in the midst of my poverty it
never occurred to me to be
unfair to you. Therefore so that
each of us may be secured, let
us have a document prepared
to the effect that we are
partners in the fishpond that we
caused to be made here in
Balasinon, but it does not mean
that you will treat me as one of
your "Bantay" (caretaker) on
wage basis but not earning
wages at all, while the truth is
that we are partners. In the
event that you are not
amenable to my proposition
and consider me as "Bantay"
(caretaker) instead, do not
blame me if I withdraw all my
cases and be left without even
a little and you likewise.
(emphasis supplied)9
Pursuant to the foregoing suggestion
of the appellant that a document be
drawn evidencing their partnership,
the appellee Inocencia Deluao and
the appellant executed exhibit A
which, although denominated a
"contract of service," was actually the
memorandum of their partnership
agreement. That it was not a
contract of the services of the
appellant, was admitted by the
appellees themselves in their
letter to Casteel dated December
10
19, 1949 wherein they stated that
they did not employ him in his
(Casteel's) claim but because he
used their money in developing and
improving the fishpond, his right must
be divided between them. Of course,
although exhibit A did not specify any
wage or share appertaining to the
appellant as industrial partner, he
was so entitled — this being one of
the conditions he specified for the
execution of the document of
partnership.11
Further exchanges of letters between
the parties reveal the continuing
intent to divide the fishpond. In a
letter,12dated March 24, 1950, the
appellant suggested that they divide
the fishpond and the remaining
capital, and offered to pay the
Deluaos a yearly installment of P3,000
— presumably as reimbursement for
the expenses of the appellees for the
development and improvement of
the one-half that would pertain to the
appellant. Two days later, the
appellee Felipe Deluao
replied,13expressing his concurrence
in the appellant's suggestion and
advising the latter to ask for a
reconsideration of the order of the
Director of Fisheries disapproving his
(appellant's) application, so that if a
favorable decision was secured, then
they would divide the area.
Apparently relying on the partnership
agreement, the appellee Felipe
Deluao saw no further need to
maintain his petition for the
reinvestigation of Casteel's
application. Thus by letter14 dated
March 15, 1950 addressed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, he withdrew his petition
on the alleged ground that he was no
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
longer interested in the area, but
stated however that he wanted his
interest to be protected and his
capital to be reimbursed by the
highest bidder.
The arrangement under the so-called
"contract of service" continued until
the decisions both dated September
15, 1950 were issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources
in DANR Cases 353 and 353-B. This
development, by itself, brought
about the dissolution of the
partnership. Moreover, subsequent
events likewise reveal the intent of
both parties to terminate the
partnership because each refused to
share the fishpond with the other.
Art. 1830(3) of the Civil Code
enumerates, as one of the causes for
the dissolution of a partnership, "...
any event which makes it unlawful for
the business of the partnership to be
carried on or for the members to
carry it on in partnership." The
approval of the appellant's fishpond
application by the decisions in DANR
Cases 353 and 353-B brought to the
fore several provisions of law which
made the continuation of the
partnership unlawful and therefore
caused its ipso facto dissolution.
Act 4003, known as the Fisheries Act,
prohibits the holder of a fishpond
permit (the permittee) from
transferring or subletting the fishpond
granted to him, without the previous
consent or approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. To the same effect is
15
Condition No. 3 of the fishpond
permit which states that "The
permittee shall not transfer or sublet
all or any area herein granted or any
rights acquired therein without the
previous consent and approval of this
Office." Parenthetically, we must
observe that in DANR Case 353-B, the
permit granted to one of the parties
therein, Leoncio Aradillos, was
cancelled not solely for the reason
that his permit covered a portion of
the area included in the appellant's
prior fishpond application, but also
because, upon investigation, it was
ascertained thru the admission of
Aradillos himself that due to lack of
capital, he allowed one Lino Estepa
to develop with the latter's capital
the area covered by his fishpond
permit F-289-C with the
understanding that he (Aradillos)
would be given a share in the
produce thereof.16
Sec. 40 of Commonwealth Act 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, likewise provides that
The lessee shall not assign,
encumber, or sublet his rights
without the consent of the
Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, and the violation
of this condition shall avoid the
contract; Provided, That
assignment, encumbrance, or
subletting for purposes of
speculation shall not be
permitted in any
case: Provided, further, That
nothing contained in this
section shall be understood or
construed to permit the
assignment, encumbrance, or
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
subletting of lands leased
under this Act, or under any
previous Act, to persons,
corporations, or associations
which under this Act, are not
authorized to lease public
lands.
Finally, section 37 of Administrative
Order No. 14 of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued in August 1937, prohibits a
transfer or sublease unless first
approved by the Director of Lands
and under such terms and conditions
as he may prescribe. Thus, it states:
When a transfer or sub-lease of
area and improvement may
be allowed. — If the permittee
or lessee had, unless otherwise
specifically provided, held the
permit or lease and actually
operated and made
improvements on the area for
at least one year, he/she may
request permission to sub-lease
or transfer the area and
improvements under certain
conditions.
(a) Transfer subject to
approval. — A sub-lease or
transfer shall only be valid
when first approved by the
Director under such terms and
conditions as may be
prescribed, otherwise it shall be
null and void. A transfer not
previously approved or
reported shall be considered
sufficient cause for the
cancellation of the permit or
lease and forfeiture of the
bond and for granting the area
to a qualified applicant or
bidder, as provided in
subsection (r) of Sec. 33 of this
Order.
Since the partnership had for its
object the division into two equal
parts of the fishpond between the
appellees and the appellant after it
shall have been awarded to the
latter, and therefore it envisaged the
unauthorized transfer of one-half
thereof to parties other than the
applicant Casteel, it was dissolved by
the approval of his application and
the award to him of the fishpond. The
approval was an event which made
it unlawful for the business of the
partnership to be carried on or for the
members to carry it on in partnership.
The appellees, however, argue that
in approving the appellant's
application, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
likewise recognized and/or
confirmed their property right to one-
half of the fishpond by virtue of the
contract of service, exhibit A. But the
untenability of this argument would
readily surface if one were to
consider that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
did not do so for the simple reason
that he does not possess the authority
to violate the aforementioned
prohibitory laws nor to exempt
anyone from their operation.
However, assuming in gratia
argumenti that the approval of
Casteel's application, coupled with
the foregoing prohibitory laws, was
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
not enough to cause the
dissolution ipso facto of their
partnership, succeeding events
reveal the intent of both parties to
terminate the partnership by refusing
to share the fishpond with the other.
On December 27, 1950 Casteel
wrote17 the appellee Inocencia
Deluao, expressing his desire to divide
the fishpond so that he could
administer his own share, such division
to be subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. By letter dated December
29, 1950,18 the appellee Felipe
Deluao demurred to Casteel's
proposition because there were
allegedly no appropriate grounds to
support the same and, moreover, the
conflict over the fishpond had not
been finally resolved.
The appellant wrote on January 4,
1951 a last letter19 to the appellee
Felipe Deluao wherein the former
expressed his determination to
administer the fishpond himself
because the decision of the
Government was in his favor and the
only reason why administration had
been granted to the Deluaos was
because he was indebted to them. In
the same letter, the appellant
forbade Felipe Deluao from sending
the couple's encargado, Jesus
Donesa, to the fishpond. In reply
thereto, Felipe Deluao wrote a
letter20 dated January 5, 1951 in
which he reiterated his refusal to
grant the administration of the
fishpond to the appellant, stating as
a ground his belief "that only the
competent agencies of the
government are in a better position
to render any equitable arrangement
relative to the present case; hence,
any action we may privately take
may not meet the procedure of legal
order."
Inasmuch as the erstwhile partners
articulated in the aforecited letters
their respective resolutions not to
share the fishpond with each other —
in direct violation of the undertaking
for which they have established their
partnership — each must be deemed
to have expressly withdrawn from the
partnership, thereby causing its
dissolution pursuant to art. 1830(2) of
the Civil Code which provides, inter
alia, that dissolution is caused "by the
express will of any partner at any
time."
In this jurisdiction, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
possesses executive and
administrative powers with regard to
the survey, classification, lease, sale
or any other form of concession or
disposition and management of the
lands of the public domain, and,
more specifically, with regard to the
grant or withholding of licenses,
permits, leases and contracts over
portions of the public domain to be
utilized as fishponds.21, Thus, we held
in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al. (L-15414,
June 30, 1960), and reiterated
in Ganitano vs. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, et
al.
(L-21167, March 31, 1966), that
... [T]he powers granted to the
Secretary of Agriculture and
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Commerce (Natural gave due course to the appellant's

Resources) by law regarding fishpond application 1717 and
the disposition of public lands awarded to him the possession of the
such as granting of licenses, area in question. In view of the finality
permits, leases, and contracts, of the Secretary's decision in DANR
or approving, rejecting, Cases 353 and 353-B, and
reinstating, or cancelling considering the absence of any proof
applications, or deciding that the said official exceeded his
conflicting applications, are all statutory authority, exercised
executive and administrative in unconstitutional powers, or acted
nature. It is a well-recognized with arbitrariness and in disregard of
principle that purely his duty, or with grave abuse of
administrative and discretion, we can do no less than
discretionary functions may not respect and maintain unfettered his
be interfered with by the official acts in the premises. It is a
courts (Coloso v. Board of salutary rule that the judicial
Accountancy, G.R. No. L-5750, department should not dictate to the
April 20, 1953). In general, executive department what to do
courts have no supervising with regard to the administration and
power over the proceedings disposition of the public domain
and action of the which the law has entrusted to its
administrative departments of care and administration. Indeed,
the government. This is courts cannot superimpose their
generally true with respect to discretion on that of the land
acts involving the exercise of department and compel the latter to
judgment or discretion, and do an act which involves the exercise
findings of fact. (54 Am. Jur. of judgment and discretion.22
558-559) Findings of fact by an
administrative board or official, Therefore, with the view that we take
following a hearing, are of this case, and even assuming that
binding upon the courts and the injunction was properly issued
will not be disturbed except because present all the requisite
where the board or official has grounds for its issuance, its
gone beyond his statutory continuation, and, worse, its
authority, exercised declaration as permanent, was
unconstitutional powers or improper in the face of the
clearly acted arbitrarily and knowledge later acquired by the
without regard to his duty or lower court that it was the appellant's
with grave abuse of application over the fishpond which
discretion... (emphasis was given due course. After the
supplied) Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources approved the appellant's
In the case at bar, the Secretary of application, he became to all intents
Agriculture and Natural Resources and purposes the legal permittee of
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
the area with the corresponding right
to possess, occupy and enjoy the
same. Consequently, the lower court
erred in issuing the preliminary
mandatory injunction. We cannot
overemphasize that an injunction
should not be granted to take
property out of the possession and
control of one party and place it in
the hands of another whose title has
not been clearly established by law.23
However, pursuant to our holding
that there was a partnership
between the parties for the
exploitation of the fishpond before it
was awarded to Casteel, this case
should be remanded to the lower
court for the reception of evidence
relative to an accounting from
November 25, 1949 to September 15,
1950, in order for the court to
determine (a) the profits realized by
the partnership, (b) the share (in the
profits) of Casteel as industrial
partner, (e) the share (in the profits) of
Deluao as capitalist partner, and (d)
whether the amounts totalling about
P27,000 advanced by Deluao to
Casteel for the development and
improvement of the fishpond have
already been liquidated. Besides,
since the appellee Inocencia Deluao
continued in possession and
enjoyment of the fishpond even after
it was awarded to Casteel, she did so
no longer in the concept of a
capitalist partner but merely as
creditor of the appellant, and
therefore, she must likewise submit in
the lower court an accounting of the
proceeds of the sales of all the fishes
harvested from the fishpond from
September 16, 1950 until Casteel shall
have been finally given the
possession and enjoyment of the
same. In the event that the appellee
Deluao has received more than her
lawful credit of P27,000 (or whatever
amounts have been advanced to
Casteel), plus 6% interest thereon per
annum, then she should reimburse
the excess to the appellant.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the
lower court is set aside. Another
judgment is hereby rendered: (1)
dissolving the injunction issued
against the appellant, (2) placing the
latter back in possession of the
fishpond in litigation, and (3)
remanding this case to the court of
origin for the reception of evidence
relative to the accounting that the
parties must perforce render in the
premises, at the termination of which
the court shall render judgment
accordingly. The appellant's
counterclaim is dismissed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118655. April 12, 2000.]
HEIRS OF ELIAS LORILLA, Namely: FE,
ELIAS, JR. and SERVANDO, ALL
SURNAMED LORILLA, Petitioners, v.
COURT OF APPEALS, COMMERCIAL
CREDIT CORPORATION, HON.
FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA and SHERIFF
HONORIO P. SANTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 29, 1994
which dismissed the petition for
annulment of the judgment rendered
on April 5, 1989, by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 58, of Makati in Civil
Case No. 5262. 2 The motion to
reconsider the decision of the Court
of Appeals was denied by said Court
in a Resolution promulgated on
January 11, 1995. 3chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
The antecedent facts of this case as
found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) On September 10, 1983, private
respondent Commercial Credit
Corporation (now known as
Pentacapital Finance Corporation
and hereinafter referred to as
PENCAPITAL) filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, (hereinafter referred to
as the Makati Court) for a sum of
money against Sanyu Machineries
Agencies, Inc., Sanyu Chemical
Corporation, and several other
defendants, among whom was Elias
Lorilla, (now deceased) who had
acted as sureties for the two
corporate debtors. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No 5262
and was assigned by raffle to Branch
58 of said court.
(2) PENCAPITAL sought for, and
obtained from the Makati Court, a
writ of attachment on the real
property of defendant Elias L. Lorilla
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 298986, and which levy was duly
annotated on the certificate of title
concerned.
(3) Defendant Elias Lorilla, together
with four other individual defendants,
was initially represented by one Atty.
Danny Tablizo, but who later on
withdrew his appearance and was
substituted by another lawyer, Atty.
Alfredo Concepcion
(4) During the pendency of Civil Case
No. 5262, Elias L. Lorilla executed a
dacion en pago over the property
attached in favor of the Joint
Resources Management
Development Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as JRMDC) by
reason of which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 298986 in the name of Elias L
Lorilla was cancelled and replaced
by Transfer Certificate of Title No
114067 in the name of JRMDC. But the
levy caused to be made by
PENCAPITAL over the property was
carried over to the new certificate of
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
title
(5) On June 9. 1986, JRMDC filed suit
against PENCAPITAL for the
cancellation of the latter’s levy on the
property in question with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila
(hereinafter referred to as the Pasig
Court), which was docketed therein
as Civil Case No. 63757 and assigned
by raffle to its Branch 153.
(6) On April 25, 1989, the Makati
Court, after due hearing, rendered
judgment in Civil Case No 5262 in
favor of PENCAPITAL and against the
defendants therein, including Elias L.
Lorilla. The dispositive portion of said
judgment
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendants who
are hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff,
jointly and severally, and solidarily the
total principal amount of P421,596.28
plus interest at 12% per annum and a
penalty of 3% per month of default
from the time it became due on July
1, 1981 until fully paid, and 20% of the
entire amount due as attorney’s fees
plus costs.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw
library
(7) Despite receipt of a copy of the
aforesaid decision by Alfredo
Concepcion, then counsel of record
of defendant Elias L. Lorilla, no
appeal whatsoever was interposed
from said judgment by said lawyer in
behalf of defendant Lorilla.
(8) On March 3. 1993, upon motion of
PENCAPITAL, the Makati Court issued
a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
5262 and PENCAPITAL thereafter
proceeded against the property
covered by TCT No. 298986 in the
name of defendant Lorilla.
(9) On May 26, 1993 the Pasig Court
rendered decision in its Civil Case No.
53757 dismissing JRMDC’s complaint
for the cancellation of the levy on
attachment on the Lorilla property,
ruling that the dacion en pago
executed by defendant Lorilla in
favor of JRMDC cannot prevail over
the prior writ of attachment duly
annotated on the property in favor of
PENCAPITAL. No appeal from the
decision in Civil Case No. 53757
having been made by JRMDC, the
same became final and executory
(Annex "15", Reply Memorandum of
PENCAPITAL).
(10) On September 15. 1993,
petitioners herein as heirs of Elias L.
Lorilla, filed a motion in Civil Case No.
5262 to quash the writ of execution
issued by the Makati Court, arguing
that since defendant Elias L Lorilla
passed away on January 15, 1988, or
one year and three months before
the Makati Court. rendered decision
in Civil Case No. 5262 on April 5 1989,
the case should have been dismissed
insofar as Elias L. Lorilla is concerned,
in keeping with Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
‘SECTION 21. Where claim does not
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
survive. — When the action is for
recovery of money, debt, or interest
therein, and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be presented in the manner
especially provided in these rules.’
(11) On February 8, 1994, the Makati
Court, through its Acting Presiding
Judge, the Honorable Francisco
Donato Villanueva, denied the
motion to quash said writ of
execution, ruling that the judgment in
Civil Case No 5256 having become
final, it is now beyond its authority to
amend it by dismissing the same
insofar as defendant Elias L. Lorilla is
concerned, and that the suggested
remedy, if at all, is a petition for its
annulment Petitioners moved to
reconsider the denial of their motion
to quash the writ of execution, but the
Makati Court stood pat on its ruling,
hence, petitioners’ recourse to this
Court for annulment of judgment." 4
Petitioners, thus, filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for annulment of
Judgment, Writ of Execution, and/or
Levy on Execution with Preliminary
Injunction and Restraining Order to
annul or enjoin enforcement of the
judgment dated April 5, 1989 of the
Makati Court in Civil Case No. 5262. In
its decision promulgated on
November 29, 1994, the Court of
Appeals resolved to deny the
petition, hence petitioners’ present
recourse to this Court. They assign the
following errors:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
I Elias Lorilla, were deprived of their
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT
ANNULLING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT, DATED 5 APRIL 1989,
INSOFAR AS DECEASED DEFENDANT
ELIAS LORILLA IS CONCERNED,
THEREBY VIOLATION (sic) PETITIONERS’
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
VIOLATING SECTION 21, RULE 3, AND
SECTIONS 5 AND 7, RULE 86 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DENYING PETITIONERS THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW." 5
In our view, the main issue for
resolution now is whether the
respondent appellate court erred
and gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioners’ action for
annulment of judgment of the RTC of
Makati, Branch 58, concerning the
deceased defendant Elias Lorilla.
Pertinently, we have to consider
whether Section 21 of Rule 3 and
Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court are applicable
in the present case. Similarly, we have
to inquire whether petitioners, heirs of
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
right to due process of law.
Petitioners argue that the cause of
action of private respondent
Commercial Credit Corp. (now
known as Pentacapital Finance
Corp. and hereinafter referred to as
PENTACAPITAL) did not survive for
being in violation of Section 21 of Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court. They
claim that under this rule, the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the person
of Elias Lorilla when he died, and
consequently the action against him
should have been dismissed.
Section 21 of Rule 3 notice of the death of Lorilla, absent
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 21. Where claim does not
survive. — Where the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in these
rules."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that
upon the defendant’s death, the
action "shall be dismissed to be
presented in the manner especially
provided in these rules." Petitioners
argue that this manner is provided for
in Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court. 6 As
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3,
the action has to be dismissed
without prejudice to the plaintiff
thereafter presenting his claim as a
money claim in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased defendant. 7
The claim becomes a mere incident
in the testamentary or intestate
proceedings of the deceased where
the whole matter may be fully
terminated jointly with the settlement
and distribution of the estate. 8
In the present case, however, the
records do not show if any notice of
death was filed by Atty. Alfredo
Concepcion, counsel of record of
Elias Lorilla in Civil Case No. 5262
before the Makati Court. Thus, neither
the Makati Court nor PENTACAPITAL
were made aware of the death of
Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not
be expected to know or take judicial
such notice. Neither could the
petitioners have been made aware
of the trial court’s judgment adverse
to their father, for all notices and
orders of the court were sent to
Lorilla’s counsel of record, who did
not bother to inform the parties
concerned of Elias Lorilla’s death.
Apparently, Lorilla’s counsel failed in
his duty to promptly inform the court
of the death of his client, as the Rules
require. 9
As far as the Makati Court was
concerned, until the Writ of Execution
was issued and the levy thereof on
August 5, 1993, Lorilla continued to be
represented by counsel of record,
Atty. Concepcion; and that upon
service of a copy of the decision on
said counsel at the latter’s address,
Lorilla was deemed to have been
validly served notice of the judgment.
10 The failure of Atty. Concepcion to
serve notice on the court and the
adverse parties regarding his client’s
death binds herein petitioners as
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
much as the client himself could be
so bound. Jurisprudence teems with
pronouncements that a client is
bound by the conduct, negligence
and mistakes of his counsel. 11
In this case, petitioners claim that
their right to due process was violated
when the Court of Appeals did not
annul the decision of the Makati
Court dated April 5, 1989. They claim
that as heirs of Elias Lorilla, they would
be deprived of their lawful
inheritance without due process, as
they were not parties to the case
where the adverse decision against
their father was rendered. Said
judgment, they posit, cannot be
enforced against them because the
court had not acquired jurisdiction
over them, nor over the estate of Elias
Lorilla.
True, a judgment may be annulled for
want of jurisdiction or lack of due
process of law. 12 But while
petitioners were not properly
substituted for Elias Lorilla as
defendants, absent any notice of his
death, it could not be said that
petitioners were deprived of due
process of law, for as far as the trial
court was concerned, they were not
parties to the case. To rule otherwise
would be in fact, a more obvious and
grievous transgression upon due
process.
Moreover in this case, we find that the
property which petitioners claim as
their lawful inheritance, was no
longer part of the estate of Elias Lorilla
at the time of his death. For Elias Lorilla
had earlier executed a dacion en
pago over this property in favor of the
Joint Resources Management
Development Corporation (JRMDC).
By reason thereof, Lorilla’s transfer
certificate of title was cancelled, and
a new one was issued in favor of
JRMDC. 13 The levy of PENTACAPITAL
annotated on Lorilla’s certificate of
title was carried over onto the title of
JRMDC. Elias Lorilla’s payment of his
obligation to JRMDC being one of
dation in payment, it is governed by
the law on sales. 14 The subject
property was validly transferred to
JRMDC already. Hence petitioners
could not claim that they were
deprived of their lawful inheritance
without due process of law.
Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court sets out the procedure
that should be followed after the
death of the defendant in a case. If
he died "before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance," the action
should be dismissed without
prejudice to the plaintiff presenting
his claim in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased in
accordance with and as required by
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court. 15 Here, however, the
property in question had already
been taken out of the estate of Elias
Lorilla, even before judgment in Civil
Case No. 5262 was rendered, and it
was transferred to JRMDC by virtue of
the dacion en pago executed by
Elias Lorilla. For this reason, Section 5,
Rule 86 loses its pertinence to the
case at bar.
Likewise, Section 7 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court 16 will not
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

apply to the present case. For it on November 29, 1994 and its
speaks of a situation where a party Resolution promulgated on January
dies after the entry of the judgment or 11, 1995 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
order of the court. It does not cover a against petitioners.
situation where the court was
reportedly informed of the death of a SO ORDERED.
party only after final judgment.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De
Since there was no timely appeal Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
taken from the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati dated
April 5, 1989, in Civil Case No. 5262,
that judgment had properly become
final and executory. As well said by
respondent appellate court, to
adopt a view contrary would." . .
open the floodgates to protracted
and endless litigations, because all
that counsel for defendant has to do,
in an action for recovery of money, in
case said defendant dies before final
Judgment in a regional trial court, is
to conceal such death from the court
and thereafter pretend to go through
the motions of trial, and, after
judgment is rendered against his
client, to question such judgment for
being violative of Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. Thus, counsel for
such defendant could unduly delay
the rendering of a judgment against
his client It is a fundamental concept
in any jural system, that even at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some
definite time fixed by law. Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litim." 17

We see no reason, in the interest of

justice, to disturb, much less annul,
the aforesaid judgment.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals promulgated
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

Republic of the Philippines they shall fail to remove

SUPREME COURT the house from the land
Manila in question, the plaintiffs
shall be authorized to
EN BANC remove it at the expense
of the defendants; to
pay the plaintiffs in the
amount of (P300.00)
A.M. No. 405 May 31, 1971 three hundred pesos for
attorneys' fees; for
VALENTIN AVELINO, petitioner, damages, to pay the
vs. plaintiffs the amount of
ATTY. PEDRO K. PALANA, respondent. P1,800.00 which is the
estimated value of the
produce of the land in
question from 1951 up to
DIZON, J.: the present year which
the plaintiffs failed to
In a verified complaint filed by take advantage of due
Valentin Avelino against Atty. Pedro to their being
K. Palaña the latter was charged with dispossessed of the
malpractice in connection with his aforementioned land;
professional conduct as the and, to pay the costs
complainant's counsel in Civil Case there being no
No. 2250 of the Court of First Instance adequate evidence to
of Leyte such malpractice having support the claim for
given rise to the rendition of judgment moral damages, no such
against said complainant and his wife damages are adjudged.
ordering them:
Answering the complaint, the
... to restore the respondent admitted some of the
ownership and allegations thereof and denied the
possession of the others, and, by way of affirmative
property described defenses, alleged the following:
under paragraph 2 of
the complaint to the xxx xxx xxx
plaintiffs herein; to
demolish or transfer the 2. That the respondent
house they built in the was admitted a member
land within a period of of the Philippine Bar in
three months counted 1939 which is now a fifth
from the receipt of this of a century since his
decision at the taking his oath as
expiration of which, if attorney and counselor-
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
at-law; was appointed
to the Judiciary as
Justice of the Peace
Court of Palo, Province
of Leyte, in 1949,
remaining as such until
1954 — the date when
he resigned to continue
his practice of law; in
1957, he (respondent)
was again appointed as
Justice of the Peace
Court, this time in his
home town at Tolosa,
Leyte; remaining as such
until he resigned in 1958
to accept the position as
Assistant Administrative
Officer in the Office of
the Speaker of the House
of Representatives,
Congress of the
Philippines. During all the
years that he was
actively practicing his
noble profession, he has
never been nor will he in
the future, be a
renegade to this noble
profession. In his
actuations as a Justice
of the Peace Courts: first
at Palo, Leyte then at
Tolosa, Leyte, his records
are his eloquent proof of
his being a missionary of
justice;
3. That it is true that the
respondent was
engaged by the
petitioner to be their
counsel in the case
entitled "FERMIN
NATIVIDAD, ET AL., versus
VALENTIN AVELINO, ET
AL.," docketed as Civil
Case No. 2250 of the
Court of First Instance of
Leyte where the
petitioner is one of the
defendants;
4. That the respondent
verbally advised the
petitioner of the hearing
of the aforestated case
on November 15, 1957,
at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning at least three
days before the
scheduled hearing when
the petitioners called on
the respondent at the
latter's residence which
the former were used to
do as admitted by him in
paragraph 4 of the
complaint as that is their
understanding to enable
them to confer;
5. That when the
scheduled hearing of
the aforecited case on
November 15, 1957, at
8:30 o'clock in the
morning arrived, the
respondent failed to be
present in court or
appear thereat
because: "at about 3:00
o'clock in the morning of
that day, I had a severe
stomach ache followed
by constant moving of
bowel and vomiting. As
a consequence I
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

became very weak and in this case

I felt that I was about to at bar
die," as shown by a consisting of
medical certificate their
which is attached to the adverse,
"motion for new trial" filed continuous
by the respondent, and
hereto attached as an peaceful
integral part hereof and possession
marked as Annex "A"; of the
property in
6. That when the question for
respondent received a almost
copy of the decision in twenty
the Court of First Instance years,
of Leyte entitled "Fermin payment of
Natividad, et al., versus land taxes,
Valentin Avelino, et al., fraud
he filed a "motion for committed
new trial" already in the part
marked as Annex "A" of the
hereof, wherein the plaintiffs
respondent explained herein and
his failure to appear on estoppel in
the date of the hearing the part of
of said case on the plaintiffs
November 15, 1957, at are very
8:30 o'clock in the strong; and
morning; that if the
defendants
7. That on January 18, are given
1958, the herein their day in
respondent filed an court to
"amended motion for present their
new trial" where, in evidence,
addition to the reasons the findings
recited by him in his and
motion for new trial he conclusions
stated that: of the
Honorable
... the Court might
evidence of be made in
the favor of the
defendants herein
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

defendants The issues having been thus joined,

and the case was referred to the Office of
adverse to the Solicitor General for investigation
the report and recommendation.
plaintiffs;
Upon the evidence presented by the
or another way of parties the Solicitor General
alleging that the submitted his report, the portion of
defendants have a which under the title "ANALYSIS" reads
good and valid defense; as follows:
said "amended motion
for new trial is hereto From the foregoing facts,
attached as Annex "B" this Office finds the
and made an integral respondent guilty of
part hereof; negligence on the
following counts:
8. That the failure of the
defendants to appear in 1. Atty. Palaña did not
court when their case duly inform his client of
was set for hearing on the date of the trial
November 15, 1957, at scheduled for November
8:30 o'clock in the 15, 1957 when the
morning despite the evidence shows that he
verbal notice to them by received notice of such
the herein respondent is hearing on October 11,
not until the present 1957.
known to herein
respondent; 2. The filing of the motion
for new trial on January
9. That when the herein 7, 1958 was made out of
respondent was time, exactly 40 days
appointed after the decision was
Administrative Officer in received on November
the Office of the Speaker 28, 1957. The delay in the
of the House of filing of the said motion
Representatives, remains unexplained in
Congress of the the record.
Philippines, sometime in
March 1958, he already 3. Atty. Palaña's 2nd
advised the petitioner to motion for new trial, after
look for another lawyer the Court had afforded
to represent him. him all the opportunity to
plead his motion
successfully, was denied
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

by the lower court on the on the part of Atty.

ground that he failed to Palaña for failing to
comply with an order of notify him and his co-
the court dated respondents in Civil Case
February 1, 1958. While No. 2250 of the date of
the said motion was duly the hearing.
filed on time, a previous Furthermore, we are fully
order of the Court aware of the practice
directed the movant that practicing attorneys
(Atty. Palaña to serve a usually prepare such
copy of his amended petitions for their clients
motion to the other party to sign.
through counsel, but
compliance therewith This Office however
does not appear on the believes that the non-
said motion) (Exh. 4). appearance of Atty.
Palaña at the bearing of
The testimony of November 15, 1957 has
petitioner is not clear as been satisfactorily
to whether respondent explained by the verified
was responsible in hiring medical certificate. But
Atty. Aristedes de la Paz we do not share the
to take over the case same view insofar as his
after the decision had negligence in failing to
become final. However, notify his clients of the
we allow such a doubt to date of hearing is
be resolved in favor of concerned."
the respondent's claim
that he suggested to his On the basis of the findings contained
client that he contract in the above-quoted portion of his
Atty. De la Paz. report, the Solicitor General found the
respondent "guilty of negligence in
This Office believes that the performance of his duties as a
although petitioner had member of the Bar" and
verified the petition for consequently recommended "that
relief from judgment he be suspended from the practice
dated March 18, 1958 of law for at least six months."
filed by Atty. De la Paz,
petitioner herein did not Thereafter following the procedure
exactly comprehend, provided by the Rules of Court in
due to his patent cases of the same nature, the Office
illiteracy, what he was of the Solicitor General filed with this
signing in alleging Court the corresponding complaint
excusable negligence based on the findings of fact
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
contained in his report. In
respondent's answer thereto he
reproduced the defenses set forth in
his answer to the verified complaint,
filed by the complainant.
Thereafter, We set the case for
hearing but, instead of arguing the
case orally, the respondent
submitted a written memorandum
while the Office of the Solicitor
General did not.
Upon consideration of the whole
record, We find no sufficient
justification to reverse the finding
made by the Office of the Solicitor
General to the effect that
respondent "did not duly inform his
client of the date of the trial
scheduled for November 15, 1957" in
spite of the fact that, according to
the evidence, he had received
notice of such hearing four days
before.
As regards respondent's failure to
appear in court on the day set for the
trial, We are inclined to accept his
claim that it was due to the fact that
early in the morning of that date he
had "a severe stomach ache,
followed by constant moving of
bowel and vomiting and that as a
consequence he became very
weak." But while this might be, to a
certain extent, a good excuse for his
non-appearance in court, it is
obviously not sufficient to explain his
failure to notify his clients in due time
of the date of the trial. Had he done
so, his clients would probably have
tried to contact him in due time, and
upon discovering that he was sick
they would have either gone to court
to ask for the postponement of the
trial, or they would have looked for
another lawyer to represent them in
court.
Then again We find no sufficient
exculpatory evidence for respondent
filing a motion for new trial "out of
time," exactly forty days after notice
of the decision rendered by the
court. Moreover, although he was
given an opportunity to file a second
motion for new trial, it appears that
the same was denied by the court
"on the ground that he had failed to
comply with its previous order dated
February 1, 1958. In this connection,
We reproduce hereunder the
pertinent portion of the report
submitted by the Solicitor General:
xxx xxx xxx
The said decision was
received by Atty. Palaña
on November 28, 1957.
This is admitted by him in
his second motion for
new trial (Exh. 1) Atty.
Palaña filed his motion
for new trial dated
December 26, 1957 on
January 7, 1958, 40 days
after receipt of
judgment (Exh. C). The
motion for new trial was
opposed by the attorney
for the plaintiffs on the
grounds: (1) that the
motion for new trial is not
the proper remedy; (2)
that the motion was not
accompanied by
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

affidavits or affidavits of charged in the report and complaint

merits (Exh. E). An filed by the Solicitor General, and
amended motion for considering all the circumstances of
new trial was the case, he is hereby suspended
subsequently filed dated from the practice of law for a period
January 18, 1958, of three months from notice hereof.
attaching thereto an
affidavit executed by Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Atty. Palaña (Exh. F). On Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,
the same date, January Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar,
18, 1958, the Court of First JJ., concur.
Instance of Tacloban
City ordered the movant Castro, Barredo, JJ., took no part.
"to serve a copy of his
amended motion, if he
so desires to amend his
motion, to the other
party through counsel,
Atty. Fernando Suddrio
not later than the 25th of
January so that the latter
may file a reply if he so
desires." On February 1,
1958, another order was
issued by the Court
giving Atty. Palaña one
week's time within which
to present another
amended motion for
new trial (Exh. H). A
subsequent amended
motion for new trial was
filed on February 8, 1958
(Exh. H). The said motion
for new trial was
however denied on the
same date for "not
having complied with
the order of this court
dated February 1, 1938"
(Exh. J).

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the

respondent, as hereby found guilty as
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 131466. November 27, 1998
CRISTINA DIMAN, CLARISSA DIMAN,
GEORGE DIMAN, FELIPE DIMAN and
FLORINA DIMAN, Petitioners, v. HON,
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS
PIAS, BRANCH 255; HEIRS OF
VERONICA V. MORENO LACALLE,
REPRESENTED BY JOSE MORENO
LACALLE, Respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
The petition for review on certiorari in
this case was initially dismissed by
Resolution dated January 14, 1998;
but after deliberating on petitioners'
motion for reconsideration dated
February 23, 1998, the private
respondents' comment thereon, the
reply to the comment, as well as the
record of the case itself, the Court
was convinced that the order of
dismissal should be reconsidered and
the petition reinstated. It accordingly
promulgated a resolution to that
effect on October 12, 1998, and
required "respondents to file their
Comment on the petition within ten
(10) days from notice **."
Notice of the Resolution was duly
served on private respondents'
attorney on October 21, 1998. The
latter filed a motion for extension of
time of thirty (30) days to file
comment, counted from October 31.
The Court granted the extension
sought, but only for fifteen (15) days.
The comment was filed late, on
November 20, 1998, Counsel's
explanation is that he had sought an
extension of 30 days "due to the other
volume of legal works similarly
situated and school work of the
undersigned as professor of law and
dean of the University of Manila," and
had entertained "the honest belief"
that it would be granted. However,
he learned belatedly that only a 15-
day extension had been conceded.
He forthwith completed the
comment and filed it, albeit five days
late.
The Court admits the late comment,
but takes this occasion to reiterate
the familiar doctrine that no party has
a right to an extension of time to
comply with an obligation within the
period set therefor by law; motions for
extension are not granted as a
matter of course; their concession lies
in the sound discretion of the Court
exercised in accordance with the
attendant circumstances; the
movant is not justified in assuming
that the extension sought will be
granted, or that it will be granted for
the length of time suggested by him.
It is thus incumbent on any movant for
extension to exercise due diligence
to inform himself as soon as possible
of the Court's action on his motion, by
time inquiry of the Clerk of Court.
Should he neglect to do so, he runs
the risk of time running out on him, for
which he will have nobody but
himself to blame.
Now, the petition for review
on certiorari appends practically all
the material pleadings, motions,
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
orders and judgments in the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The respondents' comment on the
petition has been filed, as just
mentioned, and opposes its material
averments. There is now no
impediment to the adjudication of
petitioners' appeal on the merits on
the basis of the record as it stands at
this time. This, the Court will now
proceed to do.
In 1991, more than fifty years after the
effectivity of the Rules of Court1 --
containing provisions relative inter
alia to the modes of discovery2 -- this
Court had occasion to observe that
"among far too many lawyers (and
not a few judges), there is, if not
regrettable unfamiliarity and even
outright ignorance about the nature,
purposes and operation of the
modes of discovery, at least a strong
yet unreasoned and unreasonable
disinclination to resort to them --
which is a great pity for the intelligent
and adequate use of the deposition-
discovery procedure, could, as the
experience of other jurisdictions
convincingly demonstrate,
effectively shorten the period of
litigation and speed up
adjudication." cräläwvirtualibräry
3 filed by the Heirs of Veronica
The case at bar deals with one of
such modes of discovery -- a request
for admission under Rule 26 of the
Rules of 1964; more particularly, the
legal consequences of the failure to
respond thereto in the manner
indicated by law. It also treats of
other adjective devices to expedite
litigation: a summary judgment under
Rule 34,4 and a judgment on
demurrer to evidence under Rule
35.5 Had the principles involved been
better understood and more faithfully
observed, the case might have been
more quickly decided.
Actually, there are several adjective
tools incorporated in the Rules of
Court explicitly designed, like those
just mentioned, to abbreviate
litigation or abort it at certain stages.
Their obvious purpose is to unmask as
quickly as may be feasible, and give
short shrift to, untenable causes of
action or defenses and thus avoid
waste of time, effort and money.6For
reasons yet to be fathomed, these
devices seem to be of scant
familiarity and of infrequent
availment, as above observed, with
the result that the salutary objective
of the Rules of bringing about a
simple, inexpensive and expeditious
system of litigation has not been fully
achieved.
Now, to come to grips with the case.
There is no disagreement about the
antecedents. The case began in the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias
(Branch 255), where a complaint for
"Quieting of Title and Damages" was
V.Moreno Lacalle (represented by
Jose Moreno Lacalle) against Cristina
Diman, Clarissa Diman, George
Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina
Diman.7 In their complaint, the
Lacalle heirs claimed that:
a) their mother, the late
Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle
(who died in 1992), was the
owner of a "parcel of land
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
situated at Brgy. Pulang Lupa
Uno, Las Pias, ** covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
273301 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of
Rizal;"
b) Veronica Lacalle had
acquired the land in 1959 by
virtue of a deed of absolute
sale, and retained as
caretakers the persons she
found in occupancy of the lot
at the time of the sale,
namely: Julian Nario and his
wife, Adelaida Legaspi, "with
arrangement to share the
agricultural fruits" until the
former would have need of
the property;
c) the caretakers of the lot
were served with a notice for
them to vacate the land
(dated November 22, 1994)
and an alias writ of demolition
(dated June 7, 1994) issued by
the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 2619 -- a case
for "ejectment with damages"
filed by the Dimans against
the Narios, judgment in which,
commanding the Narios'
ouster, had supposedly been
affirmed by the Makati
Regional Trial Court (Branch
137);
d) neither the deceased
Veronica nor any of her heirs
had been made parties to
said ejectment action;
e) the complaint for
ejectment contains false
assertions, and had caused
them injury for which the
Dimans should be made to
pay damages.
In their answer with counterclaim
dated February 2, 1995,8 the Dimans
alleged that:
a) they are the registered and
absolute owners of the land
registered in their names
under TCT Nos. 90628, 90629
and 58676 (Pasay City), and
have no knowledge of the
land claimed by the Lacalle
Heirs;
b) they are entitled to eject
from their land the Nario
Spouses, who were falsely
claiming to be their lessees;
c) if the Heirs' theory is that the
land in their title, No. 273301, is
the same as that covered by
the Dimans' titles, then said
title No. 2733101 is spurious
because:
(1) no less than three
official agencies -- (i)
the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds for
Rizal and Regional
Registrar for Region IV,
(ii) the Registrar of
Deeds of Pasay City,
and (iii)
the Pangasiwaan
Pangtalaan ng
Lupain (Land
Registration Authority) -
- have certified to the
absence of any entry
in their records
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
concerning TCT No.
273301 covering land
with an area of 22,379
square meters in the
name of Veronica
Vda. De Moreno
Lacalle;
(2) Decree No. N-11601
explicitly cited as basis
by TCT No. 273301
refers to land in
Mauban, Quezon
Province, according to
the records of the Land
Registration Authority;
and GLRO Record No.
14978 also expressly
mentioned as basis for
TCT No. 273301, refers
to a registration case
heard in Pangasinan;
and
d) they are entitled to damages
on their counterclaim.
After joinder of the issues, the Dimans
served on the Heirs on February 2,
1995, a REQUEST FOR ADMISSION
(dated February 2, 1995) of the truth
of the following specified matters of
fact, to wit:9
a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal)
is not recorded in the Registry
of Rizal, or of Pasay City, or of
Paraaque, or of Las Pias;
b) the Dimans' transfer
certificates of title are all duly
registered in their names in
Pasay City, as alleged in their
answer;
c) in the Index Records of
Registered Property Owners
under Act No. 496 in the
Office of the land Registration
Authority, there is no record of
any property situated in Las
Pias in the name of Veronica
Lacalle, more particularly
described in TCT 273301;
4) the Heirs cannot produce a
certified true copy of TCT
273301;
5) neither Veronica Lacalle
nor any of her heirs ever
declared the property under
TCT 273301 for taxation
purposes since its alleged
acquisition on February 24,
1959 or since the issuance of
said title on August 7, 1959;
6) not a single centavo has
been paid by the Heirs as real
estate taxes; and
7) no steps have been taken
by the Heirs to ascertain the
genuineness and authenticity
of the conflicting titles.
The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was
received by Jose Lacalle himself
through registered mail on February
6, 1995, and copy thereof, by the
latter's lawyer (Atty. Cesar T. Ching)
on February 4, 1995. However, no
response whatever was made to the
request by Lacalle, his lawyer, or
anyone else, despite the lapse of the
period therefor fixed by Section 2 of
Rule 26 (not less than ten days after
service). The Dimans thereupon filed
with the Court a "MANIFESTATION
WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION," dated March 28,
1995,10 giving the Heirs ten (10) more
days to file their answer to the request
for admission, a copy of which was
personally delivered to the latter's
lawyer; but again, no response
whatever was made.
The Dimans then submitted a
"MOTION FOR SUMMARRY
JUDGMENT" dated April 17, 1995.11 In
that motion they drew attention to
the Heirs' failure to file any Pre-Trial
Brief, and the several instances when
the Heirs failed to appear at
scheduled hearings resulting in the
dismissal of their complaint, which
was however later reinstated. They
argued that because the heirs had
failed to respond to their REQUEST
FOR ADMISSION, each of the matters
of which an admission was
requested, was deemed admitted
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26. On this
basis, and on the basis of the joint
affidavit of Clarissa Diman de los
Reyes and Florina Diman Tan --
attached to the motion and
substantiating the facts recited in the
request for admission -- the Dimans
asserted that no genuine issue existed
and prayed that "a summary
judgment be entered dismissing the
case for lack of merit."
The Heirs' counsel filed a two-page
opposition dated May 15, 199512 in
which, betraying an unfortunate
unfamiliarity with the concept of
summary judgments, he
asserted inter alia that:
"In order for defendants
(Dimans) to successfully pray
for judgment on the
pleadings, they have to
clearly alleged in their
permissive counterclaim their
cause of action and if the
answer of the plaintiffs (Heirs)
to such kind of counterclaim
admit (sic) it or the answer to
the counterclaim is a sham,
that is the time for the
defendants to move for a
judgment summarily. ** **
(D)efendants have no cause
of action for praying for
summary judgment. It is the
plaintiffs who will pray for that
and not the defendants."
Subsequently, the Dimans submitted
a reply dated May 23, 1995;13 the
Heirs, a rejoinder dated June 1,
1995;14 and the Dimans, a pleading
entitled "Exceptions and Comment to
Plaintiffs' Rejoinder" dated June 8,
1995.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The Trial Court denied the Dimans'
motion for summary judgment. In its
Order of June 14, 1995,16 the Court
declared that a "perusal of the
Complaint and the Answer will clearly
show that material issue is raised in
that both plaintiffs and defendants
claimed ownership over the land in
dispute, presenting their respective
titles thereto and accused each
other of possessing false title to the
land." It stressed, citing jurisprudence,
that a summary judgment "is not
proper where the defendant
presented defenses tendering
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
factual issues which call for the
presentation of evidence."
The case proceeded to trial in due
course. At its start, the Heirs' counsel,
Atty. Michael Moralde, responding to
questions of the Court, admitted that
his clients did not have the original
copy of the title which was the basis
for their cause of action, but asserted
that they were "still searching" for it
since "(i)n every municipality there
are several Registry of Deeds." He
theorized that the word "'title' ** is a
relative term ** (and) does not only
refer to a document but refers to
ownership."17cräläwvirtualibräry
Only Jose Moreno Lacalle gave
evidence for the plaintiff Heirs. Like
Atty. Moralde, he admitted that he
had no copy "of the document which
says ** (his) mother is the registered
owner;" that the deed of sale was not
the only basis for his and his co-heirs'
claim to the land, but also "a xerox
copy of the ** title ** except that **
(he) cannot find the original;" that
"maybe" the original was in possession
of the person who was his mother's
agent in all her transactions, a certain
Mr. Lopez, whom he could no longer
locate; that he had tried to verify the
existence of the title "from the
Register of Deeds of Pasig and Pasay"
without success; that he had not,
however, gone to the Register of
Deeds of Paraaque or Las
Pias. cräläwvirtualibräry
18
The Heirs' documentary evidence
consisted of (1) Veronica Lacalle's
death certificate, (2) the special
power of attorney authorizing Jose
Lacalle to act for his brothers and
sisters; and (3) the deed of absolute
sale purportedly executed by
Eusebio Mojica, Clara Mojica, Maria
Mojica, Antonia Mojica, Amanda
Mojica and Teodora Aranda which
deeded over to Veronica Lacalle the
"Land 'known as Lot 1 PSU-151453,'"
but which made no reference to any
Torrens title over it
Shortly after the Heirs rested their
case, the Dimans filed a "Motion for
Judgment on Demurrer to Evidence,"
dated June 25, 1996.19 They
summarized the Heirs' evidence --
focusing attention on the Heirs failure
to present "even an unauthenticated
photocopy of the title," and the
absence of any proof that any
proceedings for registration of the
land under the Torrens Act had been
instituted -- and emphasized anew
said Heirs' implied admissions resulting
from their failure to answer their (the
Dimans') request therefor as a mode
of discovery. On these premises, the
Dimans contended that a judgment
on demurrer should be rendered,
there being no genuine issue
between the parties notwithstanding
the ostensible conflict of averments in
their basic pleadings.
The Heirs presented a three-page
opposition, dated July 7, 1996.20 In it
their counsel set out the startling
contention that "(d)emurrer to
evidence is violative to due process
as the judgment be rendered without
giving the plaintiff the opportunity to
cross-examine the defendant," and
petulantly inquired, "How could the
truth come out without cross-
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
examination of the defendants by
plaintiff?" particularly, as regards
"whether their (the Dimans') title is not
fake." Said counsel also posited the
amazing notion that "Demurrer to
evidence may be correct only in
criminal cases as it is the right of the
accused to remain silent, and that
includes his right to file demurrer for
fear of cross-examination. But not in
Civil Cases." Once more counsel
regrettably exposed his ignorance of
quite elementary legal principles.
Again, the Dimans' efforts at
expediting disposition of the litigation
were unsuccessful. By Order dated
December 2, 1996,21 the Trial Court
denied their motion to dismiss.
Respecting the Heirs' omission to
present in evidence any copy (even
a photocopy) of TCT No. 273301, the
Court remarked that "Not being able
to prove the genuineness and
authenticity of TCT No. 273301, it
being only a mere xerox copy ** (the
Heirs) did not formally offer the same
in evidence." However, the Court
said, the deed of sale of the land in
Veronica Lacalle's favor that was
submitted instead -- the "genuineness
and authenticity ** (of which had)
been fully established" by the
certification of the Clerk of Court of
the Manila RTC -- was adequate for
the purpose. According to the Court,
"(e)xecution of a deed of
conveyance in a certain prescribed
form gave to the transfer of a title to
the land conveyed ** (and) without
being controverted by any
convincing evidence to the contrary
can be sufficient basis in granting the
plaintiffs' relief for quieting of their
title." The Order passed sub silentio on
the quaint contentions in the Heirs'
opposition.
The Dimans moved for
reconsideration under date of
January 2, 1997,22inter alia (1)
alleging that although the
photocopy of TCT 2773301 annexed
to the Heirs' complaint states that the
"certificate is a transfer from T.C.T. No.
259150" (and this, presumably, would
be the vendors' [the Mojicas'] title),
no effort whatever was made to
submit proof thereof, and (2)
reiterating the proposition that the
Heirs were bound by their implied
admissions under Rule 26.
The Dimans also submitted a
"SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION" dated January 7,
199723 in which they invited attention
to the identity of the technical
description of the land contained in
the deed of sale to Veronica Lacalle
and that set out in TCT No. 273301. It
must therefore have been Veronica
Lacalle, they reasoned, who had
instituted the registration
proceedings leading to the
supposed issuance of said TCT No.
273301. Yet the heirs failed to present
evidence of the record of any such
registration proceedings, just as they
failed to present evidence of any
authentic copy of the title itself.
The Heirs filed a one-page
"Vehement Opposition ** " dated
February 15, 1997.24 Once again they
reiterated the astounding argument
that the Dimans' "insistence ** (on the
demurrer to evidence) is tantamount
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
to suppression of their evidence as
they are afraid of cross-examination"!
Again the Trial Court rebuffed the
Dimans. In its Order of February 28,
1997,25 the Court ruled that the issues
raised in the motion for
reconsideration and its supplement
had already been passed upon in the
Order of December 2, 1996. It then set
the case "for the reception of
defendants' evidence on April 22,
1997 **."
What the Dimans did was to
commence a special civil action
of certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition in the Court of Appeals
praying (a) that it set aside the Orders
of June 14, 1995 (denying summary
judgment), of December 2, 1996
(denying demurrer to evidence), and
of February 28, 1997 (denying
reconsideration); (b) that the Trial
Judge be commanded to dismiss the
case before it; and (c) that said judge
be prohibited from conducting
further proceedings in the case.
But once again their efforts met with
failure. The Appellate Tribunal
(Seventh Division) promulgated
judgment on September 9, 1997
decreeing that their petition be
"DENIED due course and DISMISSED."
The Court of Appeals held that insofar
as concerned the Order of June 14,
1995, the petition for its invalidation
had not been filed within a
reasonable time; and that as regards
the Order of December 2, 1996, the
remedy of certiorari was improper
because : (1) said order was merely
interlocutory, (2) any error therein
constituted only an error of judgment
correctible by appeal, and (3) there
was no capriciousness or whimsicality
attendant upon the order. The
Dimans' motion for reconsideration
was later denied by the Court of
Appeals by Resolution dated
November 5,
1997. cräläwvirtualibräry
26
The Dimans thereupon filed with this
Court a petition for review
on certiorari of the Appellate
Tribunal's Decision of September 9,
1997. But seemingly consistent with
the pattern of judicial misfortune
which they had theretofore been
traversing, their petition for review
was dismissed, by Resolution dated
January 14, 1998. Their appeal was
however subsequently reinstated, as
earlier recounted.
Now, what first strikes the Court about
the case at bar is the regrettable
absence of familiarity, therein laid
bare, with the rules of discovery and
with the underlying philosophy and
principles of the cognate remedy of
summary judgment. That resulted in
the undue protraction of the present
action despite ample demonstration
of the absence of any genuine issue -
- that is to say, that the issues
ostensibly arising from the pleadings
were sham or fictitious.
A Trial Court has no discretion to
determine what the consequences
of a party's refusal to allow or make
discovery should be; it is the law
which makes that determination; and
it is grave abuse of discretion for the
Court to refuse to recognize and
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
observe the effects of that refusal as
mandated by law. Particularly as
regards request for admission under
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law
ordains that when a party is served
with a written request that he admit :
(1) the genuineness of any material
and relevant document described in
and exhibited with the request, or (2)
the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact set forth in the request,
said party is bound within the period
designated in the request,27 to file
and serve on the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either
(10 denying specifically the matters
of which an admission is requested or
(2) setting forth in details the reasons
why he cannot truthfully either admit
or deny those matters. If the party
served does not respond with such
sworn statement, each of the matters
of which an admission is requested
shall be deemed
admitted. cräläwvirtualibräry
28
In this case, the Dimans' request for
admission was duly served by
registered mail on Jose Lacalle on
February 6, 1995, and a copy thereof
on his lawyers on February 4, 1995.
Neither made any response
whatever within the reglementary
period. Nor did either of them do so
even after receiving copy of the
Dimans' "MANIFESTATION WITH
MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO
ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION."
dated March 28, 1995. On account
thereof, in legal contemplation, the
Heirs impliedly admitted all the facts
listed in the request for admission.
These plain and simple legal
propositions were disregarded by His
Honor.
It is also the law which determines
when a summary judgment is proper.
It declares that although the
pleadings on their face appear to
raise issues of fact -- e.g., there are
denials of, or a conflict in, factual
allegations -- if it is shown by
admissions, depositions or affidavits,
that those issues are sham, fictitious,
or not genuine, or, in the language of
the Rules, that "except as to the
amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entiled
to a judgment as a matter of
law,29 the Court shall render a
summary judgment for the
plaintiff or the defendant as the
30 31
case may be.32cräläwvirtualibräry
Parenthetically, the existence or
appearance of ostensible issues in
the pleadings, on the one hand, and
their sham or fictitious character, on
the other, are what distinguish a
proper case for a summary
judgment from one for a judgment
33
on the pleadings under Rule 19 of the
1964 Rules.34In the latter case, there
is no ostensible issue at all, but the
absence of any because of the
failure of the defending party's
answer to raise an issue. Rule 19
expresses the principle as follows:
"Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion
of that party, direct judgment on
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
such pleading
**."35cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, in the case of a
summary judgment, issues apparently
exist -- i.e., facts are asserted in the
complaint regarding which there is as
yet no admission, disavowal or
qualification; or specific denials or
affirmative defenses are in truth set
out in the answer -- but the issues thus
arising from the pleadings are sham,
fictitious, not genuine, as shown by
admissions, depositions or admissions.
In other words, as a noted authority
remarks, a judgment on the
pleadings is a judgment on the facts
as pleaded while a summary
judgment is a judgment on the facts
as summarily proven by affidavits,
depositions or admissions.36Another
distinction is that while the remedy of
a judgment on the pleadings may be
sought only by a claimant (one
seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief, supra), a
summary judgment may be applied
for by either a claimant or a
defending party.
These basic distinctions escaped His
Honor. He denied the Dimans' motion
for summary judgment in his Order of
June 14, 1995, opining that a "perusal
of the Complaint and the Answer will
clearly show that material issue is
raised in that both plaintiffs and
defendants claimed ownership over
the land in dispute, presenting their
respective titles thereto and accused
each other of possessing false title to
the land." He added, citing cases,
that a summary judgment "is not
proper where the defendant
presented defenses tendering
factual issues which call for the
presentation of evidence." Such a
ratiocination is grossly erroneous.
Clearly, the grounds relied on by the
Judge are proper for the denial of a
motion for judgment on the
pleadings -- as to which the essential
question, as already remarked, is: are
there issues arising from or generated
by the pleadings? -- but not as
regards a motion for summary
judgment -- as to which the crucial
question is: issues having been raised
by the pleadings, are those issues
genuine, or sham or fictitious, as
shown by affidavits, depositions or
admissions accompanying the
application therefor?
Errors on principles so clear and
fundamental as those herein involved
cannot but be deemed so egregious
as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion, being tantamount to
whimsical or capricious exercise of
judicial prerogative.
When the Heirs closed their evidence
as party plaintiffs, and the Dimans
moved to dismiss on ground of
insufficiency of the Heirs' evidence,
the Trial Judge was charged with the
duty to assess the evidence to
ascertain whether or not "upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff(s) **
(have) shown no right to relief." It was
in the first place incumbent on His
Honor to hold the Heirs bound to their
admissions appearing in the record,
express and implied. In accordance
with Section 2, Rule 26 of the 1964
Rules of Court, the Heirs were
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
impliedly, but no less indubitably,
deemed to have admitted the facts
on which admissions had been duly
requested by reason of their failure to
reply thereto. Said Section 2 reads as
follows:
"SEC. 2. Implied admissions. -- Each of
the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed
admitted unless, within a period
designated in the request, which shall
not be less than twn (10) days after
service thereof, or within such further
time as the court may allow on
motion and notice, the party to
whom the request is directed serves
upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters on
which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully either admit or
deny those matters.
Objections on the ground of
irrelevancy or impropriety of the
matter requested shall be promptly
submitted to the court for
resolution." cräläwvirtualibräry
37
In determining the chief issue in the
case, the Trial Judge should have
taken due account of the following
circumstances on record and
obvious legal propositions:
1) the Heirs' admissions of the
following facts, viz.:
a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not
recorded in the Registry of Rizal, or of
Pasay City, or of Paraaque, or of Las
Pias;
b) on the other hand, the Dimans'
transfer certificates of title are all duly
registered in their names in Pasay
City;
c) there is no record of any property
situated in Las Pias in the name of
Veronica Lacalle -- more particularly
described in TCT 273301 -- in the Index
Records of Registered Property
Owners under Act No. 496 in the
Office of the Land Registration
Authority;
d) the Heirs do not have and cannot
produce even a certified true copy of
TCT 273301;
e) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of
her heirs ever declared the property
under TCT 273301 for taxation
purposes since its alleged acquisition
on February 24, 1959 or since the
issuance of said title on August 7,
1959;
f) not a single centavo was ever paid
by the Heirs as real estate taxes; and
g) no steps were ever taken by the
Heirs to ascertain the genuineness
and authenticity of the conflicting
titles.
2) the statement in open Court of the
Heirs' own counsel that his clients did
not have original copy of the title,
that they were fact "still searching" for
the title;38
3) the testimony of Jose Moreno
Lacalle that he had no copy "of the
document which says ** (his) mother
is the registered owner" of the land in
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
question; that he "cannot find the
original" which "maybe" was in
possession of his mother's agent, a
certain Mr. Lopez, who, he could no
longer locate; that he had tried to
verify the existence of the title "from
the Register of Deeds of Pasig and
Pasay" without success; that he had
not, however, gone to the Register of
Deeds of Paraaque or Las Pias;39
4) that the only document bearing on
the issue submitted by the heirs, the
deed of absolute sale purportedly
executed by Eusebio Mojica, Clara
Mojica, Maria Mojica, Antonia
Mojica, Amanda Mojica and
Teodora Aranda -- which deeded
over to Veronica Lacalle the "land
'known as Lot 1 PSU-151453,'" but
which made no reference to any
Torrens title over it -- was not
accompanied by proof of the
vendors' ownership of the land in
question;
5) that the land subject of the Heirs'
action for quieting of title being
registered land (being in fact
registered in the Dimans' favor), the
unregistered deed of sale relied upon
by the Heirs cannot and does not
affect said land, or bind any third
party (including the Dimans) for the
reason that, as a matter of law:
" ** (N)o deed,
mortgage, lease or
other voluntary
instrument, except a will
purporting to convey or
affect registered land,
shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the
land, but shall operate
only as a contract
between the parties
and as evidence of
authority to the Register
of Deeds to make
registration;" and it is the
"act of registration (that)
shall be the operative
act to convey or effect
the land in so far as third
persons are
concerned," which
"registration shall be
made in the ** Register
of Deeds for the
province or city where
the land
lies." cräläwvirtualibrär
40
y
and
6) that there is no proof whatever of
the ownership or character of the
rights of the vendors (the Mojicas)
over the property purportedly
conveyed.
In fine, the Heirs had proven nothing
whatever to justify a judgment in their
favor. They had not presented any
copy whatever of the title they
wished to be quieted. They had not
adduced any proof worthy of the
name to establish their precedessors'
ownership of the land. On the
contrary, their own evidence, from
whatever aspect viewed, more than
persuasively indicated their lack of
title over the land, or the spuriousness
of their claim of ownership thereof.
The evidence on record could not be
interpreted in any other way, and no
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

other conclusion could be drawn Case No. 94-3085 is DISMISSED. Costs

therefrom except the against private Respondents.
unmeritoriousness of the complaint.
The case at bar is a classic example IT IS SO ORDERED.
of the eminent propriety of a
summary judgment, or a judgment Romero, Kapunan, Purisima, and
on demurrer to evidence. Pardo, JJ., concur.

Considering these circumstances,

including the outlandish grounds of
opposition advanced by the Heirs
against the Dimans' motions for
summary judgment and for demurrer Republic of the Philippines
to evidence, no less than the SUPREME COURT
obviously mistaken grounds cited by Manila
the Trial Court for denying said
motions, this Court has no hesitation in EN BANC
declaring that it was indeed grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the G.R. No. L-29612 November 15,
Trial Court to have refused to render 1968
a summary judgment or one on
demurrer to evidence. In no sense LUCIANO A. SAULOG, plaintiff-
may the Trial Court's errors be appellee,
considered, as the Court of Appeals vs.
did in its judgment of September 9, CUSTOMBUILT MANUFACTURING
1997, as mere errors of judgment CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants,
correctible by appeal, untarnished CUSTOMBUILT MANUFACTURING
by any capriciousness or whimsicality. CORPORATION, defendant-
appellant.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision
of the Court of Appeals promulgated Rafael Concegco for plaintiff-
on September 9, 1997 is REVERSED appellee.
and SET ASIDE: the Orders dated July C. L. Pe Law Firm for defendant-
14, 1996 and December 2, 1996 appellant.
rendered in the action for "Quieting
of Title and Damages" -- docketed as SANCHEZ, J.:
Civil Case No. 94-3085 of the Regional
The question shaped out by this case
Trial Court at Las Pias (Branch 255)
is the propriety of the trial court's
and entitled "Heirs of Veronica V.
denial of defendant's petition for
Moreno Lacalle, represented by Jose
relief from judgment.1
Moreno Lacalle versus Cristina
Diman, Clarissa Diman, George
On September 12, 1961, plaintiff
Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina
Luciano A. Saulog sued in the City
Diman" -- are annuled; and said Civil
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Court of Manila for damages and
attorneys' fees against defendants
Custombuilt Manufacturing
Corporation (Custombuilt), Northwest
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.
(Northwest), and the City Sheriff of
Manila.2 Plaintiff complained that
Custombuilt caused to be sold on
execution certain properties
belonging to him which he leased to
one Adriano Go, Custombuilt's
judgment debtor in another
case. Those properties consisted of a
3
piano with a stool, and a rattan
dinner and sala set. Plaintiff filed a
third-party claim thereon to stave off
levy. But Custombuilt posted a
P1,200-bond issued by Northwest in
favor of the City Sheriff. This paved
the way for the execution sale of said
properties on July 29, 1961. The prayer
in plaintiff's complaint: For the three
defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, P1,200; against
Custombuilt, for P1,000 as actual and
moral damages and P500 as
attorneys' fees; and against all of
them, the costs of suit.
On March 3, 1962, the City Court of
Manila rendered judgment on
plaintiff's evidence introduced ex-
parte against Custombuilt, the City
Sheriff, and the defaulting Northwest
— all of whom failed to appear on
the date set for the trial despite due
notice. the city court's judgment
directed defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
P1,200 plus P100 for attorneys' fees,
and the costs.
Custombuilt appealed to the Court
of First Instance of
Manila4 substantially reiterated its
answer in the inferior court.
Defendant Sheriff reproduced his
answer.
On November 5, 1964, pre-trial was
had. Custombuilt's counsel was in the
courtroom that day, but left before
the case was called. On plaintiff's
motion, the judge, on the same day,
dismissed the appeal and revived the
city court's judgment, without costs.
Copy of this order was received by
Custombuilt's counsel on November
10. On November 14, he filed a
petition for relief. On November 19,
plaintiff opposed. On November 27,
the court below denied the petition
for lack of merit. Custombuilt
appealed.
The city court's judgment as revived
by the Court of First Instance must be
sustained.
1. Concededly, at the start of the pre-
trial on November 5, Custombuilt's
attorney was present. But he
unceremoniously left the courtroom.
Counsel averred in his petition for
relief that he had to leave posthaste
because "he was summoned home
all too suddenly" as "(h)is pregnant
wife had been having labor pains"
which "were cause for alarm"
because "his wife was due for
confinement ... and she finally
delivered on November 10, 1964."
Counsel did not have the foresight
required of him. Pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, both
client and counsel must appear at
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
the pre-trial. This is mandatory. Failure
of the client to appear is ground for
dismissal.5 If one representing his
client — a corporation — was
present, counsel could have easily
left word for the former to tell the
judge that he was suddenly
summoned to his home. If the client
were not present, then the case just
the same would have been
dismissed. But, the point is that
allegedly someone summoned said
attorney to go back home. If this
were true, then it would have been
quite easy for the lawyer to have
asked that man to stay around and
tell the judge or the clerk or the
branch deputy clerk of court of his
predicament. Or, he himself could
have as easily told the judge, or either
clerk, or the adverse counsel, the
court stenographer, the interpreter,
the bailiff, or anyone for that matter,
of his inability to wait for the pre-trial.
He failed to do anyone of these.
In his petition for relief, Custombuilt's
lawyer also made the statement that
his wife did not give birth until five
days later, that is, on November 10. It
is unreasonable to assume that
during the whole period of time —
from November 5 to November 10 —
his mind was in blank, such that it was
impossible for him to have taken steps
to tell the court personally or
otherwise that his absence during the
pre-trial was excusable. Again, he did
not. He received copy of the decision
on November 10. He did not file the
petition for relief until November 14.
The foregoing are not isolated
instances. The fact is that even when
the trial was held in the City Court of
Manila, neither was there
appearance for appellant
Custombuilt — "despite due notice"'.
All of these facts point to one
conclusion: lack of interest on the
part of appellant to defend itself
against the complaint. Rather, the
pattern of conduct discloses a desire
to delay disposal of the present case.
Failure to prosecute is a ground for
dismissal of the appeal and revival of
the judgment of the city court under
Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court.
We have not overlooked Section 2,
Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, which
says that "a party who failed to
appear at the pre-trial conference
may be non-suited or considered as
in default." So that, as held in the two
cases heretofore cited,
namely, American Insurance
Company vs. Republic, supra,
and Home Insurance Company vs.
United States Lines Co., supra, a
complaint may be dismissed on
failure of the party plaintiff to appear
at the pre-trial. But, this remedy is by
no means exclusive. It goes hand in
hand with the right of the court of first
instance — upon a showing of failure
to prosecute — to dismiss a
defendant's appeal from the
judgment of an inferior court
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 40.
2. In Custombuilt's notice of
appeal,6 we note that defendant
gave notice that he would "appeal
the judgment on the merits, upon the
ground that it is not supported by the
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

evidence and is contrary to law."

Indeed, his second assignment of
error challenges the correctness of
the judgment of the city court on the
merits.

One important roadblock stands

astride any discussion of the
judgment of the City Court of Manila.
Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 40, supra,
that judgment "shall be deemed
revived and shall forthwith be
remanded to the justice of the peace
court or municipal court for
execution." Implicit in this rule is that
that judgment of the City Court of
Manila may no longer be reopened.
For, the appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Manila has already been
dismissed by the latter court. All that is
left is to execute the city court's
judgment.

For the reasons given, the trial court's

order of November 5, 1964 is hereby
affirmed.

Costs against appellant Custombuilt

Manufacturing Corporation.

So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

EN BANC night with her parents in another

barrio of the same municipality two
G.R. No. L-3097 March 5, 1951 kilometers away. When Macaria
Dalag, the wife, came home the next
THE PEOPLE OF THE morning her husband was dead with
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, two gunshot wounds, and she found
vs. CASIMIRO BERSAMIN (alias household articles scattered all over
MIRONG) ET AL., defendants. the house and merchandise missing.
CASAMIRO BERSAMIN (alias The deceased and his wife had been
MIRONG), Appellant. running a small business, and the
missing goods were salted fish,
Emiliano V. Malit for appellant. canned sardines, canned salmon,
First Assistant Solicitor General Chinese wine, threads, glass jars with
Ruperto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jose biscuits, and one Bible, the total value
G. Bautista for appellee. of which was calculated at
P80.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
PER CURIAM: chanrobles virtual law obles virtual law library
library
There were no eye-witnesses to the
This is an appeal from a judgment of crime, and the main evidence for the
conviction for robbery with homicide prosecution was furnished by alleged
sentencing the herein appellant, companions of the defendants in the
Casimiro Bersamin, to reclusion robbery - Emiliano Tolentino and
perpetua, P6,000 indemnity to the Francisco
heirs of the deceased to be paid Bulatao.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary c
jointly and severally with Saturnino de hanrobles virtual law library
la Vega, to return the goods robbed
or pay their value in the sum of P65, Briefly, Emiliano Tolentino testified that
and costs. Convicted with the on the night of October 24, 1948,
appellant was Saturnino de la Vega, about eight o'clock, he was "taken or
who did not appeal, and prosecuted asked" by Francisco Bulatao and
with these two were Pablo Calugay, Casimiro Bersamin to accompany
Isabelo Gusto and Alfredo Arellano them. From his house, they set out for
who were acquitted on grounds of the place of Dalmacio Caguing, and
reasonable on the way, at the "junction," they
doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch were joined by other people among
anrobles virtual law library whom he recognized Saturnino de la
Vega. Arriving at Dalmacio
It appears that on the night of Caguing's house, Bersamin and De la
October 24, 1948, Dalmacio Caguing Vega went upstairs, Bersamin with a
slept alone in his home in barrio .45 caliber "rifle", which seemed to be
Malabobo, municipality of Exhibit C, and De la Vega a carbine.
Mangatarem, Province of Thereafter he heard two shots from
Pangasinan, his wife having spent the the house while he was standing
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
about six meters away, and noted a
commotion although he could not
tell what they were doing inside the
house. Those who remained
downstairs were around the house. A
few moments after the shots
Saturnino de la Vega and Casimiro
Bersamin came down, the former
with a knapsack and the latter with a
sack. He did not know what the sack
contained but he saw some of the
contents of the knapsack, and they
were bottled sarsaparilla, bottled
orange and a box of gaffs. Exhibit A,
a Bible, seemed to him one of the
things Bersamin brought down. On
the way from Caguing's house, they
stopped at the "junction" and were
handed a bottle of soft drinks,
each.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
Francisco Bulatao's testimony run
substantially as follows: He was left at
the road by Casimiro Bersamin and
Saturnino de la Vega while these
walked toward the house of
Dalmacio Caguing, Bersamin
carrying a revolver and De la Vega a
carbine. It was about eight o'clock,
rather dark, and he could not see
Bersamin and De la Vega when they
climbed up stairs. Afterward shots
rang out inside the house. By and by
Bersamin and De la Vega came
down bringing with them a sack and
a knapsack respectively, the latter of
which contained bottle soft drinks.
When the band arrived at the
"junction" after the crime they were
given a bottle each by Bersamin. A
book, Exhibit A, was also taken from
the house and was given to him
(witness) by Bersamin when they
were returning
home.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch
anrobles virtual law library
Explaining how he came to be with
the band, Bulatao said that Casimiro
Bersamin came to his house and
house and requested him to come
long to Emiliano Tolentino's house:
that with Tolentino they proceeded
to Caguing's house; that on the way
they were joined by Saturnino de la
Vega and others whom he did not
know: chanrobles virtual law library
On minor matters other witness were
called.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch
anrobles virtual law library
Anastacio Zamuco, justice of the
peace of Bugallon and Aguilar,
identified Exhibit D as alfredo
Arellano's statement sworn to before
him; and Deogracias C. Andaya, PC
T/ SGT, identified Exhibit C, a pistol,
which he said had been "mortagage"
by Casimiro Bersamin to one Jacinto
Viperas in barrio Caturay,
Bayambang. Andaya also identified
the bible and said it had been turned
over to him by Pfc. Pedro Sison of his
company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
For the defense, Saturnino de la
Vega, Alfredo Arellano, Casimiro
Bersamin, Felisa Dalag (Arellano's
wife) and Francisco Cuaresma took
the stand. Saying nothing about his
part in the crime, De la Vega
confined his testimony to the alleged
conversation in the provincial jail
between Bulatao and Bersamin, by
which, it will be seen later, Bersamin
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
undertook to impeach Bulatao's in
which he said, among other things,
that Bulatao and Bersamin entered
Caguing's house was signed and
sworn to by him before the justice of
the peace when he was dizzy. He put
up an alibi. Arellano's wife and
Francisco Cuaresma gave evidence
in support of Arellano's purported
alibi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library
Casimiro Bersamin testified
substantially as follows: On October
24, 1948, he was in his house in barrio
Galarin, Urbiztondo, about eight or
nine kilometers from Mangatarem.
Between his house and Mangatarem
there are unbridged rivers and
houses. On foot, the trip from one
place to the other would take three
and one-half hours. About six o'clock
in the afternoon he went with
Domingo Palisoc to Caturay,
Mangatarem, near the barrio school,
which was about ten or twelve
kilometers from barrio Malabobo, not
even once. Francisco Bulatao's
testimony was untrue, and Exhibit C
was not his pistol. Bulatao "has reason
against me or that he is mad with me"
because the Chief of Police showed
Bulatao an affidavit "wherein he
(Bulatao) was imputed (by me) to be
the person who has committed the
crime." The chief of police informed
Bulatao that the affidavit was
Bersamin's. Furthermore, the chief of
police told Bulatao: "If you will not say
that it was Bersamin who has
committed the killing in the vicinity,
he will testify against you in court." He
said he learned of this conversation
because while he was still in jail he
asked Bulatao; "Brother, why did you
testify something false against me?"
and Bulatao answered, "why should I
not do that when you are trying to
implicate me." He proceeded to
repeat what he said was a dialogue
between him and Bulatao in
jail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
We agreed with counsel for
appellant that Arellano's confession
was inadmissible against Bersamin.
We also agree that the pistol
identified by Andaya as having been
pawned by Bersamin has not shown
to have any bearing on the
perpetration of the crime in question.
Besides, the testimony in hearsay.
And it must be admitted that the
probative value of the bible which
Bulatao said had been handed to
him by Bersamin can be no greater
than Bulatao's
credibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
But the lower court did not take
Arellano's confession, the pistol and
the bible into cannot. The court
below rested its findings solely on
Bulatao's and Tolentino's testimony
given in open court. The question thus
is reduced to whether Bulatao and
Tolentino spoke the
truth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
There is no sufficient justification for
reversing the trial court's findings on
the appellant's guilt on the basis of
the two principal witnesses'
evidence. The record discloses no
ground for doubting the veracity of
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
these witnesses. Their testimony rings
true in all its material aspects, while
Casimiro Bersamin's testimony and his
attempt to discredit Bulatao sounds
irrational and is conflicting. In our
opinion, the said witnesses'
statements are as convincing as the
appellant's are unconvincing. It is
noteworthy that Bersamin did not
impeach Emiliano Tolentino's
testimony, nor did he call any witness
to corroborate him in his alleged alibi,
easy as it was even to fabricate this
kind of
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
That none of the witnesses saw who
killed the aggrieved party is
absolutely immaterial. There is no
gainsaying that there was not only
conspiracy to rob, but Casimiro
Bersamin was the moving and
directing spirit behind it, and that the
killing was a part and the direct result
of the robbery. Conspiracy being
established, each and every one of
the conspirators who took active part
in its execution is equally responsible
for the ensuing crime embraced in
the
plan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
The court below found the presence
of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, superior strength, and use
of unlicensed firearms. The Solicitor
General would substitute dwelling for
the use of unlicensed firearm. We
think that the prosecution is right in
eliminating the last-mentioned
circumstance. The use of unlicensed
firearm is special aggravating
circumstance applicable only in
cases of robbery in band (Art. 296,
Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 3, Republic Act No. 12). The
crime here established was one of
simple robbery with homicide since
only two of the malefactors are
shown to have been armed,
Bersamin and de la
Vega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
In the case of People vs. Balagtas a
case for robbery with homicide, 68
Phil., 675 it was held that "nighttime
can not . . . be considered as an
aggravating circumstance separate
and independent of that
aggravating circumstance separate
and independent of that of
treachery and abuse of superior
strength." But in People vs. John
Doe (L-2463, March 31, 1950), also a
case for robbery with homicide, the
Court appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, dwelling
and treachery separately. However,
that may be, at least two
aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the
crime at bar, namely dwelling and
either nighttime or superior
strength.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary c
hanrobles virtual law library
There is one other proof of moral
perversity which, added to the
circumstances already mentioned,
compels the Court to deal with the
appellant with utmost severity. When
Bersamin pretreated the crime at bar,
he had been the ringleader in the
case for murder and another case for
double murder and was in hiding to
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

avoid arrest prosecution in those

cases. In the case for double murder,
docketed in this court on appeal as
G.R. No. L-3098, he has been found
guilty in decision which affirmed that
of the Court of First Instance
sentecing him to life imprisonment,
and which is being promulgated with
this decision. In the other case, one of
the defendants, Crispin Licuanan,
was found guilty and sentenced to
prison for life by the Court of First
Instance and by this Court (G.R. No.
L-2960). As far as can be gathered
from the record of the present
appeal, that case was pending
preliminary investigation with
reference to Casimiro Bersamin at the
time of the trial of the instant case for
robbery with
homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The decision of the lower court is

reversed as to the principal penalty,
and the appellant, Casimiro
Bersamin, is hereby sentenced to
death to be carried out in the
manner provided by law. The
appealed judgment is affirmed as to
the rest of the sentence. Costs of this
appeal will be taxed against the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon,

Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes
and Jugo, JJ., concur.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 131384-87. February 2, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. ELEGIO NADERA, JR. Y
SADSAD, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases are before us on
automatic review of the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, finding
accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr.
guilty of four counts of rape of his
minor daughters, Oleby and Maricris
Nadera, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
one count of rape and death for
each of the remaining three counts.
Accused-appellant was also ordered
to indemnify complainants Oleby
Nadera in the amount of P150,000.00
and Maricris Nadera in the amount of
P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of
insolvency.MENDOZAJ
Reversal of the decision is sought on
the sole ground that -
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
ACCEPTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY TO A
CAPITAL OFFENSE AND IN FAILING TO
CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCUSED
FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE
CONSEQUENCE OF HIS
PLEA. cräläwvirtualibräry
1 Municipality of Naujan, Province of
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera,
Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy,
namely: Oleby, born on October 2,
1982; Maricris, born on March 16,
1984; March Anthony, born on
January 8, 1986; and Sherilyn, born on
September 27,
1987. cräläwvirtualibräry
2
On September 22, 1991, Daisy left for
a job in Bahrain, and came home to
the Philippines for vacation only in
July 1993. She then left again for
Bahrain in September 1993 and did
not return until September 12,
1995.3cräläwvirtualibräry
On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris,
assisted by a neighbor, Lita
Macalalad, told their mother that
they had been raped by their father,
herein accused-appellant.
Thereupon, they went to the police
authorities of Naujan and filed a
complaint against accused-
appellant.4cräläwvirtualibräry
After preliminary examination, on
June 6, 1996, four informations
charging accused-appellant with
rape on various dates were filed in
the Regional Trial Court, Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro.
In Criminal Case No. C-4982, the
information5 alleged-
That on or about the 17th day of May,
1992, at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Barangay Bayani,
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd
design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously did lie and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with his
daughter, OLEBY NADERA, nine (9)
years of age at that time against the
latter's will and consent.
In Criminal Case No. C-4983, the
information6 charged -
That on or about the 17th day of April,
1995 at Barangay Bayani,
Municipality of Naujan, Province of
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd
design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, and unlawfully
and feloniously did lie and
succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY
NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at
that time against the latter's will and
consent.
In Criminal Case No. C-4984, the
information7 stated-
That on or about the 24th day of April,
1995, sometime in the evening, at
Barangay Bayani, Municipality of
Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, motivated by lust
and lewd design, and by means of
force and intimidation, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did lie and
succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY
NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at
that time against the latter's will and
consent.
In Criminal Case No. C-4985, the
information8 recited -
That on or about the 3rd day of
March 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, at Barangay Bayani,
Municipality of Naujan, Province of
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd
design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously did lie and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with his
daughter, MARICRIS NADERA, eleven
(11) years of age against the latter's
will and consent.
The record shows that at his
arraignment on July 23, 1996,
accused-appellant, assisted by Atty.
Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public
Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty
to the charges filed against
him.9 However, on August 5, 1997,
after the prosecution had presented
Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-
appellant pleaded guilty to the crime
charged in all the informations.
The prosecution presented four
witnesses, namely: Dr. Cynthia
Fesalbon, Oleby Nadera, Maricris
Nadera, and Daisy Nadera.
Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, Medical
Officer IV of the Oriental Mindoro
Provincial Hospital, who conducted
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

the medical examination of both Dr. Fesalbon likewise rendered a

complainants, submitted a report on report12 on the medical examination
the result of Oleby Nadera's of Maricris Nadera, the pertinent
examination as parts of which state:
follows:10cräläwvirtualibräry
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
- No sign of external physical injuries
- No sign of external physical injuries as of time of examination.
as of time of examination. - Abdomen, flat, soft.
- Breast developed
- Abdomen: flat, soft non-tender. EXTERNAL GENITALIA:

EXTERNAL GENITALIA - Absence of pubic hair healed

- Minimal pubic hair
- Healed incomplete hymenal
lacerations at 5, 7, 12 o'clock
positions.
- No bleeding.
INTERNAL SPECULUM EXAMINATION
- Vagina admits 2 fingers with ease.
- Cervix small, firm, close non-tender
(-) bleeding.
- Uterus not enlarged.
- Adnexae negative
LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
- Smear for the presence of
spermatozoa revealed positive result.
She testified that the hymenal
lacerations may have been caused
by the insertion of a hard object, the
patient's history of genitalic insertions,
a straddle injury, or sitting on hard
wood. She could not determine
when these lacerations were
sustained because they had healed
over a period beyond seven
days.11cräläwvirtualibräry
hymenal lacerations, incomplete at
1, 5, 8, 11 o'clock positions.
INTERNAL EXAMINATION:
- Vagina admits 1 finger with ease.
- Cervix small (-) bleeding
- Uterus not enlarged.
-Adnexae (-).
LABORATORY EXAMINATION
- Smear for the presence of
spermatozoa revealed Negative
result.
In the case of Maricris Nadera, Dr.
Fesalbon explained that the hymenal
lacerations could have been caused
by penetration such as through
instrumentation or insertion of an
object inside the vagina. They could
also have been caused by the
penetration of the penis. Upon inquiry
from the court, Dr. Fesalbon stated
that the fact that Maricris had more
hymenal lacerations than Oleby
could be due to the difference in the
impact of penetration. She added
that the number of times each of the
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
girls had sexual intercourse could not
be ascertained merely from the
hymenal lacerations, although it
could be concluded that an object
had been inserted in the
vagina. cräläwvirtualibräry
13
Oleby Nadera testified about the
rapes committed by her father
against her as follows:
On May 17, 1992, at around 10
o'clock in the evening, while Daisy
was away working as a domestic
helper in Bahrain, accused-
appellant pulled Oleby, then nine
years of age, towards a bed,
removed her panties and shorts and
ordered her to keep quiet. He then
placed himself on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. He
proceeded to make an up and down
motion while on top of his daughter.
All the while, Oleby was crying,
pleading with her father, "Huwag
po!", "Huwag po!" Accused-
appellant again ordered Oleby to
keep quiet lest her brother and sisters
were awakened. Afterwards,
accused-appellant told Oleby to put
on her panties and shorts and to go
to sleep. Oleby went to the bed
where her brother and sisters were
sleeping and cried.
On another occasion, on April 17,
1995, accused-appellant sent
Sherilyn and Maricris to the sari-sari
store while he asked March Anthony
to gather firewood. While Oleby was
left alone inside their house in
Barangay Bayani, Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro, accused-appellant again
raped her. Oleby was 12 years old at
that time. Accused-appellant closed
the door and windows, removed
Oleby's panties and shorts and sat
down. While sitting down, accused-
appellant placed Oleby's legs on his
thighs and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Later on, he told Oleby to put
on her panties and shorts and told her
to fetch her brother and sisters.
Oleby was raped by her father for the
third time on April 24, 1995. That
evening, she woke up to find her
father on top of her, taking off her
shorts and panties and inserting his
penis into her vagina. As her father
was taking off her clothes, Oleby
cried and pleaded, "Huwag po!
Huwag po!" Instead of desisting,
accused-appellant told her to keep
quiet so as not to awaken her brother
and sisters, and threatened her with
harm if she made any noise.
Accused-appellant then made a
pumping motion, consummating the
sexual act with his
daughter. cräläwvirtualibräry
14
After Oleby's direct examination had
been finished, Atty. Brotonel,
accused-appellant's counsel, did not
conduct any cross examination on
the ground that he was convinced
Oleby was telling the
truth.15cräläwvirtualibräry
On that same day, Maricris also
testified. She related how she was
raped by her father on March 3, 1996,
the year before, when she was 11
years old. At about eight o'clock in
the evening of said date, while her
brother and sisters were sleeping, she
was pulled by her father towards his
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
bed and told to lie down. Accused-
appellant then placed himself on top
of Maricris and inserted his penis into
her vagina. Maricris pleaded "Papa,
huwag po, maawa naman kayo sa
amin." Ignoring his daughter's pleas,
accused-appellant continued raping
her by making a pumping motion
and threatened to kill all of them if
she cried. Accused-appellant
afterwards asked Maricris to put on
her shorts and panties and return to
bed. He told Maricris not to cry so as
not to awaken her siblings. She did
not tell anyone what befell her
because she was afraid. A neighbor,
named Lita Macalalad, asked her if
Oleby had been raped by their
father. It turned out Oleby had told
her ordeal to Lita Macalalad while
they were washing clothes and
talking about Oleby's parents. Oleby
also told Lita Macalalad that Maricris
had been raped by their father as
well, a fact related to Oleby by
Maricris.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Daisy Nadera, accused-appellant's
wife, also testified for the prosecution.
Her testimony focused on the dates
of births of her children and the fact
that she was out of the country when
the alleged rapes occurred. She
testified that she and her daughters
filed a complaint for rape against
accused-appellant after discovering
his hideous acts. Thereafter, her
children were subjected to a medical
examination.17cräläwvirtualibräry
On August 12, 1997, the prosecution
formally offered its documentary
evidence and rested its case
thereafter.
Accused-appellant did not present
any evidence in his defense.
On August 27, 1997, the trial court
rendered judgment finding accused-
appellant guilty of four counts of rape
against his daughters. The dispositive
portion of its decision18 reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds
accused Elegio Nadera, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Rape [4
counts] with the qualifying
circumstance that the victims are
under 18 years of age and the
offender is a parent. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua ranging
from 20 years and 1 day to 40
years for the rape committed on May
17, 1992 and three DEATH
PENALTIES for the rape committed on
April 17 and 24, 1995 and March 3,
1996, together with the accessory
penalties provided by law. He is also
ordered to indemnify victim Oleby
Nadera the total amount of
P150,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. C-
4982, C-4983 and C-4984 and Maricris
Nadera, the amount of P50,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. C-4985, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
S OO R D E R E D.
As already stated, accused-
appellant's lone assignment of error is
that the trial court accepted his plea
of guilty to a capital offense without
making a searching inquiry to
determine whether he understood
the consequences of his plea. In
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
support of his contention, accused-
appellant invokes the ruling in the
case of People v. Dayot19 in which
this Court ruled that, in criminal cases,
the judge must be convinced that
the accused, in pleading guilty, is
truly guilty. This could be done by
requiring him to narrate the events
leading to the crime, making him
reenact it, or asking him to supply
missing details. The judge must satisfy
himself that: (1) the accused is
voluntarily pleading guilty, and (2) he
is truly guilty and there is a rational
basis for a finding of guilt based on his
testimony.
We find merit in accused-appellant's
allegations. In addition, we find that
there was inadequate representation
of his case in court, thus necessitating
the remand of this case for further
proceedings.
I.
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital
offense; reception of evidence.-
When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also
present evidence on his behalf.
Under this Rule, three things are
enjoined upon the trial court when a
plea of guilty to a capital offense is
entered: (1) the court must conduct
a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the
accused's full comprehension of the
consequences thereof; (2) the court
must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability; and, (3) the court
must ask the accused if he desires to
present evidence on his behalf and
allow him to do so if he
desires.20cräläwvirtualibräry
What constitutes a searching inquiry,
as explained in People v.
Alicando,21 is that the plea of guilt
must be based on a free and
informed judgment. Hence, a
searching inquiry must focus on: (1)
the voluntariness of the plea, and (2)
the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.
In the case at bar, the record does
not show what exactly transpired at
the re-arraignment of accused-
appellant, for what reason he
changed his plea from "not guilty" to
"guilty," and whether he fully
understood the consequences of his
guilty plea. The only indication in the
record that accused-appellant
changed his plea to guilty is the
Certificates of Re- Arraignment,
dated August 5, 1997, in Criminal
Case Nos. C-4982 to C-4985.22 On
what exactly accused-appellant said
in entering his plea of guilty and what
exactly he had been told by the trial
judge, the records shed no light.
There is thus no evidence to show that
accused-appellant's guilty plea was
voluntarily made or that he had fully
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
understood the consequences of
such plea.
In its decision, the trial court
described the manner in which the
accused pleaded guilty, thus:
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted
by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the
Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged.
However, on August 5, 1997, when
these cases were called for pre-trial
and trial, counsel for the accused
manifested that the accused,
realizing the futility of entering into
trial and considering that he actually
committed the acts complained of,
intimated his intention to enter a plea
of guilty to the above- mentioned
charges. The accused was then
asked by this Court if he was aware of
the consequences of a plea of guilty
to a capital offense: that for the rape
he committed on May 17, 1992
against his daughter, Oleby Nadera,
who was 9 years old at the time, he
would be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and for the three other
counts of rape committed on April 17
and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby
Nadera] and on March 3, 1996
[against Maricris Nadera, 11 years old
at the time], he would be sentenced
to death by lethal injection. After
having been informed of this, he
insisted that he is willing to enter a
plea of guilty to the crimes charged
and is ready to face the
consequences
thereof.23cräläwvirtualibräry
The warnings given by the trial court
in this case fall short of the
requirement that it must make a
searching inquiry to determine
whether accused-appellant
understood fully the import of his
guilty plea. As has been said, a mere
warning that the accused faces the
supreme penalty of death is
insufficient.24 For more often than not,
an accused pleads guilty upon bad
advice or because he hopes for a
lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.
The trial judge must erase such
mistaken impressions.25 He must be
completely convinced that the guilty
plea made by the accused was not
made under duress or promise of
reward. The judge must ask the
accused the manner the latter was
arrested or detained, and whether he
was assisted by counsel during the
custodial and preliminary
investigations. In addition, the
defense counsel should also be
asked whether he conferred with the
accused and completely explained
to him the meaning and the
consequences of a plea of guilt.
Furthermore, since the age,
educational attainment and socio-
economic status of the accused may
reveal insights for a proper verdict in
the case, the trial court must ask
questions concerning them.26 In this
case, absent any showing that these
questions were put to accused-
appellant, a searching inquiry cannot
be said to have been undertaken by
the trial court.
What the trial court did in this case, as
described in its decision, is similar to
what happened in People v.
Sevilleno. In that case, the accused
27
was charged with the rape and
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
homicide of a nine-year old girl. The
accused pleaded guilty whereupon
the judge asked him questions: (1) Do
you understand your plea of guilt?
and (2) Do you know that your plea
of guilt could bring the death
penalty? This Court held that these
questions did not constitute a
searching inquiry.
. . . In every case where the accused
enters a plea of guilty to a capital
offense, especially where he is an
ignorant person with little or no
education, the proper and prudent
course to follow is to take such
evidence as are available and
necessary in support of the material
allegations of the information,
including the aggravating
circumstances therein enumerated,
not only to satisfy the trial judge
himself but also to aid the Supreme
Court in determining whether the
accused really and truly understood
and comprehended the meaning,
full significance and consequences
of his plea.28cräläwvirtualibräry
Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-
appellant in this case was made
improvidently.
II.
Convictions based on an improvident
plea of guilt are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
If the trial court relied on sufficient
and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be
sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but on evidence
proving his commission of the offense
charged.29cräläwvirtualibräry
As already stated, the prosecution
evidence consisted of the testimonies
of Oleby and Maricris Nadera, the
results of their medical examinations,
and the testimonies of their mother,
Daisy, and the physician who
conducted the medical examination
of the two girls, Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon.
Certain circumstances present in this
case, however, persuade us that a
remand of this case is necessary.
First. A perusal of the decision of the
court reveals that the trial judge
failed to state the factual and legal
reasons on which he based accused-
appellant's conviction. Except for the
narration of the prosecution's
evidence and a bare recital of R.A.
No.7659, amending Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, there is nothing
else to indicate the reason for the
decision. There is no evaluation of the
evidence and no reason given why
the court found the testimonies of the
witnesses credible. Rule 120 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of
judgment.- The judgment must be
written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and
shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the
law upon which the judgment is
based.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall
state (a) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the
commission thereof, if there be any;
(b) participation of the accused in
the commission of the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (c) the
penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (d) the civil liability or damages
caused by the wrongful act to be
recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there be any, unless
the enforcement of the civil liability
by a separate action has been
reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a
clear showing that the act from
which the civil liability might arise did
not exist, the judgment shall make a
finding on the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the offended
party.
In People v. Bugarin,30 we stated:
The requirement that the decisions of
courts must be in writing and that
they must set forth clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on
which they are based serves many
functions. It is intended, among other
things, to inform the parties of the
reason or reasons for the decision so
that if any of them appeals, he can
point out to the appellate court the
finding of facts or the rulings on points
of law with which he disagrees. More
than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard
against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding by ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword
nor the purse by the Constitution but
nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing
judgment on the life, liberty or
property of his fellowmen, the judge
must ultimately depend on the power
of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his
decision. The decision of the trial
court in this case disrespects the
judicial function.
Second. The cavalier attitude of
accused-appellant's counsel, Atty.
Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public
Attorney's Office, cannot go
unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his
refusal to cross examine Oleby
Nadera; (b) the manner in which he
conducted Maricris Nadera's cross
examination; and, (c) his failure not
only to present evidence for the
accused but also to inform the
accused of his right to do so, if he
desires.
Only faithful performance by counsel
of his duty towards his client can give
meaning and substance to the
accused's right to due process and to
be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's duty,
especially that of a defense counsel,
must not be taken lightly. It must be
performed with all the zeal and vigor
at his command to protect and
safeguard the accused's
fundamental rights.
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
In the case of People vs. Bermas,31 no
less than three PAO lawyers were
found by the Court to have failed in
performing their duties to their client,
an accused charged with raping his
daughter. The first lawyer inexplicably
waived the cross examination of the
private complainant and later asked
to be relieved of her duties as
counsel de oficio. A second lawyer
appointed by the court missed
several hearings during the trial and
could no longer be located. The third
PAO lawyer appointed by the trial
court accepted his duties reluctantly
and later ceased to appear for the
accused. This Court held that:
The right to counsel must be more
than just the presence of a lawyer in
the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions
and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended
by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an
active involvement by the lawyer in
the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing
constantly in mind of the basic rights
of the accused, his being well-versed
on the case and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. The
right of an accused to counsel finds
substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to
his client. Tersely put, it means an
efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.
Measured by this standard, the
defense counsels conduct in this
case falls short of the quality of
advocacy demanded of him,
considering the gravity of the offense
charged and the finality of the
penalty. A glaring example of his
manifest lack of enthusiasm for his
client's cause is his decision not to
cross examine Oleby Nadera, as
revealed in the following portion of
the records:
COURT:
....... Any cross?
ATTY. BROTONEL:
....... If Your Honor please, we are not
conducting any cross-examination,
because this representation, from the
demeanor of the witness, I am
convinced that she is telling the
truth.32cräläwvirtualibräry
It may be so that defense counsel
personally found Oleby's testimony to
be believable. Nonetheless, he had
the bounden duty to scrutinize
private complainant's testimony to
ensure that the accused's
constitutional right to confront and
examine the witnesses against him
was not rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape
cases, it is often the word of the
complainant against that of the
accused, the two being the only
persons present during the
commission of the offense. While the
lone testimony of the victim is
sufficient to convict the accused,
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
such testimony must be clear,
positive, convincing and consistent
with human nature and the normal
course of things. Complainant's
testimony cannot be accepted with
precipitate credulity without denying
the accused's constitutional right to
be presumed innocent.33 This is where
cross examination becomes essential
to test the credibility of the witnesses,
expose falsehoods or half-truths,
uncover the truth which rehearsed
direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and
demonstrate inconsistencies in
substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused and thus to give
substance to the constitutional right
of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him. For unless
proven otherwise to be guilty beyond
all reasonable doubt, the accused is
presumed to be
innocent. cräläwvirtualibräry
34
Indeed, cross examining Oleby
Nadera becomes indispensable if her
testimony is viewed together with the
results of her medical examination.
Oleby Nadera claimed that she was
last raped by her father on April 24,
1995.35 Yet, the medical examination
conducted on her on April 30,
199636 revealed the presence of
spermatozoa in the vaginal canal on
that date. This was a year after the
last rape allegedly committed by her
father. This evident discrepancy leads
to only one natural conclusion: Oleby
engaged in sexual intercourse a few
days before she was examined. This
raises a number of questions that
bear upon the credibility of Oleby as
a witness and upon the guilt of
accused- appellant. This may not
necessarily mean that she was lying
when she said that on April 24, 1995
she had been raped by accused-
appellant, but it does indicate a
necessity-that of cross examining her
in order to ferret out the truth.
The same may be said of defense
counsel's treatment of Maricris'
testimony. While she was cross
examined by defense counsel, the
examination was at best a half-
hearted attempt to comply with a
lawyer's obligation, lacking the rigor
and zeal required considering that a
man's life is at stake. The cross
examination centered on what
Maricris did or did not do while she
witnessed her sister being raped, and
on her failure to report the allegedly
incestuous rapes against them. Said
cross examination did not even touch
upon the specific details concerning
the rape committed against her.
Containing lurid details as it may be,
it was nonetheless important to probe
Maricris' testimony, especially since it
was substantially similar to the first
incident of rape narrated by her
sister, and thus raised the possibility
that it was a rehearsed, if not
concocted, story.
Lastly, not only did defense counsel
fail to object to the documentary
evidence presented by the
prosecution, according to the trial
court's decision, he even expressed
his conformity to the admission of the
same. Neither did he present any
evidence on behalf of accused-
appellant.37Worse, nowhere in the
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

records is it shown that accused- with all deliberate speed upon

appellant was informed, either by his receipt of the records of the cases.
counsel or by the court, of his right to
present evidence, if he so desires. SO ORDERED.2/28/00 9:29 AM

Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
had the duty to defend his client and Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban,
protect his rights, no matter how Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
guilty or evil he perceives accused- Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
appellant to be. The performance of Santiago, and De Leon,
this duty was all the more imperative Jr., JJ., concur.
because the life of accused-
appellant hangs in the balance. His
duty was no less because he was
counsel de oficio.

In view of the foregoing, we find it

necessary to remand the case for the
proper arraignment and trial of the
accused, considering not only the
accused's improvident plea of guilt
but also his lawyer's neglect in
representing his cause. A new trial has
been ordered in criminal cases on the
ground of retraction of witnesses,
negligence or incompetency of
counsel, improvident plea of guilty,
disqualification of an attorney de
oficio to represent the accused in the
trial court, and where a judgment
was rendered on a stipulation of facts
entered into by both the prosecution
and the defense.38cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE , the decision, dated

April 27, 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 40, Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, is hereby SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983, C-
4984 and C-4985 are REMANDED to it
for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision. The
trial court is enjoined to conduct the
proper trial of accused-appellant
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
October 11, 1933
JOSE TOPACIO
NUENO, complainant,
vs.
PASCUAL SANTOS, respondent.
Pascual Santos in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor Hilado for the
Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
These proceedings present for
consideration the question of what
action, if any, should be taken
against Attorney Pascual Santos for
malpractice.
Judge Anacleto Diaz of the Court of
First Instance was made a special
investigation of conditions in the city
government of Manila. In the course
of the investigation a complaint was
filed by Jose Topacio Nueno, a
member of the municipal board of
the City of Manila, against Pascual
Santos, another member of
municipal board, it being alleged
that the latter had interested himself
in prohibited games. Santos was
required to answer the charges
which he did by denying them.
Hearings were had on the said
charges and the testimony of a
number of witnesses was taken. At
the conclusion of the hearing, Judge
Diaz made a report to the Honorable,
the Secretary of the Interior, in which
he recommended the removal of the
respondent from his office of member
of the municipal board, and that all
the papers connected with the
charge that the respondent had
openly been running a club for
gambling purposes, such as the
Circulo Nationalista Consolidado
Club and had directly taken part in
said games, be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for action, "it being
evident that the respondent, as a
member of the Bar, violated his oath
of office by deceiving the court and
consenting a falsehood to be
committed, as it was in fact
committed, in the case referred
to, viz.: Criminal case No. E-87890,
Municipal Court of Manila, entitled
P.P.I. vs. Iñigo Hernandez." On receipt
of the report of Judge Diaz against
Attorney Santos, this court ordered it
referred to the Attorney-General for
investigation, report, and
recommendation. In the latter office
Attorney Santos was furnished with a
copy of the report and was given five
days within which to state in writing
whether or not he desires to present
evidence, in addition to that already
adduced in the investigation
conducted by Judge Diaz, and to
state why his disbarment should not
be recommended to the Supreme
Court in view of the findings of Judge
Diaz. The respondent eventually filed
an answer denying the charge and
requesting that he be given an
opportunity to present evidence in
support of his defense.
At the commencement of the
investigation in the office of the
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE
Attorney-General, a question was
raised as to the exact charged, and
it finally seems to have been agreed
that the respondent stood charged
on but one count, namely, that he, as
counsel for Iñigo Hernandez who was
charged with a violation of an
ordinance for having willfully and
unlawfully encouraged, tolerated
and permitted to be played a game
of chance and hazard commonly
known as "monte", wherein money
and other things of value were
played for at No. 18 Soler Street,
Manila, Criminal case No. E-87890 of
the municipal court of Manila,
entered a plea of guilty for said
Hernandez although he knew that
the latter was a mere waiter in said
house and did not encourage,
tolerate, or permit a game of "monte"
to be played in said house. it seems
further to have been agreed that
additional evidence could be
received limited to that charge. At
any rate, the respondent called Iñigo
Hernandez as his witness and testified
in his own behalf. It was only at
conclusion of the hearing that
counsel for respondent protested
against the evidence which had
been received by Judge Diaz being
taken into account against him. The
report of the Solicitor-General
concludes with the recommendation
that disciplinary action be taken
against the respondent. In a
memorandum filed with the court the
respondent has protested against the
irregularity of the investigation and
has asked for exoneration.
The way the proceedings have been
handled leads us to believe that the
respondent was fully informed of the
specific charge against him, and that
it was not improper to consider the
evidence taken by Judge Diaz, and
in conjunction with the additional
evidence received by the Solicitor-
General, to make findings thereon.
We further believe that there is no
escaping the conclusion that the
respondent attorney consented to
the doing of a falsehood and
deceived the court when he had an
accused plead guilty to an offense
which he had not committed. The
background of the administrative
investigation showing the
respondent's connection with
prohibited games, under
circumstances of the case, can only
be taken into consideration in so far
as it relates to the precise charge laid
against him. There was a clear
violation of the lawyer's oath that he
would do no falsehood nor consent
to the doing of any in court.
From one standpoint, the facts merit
our dealing sternly with the
respondent for having violated his
oath of office. On the other hand, in
favor of the respondent are the
circumstances that the charge is
strictly circumscribed to the improper
action taken by him in one case; that
political considerations induced the
filing of the charges against him
before Judge Diaz, and that the
matter involved was not new but had
occurred approximately two years
before the investigation was begun.
The facts, are, therefore, different
from those found in the case of In
re De Lara ( [1914], 27 Phil., 176),
where the attorney was disbarred,
8. LAWYER’S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT’S CASE

and in the cases In re Terrell ( [1903], 2

Phil., 266), and Piatt vs. Abordo (
[1933], No 1781), 1 where the
attorneys were each suspended for a
term of one year. A brief period of
suspension will serve to indicate our
disapprobation of the deceit
practiced by the respondent on the
court and will be fair to the
respondent.lawphi1.net

It is the order of the court that

effective as of October 16, 1933, the
respondent Pascual Santos be
suspended from the practice of Law
for a period of three months.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villa-Real,

Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ.,
concur.