Romeo Reyes v.

CA; GR 96492;

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Court's decision
promulgated on November 22, 1990, 1 which affirmed with modification the agrarian court's decision promulgated
January 10, 1990,2 which ordered them and the other defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of
the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said respondent court's decision is now
final and executory as to Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the respondent court,
since they did not appeal the same.

G.R. No. 96492 | November 26, 1992 | J. Nocon

Facts:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Court’s decision, which
affirmed with modification the agrarian court’s decision, which ordered them and the other defendants therein to,
among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz.

Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga.
Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now deceased Julian dela Cruz,
husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina alleged that her husband’s death, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that
Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of
the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights.
Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and
defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots and asked for the dismissal of the case,
moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and
non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses.

Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable

Held:
No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at their findings of fact. The
Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled is the rule that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which
do not obtain in the instant case.
In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil case. It has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not
shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court
cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of
evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO
and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated February 28,
1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:

BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ

GR No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

ART 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by operation of law.

FACTS:
 Leodegaria Julian died and was survived by Felix Balanay Sr. and their 6 children.
 Felix Balanay Jr, one of the 6 children, filed a petition for the probate of their mother’s notarial will.
 Their mother’s will declared that:
a. She owned the “southern half” of the conjugal lots.
b. Her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in
the will.
 Avelina Antonio and Felix Balanay Sr. opposed Balanay Jr’s petition, but an affidavit was filed where Felix
Balanay Sr. withdrew his opposition and renounced his hereditary rights over the estate of his wife.
 Avelina contended that the affidavit of renunciation was void.
 A new lawyer, Atty. Montana, appeared in behalf of Felix Balanay Jr, withdrawing the petition for probate
of will and requesting for an intestate proceeding instead. Such was granted by the probate court.
 Felix Balanay Jr. with a new lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that Atty. Montana had
no authority to withdraw the petition.
 The probate court denied the motion and the will was declared void because of the disposition where the
mother declared that she owned the “southern half” of the properties.
 The disposition was declared illegal because she cannot declare ownership over the undivided conjugal
properties, as her right as a co-owner was inchoate and pro-indiviso.
 The court then ordered for intestate proceedings to commence instead of testate.

ISSUE:
 WON mixed succession may occur in this case? YES

HELD:
 For mixed succession to occur, the invalid disposition must be separable from the valid dispositions. The
invalid disposition must not be a condition to the valid disposition.
 The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before establishing its
formal validity.
 Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issues.

 But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into
an intestate proceeding.
  The rule is that the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity
of the other disposition, unless it is presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.
 Hence, if there are certain dispositions in a will that are not valid, it will not render the whole will invalid.
The will remains valid, and the valid dispositions should be followed.

 The rule is testacy is favored over intestacy. The policy of the State is to give effect to the wishes of the
testator as much as possible.
 The illegal disposition of Leodegaria declaring that she owned the “southern half” of the properties can be
rendered invalid, but the entire will is not nullified.
 Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can
be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.
 The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law
because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro-indiviso. But That illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
 Hence, testacy should be favored over intestacy. The valid dispositions of Leodegaria in her will should be
followed, while the invalid ones shall be effected by operation of law. (mixed succession)

BALANAY vs MARTINEZ
64 SCRA 452
June 27, 1975

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Partition and Distribution of the Estate

FACTS:
-Leodegaria Julian died leaving her husband Felix Sr., and six legitimate children, Felix, Jr. Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina,
Delia, and Emilia.
-She left a notarial will and in paragraph 5 of the will she said that after the death of Felix Sr. her land and all
conjugal lands should be divided in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned of in
the will her husband’s one-half share of the conjugal assets.
-Felix Sr and Avelina opposed.
-Subsequently, Felix Sr withdrew and he conformed and renounced his hereditary rights. However, Avelina
continued on with her opposition.
-The lower court declared the will as void and converted the testate proceeding to an intestate proceeding.
-Felix, Jr. appealed.

ISSUES:
1. WON the will should first be determined to be intrinsically valid prior to the determination of its allowance or
formal validity
2. WON the declaration that the will was void is proper
3. WON the renunciation of Felix, Sr. of his hereditary rights is valid
4. WIN Felix, Sr. will was intrinsically void because it preterited him

HELD:
1. Yes, it was correct in passing upon the question of intrinsic validity first. The court was of the opinion that in view
of certain unusual provisions of the will (i.e. paragraph 5), which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion
to withdraw the petition for probate. It was correct to pass upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity is established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical consideration demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
2. No, it was not proper. The invalidity of one of the several dispositions does not affect the validity of the other
dispositions. Except if the other dispositions is dependent on the first invalid disposition that has been made. The
valid parts should be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator
or interfering with the general scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.
3. Yes, it was valid. Art. 793 of the Civil Code states that Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass
thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that
such was his intention and Art. 930 The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator
erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the
testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect. The
partition then has become valid.
4. No, Felix, Sr.’s case In the case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce
intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights. Thus it is
different from the Nuguid case because where the testatrix as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will
was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Art. 854 of the Civil Code provides,
“The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.” Since the preterition of
the parents annulled the institution of the sister as testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy
resulted.
Moreover, testacy is preferable to intestacy. Doubts are resolved in favor of intestacy. As far as legally possible, the
expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions in the will should be followed.

PASCUAL COSO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA ET AL., objectors-appellees.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for Appellant.

Jose Varela Calderon and Benito Jimenez Zoboli for Appellees.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila setting aside a will on the ground of undue
influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of a testator by one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio
de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the
payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
taking care of the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from
severe illness.

Pascual COSO, vs.

Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al.,
G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921

FACTS:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her for many
years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testator’s will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimate son
and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement
for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness.
The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator
by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

RULING:

Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that effect, the
influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously stated, but the
substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a
kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him
express the will of another rather than his own.

Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the will in
question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object
of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which
the testator would not otherwise have made.

And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an improper and
adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation
does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testator’s free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of its
execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear
that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency and make him express
the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not
invalidate a will.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be practiced,
even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those
who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made

Nicolas Macam v. Juana Gatmaitan; GR L-42619;

This is an action brought by the plaintiff as executrix of the testate estate of the deceased Leonarda Macam, for
the recovery from the defendant Juana Gatmaitan and Magno S. Gatmaitan of the ownership of the house
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the court absolving the
defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Topic/Doctrine: Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

The records show that NicolasaMacam fi led a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a
will and a codicil. Both will and codicil were executed by LeonardoMacam. The will was admitted to probate without
any opposition, but with regard to the codicil, however, an opposition to its probate was fi led by Juana Gatmaitan.
After hearing, the court ordered the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the codicil as well as of the opposition
thereto on the ground that since the allowance of the will had already become fi nal and executory, it was too late
to consider the codicil. Both parties appealed.

ISSUE:

W/N a probate of a will would be a final judgment prior to that of a codicil, thereof a bar to the probate of the
codicil?

HELD:

The Supreme Court, speaking through JusticeVillareal, held:

“The fact that a will has been allowed without opposition and the order allowing the same has become final and
executor is not a bar to the presentation of a codicil, provided it complies with all the necessary formalities for
executing a will. “It is not necessary that the will and the codicil be probated together as the codicil may be concealed
by an interested party and it may not be discovered until after the will has already been allowed; and they may be
presented and probated one after the other, since the purpose of the probate proceeding is merely to determine
whether or not the will and the codicil meet all thestatutory requirements for their extrinsic validity, leaving the
validity of their provisions for further consideration. “The appeal taken by the petitioner NicolasaMacam is,
therefore, well-founded and the court a quo erred in flatly denyingher petition for the probate of the codicil on the
erroneousground that said codicil should have been presented at the sametime as the will.

“With respect to the opposition of the oppositor-appellantJuana Gatmaitan, the fact that she failed to file opposition
tothe probate of the will does not prevent her from filing oppositionto the probate of the codicil thereof, inasmuch
as the willmay satisfy all the external requisites necessary for its validity,but the codicil may, at the time of its
execution, not be in conformitytherewith. If the testator had testamentary capacity atthe time of the execution of
the will, and the will was executedin accordance with all the statutory requirements, opposition toits probate would
not lie. On the contrary, if at the time of theexecution of the codicil, the testator lacked some of the
subjectiverequisites legally capacitating him to execute the same, orall the statutory requirements were not
complied with in theexecution thereof, opposition to its probate would lie.

Johnny Rabadilla v. CA; GR 113725;

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-
35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 113725
June 29, 2000

FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix AlejaBelleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-
interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee to most of the properties of the
decedent with the condition that she will subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to
the herein private respondent every year.

However, there was no compliance. Lower court dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity. Appealed CA but
they were not satisfied since the settlement on Art. 882 was not satisfied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simple substitution exists?

HELD:

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to
whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express
charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. 13 The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants
would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Rebecca Viado Non, et.al. v. CA; GR 137287

Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th
May 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals, basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC") of Queron City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property subject matter of the litigation to respondents.
The case and the factual settings found by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that
made by the trial court.

VIADO vs. CA
G.R. No. 137287
February 15, 2000

Topic/Doctrine: Rescission and Nullity of Partition, Art. 1104

FACTS:

During their lifetime, spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and
lot located Isarog Street, Quezon City. Virginia died on 1982. Julian died three years later. Surviving them were their
children -- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia
Viado. Nilo and Leah died on 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents --- his wife Alicia
Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado. Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a
common residence at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between
petitioner Rebecca and respondent Alicia after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between
the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over
the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 1988, petitioners,
asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for partition. Respondents predicated their claim
of absolute ownership over the subject property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian
covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in
which Julian, Leah, petitioner Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo their rights and interests over their share of the
property inherited from Virginia. Both instruments were registered by virtue of which old TCT was cancelled and
new one was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado. Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the
foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce deceased
Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia
Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not preterition justifies partition of estate.

HELD:

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily
has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
does not justify a collateral attack on the Transfer Certificate of Title. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value
of the share pertaining to her. The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their
execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against
all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.

When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in question
included, was transmitted to her heirs --- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah
Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under
a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs
and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a
donation or an extrajudicial settlement. In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties
in this case, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the
title solely to Nilo Viado. Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of
the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals,
in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of,
by and large, self-serving testimonies.