Hassan Shanne C.

Mala

LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING- EH 201

CASE SYNTHESIS

I. STATE

In the Case of Province of North Cotabato V. GRP, GR. No. 183591, October 14,
2008

II. CITIZENSHIP

In the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao V. Commission of Immigration the Court said that
the alien wife of thenaturalized Filipino need not go through the formal process of
naturalization in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. All she has to do is to file before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a petition for the cancellation of her Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR). At the hearing on the petition, she does not have to
prove that she possesses all the qualifications for naturalization; she only has to show
that she does not labor under any of the disqualifications. Upon the grant of the petition
for cancellation of the ACR, she may then take the oath of the allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and thus, become a citizen of the Philippines.

In Lee V. Director of Lands the court ruled that land sold to an alien which was later
transferred to a Filipino citizen or where the alien later becomes a Filipino citizen — can
no longer be recovered by the vendor, because there is no longer any public policy that is
being assailed to be violated involved.

In Tecson v. Comelec on the controversy surrounding the citizenship of Fernando Poe,

Jr. (FPJ), presidential candidate. The issue of whether or not FPJ is a natural-born
citizen would depend on whether his father, Allan F. Poe, was himself a Filipino citizen,
and if in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of FPJ prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. The Court took note of
the fact that Lorenzo Pou (father of Allan F. Poe), who died in 1954 at 84 years old, would
have been born sometime in 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and
that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill of 1902 effected. That Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (father of FPJ), The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
In Valles V. Comelec, 337 SCRA 543 it was held that the fact that private respondent was
born in Australia does not mean that she is not a Filipino. If Australia follows the principle
of jus soli, then at most she can also claim Australian citizenship, resulting in her having
dual citizenship. That she was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate
of registration do not constitute effective renunciation, and do not militate against her claim,
of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, it must
be express.

In the case of In Re: Application of Vicente Ching, Bar Matter no. 914 where Ching,
having been born on April 11, 1964, was already 35 years old when he complied with with
requirements of CA 625 on June 15, 1999, or over 14 years after he had reached the age of
majority. By any reasonable yardstick, Ching’s election was clearly beyond the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege. All his mentioned acts cannot vest in him
citizenship as the law gives the requirement for election of Filipino citizenship which Ching
did not comply with.

In the case of Bengzon III v. HRET the Supreme Court ruled that the act of repatriation
allows the person to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship. Thus, respondent Cruz, a former naturalborn Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship when he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, was deemed to
have recovered his natural- born status when he reacquired Filipino citizenship through
repatriation.

In Mercado v. Manzano the Supreme Court clarified the “dual citizenship” disqualification
and reconciled the same with Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution on “dual allegiance”.
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of
another State, the Court explained that “dual citizenship” as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under the disqualification.

In Co v. HRET , the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the HRET that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.

In the case of Republic v. Dela Rosa and companion cases, the Supreme Court noted
several irregularities which punctuated the petition and the proceedings in the application
for naturalization of Juan C. Frivaldo, viz: the petition lacked several allegations required by
Secs. 2 and 6 of the Naturalization Law; the petition and the order for hearing were not
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper
of general circulation; the petition was not supported by affidavits of two credible witnesses
vouching for the good moral character of the petitioner; the actual hearing of the petition was
held earlier than the scheduled date of hearing; the petition was heard within 6 months from
the last publication; the petitioner was allowed to take the oath of allegiance before finality
of the judgment, and without observing the two year probationary period.
In Limkaichong V. Comelec. GR. No. 178831-32,

In the case of Coquilla V. COMELEC, GR. NO.151914, July 31, 2002 the Supreme Court
ruled that the petitioner had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar, for at least one
year prior to the May 14, 2001 elections. Although Oras was his domicile of origin, petitioner
lost the same when he became a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy. From then on,
until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation,
petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines.

In Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, the Supreme Court said that the Local
Government Code does not specify the date when the candidate must possess Filipino
citizenship. Philippine citizenship is required in order to ensure that no alien shall govern
our people. An official begins to govern only upon his proclamation and on the day that his
term begins. Since Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance (as Filipino) on June 30, 1995 when
his application for repatriation was granted by the Special Committee on Naturalization
created under PD 825, he was therefore qualified to be proclaimed. Besides, Sec. 39 of the
Local Government Code speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates.