Offshore Facilities Layout

Document No.
GN 44-100
Applicability Group
Date 19 January 2009
GN 44-100
Offshore Facilities Layout
Guidance Note
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Guidance Note for Offshore Facilities Layout
Foreword
This issue of BP GN 44-100 is based on GP 44-15 which has been retired. This Guidance Note (GN) is
not based on heritage documents from the merged BP companies.
Copyright © 2008 BP International Ltd. All rights reserved.

This document and any data or information generated from its use are classified, as a
minimum, BP Internal. Distribution is intended for BP authorized recipients only. The
information contained in this document is subject to the terms and conditions of the
agreement or contract under which this document was supplied to the recipient's
organization. None of the information contained in this document shall be disclosed
outside the recipient's own organization, unless the terms of such agreement or contract
expressly allow, or unless disclosure is required by law.
In the event of a conflict between this document and a relevant law or regulation, the
relevant law or regulation shall be followed. If the document creates a higher obligation, it
shall be followed as long as this also achieves full compliance with the law or regulation.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Table of Contents
Page
1. Scope...................................................................................................................................... 5
2. Normative references.............................................................................................................. 5
3. Terms and definitions.............................................................................................................. 7
4. Symbols and abbreviations.....................................................................................................9
5. Design parameters................................................................................................................ 11
5.1. Capital project design.................................................................................................11
5.2. Existing plant continuous risk reduction......................................................................11
5.3. Inherently safer design (ISD)......................................................................................11
5.4. Hazard evaluation and risk management...................................................................12
6. Layout philosophy................................................................................................................. 14
7. Overall facility layout............................................................................................................. 14
7.1. General facility design................................................................................................14
7.2. Typical facility layout options......................................................................................15
8. Decks and systems layout.....................................................................................................21
8.1. General...................................................................................................................... 21
8.2. Platform orientation and elevation..............................................................................21
8.3. Decks......................................................................................................................... 21
8.4. Boat landings and cargo transfer areas......................................................................22
8.5. Decking and stairways construction...........................................................................23
9. Low hazard area................................................................................................................... 23
9.1. General...................................................................................................................... 23
9.2. Buildings within low hazard area................................................................................24
9.3. Temporary refuge (TR)...............................................................................................25
10. Emergency response and escape.........................................................................................26
10.1. Escape routes............................................................................................................26
10.2. Muster areas..............................................................................................................26
10.3. Alternate muster area.................................................................................................27
10.4. Incident command centre (ICC)..................................................................................27
10.5. Evacuation facilities....................................................................................................27
10.6. Lifeboats or escape craft............................................................................................27
10.7. Emergency fire protection equipment.........................................................................28
10.8. Firewalls and blastwalls..............................................................................................28
11. Equipment Layout................................................................................................................. 29
11.1. Arrangement of equipment.........................................................................................29
11.2. Layout and spacing of equipment...............................................................................30
11.3. General piping arrangement (API RP 14E)................................................................30
11.4. Clearance requirements.............................................................................................31
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
12. Equipment............................................................................................................................. 32
12.1. Vessels and exchangers............................................................................................32
12.2. Rotating equipment....................................................................................................32
12.3. Flares and vents (API RP 14, API RP 521)................................................................33
12.4. Fired heaters..............................................................................................................33
12.5. Conductors, caissons, and other sea penetrations.....................................................33
12.6. Storage (NFPA 30, NFPA 497)...................................................................................34
12.7. Wellbay area..............................................................................................................35
12.8. Wellhead area............................................................................................................ 35
12.9. Drilling rigs.................................................................................................................36
12.10. Pipeline equipment.....................................................................................................38
List of Figures
Figure 1 - ISD Layout features on Tangguh Facility........................................................................12

Figure 2 - ISD Layout features on Atlantis Facility..........................................................................12
Figure 3 - PQ platform - topsides, south elevation..........................................................................15
Figure 4 - PQ platform - topsides, east elevation............................................................................16
Figure 5 - PDQ platform - production deck.....................................................................................17
Figure 6 - PDQ platform - elevation................................................................................................18
Figure 7 - PDQ platform - alternate arrangement...........................................................................19
Figure 8 - FPSO - functional diagram.............................................................................................20
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
1. Scope
a. This GN provides guidance for layout of offshore facilities and forms a foundation for
inherently safer design (ISD).
b. This GN applies to:
1. New facilities.
2. The evaluation of risk reduction opportunities for existing facilities.
3. Expansions and modifications of existing facilities.
c. The intent of this GN is to share guidance for ISD of facilities but not to mandate a set
design.
d. Facilities that may be addressed by this GN include:
1. Topsides layout for permanently installed facilities supported by substructures, such
as steel piled jackets, gravity base structures, guyed towers, and floating production
facilities (including tension leg and deep draft caisson vessels).
2. Layout of storage, pipeline, process, and utility equipment in hull.
3. Manned installations, including facilities to support drilling equipment.
4. Conventional installations for processing, storing, and handling flammable or toxic
fluids.
5. Units constructed onsite and modules fabricated offsite.
e. The layout of safety equipment such as sprinklers and deluge systems, portable fire
extinguishers, and life rings, are not addressed in this document. Refer to US Coastguard,
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), or NORSOK standards.
2. Normative references
The following referenced documents may, to the extent specified in subsequent clauses and normative
annexes, be required for full compliance with this GP:
• For dated references, only the edition cited applies.

• For undated references, the latest edition (including any amendments) applies.
BP
GIS 22-201 Flares (API 537).
GIS 24-233 Fire Water Pumps and System Design.
GP 04-10 Drainage Systems.
GP 44-32 Protection of Personnel from Explosion, Fire, and Toxic Hazards on
Offshore Facilities.
GP 22-10 Design of Fired Heaters to ISO 13705 (API 560).
GP 22-20 Design of Flares (API 537).
GP 48-04 Inherently Safer Design (ISD).
GP 24-20 Fire and Explosion Hazard Management of Offshore Facilities.
GP 24-22 Gas Explosion Hazard Analysis - Offshore and Onshore.
GP 24-23 Active Fire Protection - Offshore.
GP 24-24 Offshore Passive Fire Protection.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
GP 30-85 Fire and Gas Detection.

GP 44-30 Event Modelling and Risk Based Evaluation.
GP 44-60 API RP 500 Area Classification.
GP 44-70 Overpressure Protection.
GP 44-80 Relief Disposal Systems.
GP 48-50 Major Accident Risk (MAR) Process.
GP 76-01 HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
ASME International (ASME)

ASME B31.3 Process Piping.
American Petroleum Institute (API)

API RP 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of
Basic Surface Safety Systems on Offshore Production Platforms.
API RP 14E Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Offshore
Production Platform Piping Systems.
API RP 14F Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems
for Fixed and Floating Offshore Petroleum Facilities for Unclassified and
Class 1, Division 1 and Division 2 Locations.
API RP 14FZ Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems
for Fixed and Floating Offshore Petroleum Facilities for Unclassified and
Class 1, Zone 0, Zone 1 and Zone 2 Locations.
API RP 14G Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on Open-type
Offshore Production Platforms.
API RP 14J Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore
Production Facilities.
API RP 49 Recommended Practice for Drilling and Well Servicing Operations
Involving Hydrogen Sulfide.
API RP 64 Recommended Practice for Diverter Systems Equipment and Operation.
API RP 500 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical
Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1 and
Division 2.
API RP 505 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical
Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1,
and Zone 2.
API RP 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.
NFPA 497 Recommended Practice on the Classification of Flammable Liquids,
Gases, or Vapours and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical
Installations in Chemical Process Areas.
3. Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this GN, the following terms and definitions apply:
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Drilling facilities
Drilling rigs (including associated drilling systems and equipment) that may be procured as pre-
existing contracted equipment and may be on location only temporarily during the drilling programme.
Control rooms
Room serving as an operations centre where a facility or service can be monitored and controlled.
Control rooms may also be buildings where personnel perform incident control for a facility major
accident.
Egress, refuge, and evacuation system

System of walkways and stairways that comprise the egress route from any location where personnel
work or live to the muster location, including evacuation facilities.
Endurance period
Time period following a major accident during which critical equipment must survive and perform
their respective roles.
Equipment
a. Any facility hardware item, including vessels, machinery, utilities, and piping.
b. Excluded from this definition of equipment are basic facility supporting structure, flare
boom, and equipment internal to quarters or pressure vessel internals.
Evacuation facilities
Equipment that provides a means for evacuation of personnel following, or in preparation of, a major
incident (typically lifeboats or helicopters).
High hazard area

Area of the facility where hydrocarbon-containing equipment is grouped and is a potential source of
credible fire, explosion, and hazardous release events. Facilities and equipment normally located in
high hazard area include:
a. Production area.
b. Compression modules.
c. Drilling.
Incident Command Centre (ICC)

Room serving as an operation centre where the incident is assessed and the incident response is
planned and executed.
Integrated decks
Decks that reflect the fabrication method of topsides construction by which facilities and structural
support systems are fabricated into a single unit that may be installed by a single lift or by float on
mating to the substructure.
Layout
Addresses the location of:
a. Equipment, including pipework, cable trays, instrument racks, surrounding and associated
with discrete pieces of equipment.
b. Buildings, such as control rooms, switchgear, MCCs, maintenance shops, storerooms,
warehouses, labs, portable buildings, and permanent buildings.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
c. Support structure and consideration of construction/installation methods, hook-up, and

commissioning of facilities.
d. Storage facilities.
Low hazard area

Area that is separate from high hazard areas and designed to protect personnel and critical equipment
from credible fire, explosion, and hazardous release events. Facilities and equipment normally located
in low hazard area include, e.g.:
a. TR.
b. LQ.
c. Control room.
d. Firewater pumps.
e. Emergency switchgear.
f. Muster area.
Living quarters (LQ)

Includes buildings in which personnel sleep (cabins), work (offices), and food preparation, dining,
exercise, and recreation occur.
Major Accident Risk (MAR) process

An assessment of major accident risk in accordance with GP 48-50. Major accident risk is the
combination of likelihood and consequence of major accidents, which is usually expressed in
graphical format as a FN curve for risks to people, and as an F-Reputation curve for risk to the
environment.
Muster Area
A designated place where personnel can muster and survive the initial effects of a major incident while
awaiting evacuation.
Occupied
Occupancy for 2 man-hours or more in any 24 hour period.
Platform modules
Platform modules reflect the modular construction method typically used for topside facilities. These
modules are usually installed offshore by crane vessels and supported on a jacket cap structure or
module support frame (MSF) for steel piled jackets.
Process equipment
Equipment directly supporting the primary intent of the facility, such as production of gas and oil.
Process equipment includes some utilities.
Temporary refuge (TR)

A location (typically in an enclosure or building) that will enable occupants to survive defined major
accidents for the specified endurance period.
Utility enclosures (UE)

Buildings occupied for part of the time that house equipment which needs to be isolated from the
surrounding environment and where personnel also need to have access for maintenance and process
control. Examples of these are, e.g.:
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
a. Local equipment rooms.

b. Local control rooms.
c. Machinery spaces.
d. Subsea master control rooms.
e. Fire pump rooms.
f. Emergency generator rooms.
g. Inert gas generator rooms.
h. Drilling utility enclosures.
Utility equipment
Utility equipment generally includes, but is not limited to:
a. Electrical power generation, distribution equipment, emergency generators, and battery

systems.
b. Seawater, potable water, and inhibited fresh water (cooling water) storage, pumps, and
piping.
c. Instrument and utility air compressors, dryers, filters, and distribution systems.
d. Diesel fuel storage, pumping, treating, and distribution facilities.
e. Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment and ducting.
f. Lube and seal oil storage tanks, pumps, filters, and piping required for rotating machinery.
4. Symbols and abbreviations
For the purpose of this GN, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
AMA Alternate muster area.
BOP Blowout preventer.
DLLR Davit launched life raft.
ESD Emergency shutdown.
E&P Exploration and Production.
FPSO Floating production, storage, and offloading (vessel).
FSR Floating systems and risers.
FVO First valve on.
FVO/LVO First valve on, last valve off.
HAZID Hazard identification.
HAZOP Hazard and operability.
HSSE Health, safety, security, and environment.
HVAC Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
ISD Inherently safer design.
LEL Lower explosive limit.
LFL Lower flammable limit.
LQ Living quarters.
LVO Last valve off.
MAR Major accident risk.
MCC Motor control centre.
MCR Main control room.
MPcp Major project common process.
MGL Main gas line.
MOL Main oil line.
MSF Module support frame.
MSL Mean sea level.
MWD Measurement while drilling.
NUI Normally unattended installation.
PA Public address.
PDQ Production, drilling, and quarters.
PPE Personal protection equipment.
PQ Production and quarters.
TEMPSC Totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft.
TR Temporary refuge.
SIL Safety integrity level.
SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations.
UE Utility enclosures.
UPS Uninterruptible power supply.
5. Design parameters
5.1. Capital project design

a. When designing layout of new offshore facilities, Major Project Common Process (MPcp)
principles of design safety should be used.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
b. MPcp Design Safety supports and uses ISD principles, hazard evaluation, and risk
management tools.
5.2. Existing plant continuous risk reduction

a. Existing facilities can also benefit from guidance in this GN.
b. This GN includes many principles and examples of ways to reduce risk that can support
the need to incorporate lessons learned in process safety and design safety activities.
5.3. Inherently safer design (ISD)
5.3.1. ISD Philosophy

a. Per GP 48-04, the four goals of ISD are:
1. Fewer hazards.
2. Fewer causes.
3. Reduced severity.
4. Fewer consequences.
b. The concept of ISD should be incorporated into the process risk management programme
for each facility throughout all phases of design and operation, including facility layout.
5.3.2. Examples of ISD used in facility layout

This document shares knowledge from experience and lessons learned to support the application
of ISD.
Figure 1 - ISD Layout features on Tangguh Facility
Open layout and

grated decks to
increase gas
Export riser dispersion
located
within structure
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Figure 2 - ISD Layout features on Atlantis Facility
High pressure gas Maximized separation

equipment located on distance between
upper deck of process equipment and
compression module occupied buildings
Maximized natural Control room

ventilation relocated to deck box
No process Egress routes located

equipment or oil in deck box and
storage facilities pontoon level
located in hull
5.4. Hazard evaluation and risk management
5.4.1. Overview
a. A number of hazard evaluations and risk analyses are identified throughout the capital
project value process supporting documentation.
b. Risk analyses overtly address ISD by identifying hazards and risks and considering ways
to eliminate or reduce them through layers of protection.
c. Potential hazards associated with process conditions, equipment layout, ignition sources,
fuel sources, dropped objects, toxics, marine operations, etc., should be considered during
facility layout design stage.
d. Potential hazards associated with simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) should be considered
during facility layout design, including the impact on escape and evacuation facilities.
e. The following are typical assessments that should be performed in developing facilities
layout. For further guidance, refer to MPcp Design Safety.
1. Hazard identification (HAZID) analysis.
2. “What if”.
3. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study.
4. Fire and blast analyses.
5. Heat radiation analysis.
6. Major Accident Risk (MAR) study.
7. Concept risk assessment.
8. Layout review.
9. Mechanical handling study.
10. Smoke study.
5.4.2. Explosion analysis

For offshore facilities, explosions can be a dominant hazard. Consideration of the following
points is warranted.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
a. Optimum blast wall locations and level of overpressure protection can be determined based
on results of explosion analysis. Refer to GP 24-20 and GP 24-22.
b. Explosion analysis results can provide estimated effects of overpressure on structural
design of walls, floors, and ceilings.
c. Mitigation options for explosion hazards may include:
1. Reducing potential overpressures by improved ventilation.
2. Reducing confinement and/or congestion to reduce blast overpressure.
3. Module and equipment location selection.
4. Early detection and isolation.
5. Inventory minimisation.
6. Strengthening structural components to resist blast.
d. Considerations to reduce confinement include the following:
1. Eliminating walls or using lightweight walls that relieve at low overpressure (e.g.,
loosely attached weather cladding).
2. Using louvered panels in walls.
3. Using grating rather than solid plate for decks.
4. Minimising number of obstructions in explosion vent path.
5. Using steel mesh rather than solid plate for heat shields.
6. Using blowout panels in walls, floors, or ceilings.
7. Increasing spacing between equipment.
8. Minimising use of mezzanine decks, particularly in the wellbay.
6. Layout philosophy
Offshore equipment and systems arrangement should provide the following features in offshore
facility design and layout:
a. Separate people from hazards.

b. Separate high and low hazards.
c. Ensure critical structural elements, including the hull, are at minimal risk.
d. Segregate high pressure hydrocarbons and minimize volume, including in the hull.
e. Provide safe means of escape from all credible scenarios.
f. Ensure flares and vents are appropriately located.
g. Provide access for emergency response, operations, maintenance, and future equipment.
7. Overall facility layout
7.1. General facility design

a. Location of wells, production, process, and pipeline facilities should be oriented to
minimise exposure risk to personnel and adjacent facilities from potential events.
b. To the extent possible:
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
1. Process areas and open-sided modules should be open to maximize natural

ventilation.
a) Adequate ventilation should be determined based on gas dispersion and blast
studies in addition to the guidance provided in API RP 500, which defines
adequate ventilation as that sufficient to prevent accumulation of significant
quantities of vapour/air mixtures in concentrations of 25% of lower flammable
limit (LFL).
b) In extreme weather environments (e.g., Arctic) where enclosure is necessary,
need for ventilating using concepts, such as partial enclosures, wind walls
(including perforated plate type), and louvers, should be considered.
2. Large or high pressure hydrocarbon inventories should be separated from people to
minimize risk and separated from other hydrocarbon inventories to minimise
escalation in event of an incident.
3. High and low risk equipment should be defined in an early design stage and be
separated, with the higher risk equipment located maximum practical distance from
the low hazard area.
4. Unless piping is all welded construction, H2S process lines (above 250 ppm) should
not be routed through enclosed areas with personnel access.
c. Separate platforms
1. Consideration should be given to locating LQ and emergency utility systems on a
separate platform from production, drilling, risers, and gas compression facilities.
2. LQ platform should be bridge connected but at sufficient distance to minimise
consequence of fires, explosions, and toxic releases onto quarters platform.
3. If separate platforms are not practical, a combined platform design may be required.
7.2. Typical facility layout options
7.2.1. General
a. Several typical facility layouts are provided in 7.2.2 through 7.2.5 to illustrate application
of the overall layout concepts in this GN.
b. Hazard evaluations and risk analysis should be performed to assist in evaluating trade-offs
for each design option (GP 44-30).
c. Selected facility configuration is in most cases site specific and a trade-off between the
various hazards.
7.2.2. PQ platform
Typical arrangement for large production and quarters (PQ) platform is shown in Figures 1 and
2. Features of a PQ platform include:
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Figure 3 - PQ platform - topsides, south elevation
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Figure 4 - PQ platform - topsides, east elevation
a. Production and compression modules in this design option are at the far end of the
platform and downwind from low hazard area, providing maximum separation between
higher hazard facilities (compression and process) and areas with occupied buildings and
emergency response equipment.
b. Flare or relief disposal system piping does not have to pass through wellbay area, further
reducing risk of incidents that may damage the header and increase fire risk on platform.
c. Wellbay is closer to low hazard area but historically, wellbay area poses lower frequency
events than compression or production areas.
d. All risers and well caissons are within the jacket structure.
7.2.3. PDQ platform

Typical arrangement for large production, drilling, and quarters (PDQ) platform is shown in
Figures 3 and 4. Features of a PDQ platform include:
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Figure 5 - PDQ platform - production deck
Production and
Compression Modules
Well Bay Blast

Wall
Low Hazard Area
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Figure 6 - PDQ platform - elevation
a. Production and compression modules in this design option are at the far end of platform
and downwind from low hazard area, providing for maximum separation between higher
hazard facilities (compression and process) and areas with occupied buildings and
emergency response equipment.
b. Flare or relief disposal system piping does not have to pass through wellbay area, further
reducing risk of incidents that may damage header and increase fire risk on platform.
c. Drilling and workover facilities are closer to low hazard area, but personnel working in
production/compression areas are further away from low hazard area and may pass through
wellbay area in an emergency.
d. Integrated PDQs often require large numbers of personnel due to labour intensive drilling
operations, which puts higher number of personnel at risk from potential hazards of
production module.
e. PDQs are typically not the most inherently safe design option.
f. Concept selection should justify the use of a PDQ design.
7.2.4. Alternate PDQ platform

An alternate general arrangement for a large PDQ platform is shown in Figure 5. Features of
this alternate arrangement include.
a. Wellbay is at the far end of platform but still downwind of low hazard area.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
b. Distance between wellbay area and low hazard area is maximised.

c. Compression/production operating personnel are closer to low hazard area and do not have
to pass through wellbay area during emergencies.
d. Higher frequency event facilities (compression and process) are closer to low hazard area.
Figure 7 - PDQ platform - alternate arrangement
e. Flare and relief disposal system piping cross wellbay area, posing risk of header damage in
event of an incident in wellbay area.
7.2.5. FPSO
a. Layout of FPSOs may vary based on whether the vessel is spread-moored or turret-
moored.
b. Each layout poses different hazards and may require different measures to manage the
hazards. The following points should be considered:
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
1. Placement of the LQ (either upwind of and close to the turret or at a maximum

distance from turret and downwind of all hydrocarbon hazards).
2. Effect of turret location on natural weathervaning.
c. Figure 6 presents a general arrangement for floating production designs based on a floating
production, storage, and offloading (FPSO) vessel. Features of an FPSO include:
1. Risers may be located on either side of the vessel to aid in vessel stabilisation or in
the turret at forward of vessel to provide maximum distance between risers and low
hazard area.
2. Subsea drilling is performed separately with no drilling or workover facilities
required onboard the vessel.
3. Process equipment is located on the main deck such that the equipment with highest
pressure is furthest from low hazard area.
4. Storage of crude and other materials is below deck in vessel hull compartments.
5. Work vessel berthing is a safe distance from well risers.
6. Offloading occurs at the aft, which provided maximum distance from the operation to
the risers.
Figure 8 - FPSO - functional diagram
7. Crane operation is outside riser envelope to minimise drop object risk to risers.
8. Flare or relief disposal system is at the opposite end of vessel from low hazard area.
9. Cofferdam should be considered for separation between crude storage/slop tanks and
machinery space.
10. Low hazard area is not located above crude storage tank block.
11. Crude piping does not pass through accommodation space, and hydrocarbon piping
should have welded joints on open deck outside of the crude storage block.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
8. Decks and systems layout
8.1. General
a. Guidance on layout of platform decks, layout of various functional areas on each deck, and
integrated systems, such as fire and blast protection and emergency egress pathways, are
provided in this clause.
b. General guidance are provided for how areas of the facility should be placed with respect
to other areas, which areas are appropriate to be grouped together, and which areas should
be separated from one another.
c. For some equipment, specific layout details are provided, such as separation distances to
other equipment.
8.2. Platform orientation and elevation

a. A number of factors can affect orientation of an offshore facility, including local wind and
sea conditions, subsea topography, routing of subsea pipelines, and tender vessel mooring
requirements.
b. Local prevailing winds and sea conditions typically determine the final orientation of an
offshore facility.
c. In any case, offshore facility low hazard area should be upwind or crosswind of prevailing
wind direction from flares, vent plume, and all equipment containing hydrocarbons that
can release hydrocarbon vapour on loss of containment.
d. Minimum elevation of lowest deck with process or utility equipment is at design wave
height plus appropriate allowances above mean sea level (MSL).
8.3. Decks
8.3.1. Production deck

a. Production deck is the deck level where most process equipment is typically located.
b. In some designs, such as a semisubmersible with large topsides and hull, it may be
advantageous to locate quarters below production deck if quarters can be located such that
they are protected by structural support and location from explosions, thermal radiation,
smoke, and gas.
8.3.2. Main deck

a. Main deck (or weather deck) is generally above production deck.
b. Drilling rig or workover rig, cranes, primary laydown areas, and living quarters are
generally located on main deck level.
c. Facilities with simple process equipment and no living quarters may have a combined
production and main deck (i.e., single deck).
8.3.3. Other decks

Facilities may have other intermediate deck levels that cover all or only a portion of platform
length or width, including the following:
a. Cellar deck
1. Cellar deck is directly below production deck.
2. Cellar deck level may contain pig launchers and receivers, potable or fresh water
storage tanks, closed drain vessel and transfer pumps, selected process and utility
equipment, and other miscellaneous items.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
3. If cellar deck is exposed to storm waves, inclusion of tanks and process vessels
should be avoided.
b. Seadeck
1. Seadeck is lowest deck on the platform.
2. Purpose of the seadeck is to provide access (boat landings) and/or platform support
structure inspection.
c. Mezzanine decks
1. Mezzanine decks are intermediate deck levels that typically cover a portion of the
platform area.
2. Mezzanine level provides additional area for equipment and/or access to equipment
located on production deck.
d. Helideck
1. The helideck is typically located above the LQ.
2. Helideck should be designed in accordance with local regulations and reviewed by BP
aviation services or a qualified aviation consultant early in the project planning
process.
3. Helideck should be oriented to extent practical to take advantage of predominant
prevailing wind.
4. Helideck should have unobstructed access for approach zones.
5. Helideck should have unobstructed dropdown zone from outer edges of helideck for
at least 210 degree splay of landing/takeoff sector to sea level.
6. Consideration should be given for providing sufficient space for helicopter landing
while another helicopter is parked.
8.4. Boat landings and cargo transfer areas

a. Boat landings (if provided) should be located on sheltered side of facility based on
prevailing weather conditions.
b. Cranes and cargo laydown areas should be located to optimise favourable vessel motions
during cargo transfer.
c. Cargo vessel positioning should minimise potential for vessel impact on facility.
8.5. Decking and stairways construction

a. Options for decking material include solid decking (pattern floorplating, such as chequer
plate or non-skid coated plate) or open decking (grated decking).
b. When choosing between open decking and solid decking, the following points should be
considered:
1. Use of open decking allows induced updraft in the event of a fire. Induced draft aids
in protection of process equipment adjacent to fire and reduces toxic smoke
production, but also increases the concern of flame impingement and fire damage of
equipment above fire.
2. Use of open decking (or grating) yields lower strength explosion overpressures.
3. Use of open decking improves natural ventilation.
4. Use of solid decking promotes containment of spills.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
c. Final consideration should be based on benefits and concerns analyzed through fire and
blast studies, smoke studies, and environmental spills.
d. If dropped object damage and mud spills are a concern during drilling, temporary,
removable wellhead hatches made from plate may be considered as alternative.
e. Each deck level around facility perimeter should have open decking walkways. Potential
exceptions include:
1. Areas where crane access to lower decks may be blocked by walkways.
2. Materials laydown and work areas where plating is more appropriate to protect
against drops and spills.
f. Stairways connecting each deck level should be provided (minimum of two per deck
level).
g. For manned platforms, external stairways near each corner of platform at each deck level
(except sea deck) should be provided.
h. Additional stairways may be required for larger facilities.
i. Layout should consider normal equipment and personnel traffic, security, emergency
evacuation, firefighting, and access for operation, maintenance, and workovers.
9. Low hazard area
9.1. General
a. Low hazard area should be designated on facility for location of LQ, TR, and main control
rooms (MCRs).
b. Maintenance shops, switchgear, and MCCs should be located in low hazard area.
c. Location of low hazard area should comply with the following criteria:
1. Orientation should normally be upwind or crosswind of hazardous facilities, including
drilling, production, storage, gas compression, flow lines, oil transfer equipment, and
flare facilities.
2. Low hazard area should be outside hazardous areas and should not be above crude oil
storage tanks, process areas, or other large inventories, such as risers or wellheads.
3. Equipment in low hazard area should be limited to safety and evacuation equipment,
central control panels, uninterruptible power supply (UPS), emergency power
generation equipment, and low hazard utilities.
4. Systems containing combustible materials, such as heating medium oil, should not be
within or below low hazard area.
5. Storage of diesel or aviation fuel in low hazard area should be limited to day tanks for
firewater pumps and emergency generators.
6. Diesel or aviation fuel piping should:
a) Be as short as practical.
b) Contain minimum number of flanges.
c) Have emergency isolation.
d) Be operated at lowest practical pressure.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
9.2. Buildings within low hazard area

Buildings within low hazard area may include LQ, TR, MCR, emergency switchgear, MCC, and
other emergency support facilities that do not pose a hazard to the low hazard area. Specific
guidance for buildings within the low hazard area includes:
a. Firewalls or blastwalls, if required, should be constructed to protect occupied buildings
within low hazard area, or the buildings should be designed for credible fire and blast loads
in accordance with GP 44-32. A holistic design approach is required, because blast and fire
barriers may impair natural ventilation, leading to increased risk of gas cloud development
and increased blast overpressure.
1. Firewalls should be designed:
a) To comply with hydrocarbon fire test requirements (H rated).
b) For a minimum H-60 rating, but this requirement may vary, depending on
estimated evacuation duration for the facility. This also applies to combined fire
and blast walls.
2. Blastwalls should comply with design or evacuation event blast loads predicted by
explosion analysis, in which case wall may deform but should not be breached by
blast pulse.
3. Firewall and blastwall may be combined into a single wall design.
4. Firewalls built into exposed wall facing process/drilling areas should not have
windows or penetrations.
5. Number of doors and windows in other firewalls (not directly facing high hazardous
equipment) should be minimised.
b. Floor, roof, and walls of occupied buildings in low hazard area should be sealed/protected
against flame and/or smoke ingress and may also have designated fire ratings.
c. Fire loads from helicopter crash or helifuel incident should be considered if LQ, MCR, or
TR is beneath or near helideck.
d. Local, not normally manned control rooms and drilling facility controls may be located in
hazardous areas and adjacent to respective equipment where appropriate.
e. LQ, MCR, TR, switchgear, and MCCs should be pressurised with air intakes in a safe
location.
f. Maintenance shops
1. Maintenance shops, storerooms (warehouses), offices, etc., may be adjacent to LQ,
MCR, or TR and should be located in a low hazard area on facility (e.g., behind
firewall or blast wall) whenever practical.
2. If it is not practical to locate the maintenance shop in the low hazard area, then:
a) Maintenance shops housing equipment that is a potential ignition source should
be pressurised or purged with air from a safe location.
b) Maintenance shops should provide protection from the immediate effects of a
major accident for any personnel who may be in enclosure.
c) Air intakes on maintenance shop HVAC systems should be located in low hazard
areas to minimise possibility of toxic gas ingress.
9.3. Temporary refuge (TR)

a. TR design should provide protection for personnel from the immediate effects of a major
accident and delayed effects for a specified endurance period.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
b. Environment inside TR should not be impaired by immediate damage due to explosion or

delayed impairment due to heat or ingress of smoke, flammable gas, or other toxins for a
specified endurance period. This provides a habitable atmosphere such that it is possible
for rational behaviour and decision making to take place.
c. Location
1. TR should be located in area of lower risk, with maximum possible distance between
primary hazards and TR. Consideration to maximise this distance should be given
during early design phases.
2. TR for FPSOs should be as far as possible from risers and high risk process
equipment. This applies whether vessel is turret moored or spread moored.
d. Other features
1. Entry doors should be easily accessible for personnel escaping from other areas and
protected from heat radiation as necessary.
2. TR should have sufficient room for personnel to prepare for evacuation.
3. TR should have access to evacuation facilities (lifeboats or helicopters) as a minimum
at any time during endurance period and without exposing personnel to major
accident effects (heat, gas, smoke, or toxics).
4. TR and main LQ may be a combined building.
5. TR should have at least two air intakes from a safe location.
10. Emergency response and escape
10.1. Escape routes

a. At least two emergency escape routes from all areas to muster area and from the muster
area to the primary evacuation facilities should be provided.
b. At least one of the emergency escape routes from all areas should remain unimpaired
during a major incident for the specified endurance period.
c. Emergency escape of personnel to muster area following a major accident should be
demonstrated via a formal safety assessment or EER.
d. Emergency escape routes should be wide and high enough to allow rapid egress of
personnel and transit of stretchers.
e. Landings and changes of direction should be minimized.
f. Emergency escape routes should be readily accessible, unobstructed, non-slip, marked and
signposted and have markings and signs that are clearly visible if there is loss of artificial
lighting during darkness. Consideration should be given to using photoluminescent
direction signs.
g. Doors should be designed for opening by one person from either side.
h. Hinged doors should open in the main direction of evacuation.
i. Sliding doors should show direction of opening on both sides of the door.
j. Air inlets and exhausts, such as HVAC, engine air, or turbine air, should not draw from or
vent onto escape paths or other personnel areas.
10.2. Muster areas

a. Muster area is designated area on facility for final assembly of personnel in preparation for
potential evacuation.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
b. A habitable muster area should be accessible for all personnel for all accident scenarios.
c. Muster areas should be located in the TR or open areas adjacent to lifeboats.
d. Means should be provided for personnel to be kept informed during an emergency and for
direct, reliable, and two way communication with incident command centre:
e. Muster area should have sufficient space to enable emergency command personnel to make
effective and informed decisions regarding incident control, manage emergency response
teams via radio, and organise controlled evacuation.
f. If muster area is to be used for staging firefighting teams, sufficient space should be
provided for emergency firefighting teams to assemble and don fire suits, breathing air, etc.
g. Muster area should have sufficient free floor area to accommodate maximum number of
personnel on board and allow donning personal protection equipment (PPE) (e.g.,
breathing air, survival gear). Floor area should be at least 0,46 m 2 (5 ft2) per person, but
more area (at least 0,75 m2 (8 ft2) per person) may be required if survival gear is used.
h. Muster area or embarkation area should have lifejackets and “grab bags” sufficient for all
personnel on board.
10.3. Alternate muster area

a. If an alternate muster area (AMA) is necessary, then it should meet the same requirements
as the primary muster area in section 10.2.
b. AMA should be provided in the following situations:
1. If some personnel may not be able to move along escape route to primary muster area
under some major accident scenarios, or
2. If the primary muster area will not remain unimpaired for all design incidents.
10.4. Incident command centre (ICC)

a. The facility should have an incident command centre (ICC) capable of monitoring
information from process systems, fire and gas detection (GP 30-85), ESD systems, and
other systems necessary for incident commander to understand the nature of an incident,
control emergency response activities, and judge whether to order evacuation or remain on
board while incident is brought under control and plant stabilised.
b. The ICC should be located and designed to survive the effects of major incidents for the
specified endurance period.
c. ICC should have sufficient space for emergency response planning.
d. ICC should have a public address (PA) broadcast facility to ensure that incident
commander can keep everyone informed of developments and plans for evacuation or
provide instructions to remain on board.
e. Communications between the ICC and shore base, other nearby or connected installations,
and external emergency and rescue services should be reliable such that communication
with these services is always available.
10.5. Evacuation facilities

a. Design should allow personnel to evacuate from facility during a major incident without
life-threatening exposure to effects of major accident (heat, smoke, toxics, or gas) during
specified endurance period.
b. At least one escape route should be available for personnel sheltering in TR, muster area,
AMA, or ICC to reach evacuation facilities under all identified accident scenarios.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
c. Selection and location of evacuation facilities should consider the types of hazards present
on facility, environmental conditions (including prevailing sea currents), and type of
facility.
10.6. Lifeboats or escape craft

a. Unimpeded visual contact between lifeboat launch stations is preferred.
b. Facilities should provide multiple lifeboat and life raft launch stations around the facility as
required to provide evacuation for major accident scenarios.
c. Launch mechanisms should provide lifeboat with adequate clearance from any fixed object
throughout descent path and at sea level.
d. Lifeboat embarkation points should be clearly marked and have adequately protected
access.
10.7. Emergency fire protection equipment

a. Active and passive fire protection systems and fire and gas detectors should be located
such that maintenance activities can be performed while facility is active (GP 24-23 and
GP 24-24).
b. Firewater pumps, detection and alarm panels, shutdown logic panels, and other critical fire
and safety system control equipment should be located in the low hazard area to meet the
survivability requirements and separated by adequate distance and/or by firewalls to avoid
potential of a single fire/explosion rendering firewater pumps inoperable (GIS 24-233).
c. Firewater pump engine air intakes should be located in well ventilated locations to prevent
the possibility of smoke or hydrocarbon vapour ingestion.
d. Safe access to remote activation panels or headers for fire protection systems and
emergency shutdown (ESD)/isolation systems should be provided for major accident
scenarios requiring their use.
e. Layout of walkways and firefighting equipment should provide adequate access for
firefighting activities based on fire hazard analysis.
10.8. Firewalls and blastwalls

a. Firewalls, blast walls, explosion overpressure vent panels, etc., may be required to
maintain integrity of low hazard area for a sufficient period to ensure evacuation of
personnel (GP 24-20 and GP 44-70).
b. Firewalls used to segregate low hazard areas and buildings within low hazard area from
process equipment and other hazardous exposures should comply with the following:
1. Firewalls should have no firedoors or other openings.
2. Structural elements within firewalls should be fully fire-rated.
3. Penetrations of firewall should be minimised.
4. Necessary firewall penetrations should have the same or higher fire or blast rating as
the firewall.
c. Blastwalls
1. Blastwalls may be required to segregate potential sources of overpressure from other
process equipment, utility systems, and/or low hazard areas.
2. Need for and location of blastwalls should be determined during explosion studies
performed in early design stage.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
3. Blastwalls should be fit for purpose and therefore may vary significantly in materials
of construction, dimension, and shape.
4. Blastwalls should be designed to withstand the negative pressure pulse following an
explosion.
d. Combination firewall and blastwall
1. Blastwall may double as firewall if it complies with b.
2. Combination firewalls and blastwalls should be designed such that distortion from
blast overpressure does not impede function of fire protection insulation.
3. Equipment should not be attached to blastwalls.
11. Equipment Layout
11.1. Arrangement of equipment

Arrangement of offshore facility equipment may vary depending on type of equipment required
and design basis for platform, with the following equipment layout considerations:
a. Similar service equipment (except firewater pumps) should be grouped if practical. The
following groupings are recommended:
1. Oil inventories.
2. High pressure gas inventories.
3. Low pressure gas inventories.
b. Gas inventories should be grouped together and provided surrounding open space as a
buffer zone to reduce blast overpressure on surrounding equipment.
c. Equipment should occupy minimum space consistent with function, maintenance,
operational, and inspection access requirements. Refer to section 11.4.
d. Consideration should be given to the following items for arrangement and orientation of
process equipment:
1. Grouping similar service equipment as stated above.
2. Maximize natural ventilation to minimize potential overpressures.
3. Avoid placing multiple similar-sized vessels in a row to reduce flame front
propagation in an explosion.
4. Minimise length of piping runs by considering the main process flow.
e. The following support structures and equipment should be considered during design and
layout:
1. Platform access to remote valves, instruments, safety relief valves, and FVO/LVOs.
2. Critical or large inventory equipment should be placed to minimize risk from dropped
objects or protective frames should be considered.
3. Eyewash stations and safety showers adjacent to chemical and acid handling units.
4. Monorails or other mechanical lifting devices to assist dismantling during routine
maintenance.
5. Operator control stations and local instrument panels.
6. Enclosures around engines.
7. Deck hatchways and porches for lifting access to equipment below, including the
seadeck.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
8. Equipment auxiliaries, such as pump seal and cooling systems.

f. Areas around equipment should be designed to allow maintenance, access, and staging of
components and equipment.
g. Maintenance areas in f. should not interfere with escape routes.
h. Material in transit should have laydown areas in locations readily accessible by crane.
i. The following items should be considered when determining crane location:
1. Equipment loaded to or from supply boats is not lifted directly above process
equipment.
2. Laydown areas
3. Marine vessel locations
4. Riser locations
5. Equipment access requirements
6. Cross-facility lifts
j. Permanent overhead lifting points or monorails should be provided to facilitate horizontal
traverse of heavy items to laydown areas for crane access.
k. For FPSOs, the effect of vessel motions on process equipment should be considered.
Separators should be located near vessel centre to minimise this effect.
l. Switchgear and MCCs may be located outside low hazard area and should be housed in
pressurised enclosures with humidity control.
11.2. Layout and spacing of equipment

a. Operational access should be provided to all:
1. Routine operated manual valves and local field instrumentation required for normal
operation.
2. Isolation points required for emergency shutdown and isolation of operations.
3. Sample points, manual drains, and vents required for normal operations.
4. Equipment requiring routine inspection and surveillance (e.g., compressors, pumps,
fin fans, etc.).
b. Maintenance access should have the following features:
1. Equipment located with adequate access for crane lifts and material handling
equipment during maintenance.
2. If equipment requires lifting, sufficient area to manipulate a boom, monorail, and/or
trolley.
3. Equipment layout should avoid need to lift heavy pieces of frequently maintained
equipment during unit operation over in service process lines or equipment or provide
passive protection.
c. Space allocation for planned future equipment should be addressed during initial project
risk assessment to identify potential hazards associated with installation, operation, and
maintenance of future equipment.
d. Confined space access points should be provided adequate clearance for emergency rescue
equipment.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
11.3. General piping arrangement (API RP 14E)

a. Piping should generally be routed in (facility) north/south and east/west directions and
grouped together for piping support purposes.
b. Expansion loops between piping and vessels, piping in piperacks, pipe flanges, and other
equipment should be provided.
c. Clearance should be provided for maintenance access and personnel protection as follows:
1. Headroom over access routes or access platforms. Refer to section 11.4.2.
2. Accessibility for suitable support points and valve orientation, operation, and
maintenance.
3. Clearance to permit removal of inline equipment with minimal dismantling of piping.
4. Extra space for piping insulation and inspection., as applicable.
d. Piping should not be located near explosion vent areas, since an explosion will produce
high gas velocities and hence high drag forces on piping at such locations.
e. Hydrocarbon piping should not be routed through nonhazardous areas.
f. Process piping should be protected from dropped objects by routing under decks or near
structural elements.
11.4. Clearance requirements
11.4.1. General
a. Items should not block operating aisles, maintenance access, or escape routes, including
the following:
1. Projecting piping.
2. Valve spindles (valve wheels).
3. Instrumentation and instrument air manifolds.
4. Local panels.
5. Transducer stations.
6. Pneumatic and electrical junction boxes.
7. Grouped steam tracing supply and condensate manifolds.
b. Based on maintenance and egress requirements, clear working space should be maintained
around equipment that requires frequent servicing, such as pumps, exchangers, control
valves, instruments, and vessel manways.
c. Horizontal and vertical clearances for maintenance and operations should be specified by
BP with consideration given to equipment vendor recommendations.
d. Clearances should be measured from furthest projection on equipment, including
associated pipe work with flanges and insulation boxes, filters, valves in open position,
drains, cabling, and instruments, between grade and 2 m (6 ft) above grade.
11.4.2. Vertical clearance

Overhead clearances should be at least:
a. 3,7 m (12 ft), if carry deck crane access is required.
b. 3,1 m (10 ft), if 1,8 tonne to 2,7 tonne (2 ton to 3 ton) forklift truck access is required.
c. 3,7 m (12 ft) for main pipe racks.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
d. 2,2 m (7 ft) from grade or elevated platform for personnel passageway.
11.4.3. Horizontal clearance

Unless approved otherwise by BP, minimum horizontal clearance to piping, equipment, and
instrumentation should be as follows:
a. 1,5 m (5 ft) for aisles at equipment and machinery.
b. 1,2 m (4 ft) for operating and maintenance areas at grade.
c. 1,2 m (4 ft) for workspace on platforms servicing heads of shell/tube exchangers mounted
on structure.
d. 0,9 m (3 ft) for workspace on platforms servicing manways.
e. Centreline of manway at elevation of 1,5 m (5 ft) from platform.
f. 2,1 m (7 ft) for workspace around compressors, turbines, and large motors for operating
and maintenance clearances to handle casings, rotors, crankshafts, flywheels, etc.
g. Storage tank access
1. 0,9 m (3 ft) for access around storage tanks to level gages, controls, and access into
tank through manways.
2. If no piping or controls are located on one side of tank, only a walkway may be
required.
12. Equipment
12.1. Vessels and exchangers

a. To permit access to instrumentation, maintenance, and visual inspection, minimum of 1 m
(39 in) around vessel and heat exchanger footprints is recommended.
b. Horizontal vessels handling hydrocarbons should be oriented such that vessel heads point
toward open sides of facility.
c. Large vessels should be located such that they do not block major explosion venting paths.
d. Sufficient clearance should be provided around shell and tube exchangers to permit
removal of tube bundles for maintenance, inspection, or replacement.
e. Unless equipment is part of exchanger system, equipment should not be installed
immediately under air-cooled heat exchangers.
f. Equipment located near air-cooled heat exchangers should not impede exhaust air stream
above exchanger.
g. Potential for recirculation of air from exchanger exhausts to inlets should be evaluated.
h. Bunds/dikes, plating, and combing should be considered around vessels with large liquid
inventories to limit spill surface area and prevent environmental releases.
12.2. Rotating equipment

a. Large rotating equipment, such as compressors, condensate pumps, and vapour recovery
units should be located in well ventilated areas and as far from low hazard area as
practical.
b. Rotating equipment layout should permit maintenance, removal, lifting access, and
replacement of rotors and other major components, as appropriate for the equipment
maintenance philosophy.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
c. Pumps should have access, clearance, and lifting capability (preferably with crane for
vertical pumps, such as seawater and firewater pumps, which have long drive shafts).
d. Gas turbine air intakes should be located and arranged as follows:
1. As high an elevation as practical to minimise salt ingestion.
2. Arranged to avoid intake or recirculation of exhaust air from air fin heat exchangers
or turbine exhausts.
e. Gas turbine exhaust stacks should be located at least 6 m (20 ft) above inlet air system or
HVAC inlets to avoid recirculation of hot exhaust gases.
f. Gas turbines should be enclosed, cooled, and ventilated by forced, filtered air drawn from
as safe a location as practical.
g. Effects of gas turbine exhaust plume on helicopter and crane operations should be
considered in selecting location and orientation of gas turbine exhaust outlets.
h. Electrical generators for normal facility power should be located outside low hazard area
and should be as remote from process as practical.
i. Gas turbines should be located and oriented such that the LQ is not struck in the event of a
broken turbine blade.
12.3. Flares and vents (API RP 14, API RP 521)

a. Flares and/or vents should be provided to dispose of hydrocarbon gas (GIS 22-201,
GP 22-20, and GP 44-80).
b. Flares or relief disposal systems should be located:
1. Downwind (or cross-wind) from low hazard area. Refer to GP 44-80.
2. Such that release of flammable unburned vapour or combustion products does not
impose exposure hazard to personnel or facility.
3. Such that heat radiation intensity is within acceptable limits in accordance with
GP 44-80.
4. Such that probability of burning liquids falling on facility or on normal boat or barge
traffic areas is low.
c. Flare knock-out drum should be located as close as practical to the base of the flare.
12.4. Fired heaters

a. Fired heaters on offshore facilities should be avoided.
b. Fired heaters, if necessary, should be located in open, well ventilated areas away from
inventories of flammable materials.
c. The following safeguards should be used for location of fired heaters (GP 22-10):
1. Minimum of 4,5 m (15 ft) spacing should be maintained between fire heaters and
other process or mechanical equipment, unless protective barriers (firewalls) are used
for fire heater isolation.
2. Direct fire heaters should be isolated behind firewalls.
3. Maintenance space should be provided for pulling fire tubes.
4. Hoisting equipment should be provided for fired heater maintenance, or heater should
be accessible by crane.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
12.5. Conductors, caissons, and other sea penetrations

a. Intake and discharge lines, including firewater and risers, should be inside jacket
structure/hull and supported by structural members.
b. For condeep designs, firewater intake lines should be inside riser or utility shaft leg, but
not inside a drill shaft.
c. Bottom ends of discharge lines and inlets of intake lines (between sea and platform) should
be located to minimise risk of recirculation and deposition of material on structures.
d. Typical overboard lines operating on a facility include:
1. Discharge lines (Refer to Environmental Requirements for New Projects)
a) Drilling and completion fluid waste during drilling.
b) Drill cuttings during drilling (should be avoided if practical).
c) Drilling bulk materials (vented dust).
d) Formation water from produced water treating system.
e) High salinity water from desalination system.
f) Excess firewater pump discharge, one per pump, full discharge during pump
testing.
g) Deluge drains.
h) Kitchen scraps from quarters.
i) Deck drain overflow.
j) Skimmer piles or caissons.
k) Seawater cooling water
2. Intake lines
a) Firewater pumps (one per pump).
b) Service water or seawater for cooling as required.
c) Drilling fluid makeup during drilling.
12.6. Storage (NFPA 30, NFPA 497)

a. Atmospheric pressure tanks may be required for stabilising liquid hydrocarbons or storage
of materials, such as lube and fuel oil, diesel fuel, and potable water.
b. Horizontal “gun barrel” tanks for oil treating and large water skim tanks may be used on
smaller facilities, although these are less common due to large size and weight.
c. If sectioned tanks are used, non-flammable liquids may be kept between stored fuel and
potential ignition sources to act as a safety buffer.
d. Both horizontal and vertical separation should be provided between potential ignition
sources and systems containing or processing flammable materials. Storage tanks
containing hydrocarbons should be separated from fired vessels and other continuous
ignition sources by firewall or minimum of 15 m (50 ft).
e. Tanks containing hydrocarbons should be isolated from areas where heavy equipment is
maintained.
f. Hydrocarbon tanks should be located on top deck with nothing above them (due to risk of
internal overpressure).
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
g. Minimum storage volume required depends on operational philosophy, daily use, and time
between supply trips.
h. Drum storage
1. On small facilities, liquids are generally stored in 208 l (55 gal) drums and
transported by hand carts.
2. Drum storage should be well ventilated and easily reached by crane.
i. Bulk storage
1. On larger installations, bulk storage in cylindrical or rectangular tote tanks may be
required, along with pumps to distribute liquid to various locations within the facility.
2. Adequate space and location for bulk storage of materials should be crane accessible
and allocated outside low hazard area in a lower risk area.
j. With exception of diesel fuel tanks for diesel driven firewater pumps and emergency
generators, potentially hazardous materials should not be stored within low hazard area.
k. Stored amount of hazardous materials onboard a facility should be kept to minimum
needed for safe operation.
l. Hydrocarbon storage in the hull should be limited to diesel fuel and avoided if possible.
m. Temporary stores housing explosives should be located on outer edge of deck away from
low hazard area and critical escape routes.
12.7. Wellbay area

a. Equipment located within wellbay area should be limited to wellheads, manifolds,
flowlines, and associated equipment.
b. Access to wellbay area and trees is generally on main deck and production deck,
respectively, for fixed and floating facilities.
c. Wellbay area of main deck for drilling and workover rigs should be clear of permanent
equipment.
d. Wellbay area should be accessible for personnel escape and firefighting from both sides of
facility.
e. Wellbay area should be naturally ventilated to maximum extent possible using floor
grating, etc.
12.8. Wellhead area
12.8.1. Spacing and dimensions

a. For combination drilling/production facilities, wellhead area location and size are
determined by tree size, access requirements, and number of wells drilled.
b. Actual spacing of wells depends on production tree and rig well control equipment
dimensions and orientation.
c. Wells can be laid out on a rectangular or circular grid at the mudline, but wellhead layout is
rectangular at the surface.
d. Spacing and configuration of wellhead areas depend on:
1. Dimensions and shapes of specific components required for tree and flowlines.
2. Whether wells are to be completed as single zone or dual zone.
3. Maintenance requirements.
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19 January 2009 GN 44-100
12.8.2. Wellhead pressures

Wellheads usually contain the highest pressures on an offshore facility. Minimum requirements
necessary for protection against potential damage to or from the wellheads are as follows:
a. Wellheads and trees should be protected against impact from fires or explosions resulting
from failures originating in the wellbay area or elsewhere on the facility.
b. Remainder of the facility should be protected against potential failures in the wellhead
area.
c. Wellheads should be protected against dropped objects from crane lifts and other
construction activities.
d. No equipment should be located in wellhead area other than wellhead fittings (including
wing valves), flowlines, individual gas lift, gas injection, well kill, water or chemical
injection lines, and parts of facility safety systems that serve wellhead area.
e. Process piping required to traverse wellbay area should be routed outside wellhead area.
f. Valves (other than wing valves), instruments, vent lines, and drain lines should be outside
wellhead area if practical.
g. Clearance should be provided above wellheads for wireline blowout preventer (BOP) and
lubrication systems installation.
h. Injection manifolds
1. Manifolds for chemical injection, gas injection and lift, water injection, well kill, and
blowdown of wellhead piping systems are permitted in production deck wellbay area
but should be outside wellhead area.
2. Manifold should be at least 4,6 m (15 ft) between outside well rows and structural
trusses.
i. Well control panels are permitted in production deck wellbay area.
j. Safety equipment specific to protection of wellhead area is permitted in surrounding
wellbay area.
12.9. Drilling rigs
12.9.1. General
a. Drilling rig size and selection may vary depending on well construction and completion
scope.
b. Spacing and layout requirements depend on drilling rig selected and required service
components. Facility main deck area design should provide adequate space for required
rig.
c. Drilling rig options include the following:
1. Self contained drilling rig integral to facility.
2. Self contained drilling rig either packaged in modules or handled as individual
components that can be set and removed via derrick barge or cranes.
3. Derrick set temporarily installed onto facility and tender assisted by floating vessel or
jackup.
4. Drilling from jackup temporarily positioned over portion of facility.
12.9.2. Drilling rig layout

a. Hazard analysis and risk assessment should be performed to analyse potential hazards
associated with a specific drilling rig option selected in consideration of the following:
Page 35 of 38
19 January 2009 GN 44-100
1. Drilling rig installation.

2. Drilling rig operation (particularly with simultaneous drilling and production),
including drilling, completions, and workovers.
3. Drilling rig maintenance.
4. Transfer of drilling materials and equipment to and from workboats.
5. Operation during bad weather.
b. Drilling related interfaces that are typically required should be considered, such as disposal
chutes/downcomers, drain tie-ins and sump location, vent lines, consumables loading
station, crane access, utilities, fire and gas protection, communications, ESD systems, and
emergency power.
c. Rig equipment should be arranged to maximise access to major escape routes and
minimise alleyways with only a single escape route.
d. Adequate deck space should be available for all drilling service company equipment and
control cabins, including power, supply storage, additional personnel quarters,
instrumentation/data processing units for mud logging, measurement while drilling
(MWD), auxiliary wireline services, cement unit, and mud lab.
e. Mud logging unit should be as close as practical and safe to shale shakers.
f. Diverter system should be arranged in accordance with API RP 64.
g. Adequate layout and location of major drilling rig components is required for safe
operation and emergency response, including:
1. Well control equipment.
2. Choke/kill manifold.
3. Choke control panel.
4. Mud/gas separator.
5. Gas discharge lines.
6. Trip tank.
7. BOP closing unit and control panels as follows:
a) At least two BOP control panels are required.
b) One BOP panel should be located on rig floor near driller console.
h. On self contained drilling rigs or tender rig derrick sets, independent offshore fire
protection system, alarm and ESD systems, relief, flare, vent, and drain systems should
comply with facility minimum requirements.
12.9.3. Reservoirs containing H2S

a. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) and risk assessment study for reservoirs that contain H 2S
is recommended to address possible H2S release.
b. Equipment should be arranged to mitigate or minimise risk to personnel.
c. Blower ventilation should be considered for the following areas:
1. Rig floor.
2. In low and confined areas, such as under derrick substructure and adjacent wellheads
and BOP stack.
3. At shale shakers.
4. Above open mud tanks.
Page 36 of 38
19 January 2009 GN 44-100
d. Rig layout and auxiliary equipment, including primary and remote auxiliary choke control
panels, remote kill lines, mud/gas separators, degassers, and flare system, should comply
with API RP 49.
12.10. Pipeline equipment

Pipeline equipment includes risers, FVO, LVO, and facilities, such as pig launchers, receivers,
and associated kicker line piping and valves.
12.10.1. Risers and FVO/LVOs

a. Risers and FVO/LVOs should be located as far from low hazard area and primary
evacuation facilities as practical.
b. Risers should be located such that they are protected against impact from marine traffic as
follows:
1. Risers should be located within area outlined by platform legs/hull.
2. If 1. is not possible, risers should be protected against impact from marine traffic by
location of berthing areas and berthing approach or by fender protection around risers.
c. To prevent damage to valves, actuators, and instrumentation, FVO/LVOs should be located
to minimise potential risks from falling objects, liquid hydrocarbon overflow, explosions,
or flame impingement, or provided with adequate protection against these hazards.
d. FVO/LVOs are generally located in vertical portion of risers below production deck.
e. If FVO/LVOs are located at seadeck level, access and/or maintenance platforms will be
required and valve instrumentation should be protected from storm waves and corrosion.
f. If risers connect to facility from over side of jacket/hull, FVO should be located as close to
edge of facility as possible.
g. Location of FVO should be selected to minimize the effects of an uncontrolled loss of
containment in event of riser failure upstream of FVO.
12.10.2. Pig launcher/receiver equipment

a. Lateral and vertical access and maintenance space should be provided for pig launcher,
receiver facilities, and pig handling equipment.
b. Export line launchers and receivers should be located away from wellbay area, higher risk
process equipment, known ignition sources, highly travelled personnel routes, and material
handling areas.
c. Horizontal launcher or receiver doors should face outboard and away from quarters or low
hazard areas to reduce potential of exposing personnel or other equipment to projectiles.
Page 37 of 38
19 January 2009 GN 44-100
Bibliography
[1] US Coastguard standards.
[2] Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
[3] NORSOK standards.
Page 38 of 38

Offshore Facilities Layout

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Offshore Facilities Layout

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Document No.

Offshore Facilities Layout

Copyright © 2008 BP International Ltd. All rights reserved.

Figure 1 - ISD Layout features on Tangguh Facility........................................................................12

• For dated references, only the edition cited applies.

GP 30-85 Fire and Gas Detection.

ASME International (ASME)

American Petroleum Institute (API)

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

3. Terms and definitions

Egress, refuge, and evacuation system

High hazard area

Incident Command Centre (ICC)

c. Support structure and consideration of construction/installation methods, hook-up, and

Low hazard area

Living quarters (LQ)

Major Accident Risk (MAR) process

Temporary refuge (TR)

Utility enclosures (UE)

a. Local equipment rooms.

a. Electrical power generation, distribution equipment, emergency generators, and battery

4. Symbols and abbreviations

AMA Alternate muster area.

BOP Blowout preventer.

DLLR Davit launched life raft.

ESD Emergency shutdown.

E&P Exploration and Production.

FPSO Floating production, storage, and offloading (vessel).

FSR Floating systems and risers.

FVO First valve on.

FVO/LVO First valve on, last valve off.

HAZID Hazard identification.

HAZOP Hazard and operability.

HSSE Health, safety, security, and environment.

HVAC Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.

ISD Inherently safer design.

LEL Lower explosive limit.

LFL Lower flammable limit.

LVO Last valve off.

MAR Major accident risk.

MCC Motor control centre.

MCR Main control room.

MPcp Major project common process.

MGL Main gas line.

MOL Main oil line.

MSF Module support frame.

MSL Mean sea level.

MWD Measurement while drilling.

NUI Normally unattended installation.

PDQ Production, drilling, and quarters.

PPE Personal protection equipment.

PQ Production and quarters.

TEMPSC Totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft.

SIL Safety integrity level.

SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations.

UPS Uninterruptible power supply.

5.1. Capital project design

5.2. Existing plant continuous risk reduction

5.3. Inherently safer design (ISD)

5.3.1. ISD Philosophy

5.3.2. Examples of ISD used in facility layout

Figure 1 - ISD Layout features on Tangguh Facility

Open layout and

Figure 2 - ISD Layout features on Atlantis Facility