Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P.

JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

G.R. No. L-65935; September 30, 1988

FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUNGA JR.,
respondents,

FACTS:
A businessman named Nestor B. Sunga Jr. owned NBS Machineries
Marketing and the NAP_TAP transit filed a case for damages due to the confiscation
of his motor vehicle that was mortgaged which was executed by him in favor of the
Motor center, Inc. The Chattel Mortgage and Assignment was assigned to the
Filinvest Credit Corporation by the Motor center, Inc with the conformity of the
plaintiff.
Filinvest explained that the minibus was confiscated because the balance was
already past due. After verification that his accounts are all in order, Florence Onia
of the Filinvest admitted that it was their fault. The motor vehicle was returned to
the plaintiff upon proper receipt and after trial, The Intermediate Appellate Court
awarded Sunga a moral damage amounting to 30,000 php. Filinvest Credit
Corporation appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC’s decision,
however, it increased the moral damages to 50,000 php.
The petitioner alleged that the respondent court had no authority to increase the
award of damages to private respondent when the latter did not appeal the decision
because private respondent considered the judgment as “perfect”, “sound” and
“wise”.

ISSUE:
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award damages.

RULING:
Yes, the court hold that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages and in granting
litigation expenses. There is no gainsaying that the plaintiff-appellee (respondent)
Sunga did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo which awarded him the
sum of P30, 000 by way of moral damages. According to the court, “Well settled is
the rule in this jurisdiction whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case an appellee
who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below’. The petition is
partially granted. The award of moral damages is reduced to 10,000.00 and the grant
of litigation expenses is eliminated. The rest of the judgment is affirmed. Without
costs.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P. JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
The LLDA discovered that the City Government has been maintaining the
open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental Compliance
Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR because the
residents in the area filed a complaint against the City Government for the harmful
effects to the residents. The LLDA also found the water is directly contaminated by
the operation of the dumpsite. LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the
City Government and other entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping
any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
The City Government then went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filing
an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be
declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and
enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA dismissed the complaint, contending that the Pollution Control Law
that the review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of
Appeals and not the RTC. The RTC then denied LLDA’s motion to dismiss, and
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease
and desist order during the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeals rendered a
decision ruling that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order enjoining the dumping of garbage.
In this case, the residents seek a review of the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in
its nature and effect was injunctive.

RULING:
Yes, LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and
affect was injunctive. LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment,
preserve the quality of human life and ecological systems and prevent undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution in the Laguna Lake area and
surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan. While pollution cases are
generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from special laws
that provide another forum.
In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated
to pass upon or approve or disapprove plans and programs of local government
offices and agencies within the region and their underlying environmental/ecological
repercussions. The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA
over the case when the DENR acted as intermediary at a meeting among the
representatives of the city government, LLDA and the residents. Hence, LLDA has
the authority to issue the cease and desist order.
LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the
projects within the Laguna Lake region, and this includes the implementation of
relevant anti-pollution laws in the area.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P. JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

G.R. Nos. L-66870-72; June 29, 1985

MAGBANUA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS:
A joint decision was rendered in CAR Case Nos. 827, 828 and 829 of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations stationed in San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental) because the six plaintiffs who are the petitioners at bar all alleged that
they are share tenants of the defendants; that the defendants diverted the free flow
of water from their farm lots which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up
to their great damage and prejudice: and that they were told by the defendants'
overseer to vacate their respective areas for they could not plant palay any longer
due to lack of water.
They prayed that they be declared as leasehold tenants and that the defendants
be ordered to pay attorney's fees and different kinds of damages. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to pay moral
and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants then appealed to the IAC
which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the IAC, the trial
court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision because the trial court believe
that as shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as agricultural lessees in
peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.

RULING:
The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and each of
the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by the
defendants.
Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs (now petitioners) are entitled to a
measure of moral damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of
moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same code and the latter
stipulates that: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage."
It appears that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots
in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the
plaintiffs' rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified diversion of the
water.
The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the defendants
acted in an oppressive manner. (See Art. 2232. Civil Code.)
It follows from the foregoing that the petitioners are also entitled to attorney's fees
but the size of the fees as well as the damages is subject to the sound discretion of
the court.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P. JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

GR No. 101083; July 30, 1993

OPOSA v FACTORAN

FACTS:
Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., group of minors representing their generations
filed a taxpayer’s class suit through their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., the
Secretary of the DENR. They prayed that the judgement be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel
all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country, to cease and desist
from receiving accepting, processing, renewing or appraising new TLA’s and
granting the plaintiffs “ such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They
alleged that they have the clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to the protection by the State in its capacity as Parens
Patriae. They also claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA Holders to cut
and deforest the remaining forests constitutes misappropriation and impairment of
the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs and
the succeeding generations.
Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and the issues raised
by the plaintiffs are purely political questions which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss and ruled that the grant of
relief prayed would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner-minors have a cause of action;

RULING:
Yes, the petitioners-minors have a cause of action. The Supreme Court
introduced the Doctrine of Intergenerational Responsibility where the minors has
the right to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned which is incorporated in Section 16
Article II of the Constitution. It carries with it the duty for disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources, provided that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as the future generations. Moreover, Section 2 of EO 192 mandates the
DENR as a primary government agency responsible for governing and supervising
the exploration, utilization and conservation of the country’s natural resources. Thus,
the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR’s duty to protect and advance the same right
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P. JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

GR No. 74816; March 17, 1987

Ernest Rodriguez, et. al v Intermediate Appellate Court, et.al

FACTS:
The Quezon City government issued a business permit to Daytona
Construction and Development Corporation for the manufacture of road and
building concrete materials such as concrete aggregates, with cement batching plant.
The petitioner, together with all other residents filed an action for abatement of a
public nuisance with damages against the Daytona Construction and Development
Corporation in December 16, 1980, alleging that the operations of the company has
caused serious risks on the health of the residents particularly respiratory diseases.
Rodriguez and all other witnesses executed their statements proving that indeed the
cement batching plant has caused great damage and pollution in their place. The
court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners in June 30, 1932 and ordered the
closure of the cement batching plant permanently and to pay for the damages.
Upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court granted an execution pending the
appeal. On July 23, 1982 defendant filed a petition for relief which was denied by
the lower court. The defendant then filed a petition for injunction before the IAC
which denied the same. Furthermore, the defendant appealed before the Supreme
Court which denied its petition for lack of merit. The petition having been denied by
the IAC and the SC, the defendant pursued the remedy of appeal in IAC. IAC set
aside the earlier decision and remanded it to the court of origin for further
proceedings and judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation
of the defendant’s cement batching plant since it is injurious to the health of the
plaintiffs and other residents in the area.
RULING:
Yes, there is a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation of the
defendant’s cement batching plant. From the uncontroverted evidence presented by
the plaintiffs, there is hardly any question that the cement dust coming from the
batching plant of the defendant corporation The noise, vibration, smoke and the odor
generated by the day and night operation of the plant must indeed be causing them
serious discomfort and untold miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain rights
of the plaintiffs and causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance and its abatement
justified.
With reference to the defendant’s allegation that the period within which to
answer has been suspended by its having filed a petition for review before the
Supreme Court is without merit. The circumstances of the case point to a deliberate
desire to delay and the corporation, governed as it is by knowledgeable business
executives, should have taken steps to prevent it being declared default. The
corporation waited for six months before verifying the status of the case. In the
meantime it had been declared in default, a judgment by default had been rendered
against it and execution was already pending before it woke up to file the case at
hand.
The challenged decision and resolution in this case are hereby set aside and a
new judgment was rendered reinstating the decision of the trial court with a
modification that all awards from nominal damages be eliminated.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P. JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

GR No. 98759
Technology Developers, Inc. v.CA

FACTS:
The Municipal Mayor ordered the full cessation of the petitioner’s plant and
requested the company with its duly authorized representative to present before the
Mayor’s office its building permit, Mayor’s permit and Region III-Anti Pollution
Permit in Bulacan.
The petitioner is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of
charcoals. The petitioners then was issued with a Temporary Permit to Operate Air
Pollution Installation. In compliance with the Mayor’s order, they went to secure the
Anti-Pollution Permit and the Mayor’s Permit but they were not entertained for the
latter. The company premises was then ordered to be padlocked. Thereafter, they
instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the acting mayor, alleging that the closure order was issued in
grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners and
ordered the revocation of the closure order and allow the same to resume its normal
business operations.
The defendant filed for a motion for reconsideration and this time, presented
evidence as to the allegations that the manufacturing process and the nature of the
raw materials used by the company and the fumes coming from the factory emits
offensive odors and contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of
the people. Hence, the company should cease operating until such time that the
proper air pollution device is installed and operational. The RTC reassessed the
evidence and reversed their earlier judgment. The petitioners also appealed before
the CA but to no avail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acting Mayor has the authority in ordering the stoppage of
the operations of the Technology Developers Inc.

RULING:
Yes, the acting Mayor has the authority in oredering the stoppage of the
operations on the Technology Developer’s Inc.
The Supreme Court pointed out the following considerations; first, it was
noted that no Mayor’s Permit has been secured by the petitioner; second, while it is
true that the matter of determining whether there is pollution in the environment that
requires control, if not prohibition of the operation of the business is lodged with the
Environment Management Bureau of the DENR, it has to be remembered that the
mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution
and through his police power may deny the application for a permit to operate or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are undertaken to control
and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions
in the operation of the business; third, the closure was issued only after an
investigation was made which evidently revealed that the fumes emitted by the plant
goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has
been installed; fourth, they failed to produce a building permit issued by the
municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and temporary permit that they have presented
has already lapsed, without any effort from the company on extending or validating
the same; last but equally important is the plea of the petitioner focusing on its hug
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P. JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

investment in the industry, the Supreme Court stressed that “concomitant with the
need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the
equally essential imperative of protecting the health and the very lives of the people
from the harmful effect of pollution in the government.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P. JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

GR No. 145328; March 23, 2006

HERNANDEZ v NPC

FACTS:
The NAPACOR’s Sucat-Araneta Power Transmission Project which is a 29
decagon shaped steel poles or towers to support overhead high tension cables
construction was built. These lines passes through the South Superhighway, the
perimeter of Fort Bonifacio and Dasmarinas Village adjoining Tamarind Road
where the petitioners reside. They found out that the structures could bring possible
effects to human health and the exposure to electromagnetic fields may result to
cancer or leukemia. They raised the issue to the NAPOCOR and had negotiations,
however it was unsuccessful. The petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against the NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR sought the dismissal of the case
claiming that Section 1 of PD 1818 provides that no court in the Philippines shall
have the jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
mandatory injunction in any case involving an infrastructure project of the
government. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. NAPOCOR appealed to CA and the decision was reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may issue a TRO and preliminary injunction to
enjoin the construction and operation of the NAPOCOR.

RULING:
The trial court may issue a TRO and preliminary injunction to enjoin the
construction and operation of the NAPOCOR. The Supreme Court explained that
while it is true that Section 1 of PD 1818 prohibits judges from issuing restraining
orders against government infrastructure, projects, said rule however is not absolute
as there are actually instances when PD 1818 should not find application. In a series
of cases, the Supreme Court declared that although PD 1818 prohibits any court from
issuing injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects, the
prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases;
meaning on issues clearly outside the dimension and involving questions of law, the
courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.
Ramirez, Maria Hannah Kristen P. JD-2C
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada, CPA, MBA, LLM

GR No. 72119; May 29, 1987

LEGASPI v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:
Legaspi requested the Civil Service Commission an information on the civil
service eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the Health Department of Cebu City.
The two allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligible who passed the
civil service examination for sanitarians. The respondent rejected the request,
asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the information. The petitioner averred that
his request is a constitutionally mandated right and that he has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to acquire the information. Legaspi instituted an action for
mandamus from the court to compel the respondent to disclose said information.
The respondent challenged the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit.
They claim that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in
the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to bring the suit.

RULING:
The petitioner has a legal standing to bring the suit. The Supreme Court began
by noting that both the 1973 (Article IV Sec.6) and 1987 (Art.III, Sec. 7)
constitutions recognize the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. The court also stressed that information shall be provided, subject only to
limitations provided by law. The Court further rued that in this case, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest” and the requester, as a citizen interested in the
execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or special interest in the result.
Furthermore, government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or
access to, information of public concern because the Constitution guarantees access
to information of public concern. That is, the government agency denying
information access has the burden to show that the information is not of public
concern, or, if it is for public concern, that the information has been exempted by the
law from the operation of the guarantee.
In this case, the information was of a public concern because it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by eligible persons, and the Civil Service
Commission failed to cite any law limiting the requester’s right to know. Thus, the
court ordered the CSC to provide the information.