Title: John Philip Guevarra Vs. Honorable Ignacio Almodovar, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989.

Facts:
The Petitioner who was then 11 years old was playing with best friend Teodoro Almine Jr. and three
other children in their backyard. The children were target-shooting bottle caps placed 15 to 20 meters
away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour. In the course of game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on
his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death. The examining fiscal after investigation
exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate appeared to be an accident. Victim’s
parents appealed to Ministry of Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide
through reckless imprudence. On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the said information on
the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense
b) Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification
c) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of defendant
His primary argument was that the term discernment connotes intent under the exempting circumstance
found under Article 12, Section 3 of the RPC. If this was true, then no minor between the age of 9 to 15
may be convicted of quasi offense under Article 265 which is criminal negligence.
On April 4, 1986, the said motion was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon
decision on and part was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.
A petition for certiorari was filed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RULING:
Yes. “Intent” and “discernment” are two different concepts. Intent means a determination to do
certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent.
Discernment means the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The second
element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because… the infant has no intelligence, the
exempts him from criminal liability. In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three elements
are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in
such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor
above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act
which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable he must discern the rightness or wrongness
of the effects of is negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable
for quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. Minors nine years to fifteen years are presumed to be
without criminal liability; but this presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable
of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that they acted with discernment.
Title: Rennie Declarador vs Hon. Gubaton et. al.
GR. 159208 (August 18, 2006)
Facts:
Accused (Bansales) was 17 years old when he stabbed his female teacher in high school (Mrs.
Declarador) 15 times which resulted to the latter's death. Based on the evidence and his plea of guilt,
accused was convicted of murder with qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation but the court
considered accused's minority as a special mitigating circumstance thus his sentence was lowered. Instead
of reclusion perpetua, the maximum term of imprisonment of reclusion temporal was given in view of the
mitigating circumstance. Further the sentence was suspended and commitment to youth rehabilitation
center was ordered. This is pursuant with Art. 192 of PD 603 as amended known as "Suspension of
Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender".
Petitioner husband of the deceased, however, claimed that under Art. 192 of PD 603 and AM 02-1-18-SC,
the sentence should not have been suspended since the juvenile convicted committed an offense
punishable by death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to
the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.
Ruling:
Yes. Crime committed by minor, below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
will be automatically suspended without a need for application except when the youthful offender was
disqualified on any one of the following grounds: (1) the youthful offender has once availed or enjoyed
suspension of sentence under its provisions, (2) to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by
death or life imprisonment, (3) to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. In the
case at bar, the youthful offender’s crime of murder is punishable, not the actual sentence, by death or life
imprisonment thus the benefit of automatic suspension of sentence is not applicable.
Title: People Vs. Mantalaba
Facts:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report that Allen Mantalaba, 17 years old at the time, was selling shabu. A buy-bust team was
organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers with two
(2) pieces of P100 marked bills. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was said to be in
the act of selling shabu. The appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and
the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police
officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon
rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place. After the operation,
the police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant: (1) one big
sachet of shabu; (2) one small sachet of shabu; and (3) two pieces of P100 marked money and a
P50 peso bill. Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City
against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 (COMPREHENSIVE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002).
Issue:
Whether or not there should have been a suspension of sentence by reason of minority.
Ruling:
YES. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when
the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's
Decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its
decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor.

The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with The Child and Youth Welfare Code and
The Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
imprisonment to death.

The appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of
RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court
shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
 Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child,
the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
Title: People of the Philippines vs. Quindoy and Ventura
Facts:
On February 23, 2000, around 2:00am, while the victims were all asleep in their room, appellants
stealthily gained entry through the kitchen door. The two then went to the victims’ unlocked room and
there killed Aileen Bocateja in defense of his husband, and seriously wounded Jaime Bocateja using the
bladed weapon Arante was carrying. Ventura, on the other hand, was armed with a .38 Caliber
Homemade Revolver. The two then fled from the victims’ house but was later on apprehended by the
Philippine National Police.
During the interview conducted, it was learned that, according to Ventura, on February 17, 2000, her
wife, Johanna, confessed that she and Jaime Bocateja were having an affair. Five days later, when
Ventura’s nephew, Flores, came to visit his uncle, appellant Ventura asked Flores to go with him to
Bocateja’s residence so he could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna. The two then went to the
said house and arrived there at 11pm but was not able to get in until 2:00 am.
Issue:
1. Whether or not superior strength be considered as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-
20892.
2. Whether or not evident premeditation be considered as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No.
00-20893.
3. Whether or not breaking of door and nocturnity be considered as aggravating circumstances in both
cases.
4. Whether or not Death be the penalty in Criminal Case No. 00-20893.

RULINGS:
1. This Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took
advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
2. The trial court, did not consider evident premeditation as having aggravated the killing of Aileen since
she was not the intended victim of appellants' conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this Court
finds that this aggravating circumstance should have been appreciated in connection with Aileen's
murder. Jurisprudence is to the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a
person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to
kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance.
3. In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and breaking of door in connection with both crimes. Dwelling is
considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode. Thus, it
has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the
accused and produces greater alarm. Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated since the crimes were
committed in the place of abode of the victims who had not given immediate provocation.
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test, under which
nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense; and (2) the
subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness was purposely sought by the
offender.90 Applying these tests to the established factual circumstances, this Court concludes that
nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with both crimes.
4. It is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information, resulted in the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death upon accused-appellant. The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to
present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death
in order for the Court to properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence. This, the
accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon
him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the Court
cannot appreciate it. Consequently, we hold that due to their non-allegation in the Information for rape
filed against accused-appellant, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be
considered in raising the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.
Title: People vs. Belbis
Facts:
Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi,
Albay. On the night of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00
p.m., Veronica Dacir, Jose’s live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went
to where Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that
he was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.)
stabbed him. Jose was brought to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was confined for 6 days.
Jose was brought back to the hospital on January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys
had inflamed due to infection. He died the next day.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would
warrant his acquittal

Ruling:
No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done the deed to
defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-
defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by
credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission
that he killed the victim.

The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the victim ceased when
petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of
the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by
a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack
sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression. In the present case, four stab wounds to the back of the victim are not necessary to
prevent the alleged continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already
without a weapon.

Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the death of the victim is not
controlling since what really needs to be proven in a case when the victim dies is the proximate
cause of his death. It can be concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without the stab
wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted with an infection which later on caused
multiple organ failure that caused his death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the
victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. The
petitioners are found guilty of homicide.
Title: People Vs Nieto
Facts:
On September 21, 1956, an Information for homicide was filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija against Gloria Nieto who, upon arraignment pleaded guilty to the charge but -notwithstanding that
plea, the trial judge acquitted her on the Page 254 ground that although the accused was a minor "over 9
and under 15 years old" the Information failed to allege that she acted with discernment.
Thereafter the prosecution filed another Information for the same offense stating therein that the accused
Gloria Nieto was "a child between 9 and 15 years" and alleging in express terms that she acted with
discernment. The defense filed a motion to quash this second Information on grounds of double jeopardy,
and the trial court already presided by another Judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, now Justice of this Court,
granted the motion. The prosecution appealed to this Court from said order. In its Decision, the Court
dismissed the appeal and sustained the order of then Judge Makasiar, deploring that as a result of a
mistaken view taken by the trial judge who acquitted the accused Gloria Nieto despite her plea of guilty
there was a miscarriage of justice which cannot be righted and which leaves the Court no choice that to
affirm the dismissal of the second Information for reasons of double jeopardy.

Issue:
Whether or not the plea of jeopardy is available in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. The motion of dismissal was based on the motion of the accused, however this was done after the
prosecution rested its case where the court can appreciate the evidence presented and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
All the elements of double jeopardy are present. It was clear that the dismissal of the case was erroneous
on the eyes of the SC. The act of making a false entry in the “tarjetas” is undoubtedly an act of
falsification of private document, the accused having made untruthful statements of facts which they are
obliged to do as part of their duties. However the decision cannot be revoked or be righted as because of
the timely plea of double jeopardy.
Title: Arias vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, the accused are convicted as co-conspirators in the
conspiracy to cause undue injury to the government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of
public funds. As per record, there are 6 accused persons (Engr. Priscillo Fernando, Ricardo Asuncion,
Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose) who are convicted in the overpricing of
the land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project, which was
intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The 19, 004 square meters of
riceland in Pasig which has been assessed at P5.00/sq meter in 1973 were sold as “residential land” in
1978 for P80.0/sq meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase. The basis
for the P80.00/sq meter is acquired through a negotiated purchase, that there was a meeting of minds
between them and after taking the forgoing premises into consideration, the parties have, thus arrived at
the amount as the fair and reasonable price. There appears to be no question from the records that the
documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number
instead of being machine-numbered. The registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified
as residential instead of ricefield. The court argues that Arias should have proved records, inspected
documents, received procedures, and questioned persons sinced he was to sign the documents. Arias
contended that he joined the office on July 19, 1978 as the auditor of the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig
in which the transaction had already been consummated since the negotiations for the purchase of the
property started in 1977 and the deed of sale was executed on april 20, 1978 and the title was transferred
to the republic on june 8, 1978. The pre-audit, incident to the payment of the purchase, was conducted in
the first week of october, 1978. Arias pointed out that apart from his signature linking him to the voucher,
there is no evidence to the transaction. The total amount of the sale is P 1, 520, 320.00 should have caused
him to investigate even the smallest details of the transaction but the falsification of the tax declaration by
changing “riceland” to “residential” was done before Arias was assigned to the office. Arias kept
documents from October 1978 to June 23 1982 because the rules of the COA requires auditors to keep
these documents and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons. During the testimony
of Arias, he was asked if a pre-audit of the papers is a procedure in his office that before a payment is
given by the government to private individuals should be done and he answered, “it depends on the kind
of transaction.” He also contended that that in that case, he didn’t find it odd or unusual that the papers
were transferred to the government without paying the price because the deed of sale as being noted there
is a condition that no payments will be made unless the corresponding tile in the payment of the republic
is committed and the title was already in the name of the government. The other accused, Cresencio D.
Data, contended that he did not take any direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan
floodway and it was the 6 other accused who determined the authenticity of the documents presented to
them for the processing and on the basis thereof prepared the deed of sale. He only signed the supporting
certified documents which appeared regular and complete on their face as he had the authority to but he
did not sign the deed of sale because it was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works. He then
transmitted it to the respective office and was approved and signed. After which the covering voucher for
payment was prepared in which he signed. He also contended that he did not know Gutierrez and had
never met her.
Issue:
Whether or not Arias and Cresencio are co-conspirators in causing undue injury to the Government
through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds.

Ruling:
No. It would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems —
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence
— is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every
single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of
those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason
why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government
agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of
documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands.
The number in bigger offices or department is even more appalling. There should be other grounds than
the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction
Title: People vs Legaspi
Facts:
Accused-appellant Nenita Legaspi Lucas was charged for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 having
sold, delivered and give away to Police Officer Arturo San Andres, a police poseur buyer, one plastic
sachet containing of shabu, a dangerous drug. A confidential informant, approached San Andres to report
about the rampant incidence of drug abuse at Centennial Village, Pasig City and about the drug pusher
who was identified as Legaspi. A buy-bust operation was thereby conducted by the Mayor Special Action
Team. San Andres was to act as the poseur-buyer. San Andres, together with the informant, proceeded to
Legaspi's house, while the rest of the team strategically placed themselves in the entrapment area. Upon
seeing Legaspi, the informant introduced San Andres to her as a "scorer." Legaspi asked them how much
they wanted to "score," to which San Andres replied "P200.00 panggamit lang." Afterwards, San Andres
gave Legaspi the buy-bust money. As soon as San Andres got the sachet, he signalled his team that the
transaction was over. Legaspi was thereafter arested. Legaspi contends that she was instigated to commit
the crime, as she was not the one who sought out San Andres to sell him shabu. She avers that San
Andres's own testimony clearly shows that he had suggested the commission of the crime by offering her
P200.00 for the purchase of shabu. Legaspi claims that this is supported by her testimony wherein she
denied selling shabu to San Andres or to anyone for that matter. This, she says, is confirmed by the fact
that she has no police or criminal record.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant was instigated by the police officers in the commission of
the crime.
HELD: No, entrapment was made and not instigation, the former is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate
method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their
criminal plan. Instigation, on the other hand, involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the
commission of the offense. In such a case, the instigators become co-principals themselves. Where the
criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no conviction may
be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense
is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused
an opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the commission of the
crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no instigation and the accused
must be convicted. Instigation is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused. To use
this as a defense, however, the accused must prove with sufficient evidence that the government induced
him to commit the offense. Legaspi claims that she was induced into committing the crime as charged, as
she was the one approached by San Andres, who was then looking to buy shabu. We find, however, that
Legaspi's defense of instigation must fail.
In the case at bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of drug trafficking from their confidential
informant, immediately set-up a buy-bustoperation to test the veracity of the report and to arrest the
malefactor if the report proved to be true. The prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi
agreed to sell P200.00 worth of shabu to San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never
forced, coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres did not even
has to ask her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely informed that he was also a "scorer"; and
as soon as she learned that he was looking to buy, she immediately asked him how much he needed.
Under the circumstances, the police officers were not only authorized but were under an obligation to
arrest Legaspi even without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence.
Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not instigation. While
instigation is a positive defense, it partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. In instigation, the
crime is actually performed by the accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducer.
Thus, it is incompatible with the defense of denial, where the theory is that the accused did not commit
the offense at all. Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present concurrently.
Hence, the court affirms the decision the of CA, conviction for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of RA No.
01209.
Title: People Vs Nacnac
Facts:
On the fateful night of February 20, 2003 SPO2 Nacnac the accused-appellant, the victim and together
with other police officers were on duty. SPO2 Nacnac being the highest ranking officer present during the
shift was designated as the officer-of-the-day. Shortly before 10 in the evening, SPO1 Espejo togtehre
with the SPO1 Basilio, took the patrol tricycle. Espejo told Nacnac that he needed to go back to Laoag to
settle a previous disagreement with a security guard at a local bar. Nacnac refused and told the former to
stay because he is drunk. They had a heated argument with SPO1 Espejo which led to a violentscenario,
killing SPO1 Espejo. SPO2 Nacnac was found guilty of homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the justifying circumstances of the petitioner’s acts constitutes a valid
self-defense.
HELD:
Yes. Art. 11 the following do not incur any criminal liability: Anyone who acts in defense of his person
or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. Ordinarily, there is a difference between
the act of drawing one’s gun and the act of pointing one’s gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. While the latter is considered to be unlawful aggression.
The refusal of the victim to follow a lawful order from petitioner , his superior , considering also the
negative words uttered by the victim in response to SPO2 Nacnac, his drunken situation, his profession as
being a police officer and the warning shot fired by the petitioner justifies the acts done as mere defending
himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague. The lone wound inflicted on the victim supports
that petitioner feared for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. It was a reasonable means
chosen by the petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed victim, his drunken
state, disobedience on lawful order and failure to stand down despite a warning shot.
Title: Legrama Vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The COA conducted an examination on the cash and account of Cecilia Legrama, the Municipal
Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio Zambales. After which it was found that the cash
accountability of the petitioner is was short of P289, 022.75. unaccounted Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) in the amount of ₱863,878.00, thereby showing a total shortage in the amount of ₱1,152,900.75.
This included the shortage amount of P709,462.80 it represents the total amount of various sales invoices,
chits, vales, and disbursement vouchers which were disallowed in the audit for lack of supporting
documents. From all that lack of amount the petitioner was able to restitute P60,000.
After that, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the Municipal Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales at the time the audit was conducted, were charged with the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds.
Both petitioner and Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash bonds. They both
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. After the petitioners presented their evidence, pleadings and testimonies
the Sandiganbayan acquitted Lonzanida but found that petitioner was guilty of Malversation of Public
Funds.
Petitioner failed to properly explain or justify the shortage in her accountability. She argues that the
Sandigan Bayan failed to consider the testimonial and documentary exhibits presented to support her
claim that she did not misappropriate the funds for her own use. Petitioner maintains that she have
satisfactorily explained the shortage on the evidence submitted.
Respondent maintains that petitioner failed to account for shortage after she was demanded to do so is
prima facie. And it insists that the prosecution sufficiently proved that it shows that all the elements of the
crime of Malversation of public funds are present.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused appellant, based on the facts can avail mitigating circumstances on her act of
voluntarily surrendering and restitution.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner enjoys the mitigating circumstances. Restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, as
provided in paragraph 7 of Article 13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article 13 in relation to
paragraph 10 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution should be treated as a separate
mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are present in a case.
Because of the absence of any aggravating circumstances and there were 2 mitigating circumstances, she
voluntary surrendered and partial restitution of the amount involved in the instant case she was sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
She is entitled to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Title:
Facts: