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The Qu’ran (2:223) says, “Women are your fields. Go then into your fields
as you please.” The only prohibitions in Islam are vaginal intercourse
during menstruation and anal intercourse. Oral sex should not lead to any
naajis (impure) substance being swallowed otherwise “anything goes” as
long as it’s done within the confines of one’s home and within the confines
of marriage – there is no “free love” or “pre-marital relationships” in Islam. If
you are a male you might get away with a little hanky-panky here and there
but if you are a muslima you better watch out: Islam encourages a
phenomenon known as honor killings. This Islamic practice consists of the
murder of female family members who are seen as dishonoring their
families through real or perceived acts, such as premarital sexual relations
or unapproved dating. Honor killings are justified under Islam in some
Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia. For example, tenth-grade
textbooks teach Saudi children that it is permissible to kill adulterers. In
April 2008, a girl was killed by her father for talking to a boy on Facebook.
A leading Saudi cleric, Sheikh Ali al-Maliki, was outraged that girls had
access to such websites where they could post pictures of themselves and
otherwise "behave badly," but showed no concern over the girl actually
killed. Then there is the lack of freedom due to arranged marriages – where
your parents pick who you will spend the rest of your life with based on
their criterions.
DRUGS
They ask you about intoxicants say, ‘In them there is a gross
sin, and some benefits for the people, (alcohol in medicine for
example, cocaine in anesthesia and pain medications). But
their sinfulness far outweighs their benefit.’
The more muzzies we let in this country the less of chance there is
that pot will ever be legalized. They form a solid anti-drug voting bloc. And
if Sharia law ever took effect in this country people who are caught selling
or possessing it would be lashed. All pro-marijuana groups would be
banned. Pot people should think about the people already locked up for
reefer and what it would be like in theocratic, totalitarian state.
Islam says, let those who refuse to obey Him beware lest calamity
strike them, or a painful torment. The Prophet Chester the Molester said:
“Allah the Mighty and Majestic sent me as a guidance and mercy to
believers and commanded me to do away with musical instruments, flutes,
strings, crucifixes, and the affairs of the pre-Islamic period of
ignorance…On the Day of Resurrection, Allah will pour molten lead into the
ears of whoever sits listening to a songstress…Song makes hypocrisy grow
in the heart as water does herbage…This Ummah will experience the
swallowing up of some people by the earth, metamorphosis of some into
animals, and being rained upon with stones.” Someone asked, “When will
this be, O Messenger of Allah?” and he said, “When songstresses and
musical instruments appear and wine is held to be lawful…There will be
peoples of my Ummah who will hold fornication, silk, wine, and musical
instruments to be lawful.” In plain Aramaic, never! All of this is explicit and
compelling textual evidence that musical instruments of all types are
unlawful.3 In a 1996 interview with the journal Sobh Ayatollah Khamenei
wrote that children should not be allowed to play music. ''Teaching music is
not in accordance with the Islamic establishment, and teaching music to
schoolchildren brings corruption,'' he said. The partially blinded Mullah
Muhammad Omar followed these mandates and banned all non-religious
music in Afghanistan. Omar never appeared in public. Most Afghans had
no idea what he looked like because of an edict issued by him that banned
photographing humans.
NO LONG HAIR
NO DANCE CLUBS
The 9/11 “shaheeds” trained in America. The FBI was made aware of
the fact that suddenly the number of Arab student pilots had skyrocketed.
But they were too busy wasting agent hours busting people like me and 60
other pot dealers who one connection ratted down on. What else could they
do? The Islamists were not considered a threat even after the first World
Trade Center attack and the Soviet Union had imploded. The War on Drugs
was why at least 3,000 people died. In
1973, the FBI reported that there were
328,670 arrests for drug law violations. In
2000, that number rose to 1,579,566.
Why? One reason was that in 1992 Bush
the Elder’s U.S. Attorney General William
Barr announced that he was shifting the
priorities of approximately three hundred
FBI agents to the nation’s War on Drugs.
Barr cited a decrease in tensions with the Soviet Union and the Eastern
Bloc, as the reason for allowing the FBI shift from counterintelligence to
anti-drug work. Between 1992 and 1998 Federal drug convictions
increased from 1,925 to 3,253 per year -- a 69% jump. In 1998 the FBI
adopted a 5-year strategic plan that established the FBI investigative
priorities in a 3-tier system. Tier I priorities were "foreign intelligence,
terrorist, and criminal activities that directly threaten the National or
Economic Security of the United States." Tier II priorities were "crimes that
affect the public safety or undermine the integrity of American society:
drugs, organized crime, civil rights, and public corruption." Tier III priorities
were "crimes that affect individuals and property such as violent crime, car
theft, and telemarketing scams…” On another level, “On March 15, 1999,
shortly after Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet asserted the U.S.
Intelligence Community was declaring war on Usama bin Laden and al
Qaeda, FBI Headquarters established national level priorities within its
Counterterrorism Program. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, along with the bin
Laden-allied Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG),
were designated as “priority group one" for the FBI's counterterrorism
efforts.5
But this was not followed: When the Department of Justice studied
the case of 9/11 shaheeds Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Midhar in San Diego the
chronology revealed no appreciable shift in resources by the FBI's San
Diego Field Office in response to these changed priorities. It found that
prior to the September 11th Raids, the actual investigative priority for the
San Diego Field Office was drug trafficking. According to former San Diego
Special Agent in Charge William Gore, the highest concentration of FBI
agents and resources in San Diego was directed at combating drug
trafficking based on the FBI's process and procedures used each year to
set priorities in its field offices. He said that white-collar crime was the
office's second priority, and violent crime was its third priority.
Counterterrorism was only the fourth priority for the San Diego FBI office.
The counterterrorism efforts in San Diego were directed primarily at Hamas
and related groups and the majority of San Diego's counterterrorism
investigations targeted activities related to the indirect support of Jihad
conducted by those groups.
It is clear that the major reason al-Qaeda was able to effectuate the
September 11th Raids was because the FBI was busy pursuing the Drug
War, not the War on Terrorism. According to an external review of the FBI,
by 2000 there were twice as many agents devoted to drug enforcement
matters as to counterterrorism. On September 11, 2001, only about 1,300
agents, or six percent of the FBI’s total personnel, worked on
counterterrorism. On May 10, 2001, the Department issued guidance for
developing the fiscal year 2003 budget that made reducing the incidence of
gun violence and reducing the trafficking of illegal drugs priority objectives.6
The American Government reported, Prior to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, national security, including counterterrorism, was a top-tier
priority for the FBI. However, this top tier combined national security
responsibilities with other issues, and the FBI’s focus and priorities were
not entirely clear. According to a Congressional Research Service report,
the events of September 11 made clear the need to develop a definitive list
of priorities. In June 2002, the FBI’s director announced 10 priorities. The
top 3 priorities were to (1) protect the United States from terrorist attack
(counterterrorism), (2) protect the United States against foreign intelligence
operations and espionage (counterintelligence), and (3) protect the United
States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes (cyber
crime). White-collar crime ranked seventh in the priority list and violent
crime ranked eighth. Drug crimes that were not part of transnational or
national criminal organizations were not specifically among the FBI’s top 10
priorities.7
Before September 11th the FBI went after even minor violations of
drug laws and obtained numerous convictions. What happened was that al-
Qaeda was left to do the work of Jihad while FBI drug referrals,
prosecutions, and convictions shot up. The FBI followed drug suspects,
tracked down fugitives who had been at large for decades, and ran up
many additional agent hours in cases where this sort of attention was not
merited. Instead of relying on investigatory work, the United States
Attorney’s Office and the FBI bureaucrats sat back in their offices, waiting
to hear from their Field Agents that another suspect was willing to give up
his confederates in return for a downward departure from the Minimum
Mandatory Sentences Congress had legislated for drug offenses. The
federal secret police were after seizures of cash and property so that they
could point to this should Congress tie their purse strings any tighter.
The Clinton Administration was happy with the FBI and Justice
Department’s agenda. In the year 2000 the federal police were proud that
there was more than $2.7 billion in the federal government’s Asset
Forfeiture Fund. This was what their minds were focused on. For this
fixation with drugs and money, Americans paid a great price. Economists
for the International Monetary Fund estimated that the September 11th
attacks cost the United States $21 billion, based only on property losses
and insurance costs. The Federal Reserve Bank of the United States
estimated the attack cost the city $33 billion to $36 billion in lost wages and
business, property damage and cleanup.
Another factor came into play that worked in Islamists’ favor: During
the Clinton years the number of FBI intelligence officers almost quintupled,
jumping from 224 in 1992 to 1,025 in 1999. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act physical break-in warrants climbed from 484 in 1992 to
886 in 1999. But these additional intelligence officers and warrants
produced very few court actions. In 1998, for example, only 45 of the FBI’s
12,730 convictions involved what the department classified as “internal
security” or “terrorism” matters. In 1999 the FBI had more special agents
and support staff than at any time in its entire 90-year history, more than at
the height of the Cold War, yet it was unable to stop terrorists, because it
was concentrating on arresting drug dealers as images of brains frying like
eggs replaced sugarplums and fairies in the minds of the two political
parties.
Brent Scowcroft contended that the best FBI agents worked criminal cases,
not counterterrorism cases that were not linked to traditional criminal work.
The criminal vs. intelligence investigation took on a greater and greater
significance and even provided an excuse not to act. For example when the
FBI finally concluded that Khalid al-Midhar was a terrorist and a “risk to the
national security of the United States” the Joint Committee on Intelligence
reported,
America is the “land of the free.” But carefully observe the numbers of
people imprisoned in Western dominated countries and compare them to
the numbers imprisoned in Iran. U.S. 2.00 million, China: 1.41 million,
Russia: 1.01 million, India: 230,000, Ukraine: 210,000, Brazil: 170,000,
South Africa: 140,000, Iran: 100,000. Between 1972 and 2000, the number
of people behind bars in the United States rose from 330,000 to nearly 2
million. Seventy percent of these were non-violent drug offenders. In the
latter year, the number of adults under “correctional supervision” - behind
bars, on parole or on probation - reached 6.47 million, equaling one in
every 32 adults. Six countries - the United States, Yemen, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan and Iran - accounted for all the executions of juvenile
offenders since 1990. But the United States accounts for half of these
executions.8
HOW THE BLOATED PRISON POPULATION WORKS IN TERRORISTS
FAVOR
Between the FBI’s preoccupation with the War on Drugs, and Clinton’s
preoccupation with fornication, Islamists were able to inflict great pain on a
civilization characterized by an advanced, complex and dense
infrastructure. The current situation has made it much more difficult for
terrorists to pursue the pillar of Jihad. The FBI has reorganized. Further,
the FBI's intelligence budget has been rationalized, with an initial
realignment of this funding enacted in 2006. Now the FBI focuses on
preventing acts of terrorism and, where prevention fails, responding to and
investigating acts of terrorism; countering foreign intelligence activities and
investigating acts of espionage including economic espionage. The FBI
admitted that drug fighting has taken the biggest hit. The FBI drug budget
skyrocketed 76%, from $278 million in 1993 to $489 million in 2001. But the
budget for the War on Drugs in 2002 has plunged 35%, to $320 million,
back to 1994 levels.9 In 2002 21% of the FBI’s resources were devoted to
drugs and organized crime gangs, by 2003 this figure dropped to 14%. In
the same period resources devoted to counter-terrorism rose from 26% to
36%.10 The FBI has no choice but to redirect experienced narcotics agents
to the fight on Islamism. It would take years to train new agents to conduct
such sophisticated investigations; rookies typically track stolen cars across
state lines and catch bank robbers.
In 1999 there were a total of 28,192 FBI employees: 11,646 agents and
16,546 support staff. In September 2002, 900 new agents were hired. The
Counter Terrorism Division was expanded, adding 14 new “sections” and
“units” specializing in trying to forestall the Islamist world revolution. Five
hundred and eighteen agents were reassigned to counter-Islamist
operations from within the agency. Of them, 400 came from the anti-drug
crimes division, 59 were shifted from white-collar crime divisions and
another 59 were transferred from the violent crime-fighting sections.
Indeed, the FBI has transferred even more agent positions than it originally
announced and has augmented those agents with the short-term
assignment of additional field agents from drug and other law enforcement
areas to work on counterterrorism. Before leaving office former United
States Attorney General John Ashcroft said American law enforcement
agencies have now created a “most wanted list” of 54 drug organizations
that must be toppled here and abroad, and this is what they will focus on.
After the September 11th terrorist victory the number of agents working
narcotics cases dropped 45%, bank fraud cases dropped 31% and bank
robbery investigations dropped 25%. As would be expected, the number of
newly opened drug cases has fallen in relation to the decline in the number
of field agent positions allocated to drug enforcement. None-the-less senior
FBI officials believed that most of the FBI’s 56 field offices still were not
shifting from their focus on solving traditional federal crimes like bank
robberies, drug trafficking and kidnappings, and concentrating on terrorist
activities.
The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 hinted that the law
enforcement and intelligence communities were finally realizing the extent
of Islamist destructive power:
Every major FBI office in the country is monitoring terrorist activities. This
involves 24-hour monitoring of our telephone calls, e-mail messages and
Internet use, as well as scrutiny of our credit-card charges, our travel and
our visits to neighborhood gathering places, including mosques. A new FBI
program calls upon the FBI’s 56 field offices to count the number of
mosques and Muslims in their areas. The information is to be used by the
FBI to gauge the number of investigations and FISA warrants – that is
establish a quota - that a field office could reasonably be expected to
produce in the area it is assigned to monitor. If the numbers don’t compute
that will trigger an automatic inspection from headquarters to figure out why
they aren’t living up to that.