CASE DIGEST: LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS, respondents

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel Santos, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal
Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia
lived with the latter’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby
boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents
into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a “quarrel” over a number of other
things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would
express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to so dissuade
her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance
telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel
got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for “Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code” (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:

(T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period
of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

Issue:

Whether or not the failed to communicate and inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years,
more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

Held:

-Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
-The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
-The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
CASE DIGEST
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child
was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage
with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic
ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, Petitioner

Vs

Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te, Respondent

G.R. No. 161793

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

Sometimes in January 1996 Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first met respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez YuTe in a
gathering organized by the Filipino Chinese association in their college. Sharing similar angst towards their families, the
two understood one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around
three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was
young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money and she, purchases the boat ticket.

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast
depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. On April 23,
1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. Rowena
suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father he told that
he will disinherited and insisted that Edward must go home. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved
by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They
then parted ways.

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. The
trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that
both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Issue:

Whether or not the contracted marriage is void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated

Held:

The Psychological test result and evaluation result were both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different
notions on marriage. Although there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,
REINSTATED.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi (CASE DIGEST)

GR No. 119190

16 January 1997

FACTS:

On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married. Although they slept in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, no sexual intercourse took place. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations.
She was found healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her husband’s examination was kept confidential.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual, and that the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a
normal man. The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his wife’s fault. He claims no defect on his part, as he
was found not to be impotent, and any differences between the two of them can still be reconciled. He admitted that
they have not had intercourse since their marriage until their separation because his wife avoided him. He added that
his wife filed this case against him because she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewellery of his
mother, and, that the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?

RULING:

Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Court clearly demonstrates
an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of
the Family Code.

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. However, neither the trial
court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have
sexual contact with the other. But the fact remains that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since
the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

The petition is DENIED.

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ v. CA, GR No. 126010, 1999-12-08

Facts:

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic
Parish Church

Three children were born to them, namely, Maie,... Lyra,... On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court... a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to... the time of the filing of the suit, private
respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household,
devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent,...
after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs
with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her
with a sexually transmissible disease (STD).

She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life.
Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three
children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every... month... purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which
private respondent took with... him when he left the conjugal home

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany.
Private respondent, a college freshman, was her... student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in
February 1979 when she was no longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.

Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner
provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty member
of the Philippine Christian University.

Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee,
rice and polvoron.

From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in
her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other
women, petitioner's business suffered. Private... respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and
betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a
certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student... whose husband was working in
Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena.
Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent
said he would... end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned
petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private
respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.

Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in
San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991,
because he availed himself of the early retirement... plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement
pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself
and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became
worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had relations
with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki;

Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master
Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he
had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva

When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As
a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then
barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent
time with them.

Petitioner... told private respondent of her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.

It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had already abandoned
petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since
then, private respondent's... whereabouts had been unknown.

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19] dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals... rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court

Issues:

whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private
respondent's psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so... expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"... to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,... upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."

In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they
were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of... marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was
not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of... fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation
of the Family Code.

It must be shown that... these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent's
youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate... court held.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon... petitioner.

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial
court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the
marriage, are entitled to great weight... and even finality.[28] Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical,
capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with
friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of
marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to
provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for
the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which
was however reversed by CA.

Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the
behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period
of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
G. R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001356

FACTS:

The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends that respondent
surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color”
of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a
habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning. When
cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased
petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves
were not spared from physical violence.

Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no
longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay,
things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half
an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight
physical injuries.

Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn reversed the decision of the
trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina should be taken to be merely
advisory and not mandatory in nature.

HELD:

(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further
explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.

(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina,
additional procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are
mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.
ROBERT F. MALLILIN v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN, GR No. 192718, 2015-02-18

Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC

On March 7, 1996, RTC... denied the petition... n January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC... decision "due to lack of participation of the State as
required under Article 48 of the Family Code."

In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity
and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such... incapacity became even
more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational
judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their
marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial.

When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that when they
were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz... had been
remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room
because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed... their
clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3)it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time
sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous... letters reporting
her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he
was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.

In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal
of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of
due discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon 1095. This decision was... affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA.

The CA,... granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision.

Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA

Issues:

whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luzwas psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely
physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed... and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of... the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[7]

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,[9]the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[10] based on Article 36 of the Family Code.Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be... psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.

The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state

Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert's evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.

First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no
other evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz.

Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the
trial.

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage
void based on psychological incapacity.

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was
insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[14] the Court stated that interpretations given by... the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged
psychological incapacity of Luz.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Ting v. Ting

G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009

FACTS:

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school and they married each other after several years. Years after, Benjamin became a
full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the Velez Hospital owned by Carmen’s family. Benjamin and Carmen had six children during their marriage.
But after 18 years of marriage, Carmen went to court to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated. She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the latter was already a drunkard; that Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent,
and would rather spend on his expensive hobby; that he rarely stayed home and even neglected his children and family obligations.

Carmen presented an expert witness, Dr. Oñate, to prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity. However, Oñate merely based her findings on the
statement submitted by Benjamin. Oñate was not able to personally examine Benjamin because at that time, Benjamin was already working as an
anaesthesiologist in South Africa. On his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own expert witness to disprove Carmen’s
allegations. Obra was not able to personally examine Benjamin but he also evaluated the same deposition evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin
submitted himself for evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. Pentz) and the transcript of said evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter
also evaluated the same. Obra found Benjamin not to be psychologically incapacitated.

The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.

RULING:

No, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage 18 years
ago.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an absolute insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at
the inception of the marriage should be a disorder so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that
prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence presented prove such defects to be
incurable. The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the significant evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage
between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, the Court was not convinced that the opinions proiced by these experts strengthened
respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two provided absolutely contradicting psychological evaluations.
Azcueta v. Republic

G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24, 1993. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage and bore no
child.

Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, claiming that her husband
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the
essential responsibilities and duties of husband

Petitioner also complained of physical violence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations.

RULING:

Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with the guidelines in the Molina case to
warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.

The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision;

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage;

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children;

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.

In all, the Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper
under the premises.
Halili v.Halili, G.R. No. 165424, June 9, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a
“joke.” After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting
constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he
received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out
that the marriage was not “fake.” Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent
and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioner’s personality
disorder was serious and incurable. CA reversed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
W/N he is psychologically incapacitated

HELD:

The testimony of petitioner’s expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder. In her psychological
report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his
parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioner’s mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on
what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real. Dr. Dayan further observed that petitioner typically acted in a self-
denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him. This could
be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots and, later, by respondent who
was as domineering as his father. When petitioner could no longer take respondent’s domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than
confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage. It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological
condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause.
SUAZO v. SUAZO

G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without any means to support themselves, they lived with
Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but
this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he
has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on
the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and
testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC
annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense
of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA
reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still
necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior
of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or
refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to
declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only
in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be
doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality
profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality
disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on
the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence
showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony
regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
G.R. NO. 185286, August 18, 2010

SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, vs. RAMON REYES,

FACTS:

Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondent’s actions, caused the petitioner to file a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with the respondent alleging psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was
not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed
[respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical
psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr.
Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity.

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision and declared the parties’ marriage valid and
subsisting. It held that the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. It held:

“In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the [respondent’s] alleged mixed personality disorder, his “come and go”
attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s] feelings,
irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed
business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences
and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] “defects” were not present at the inception of
marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner]
admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most
Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter,
[respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc.
since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].”

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court held:

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically
constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In
this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had
occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and
sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors’
assessments.

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’
separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include
chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

The respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance
abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

PETITION GRANTED.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011 Psychological Incapacity Art. 36 Family Code
JUNE 17, 2018
FACTS:

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973, maintained a
relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four children. Shortly after the birth of their
youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano who gave birth to a son.

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with
Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his
marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.

The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with
their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.

Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and
chose to live with Malyn.

Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger
children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends
because of alleged weekend plans with their father.

Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with
the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her
psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during
their co-habitation

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J.
(Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual
mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).

The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code.

The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal
and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely
disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD,
there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence
points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and
incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties.

The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
MARABLE V. MARABLE

G.R. No. 178741, [January 17, 2011]

FACTS:

On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor
Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 and their marriage was blessed with 5 children.

Their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. Petitioner developed a
relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But
despite the end of the affair, their quarrels aggravated. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and
unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. Petitioner left the family home and stayed with his
sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in
favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds and filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital
life.

Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an early
age. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused
petitioner’s mother and siblings to suffer immensely. He further alleged that he supported himself through college and
worked hard for the company he joined. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a
child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.

Petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Tayag’s report stated that petitioner is suffering from “Antisocial Personality Disorder,” characterized
by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of
remorse. The report also revealed that petitioner’s personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting
from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr.
Tayag’s conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.

The RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioner’s psychological
incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision. CA denied MR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD:

NO! CA’s decision was upheld.

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. These are the disorders
that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he
or she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.

In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held,
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. (7)

Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its
root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a
general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder. As held in the case of Suazo v.
Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of
the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner’s marriage to respondent. It is
indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why
he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a
result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. In
Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Republic v CA and Quintos (G.R. No. 159594)

Facts:
Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. However, the couple were not blessed with a child because Catalina had
a hysterectomy following her second marriage.

Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a ground. He alleged that
Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly
refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for
their adopted daughter; that she gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker; and that she abandoned the
conjugal home with her paramour.

As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was no
longer treatable.

Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting with different men and
abandoning the conjugal home.

Issue:
Whether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.

Held:
No. Marriage remains valid.

Psychological incapacity is an incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is
not merely the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.

In Republic v CA(Molina), the Supreme Court has established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage based on the
ground of psychological incapacity. These were not met in the instant case since the gravity, root cause and incurability
of Catalina's purported psychological incapacity were not sufficiently established.

Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to do household chores,
and take care of their adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo presented no other witness to corroborate these
allegations.

Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr. Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this claim. The
report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the incapacity.Even the testimony of Dr. Reyes stated
a general description of borderline personality disorder which did not explain the root cause as to why Catalina was
diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or omissions or the gravity which constituted the disorder. What was
established was that Catalina was childish and immature.

Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the depth and objectivity of an expert
assessment.

From the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her
marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity alone. It must be shown that such immature acts were
manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage.
BUENAVENTURA vs CA

Petitioner: NOELBUENAVENTURA
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA

FACTS:

Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife
were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and
respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered
petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity
arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the
appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20,
000. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

RULING:

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to
articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been
acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate
property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution.