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Bench: S Bhargava
Brejendra Narayan Ganguly And Anr. vs Chinta Haran Sarkar And Anr. on 10/10/1960
JUDGMENT
S.P. Bhargava, J.
1. This appeal arises out of an application under Section 25(1) and (2) of
the Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) read with Section 6 of the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, made in the Court of the Second Additional
District Judge, Jabalpur. The application of the applicants was rejected by the
said Court. Being aggrieved by the said decision, this appeal has been
preferred.
2. The relevant facts of the case are that the applicants are husband and
wife and belong to Bengali Brahmin community. The applicants were the parents of
three children before 11−2−1956. Their 4th child was born on 11−2−1956 in some
hospital at Jabalpur. This child was a girl and was named ’Mana’. It is admitted
that on the 9th day after her, birth, the child was handed over to the custody
and care of the non−applicants (respondents) who also are the husband and wife.
The respondents belong to the Bengali Kayastha community. This is also admitted
that at the time of the handing over of the child, the relations between the
parties were very cordial. The present dispute ranges round the custody of this
child ’Mana’.
3. The case of the applicants was that at the time when Mana was born, her
mother (applicant No. 2) was in a very weak state of health. She was not
expected to feed the child properly. Under these circumstances the applicants
were required to make suitable arrangement for getting the child properly
brought up. The applicants say that ultimately they approached the respondents
with the request that they may assume responsibility for bringing up the child
till its mother (applicant No. 2) was in a fit state of health to assume her
responsibility of nurturing the child.
It is averred by the appellants (applicants) that the respondents (non−
applicants) gladly acceded to their request and brought up the child
satisfactorily. About seven or eight months after however, when the applicants
desired the child to be restored to them, the non−applicants on one ground or
the other put off the handing over of child and ultimately, refused.
4. The case of the non−applicants on the other hand was that a few days
before the birth of the child, there was an agreement entered into between the
parties to the effect that in case a female child was born to the applicant No.
2, the child would be given in adoption to the non−applicants who were issue−
less. It was further stated that it was agreed upon that the ceremony of
adoption would be performed about a year after.
In pursuance to the agreement, the ceremonies of giving and taking in
adoption took place on 6−1−1957. As a consequence of adoption, the applicants,
it was alleged, were not entitled to the restoration of the custody of child, It
was further alleged that the return of Mana to the applicants was not in her own
interest considering her welfare and so it was urged that the application of the
applicants deserved to be rejected.
5. A further point was urged in this Court to the effect that the application
as laid in Court did not fall within the purview of section 25 of the Guardians
and Wards Act.
6. The lower Court had framed four issues covering the objections raised.
Indian Kanoon − http://indiankanoon.org/doc/53205/
Issue No. 1 pertained to tile factum of handing over of the child because
applicant No. 2 was not in a proper state of health. Issue No. 2 was with regard
to the factum of adoption. In my view, the facts covered under issue No. 1 fall
properly within the purview of the rebuttal of issue No. 2 and, therefore, I
propose to deal with the evidence led by the parties with regard to these two
issues together.
Non−applicant No. 1 deposed that both he and his wife were willing to adopt
the child, on the very day the talk originally took place, and when the
agreement was made. Non−applicant No. 2 gave a contrary version by saying that
she neither desired nor expressed her willingness to adopt till adoption
actually took place on 6−1−1957. In fact, she went to the length of stating in
the witness−box that the adoption of the child was forced upon her by the
applicant No. 1 and that in fact, she never had any desire to adopt.
8. Apart from the contradictions found in the statement of the two non−
applicants, there are many circumstances present in the case which point out
that possibly the story of the agreement of adoption being in existence has been
cooked up only to support the case of adoption set up by the non−applicants. The
non−applicant No. 2 has admitted in her statement that her husband’s brothers
have as many as seven or eight daughters. She has admitted that it was suggested
to her that some one amongst these girls may be taken by her but she did not
like the idea.
10. Considering all the facts and circumstances that have been brought to
light with regard to the alleged agreement of adoption, I am in full agreement
with the view taken by the lower Court and hold that no such agreement has been
proved.
11. Before discussing the evidence pertaining to the ceremony of adoption
alleged to have taken place on 6−1−1937, I may emphasize that there is a very
heavy and serious onus resting on a person who relies upon an adoption. In such
a case, the proof of adoption has to satisfy a strict and severe scrutiny. In a
recent case reported in Kishori Lal v. Mt. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504, their
Lordships observed as follows:−−
"(2): For the purpose of arresting the ward, the Court may exercise the
power conferred on a Magistrate of the first class by Section 100 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1881.
"(3): The residence of a ward against the will of his guardian with a
person who is not his guardian does not of itself terminate the guardianship."
16. In the case of Annie Besant v. Narayaniah, ILR 38 Mad 807: (AIR 1914 PC
41), the Privy Council has observed:
"Among Hindus, as in England, the father is the natural guardian of his
children during their minority; but this guardianship is in the nature of a
sacred trust, and he cannot therefore during his lifetime substitute another
person to be guardian in his place. He may, in the exercise of his discretion as
guardian, entrust the custody and education of his children to another; but the
authority he thus confers is essentially a revocable authority, and if the
welfare of his children require it, he can, notwithstanding any contract to the
contrary, take such custody and education once more into his own hands....."
The facts of that case bear considerable similarity with the facts involved
in the instant class. In that case also, the father of the two minor children
had made them over for up−bringing and education to the defendant and
afterwards, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant cancelling his previous letter
by which he had constituted her the guardian of his two sons and demanding that
the two boys should be handed over to him by ’a’ named date.
"A ward who was never in the actual custody or charge of his father may be
deemed to be re−moved from his custody when the person in actual possession
repudiates to the father’s knowledge the right of the father to the actual
custody of the minor."
Further, in Noshirwan v. Sharoshbanu, AIR 1934 Bom 311 the law on this point
was stated as under:
"A ward in the actual custody of another person with the permission of the
guardian .....is deemed to be under the constructive custody of the guardian,
and the refusal of the person in actual custody to hand over the minor to the
guardian amounts to a removal of the minor from the constructive custody of the
guardian within the meaning of Section 25."
And, in Sarada Nayar v. Vayankara Amma, AIR 1957 Kerala 158, it was observed:
"Even though the words "removal" and ’custody" are not defined in the Act,
these two words have also to be taken to have been used in Section 25 in their
widest sense just as the words "guardian" and "ward". The word ’custody’ must,
therefore, be taken to mean any form of custody, actual or constructive, or, in
other words physical or legal. The legislature has not chosen to specify the
nature of the custody contemplated by Section 25....."
Applying the principle formulated in these cases to the facts of the present
case, the conclusion reached by me is that the respondents’ act in repudiating
the right of the appellants to resume the custody of the child amounts to
’removal’ within the meaning of Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act.
19. The result is that the appeal succeeds. I set aside the order passed by
the lower Court and order that the female child, Mana, referred to above, shall
be restored to the custody of applicant No. 1 under the provisions of Section
25(2) of the Guardians and Wards Act, within one month of this order. If
necessary, warrant of arrest of the child, ’Mana’ shall be issued and
immediately on arrest, the child shall be made over to the applicant No. 1. The
non−applicant (respondents) shall pay the costs of the appellants for both the
Courts, Counsel’s fee in this Court is fixed at Rs. 50/−.