Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 5

G.R. No.

L-17619 October 31, 1962

FACTS: Respondent Valencia filed an application for registration of two


FRANCISCA GATCHALIAN, plaintiff-appellee,
parcels of land (Lot No. 1-b-2 and Lot No. 1-b-3). Respondent claimed that he
vs.
GORGONIO PAVILIN, JOSE DE VERA, EUGENIO DE VERA, JOSE had acquired title thereto because Sps. Marquez and Capiral failed to repurchase
ORTIZ, ALFONSO ORTIZ, and CONRADO CABUYADO, defendants- the parcels of land within the period stipulated in the contract of sale with right
appellants. to repurchase. Sps. Marquez and Capiral opposed the application on the ground
that the parcels of land were subject of pending litigation before the CFI of
Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 5250. By agreement, the application was
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
postponed until the final judgment of said civil case.

By: Sicalag

In Civil Case No. 5250, the spouses prayed for the nullity of the contract of sale.
Topic: Rule 8 Section 2 - Alternative causes of action or defenses. — A party The CFI of Bulacan ruled that the contract was one of antichresis. On appeal,
may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or
the CA ruled that it was a pacto de retro sale. On appeal by certiorari, the SC
hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in separate causes of
ruled that it was an equitable mortgage and that spouses should pay only
action or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative
and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not mortgage debt of P7,000.00.
made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements.
Lot No. 1-b-2 was excluded from the application because it was already
Facts: Francisca Gatchalian is an owner of a tract of land of 143 hectares registered in the name of Felipa Crisostomo.
covered by an OCT issued by the RD of Isabela, consisting of 3 lots. Lot No. 2
is consisting of about 88 hectares, portions of which were "by means of force,
strategy, and/or stealth, unlawfully entered" by defendants-appellants during
the planting season of 1953, "ejecting the plaintiff and/or her representative or Respondent, in view of the judgement in Civil Case No. 5250, amended his
representatives, thereby illegally depriving Gatchalian of the possession of an application and alleged that he had acquired the parcel of land (Lot No. 1-b-3)
aggregate area of 36 hectares. Hence, this case for recovery and damages. by inheritance from his maternal grandfather, the late Pedro Crisostomo and
that his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since time
In their joint answer, appellants denied the material facts and allegations of the immemorial and was only interrupted by heirs of Marquez who also claimed to
complaint and made "Affirmative and Alternative Defenses" with be the owner of the parcel of land.
"Counterclaim", alleging that the OCT is null and void ab initio, the same being
a forest land at the time it was all bought in 1947 by plaintiff-appellee.
Appellants claim that "the alleged landholding and title of the plaintiff could
not have covered defendants landholding"; that their predecessors-in-interest, The trial court dismiss the application for registration on the ground of res
in good faith, took possession, made cultivations and improvements thereon for judicata. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling being of the opinion that the
several years long before 1953, OCEN, on concept of owners thereof, with judgement in Civil Case No. 5250 did not bar filing of an amended application
intention of acquiring later on their respective land titles over the same from the for registration and remanded the case to the lower court for new trial.
Bureau of Lands,

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment which was objected by the ISSUE: Whether or not the application for registration of land filed by
defendants, but the trial court granted the motion ratiocinating that there is no
respondent is barred by reason of res judicata?
genuine issue of fact to be resolved and rendered summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in rendering a summary judgment RULING: Yes. The application for registration of land filed by respondent is
upon finding that the two defenses raised by the defendants being incompatible barred by reason of res judicata. The rule that a dismissal of an application for
inter se, could not raise genuine issue of fact. the registration of a parcel of land does not bar the filing of another application,
cannot be availed of in the case at bar. A renewal of an application for
Ruling: No. registration of the same parcel of land or an amendment thereto upon a ground
different from that alleged in the previous application may be allowed if the
dismissal of the first application was without prejudice and not when the
Although inartistically drawn, the two main defenses raised are: (1) that their ownership or title to the parcel of land was litigated by the same parties and a
landholdings lay outside the title of the plaintiff; and (2) that if her title did judgment rendered for one party and against the other.
cover their landholdings, the title was acquired illegally, because at the time the
plaintiff's sales patent was issued, the land covered was still part of a forest
reserve. While such defenses are to a certain extent incompatible inter se, it
cannot be said that they raise no genuine issue of fact. It must be remembered In the case at bar, in view of the judgment in Civil Case No. 5250 declaring the
that section 9 of Rule 15 (now rule 8 section 2) specifically authorizes the nullity of the contract of sale where respondent solely anchored his claim of
pleading of alternative or hypothetical defenses, and the decisions of this Court
ownership, barred the filing of amended application for it involved the same
hold that such defenses may be inconsistent with each other provided each is
property and same parties and a judgment was rendered in favor of spouses
consistent in itself.
Marquez and Capiral. Thus, constituted res judicata.

The Rules of Court gives the courts limited authority to enter summary
judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
In this case, the conflicting claims of the parties plainly require exact PRINCIPLE: “If aside from relying solely on the deed of sale with a right to
delimitation of the areas covered by the title of plaintiff and those occupied by repurchase and failure on the part of the vendors to purchase it within the period
the defendants in order to find out if they overlap. To do so, a trial is stipulated therein, the defendant had set up an alternative though inconsistent
indispensable. defense that he had inherited the parcel of land from his late maternal
grandfather and presented evidence in support of both defenses, the overruling
The SC ruled that the summary judgment is null and void and the case was of the first would not bar the determination by the court of second.
remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.

Principle: Two defenses that are to a certain extent incompatible inter se, The defendant having failed to set up such alternative defenses and chosen or
cannot be said to raise no genuine issue of fact. elected to rely on one only, the overruling thereof was a complete determination
of the controversy between the parties which bars a subsequent action based
upon an unpleaded defense, or any other cause of action, except that of failure
of the complaint to state a cause of action and of lack of jurisdiction of the
HEIRS OF LAUREANO MARQUEZ VS. VICENTE VALENCIA Court.”

G.R. No. L-7328; 21 AUGUST 1956

By Ian Hernandez
TUMANG VS. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-69098 May 31, 1985
By: Rafael L. Bernardo
TOPIC: Alternative Causes of Action or Defenses
TOPIC: RULE 8- Language in the pleadings
FACTS: covered by the deed of sale and to require the defendant to
pay damages, and to pay the costs.
Emilio Javier, the private respondent herein, filed a Sakdal (complaint) for
unjust vexation against Enrique Tumang and his daughter Georgia Respondent answered with a general denial and a special
Tumang para Danyos Purhisyo.(damages) The sakdal was written in Tagalog defense, not sworn to, in which she asked to nullify the contract
and was unaccompanied by an English translation. of sale. The plaintiffs denied under oath the genuineness and
due execution of the so-called donation intervivos set forth in
In a motion for a bill of particulars, the Tumangs prayed: the answer.

That plaintiff (Javier) be ordered to file the complaint as CFI (now RTC) declared the deed of sale, Exhibit A, fictitious,
translated in English, the language recognized by the null, and without effect, and absolving the defendants from the
courts and thereafter furnish copy together with the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs. Hence, this petition.
copy of the criminal complaint and the Decision of
acquittal in the "Unjust Vexation" case
ISSUE:

The trial court ruled:


Whether or not the defendants may impugn the genuineness
and due execution of the deed of sale which were not
The complaint written in Pilipino, which is an official specifically denied under oath in the answer?
language, is proper and is hereby admitted. After, the
words and sentences used are clear and can be easily
understood. RULING:

The defendants failed to answer the sakdal and were declared in default. They YES. Although the defendants did not deny the genuineness
sought reconsideration not only of the order of default but also of the RTC and due execution of the contract of sale of December 9,
Ruling 1913, under oath, yet the defendants could properly set up
the defenses of fraud and want of consideration
The trial court refused to reconsider. It said:
Section 103 of the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure
provides: When an action is brought upon a written
RTC finds it should be noted that "Pilipino" is an instrument and the complaint contains or has annexed a copy
official language of the land, and there is no law of such instrument, the genuineness and due execution of the
prohibiting a party to a case from filing a pleading in instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless specifically
"Pilipino."
denied under oath in the answer; and when the defense
to an action, or a counterclaim stated in an answer, is
Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. They founded upon a written instrument and the copy thereof is
alleged that the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the venue contained in or annexed to the answer, the genuineness and
was improperly laid. RTC denied the motion due execution of such instrument shall be deemed admitted,
unless specifically denied under oath by the plaintiff in his
ISSUE: WON the sadlak should be written in English and not Tagalog pleadings.

RULING: The Court looked into the intention of the Legislature in


enacting in, as based from sections 448 and 449 of the Code
of Civil Procedure of California.
YES. The Court rule that while the Constitution says that "Until otherwise
provided by law, English and Pilipino shall be the official languages." (Art.
XV, Sec. 3, par. 3.) If we are to be guided by this provision then either English The law says that the genuineness and due execution of a
or Pilipino can be used. But in fact English is almost exclusively used and written instrument properly pleaded shall be deemed
with good reason. For Pilipino is still a gestating language. The Constitution admitted unless the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may
directs that "The Batasang Pambansa shall take step towards the development be, shall specifically deny the same under oath.
and formal adoption of a common national language to be known as Pilipino."
. The Batasang Pambansa, still has to take steps towards the development and
formal adoption of Pilipino as a common national language. The Court submit When the law makes use of the phrase "genuineness and due
that we should confine ourselves to the English language. execution of the instrument" it means nothing more than that
the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different
import on its face from the one executed. But the failure of
However, the petitioner cannot now raise before this Court - the question of
the party to file an affidavit denying the genuineness and due
Language. For in the motion to dismiss the complaint, the defendants tacitly
execution of the document does not estop him from
submitted to the trial court's ruling that the sakdal did not have to be translated
to English; they analyzed the sakdal in arguing that it stated no cause of controverting it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise,
action. Such analysis demonstrated that they understood its contents although payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and want of
it was not in English. consideration. As section 285 of our Code of Civil Procedure
permits a writing to be impeached because of its illegality or
fraud, such a defense would not be barred by the provisions
PRINCIPLE: English is almost exclusively used as Pilipino is still a of section 103.
gestating language, still being developed by Batasang Pambansa

G.R. No. 13300 September 29, 1919


TOPIC: SPECIFIC DENIAL
BASILIA BOUGH and GUSTAVUS BOUGH, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. HIBBERD V. ROHDE
By: Coryne Ramos
MATILDE CANTIVEROS and PRESBITERA
HANOPOL, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
McMillian was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock of
MALCOLM, J.: merchandise valued at P1,200 from Brand & Hibberd and sold it. Brand and
Hibberd argue it was only given as a DEPOSIT and filed a case of Estafa
agains Mcmillian. Mcmillian got an attorney, named Rhode for his defense in
Respondent Matilde Cantiveros she was the owner of various the estafa case. According to the SC, it appears that Rhode strongly insisted
parcels of realty. Because of her great confidence with that McMillian was not guilty of the crime charged, and no doubt his ability as
Gustavus Bough, she was induced to sign a fictitious contract a lawyer tended to convince the complainants that the criminal charge was
of sale of all her property to Basilia Bough, her cousin and unjustified.
protege since childhood and Gustavus’ wife in fear that her
husband Jose Vasquez was in town and might contest the The parties made an agreement: 1) IF Brand & Hibberd would withdraw the
contract for the separation of the conjugal property. estaf complaint. 2) Rohde agreed to be a jointly and severally liable with
Subsequently, petitioners Bough executed a donation Mcmillian to pay tothe firm of Brand and Hibberd, of the city of Baguio,
intervivos of the properties subject of the contract of sale in 1,200 pesos in monthly installments of 100. Rhode paid 200.
favor of the respondent.With this, petitioners Bough filed a
complaint in the CFI Leyte for the possession of the property
Only Rhode appeared and answered BUT did NOT enter a denial on the Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is explicit in that there are two ways of
genuineness and the execution of the note. Raises only the Special Defense of pleading an actionable document, namely:
Illegality of Consideration.
(a) by alleging the substance of such written instrument in the pleading and
Hibberd argues that his special defense of illegality of consideration is cut attaching a copy thereof to the pleading; and
off by section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
"Actions and defenses based upon a written instruments. — When an action is (b) by copying the instrument in the pleading.
brought upon a written instrument and the complaint contains or has annexed
a copy of such instrument, the genuineness and due execution of the The complaint in the present case complied with the first situation under
instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless specifically denied under oath in paragraph (a). The complaint alleged the substance of the promissory note
the answer; and when the defense to an action, or a counterclaim stated in an subject of the litigation and a copy of the promissory note was attached.
answer, is founded upon a written instrument and the copy thereof is
contained in or annexed to the answer, the genuineness and due execution of There is no question likewise that the petitioner failed to specifically deny
such instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless specifically denied under under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note subject
oath by the plaintiff in his pleadings. (Identical to Rule 8 Section 8 of 1997 of the complaint. By its omission, petitioner clearly admitted the genuineness
Rules/Current Rules) and due execution of the document and that the party whose signature appears
thereon had indeed signed the same and that he has the authority to sign the
Trial Court - In-favor of Rohde, since the consideration of the promissory note
same and that the agreement between the parties is what was in words and
was the compromise of a public offense.
figures in the document. Defenses which are inconsistent with the due
Submitted for review with the SC execution and genuineness of the written instrument are cut-off by such
admission. 6
ISSUE
WON the defense of illegality of consideration may still be raised despite The claim of petitioner is that its failure to specifically deny under oath the
the failure to enter a denial on the genuineness of the note. actionable document does not prevent it from showing that one Julio Tan was
not authorized to enter into the transaction and to sign the promissory note for
HELD/RATIO: and in behalf of the petitioner. But precisely, the petitioner is a party to the
YES, it may still be raised. instrument represented by Julio Tan so that it may not now deny the authority
The special defense interposed by the defendant of illegality of consideration of Julio Tan to so represent it. 7 The due execution and genuineness of the
is not barred by his failure to enter a verified denial of the genuineness and document have thereby been conclusively established.
due execution of the note set out in the complaint.
Moreover, in this case the judgment appealed from is supported by the
Rule 103 cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on evidence. This petition is at best dilatory.
the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument
introduced in evidence.
o SECTION 103 (of the old rules) DOES NOT PROHIBIT
SUCH A DEFENSE AS ILLEGALITY OF CONTRACT. To TORIBIO VS BIDIN
interpret section 103 as to prohibit such a defense as illegality of 134 SCRA 162 (1985)
consideration, which is clearly a defense of new matter, would pro By: April Juco
tanto repeal the second paragraph of section 94, which permits a
defendant to answer by "A statement of any new matter
constituting a defense or counterclaim." Likewise, section 285 TOPIC: Actionable Document
provides that the terms of a writing may be impeached by reason of
its illegality or fraud. FACTS: This petition is premised on the interpretation and application of
The Court has held before that Sec. 103 is not applicable to an indorser in a Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court on actionable documents.
promissory note in a suit against the maker. It has been held that the admission Engracio Francisco and Juliana Esteban were the registered owners of the parcel
of the genuineness and due execution of the instrument does not bar the of land Zamboanga. At the death of said spouses, they were survived by their
defense of want of consideration. The only object of the rule was to enable a ten (10) children who inherited their state in equal pro indiviso shares.
plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case. Subsequently, the property was subdivided among the heirs and a portion
designated as Lot No. 1943-B was allotted to the Justa Francisco. Justa died and
G.R. No. 86568 March 22, 1990 was survived among by eight (8) children namely: Dionoso, Eufremia, Alfonso,
Rafael, Petrona, Olegario, Segundino and Eusebia, all surnamed Toribio.
IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., petitioner, vs. Eufremia, Alfonso and Petrona, sold their property to Ramon Ledesma. Rafael
COURT OF APPEALS and THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE also sold his share to Dinisio who, in turn, sold the same to Ramon Ledesma.
BANK, INC., respondents. Thus, Ramon Ledesma acquired four (4) shares out of eight (8) shares, or a ½
pro indiviso share of Lot 1943-B.
Facts:
Subsequently, Dionisio sold his own hereditary share in the aforesaid estate of
In an action for the collection of a sum of money that was filed by the private his mother to Juanito Camacho, who by said sale acquired a 1/8 pro indiviso
respondent against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro share of the property. The three other heirs, petitioners Segundino Eusebia and
Manila, it was alleged, among others, as follows: Olegario alleging that their shares had never been sold nor in any wise
transferred or disposed to others filed a case against herein private respondents
3. On August 18, 1980, for valuable consideration, defendant executed in Ramos and Camacho for recovery of hereditary rights.
favor of, and delivered to plaintiff Promissory Note No. TL-0532-80, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A", whereby defendant obligated itself to In their answer, the defendants-respondents alleged that the shares of plaintiffs-
pay plaintiff on November 16, 1980 the sum of Twelve Million Pesos petitioners had likewise been sold to Dionisio Toribio, their brother, who, in
(P12,000,000.00) and with interest thereon at the rate of 16% per annum. turn, sold the same to Juanito Camacho and Dalmacio Ramos. The alleged sale
from petitioners to Dionisio and the sale from Dionisio to the respondents
4. The promissory note, Annex "A", expressly stipulates that in case of non- were evidenced by deeds of sale, xerox copies of which were appended to
payment when due, defendant shall pay plaintiff an additional amount equal to and made an integral part of the respondents' partition agreement between
3% per month of the amount due as liquidated damages and a further sum the respondents and also a xerox copy of the respondents' transfer
equal to 10% thereof as attorney's fees. 1 certificates of title.
Attached to the complaint as Annex A was the Promissory Note. While testifying during the trial, Eusebia Toribio was asked whether she
executed any sale of her share in the parcel of land in litigation. The counsel for
The petitioner denied liability and alleged that one Julio Tan had no authority private respondents objected, raising the proper mode of contesting the
to negotiate and obtain a loan on its behalf. While defendant specifically
genuineness of an actionable document pursuant to Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8 of
denied the aforestated promissory note alleged in the complaint, the answer the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court sustained the objection.
was not verified. For this reason, in due course, a decision was rendered by the
trial court on December 1, 1986, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the Petitioners filed a constancia with a motion for reconsideration stating that the
total sum of P40,486,229.16, with interest thereon at the rate of 16% per documents submitted by the respondents were merely evidentiary in nature, not
annum from 17 June 1985 until fully paid. a cause of action or defense, the due execution and genuineness of which they
had to prove. They argued that a simple specific denial without oath is
The CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this petition
sufficient. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff complied with Sec 7 and 8 of Rule 8.

Held: The Court ruled in the affirmative. No rule is more settled than that in ISSUE: WON the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the petitioners in favor
an action based on a written instrument attached to the complaint, if the of their brother Dionisio Toribio and appended to the respondents' answer are
merely evidentiary in nature or the very foundation of their defense (actionable
defendant fails to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument, the same is deemed admitted. 5 document) which must be denied under oath by the petitioner.
latter P2,104,650.51. On October 29, 1976, IUCP & Comptronics entered into
RULING: The deeds of sale are actionable document which must be denied a ‘Guaranty Agreement’ which is attached Annex ‘C’. By virtue of the
under oath by the petitioner. It is clear that the respondents anchor their defense agreement, the Chartered Bank of Manila advanced on September 16, 1977
on the deeds of sale by virtue of which the hereditary rights of all the petitioners the amount of P271,801.57 to Comptronics under an availment secured and
over Lot 1943-B were sold, transferred, and conveyed in favor of their brother, guaranteed by IUCP. The loan has already matured and is now past due
Dionisio Toribio, who in turn sold the same to herein respondents. The deed of making the plaintiff liable therefor. The current account of IUCP with said
sale executed by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio is an essential
Bank was debited with the said amount. A photocopy of the debit memo is
and indispensable part of their defense to the allegation that the petitioners had
hereto attached as Annex ‘D’. In consideration of the loan obtained or to be
never disposed of their property. The genuineness and due execution of the deed
between the co-heirs is also elemental to the defense of the respondents. The obtained by Comptronics, Gene V. Tamesis executed on October 22, 1976 a
first deeds of sale, to which the respondents were not parties but which they ‘Continuing Guaranty’ obligating himself to pay all sums unpaid in case of
seek to enforce against the parties are also actionable documents. default. A copy of the said ‘Continuing Guaranty’ is hereto attached a Annex
‘E’ and made an integral part of the complaint. The aforesaid complaint
Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8, therefore, apply. The proper procedure was for the prayed that respondents be ordered to pay IUCP.
petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution
of the questioned deeds of sale and to set forth what they claim to be the facts.
The requirement of denial under oath applies also to defenses based on a
document attached to an answer. The offeror need not be a party to the On March 20, 1978, Comptronics filed its answer denying the
instrument in order to require a denial under oath, as long as the adverse party material allegations in IUCP’s complaint concerning the promissory note
is a party to the instrument. Allegation in a previous sworn pleading negating
the possibility of execution of the instrument subsequently offered by the for the reason that the party-signatory thereto has been disauthorized to sign
opponent is sufficient denial under oath of such instrument. for and in behalf of Comptronics; admitting the material allegations on
Comptronics’ account with the Chartered Bank of Manila but that the
PRINCIPLE: The reason for the rule on contesting actionable documents remaining balance is now purely nominal; denying the liability of Gene
appears to have been to relieve a party of the trouble and expense of proving in Tamesis for lack of consideration; the allegations that Comptronics failed to
the first instance an alleged fact, the existence or nonexistence of which is pay the amount due on the aforesaid promissory note, the alleged demand for
necessarily within the knowledge of the adverse party, and of the necessity (to payment thereof and the failure and refusal to pay. While Comptronics denied
his opponent's case) of establishing which such adverse party is notified by his the genuineness and due execution of the documents, such denials were not
opponent's pleading.
under oath, hence under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, Comptronics
is deemed to impliedly admitted the same.
JABALDE VS. PNB
G.R. No. L-18401; April 27, 1963
By Tifanny Lucman Comptronics received a request for admission from IUCP of the
genuineness and due execution of the document in which the former objected
TOPIC: Actionable Document (On Waiver) to such request. IUCP filed a motion praying that summary judgment be
rendered. The court a quo denied said motion since ‘factual issues are
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Perfecto Jabalde filed an action in the CFI Cebu involved considering Comptronics’ allegation in the answer that there had
for the recovery of his P10,000.00 allegedly deposited in 1941 (P5,000.00- been regular liquidation of their account and that the remaining balance of
PhP) and 1943 (P5,000.00-PhP and Japanese military notes) with defendant- their indebtedness . . . is now purely nominal’. On October 30, 1980, IUCP
appellee bank PNB. manifested that it was resting its case by reason of the failure of Comptronics
Defendant's answer was not under oath, and admits the making of the to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the actionable
foregoing deposits, but avers that the entries in the passbook as to the deposit documents attached to the complaint. On July 6, 1982, Comptronics rested its
dates were altered by the plaintiff from the true dates both in 1944; and that
case without presenting any evidence. Court a quo dismissed IUCP’s
the deposits were all in Japanese military notes – wartime deposits not
complaint.
reimbursable under EO 49.

CFI Cebu dismissed the case. Tampering was clear to the naked eye and
photographic enlargement showed true date to be 1944. Defendant was able to
ISSUES:
prove through witnesses and business sheets that plaintiff had no pre-
1. Whether or not the act of requesting for admission of facts already deemed
war/controlled account, but opened only a wartime/free account. CA elevated
appeal to it to SC. admitted by failure to deny the same under constitutes a waiver of that implied
admission;
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB’s failure to deny under oath the entries in the
passbook as “copied in the complaint constitutes a admission of genuineness 2. Whether or not in an action for a sum of money based on a promissory note
and due execution of the document attached to the complaint, it is still necessary for plaintiff-appellant to prove
non-payment by the defendant-appellees even if the latter had failed to deny
RULING: Ordinarily, such failure is an admission. However, this rule cannot under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note.
apply in the present case because the plaintiff introduced evidence purporting
to support his allegations of deposit on the dates he wanted the court to
RULING:
believe, and offered no objection during the trial to the testimonies of
defendant's witnesses and documentary evidence showing different dates of
1. While the act of IUCP in requesting for admission the genuineness and due
deposit. By these acts, the plaintiff waived the defendant's technical admission
execution of the documents after having obtained from Comptronics an
through failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
document. implied admission thereof may at best be considered as improper. It cannot be
considered as having waived such implied admission.
PRINCIPLE: Where written instrument set forth in answer is not denied by
affidavit, yet if evidence in respect to that matter, and tending to show that
instrument is not genuine, or was not delivered, is introduced by plaintiff
without objection on part of defendant, or motion to strike out, and is met by Under Rules 8, Section 8, it is true that such implied admission
counter-evidence on part of defendant, the latter ought not to be permitted to maybe waived by a party but only if he acts in a manner indicative of either an
claim that genuineness and due execution of instrument are admitted. express or tacit waiver thereof. A finding of waiver is proper where a case had
been tried in complete disregard of the rule and the plaintiff having pleaded a
document by copy, presents oral evidence to prove the due execution of the
INVESTMENT AND UNDERWRITING CORPORATION OF THE document and no objections are made to the defendants’ evidence in
PHILIPPINES (IUCP) VS. COMPTRONICS PHILIPPINES, INC. refutation. In the case of Yu Chuck (supra), the plaintiff was considered to
(Comptronics) and GENE V. TAMESIS have waived the implied admission when he presented, at the beginning of the
trial, a number of witnesses and made no objections to the defendant’s
G.R. No. 81039; Date: December 26, 1990 evidence in refutation. Hence, the Court considered the rule (Rule 8, Section
8, Rules of Court) in above cases, to have been waived. In the instant case,
By Kim Bianca Manarang IUCP did neither of these. Hence, IUCP’s request for admission cannot be
taken as indicative of either an express or tacit waiver thereof. It can, at best,
be considered as a mere ‘superfluity’ but should not be considered as a waiver
TOPIC: Waiver of Implied Admission (Applicability of Rule 8 Section 8) of the implied admission.

FACTS: 2. The failure of Comptronics to deny, under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the documents does not carry with it the admission of payment as
IUCP filed a complaint against Comptronics for collection of a such is a defense of new matter that may be alleged in a proper plea to that
sum of money allegedly due to loan obtained by Comptronics. Comptronics effect. They are not estopped from controverting it by evidence of fraud,
executed a promissory note, attached as Annex B, obligating itself to pay the
mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of NO. The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant
consideration. has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where
by reason of their failure to deny the execution of the documents, under oath, the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily
a prima facie case is made out for IUCP without adducing any proof whatever within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be
necessary on the part of the latter to show that Comptronics owed the amount palpably untrue. In this case, a copy of the PN sued upon was attached to the
claimed. Except for the self-serving allegations in the answer denying the complaint.
claims of IUCP, nowhere in the records show that Comptronics proved
payment thereof. As a matter of fact, Comptronics rested its case in the court a A mere allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint,
quo without adducing any evidence. Hence, Comptronics should be held liable is insufficient to raise an issue; the defendant must aver positively or state how
to their obligation with IUCP. it is that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged. Like in the case of Benavides v.
Alabastro, the defendant's answer did not only deny the material allegations of
the complaints but also set up certain special and affirmative defenses the nature
PRINCIPLE: Implied admission of the documents attached in the pleadings of which called for presentation of evidence.
maybe waived by a party but only if he acts in a manner indicative of either an
express or tacit waiver thereof .

CAPITOL MOTORS VS. YABUT PRINCIPLE:

G.R. No. L-28140; March 19, 1970 A mere allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint,
is insufficient to raise an issue; the defendant must aver positively or state how
By Renee Mirielle G. Dela Cruz it is that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged.

Topic: ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT

TOPIC: Specific Denial Galofa vs Nee Bon Sing


By: Coryne Ramos

FACTS: FACTS:
Yabut executed a PN in favor to Capitol Motors, it was stipulated In this case a recovery of possession the defendant denied parts of the
that should the defendant (Yabut) fail to pay 2 successive installments, the complaint of the plaintiff. The defendant denied all the facts that could lead
principal sum remaining unpaid would immediately become due and for his right of possession of the property and had denied that he deprive the
demandable and the defendant would, by way of attorney's fees and costs of plaintiff of the possession of the property. And defendant still filed a motion
collection, be obligated to the plaintiff for an additional sum equivalent to 25% of reconsideration.
of the principal and interest due. The sum remaining unpaid on the PN was P30,
754.79. Subsequently, defendant defaulted in the payment of 2 successive Issue:
installments. In spite of demand of the plaintiff (Capitol motors) Yabut failed Despite the denial is there still an issue?
and refused to pay. Thus, Capitol motors filed a complaint against Yabut for
sum of money, THE COPY OF THE PN WAS ATTACHED TO THE RULING:
COMPLAINT)
No. The defendant's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial furnished no
Yabut filed an answer which reads: justification to the lower court to set aside or reconsider its judgment. Said
motion prayed that the defendant be allowed to amend his answer, but
“DEFENDANT through counsel alleges: annexed to it is the defendant's own affidavit (Annex A, Rec. on Appeal, p.
57) reiterating that he had "no real right or interest whatsoever not having
1. Paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted. been involved in any way with any transaction affecting the title or possession
of the same. Definitely, therefore, there was no issue to be tried and the court's
2. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint are specifically denied for denial of the motion was proper. And why should the defendant resist the
lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.” judgment when he simultaneously asserts that he has no right to the land?

Capitol motors filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the It is to be noted that, to the plaintiff's allegation of his inability to take actual
ground that Yabut, not having set forth in his answer the substance of the matter possession of the parcel of land due to "an unwarranted adverse claim of rights
relied upon by him to support his denial, had failed to deny specifically the of ownership and possession by the defendant . . .", followed by an allegation
material allegations of the complaint,hence, must be deemed to have admitted of how such claim was exercised, the defendant's denial is as to "the materials
averments contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, . . ." conjoined with his
them.
disclaimer or dominical or possessory rights in the manner alleged in the
complaint. The defendant's denial is, therefore, a negative pregnant, which is
Yabut did not file an opposition to the motion. TC issued an order
equivalent to an admission.
granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and considered the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings. Thus, the TC rendered As to the plaintiff's allegations of his having contracted a lawyer for a fee, the
judgment granting in toto the plaintiff’s prayer in its complaint. defendant does not deny the alleged fact; what he denies in
his liability therefor, which is an issue of law. Since the defendant neither
Yabut appealed, in his appeal, the contends that the TC erred in denies nor admits the material allegation about the services of plaintiff's
considering him as having failed to deny specifically the material allegations of counsel, judgment on the pleadings is proper. (Alemany vs. Sweeney, 3 Phil.
the complaint and argued that since Sec. 10, Rule 8 recognizes 3 modes of 114)
specific denial:
The defendant, however, had specifically denied the plaintiff's allegations in
“(1) by specifying each material allegation of fact in the complaint the truth of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint. He traversed these allegations in his
which the defendant does not admit, and, whenever practicable, setting forth the answer by stating that he "does not possess any knowledge or information
substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial; or sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the (original) Complaint and therefore, denies the
(2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material same." But paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint referred to damages, while
and denying only the remainder; or paragraph 5 of the complaint merely alleged a conclusion (that by defendant's
acts a cloud over plaintiff's title had been raised) so that the defendant's
(3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information specific denials served no purpose at all. As to the amount of damages, alleged
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the in paragraph 6 of the complaint (P2,000.00 per agricultural year) and
complaint, which has the effect of a denial” specifically denied by the defendant, as aforesaid, a specific denial is not
required by the Rules. (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of Court) At any rate, the
He has adopted the third mode of specific denial, his answer tendered an issue, appealed judgment did not condemn the defendant-appellant to pay damages.
and, consequently the TC could not render a valid judgment on the pleadings.
A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it
cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is
intended to be denied.
ISSUE: WON #2 of Yabut’s answer constitutes a specific denial under Sec. 10,
Rule 8?

RULING:

Вам также может понравиться