BALTAZAR v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT G.R. No. L-14029 October 15, 1919 MALCOLM, J.

:
FACTS: The heirs of the deceased Lucino Almeida applied to the CFI of La Union for the registration in
their name of two parcels of land in the barrio of Paraoir, municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union,
containing 815 hectares, 68 ares, and 88 centares. Their ownership was evidenced by documents
denoting a public sale of 2 parcels of land by Pastor Versosa y Florentino in favor of Lucino Almeida on
June 9, 1895
The Attorney – General opposed the registration on the ground that it included forest lands. A
forest ranger testified that in the portions indicated on the plan, there were either forests,
noncommercial forest, or caiñgins.
Judge of First Instance, Honorable Manuel Camus, denied the application as the record does not
disclose proof of the right alleged by them and with the testimony of the ranger of the Bureau of
Forestry.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in denying the application.

RULE: No. The time which advantage could be taken of the Maura Law expired on April 17, 1895.
Almeida obtained dominion over 526 hectares of land on June 9, 1895. The possessory information for
815 hectares was issued to Almeida on December 14, 1896. Almeida was thus not in possession until
after the expiration of the period specified by the Maura Law for the issuance of possessory titles, and
his possessory information was of even a later date and made to cover a large excess of land.

SPS. PALOMO v. CA G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997 ROMERO, J.:
FACTS: Pursuant to Act 648 of the Philippine Commission, E.O. 40 was issued. It reserved some land,
situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay, for provincial park purposes. CFI of
Albay, 15th Judicial District, USA, then ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by E.O. 40
under Diego Palomo, who donated these parcels of land to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and
Carmen Palomo 2 months before his death.
Ignacio Palomo then filed a petition for reconstitution claiming that the original certificates of
title were lost during the Japanese occupation, which the Register of Deeds of Albay then issued
multiple Transfer of Certificates of Title (TCT). Later, President Magsaysay issued Proc. 47, converting
the area embraced by E.O. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," The area was never released as
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
The Palomos however continued in possession of the property, paid its real estate taxes and
introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. Said parcels of land were
mortgaged to guarantee a loan of P200,000.00 from BPI.
Later, Petitioners filed a civil case for injunction with damages against private respondents who
are Bureau of Forest Development employees who cut down bamboos, leveling at least 4 groves worth
around P2,000.00. Republic of the Philippines also filed a case for annulment and cancellation of
certificates of title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners.
The trial court ordered to cancel the alleged Original Certificates of Titles.

ISSUE: WON the alleged original certificate of titles were valid.

RULE: No. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect
title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District Forester,
records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and
disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present. Moreover, as part of the
reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands
are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
As to petitioners’ claim that as they obtained the titles without government opposition, the
government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were
granted, the principle of estoppel, does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents.

CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTTHORITY G.R. 133250 July 9, 2002 CARPIO, J

FACTS: The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP') to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
Pres. Marcos then issued P.D. 1084, creating the Public Estates Authority (PEA) tasked "to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, . . . lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands." Simultaneously, P.D. 1085 was issued, transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). By virtue of a memorandum issued by Pres. Marcos, PEA and CDCP
executed a MOA, which included among others that “All future works in MCCRRP… shall be funded and
owned by PEA”
Pres. Aquino then issued Special Patent 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of
land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP with a total area of 1,915,894sq.m. Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of PEA, covering the 3 reclaimed
islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Parañaque City, with a total area of 1,578,441sq.m. PEA then entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement ("JVA") with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation (AMARI), a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without
public bidding.
Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." The
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. It was reported that
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is
illegal. Under Pres. Ramos, a legal task force was created to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA,
which upheld the legality of the same.
Later, Petitioner, Frank Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a petition praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO, contending that the government would lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI. The motion for the issuance of a TRO was denied.
Despite the pending case, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
("Amended JVA") which was approved by Pres. Estrada. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the
Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the amended
contract, be declared null and void.
ISSUE: WON stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer of lands to AMARI, violated the
Constitution.

RULE: YES. Under the Regalian Doctrine, the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted such Doctrine. Consistent with the said doctrine, foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore
and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted
pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.
Alienable lands of the public domain are to be distributed equitably among our population. To insure
such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. RP G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013 BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: Mario Malabanan bought a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, from Eduardo
Velazco, and applied for a land registration covering the property in RTC of Tagaytay City, Cavite,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title. Such claims were evidenced by a certification issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR. RTC then granted the application.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed to the CA, arguing that Malabanan failed to
prove that the property is under the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the
RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property for period required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
CA then reversed the decision and dismissed the application declaring that under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs
elevated the CA’s decision to this Court.
Petitioners relied in the case of naguit, where it was ruled that any possession of agricultural
land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period
of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree.
The RP contends that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the subject land had
been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE: WON the court erred in denying the application for the land registration

RULE: No, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service
or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable. Regalian Doctrine is a
legal concept where all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All
lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons
 Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession - that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, possession and
occupation, since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the
public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to
belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are exempted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of
the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased
to be part of the public domain and has become private property.

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

MENGUITO v. RP G.R. No. 134308 December 14, 2000 PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: In the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, an Application for Registration of Title was filed by the
successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito. They
claimed that applicants are the owners in fee simple of 11 parcels of land located in the Barrio of
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila, that said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the
concept of owners, of said parcels of land for more than thirty years
RP, through the Solicitor General, prayed for the denial of the application contending, that the
muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, attached to or alleged in the application, do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The Lower court decided in confirming the registerable title of the applicants. The CA, however,
agreed with respondent that the lower court failed to consider the legal requirements for registration of
imperfect titles.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in rejecting petitioners’ application for the registration of their respective
titles.

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed to
consider the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the
land is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-
in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the
land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that
petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since
June 12, 1945.

RULE: No, under Sec. 48 of C.A. 141, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements for
the registration of imperfect titles: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. Petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.
Petitioners’ reliance on the printed words,” This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, X X X” of the survey plan is insufficient proof. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
The tax declarations, tax receipts and the Municipal Treasurer’s certifications of tax payments
presented in evidence are insufficient to prove petitioners’ and their predecessors-in-interest’s
possession of the lots in question.

SPOUSES DE OCAMPO v. ARLOS G.R. 135527 October 19, 2000 PANGANIBAN, J:

FACTS: Federico S. Arlos and Teolo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration seeking judicial
confirmation of their titles to 3 parcels of land all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan. Spouses
Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed
the application for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of lots 1 and 2, evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the government
through sales patents. The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that
neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the ling of the application. Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses
Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron also opposed the application for registration.
Almost 4 years after the filing of the land registration case, the applicants sought to cancel; (1)
the free patent title of defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Runa Enriquez, (2) the free patent title
of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, and (3) the sales patent title of defendants-spouses
Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta
Santos.
On another case involving the same properties subject of this appeal (G.R. 64753), the SC
annulled the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the sales patent title issued
in favor of the spouses De Ocampo and spouses Santos.
Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to
comply with the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and
cultivators of the land. It explained that because of the absence of the actual occupancy on their part,
the sales patents and titles issued in their favor are null and void. It was ruled that the alleged
misrepresentation of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land are sufficient
grounds to nullify the patent and title under Section 9 of the Public Land Laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753

RULE: No, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military reservation that had been turned
over to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared disposable and alienable only in 1971. In
Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo a suit involving the same parcel of land, the court held: The ownership
and control over said reservation was transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature as a
military reservation remained unchanged. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public
domain only on May 19, 1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry.
Respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subject property
from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military
reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement. Clearly then, their
application for the registration of their titles was erroneously granted by the appellate and the trial
courts.

SANTIAGO v. DE LOS SANTOS G.R. L-20241 November 22, 1974 FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: An application is filed by Luis R. Santiago for registration of his title over a parcel of land in San
Mateo, Rizal. The application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and by Mrs. Pacita
V. de los Santos. After examination of the records, the Court ordered the applicant to show cause why
his application should not be dismissed outright on the ground that the property applied for is part of
the public domain. Subsequently, motions to dismiss the application were filed by the oppositor Mrs. de
los Santos and the Director of Forestry which motions are principally based on the allegation that the
property applied for is a portion of the public domain which was leased to Mrs. de los Santos under
Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1305. The court then found the motion to dismiss to be justified and
meritorious.

ISSUE: WON the court erred in affirming the dismissal of the application.

RULE: No, a portion of the said parcel of land subject of this registration which was claimed as part of
the public forest has already been released by the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources for agricultural purposes as evidenced by its order on August 10, 1961. Former counsel ought
to have realized the fatal effect on his client's case of such an admission. If it were his intention to
demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to the claim that he had been in open, public,
uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner from July 26, 1894 up to the
present, he could not have succeeded any better.
In case of doubt, considering that our forest resources have been unduly depleted, courts
should no lightly accept claims that a parcel of land no longer can be classified as forestal. That is
certainly one mode of assuring the realization of the national patrimony being held in trust for future
generations. There is thus fealty to the ideal of conservation.
SPOUSES REYES v. CA G.R. 94524 September 10, 1998 MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS: Antonia Labalan filed with the Bureau of Lands Homestead Application and was approved. She
however died and was survived by her children who are the defendants in this case. Before the
application of the homestead patent by Labalan, she was already residing in the said place and made
improvements on the land. After her death, defendant Federico Reyes, one of her children continued to
reside therein. After the land was surveyed, Reyes filed the required Notice of Intention to make Final
Proof. Homestead Patent No. 64863 was then issued in the name of the heirs of Antonia Labalan and
the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 727 was issued.
Later, a certain Mary Agnes Burns, fi led with the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a 50-hectares property she allegedly purchased from Salvador Moreno. Included
thereat is the property covered by O.C.T. No. 727. Despite the land she bought was still within the Naval
Reservation Area and part of the forest zone, Burns nevertheless took the risk of occupying and
improving the land after verifying that the same would be released for private disposition.
Alleging that Burns illegally and forcibly entered the defendant's titled property, the defendants
filed a Forcible Entry Case against the former with four (4) others. Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, they
elevated the case to the then CFI of Zambales and Olongapo City. The heirs of Antonia Labalan were
declared as the registered owner of the land covered by O.C.T. 727 and therefore entitled to the
possession of the same. Burns then filed a petition with the Solicitor General for the cancellation of
O.C.T. 727 on the ground that the land covered thereby is within the forest zone. The petition was
referred by the Solicitor General to the Bureau of Lands for investigation. By virtue of the reports
submitted by the land inspectors and the certication issued by district Forester Rogelio Delgado,
Certication No. 65, showing that the land in question was found to be within the alienable and
disposable land only on January 31, 1961 per LCM 2427. That the area covered by O.C.T. No. 727 and
the adjoining owners of the land are still forest zone from 1941 – 1960.
OSG, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint for "Cancellation of Title and
Reversion" against herein petitioners. The case was dismissed on the ground that the Republic failed to
prove its allegation that the subject land was not yet alienable and disposable at the time the Bureau of
Lands granted Antonia Labalan, a homestead patent. The Republic appealed to the CA arguing that the
trial court erred in ruling that: Homestead Patent No. 64863 and the corresponding OCT No. 727 issued
to petitioners are valid and binding, and that the subsequent release of the land as alienable and
disposable in 1961 rectified or validated the grant to them or at least gave them priority over the land.
CA reversed the trial court, ruling that the land subject matter of the case was part of the forest
lands when Homestead Patent No. 64832 dated January 2, 1941 and O.C.T. 727 were issued in the name
of the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON the subsequent release of said land as alienable rectified or validated the defect or at least
accords the grantees preferential right over the same.

RULE: NO, We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belonged to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the
public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at
the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent
applicant, the Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was
not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the
Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.
The rule is that a void act cannot be validated or ratified. The subsequent release of the subject
land as alienable and disposable did not cure any defect in the issuance of the homestead patent nor
validated the grant. The hard fact remains that at the time of the issuance of the homestead patent and
the title, the subject land was not yet released as alienable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA G.R. 79582 April 10, 1989 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J

FACTS: Nicolas Felisilda, as a settler of the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), was
assigned Farmlot No. 1279 and Homelot No. 200, both situated in Polomolok, South Cotabato. A
Certificate of Permanent Assignment of said lots was issued to him by the Farm Administrator of
Polomolok Settlement District. Felisilda then filed Free Patent Application No. 37-175 for the Disputed
Property with the Bureau of Lands, through Lands Inspector Vicente Gal Cejas. Nicolas Felisilda later on
died.
It was only after the death of Nicolas Felisilda, when Cejas acted upon said application and
processed it, after Felisilda's widow, Catalina Felisilda, sought his help in expediting action on her
husband's application. Cejas submitted a Certification to the Director of Lands that upon ocular
inspection of the land covered by Free Patent Application No. 37-175, he found that the applicant had
been in continuous occupation and cultivation thereof since 1941; that the applicant "is still living; that
it was free from claims and conflicts at the time of inspection; and recommending that patent be issued
to the applicant., The Bureau of Lands approved the Application and ordered the issuance of Patent.
Free Patent No. 326416 was issued to Nicolas Felisilda, followed by the issuance of the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. (P-29004) P-11128. This was subsequently cancelled and TCT T10450 was
issued in the name of the Heirs of Nicolas Felisilda after an extrajudicial settlement had been executed
by them.
After 5 years from issuance of the TCT, the Heirs of Nicolas Felisilda sold the entirety of the land
to Manuel Serranillo, and Francisco Laiz. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-12335 and T-12416 were
issued to Serranillo and Laiz. If the Deeds of Sale are to be taken at their face value, the Disputed
Property was sold beyond the prohibitory period of five (5) years from the issuance of the Free Patent
on 14 April 1967.
The Republic stresses, however, that as early as 1970, or within the proscribed period for
transfer of land covered by a Free Patent, the Heirs of Nicolas Felisilda had already alienated portions of
the land to Serranillo and Laiz except that the formal contracts were not executed until 1972. Proof of
the matter was that even on 29 September 1970 and 22 April 1971 Serranillo had executed acts of
ownership by entering into notarized contracts to sell portions of the Disputed Property with Nena B.
Jamila and Pablo Poliquit, respectively
In a first endorsement, where land Inspector Francisco del Rosario was assigned as Investigator,
he recommended the annulment of the Patent on the principal grounds that neither Nicolas Felisilda nor
his heirs had continuously occupied or cultivated the land; that the application filed by them appears to
have been falsified. The Director of Lands rendered a Decision declaring that Free Patent No. 326416
granted to Nicolas Felisilda was null and void as it had been fraudulently issued, and recommending the
judicial cancellation of said patent and title.
The Republic, as petitioner, upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands, filed a
Complaint for cancellation of Free Patent No. 326416, Original Certificate of Title No. P-29004, and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-12335 and T-12416, claiming that actual fraud and deception was
practiced on the Director of Lands considering that the Application for Free Patent and the Notice of
Application for Free Patent were accomplished after the death of the applicant Nicolas Felisilda, and
that the land was sold within the prohibitory period of five (5) years contrary to the Public Land Law.
The lower court dismissed the complaint declaring the Free Patent as valid against the whole
world and the corresponding Original Transfer Certificates of Title as legal and binding, no fraud having
been proven. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals which affirmed said judgment in toto
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in holding that there was no violation of the provisions of section 118
of the public land law considering that the deed of conveyance in favor of the defendants was executed
beyond the prohibitory period of five years from the issuance of the patent.

RULE: yes, Sec. 118 of the Public Land Law provides that lands acquired under Free Patent shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent.
In the case at bar, the Free Patent was issued on 14 April 1967 and yet, barely three (3) years
after its issuance, or in 1970, Catalina Felisilda had bartered a portion thereof with Serranillo, as she
herself had declared in the investigation proceedings. Records also show that after Seranillo had
acquired the property, on 1970, he sold a lot covered by OCT P-29004, in favor of Nena Jamila and
another to Pablo Poliquit.
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that Felisilda's widow had disposed of the land within
the prohibitory period because as she herself stated she needed money to finance her medical
expenses. The provision of the law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within
five years after the grant of the patent is mandatory, the purpose of the law being to promote a definite
public policy, which is to preserve and keep in the family of the patentee that portion of the public land
which the State has gratuitously given to them.

RP v. ESTONILO G.R. 157306 November 25, 2005 PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: An application for registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey
of Cagayan de Oro was led by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct CFI of Misamis
Oriental. Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned and possessed by a certain
Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their
attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty.
the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] led its opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable
land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the
Philippine Army.
CA ruled that (Proc 265) failed to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the military
reservation. The CA said that the proclamation was "not self-executory and self-adjudicating considering
that there is a need to determine private rights of claimants over lands sought to be reserved. It also
agreed with the trial court that respondents were able to establish with sufficient evidence their right to
have the land registered under their names. It acknowledged that possession by respondents'
predecessors-in-interest had ripened into an imperfect title of ownership, subject to judicial
confirmation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Presidential Proclamation No.
265 did not effectively segregate Lot 4318 from the public domain

RULE: Yes, It is undisputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 for the use of the Philippine
Army. Respondents maintain, though, that the land was not effectively segregated as a military
reservation by the Proclamation. Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does not require a
judicial order to create a military reservation. It contends that the proviso requiring the reservation to
be subject to private rights means that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded
from proving their claims.
 The segregation of land for a public purpose is governed by the Public Land Act, under Sec. 83
“the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as
reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof,” Clearly, only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate a piece of land for a public
purpose. Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as a military reservation.
Consequently, respondents could not have validly occupied it in 1954, because it was considered
inalienable since its reservation in 1938.